non-conceptual knowledge, Kelsen, normativity, naturalistic explanation, tacit knowledge
Practice relativism is the idea that practices are foundational for bodies of activity and thought, and differ from one another in ways that lead those who constitute the world in terms of them to incommensurable or conflicting conclusions. It is true that practices are not criticizable in any simple way because they are largely tacit and inaccessible. But to make them relativistic one needs an added claim: that practices are “normative”, or conceptual in character. It is argued that this is not supportable by any explanatory necessity, and that the differences in outcomes, though real, are not instances of relativism.
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Citation / Publisher Attribution
Crítica, Hispano-American Journal of Philosophy, v. 39, issue 115, p. 3-27
Crítica is an open access journal, as defined in the Budapest Open Access Initiative, which allows users to download, read, distribute, print the contents published in the journal, provided that credit is given to the relevant authors and editors.
Scholar Commons Citation
Turner, Stephen, "Practice Relativism" (2007). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 270.