Abstract
Cyber deception may be used fairly easily in a contested cyberspace to impose disproportionate operational cost to adversarial actors. Concepts of what comprise a legitimate defensive effort in cyberspace are changing. The concept of a rigid perimeter defense as a panacea are increasingly viewed as a fallacy. “Sovereign” cyberspaces are increasingly contested. Concurrently to these trends, the Department of Defense is moving toward standardization and homogenization of cyberspace that may facilitate enemy operation in our spaces. Military deception doctrine has been used successfully in conflict through the history of warfare in contested spaces and may provide a useful taxonomy to advance this discussion. Civil society has developed several tools that may afford an easy implementation of deception via existing infrastructure. Honeypots, tokens, and moving target defense may be more widely adopted today to sow ambiguity in adversary operations. Deliberate development of a deceptive capability could afford the ability to actually mislead our adversaries.
DOI
http://doi.org/10.5038/2378-0789.2.1.1021
Recommended Citation
Calder, Spencer R.
(2016)
"A Case for Deception in the Defense,"
Military Cyber Affairs: Vol. 2
:
Iss.
1
, Article 4.
http://doi.org/10.5038/2378-0789.2.1.1021
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol2/iss1/4
