The Effects of U.S. Middle East Foreign Policy on American Muslims: A Case Study of Muslims in Tampa Bay

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"The Effects of U.S. Middle East Foreign Policy on American Muslims: A Case Study of Muslims in Tampa Bay"

by

Mark G. Grzegorzewski

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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College of Arts and Sciences
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June 30, 2014

Keywords: racialization, double consciousness, identity, War on Terror, Othering, whiteness, Islam

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DEDICATION

For my inspiring daughter, Riley Katelyn. Without you, I never would have completed my education.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like thank Dr. Bernd Reiter for his guidance and patience in this endeavor. His critical remarks over the past two years have given form to an initially unfocused research project. I would also like to thank Dr. Abdelwahab Hechiche for allowing me to access his wealth of knowledge on the Middle East. Dr. Earl Conteh-Morgan, thank you for your refreshing optimism. You have made learning a pleasurable experience. Thank you also to Dr. Kevin Yelvington for providing extensive and constructive feedback in this dissertation. Also, thank you Dr. Mark Amen and Dr. Harry Vanden. Without the two of you, I do not think I could have it this far. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Steven Tauber for being my mentor.
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ABSTRACT

Over the past thirteen years the United States has used military force against three different Muslim-majority nations. These conflicts have lead to the deaths of many Muslims, including many innocent civilians. Meanwhile, American Muslims have become conflicted about their identities as Muslims and Americans. However, this does not mean that they have become a fifth column within America. What it does mean is that they have felt anguish regarding the torment of their religious brethren, while at the same time retaining their American identity. Post-9/11, Muslim American groups have acknowledged their place in the racial ordering of America. Muslim Americans understand that they are second rate citizens within their own country.
INTRODUCTION

In 2008, former USF students Ahmed Mohamed and Youssef Megahed were arrested near a Navy base in South Carolina with explosive devices. Mohamed had posted videos on YouTube showing how to make and utilize these explosive devices, as well as other videos expressing his desire to commit martyrdom. Mohamed claimed that his actions were in response to the United States foreign policy towards the Middle East. Ahmed Mohamed eventually accepted a plea agreement and is currently serving a 15-year sentence for providing material support to terrorists. Conversely, Youssef Megahed was acquitted of the two charges against him (Tampa Bay Times, December 18, 2008; Tampa Bay Times, April 3, 2009).

In January 2012 a man from Pinellas Park, FL, Sami Osmakac, was arrested in an FBI sting in which it was claimed he attempted to buy weapons of mass destruction and attack several sites in the Tampa Bay area. Fortunately, local Muslim leaders tipped off the FBI about Osmakac's extremist views. It has been reported that Osmakac, who was a Muslim immigrant from Kosovo, was upset with what he viewed as wrongdoings toward the Muslim world stemming from American foreign policy. A jury convicted Osmakac on terrorism charges, and he has a sentencing hearing on Oct. 7. (Tampa Bay Times, June 10, 2014).
What do these cases have in common? In both cases, Muslim American from the Tampa Bay area actively displayed their dissatisfaction towards U.S. Middle East foreign policy. What is telling about these cases is how these particular Americans felt displaced by U.S. foreign policy that they decided to act against their own country while embracing a transnational religious identity. Although these cases are certainly outlier actions and not representative of the larger Muslim American population, they beg the larger question of how U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East affects Muslim Americans that do not engage in actions against their country.

However, before delving deeper into this question I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge that the Muslim American population is quite diverse. In 2010, the U.S. census determined that there a total 2.6 million Muslims out of almost 309 million people in the United States, making them about 1 percent of the population. Within the state of Florida in 2010, there were almost 18 million people, out of which about 1 percent were Muslim (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life). At a more localized scale, in 2010 in the Tampa Bay area (Tampa, St. Petersburg, and Clearwater) there were about 2.3 million people, with an estimated 20,000 people identifying as Muslim (The Examiner, 2011). Another estimate by Hassan Shibley, the Tampa Executive Director of the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), holds that there are 40,000 Muslims in the Tampa Bay area. By either estimate, this makes Muslims in the Tampa Bay almost 1 percent of the population. Therefore, numerically speaking, Muslims in the Tampa Bay area are representative sample not only of Florida but also of the United States at large (see table 1).
Table 1: Muslim Population by Country/State/Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>309 million</td>
<td>2.6 million</td>
<td>≈1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>18 million</td>
<td>124,000</td>
<td>≈1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampa Bay</td>
<td>2.3 Million</td>
<td>20-40,000</td>
<td>≈1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It would be misleading to judge representativeness of Muslims on quantity alone. Within the Islamic faith, there are many cleavages along both sectarian and ethnic lines. Nationally 65 percent of Muslims identify as part of the Sunni branch whereas 11 percent identify with the Shia tradition. The remaining 15 percent simply identify as “just a Muslim” (Pew Research Center, 2011). Further, within the two main branches, the traditions further disaggregate into sub-faiths (i.e. Sufism, Druze, Alawite, Fiver Shi’ism, etc.), as well as Muslims, who exercise more or less devotion to their faith.

Regarding race, Islam as an inclusive faith draws a multitude of races to the religion (see table 2). In the U.S., 68 percent of Muslims self-identify as white; 12 percent as black; 5 percent as Asian; 14 percent as Hispanic; and 2 percent as other/mixed (Pew Research Center, 2011). Obviously, these categories are socially constructed and chosen in advance by the Pew Research Institute. Therefore, even those who do not neatly fit into one of these categories may feel compelled to
choose a category so as to “fit.” Further, the category “white” is a category in which the U.S. Census Bureau currently places Arabs and North Africans. This placement has more to with religion than skin color, as the early Arab immigrants to the U.S. were from Syria and were Christian (Naber, 2000). As such, these early immigrants were generally more accepted by early “white” Christian communities in the U.S.

**Table 2: Islam by Race in the United States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One more cleavage among U.S. Muslims is that of nationality. Of U.S. born Muslims, 63 percent are first generation, meaning born in the United States; 15 percent second generation; and 22 percent third generation (see table 3). Of this immigrant population, 81 percent of U.S. Muslims have acquired American citizenship. This is a much higher number of citizens when compared to other immigrant populations (who acquire citizenship at a rate of 47 percent) (Pew Research Center, 2011).

**Table 3: Muslim Generations in the United States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 63 percent first generation U.S. Muslims, 26 percent trace back their nationality to the Middle East/North Africa; 9 percent to Pakistan; 7 percent to Other South Asia; 3 percent to Iran; 7 percent to Sub-Saharan Africa; 5 percent to
Europe; and 6 percent to Other (see table 4) (Pew Research Center, 2011). As with ethnicity, these nominal categories tell us little about the diversity within these regional groupings.

**Table 4: Nationality of First Generation U.S.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Origins</th>
<th>Middle East/North Africa</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Other South Asia</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Origins</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Socioeconomic Class**

The earliest wave of documented Middle Eastern immigration is traced back to the 1800’s, with most of the immigrants coming from Lebanon and Syria. These early Middle Eastern immigrants were primarily Christian by religion, and therefore were characterized as “white” in the United States (Naber, 2000). These early immigrants to the United States emigrated primarily due to economic reasons as “Greater Syria” (Syria, Lebanon, and parts of Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia) was experiencing economic decline. Pushing emigration from Greater Syria was improvements in sea transportation, while a pull factor was the political stability of America relative to the Middle East (Suleiman, 1999). Many of these early immigrants to the United States came from the merchant class in the Middle East. This occupation typically gave Middle Eastern immigrants the income to move from the Middle East (Haddad, 2011). Further, this occupation pushed early Middle Eastern immigrants to become “white” by requiring them to assimilate and learn the language and culture of America in order to sell their merchandise (Suleiman, 1999).
After World War II, there was a second wave of Middle Eastern immigrants to the United States. Unlike the first wave of immigrants, this second wave was constituted primarily by Muslims from the greater Middle East. This second wave was mostly composed of educated professionals seeking political refuge in the United States (Cainkar, 2006; Naber, 2000). Again, like the first wave, the second wave was primarily able to make the trip to the United States due to their higher economic class. This second wave of immigrants was more politically active in the United States due to their opposition the newly created Israeli state (Haddad, 2011).

The third wave of immigrants from the Middle East came primarily after the 1960’s. Like the second wave, the third wave was composed of primarily Muslims, not Christians. In addition, this third wave of Muslims were mostly high school and college educated (Naber, 2000). Differentiating this third wave from the second wave, this group of immigrants had stronger national identities, which is attributed to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. As a result of this strong national identity, during the 1960’s the idea of “Arab-American” came into being to differentiate this group from other ethnic groups (Naber, 2000).

As stated, these early Muslim Americans were grouped in with others of Middle Eastern descent. This meant that in many ways they were understood as ethically white. This group therefore had more ability to access the social climb in America since they were white. In making the climb to whiteness, Muslim Americans sought to access the privilege that came along with white identity, as well as the ability to accumulate more wealth.
The ability to access whiteness, due to an early assumption about their religion, sets early Muslim Americans apart for other immigrant groups, such as those from Latin America. Immigrants from Latin America are unable to immediately access whiteness despite their shared “white” religion. Rather, Latin American immigrants are denied whiteness due to their socioeconomic Otherness. That is to say, Muslim Americans as a result of their higher economic and educational class had given them increased capital to access whiteness in America. Conversely, Latin American immigrants typically came from lower educational and economic classes, and are understood primarily by the capital they can provide. This ability to be socioeconomically white is one reason why Muslim Americans came to the United States. That is to say, they wanted to advance their educational and socioeconomic capital, not simply have their labor power exploited.

Relatedly, there is a push and pull element that differentiates Middle Eastern and Latin American immigration. According to Mejia, Pizurki, and Royston (1979), in migration, there are both push (donor countries) and pull (receiving counties) factors in the sending and receiving countries that influence whether migrants decide to leave a country. Push and pull factors operate on both ends in determining whether or not someone decides to emigrate, as well as constrains on migration. These factors are of political, social, economic, legal, historical, cultural, and educational nature (Kline, 2003).

In the case of Muslim Americans, the pull factors influencing migration include political stability, economic growth, and educational opportunities. Coming from donor countries in which they already have a strong ethnic identity due to
their higher socioeconomic standing, these immigrants expect to grow within the United States. Put another way, they come to the United States to increase their status. In the case of Latin American migrants, they come from lower socioeconomic groups and consequently have less developed ethnic identities. These immigrants come to the United State to sell their labor. They are not here to increase their status.

With this assumption up front, Muslim Americans that came to the United States felt a loss in status after 9/11. As the literature reports, and my interviews confirmed, Muslim Americans were almost fully white before 9/11. They now feel that they lack the privilege that goes along with being white in the United States. This lack of privilege for Muslim Americans goes beyond economic class to an overall sense of second-rate status.

While I do see the value in class when understanding identity politics, I take a position similar to Nancy Fraser in *Heterosexism, Misrecognition and Capitalism: A Response to Judith Butler* (1997). In her response to Butler, Fraser argues that social injuries can be based on either cultural or economic injustice. That is to say, injuries can be based on recognition or redistribution. At the cultural end of the spectrum lies homosexuality, while at the economic end lies the political-economic (class). Butler in her critique rejects Fraser’s model. She believes that Fraser is trivializing the plight of homosexuality by relegating it to the less important realm of culture. Fraser responds that neither end is trivial. Rather misrecognition of homosexuals prevents “participating as a peer in social life” (Fraser, 280). This denial of status is as equally damaging as claims of political economic
maldistribution. Yet, misrecognition need not lead to maldistribution. This is due capitalist systems decoupling of status and class. Therefore, Fraser argues that “the essence of misrecognition [is] the material construction through the institutionalization of cultural norms of a class of devalued persons who are impeded from participatory parity” (Fraser, 283). As such, class is not the determinant of misrecognition, as the capitalist system is asexual in that it cares about accumulating profits not imposing a sexual norm.

Relating Fraser’s argument to my own, the misrecognition that Muslim Americans suffer is not a product of capitalism. The misrecognition that Muslim Americans suffer is a product of institutionalized cultural norms outlining what means to be “an American.” While Muslim Americans may suffer economically as a result of their misrecognition, it does not guarantee maldistribution. Again, the capitalist is interested in profits, not identity. Accordingly, my research focuses on the misrecognition that Muslim Americans suffer partially as a result of American foreign policy towards the Middle East. Yet, where appropriate, I do note the maldistribution suffered because of misrecognition.

**American Foreign Policy**

As part of this research, it is critical to discuss U.S. foreign policy. U.S. Foreign-policy making is driven by the American national style. The style is influenced as much by America’s past as it is by today’s challenges. Some scholars have attempted to pattern America’s national style. Glenn Hastedt (2006) holds that the pattern of American national style fluctuates between isolationism and
internationalism. To be clear, by isolationism Hastedt does not mean America does not take actions outside of the Western hemisphere. Rather, Hastedt means that while the U.S. has traditionally defined its interests in terms of the Western hemisphere, at points in its history the U.S. has also struck out on its own to defend its interests abroad. This policy finds reflection in George Washington’s farewell address in which he advised the U.S. not to become entangled in the affairs of the European states. Simply put, Washington believed that the United States’ interests should be narrowly defined and not be coterminous with any other state’s interests (Hastedt, 2006).

According to Hastedt, a second pattern in U.S. national style was moral pragmatism. This pattern is characterized by an almost evangelical promotion of American moral standards. This promotion of American moral standards mainly came into force after 1900. At this point, the U.S. largely came into its own as a rising power after the defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War. The resulting increase in power for the U.S. caused some within the American government to believe that they had both the ability and the obligation to set things right in the world. Yet, this belief that the U.S. was a moral standard bearer has had implications for America’s foreign policy flexibility. For example, when the U.S. must negotiate with another state which is viewed as unmoral, the public sees anything that falls short of completely meeting American demands as less than moral. Accordingly, the American moral standard can work at cross-purposed with the U.S. national interest (Hastedt, 2006).
The third pattern in US foreign-policy, according to Hastedt, is legalism. The legalist pattern eschews realist assumptions about the world and instead believes that a more peaceful, stable world can come about by institutionalizing behavior between states. This pattern finds expression in the emergence of the United Nations following World War II. The institutionalization of the legalist pattern with the U.N. created transparency and predictability between states and lessened the likelihood of war. One drawback to this foreign policy approach is that it does not allow the U.S. to utilize its raw power in resolving conflicts. Prior to the establishment of the U.N. the use of raw power was a prerogative usually reserved to the most powerful state in the system. Instead, when the U.S. does utilize force it must couch its actions in legalist principles (Hastedt, 2006).

Walter A. McDougall (1997) also believes that U.S. foreign-policy has a pattern to it. Unlike Hastedt though, McDougall sees eight patterns rather than three. Further McDougall tries to expand on these patterns by breaking apart the realist and idealist conceptions of U.S. foreign-policy.

Starting with the founding fathers, McDougall calls the first stage of U.S. foreign-policy the exceptionalist stage. This stage in American foreign policy held that the United States was indeed a light to lighten the world. Yet, this light was not to be carried elsewhere in order to enlighten other states. Instead, the U.S. would serve as a moral example with its own behavior, which eschewed power politics. As such, during this stage of foreign policy, America would not be a crusader state. Rather, the U.S. would be the exemplar state.
The second stage of American foreign-policy is unilateralism. McDougall makes clear that this stage should not be equated with isolationism. For example, the U.S. did interfere in the politics of many Central and South American countries. The U.S. also engaged its Navy off the Horn of Africa with the Barbary Pirates. These events aside, the U.S. primarily sought to grow at home and only interjected itself into foreign-policy problems intermittently. McDougall states that America was able to follow this foreign policy due to its unique geographical location, which gave it two gigantic moats on both sides of the country.

The third stage McDougall calls the American system. The Monroe Doctrine epitomized this stage. McDougall notes how the Monroe doctrine was never simply about maintaining the independence of the countries in Central and South America. Rather, the Monroe doctrine sought to keep the European powers out of the Western Hemisphere in order to maintain the balance of power in Europe.

The fourth stage McDougall refers to as manifest destiny. This expansionist foreign policy traced its roots back to America’s beginnings which saw the new country as a special state in the world. As such, if America was to preach reform to the world, it had to keep the European powers out of North America. Thus, by settling the remaining frontiers America could continue operating with European influence and continue shining its light upon the world.

It was these first four foreign policies that McDougall sees as sustainable. The U.S. in this “Old Testament” could see itself as a special state. This was true as long as America did not engage in colonial adventurism and kept its interests
narrowly defined. McDougall believes that once the U.S. began expanding its interests beyond its hemisphere problems arose in American foreign policy.

It was at the fifth stage where McDougall believes America’s foreign policy started to go astray. This stage he labels progressive imperialism. This era, to McDougall, is best characterized by the Spanish-American war. This war bestowed upon America new colonial possessions and new subjects. This was a change in past behavior since the U.S. had not been a colonial state. However, rather than release these colonies to the inhabitants, American leaders felt that they had an obligation to reform and modernize these colonies. Moreover, rather than incorporating these colonies, they remained separate from the U.S. due to their racial compositions.

The sixth stage is labeled liberal internationalism. American President Woodrow Wilson spearheaded this stage. Wilson believed that if the U.S. could institutionalize liberal values in the League of Nations it would lead to peace in the world. This is not to say peace would be automatic. Wilson knew that the League charter was imperfect, but he believed that any imperfections would be fixed once the League of Nations was operational. Of course, the Senate never approved the treaty for the U.S. to join the League of Nations. To McDougall this was a reaffirmation of America’s roots as a unilateral state.

The seventh stage is called containment. This was an American foreign policy tailored to the post-World War II realities. To McDougall this foreign policy was representative of the past but also pointed the way towards the future. Containment divided the world into spheres, capitalist and communist. Leading the
capitalist sphere was the United States. In this sphere, the U.S. could be unilateralist and maintain the balance of power, as well as preserve their freedom of action. Thus, the United States became the first amongst equals in the capitalist sphere, which meant that this sphere’s interests would be tied to American interests (McDougall, 1997).

The eight stage is labeled global meliorism. This is the foreign policy stage McDougall has the most problems with. The United States, unconstrained by a peer competitor, used its power simply to use power. Displays of this power include the U.S. traveling off to far corners of the world to solve distant problems. This, to McDougall, is a waste of American resources and not in America’s national interests (McDougall, 1997).

Formally defined, national security remains a nebulous concept, subjectively framed to meet the demands of the state. Having focused on the different periods of foreign policy, the meaning of national security during the War on Terror has again been transformed by the state. As a point of reference, national security is most basically defined by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown as “the ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity, and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions, and governance from disruption from outside, and to control its borders” (Watson, 2002: 5). In reference to this point, national security during the War on Terror is defined by national security interests including “protecting U.S. citizens abroad, guaranteeing access to the assets we need to maintain our
standard of living, and protecting the type of government we find important to sustaining the nations with which we interact in the world” (Watson, 2002: 5).

Foreign policy is also a malleable concept that can be vague, often to the point of being self-serving. The U.S. State Department, the institution charged with enacting foreign policy defines official American foreign policy as “to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community” (U.S. State Department) More conceptually for the purpose of this research project, foreign policy is defined as the “policy of a sovereign state in its interaction with other sovereign states” (Meltzer, 2008).

Today, the United States finds itself the hegemon of the international system. While on its face this position seems easy to comprehend and act out, the United States has found it difficult to develop a grand foreign policy strategy. Yet, while the U.S. may currently lack a comprehensive foreign policy toward the world, America retains elements from its past national identities. Each of these past national identities can be seen in our current foreign policy towards the world. Nevertheless, at this point, I leave it open as to what constitutes American foreign policy. I return to this discussion in chapter 2.

**Substantive Focus**

This research comes at a critical juncture for American Muslims. In the past thirteen years American troops have engaged in hostilities with three Muslim majority
countries, while also engaging in covert wars in other Muslim countries such as Yemen and Somalia (Washington Post, 2011). During this time, the U.S. has killed or captured many Muslim American citizens it deemed to be terrorists or sponsors of terror. This sweeping policy has also led to the detention or killing of many other Muslim Americans who had no involvement in terrorism. Moreover, Muslims across the world have suffered through humiliation at the awesome military and political power of the United States. Thus, whether an American Muslim sees themselves as belonging to the global Ummah or merely sympathizes with the plight of the vulnerable, it is a conflicted time to be a Muslim American in light of the effects of U.S. foreign policy.

Those who chose to act violently against the American state and society express this confliction most radically. Even those who are members of the United States armed service, such as Major Nidal Hasan, have been impacted by American foreign policy to the extent that they begin to question their identity. In the case of Hasan and others, American foreign policy towards the Middle East caused them to react against perceived injustices brought on by their government. To recap, Hassan was due to deploy to Afghanistan in 2009. Before his deployment, Hassan informed his superiors that he believed that Muslims should be allowed to leave the military as conscientious objectors, and if not, the military might face “adverse events.” Prior to his attack, Hassan exchanged e-mails with Anwar al-Awlaki in which he wrote about the acceptability of violence in Islam. Following this exchange, Hassan attacked his fellow soldiers on November 5, 2009 at Fort Hood, later justifying his actions by claiming that he was on the wrong side of the war against Islam (Washington Post, August 23, 2013). The case of Hassan shows how
American foreign policy can impact a group that is nationalistically tied to a geopolitical space, meaning the United States and American identity, but whose religious identity, meaning Islam, is not contained by nation-states or national identity. These two identities can come into conflict, yet the conflict is not always violent.

That is to say; religious identity is not necessarily compatible with nor necessarily differentiated from national identity. As such, it calls into question whether religious identity, any religious identity, can coexist with national identity. Further, national identity is not necessarily secular. For instance, in the United States the government recognizes mostly Christian holidays. This fact is evident in that the government shuts down on Christmas, but not during Ramadan. Closing down the government on Christian holidays indicates those days are important, and the state believes that the population should celebrate or acknowledge that the holiday. In essence, the supposedly secular government is favoring one religious holiday over another religious holiday. In bringing this issue back to the coexistence of religious identity with national identity, the example just presented indicates that there is a tacit agreement of a preferred religion as part of national identity. Therefore, those that do not ascribe to the state religion have to negotiate how, or if, they will rationalize their religious and national identities.

In sum, the substantive focus of this paper is on the subnational construction of Muslim American identity. Whether being an American or claiming another national identity, identity is shaped by both external events and internalized beliefs. Therefore, this research adds to the literature on identity formation by empirically
demonstrating the tension between religious identity and nationalistic identity. In particular, my research focuses on Muslim Americans that have radicalized. Rather, I focus on Muslim Americans that feel under threat but have consciously chosen to accept a path other than violence. Moreover, my research shows the tension between two belief systems that cannot be broken down into percentages since they both vie for unquestioned loyalty. As such, this confliction calls into question the supremacy of national identity in a world in which the nation-state may be losing its predominance to other post-national forms of identity.

An additional contribution I make to the field is challenging the belief that international relations stops at the water’s edge. That is to say, foreign policies do not just affect international actors. The two main theories of International Relations, Realism and Liberalism, take theoretical positions that either sees states being impacted by international forces (e.g. anarchy) or the behavior of states being guided by domestic political and economic systems. I claim that this dichotomy is too simplistic. Rather, I claim, due to unintended consequences, foreign policies can impact domestic audiences.

These unintended national consequences can clearly be seen through the effects of American foreign policy. In my case, The War on Terror has grouped Muslim Americans in with the targeted Other. As a consequence, due to ambiguously identifying who was the target during this U.S. foreign policy period, Muslim Americans face domestic backlash. Therefore, my case shows the permeability of the international and the domestic, and therefore challenges notions that foreign policy only affects international relations. As such, my study directly
challenges Political Science literature that claims when analyzing international politics one cannot also analyze domestic politics.

Chapter Outlines

In chapter 1, I discuss the literature on nationalism, ethnicity, and minorities and multiculturalism. I then discuss the connection in the literature between race and nation, racialization, racial hegemony, the eugenics movement, and the myth of a colorblind society. Following this review of the literature, I discuss key concepts in my research such as foreign policy, identity formation and understanding, and double consciousness. After these concepts are defined, I detail my research design in order to inform the reader on how I will either confirm or disconfirm my hypothesis. This section is followed by a discussion of the methodology for this research project and how I intend to collect the data to test my hypothesis. I conclude chapter 1 with a discussion on my personal biases and how I will go about mitigating them during the course of my research.

In chapter 2, I discuss the demographics of the Muslim Americans in my sample. In order to provide context to this demographic discussion, I review the literature on Muslim Americans. Returning to my sample, I discuss the primary influence on the identity of my respondents. I also detail the responses by my subjects as to whether they believe that Islam and American nationalism are compatible. In the next segment, my respondents provide word associations to the concept of American national identity. In the proceeding sections, I discuss the effect of other variables on Muslim American identity including, age, gender,
education, and economic class. I conclude chapter 2 with data and analysis on the interaction between Muslim Americans and other social groups, and the discrimination that Muslim Americans face post-9/11.

In chapter 3, I discuss the impact of American foreign policy on the identity of American Muslims. In order to show the Othering that Muslim Americans face is a result of American foreign policy towards the Middle East, I detail the similar experience of Japanese Americans during World War II. In the proceeding section, I analyze how 9/11 impacted the identity of Muslim Americans in my study, and the exclusion that they face today. As detailed in chapter 2, this exclusion has brought Muslim Americans together. Moreover, this exclusion has impacted how Muslim Americans view American foreign policy towards the Middle East. Therefore, in chapter 3, I analyze the reciprocal relationship between Muslim Americans and U.S. foreign policy. This reciprocal relationship has caused Muslim Americans to become racialized and to view American foreign policy towards the Middle East with concern. In turn, racialization has impacted how and whether Muslim Americans integrate or assimilate into the American national identity. I conclude the chapter with a comparison of my subjects’ responses to those from Pew. These responses indicate that my Muslim Americans sample convergences in terms of similarities and attitudes with what has been reported in the literature.

Chapter 4 records and analyzes an in-depth interview I conducted with a Muslim American in Tampa Bay. The responses from this subject indicate that she feels Othered, as a result, of American foreign policy towards the Middle East. My discussion with this subject range from her arrival in the U.S. to the First Gulf War
and the Israeli peace process to 9/11 and the War on Terror to the Second Iraq War to Syria. I also discuss her reaction to American foreign policy to uncover how her racialization via American foreign policy has impacted her views of America policies towards the Middle East. I conclude this chapter with a discussion on whether this respondent believes that she can ever become part of the American national identity.

I conclude my research with a chapter summarizing my findings. I detail how Muslim Americans have come to feel Othered via American foreign policy. The racialization that Muslim Americans have experienced during the War on Terror has caused them to reevaluate how they interact in American society and political life. I also discuss the effects of other variables on Muslim Americans and how they interact with American foreign policy. Furthermore, I analyze the double consciousness that Muslim Americans are experiencing, as a result, of American foreign policy and the ways in which they operate from behind a veil in response to American foreign policy and domestic discrimination. As such, the ways in which Muslim American operate from behind the veil impacts their decision on whether to integrate or assimilate. I close chapter 5 with avenues for future research.
CHAPTER 1: Theory and Methodology

Over a five month period, from August through December 2013, I investigated how America’s Middle East foreign policy impacted the identity of Muslim Americans. This research allowed me to experience the lives of American Muslims in different settings, such as at their homes, local mosques, and my office at the University of South Florida. These interviews provided me with insights into the everyday lives of Muslim Americans and how these lives differed from “common sense” understandings of Americanness. I then compared the responses from my subjects with the Pew Research Center’s data from 2007 and 2011 to identify trends and changes amongst Muslim Americans.

In what follows, I first discuss the literature on nationalism. I then discuss the literature on race and nation. These first two sections are critical as they frame the way in which I understand my subject’s responses. I define my key concepts in the third section. In the following two sections, I explain my methodology and research design. I close this chapter by discussing my personal bias and ethical responsibility.

Nationalism

between state formation and nationalism. Benedict Anderson (2006) famously conceptualizes of the nation as an 'imagined community,' meaning that even people who will never meet each other think of themselves as belonging to the same community. In his classic, *Imagined Communities*, Anderson holds that there are several variables that caused the nation-state to become the main source of identification in the modern world.

One of these variables was the introduction of printing technologies. Print capitalism made it so that people in unconnected places could read about events that happened elsewhere within the nation-state. Accordingly, print linked together these communities through the compression of space and time.

Another variable in the creation of the nation was the resistance to the colonial state. America serves as a primary example. The colonial Americans were dispersed along the eastern seaboard and had few common connections. Yet, their fight against English empire welded these people together and created the American nation.

Another source of nationalism was the transfer of bureaucratic forms of government onto former colonized people. Those individuals who worked in the bureaucratic colonial administration came to learn the concept of the nation-state, and then used it to turn on their colonial rulers. If every person had a nation, these individuals rationalized, than they too must have a nation. To this end, the census and mapmaking also played a key role in creating nations (Anderson, 2006).

The census was a tool of the colonial administrator to organize and rationalize control over the people under its domain. The problem for government
administrators is that once a new social category is created, new forms of identity come into being. With these new forms of identity people come to organize themselves within these externally imposed categories. These externally imposed categories were often racial, which meant that race became tied to the state. This created a unitary movement which challenged colonial rule. Thus, in the case of colonial rule, governmentality made national identity.

Another variable discussed by Anderson are the use of maps. These externally imposed boundaries give people a point of reference to which to tie their identity. With maps, people can view their sameness and differentiate themselves spatially. Thus, the map classifies a people, and in the process makes their nationality more “real.”

A final variable is the museum. To Anderson the museum is a highly political project. The museum and its collectors re-create history through what is included and the context in which objects are displayed. Included in the museum are those objects which celebrate the state, while those that do not fit in within the narrative of the nation are left out. Therefore, the symbols one finds in the museum are representative of how the nation views itself (Anderson, 2006).

Brubaker extends this discussion by demonstrating how nationalism is framed. This framing causes the group to interpret information in a particular way, thus transforming a particular event into whatever elites make of it. This is due to the social world being incredibly complex, and as a result, being simplified for the masses through elite framing. Framing simplifies for the masses what is important through emphasizing particular aspects of phenomena. The complexity of social
reality is made comprehensible through concepts and theories that organize, communicate, and perceive reality. Framing involves concepts and theories that constructs reality, and thereby makes sense out of reality. Elites can selectively influence what concepts and theories are important by way of their control over mass media. Thus, elite framing is a driving force in how the masses understand their reality (Benford, 1997). Elite framing informs the masses that they belong to the 'good' nationalism while others on the outside belong to the 'bad' nationalism.

Complementing these theories on national identity is the work by Michael Billig (1995) who expands general theories of nationalism towards their everyday dimensions and daily practices. His concept of “banal nationalism” holds that nationalism is all around us every day. In fact, we take nationalism for granted since it is so deeply embedded in American culture. Since this national symbolism is so commonplace, our identity can be called into action to defend the nation when necessary. Billing states that this type of nationalism claims to represent a universal morality that is shared by all civilized people since it does not challenge the status quo (Billig, 1995).

Connected to the question of nationalism, Mary Waters (1990) addresses the selectivity of ethnicity in Ethnic Options. Echoing the literature discussed above, Waters treats identity, and thus ethnicity, as socially constructed. In her work, she demonstrates how white ethnics have an ability that most other ethnic groups do not have, in that they can activate their ethnicity when it works to their advantage. This white-European identity is relatively cost-free to other socially constructed ethnicities such as Hispanic and Asian, which carry a social cost due to the stigma
associated with those identities. As a result, this European identity is reinforced as acceptable given that it reflects “old” American immigration, while other ethnicities are viewed despairingly due to them not reflecting the “old” ideology\(^1\) of American identity (Waters, 1990).

Parallel to the nationalism literature is the work done on national minorities. Several academics have addressed the right to create and maintain communities within larger states. One such academic, Will Kymlicka (2005) advocates for the rights of minorities under the liberal argument that as a sense of justice people have a right to maintain their identity. However, this claim to special rights raises questions about how minorities within a newly minted minority-majority culture will be treated. Clearly stated, does this minority-majority community have the right to culturally homogenize their community? To Kymlicka this answer depends upon whether these minorities are ethnic or national. According to Kymlicka, the former have the responsibility to assimilate into their new culture. The latter, however, cannot be forced to assimilate. These minorities share the territorial state and truly make it multicultural. This creates a conundrum in which minorities are unable to maintain their own distinct traditions separate from minority-majority culture (Kymlicka, 2005).

Charles Taylor in _Multiculturalism_ takes a different approach than Kymlicka. To Taylor, liberalism and identity itself are problematic concepts. Identity is not frozen in time. It changes over time and is influenced by its environment.

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\(^1\) Ideology in this research project is understood as “the themes, concepts and representations through which men and women ‘live’ in an imaginary way, their relation to their real conditions of existence. Ideologies are the languages, the unconscious categories through which people give meaning to experience. They constitute the taken for granted ways in which we come to see the everyday world as natural.” (as opposed to the cultural construction which it is) (Hall, 2012: 262)
Accordingly, culture changes depending on the circumstance and time period. Therefore, how can the liberal demand that we honor certain values be respected when cultures are constantly in flux? Taylor claims we cannot. Instead what is needed is to dignify these different values and the demands that each person, and each group, aspire to reaffirming their identity. Thus, ultimately, groups recognize the dignity of “others” within a liberal, multicultural society (Taylor, 1992).

Following the ways in which nationalism and identity are framed, several authors discuss the role of Islam in American national identity post 9/11 (Cainkar, 2002; Cole, 2003; Howell and Shryock, 2003; Elaasar, 2004; Nisbet, 2005; Abdo, 2006; and Peek, 2007). This identity situates Muslims as ‘others' within the American identity. Moreover, it creates situations of bias and hostility towards these American-Others.

**Race and Nation**

The literature on inclusion and exclusion within the nation-state also addresses the discursive elements of who belongs and who does not in the nation. Howard Winant is the preeminent source on racial formation (racialization) and racial hegemony. Winant (2001) notes how racial formation is a dynamic process that is constantly being renegotiated. This means that race is renegotiated in relation to several factors such as politics, economics, and social forces. In addition, racial formation occurs at two levels. The first level is within the group. The second level is within the larger society. These two levels interact and change meanings of race. As a
result of this dynamism, the concept of race is constantly in tension over what it actually constitutes.

Winant (2001) also tackles the issue of racism on a global scale and its role in modernity and development. In fact, he notes that white supremacy was a crucial factor in developing the major power centers of the world up until World War II. Winant sees the end of World War II as a crucial breaking point with the past. That being said, he still sees race as a fundamental concept in the contemporary world. This concept of race, Winant notes, is not rooted in biology but instead is created to place others at a disadvantage in relation to “white” peoples. What this means is that if a person is not white they do not deserve the advantages that are bestowed upon that racial category.

This construction of race was carried the world over through colonialism. It granted the colonizer the right to rule over others, defined conveniently as “less civilized” and “non-white.” Scientific racism and its applied branch, eugenics, which supposedly proved the inferiority of nonwhite peoples, reinforced this belief. Of course, as nonwhite peoples and white peoples began to congregate, some of them challenged notions of white supremacy. The resulting hybridization and miscegenation challenged white rule, and in some cases posited it as superior to white rule.

Accordingly, race is an ideology, as well as a way to categorize and understand the world in order to “make sense” out of it. This ideology has become less explicit in the contemporary world, but it does not mean that race does not exist as a category of exclusion today. To Winant (2001), race has changed from a system of domination to a system of hegemony. What this means is that racial
domination no longer has to be imposed simply by power. Instead, race has become “common sense.” As it is now hegemonic, racial discourse leads by consent. By leading in this manner, it allows itself to incorporate oppositional movements. This incorporation means that race as a category remains dominant through co-opting opposition. Moreover, it means the racial hegemony can make concessions without ever really losing power (Winant, 2001).

Closely tied to Winant’s discussion on a colorblind society is the work done by Michael Brown who questions the myth of the colorblind society. This myth, according to Brown (2003), is perpetuated by the focus on some successful African-American families to reach the middle class. Eduardo Bonilla Silva (2003) makes a similar argument claiming that we supposedly live in a colorblind society due to particular frames, rhetorical styles, and stories. To Bonilla Silva, racism is systemic and institutionalized. Although he does not contend that race is socially constructed, he claims that social structures are racialized. Accordingly, whites are able to maintain privilege, and reproduce that privilege, by appealing to the status quo (Bonilla Silva, 2003). Therefore, to both Brown and Bonilla Silva, race is so deeply embedded in our everyday institutions that racism is taken for granted.

In assessing how far Muslim Americans have been racialized, I will apply these insights by operationalizing some of the terms introduced by these authors. For instance, I will incorporate the understanding of national identity to demonstrate the malleability of the term and how it used to both include and exclude. Related, I will use the term racialization to understand white privilege, and how Islam has been placed at a disadvantage relative to white religions, such as Christianity.
**Key Concepts Defined**

There are several key terms which need further explication so as to refine the understanding of this research study. Central to this endeavor is to define the term foreign policy. Glenn Hastedt (2003) takes a roundabout way to define American foreign policy by first explaining the concept of the national interest. To Hastedt, national interest is a composite of the fundamental goals and objectives of a state's foreign policy. I add to this definition that the national interest is not an objective, democratic concept. The national interest is created by and the elites. In the United States elites control the state, with the masses playing a minimal role, if at all, in foreign policy. That is to say, elites frame and order the options of the national interest and the masses may influence or choose what is the national interest through methods such as voting. With this in mind, American foreign policy is the means by which the U.S. pursues the national interest and all other official relations with other countries.

Another definition central to this research is that of identity. In this research, I do not assume whether or not Muslim Americans have adopted an overarching communal conception of identity. Instead, I utilize a more open-ended definition which states that identity is "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Moghaddam, 2006: 160). In operationalizing this term, I asked individuals if they self-identified as Muslim Americans. I then further categorized this Muslim group by asking what branch of Islam they were a member.
Henri Tajfel, in his discussion of identity, holds that this concept is understood as relational dialectic, holding that you cannot understand who “we” are without knowing who “they” are (Tajfel, 2001). It is the differences between groups, real and constructed, that gives rise to identity. This Othering takes place both within the group and externally. For instance, in reaction to foreign policy actions taken against the Muslim world, many Muslim Americans chose to view their Americanness in a different way than non-Muslim Americans. In some cases, Americanness may be viewed as a less prominent identifier, while in the most extreme cases this identity may be rejected altogether. Externally, Othering occurs when other non-Muslim Americans became exclusionary about it means to be an American. This act results from a need to defend the racialized American identity when it is viewed as under threat.

Othering is a social construction in which a subject is identified as not belonging to the dominant culture. As a result of this social construction the subject is made a second-class citizen with a state (Malavet, 2004). The process of being forced out of the American identity by external actors affects internal identity formation. Those within this new supposedly un-American Muslim group may believe that they only have each other and that they need to band together to preserve their sense of self. This feeds back into internal group formation, which in turn affects how external actors view Muslim Americans and whether they are “American enough” to carve out an identity within the larger group. Accordingly, the process of identity formation is a reciprocal process in which groups define themselves in relation to another. In sum, the boundaries of identity are fluid and
are shaped by external stimuli, which affect a group’s sense of belonging and security.

Another key concept is that of “double consciousness.” Defining this term is critical for my research project, as I hypothesize that Muslim Americans are experiencing a variant of this self-understanding. W.E.B. DuBois in *The Souls of Black Folk* brought this term into the academic literature. As Howard Winant explains in *Racial Conditions* (1994), to DuBois, double consciousness meant that it “permitted a person to see her/himself not only from within, as a black person with a particular identity, but also for an externalized self-recognition: a person could learn, out of necessity, to see her/himself as the white does” (Winant, 1994: 165). I adapt this understanding to my study to understand Islamic identity and the way in which Muslim American understand American foreign policy. As such, the double consciousness of Muslim Americans is the way in which people within this minority group see themselves and the way in which non-Muslim Americans, as a result of War on Terror, perceive these individuals. Muslim Americans are aware of this external perception, and struggle to overcome these negative identifiers.

Nationalism is another critical concept in this research that must be defined. I start by discussing more of the literature on nationalism, and then refining what I mean when discussing American nationalism. Accordingly, I embrace a Foucauldian notion of the nation in this research. As Foucalt states: “Discipline makes

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2 Although the concept of “double consciousness” is often used in relation to W.E.B. DuBois, the term was used much earlier and in two difference contexts. First, Ralph Waldo Emerson in his essays “The Transcendentalist” (1843) used the term figuratively to discuss one taking a transcendental perspective of self and world. Emerson spoke of man’s desire to know the divine, all the while struggling with the pull of life. A second way in which double consciousness was used is as a concept in Psychology to describe cases of split personality. Du Bois relied on both of these conceptualizations when discussing his idea of double consciousness (Dickson, 2014).
individuals” (Foucault, 1995: 170). The state, the ultimate disciplinarian, also makes citizens. As Foucault notes, the state casts an ever present gaze over the population which shapes how people act and react. This gaze need not be enforced through coercion. Instead, simply knowing that surveillance is ever-present, even if not seen, regulates the soul of the person. In a modern sense, regulating the soul is a more thorough way to normalize behavior since it regulates unconscious actions. It is this invisible, deeper power that makes the national, the citizen, and the Other.

This invisible power of the state is enforced and perpetuated through the very institutions that it creates. For example, the state creates the identity and meaning of the Other (delinquent), thereby creating a binary opposite of the law-abiding citizen. That is to say, there is not a pre-existing identity of the Other (delinquent). As a result, the creation of the Other (delinquent) shows the model citizen how not to behave. In sum, state authority via regulation of the soul disaggregates the law-abiding citizen from the Other (delinquent) (Foucault, 1995).

Over time, this state authority becomes normalized. In the context of citizenship, what becomes normalized is a particular national representation and behavioral code. People are implicitly socialized into believing that the citizen looks a certain way or acts a certain way. Moreover, the way of the citizen becomes an unchallengeable fact.

The debate on national being is extended by two schools of thought: the primordialists and the instrumentalists. The former school of thought believes that nations are in some sense “natural” and can be defined unambiguously by particular criteria. This school of thought has lost much currency in the debate over
national identity in recent decades. The second school of thought, the instrumentalists, holds that elites manipulate myths and symbols in order to give identities political meaning. The second school thought is the dominant explanation behind national identity construction today.

Anthony Smith pursues a quasi-Primordialist argument to explain the modern attachment that people have to ancient nations. To Smith, the masses do not just soak up the framing of nationalism produced by elites. Rather, the ethno-symbolic approach to nationalism holds that while elites may produce nationalism, the environment in which they operate constrains their efforts. This ethno-symbolic approach holds that there is something to the past, that is a national identity, which is present in modern national identity. To Smith, pre-modern national identities leave behind a historical record which helps to contextualize the modern nation. Smith holds that the more detailed this pre-modern record, the more rich the current national identity. Accordingly, by rediscovering the pre-modern nation, modern elites are able to create strong contemporary nations. That is to say, pre-modern ideas, myths, memories, symbols, and traditions legitimize the current nation. Consequently, the current nation knows how to behave based upon its ability to communicate with the past. Further, newer citizens to the nation take their cue on how to act as part of this national past (Smith, 1999).

Rogers Brubaker focuses on the historical division between civic and ethnic nationalism and its connection to *jus sanguine* and *jus soli*. In bridging the divide between primordialism and instrumentalism, Brubaker contrasting notions of citizenship in France and in Germany, Brubraker details the historical connection between inclusion and exclusion in both countries. The perceptions of who can be
included in the modern state are traced back to the beginning of the modern French and German states. Brubaker displays how early Germany, which initially was a confederation of sub-national states, had a common understanding of what the nation should be. In the case of Germany, it simply needed a state to institutionalize the nation. The idea of a German nation was facilitated by the shortened distance between towns and people which helped to thicken the idea of an early imagined community.

In contrast, in neighboring France, there were no early notions of what the nation was. Unlike Germany, the French imagined community was hindered by the distances between towns in pre-modern France. This distance meant that the imagined community had difficulty in coming together due to distance and time, which slowed the transmission of an idea of what the French national identity was.

In Germany, the nationalizing project was also influenced by its surroundings. A would-be greater Germany was denied by Poles who had their own understanding of who they were. Likewise German inability to become assimilated into Slavic states due to their supposedly distinctiveness strengthened the notion of who Germany was. This distinctiveness became the bedrock of what was recognized as German tradition. This is an important point to make since tradition is normative, thereby making it unchallengeable. To clarify, tradition is part of the past and it is continuous into the present. This continuity means that it must hold some sort of unchanging value to a society.

With the 1789 revolution in France, the state came into being without a firm grasp of what the French nation was. This was partially due to the many linguistic communities within what is modern-day France, as well as the different cultural
traditions. With the French Revolution breaking the back of to the traditional power holders in France, a new modern institution arose, the state. The French state therefore had to create the French nation. This French nation promoted notions of political equality. This republican ideology was institutionalized in the school system, which regularized political equality amongst all French citizens. Assimilation by necessity also became part of the French nation. If you were receptive to French values, you could be French. As a consequence of these historical factors, citizenship became broadly defined in France, while narrowly understood in Germany (Brubaker, 1999).

Brubaker also addresses the contest for who can belong to the nation in modern Germany since this is still dependent on blood rather than assimilation. Interestingly, Brubaker concludes that it may be less important for non-citizens in Germany to formally be labeled citizens as much as it is important for them to get the benefits of citizenship. This prescription is troubling on two fronts. While I understand that Brubaker is trying to create a stepping stone toward full citizenship by leaving the door slightly ajar for German non-citizens, the suggestion wreaks of “separate but equal.” Yes, access to the state is important so that people may work and live. However, separate access does not guarantee that non-citizens will get the same quality of services and treatment from the state. They will continue to be seen as qualitatively different and, thus unequal since they do not have the legal standing of citizen.

Secondly, I think it is problematic the Brubaker assumes that a majority of immigrant population in Germany would be content with state services alone. Humans are political animals and therefore desirous of being included in the
political system. There is a psychological need to be part of the in-group, and separate but equal status will not suffice. Accordingly, Germany’s self-understanding of who is “us” needs to be rethought of by the state. Among the leading liberal democracies of Europe, the notions of citizenship need to be updated in Germany to meet the realities of a more compact, heterogeneous world where “other” and “us” are increasingly coming into contact within the same state. This means that the idea of the imagined community has changed. It is time that Germany recognizes this change. These legalized others contribute to the building of the state and adopt the myths of the nation. Therefore, they should be accepted as full and equal members of the German nation-state.

Not only do academics differ on when the nation came into being they also differ on why the nation came into being. Franz Fanon in his classic work *The Wretched of the Earth* understands national construction through the prism of colonial domination. Fanon views new nations in the postcolonial era arising out of solidarity and fighting their former colonial masters. That is to say there is no such thing as a “real” Algerian nation. Instead there are various peoples becoming conscious of their exploitation by external others, as well as by their own internal bourgeois. These supposed co-nationals who look like us but act like “them” have actually been educated abroad and thus have become infected with the mindset of the colonialist. They are therefore no longer representative of the people. Once disavowing these puppets, Fanon believes that the masses differences melt away in their battle for independence. It is in this crucible that the colonized become a nation (Fanon, 1963).
While Fanon focuses on the construction of the nation out of the colonial experience, Mahmood Mamdani examines the role of inclusion and exclusion in post-colonial states. Mamdani argues that the way in which the colonizers ruled over the colonized still affects notions of inclusion in African states today. During colonization the colonizers folded categories of customary rule into one conception of customary rule. This created a binary within the state between the customary-periphery and urban-core. The urban core was able to rule over the periphery by way of indirect rule. The colonialist found chiefs in the periphery who are powerful enough to rule over the tribes but who would also follow the rule of the urban core. This system of rule would have implications for postcolonial Africa.

White colonizers (and a few Africans) characterized this dualism at the core and otherness at the periphery. This tribal periphery of the subjects was ruled over by way of individual customs, which eventually became known as ethnic difference. In this sense ethnic difference was made in Africa. Likewise, the urban core was ruled over through contemporary notions of citizen and state relations. This duality left the tribal periphery unprepared for ascension into statehood following decolonization.

With the end of colonialism, the ethnic elites from the core attempted to create national identities. This was done through further attempts to detribalize the customary, deracialize civil society, and develop the economy. These attempts were not successful. In fact, colonial methods of rule remained after the colonizers have left. The periphery was still ruled over by the core but this time through patron-client relations. The social structure of the state remained with the binary between
citizen and subject too entrenched to be reformed. As Mamdai notes, even pressures within civil society in the core failed due to the countervailing pressures of “deracialization within and detribalization without” (Mamdani, 1996: 293). As a consequence, what occurred in postcolonial Africa was not a transfer of political rights from the colonizer to the colonized. Rather, it was a transfer of power from one colonizer elite to another colonized elite and the retention of the structure of colonization (Mamdani, 1996).

Margaret Moore takes a different approach in her study of nationalism. She argues the national identity is an ethical obligation since it provides a sense of belonging. This feeling of belonging is important in itself as people value the groups that they belong to. Yet, to Moore, nations need not be coterminous with ethnic groups. She states that nations can be multiethnic and this multi-ethnicity can be the basis of their identity. In fact, Moore states, the difference between nations and ethnic groups is that the latter are politically conscious.

Moore also addresses secession. This is a right inherent in liberalism to Moore. Liberalism requires fair treatment and equal respect. If these liberal rights are not granted than a minority group has the right to challenge the state and push for its own legally recognized nation-state. To clarify, Moore restricts this right to national groups. She also brings to the fore the reality that it is not always an entire national minority population that is calling for secession. In some cases, it is simply an elite minority that wishes to secede from the state. This obviously makes the issue of secession problematic since it is not always clear who is speaking for the national minority and whether they are representative (Moore, 2001).
The discussion on inclusion and exclusion within the nation-state also addresses the discursive elements of who belongs and who does not. Winant and Michael Omi discuss the three approaches to race, which are ethnic-based theory, class-based theory, and nation-based theory. Each of these theories by Winant and Omi is criticized for lacking sufficient analytical clarity for discussing race in the United States. The ethnic-based theory is criticized for subsuming race under ethnicity. This means that the diverse experiences of minority racial groups is not given sufficient attention in ethnic-based theory. The class-based theory is criticized for its over emphasis on economics in explaining racial outcomes. Finally, the nation-based theory is criticized for being overly tied to geography and history and thus not reflective of the experiences of racial minorities in the United States.

Since race can be negotiated, Winant looks to the civil rights movement in the 1960s as a prime example of this renegotiation. He notes how the hegemonic discourse on race at the time made small adjustments to accommodate African-Americans. This accommodationist stance split the civil rights movement and caused some within the movement to be co-opted by the majority, while those who were left out became radicalized. Further, Winant claims, reforms for African-Americans were often hollow and programs that were proposed often went underfunded.

Moving on to the 1980s and the Reagan revolution, Winant focuses on the emergence of a debate around “reverse racism.” This discursive challenge to progress made by the civil rights movement sought to reclaim advantages that were accruing African-Americans. Reverse discriminationists claimed that
affirmative action had gone too far. Now it was the "white man" who was disempowered by another racial group. Moreover, the neoconservative movement pushed forth the idea of a colorblind society. This colorblind society was in fact not colorblind. Instead this way of seeing the world froze the racial inequalities between groups and supposedly looked elsewhere outside of race to explain inequality. This caused a significant change in the discourse as even African-Americans’ political allies, the Democratic Party, began using code words which attacked the victim. For example, Democrats begin speaking of welfare reform and the dependence of welfare mothers, when in fact they meant African American race as the cause of welfare’s problems. Thus in downplaying the significance of race, Democrats also implicitly blamed race as the cause of inequality (Omi and Winant, 1994; Winant, 1997).

Following this literature on the nation-state, in this research project American identity is defined in elitist terms. Again, this is not because elitist democracy is somehow right and good, but rather because American identity is understood by a sense of privilege. Therefore, those that are not included in the American identity are repressed and unable to make changes to the government. Conversely, those that are included in this selective democracy champion idea such as freedom and liberty, not because it helps all citizens within the state, but rather because it helps their exclusive group (Vickery, 1974). These ideas of freedom and democracy are perpetuated to provide the repressed with the illusion that they too can one day become part of the select few within a democracy. As such, I formally define American identity liberally as "resting on notions of freedom, rights, self-government and insuring equality of opportunity to pursue self-interest (Thomas,
2000).” In addition, American identity is also represented by traditions included civic republicanism, ethno-culturalism, and incorporationism (Schwartz, Luyckx, and Vignoles, 2011). While these concepts and traditions define American identity, they are a rhetorical illusion. The idea of universal inclusion into the American identity is erroneous. America is characterized by advantage and disadvantage. For one group to have privilege another must operate at a loss. Accordingly, I operate on the assumption that “non-whites” that are at a disadvantage wish to be included in the American identity in order to claim the privileged status that this identity bestows.

This idea of a white, privileged class is critiques in the field of Critical Whiteness out of the need to identity “white” as a racial category. This field defines white privilege as “an invisible package of unearned assets that one can count on cashing in each day but about which one was meant to remain oblivious. These privileges are conferred not because they have been earned but merely on the basis of one’s skin color” (McIntosh, 1988). According to Ruth Frankberg, white privilege is institutionalized so that “those who engage in antiracist activism must look at their own whiteness from the perspective of having been socialized and constructed by racial ideology” (Frankenburg, 1993). Accordingly, critical whiteness attempts to contest the dominance of whiteness as a racial ideology.

Building off of the illusion of the inclusive American social contract is the work by Charles Mills in the Racial Contract (1997). Mills argues that the idea of an inclusive contract is a chimera. Rather than the idea of the social contract, Mills argues that there is a racial contract that keeps European peoples ascendant and Others submissive. This racial contract between European whites is mostly tacit,
and has divided the world into those that matter (whites) and peoples who do not
matter (non-whites). For those that matter, there are separate rules, be they
moral, political, economic, and military. All non-white peoples exist outside of these
rules. As such, these rules have become institutionalized around the world via
colonialism. All claims to racial progress are simply “window dressing” to make
racial equality seem real. Rather, racial equality is used to keep non-whites in a
subservient position and make them complacent with the current racial order (Mills,
1997; Winant, 1994; Brown, 2003).

Therefore, in this research, I embrace the term “white ethnic,” not because I
somehow take it as right and good, but rather to place it in contradistinction of
what is non-white and Other. The idea of a white ethnic arose in the early 1970’s in
response to the civil rights and black rights movement. Those included in the white
ethnic community were previously understood as the urban poor (e.g. Poles, Irish,
Italians, etc.). These individuals were seen as under attack and oppressed by the
recognition that non-white groups were receiving in the 1970’s. Therefore,
immigrant populations of European ancestry became celebrated and included within
the constructed white community (di Leonardo, 1994).

Based upon the historical construction of the white ethnic community, I define
this “ethnic group” by the white privilege that membership as a “white” confers.
White privilege is a symbolic experience that provides comfort and opportunity
(Hyde, 1995). Therefore, a white ethnic is defined as someone belonging to the
constructed and ever-changing “white community.” This belonging comes about
either by birth into the privileged white ethnic community or status recognition,
which can include economic success, and allows an individual to refer to themselves white and be accepted into the white community by others.

Since the identity of whiteness confers privilege, non-whites have sought to enter this constructed identity in several different ways. Moreover, states have sought ways in which to “whiten” their population in order to portray a privilege image of the state. In the Brazilian census, Brazilians tend to fill in the lightest color they could possibly correspond to their image, while most Brazilians refuse to fill in the darkest categories.

The denial of race in the Brazilian census does not square with everyday reality in Brazil. Nonwhites and poor whites continue to be concentrated at the lower end of Brazilian society. These groups attempt to move up the racial ladder by marrying more desirable color categories. For instance, blacks try to marry whites in order to improve their standing in society. This means that the value places on race can improved through a relationship to a white. Interestingly, even poor blacks are more inclined to marry poor white for the very same advantage it bestows. These relations within communities and between classes display the two tendencies of racism in Brazil: vertical and horizontal. For the former, it is more difficult to advance up the latter since marrying someone of a darker color is not socially desirable. For the latter, when people are in the same community and come into contact with racial others more often, social stigmas against marrying darker colors are lessened (Telles, 2004).

As the discussion on Brazil shows, Race is a socially constructed concept. Therefore, race has no biological grounding. Race is arbitrary and subjective. It is
negotiated through the political process. (Shih, Bonam, Sanchez, and Peck, 2007). Therefore, race is not based on anything in the real world, but rather race is “widespread grouping of individuals into certain categories by society” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

Moving past the connections between nation, and race, another key term to define is elite. To be understood as elite, a respondent had to hold a leadership role within the local Muslim community. These roles ranged from leaders of NGOs to lawyers to religious leaders to academics. What each of these roles has in common is that they claimed to represent a larger subset of Muslims, and therefore these elites spoke for and potentially influenced other Muslims. This reciprocal relationship was important to capture, since it showed how different attitudes were created and shaped. In general terms, attitudes are shaped by what Rogers Brubaker has labeled “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs” (Brubaker, 2004). These opinion makers, according to Brubaker, mobilize and energize putatively natural groups, which in turn evokes and reifies these groups.

Therefore, understanding elite conceptions of a community is an important aspect in recognizing how individual Muslims understand themselves. This is due to elites serving as leaders of their community, which in turn means that they make sense of complex events and offer their own interpretation of reality to others, as analytical frameworks. As such, Muslim American elites were an important source for my research in understanding how the local Muslim American community understands the effects of America foreign policy.
To be clear, these ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, or elites as I refer to them, may be self-appointed representatives of the community. Further, these elites may use a position of power to claim their representativeness. As such, this is not to say that these elites are neither fully constitutive nor fully necessarily representative of the Muslim population. Rather, as stated, these individuals may shape what it means to be a Muslim American. Yet, these individuals in no way capture the entire essence of what it means to be a Muslim American. For this reason, I also chose to interview non-elite Muslim Americans for this study. The elites may influence these non-elite masses, but they may also have desires which are not represented by the elites. Therefore, it was critical to interview non-elite Muslim Americans to understand their interpretations of the social world.

Another important definition is that of state. I really on the most widely recognized conception of the state which was legally codified in international law at the 1933 Montevideo Conference by the Organization of American States (OAS). To meet the threshold of statehood, the OAS held that a state must meet four criteria. The first criterion put forth by the OAS was that you must have a permanent population. The second criterion that the OAS agreed upon was that you must have a defined territory. The third criterion is that you must have a government. Finally the OAS members stated that to be a state, you must have the capacity to enter into relations with the other states (Malanczuk and Akehurst, 2002).

A final key concept and one that which is related to understanding U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East is the War on Terror and 9/11. Both of these terms are highly contested, and therefore have different meanings to different
people. To vary vagueness of the War on Terror allowed the U.S. to meet short
term needs. Therefore, rather than perpetuate this vagueness, I conceptualize the
War on Terror as “in opposition to Arabs and Islam, signified as terrorists and anti-
American” (Jamal and Naber, 2008). Rhetorically, the War on Terror is defined as a
“way to rid the world of evil” (Nohrstedt, 2007). More conceptually, the War on
Terror includes the goal of spreading democracy, as was pursued in the 2003 Iraq
War, and as a secondary goal in Afghanistan in 2001. The War on Terror is also
understood as U.S. involvement in Afghanistan stemmed from Al Qaeda’s terrorist
attacks on 9/11 against the United States. Therefore, the primary U.S. foreign
policy strategy in the War Terror towards Afghanistan was to dislodge and kill or
capture Al Qaeda operatives who were responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A
secondary goal of the War on Terror in Afghanistan was nation building and
democracy promotion, so that terrorists could return and use the state as a staging
ground for attacks against the U.S. (Comras, 2010)

Research Design

In this exploratory research project, I investigated how American foreign policy
affects the identity of American Muslims. Despite the exploratory nature of my
study, my research starts from somewhere. That is to say that I come to this
research project with some initial hypotheses. These hypotheses stem from
interactions with colleagues and friends who are Muslim Americans, as well as from
reports in the media about Muslim Americans being disenchanted with U.S. foreign
policy. With this background information, I hypothesize that American foreign policy
towards the Middle East is Othering Muslim Americans. This exclusion of Muslim Americans from the exclusionary American identity is a result of framing that constitutes the dangerous Other. A secondary hypothesis is that this subjective framing occurred after September 11th, and during the War on Terror.

The empirical evidence to prove my initial hypothesis correct, or incorrect, is based on whether a majority of Muslim Americans express a rising sense of double-consciousness as a result of being racialized and treated as “others,” and if this change in attitude can be related directly to a changing foreign policy, then my initial hypothesis will be confirmed. To test this, I juxtapose changing attitudes to changing foreign policy so that I can establish the strongest possible co-variation. In turn, I interpret strong and direct co-variation in terms of causality, arguing that in the absence of other, potentially relevant factors, a changing foreign policy must have caused changing attitudes and self-identification of Muslim Americans.

**Methodology**

The methodology of this research project is qualitative, exploratory, and interview-based. In finding research subjects, I utilized the snowball sampling technique. While snowball sampling can lead to problems with reliability, it is also a key strategy for outsiders who do not know the internal workings of a community. Accordingly, I had to start with a small group of Muslim Americans and ask them to refer me to others.

Since I did not know beforehand the exact number of people who are representative of Muslim Americans in Tampa Bay, I relied on Schensul and
LeCompte’s (2010) recommendation of using at least thirty informants. Ultimately, I ended up interviewing twenty-five participants, at which point no new information was gained, thus closing the hermeneutic circle (Reiter, 2006). I came to this conclusion once variability began to decrease, meaning that I got similar responses from all respondents.

As stated, my sample consisted of twenty-five respondents. Of these respondents, women composed a little more than half of the respondents (14). The sample size was also overwhelmingly composed of those belonging to the Sunni group. In fact, I was only able to interview five Shia Muslims. The sample ranged in age from 19 to 65. The average age of the respondent was 30.6 years old. The median age of the sample was 27 years old. The sample’s political affiliation consisted of the following in descending order: 11 Democrats, 9 no political affiliation, 2 Libertarian, 2 independent, and 1 Republican. Ethnically, the sample respondents identified themselves as the following: 6 Palestinian, 3 Arab, 3 Iranian, 2 Pakistan, 2 Syrian, 2 Egyptian, 2 African-American, 2 Caucasian, 1 Moroccan, and 1 Hong Kong. The sample consisted of eleven elites in the Tampa Bay Muslim community.

Of these elite Muslim Americans, some founded and operated interest groups\(^3\) as one expression of their Americanness and desire to work within the political system. That is not to say that “Americanness” is equated as a desire to work within the political system. Rather it is to show that interest group formation is one way in which some Muslim Americans have chosen to protect their rights in

\(^3\) Interest groups are defined as “any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society, most importantly including the government.” (Knoke, 1990: 16)
the United States, and possibly to pursue their own selfish class-interests. Of these interest groups, some were created after the start of the War on Terror (2001). As such, these groups symbolize that there has been a change in the idea of American identity for Muslims. As a result of this change, Muslim Americans created these groups to defend not only their identity, which is under threat by the white majority, but also to reassert themselves as Americans.

However, it would be a mistake to rely solely on these individuals as the authentic voices of the Muslim community. Although in many cases, they did represent the Muslim community, in other cases the elite Muslim’s beliefs did not coincide with the masses. This demonstrates that not all viewpoints within this community flow from top-down, but rather there is a range of beliefs within the non-elite community that are not chosen by the elites to be represented. Therefore, by also including the viewpoints of non-elite Muslim Americans, I provide a fuller, though more disorderly view, of how American foreign policy impacts Muslim Americans in the Tampa Bay community.

After the conclusion of my interviews with Muslim Americans, I decided that it was necessary to add a control group. This group allowed me to compare and contrast the views of Christians and Jews against those of Muslims. The differences in attitudes, if any, allowed me to ascribe causality as to whether religion affects American identity.

The control group was collected via snowball sampling. My control group consisted of seven individuals that self-identified as Christian (4), non-religious (2), and Jewish (1). All of the respondents had at least a Bachelors (3) or Masters
degree (4), indicating that there may have been an educational bias. The respondents ranged in age between 28-36.

As discussed further in Chapter 4, the Tampa Bay Muslim community strongly resembles the American Muslim community. In Chapter 4, I replicated part of two Pew studies on Muslim Americans, the methodologies of which can be found in the appendix. Pew is a non-partisan think tank provides information on the issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world. Pew does not take positions on policy issues. Both Pew studies were funded by grants from The Pew Charitable Trusts.

The Pew Research Center decided to conduct attitudinal studies on Muslim American in both 2007 and 2011. The reason, Pew states, is “Muslims constitute a growing and increasingly important segment of American society. Yet there is surprisingly little quantitative research about the attitudes and opinions of this segment of the public…” The Pew study in 2007 was the first ever nationwide study to “attempt to measure rigorously the demographics, attitudes and experiences of Muslim Americans.” This study in 2007 attempted to survey nearly 60,000 respondents. The 2011 study was a follow-on to the 2007 study and attempted to measure a change in Muslim American attitudes. The 2011 study repeated key questions from the 2007 study and followed the same methodology as the 2007 study. The 2011 study attempted to survey nearly 41,000 respondents.

My study disengages from the 2007 and 2011 study in two key ways. First, my study was concluded in 2013, and therefore provides an update to the previous Pew studies. While my study is not nearly as representative as the Pew studies in
2007 and 2011, my findings do converge with the Pew data. Accordingly, while my sample is different than Pews, I can still focus on similarities in attitudes between the samples. Secondly, my study is different in the types of questions I ask and those asked by Pew. Of the thirty-four questions I asked my sample, only six were replicated from the Pews study. Moreover, Pew asked closed-ended questions which limit the way in which researchers can understand Muslim Americans. Conversely, twenty-eight of my questions were open-ended questions, which allowed me to gather much more detail than Pew on how Muslim Americans interpret American foreign policy. Relatedly, my study is completely on how Muslim Americans interpret American foreign policy, while Pew focuses on broader attitudes and beliefs by Muslim Americans. Therefore, my study drills down deeper than the Pew study, while using the Pew study as a reference point for my findings.

On all but one of the questions, my respondents’ responses came close to the responses provided by Pew. As such, these similar responses on both the localized and national scales indicate that my subjects converge in terms of similarities and attitudes with what has been reported in the literature. Further, as already discussed, numerically the Tampa Bay Muslim community resembles the Muslim American population in its diversity. In 2010 in the Tampa Bay area there were about 2.3 million people in 2010, with between 20-40,000 people identifying as Muslim in 2011. By either end of the range, this makes Muslims in the Tampa Bay almost 1 percent of the population.

As such, in this exploratory research project, I investigated how Muslim Americans interpret American foreign policy and how it impacts their identity. One
source of evidence in this project came from interview data from Muslims Americans. This data was collected through both semi-structured, open-ended questions and close-ended questions. The majority of the semi-structured, open-ended interview questions I wrote because I felt that they would be the most direct way to get at the question I wanted to answer: how American foreign policy towards the Middle East impacts the identity of American Muslims. Indeed several respondents commented that the questions got to the core of the question, and in fact, made them think about their identity in ways that they had never before thought of.

During my research, I also used a psychological method of word association. The subjects were given a concept such as “American national identity” or “American foreign policy,” and then encouraged to say the first words that came into their mind. I engaged in this method of word association to uncover deeper meanings, or maybe unconscious thoughts, about these concepts. Respondents were allowed to list as many words as they wanted. I then tallied the number of responses, and drew inferences from the types of responses that I received from the subjects.

I also compared my close-ended questions interview responses with the questions asked by the Pew Research Center. The attitudinal questions and data from 2007 and 2011 addressed racial profiling and harassment experienced by Americans Muslims. Any resulting change during the time I asked my interview questions and the time Pew Research Center asked their questions allowed me to provide a diachronical assessment of how American foreign policy impacts the
identity of American Muslims. The resulting cohort study adds reliability to my research by showing that my findings come close to those reported in the literature.

Using a content analysis within a discourse analytic approach, I analyzed my semi-structured, open-ended responses. This approach assumes that meaning is constructed in a particular context, within which both the subject and researcher play a role in constructing that meaning. Further, this approach assumes that both meaning and context comprise one another. This approach does not deny that researchers approach their work with certain theories and ideas which provide an initial frame of reference. The approach does claim that certain abstract categories will emerge from within the data. Rather than just accepting these categories uncritically, researchers using this approach must move back and forth, between what participants claim and the categories that emerge. Accordingly, when explaining the findings, researchers must contextually place their analysis in order to demonstrate that the patterns that emerge represent reality (Hardy, Harley, and Phillips, 2004).

The main assumption of critical discourse analysis is that power and discourse are linked. That is to say, discourse reproduces a social hierarchy. In critical discourse analysis, discourse is analyzed to uncover ideologies and power relations. These ideologies and power relations are found in constructed texts which determine what will be included and how it is represented. Accordingly, constructed texts reproduce an ideological discourse, meaning discourse is not objective.

Discourse is selectively constructed by using certain terms, quotes, statistics, and perspectives which in turn portray and reinforce a particular ideology. For the
purpose of this dissertation, where I focus on the discourse of selected Muslim Americans, I define discourse as “situated language use or language use in everyday texts and talk” (Jorgenson and Phillips, 2002: 103).

Critical discourse analysis, as an empirical method, seeks to provide insights into how discourse reproduces, or challenges, social inequality. Upon uncovering inequality, critical discourse analysis advocates for social justice by showing how a text can biased towards a particular ideology. Discourse is analyzed by assessing the context in which it was created. That is to say, what is the broader relationship between the discourse and broader social processes of the time? Critical discourse analysis examines the linguistic devices and how it portrays ideologies. For example, critical discourse analyzes whether the discourse uses active or passive voice, naming, pre-modifiers, and indirect quotes. All of these characteristics represent different ways to reinforce the dominant ideology. Passive voice reinforces the dominant ideology by not naming a particular person and creating ambiguity as to who performs a particular action. Naming also is used to perpetuate ideology by giving a specific picture of what occurred. Pre-modifiers present a different view of a topic thereby portraying something that is the same as being different. Indirect quotes reify ideology by not providing evidence as to who reported a speech, thereby providing legitimacy free of context (Jorgeson and Phillips, 2002).

Further, analyzing discourse allows the researcher to trace the development of language, and how it has been changed over time and reconstituted. Focusing on these changes allow the researcher to identify the historical developments which
generate particular uses of language. In this way, researchers identify the discursive processes, including the dominance therein, as well as the sociohistorical development of language (Collins and Jones, 2011).

Dominance in discourse can be found in both discursive and non-discursive practices, meaning domination can also have a structural component. Therefore, the dominated are constituted through the societal structures which dominate. To Foucault, this is the unseen and unthought-of domination which affects how we think, feel, and act. The unseen domination is when the ways of belonging are maintained through discourse. This discourse comes in the form of constructs which naturalize differences in social relations. Naturalizing differences justifies and maintains particular social relations. An example of naturalizing discourse is the debate around fairness in society. This term has been institutionally renegotiated not to mean social justice, but rather to mean to social and economic conservatism (Smith, 2011).

Michel Foucault is perhaps most well-known for analyzing discourse. Foucault’s analysis focuses on power relationships in the form of language and practices. Using Foucaudian discourse analysis uncovers how authority uses language to convey dominance, as well as how to demand obedience. As such, the social world is expressed through language, which in turn is affected by power. In this sense, existing power relationships reflect the composition of society. These power relationships are embedded in institutions, ideology, and politics. In order to uncover these power relationships, researchers must identify how statements are created; what can be said and what cannot; how space is created for new
statements; and how material and discursive practices are made at the same time (Howarth, 2002; Elder-Vass, 2010).

To Foucault, the study of language can also be used as a form of resistance to those in power. In resisting power, Foucault uncovers how “truth” is constructed over time. That is to say, there is no such thing as true or false statements. Rather, true statements are constructed by the ideologically dominant discourse. Moreover, to Foucault, the subject remains dependent on previously constituted social relations and discourse. According, subjects are dominated by unacknowledged connections to discourse, which is embedded in the foundational institutions of society (Howarth, 2002; Elder-Vass, 2010).

Another method of critical discourse is outlined by Norman Fairclough which follows a three-dimensional framework, wherein three separate forms of analysis are mapped on to one another. These three analysis include spoken or written language texts, analysis of discourse practice (meaning how the text is produced, distributed, and consumed), and analyzing discursive events of sociocultural practice. The analysis of discourse has five common features. These features include: the character of social and cultural processes and structures is partly linguistic-discursive; discourse is both constitutive and constituted; language use should be empirically analyzed within social context; discourse functions ideologically; critical research (Jorgeson and Phillips, 2002).

The first common characteristic holds that discourse includes visual imagery in addition to written and spoken language. These visual images are understood and communicated by the ideologically-dominate language that makes sense of the
social world. This language is both produced and consumed, thereby making it constitutive of the world. As such, discourse has created concepts such as racism and nationalism, both of which are not objectively constituted in the world (Jorgeson and Phillips, 2002).

The second common characteristic holds that discourse both constitutes and is constitutes in a dialectical relationship. This means that discourse provides identities which affect the world. It also means that discourse only acquires meaning based upon the social context in which it is situated (Jorgeson and Phillips, 2002).

The third common characteristic claims that critical discourse analysis is based upon the empirical examination of documents. Documents can include the transcription of interviews. The examination of documents uncovers the relationship between speakers; how identities are constructed; and how wording, grammar, and metaphors reinforce the dominant ideology (Jorgeson and Phillips, 2002).

The fourth common characteristic maintains that ideology is discursively reproduced. Accordingly, discourse reproduces unequal social relations. Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis differs from Foucault in that it focuses both on how discourse is practically reproduced and how social groups benefit from the reproduction of discourse (Jorgeson and Phillips, 2002).

The final common characteristic asserts that the role of critical discourse analysis is to be critical. Hence, critical discourse analysis requires social change. Upon uncovering the ideologically dominant discourse, the aim of researchers is to challenge the social order (Jorgeson and Phillips, 2002).
In relating critical discourse to my own research, I uncover how American national is constituted in the United States by way of the dominant ideology. This dominant ideology of the American citizen is constituted as white, meaning privileged individuals. In critically analyzing discourse, I ask how American national identity is constituted and how is it is reproduced to benefit the dominant groups in the United States. To analyze this discourse I repeat the dominant national discourse to ascertain whether Muslim Americans view themselves through this ideological frame or whether they challenge the dominant national discourse. The dominant national discourse, wherein being an American means being white, is contextually understood to be a product of the War on Terror. To undercover how this dominant discourse is contextually placed, I ask questions of my respondents to uncover whether this discourse was present pre-9/11. I also question whether this dominant discourse can be unseen, and therefore, if it is more deeply embedded in United States institutions. Finally, I challenge the notion that American nationalism should be understood in terms of whiteness and recommend that the current conception of American nationalism be overturned and instead understood in terms of inclusion.

When conducting my interviews, I relied on the Georg Gadamer’s (1975) solutions to the problem of understanding historical utterances. As such, relying on Gadamer, I had to understand the context in which my subjects made their comments. After becoming familiar with the Muslim American literature and the literature on nationalism and Othering, I was able to partially make sense of the comments made by subjects. Yet, this was not enough. I also had to become familiar with the ways in which Muslim Americans spoke to me, which could be
rather guarded, given their experiences with the U.S. government. Relatedly, since I work for the U.S. government, I had to make clear my affiliations and politics. That is to say, I could not be a neutral observer, and as such, my own accounts impacted my analysis. To resolve this issue, I had to become aware of my politics and prejudices, and thereby make my position to the reader explicit. This explicit positioning allowed my audience to understand the context in which I placed my subject’s responses. In following Gadamer’s “hermeneutic circle” I compared the specific utterance to the general information and the background within which the person spoke, thus going forth and back between the specific and the general up to the point where the specific lines up with the general, thus “making sense” out of their utterances. Yet, I still could not claim a perfect overlap in meaning between what my respondents said and how I interpreted it. As such, I had to limit the types of claims I made given my subjects and my own historical situatedness (Reiter, 2006).

Although I interviewed Muslim Americans in many different locations, my interviewing style remained consistent and the order in which I asked the questions stayed constant. When interviewing Muslim Americans I asked a standard set of semi-structured, open-ended questions which can be found in the appendix. I initially told the informants that I would like to have an hour of their time. However, in some cases the interviews ran over this time. I only met once with each informant.

Another source of evidence was derived from an in-depth interview with one Muslim American. This method put a face on the research and personalized how
American foreign policy has affected this subject. This opportunity also allowed me to explore an earlier time period by finding out how this person felt about American foreign policy pre-9/11. Since this individual is thirteen years older than me, not to mention a Muslim, her experiences showed me how vastly different her interpretations of American foreign policy are when compared to my own.

**Personal Bias**

My personal biases frame how I interpret my data. Therefore, before explaining my research in the following chapters I engage in what I call personal reflection. This reflection allows me to become aware of my influence on the research project through my situatedness in relation to my research subjects. To paraphrase Reiter, only through understanding my reality can I reach the most complete possible understanding of another culture (Reiter, 2006). Therefore, while I cannot eliminate all my biases, I can become aware of them and attempt to limit them.

As a Political Scientist, I focus primarily on the geographical-cultural area known as the Middle East. I am not a neutral observer of the politics of the Middle East or of the Islamic religion. Given my long-term exposure to the region, I have a tendency to view events in the Middle East in a manner that is sympathetic to the people who are living there. For example, I frequently find myself at odds with U.S. foreign policy towards the region given the way in which it tends to favor authoritarian dictatorships that provide stability over whatever might be the will of the people. While I understand the U.S. geopolitical interest in the region, I do not agree with the harm it causes to the people who live in the Middle East.
The very fact that I chose the dissertation topic shows that I am biased in my research. While there are many possible dissertation topics to choose from, I chose the topic that I have an emotional attachment to, and as a result, a scholarly attachment to. I chose a topic that interests me because I do not agree with the way in which my fellow human beings are being treated as a result of U.S. foreign policy. Accordingly, I do not pretend that this is objective research. No research is ever truly objective. Rather, researchers should aim for a partial perspective, embracing situated knowledge, so that we can more accurately and holistically understand the world (Haraway, 1988).

While there are some biases that I can mitigate, such as being overly sympathetic to the subject, there are other biases which I cannot alter, such as my gender or religious background. As such, these and others factors bias my research in that I am not able to speak to the entire Muslim population. For instance, women might not have talked to me like they would have with a fellow woman. They may have also been uncomfortable in speaking with me due to my status with the government. Accordingly, I am aware that a deeply practicing Muslim might not have told me all they would have told another practicing Muslim. In the future, I hope that women and Muslims will conduct similar research so that my findings can be compared to their research.

My Politics

I come from an un-militaristic, military family. My grandfather served in the Navy and saw combat in the Korean War. He never spoke of his military service nor
glorified the military. My father also served in the Navy before being medically discharged. Besides knowing that he briefly served in the military, I know nothing of his military service. My brother served in the Army and saw combat in Afghanistan from 2005-2007. He has never told me about his time in Afghanistan. For my part, out of high school I almost joined the Marines. I took a trip to Parris Island, South Carolina, site of basic training for the Marines, before realizing that I did not enjoy the military culture, and therefore decided not to join.

I became interested in the Middle East as a child. I grew going to church and hearing about faraway places that existed much before my time. I wanted to know where the Phoenicians lived, as well as Cyrus the Great, among others. I was surprised to find out they places still existed in a place called the Middle East. I also grew up with the advent of CNN. Therefore, I was part of the generation that watched Palestinians throwing rocks at Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). As a child, I wondered why a U.S. ally was occupying these people. I also wondered why the IDF responded to rock throwing with live gun fire. This thought stayed with me until the end of the First Intifada and the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords. Rather than celebrating the signing, I questioned who this previously unbeknownst actor to me, Yaser Arafat, was and how he was representative of an entire people. Moreover, even as a young man, I felt that he was selling out his people and instead becoming a proxy-policeman for the Israelis. As such, I became a sympathizer of the oppressed and the disenfranchised, first in Palestine, and then in the wider Middle East. Then 9/11 occurred and I watched the hysteria against Muslims, Middle Easterners, and anyone who did not look “white.” I also had friends at this point who did not fit the white category, and I listened to the awful stories that they
shared. I wanted to do something for them. Perhaps, this dissertation, is my contribution to telling their story.

Retuning to my family, they are a mix of Democrats and Independents that favor dovish foreign policy. As such, they, myself included, have been extremely critical of U.S. foreign policy. While I currently work for the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), I believe, perhaps naively that I can impact U.S. foreign policy. My impact will not be felt immediately. Instead, my time in the IC will hopefully create change in the long term. I want to see the U.S. disengage from the Middle East and to treat the people there with respect. I want the U.S. to end the War on Terror not only in name, but also in practice. My contribution to these IC changes is to provide analysis which incorporates my politics. In order to make these changes I have to stay true to my politics and not become incorporated into the IC culture.

Moreover, it is important for me to state that as part of the IC, I cannot collect or analyze intelligence on U.S. persons. This is important because it means that the data from this dissertation cannot, by law, be used by the U.S. government. Although those who are unfamiliar with the laws of the U.S. government will say that this stipulation is for show, I have seen this stipulation enforced. For example, when Mohammed Morsi was elected president of Egypt, the IC was forbidden from collecting intelligence on him since he is a U.S. citizen. It took months of legal and bureaucratic wrangling before the IC could get intelligence on Morsi. The point of this example is to show there are legal protections in place that do not allow me to collect intelligence on U.S. persons, such as the subjects in
this research. Therefore, I assert that in no way is this research done for strategic/national security reasons, nor is it sponsored by the U.S. government.

**Ethical Responsibility**

There is a tension arising from the fact that I was an intern with the U.S. government during the time I was collecting data on a vulnerable U.S. population. This tension is due to the history of the social sciences and their work with the U.S. government. This led to the American Anthropological Association’s statement on ethics (Appendix) to keep Anthropologists’ research separate from government work.

One such academic using her social scientific knowledge in the services of the government is Montgomery McFate, an anthropologist. The “human terrain systems” (HTS) work that she conducts humanizes conflict. It shows that the other side is not an interchangeable enemy but a real person. She works to show the U.S. military that their enemy is misunderstood. Indeed, she informs the military of the many nuances of “the enemy.” She brings culture into the discussion, which brings awareness and understanding to the military. Accordingly, the military now tries to work with the population rather than implementing a blanket strategy against the population. This work in turn reduces conflicts (Shachtman, 2008). Put another way, the military in conjunction with social scientists are rethinking the term enemy and are instead looking for partners rather than opponents.
On the other hand, as both Maximilian Forte and David Price have noted, working with the government can endanger vulnerable sources. Despite best intentions, whether it be working in HTS or using one’s work in the name of nationalism (Price, 2000), social science has either been abused by the government (Forte, 2010) or used to knowingly collect intelligence on populations. In the case of HTS, the Wikileaks scandal exposed how the military was taking private field notes from well-intentioned social scientists and using the information to target populations. In the latter case of working in defense of the nation, social scientists have used the cover of their fieldwork to spy on local populations. This damages the name of the discipline; ruins the field for future researchers; and most importantly endangers vulnerable populations. Obviously, despite attempts to reform institutions or to protect the nation, the government can abuse the most well intentioned researcher in the name of the national interest.

While I do acknowledge the problems of social scientists working for the government, I still hold that it is better to try and reform these institutions than to leave them to their own devices. This latter action is much more dangerous for vulnerable populations since it allows the government to continue operating on outdated and invalid assumptions. Taken a step further, not consulting social scientists may be one reason as to why these institutions have become so calculating and dehumanized in their work with vulnerable populations. What are needed are not less social scientists but more informed individuals working within and reforming these stale institutions. Moreover, in reforming these institutions, there need to be an effort to adopt oversight mechanisms to guarantee that social
scientific work is not corrupted in name of national security. This is the role I see myself enacting in my work with the government.

Borrowing from Queer theory, I understand myself in terms of fragmented identity. I am a doctoral candidate, an intern with the U.S. government, father, male, friend, agnostic, son, brother, political independent, heterosexual, as well as many other identities. There is no coherent self-concept that makes me. Rather, I constantly switch from one present to the next. I experience the fragmentation of the narrative self (Rudy, 2001; Atkinson, 2001).

My fragmented identity shifts depending on time and space, as well as in relation to others. Put another way, my identity is situationally dependent. Moreover, my identity is dependent upon both the way that I frame my identity, and the way in which others receive my framing. I may frame myself as a friend to someone, yet the way in which I present myself as a friend to someone may be denied. Accordingly, the framing of my identity is contingent both on self and other.

In the case of my doctoral research, there is a tension between my selves as a doctoral candidate and an intern with the U.S. government. My main ethical obligation is not to expose the people from one world I inhabit to people in other worlds I also inhabit, here: research subjects in the academic world and military personal at Centcom. The same is true for all the other roles and identities we all routinely take on as fathers, children, friends, etc. As a social scientist, I hold an ethical obligation to do no harm to my research subjects. As an intern with the U.S. government, I am legally forbidden from collecting intelligence on any U.S. person. These are two ethical obligations for two different identities. Moreover, in following
the American Anthropological Association guide to ethics I am supposed to keep research separate from government work. There is no way to completely reconcile those identities. Yet, I need to complete a doctoral dissertation on a very sensitive topic. As such, I have chosen to embrace my identity as a doctoral student while working on this dissertation, all the while following ethical guidelines and keeping my research separate from my government work. When I assume my other identity as a government worker, I did not conduct research on my dissertation. Instead, I focused on international actors. While I cannot assume either of these identities at the same time, I have made the conscience decision to keep these selves separate.

Therefore, in being transparent, while conducting my research, I also interned with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from August 2013 to June 2014. In order to protect my subjects, and not give them the perception that I was spying on their community, I informed each of my subjects of my role with the government. The goal of this exercise was to be totally transparent with my subjects. I did not want to endanger these subjects or mislead them. I let them know that my work for the university is separate from my work at the DIA, meaning that I would not share any data from my dissertation with the government.

To codify this separation of myself from the government and to guarantee that this work will only be used for dissertation, I presented the subjects with a form of informed consent. I had two copies of this form. One copy was for my own records and the other copy will be for the subjects to keep. This form gave my
subjects a legal understanding of the separate nature of my work, as well as what my dissertation work entails.

At the beginning of the interview, I assured my subjects of their anonymity and confidentiality. I informed them that I only want to know what they think and what their observations are. I reassured them that their individual responses will not be taken as representative of the larger population. As such, I let them know that I am only trying to learn from them. I also let subjects interrupt me during the interview if they had a question about the interview process (Bernard, 2011).

While it is impossible to totally provide for the secrecy of my subjects, since I will know who they are and people saw me interviewing them, I took steps to reduce their visibility. One way in which I reduced their visibility was to use pseudonyms; making adjustments to biographical information; and disguising the site and/or time in which the data collection occurred (LeCompte and Schensul, 2010). By reducing their visibility my aim was to reduce any negative repercussions resulting from my interviews. Moreover, if the informant felt that they would be in danger by speaking to me, I did not coerce them into engaging with me. All interviews were voluntary.

Summary

In this chapter, I reviewed the literature on critical concepts in this research. I also defined and operationalized key concepts in this research study. In the methodology section, I discussed how I went about obtaining data for the research
study, which was primarily qualitative, exploratory, and interview-based. In the research design section, I discussed the sources of evidence for my research project, including my interview questions. I also explained my analytic approach in this section. In the personal bias section, I made clear that any claims that I make in my research project are situated and context specific. In the last section, I argued that I have an ethical responsibility to protect my subjects, given the history of government abuses of minority groups.  

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4 Minority group in this study are defined as "a group of people who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination" (Linton, 1945: 347).
CHAPTER 2: What is a Muslim American?

Before discussing the effect of American foreign policy on the impact of Muslim American identity, I sought out what Muslim America actually is. In what follows, I asked each of my participants a series of questions about factors outside of U.S. foreign policy that could impact their Muslim American identity. In the process of asking these questions, I came to know much more about Muslim American identity, including the many nuances within this minority group.

The key finding to emerge from these interviews was that my sample of Muslim Americans closely matched with the Muslim Americans found in the literature. Most of this research in the literature was conducted on Muslim Americans across the United States. As such, this finding implies that my sample of Muslim Americans residing in the Tampa bay area converge in terms of similarities and attitudes with what has been reported in the literature. In fact, not only did my sample match in areas where there are large areas of convergence in the beliefs of Muslim Americans (e.g. the view of the immigrant generation, *hijab*), my findings also reflected areas of heterogeneity within the community (e.g. wealth or class issues). Therefore, due to the large convergence between my sample and what the literature states about American Muslims, I believe with a high degree of confidence that I am well suited to draw conclusions about the attitudes of Muslim Americans in the Tampa Bay area—even if my methodology cannot provide a mathematical
formula that is able to capture the numerical significance and reliability of my sample.

In this chapter, I will first discuss the literature on Muslim Americans. Then I will discuss my findings on how Americans understand American national identity. Next, I will discuss separately how age, gender, education, and social class influence American identity. I will then address how Muslim Americans interact with other cultural groups and the discrimination they face in America. Finally, I will conclude this chapter with a summary of my findings.

Muslims in America or Muslim Americans?

The literature on Muslim Americans is as diverse as the population I encountered. In fact, it would be a misnomer to speak of “the” Muslim American. Muslim Americans are a collection of individuals from all across the world. They have come to the U.S. at different times and for different purposes. Further, upon arriving in the U.S., Muslim Americans have settled in many different areas. Therefore, this geographical disbursement has further hindered the formation of a singular Muslim American identity, which in turn has made it difficult to unite the Muslims of America (Haddad and Esposito, 1998).

According to the Pew Research Center, in 2012, there were 3 million Muslim Americans in the United States. Of these 3 million individuals, about 1.4 million were adults. Pew goes on to state that about 40 percent of the Muslim Americans in the United States were born in America. Among those Muslim Americans that were
born in the United States, about 56 percent identify as black or African American (Pew Research Center, 2007; Skerry, 2011). Demographics aside, Muslim Americans have been able to preserve and recreate traditions from their homeland. Typically, these individuals not only exercise traditional elements in new locations, they engage in acts that were barred in their homeland. For example, Iranian American immigrants are able to listen and dance to music, which was outlawed in Iran following the 1979 revolution. This ability to selectively blend homeland with American traditions in the United States is what makes these immigrants American. Put another way, these immigrants, through expressing their religiosity, are buying in to what into one conception of what it means to be an American (Leonard, 2003).

Muslims immigrate to America for many different reasons. One of the most poignant reasons is to escape totalitarianism and to reach a country where they can grow spiritually, and in many cases financially (Haddad, Smith, and Esposito, 2003). This reason is particularly true if their beliefs are not recognized or if they are persecuted in their homelands, as is the situation of Sunni Muslims in Iraq, or Shia Muslims in Saudi Arabia. As previously stated, Muslims immigrating to the United States today face an uphill path towards integration. The reasons for this difficult path are multifaceted. For one, stereotypes of Islam and hostility towards Muslims in America do not make the newly immigrated Muslim feel the desire to adopt an American identity. Rather, this climate to the newly immigrated Muslim breeds contempt and alienation (Haddad, 1998). Another obstacle to immigrating Muslims is self-imposed. Many of these individuals have escaped sexist, authoritarian regimes. However, upon entering the United States, many of them
have difficulties adapting the often very secular, liberal environments that they find themselves surrounded by and immersed in. This creates barriers to assimilation and contributes to questions regarding split loyalties for these newly immigrated Muslims (McCloud, 2006).

Within the Muslim American population, cleavages exist between Muslims. In the United States, Muslim Americans remain distinct based upon the rituals, doctrines, and institutions they brought with them from their home country and recreated in the U.S. While Islam has a universalist appeal, its practice is always embedded in local cultural norms and practices that are not easily overcome between Muslims and which can potentially lead to fragmentation of Islam in America (Ghanea Bassiri, 1997). These conflicts cause sectarian identities to reemerge, which in turn create a perception among “white” Americans that Muslim Americans are alien to the United States (Haddad and Smith, 1994).

The perception by white Americans that Muslim Americans were alien to the U.S. was only strengthened by the events of 9/11. However, the isolation and exclusion of Muslim Americans following 9/11 created a formal Otherness. That is to say, U.S. foreign policy in the War on Terror created a group of Muslim Americans that now shared a common American experience. Hence, for U.S. foreign policy to create a group of Othered Muslim Americans, American nationalism had to be understood in terms of whiteness. American foreign policy, implicitly or explicitly, was able to whip up this exclusionary identity.

As such, prior to 9/11, many Muslim Americans only had loose attachments to one another based upon their religion. Most importantly, since Muslim Americans were excluded from engaging in the national catharsis following 9/11, it meant that
they had to come closer together to heal within their group. In turn, this more closely-knit group led many Muslim Americans to feel rejuvenated in their faith (Peek, 2011; Bakalian and Bozorgmehr, 2009; Abdo; 2007).

Viewing Muslims as terrorists since 9/11 has been a source of conflict both inside and outside the Muslim community. As such, Muslims as terrorists are equated with the dangerous Other. They are characterized in the media and by some in the masses as a security risk and the oppressor of women (Ewing, 2008). In fact, some in the United States oftentimes portray Muslim Americans as undeserving of citizenship. This is especially true of the conservative media outlets and opinion-makers that hold that Muslim Americans should have their loyalty tested.

Due to their relative heterogeneity, Muslim Americans still have difficulty in coming together to challenge these claims. That is to say that Muslim Americans as of yet do not have enough common ground or clout of other minority groups to reshape the narrative (Bukhari, 2004). This common ground can come about through the processes of Othering, which might also be referred to as processes of “racialization,” has not pushed them together enough to forge one coherent, political identity. As such, Muslim Americans are stuck between being considered and treated as the potentially dangerous and threatening Others, but not enough so as to overcome their internal ethnic, national, and religious divisions.

Given the stereotypical profile of Muslim Americans that existed before 9/11, it was easier for an insecure and hyper-nationalist America to identify who was the dangerous Other. This dangerous Other in the United States matched the profile of the external dangerous Other. For instance, non-Muslim Americans would identify
women wearing headscarves as a dangerous Other, since it was foreign to them. In this instance, it was easier for men to escape scrutiny since they did not necessarily have outward identifiers. This racialization of Muslim Americans in turn made it easier to gain support for foreign policy abroad against Arab and Muslim states (Ghanea Bassiri, 2010; Cainkar, 2009).

Connecting these two trends, Anny Bakalian and Mehdi Bozorgmehr claim that following 9/11 Muslim Americans lived a life of double consciousness. On the one hand, they were Americans who had witnessed the horrors of 9/11, just as other citizens. On the other hand, many of them fit the description of what was considered the dangerous Other. Muslim Americans were now seen as distrustful and expected to explain their religion. This backlash in turn increased group solidarity amongst Muslim Americans, but it also left a back door open to those who could escape this association due to their appearance. The hyperbolic trial of Islam after 9/11 put the religion in the public eye, and as a byproduct made Islam an official U.S. religion (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr, 2009).

Another cleavage for Muslim Americans is age. Youths were particularly affected by the events of 9/11. Many youths have grown up in an America in which they are viewed as terrorists rather than as equal citizens. Often, these youths are held responsible for actions that they are unconnected to. This environment has created a world of missed opportunities for many young Muslim Americans. Further, it has created a world of resistance, anger, and ambivalence. These dynamics have led to cultural anxiety amongst many young Muslim Americans (Sirin and Fin, 2008).
Another cleavage for Muslim American is gender. In Islam, women are seen as oppressed (Sarroub, 2006). Following 9/11, it became the West’s responsibility to liberate these women from the patriarchy of Islam. The most glaring symbol of this patriarchy to the West is the hijab. Yet, many Muslim American women wear the hijab not as a sign of oppression, but rather a sign of strength. To these women the hijab carries many symbols such as a representation of free choice or as a demonstration against the hegemony of the U.S. (Haddad, Smith, Moore, 2006).

To be clear, the hijab refers to the Islamic dressing for women, although veiling dates to pre-Islamic times. The hijab was originally a sign of status as not all women could afford the headscarf. The hijab is typically understood as the headscarf on a Muslim women, although the niqab, or face veil, is sometimes grouped in with the hijab. Islam holds that the hijab is meant to preserve a Muslim women’s modesty. In protecting modesty, the hijab symbolizes that the women has been sanctified to a man and is therefore off limits to all others. In addition, the hijab is meant to symbolize that a women is much more than just her physical appearance when engaged in social interaction (Beliefnet.com, 2014).

Yet another significant cleavage for Muslim Americans is race. African-Americans constitute the largest racial group within Islam. However, the majority of African Americans express their version of Islam differently than other ethnic groups, such as Arabs and Asians. Within the African-American Muslim community, one of the most important issues is whether to incorporate themselves into the larger population of Muslim Americans, or rather to separate themselves and develop a separate identity, as advocated by the Nation of Islam. This tension is
found in the traditional Islamic view of community. One view is of the *ummah*, which is boundary transcending and unifying in the pursuit of creating a worldwide Islamic community. The second is view if of *‘asabiyah*, which holds that boundaries should be erected between one’s own community and the outside to strengthen kinship relations (McCloud, 1995).

That Nation of Islam is a leading Black Muslim separatist group. This group claims that all who do not belong to their group are “evil” and “ungodly.” Therefore, the Nation of Islam advocates a struggle to separate their group from other Muslim American groups (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2013). As such, the Nation of Islam is an ethnic nationalist group.

Through the lens of Michael Billig, the Nation of Islam is a “bad nationalism,” while the traditional view of the American community, as well as the Islamic community, are “good nationalisms.” Billig claims that many people consider ethnic nationalism to be dangerous, radical, and a challenge to the status quo. Conversely, civic nationalism is the good nationalism since it is supposedly more stable, given that it is not a challenge the status quo (Billig, 1995).

As stated, the Nation of Islam is an example of such bad nationalism. This version of Islam is expressly radical. In opposition to the agenda of the Nation of Islam are other Muslim American communities. As noted in the literature, many other Muslim American communities seek to find its place within the idea of the American community through integration and accommodation (Johnson, 2012). While there are some radical elements within the Muslim American community, these individuals constitute a minority. Therefore, I place the Muslim American community as a group within the larger civic nationalism of America.
While on the surface this dichotomy of good nationalism and bad nationalism seems straightforward, it is undoubtedly more complicated. For instance, what constitutes an African American? In the United States, race, ethnicity, and skin color is a dynamic that is constantly renegotiated by forces such as politics, economics, and social forces. This racial formation occurs not only within the group, but also within the larger society. These two levels interact and change meanings of race. As a result of this dynamism, the concept of race is constantly in tension (Winant, 2001).

An example of racial formation in America and how it is defined from without, as well as from within, is provided by the story of the orthodox Greek priest who in 2009 was attacked in Tampa. The priest had become lost and went out looking for directions. As is customary with Greek Orthodox priests, this gentleman had a long beard and was also wearing a robe. The Greek priest eventually found and approached a reservist Marine. The Marine ended up beating the Greek priest with a tire iron and claiming that the man was a terrorist who started to yell “Allah Akbar!” Eventually, the Marine pinned the non-English speaking priest to the ground and waited for the police to arrive (Tampa Bay Times, Nov. 10, 2009).

This case illustrates the ambiguity of reading and interpreting ethnic markers and attributing “race” in America. To some Americans, if you do not look the part, you are not American. This means that many Americans have a clear idea of what a Muslim American looks like. Simply put, they do not look like “us.” Accordingly, African American Muslims are more likely to fit with what an American is supposed to look like given the history they have in the United States. However, an Arab or Iranian is less likely to match with the image of American. This exclusion is due to
several factors, such as historical experience, political and social access, and media bias. Nonetheless, darker skinned Muslim Americans are less likely to “pass” as Americans when compared to their African American cohorts.

Given the ambiguity of what constitutes race in America, as well as the choice by members of the Nation of Islam to exclude themselves from civic American nationalism, I am not including African American Muslims in my sample. Hence, their exclusion from my sample brings my sample size down to twenty-four Muslim American participants.

**Getting to Know Muslim America**

During the course of my interviews, there were broad areas of overlap between the responses I received from my subjects. The portrayal of the responses from my subjects is not meant to homogenize Muslim Americans. Rather it is to show that there are some commonalities in the types of responses I received. In what follows I avoid very general and sweeping statements. Instead, to be more specific I speak of “some groups among” or "certain individuals." When I could not be more specific and group responses, I discuss the range of responses that I recorded from the subjects. The purpose of displaying these responses is to show that American Muslims cannot be universalized.

During the course of my interviews, I asked all respondents what the primary influence is on their American identity. This question by far was the most difficult for respondents to answer. They often stated something to the effect that they had never given consideration to what made them American. After contemplating the
question, most respondents answered that Islam was the primary influence on their identity. For me, this was an unexpected finding. I expected respondents to say something to the effect that because they were born in the United States it influenced their sense of national being. Instead, most respondents tended to put their religion first before their national identity. That is to say that they viewed themselves as Muslim Americans rather than American Muslims.

As X, age 19, female, born in the US, undergraduate student stated:

Growing up my identity was more driven by my Arabness, from watching Al Jazeera at home and seeing my family and their pain from things happening overseas, and not really understanding it. I think growing up I have taken a step back my Arab identity and started to explore my Muslim identity all the while being an American. I was told that you can be whatever you want to be and that you have all the opportunities in the world. I live in a country where you can walk down the street and meet people from all over the world. Within that country, I focus on my religion to become the best person I can be. (Interview conducted October 23rd, 2013, Tampa, FL)

Another respondent, D, 27, male, born in the US, undergraduate student said:

I’ve been raised here my whole life. I feel American since I’ve lived here. The thing that I do is make sure that my religion always stays with me. My religion always comes first before anything else, whether or not society believes I should be doing something else. I look to my religion before I look to American society. (Interview conducted September 11th, 2013, Tampa, FL)
I do not believe these statements to be particular to Islam. In fact, I expect that many different religious groups identify their religion as the key driver in their life. To the religious, their religious identification is eternal, while their national identity is only temporary. Therefore, while the two identities are not mutually exclusive, the religious identity does have deeper, longer lasting bonds. As such, religion is a primary driver in how Muslim Americans live their lives during their time within the United States.

I followed the question about the primary influence on one’s identity with a question asking whether Islam and American national identity were incompatible. Many respondents stated that their religious and national identities were not incompatible. In fact, a majority of respondents claimed, the American national identity reinforced their Muslim identity. Of these respondents, they stated that this reinforcement was particular to America since in many other countries the legal protections enjoyed in the United States do not exist. Therefore, by expressing their American identity, some Muslim Americans were actually empowering their religious identity.

As Y, 21, female, born in the US, head of a Tampa-based NGO stated:

There is a lot of dialogue and debate about this in Islam....We were giving guidelines like, Sharia, for example, a really contested word.... we were giving guidelines by scholars which say punishments for death or adultery or gangs. These are the things that were ruled upon after the time of the Prophet, things that God deemed problems all throughout the civilization of humanity. Everything else was open to interpretation. Everything else a metaphor....You have to listen to the people in higher positions of leadership, and be respectful to one other, to be open and fair.
and just. So we were given these guidelines, but the guidelines do not dictate our way of life. Our way of life is to be dictated in consultation with one another. America is a country that has a history of many different ethnicities, each with their own niche. Right now, it’s about American Muslims finding their niche. In creating what it means to be an American Muslim. (Interview conducted October 22\(^{nd}\), 2013, Tampa, FL)

Another participant, A, age 41, male, born in the US, leader of a local mosque stated:

I’m a traveler. One thing I noticed is that once you go out in the world, you realize that no matter where you go, you’ll never fully fit in. You always like American food. You’ll like the music. We like the way we talk. No matter how well I speak their language, it’ll never be good enough.... The certain way we think as Americans, though not necessarily un-Islamic, is open-minded, reasonable, logical, scientific. Here we listen. We hear you out and try to accommodate and be reasonable with others. (Interview conducted August 26\(^{th}\), 2013, Tampa, FL)

As such, certain respondents did not believe that there is anything incompatible with being Muslim and an American. To these respondents, their national identity is simply one more layer to who they are. That is to say that there is no conflict between their religious and national identities. These respondents did not believe there was a requirement to take sides, or to believe that Islam or America is always in the right. Instead, to these individuals, it was a much more nuanced way of understanding oneself. This viewpoint corresponds with the Quran, which states that God created all mankind and placed them in different nations and tribes. Therefore, to be a Muslim American is permissible since each individual has
a duty to their own nation. This duty is both to be a good Muslim and to be a good citizen within the territory that they reside.

My control group expressed similar sentiments about religion and nationality. To these non-Muslims respondents, religion could be understood as just one more aspect to their identity. However, this religious aspect was not in conflict with their national identity. Many respondents in my control group also noted that as part of their Christian faith they were required to be a good citizen.

As part of a psychological method of word association, respondents were also asked to name words that came into their mind when I mentioned the word “American national identity.” Of the responses, one definitive trend emerged. The trend was that most respondents would either mention all words that had a positive or negative connotation. Put another way, if a respondent mentioned all positive terms, they would not mentioned negative terms when describing American national identity. The converse was also true. Some of the more frequent positive responses were: passport, citizenship, free, choice, liberal, encompassing, no-fear, freedom of speech, open mindedness, exceptionalism, idealism, tolerance, opportunity, and coexistence. As seen in Table 5, the two most frequent positive responses were freedom of speech and opportunity. Some of the more frequent negative responses were superpower, hegemon, policeman of the world, credit cards, debt, disenfranchisement, consumer, corporations, wealthy, economic barriers, banks, loans, and deceived. As seen in Table 6, the two most frequent responses were corporations and bank.
Table 5: Top positive responses to words associated with American national identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top Positive Responses</th>
<th>Number of responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>freedom of speech</td>
<td>12 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opportunity</td>
<td>12 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>free</td>
<td>11 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>choice</td>
<td>9 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liberal</td>
<td>9 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no-fear</td>
<td>7 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passport</td>
<td>6 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open mindedness</td>
<td>5 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exceptionalism</td>
<td>5 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idealism</td>
<td>5 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tolerance</td>
<td>4 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizenship</td>
<td>4 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coexistence</td>
<td>2 respondents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Top negative responses to words associated with American national identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top Negative Responses</th>
<th>Number of responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>corporations</td>
<td>14 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>banks</td>
<td>10 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policeman of the world</td>
<td>9 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>credit cards</td>
<td>9 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debt</td>
<td>8 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disenfranchisement</td>
<td>6 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consumer</td>
<td>6 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>superpower</td>
<td>6 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wealthy</td>
<td>5 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic barriers</td>
<td>3 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hegemon</td>
<td>3 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loans</td>
<td>2 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceived</td>
<td>2 respondents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I interpret the positive responses, especially the two most frequent responses, to mean that respondents believe that America is a country of acceptance. Even as the Other within the United States, these individuals still believe that they can cross over and fulfill the “American dream.” The responses show that no matter what their current situation, they believe that they can still
mold their future. That is to say, they do not subscribe to a determinist outlook, a viewpoint which is often credited with keeping the countries they and their families immigrated from socially and politically impeded. In essence, these respondents subscribe to narrative put forth in “white America.”

Regarding the negative responses, people in the developing world share many of these downbeat word associations. These responses illustrate the connection between immigrants and their homeland. Although these individuals live in America, they are still connected to the lands from which they or their families emigrated from. Therefore, I believe that the people who shared negative responses are taking a critical view of what it means to be in an American as a result of the War on Terror. Although these respondents may feel repressed, they are still expressing their American right to dissent. Through this act, these individuals are negotiating what it means to be an American.

That being said, one respondent noted that there is not one word to describe American national identity. Instead, he said, there are many different subsets within America who define the national identity in many different ways. Yet, this respondent noted, there are some who wish to monopolize what it means to be American, and this he stated, is un-American.

The Effect of Age on Muslim Identity

The first question I asked my sample is if there are “differences in how older Muslim Americans understand their American identity when compared to younger Muslim
This question was almost universally interpreted to mean differences between the immigrant generation and second generation Muslim Americans who were born in the U.S. and became U.S. citizens. A high number of respondents held that indeed there is a difference between these generations in that the first generation typically was fleeing repression in a home country or looking for better economic opportunities, which caused them to come to America. The majority who held this view claimed that these first generation immigrants did not assimilate into the American culture but instead remained distinct. This choice to remain distinct was not a result of choosing not to assimilate into the new culture. Rather, the distinctiveness of these immigrant Muslims was due to these individuals placing more emphasis on other endeavors such as providing for one’s family. Restated, these immigrants did not have the resources to assimilate into their new culture.

As Y informed me:

The older community has this mentality that I'm going back home. I'm here to make some money, to take care of my kids, and I go back home. They never do. They never go back home. They have a very disenfranchised and disconnected identity. They're not civically involved Americans....In the younger community they're in this phase were they are trying to understand who they are in the Muslim American community. The older community, I kind of look of them like the immigrant community. Mentally they have created their own identity. This identity is not mutually exclusive to the American identity. They do not understand what it means to be an American, whereas in the younger community are trying to mold this identity. (Interview conducted October 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2013, Tampa, FL)
Again, a high number of respondents believed that there is a difference between generations because most of the elders did not see America as the home for them. That being said, I was unable to interview any older Muslim Americans holding this view, and therefore cannot confirm the validity of this belief. Respondents also claimed that those who were born in the U.S. it was easier for them to assimilate into American society. When pressed, respondents who held this view claimed that the reason that many had a hard time with adjusting was attributed to the land that they left behind. If the immigrant came from the Middle East, these respondents claimed, they remained connected to the land and culture. However, for the younger generation, they grew up learning the history and stories of the West. For this younger generation, it was easy to move and pick up since they did not have roots to a land going back hundreds of years. As such, it was harder for the older generation because they still had a strong attachment to the land that their families had resided on since time immemorial. While the young were exposed to these lands through the stories they heard, in practice they were more familiarized with America. This disjunction became most pronounced when the young would go back to visit the lands that their parents had told them about. Interestingly, some participants informed me that when they would go back home, that was the moment when they felt most American.

A smaller proportion of respondents believed that the reason these immigrants remained distinct from U.S. culture is that in the societies they come from, they are not used to engaging with the state. These are often repressive regimes where it is better to keep one’s head down and not cause problems rather than to engage with the state. This lack of experience in engagement meant that
when these immigrants arrive in the United States they do not absorb their new culture since they are reluctant to engage in an exchange of ideas.

As Hassan Shibley from the Tampa chapter of the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) put it:

They are not used to having the freedoms that we have taken for granted often in this country. You find them a little more hesitant to be involved, to voice out their opinions, to object more. They have more deference to authority. There you question authority, you get locked up... They don’t want to create a scene, don’t want to create a ruckus. (Interview conducted August 26th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

These same respondents went on to tell me that as a Muslim family begins to spread its roots in the United States, the second generation that grows up in America has more opportunities to assimilate than the first generation. Of course, these statements do not compare with my claims to racialization and Othering. This is due to identity, in that one might hold a view about oneself that is at odds with what other feel. It also may mean that although these individuals may not be “white” today, in the future, with more resources, these individuals can access white America. Accordingly, some Muslim Americans in my sample still bought into the idea of the American dream, while also recognizing their diminished status in America. These views are not necessarily at odds. One can be racialized and Othered. Yet, the pull of the idea of the American dream can be so powerful that these individuals look past their misrecognition in the hopes that one day they can access the reverence of being white in America.
These same respondents reported that the second generation is not burdened with a lack of time and money. Indeed, the first generation makes sure that the second generation has ample resources to adopt the American culture. Moreover, this second generation does not grow up with the mentality that they are guests in another country. They see themselves as belonging in the United States as much as anyone else does. Physically they are encouraged by the first generation to fit in. That is to say, they are discouraged from growing beards or wearing the hijab. In fact, in some households individuals are encouraged to “be American” first and Muslim second.

This corresponds with what A stated:
With immigrants, generally when they come here as adults for education or business or whatever purposes they retain their identity. It is still tied to where they’re from in India, Pakistan, wherever. When they have kids here and the kids are born and raised here then there’s a difference between these groups and the immigrant who is still a Pakistani, Iranian, Iraqi or whatever. They’re just attaining their citizenship, while their kids are much more open to becoming acculturated. They like hamburger and fries and not the food of the homeland. (Interview conducted August 26th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

These same individuals believed that the older generation practiced their faith in a traditional way, while the younger generation tended to get away from tradition. This act was attributed to those who were born here more ably connecting with what it means to “be American,” all the while still practicing Islam. Therefore, a main difference between the old and the young was in religious practice, with the
younger practicing what they believed to be modern Islam and the older practicing “traditional” Islam.

These second and third generation Muslims Americans, a minority of respondents believed, were more progressive than the first generation. However, several respondents reported that as the second- and third generation Muslims grow older, they tended to grow more conservative. This change in political orientations was attributed to these individuals looking back on the history of their family and noticing the changes that had occurred over the generations. This retrospective assessment supposedly caused some Muslim Americans to reach back to their roots and to re-identify with the values that were cherished in earlier generations. In fact, during the course of my interviews I met with several third generation Muslim Americans who expressed conservative views of Islam, and who felt that their generation had gotten away from “the roots” of Islam.

When compared to the Muslim American subjects, my control group expressed dissimilar views about age and nationality. In fact, they interpreted the question in a completely different way. This was a result of these individuals having a completely different experience in America. They were not recent immigrants, and all were either non-religious or of a Christian sect. The majority of these non-Muslims were white, with one African American. Therefore, these individuals constituted the mainstream of American identity, while Muslim Americans remain part of the Other within America.

Interestingly, most of the non-Muslim respondents answered this question by focusing on military veterans. These older Americans, most respondents believed,
associated their identities with important military historical events, such as World War II and the Vietnam War. Accordingly, these older Americans shared a common sense of what constitutes American national identity through their common sacrifices. By contrast, most respondents claimed, many younger Americans did not have these common experiences. Younger Americans were seen by most respondents as more individualistic and disconnected from traditional notions of American national identity.

These dissimilar responses by Muslim Americans and non-Muslim Americans display how these two very different groups understand American identity. For the former, it is about adapting to America and carving out their space. For the latter, it is about understanding the roots of American identity and how it changes across generations.

**The Effect of Gender on Muslim Identity**

In regards to gender and identity, almost all respondents in some way discussed the *hijab*. To most respondents, this was the mark of a Muslim woman’s identity. Despite this identification, many respondents were split on whether or not it was required in Islam to wear the *hijab*. Respondents noted that some women wear it all the time; some wear it sometimes; and some wear it only on Friday. Overall, determining how much to wear the *hijab* was believed to be a function of one’s interpretation of the faith, as well as societal pressures.

About half of respondents believed that the *hijab* was a way to assert a Muslim women’s identity in a climate which is not hospitable to Muslims, i.e. the
War on Terror. Rather than being seen as a sign of oppression, the hijab in many instances was viewed as a positive sign of expression. These same respondents also agreed that women who wear the hijab are putting themselves on the frontline in defense of the faith. Therefore, it was held, one does not have to wear the hijab to be a Muslim woman, yet those women who wore the hijab were the most strident defenders of Islam. These Muslim women were on the forefront, the ambassadors of the faith. Therefore, dressing in their faith, these respondents held, strengthened their religious identity.

Further, some respondents held women get more sympathy from the public since they were seen as having made it in the white collar world. In the business world, Muslim women were viewed as breaking through the ceiling, which in this case was the “oppression” that they face by male Muslims. As a result, these women had the right to wear to hijab since they had battled the sources of oppression in their community, society, academia, and the business world. Accordingly, Muslim women could actually use the hijab to express the drive and desire to make it in the business world.

Most respondents believed that men could more easily fit into the everyday American life than women. One respondent held that a Muslim man could claim to a Mexican or Italian or even a hipster and deny being from the Middle East or a Muslim. These respondents claimed that Muslim men were more able to self-select when to identity as a Muslim and when to fit in to everyday life. One respondent claimed the men “get fuzzy around the edges.” What this subject meant was that men could pick and choose when to be Muslim. For instance, men could pick and
choose when to wear a beard or at what length to keep their beard. In another instance of their selectivity, Muslim men could wear form-fitting business attire to work, whereas Muslim women have to go out of their way to find modest dress which could also be considered acceptable in the business world.

B shared this point, age 20, male, born in the US, undergraduate student who stated:

In this issue of identity, men and women probably share the same complexities, the same issues. If anything the women may be may feel a bit more comfortable with their identity, with some of the inherent complexities that are there because of being a Muslim and an American. For me, it is the men generally; the men have much more of a problem with that [i.e. being Muslim and American]. (Interview conducted August 26th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

My control group again expressed dissimilar views about gender and nationality when compared to Muslim Americans. To these non-Muslim respondents, traditionally in America there were differences in how male and female Americans understood their national identity. They claimed that historically the male identity was seen as superior due to their sacrifices in war, while the female identity was inferior since they were not viewed as making the same sacrifices as men. However, the majority of respondents held that gender differences were decreasing among male and female Americans.

Both Muslims and non-Muslim respondents saw women as making strides in overcoming gender differences. To Muslims, women were on the frontline in defense of the faith. To non-Muslims, women were finally achieving gender
equality. Therefore, when comparing both groups, women are assuming more important positions within American society.

The Effect of Education on Muslim Identity

More than half of respondents viewed education as bridging the gap between reality and ideals. These respondents did not believe that all Americans were born equally and have the same chances. As such, respondents believed that they had to work harder than those who were born into privilege in order to achieve success in America. Accordingly, these same Muslim Americans believe that they are empowered by formal education. It should also be noted that many Muslim American respondents believed that there is a relation between the Islamic faith requiring all followers seek to knowledge and their need to seek further education in order to achieve success in the U.S.

These respondents believed that education would bridge this gap in that, by attending school, immigrants could learn the unofficial language of the United States. It was stated by one respondent that once an immigrant mastered the English language, they could converse with the majority, and through language, become part of the majority. Conversely, those who do not master the English language were seen as being locked out of the American identity and were more likely to become disgruntled outsiders within American society. Further, some respondents claimed that education enables Muslim Americans to adopt certain values and symbols of the dominant culture. In the process of this exposure to
other ways of life, these respondents claimed that Muslim Americans became more Americanized, and more consumer driven.

As C, age 20, female, born in the US, undergraduate student claimed:

Education is the key to success, meaning without a degree you can’t do very much. Education is what gives you the ability to move up in status and acquire jobs and make a better income. Education is the foundation. For someone that doesn’t take their education seriously, their lives become disrupted. These people find that it’s harder to find a life here and to progress as an American Muslim, even within our community. We are very sophisticated and educated and contribute to the sciences and medicines. We contributed to the Renaissance. We are not unintelligent people. But unfortunately in some situations we are painted as backwards. (Interview conducted October 23rd, 2013, Tampa, FL)

However, education was not seen as an end in itself. As Y put it:

Being a doctor does not necessarily make you a more open minded person in the community. Your level of education is not always going to drive your level of humanity. If you are more educated and more driven to succeed in terms of attaining different degrees, it says something about you but it doesn’t really say anything about your enlightenment. (Interview conducted October 22nd, 2013, Tampa, FL)

On the whole, education was believed to solve many conflicts of identity. This was attributed to a secular education, which makes individuals deal with a whole wide variety of people. This experience gave Muslim Americans exposure to different peoples, cultures, and backgrounds. However, some held that religious
education was also important. Respondents claimed this was due to Islam already providing the answers to the conflicts of identity. To respondents, if they knew about their religion, they knew about themselves. This confidence enabled them to find their place within America.

My control group expressed similar sentiments about education and nationality when compared to Muslim Americans. To the majority of non-Muslim respondents, education allows one to become more worldly and tolerant. It also provides access to social and economic mobility. Finally, many respondents noted that education helps to sort out the many conflicting identities. That is to say, it helps people understand who they are.

**The Effect of Economic Class on Muslim Americans**

Many respondents believed that economic class impacts Muslim American identity. Virtually every respondent mentioned that in the Muslim community there is an emphasis on becoming economically successful. In fact, there is an inside joke that all Muslims go to college to either become a doctor or engineer, two careers which pay lucratively. This joke bases itself on the belief that in the Muslim community you want to become financially successful so that you can find the best possible partner.

As Y, age 19, female, undergraduate student informed me:

Money is a big thing in Islam. It’s either a big blessing or a big test. A lot of the elements with education are perceived to be worldly. When you have wealth, you supposed to give to charity. You’re not supposed to be miserly.
One of the tenants of Islam is giving. If you seek a higher education, you receive more money. If you receive more money, you should give back to the community. Your income helps to form your identity, makes you more comfortable in connecting to the American lifestyle......If you have more money, you’re taken more seriously. (Interview conducted October 17th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

Other respondents believed that Muslims who were better off had a religious obligation to give back. This was due to God bestowing upon them good fortune. As such, these better off Muslim Americans were able to give more Islamic obligatory charitable contributions, or zakat, than other Muslims who were not as well off.

As X put it:
Islam is very much a lifestyle since you’re taught to take care the poor and give back to charity. This is very much a part of who we are from a very young age. You’re told take care of those less well off. Socially it brings together people from different classes. It creates more understanding for people from different economic backgrounds. (Interview conducted September 30th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

One consequence of this economic fortune is that when Muslims have their basic needs taken care of, they increasingly want to showcase their Muslim identity. Thus, if you are better off, you were able to travel more. For instance, a wealthy Muslim American can participate in the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, or the Hajj, that all Muslims are supposed to make at least once in their lifetime. However, the Hajj is a travel destination that is unattainable to those who lack the means.
Further, if Muslim Americans have the means, they could travel to other countries and become more worldly. Therefore, a better financial position allowed Muslim Americans to become more globalized. For instance, if they had the money they could travel back to the land of their ancestors. This experience allowed participants who were better off to engage in more cross-cultural experiences than those who came from the lower class strata.

The other side, some respondents held, is that as Muslims become better off they also may want to not show off their faith. That is to say, they want to downplay their Islamic identity so as to fit into some social circles. One respondent noted that he knew of a Muslim family who gained good fortune only to move into a gated community and downplay their Islamic faith. Another respondent held that he knew of a secular Muslim family where one child wanted to adopt the secular identity and another child wanted to adopt a more traditional Muslim identity. The parents ended up forcing the second child to act against his will and to dress more modern and secular so as not embarrass the family.

Conversely, one respondent claimed, that if one is not well off, the Islamic religion is blamed by outsiders as being the reason that a Muslim family is poor. If Islam is one’s religion, some subjects believed that government assistant providers looked down on them and held that it was their oppressive religion which caused their economic backwardness. This plays into the stigmatized view of the Muslim faith as originating in a land of poverty, sexism, and social impediment.

When compared to Muslim Americans, my control group expressed similar sentiments about economic class and nationality. To many non-Muslim
respondents, economic class was tied to the American dream. This connection meant that in America everyone has the chance to succeed and do well economically. Several respondents noted that the better off economically Americans become, the less attachment they feel to American national identity. Several other respondents also noted that the better off one is economically, the more chances they have to travel and to become more worldly. Again, these responses were very similar to those made by the Muslim American subjects.

**Interaction**

Regarding the question whether certain groups, political or otherwise, treat Muslims better than other groups, a majority of respondents noted a conflict between the Republican and Democratic parties. On the one hand, many noted how Islam fits with the conservative movement with its focus on traditional family values. However, it was also noted that the Republican Party has become a party of exclusion, and that if you were not white you were treated as a dangerous Other.

E, age 31, female, doctoral student told me:

I am more affiliated with the Democratic Party, especially after the Republican convention in seeing that there’s nobody else but white people there. You don’t have to be educated to see that....I don’t fit in with them just because of my skin color, my hair color, my background. I know in the past conservative Muslims have gone on to be Republicans because they think of the conservative religious values that they provide. I wish there was a middle
party. That’s the road I really fit in. (Interview conducted September 18th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

Conversely, it was stated that although the Democratic Party is much more inclusive, the progressive values of the Democrats do not fit with the values of Islam. Despite this view, it was claimed that the Democratic Party is much more tolerant and allows conservative values to exist under their movement. As such, although many respondents have attachments to the Republican Party, they are actually embraced by the Democratic Party.

People who are “of the book” such as Jews and Christians were seen by most respondents as willing to engage with local Muslims. A few respondents mentioned that they had engaged in inter-faith dialogue with other Abrahamic religions. There were no reported instances of these other religious individuals attempting to convert Muslims. Instead, these respondents commented on the positive experience and the opportunity to “better know how others think.”

As C put it:

A lot of other religions are accepting of my Muslim identity. I’ve been to churches and they’re pretty accepting. I can’t hide the fact that I’m a Muslim and they’re very welcoming. They’ve never tried to convert me. They’re very welcoming. Other religions are always very accepting. (Interview conducted October 23rd, 2013, Tampa, FL)

As the statement by C indicates, the Muslim Americans in my sample did not encounter much, if any, discrimination by other religions. Rather, these participants were often at odds with the internal politics of America.
Perhaps, due to other non-Islamic religious groups encountering persecution at times over their history, they are open to dialogue with Muslims. This acceptance by other non-Islamic religious groups indicates that Muslim Americans are not necessarily under threat by other religions, but rather by nationalist sentiment that is defined in non-Islamic terms.

**Discrimination**

Regarding discrimination, many respondents held that they are targeted. Some subjects responded that they had met people who did not understand that Muslim and Islam is related or who believed that Islam is a violent religion. Several other individuals informed me that they had come across people who claimed that all Muslims are terrorists. However, many of these same respondents stated that these experiences were limited. They also held that the discrimination they face today is not different than the discrimination that other minority groups faced in the past.

"F, age 20, female, undergraduate student said:

In high school, there were a lot of people who didn’t understand where I came from, who I really am. They were more influenced by others. I went to a school where there were lots of cliques. The majority of the students there were white and they were from the upper-class in South Tampa. There were a lot of school clubs. Some of them wanted me to join. There was Jewish club that wanted me to join and I told him no. The girl then asked where I’m from, and I said from here. They said no. What’s your religion, and I told her I’m a
Muslim. She took the paper [away about the school club] from me and walked away.... (Interview conducted November 4th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

Other respondents felt that they are not equal under the law, regardless of whether they were born in the United States. It was noted that if a white person says that they hate the president, they are expressing freedom of speech. However, if a Muslim says that they hate the president they will be arrested for making threats against the president. Several subjects stated that this lack of equality stemmed from Muslims having few leaders in American politics. Several Muslims informed me that they could overcome this inequality if, as a group, they became more politically active. Still, many of the same respondents mentioned that another obstacle to achieving equality would only occur after changing the narrative that the United States is a Christian country. To overcome this bias, subjects claimed that those on the right needed to be reminded that America was founded on religious freedom.

G, age 47, female, teacher said:

There been times where I’ve been discriminated against when it comes to jobs. I was to get a catering job when the whole issue happened in Benghazi. The day after that the women called and told me I’m sorry but I don’t want you working with us. I asked her why and she said it might cause a little bit of tension. She said it would be better if you didn’t work with us, but I can refer you to someone else. I was like wow but okay. I didn’t take it any further. It’s not the end of the world. It’s your loss, you know... (Interview conducted November 4th, 2013, Tampa, FL)
At the same time, several Muslims held that they understood why they are discriminated against. These individuals stated that as long as individuals such as themselves “blew stuff up” they understood why they had to go through extra scrutiny. In this way, several participants normalized the discrimination that they face every day. These individuals had grown used to added scrutiny in the post-9/11 world. What really brought this normalization to the fore was that several individuals made jokes about this discrimination. This flippant talk seemed to mask a deeper desire to become part of the dominant group and to dispel and notions that they are radical and dangerous.

Conclusion

The Muslim Americans of Tampa Bay are as diverse as Muslims that can be found anywhere in America. Given that they identify by religion, they tend to emphasize their religious devotion over their national patriotism. However, this does not mean that they are some sort of fifth column within the United States. Rather, these individuals are no different than any other religious individual. They see Islam as their guiding principle within America. This is similar to how a Christian or Jew lives within their religious principles in America.

The principles and values of America are very important to Muslim Americans. Respondents were aware that they could not exercise their religion as they do in America if they were located in some other country. In fact, this openness of America allows Muslim Americans to become even more religious.
Again, this increased religiosity does not displace their sense of Americaness. Rather, it adds to their sense of identity.

Age, gender, class, and education, were all seen as variables that impact the identity of Muslim Americans. To the young, they have less difficulty in assimilating to American culture. Conversely, older Muslim American immigrants retain their traditional identity, but are supportive of their kin, in that they wanted them to adopt the American identity. In regards to gender, women are seen as being on the front line in defense of the religion. The *hijab* was seen not as a sign of oppression, but rather as a symbol challenging the hegemony of the West. Class was seen as both negatively and positively impacting Muslim American identity. Depending on whether one was rich or poor would either add to or decrease the image of their Muslim identity. Finally, education was seen as bridging the gap for immigrant Muslims. It also allowed American Muslims to come into contact with others, which in effect taught them toleration.

Muslim Americans had no problem interacting with other social groups. Respondents claimed that they were most likely to interact with people from other Abrahamic religions. While respondents did encounter some discrimination in America, it was not overly pervasive. Of note, many respondents made jokes about this discrimination which could signal their desire to join with the dominant group at any cost. In the next chapter, I will be discussing the impact of US foreign policy towards the Middle East on Muslim Americans.
CHAPTER 3: How Muslim Americans Interpret American Foreign Policy

In this chapter, I discuss How Muslim Americans interpret American Foreign Policy. In what follows, I detail respondents’ overwhelmingly negative view of U.S.-Middle East foreign policy. In my study, most respondents expressed the belief that as a consequence of the United States foreign policy towards the Middle East, they ended up being grouped in with the Others that America was fighting in the War on Terror. This finding confirms my hypothesis that U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East has racialized Muslim Americans, in that the discourse of the War on Terror has placed them at a disadvantage relative to white America. Further, my findings show that as a result of this racialization Muslim Americans are aware of their double consciousness, in that they are forced to view themselves from their own unique perspective, but also through the eyes of another who sees them as part of the dangerous Other. Accordingly, from this perspective, Muslim Americans view their identity as detached from the American identity.

In what follows, I first discuss the literature on the impact on the identity of Japanese Americans as a consequence of World War II. I discuss this literature in order to draw parallels between the two war time periods, WWII (1939-45) and the War on Terror (2001-current) to demonstrate that radicalizing American citizens is a familiar experience in American national history. Second, I address the impact of what became known as 9/11 on American Muslim identity. In order to show impact
I address perceptions pre- and post- 9/11. Third, I discuss how Muslim Americans perceive American foreign policy and how America addresses the Other we are fighting “over there” impacts how they view themselves “here.” Next, I discuss the responses from my subjects relating to their difficulty with integration. Finally, I compare the responses of my subjects with the responses given by Pew Research respondents. I make this comparison to demonstrate the impressions expressed by those in my sample that lived through some experiences and to reveal any changes in attitude over the past 7 years.

**Japanese Americans and American Foreign Policy**

Racialization of minority groups as a result of foreign policy has precedence in the United States. During World War II, Japanese Americans were labeled as untrustworthy Others by the U.S. government, as well as by popular opinion. As a result of this racialization, Japanese Americans were interned in camps across the United States. The rationale behind this internment was that Japanese-American citizens could not be trusted as the United States was at war with their ethnic homeland (Peters, 2004).

During this time period, many Americans on the west coast believed that Japanese Americans were setting up a fifth column in the U.S. for the purpose of preparing the region for a Japanese invasion. The belief of a Japanese American fifth column could not have been farther from the truth. In fact, many second and third generation Japanese Americans were loyal Americans who wanted to advance in American society. Yet, they were not perceived and treated as American because
they were not white. Herein lies the linkage between racialization and foreign policy; when a domestic group within America has not attained the status of 'whiteness' they are easier to Other in times of crisis. No matter their dedication to the nation, if they are not white they are viewed as untrustworthy and unpatriotic (Peters, 2004).

While seemingly contradictory, the interment of German- and Italian Americans during World War II displays the fluidity of whiteness and trustworthiness in the United States. In addition to Japanese Americans, German- and Italian-Americans were also interned despite their allegiance to the United States (Years of silence: The untold story of German-American internment). As Edward Blum notes, although German Americans by the time of World War II were accepted within the social boundaries of the American nation, the contents of the “white” category were not quite settled (Blum, 2005). Therefore, German Americans were racialized just as Japanese Americans were during WWII seen they were viewed as an untrustworthy, fifth column within the U.S. Yet, of note, no Japanese Americans were convicted of committing treason against the United States. This fact stands in contradiction to some German- and Italian-Americans that were convicted of treason against the United States.

The foreign threat becomes even more of a danger when there are a large proportion of that country’s people living in a country. For instance, there were 127,000 Japanese Americans living in America at the time of Pearl Harbor. As such, Japanese Americans were viewed as collaborators with the enemy. Therefore, by detaining these people, the threat perception of the enemy lessened since
Japanese Americans could not supposedly assist the enemy. However, this supposed lessening of the foreign danger through internment comes at a price. These Americans were no longer treated as Americans. Their rights as Americans were stripped in the name of security. In essence, their American identity was called into question. They became the Other within (Peters, 2004).

In a display of the construction of ethnic color and identity, Chinese Americans during WWII attempted to disaggregate themselves from Japanese Americans and the larger Asiatic 'threat.' Americans during this period grouped all of those from Asia in one category and labeled them as depraved and immoral, regardless of any educational or professional attainment. As a consequence of this racialization of Asians during WWII, the United States, who had allied with China, had to de-racialize Chinese Americans and label them as productive individuals, and more importantly, part of the United States. Accordingly, in order to please the Chinese government, Chinese Americans were separated from Japanese Americans through the modification of the color scale. Chinese were no longer "yellow" like the Japanese. Instead, they were now more 'brown.' Another way to separate the Chinese from the Japanese was to frame them as naturally more democratic, like the U.S., while the Japanese Other were seen as naturally more imperialistic (Muller, 2007).

The artificiality and political purpose of such racial constructs and classifications becomes even clearer when considering that in late 19th-century Brazil, Asians were classified just the opposite way. According to Jeffrey Lesser, Japanese migrants to Brazil were able to label themselves as the "white man of
Asia” in order to find acceptance among Brazilian elites who thought of themselves as white, whereas the Chinese, were framed as “yellow,” “sneaky,” and “lazy” and denied to enter the country as migrants. The Japanese were able to attain white status for several reasons, such as Japan being a world power at the turn of the twentieth century, whereas China was a lesser power. While Japanese were considered inferior in regards to other immigrants, they came from a developed country and therefore were considered industrious, a supposed quality of being white. Therefore, there is an economic dimension to whiteness in that immigrants that are viewed as having qualities that contribute to development can more easily become white (Lesser, 1999).

Similar to the experience of other minority populations, Japanese Americans were viewed as needing to be controlled by the superior white population during WWII. With the beginning of WWII and the transfer of Japanese Americans to the south, southern politicians portrayed Japanese Americans as hypersexual beasts who were a threat to white women. This portrayal was used to frame white people as moral and sexually normal, while the Other was portrayed as having uncontrollable sexual desires, and thus they needed to be closely monitored, if not policed (Howard, 2008).

Regarding policing, within the camps some Japanese Americans volunteered to police others of their same ethnicity. These collaborators helped inform their U.S. overseers of planned disobedience within the camps. In return, their captors treated collaborators much better. Another way in which the Japanese could separate themselves from the larger Japanese American population was to join the
military after passing a loyalty test. Those who joined the military were able to move more freely in the U.S. during and after the war. These servicemen saw themselves as different, and indeed as part of the American citizenry (Howard, 2008).

Finally, I would be remiss if I did not discuss the parallels between the problems in closing down these camps and the problem with closing Guantanamo Bay. With Japanese Americans, the government faced the difficulty of where they were to be placed after the camps closed. Across the U.S., many communities did not want Japanese Americans to be released into their community. The U.S. President for his part suggested dispersing them across the U.S. in small numbers so that they would be forced to assimilate into white America. These Japanese American citizens, much like those currently in Guantanamo did not know where they could go following the end of their internment. They had been stripped of their constitutional rights and had their property taken from them. In some cases, Japanese Americans had renounced their citizenship, for various reasons, and now were stateless persons with nowhere to go. This led many Japanese Americans to stay in the camps until the government forcefully vacated them (Robinson, 2001).

There are many obvious parallels between WWII and the War on Terror. For starters, the public labeled Japanese Americans and Muslim Americans as untrustworthy others during a time of foreign crisis. As a result of their large populations within the U.S., both groups were seen as fifth columns within America, that somehow collaborated with the Other. Today Japanese Americans, due to their success, are labeled as white in America, while Muslim Americans, also due to their
success, were nearly white before 9/11. Yet, after September 11th, 5000 individuals, many of whom were Muslim- or Arab-Americans, were rounded up across the United States and were incarcerated as suspected terrorists (Cole, 2002). This is the same fate that befell Japanese Americans during WWII. Both groups were not American enough to be trusted amongst the white population. Their danger needed to be isolated. In the popular imagination, what was American was redefined, and the United States went to war against the homeland of the Other. Simply put, the foreign policy of the U.S. was to defeat the Other over there, which had domestic consequences over here. In the process, the U.S. racialized an entire group of people and in this process classified them as potential enemies. Yet, the enemy also lived here, which domestically made an entire group of people un-American. This racialization has affects on the psyche and makes these Other groups reluctant to assimilate when they know that are not as seen as part of “us.” These groups end up living a life of double consciousness in which they are aware of their subordination within the larger group. They are in affect living two lives.

**How 9/11 Impacted Muslim American Identity**

In my study, many older Muslim American respondents noted how the majority of their community was more concerned with issues of foreign policy prior to 9/11. During this pre-9/11 period, the primary issue for them was the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian people. However, after 9/11, as a result of their civil rights as Americans being infringed upon, the Muslim American community began to look inward at domestic politics. Yet, in the past couple of years, they noted that
Muslims have become more assertive and have achieved balance in civil rights and foreign policy. Regarding foreign policy, these individuals noted the injustices happening in the Middle East, especially concerning the Afghan and Iraq wars. These issues in particular have caused older Muslim American to voice their concerns about how their tax dollars are being spent on American foreign policy through voting and contacting their congressman.

As G, age 47, female, born in the US, local educator stated:

We should look more at long-term rather than short-term election cycles in order to fulfill our own self-interest. We need to really work on our principles of justice. I think we need to make sure our tax dollars are not being used to fund war crimes, such as the Israeli occupation. We need a policy that is not dominated by special interest groups on the domestic side. We need to uphold the principles of law and justice, not butcher them and abuse them to further our agenda. Guantánamo Bay and the NSA exist because the people who are sworn to a law are twisting the law. We need to return back to our traditions. (Interview conducted November 4th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

These older respondents wanted to regain the America that they grew up in. Several of these individuals expressed that being critical of foreign policy towards the Middle East did not make you un-American. Rather it makes one more patriotic to engage with the political system, the same system which is trying to force them out. As one respondent so poignantly put it: “We would not tolerate this exclusion from our enemies.” As such, the older American Muslims from my sample have learnt to work within the system. This system, as so many of the respondents
acknowledged, is their system. They pay the taxes to support this system, and to sit idly by does not change the system. Accordingly, these individuals felt that it is their duty as Americans to engage the system to bring about a change in U.S. foreign policy. To put in the words of O: “the cost of not engaging the system is much higher than the cost of engaging the system.”

Given that the median age of my respondents was 27 years old, when 9/11 occurred most of my subjects were still very young. The factor of age was significant in my study in that these young Muslim Americans tended to view this event as an important milestone in their life. The majority of these respondents, who are now in their early- to mid-20s, believed at a young age that America was a place for people to seek protection and generally be accepted. However, after 9/11 these same individuals found themselves labeled as the enemy.

As M, age 25, female, born in the US, employee of a local Muslim American NGO stated:

> Because of the war on terror, because of 9/11, Americans think that the US government is allowed do things like drone strikes, which are illegal. 9/11 has kind of served as an excuse for us to embrace the goal and ambition that started in World War II. If this is the completion of this ambition, we are in a dangerous place. As a consequence of 9/11, I don’t think others understand international law and what sovereignty is. They can’t send missiles into any country. I think it’s a dangerous world we are in. (Interview conducted September 10th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

F, age 20, female, born in the US, employee of a Muslim American NGO adds:
I was really young when 9/11 happened. [I was] in the fourth grade. I always thought that coming to America, I came from the Middle East, from Dubai, that everyone’s really nice, very welcoming, very humble. People were like that before 9/11 happened. After 9/11, I got a lot of negative attention. As I grew up, my friends all became Muslim, except for one. It’s made me feel more comfortable to be with people of the same view as me, just because I’ve had a hard time growing up after 9/11. I was really embarrassed to say that I was Arab or Muslim a lot of [the] time. I would just say that I was Cuban. I felt ashamed. I never really even consider myself an American.

(Interview conducted November 25th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

These subject’s responses lay bare the danger and exclusion brought on by the War on Terror. To them, 9/11 was the starting point at which what it meant to be an American meant that one had to be white. The second respondent, of Arab-Cuban ancestry chose to identify with the “whiter” of her identities in order to be part on the American identity. Despite this ability to melt into the whiteness of America, this individual knows that she can never really be an American since she is doubly ostracized with her Middle Eastern and Muslim identities. As such, she has chosen to isolate herself from other Americans and to self-select Muslim friends who understand her identity.

D, age 27, male, born in the US, undergraduate student adds his insight to this new America:

After 9/11, the same people that I would say good morning to [and] have good relations with, our spitting at you. All of a sudden, you feel like I’m no longer part of you. I believe that if Osama bin Laden committed that crime,
[so] it is my duty as a Muslim to fight against them. They put me on his side and treated me like the rest of them, even though I’m saying what they did is wrong. Before 9/11, American identity was supposed to be about different religions and different people. (Interview conducted September 11th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

This subject wanted to part of the American group who was hurt by the events of 9/11. Further, he was willing to be part of the American group that would fight Islamic extremism. However, despite the attack being on U.S. soil, many Americans perceived that there was help within the Muslim American community. As such, individuals such as this subject, were grouped with the evil Others, and made to feel un-American and guilty by association.

Despite these experiences, most of my respondents chose to embrace their Islamic identity, which is viewed by many in America as part of the dangerous Other. However, these individuals do not subscribe to the belief that Islam is a dangerous, subversive religion. Rather, they view themselves as embracing an identity which can one day hopefully thrive within the mélange of what is Americanness. To achieve this end, most respondents felt that they had to work harder to educate Americans.

In explaining, why some Muslim Americans may turn to radicalism, these individuals may instead turn to adverse identification. This identification refers to people who try to assimilate but are not allowed to be part of the in-group and then take on an oppositional or adverse identity. Some individuals, such as African
Americans, chose to embrace Otherness because they know that no matter how hard they try, they will not be accepted by the white mainstream.

As P, age 27, male, born in the US, leader of a Muslim American NGO stated:

Since 9/11, the government does treat you differently. It’s getting a little better, but it’s a constant struggle for freedom and civil rights. It’s difficult to be a Muslim in America. Our religious freedom is at stake. It’s critical to defend, all the while not losing American values and freedoms. (Interview conducted August 26th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

A, age 41, male, born in the U.S., leader of a local mosque adds:

My identity didn’t change terribly much [after 9/11]. Muslims were still being attacked and assaulted as terrorists before 9/11. The event of 9/11 has solidified that [Muslim] identity. The Muslim identity was strengthened because the public came to identify us more with the Muslim identity than they did previously. We are expected to answer for our community. We were expected to talk with churches, which is very positive. People saw us as Muslims, but not for what Islam is, but rather as a threat, and other negative connotations. We do a lot of work to justify ourselves as Muslims and justifying our American identity. (Interview conducted August 26th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

Many respondents remarked how much more difficult it became to be a Muslim in the United States since September 11. This significant event served as a catalyst and a wake-up call for many Muslim Americans. Some respondents noted
that this event caused them to reflect on what it means to be an American, and that in retaining their sense of citizenry they realized that they needed to engage the system, such as through working with NGOs. As such, these individuals chose to critically reflect on their status within America and acknowledge “the reality.” These younger respondents felt that they could more easily identify their problems of their community and address them through the political process.

How Muslim Americans View U.S.-Middle East Foreign Policy

As part of my research, respondents were again presented with a psychological method of word association about all the ways in which they view American foreign policy towards the Middle East. During this word association exercise, every respondent provided words that had negative connotations. Some of the most frequent terms, as seen in Table 7, were hubris, violations of international law, global ambition, policeman, hypocrisy, oppressive, and double standard.

Table 7: Word Associations with American Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number of responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hubris</td>
<td>11 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violations of international law</td>
<td>9 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global ambition</td>
<td>8 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policeman</td>
<td>7 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hypocrisy</td>
<td>6 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oppressive</td>
<td>6 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>double standard</td>
<td>4 respondents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I interpret the fact that every Muslim American respondent provided negative responses to be a product of their experiences with Othering. As will be detailed
shortly, my respondents typically experienced discrimination and negative attention from their American co-nationalists. In fact, it is more apt to describe these individuals as co-citizens in that some people are formally citizens, but not imagined as part of the imagined community. Accordingly, citizenship and nationhood, in the case of American Muslim citizens, does not overlap.

Muslim Americans went from being almost one of “us” or “white” prior to September 11 to being in cahoots with those who plotted and carried out the attacks on the United States. As it became imagined in the minds of many Americans that the War on Terror was a war on Islam, many Muslim Americans became targets of hatred. They were the Other that America was at war with. Although most Muslim Americans correctly realize that they are not explicitly the targets of the War on Terror, they also realize their otherness as a result of the War on Terror. As such, it is not surprising to learn that all of my respondents thought of American foreign policy in a negative light. They realize that in the current social-political climate they lead a double life as one of “us,” Americans by citizenship, and as one of them, in which Muslim equates with Other.

Subjects were also asked an open-ended question if American foreign policy treats Islamic countries different than other countries. Universally, my subjects agreed that the U.S. does treat these countries differently than non-Muslim countries. However, when pressed on their answers, most expressed the belief that the reason the U.S. treated these countries was because of their oil wealth and not necessarily because of Islam. Put another way, to my respondents U.S. foreign
policy towards the Middle East was about what the U.S. could get out those countries rather than the country’s identity as an Islamic country.

As M, stated:

They treat oil countries different than non-oil countries. A good example of that is how we have reacted to the specter of the massacre in Benghazi and the situation in Syria. Syria is not oil rich and is not hotly contested. Since we need oil, we’ve treated oil states like national security interests. (Interview conducted September 10th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

W, 29, male, born in the US, graduate student agreed that American policy towards the Middle East is not just about Islam:

American foreign policy treats Islamic countries different than other countries. I know why. It’s because the Middle East has oil. It’s very important. That is the reason why the Middle East is treated differently than Africa. The fact that Israel is located there is another reason why the US has a major interest in the Middle East, because the US is a major supporter, it wants to protect Israel and make sure it’s safe. The U.S. just won’t let them go. Once there, it takes a long time for the US to leave. They want to make a base and want to have tightly fisted relations with these countries. (Interview conducted October 1st, 2013, Tampa, FL)

As part of my focus on American foreign policy, research subjects were asked: as the U.S. has started to withdraw from the Middle East has it changed how you feel about American foreign policy?“ Overwhelmingly the responses were unenthusiastic.
T, 23, male, born in the U.S., undergraduate student stated:

There’s a degree of suspicion in Muslim countries because America feels that it has a right to impose itself on those countries. The Iraq war is over, I guess it’s over, but it is more dangerous and violent and war-torn there than ever. We moved troops around and we’re supposed to get out of Afghanistan, but were training the Afghan army. If anything, we’re fighting battles more remotely and trying to hand off the battle capacity to Afghans. I wish that we would get off oil and get out of the Middle East. It would not give us a pretext for national security interests and stabilizing or controlling the Middle East.

(Interview conducted September 23rd, 2013, Tampa, FL)

F, 24, female, born in the U.S., undergraduate student saw the situation a bit more optimistically but still was cautious about the degree of U.S. withdrawal:

As the U.S. is pulling out of the Middle East it has made me a bit more relieved, but it has not really affected my daily life. I think the Middle East needs a break from the U.S. The Middle East should not be dependent upon them. They need to get their crap together. They need some space. They need to get themselves together. The only way that they can do that is if they can have their country back. (Interview conducted September 3rd, 2013, Tampa, FL)

Respondents were split on whether the U.S. should involve themselves militarily in Syria. In fact, several respondents viewed the Syria situation in conflicting ways. This was evident with L, 23, male, undergraduate student who said:
Everyone always says U.S. is sticking their nose in everyone’s business, but to be honest, I do want them to go into Syria. I get it were supposed to be the big Brothers who go in fix everything for everyone else but that doesn’t work for everyone. Sometimes you have to go and jump in. Just because you’re American. It’s you like you’re obligated to. (Interview conducted November 12th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

Another respondent, N, 21, female, undergraduate student stated:

If the US decided to intervene in Syria it would be upsetting because I think the best solution is a diplomatic answer. We would be choosing to skip over that and go to war and you want to save people who are dying by bombing? There is no logic in that. It’s irrational. Yes, it would show that America is strong and still has that power. But on the other hand, we are again being hypocritical because why did it take us that long? Why Syria and not Bahrain or some other places? If we do go, it should be for a very good reason and have a coalition of willing countries for it to be successful. It can’t just be America. (Interview conducted October 1st, 2013, Tampa, FL)

Regarding how American Muslims felt about Muslims who resorted to radical acts, almost every respondent disproved of these acts. However, opinions varied as to why these individuals engage in radical acts. Many respondents responded that problems with assimilation caused radicalization. In such cases, respondents claimed, it was an issue in which radicals were ostracized, either by themselves or the community. For example, several respondents claimed it was an issue caused by a financial situation or family situation or education or social issues that caused individuals to think that radicalism is the only way forward. In addition, social and
family issues were often tied to how people’s families were treated overseas as a result of U.S. foreign policy in places like Palestine and Iraq. That is to say, if someone lost a family member in one of these countries, respondents believed that the individual would have more of a tendency to radicalize. All told, no respondent could point to one particular variable that caused radicalization, but there was the belief that if one was not assimilating into society and not becoming well-connected in their community, they could become radicalized.

Many respondents also noted you have much more freedom to practice Islam in the United States than you do in the Middle East. In fact, they correctly observed, people have much harder time practicing their faith in Middle East because of government restrictions. Yet in America, individuals have the freedom to practice their faith. Therefore, these respondents claimed that Islamic radicals are “delusional” to take it out their anger on America. Rather, they claimed, they should appreciate the fact that they have much more freedom in the U.S. than they do in the Middle East.

H, 19, male, undergraduate student stated:

I don’t know what you would consider radical... Their craziness comes from anger and the way that they are treated. It’s also the way the media treats them [Muslim Americans]. For instance, the shooting in Los Angeles airport. Somebody in my class said that’s probably a Muslim guy or something. When you hear things like that it’s hard not get angry. (Interview conducted September 17th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

O, 53, male, leader of a local NGO stated:
People who resort to radicalism really don’t understand the religion. Islam is a religion of peace. It comes from the root word of peace. In Islam there must be a balance. It shouldn’t be extreme in either way. Obviously they don’t understand the religion at all. These people were probably pushed into a corner and did not know how to react. They were not knowledgeable about building an organization or lobbying. Violence was the only way that they could express themselves. (Interview conducted September 11th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

All of my Muslim American respondents felt that there is a double standard between Muslims who committed extremist acts and non-Muslims who commit extremist acts:

E, 31, female, graduate student stated:

There is a double standard. If an [non-Muslim] American provokes panic, he is sick or mental. If a Muslim does it, he hates America. They’ll be framed as wanting to destroy America and kill Americans. That’s how it looks. There is a difference. There’s a big difference. They will commit the same exact thing, but it means something different. When you look at the people who did anthrax they were not Muslim. They were a white militia group. A lot of people have a chip on the shoulder. A lot of people have reason to be upset when you stereotype a group of people. When you look at all these different shooting sprees that have gone on, none of these people look Middle Eastern. Radicalism wouldn’t happen, it they weren’t treated with suspicion. We should broaden our view of what is a security threat (Interview conducted September 18th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

Y, age 21, female, born in the U.S., leader of a local Muslim American NGO adds:
There is a double standard. You see on the news when a white person commits an act. They say he is mentally unstable. If somebody is close to looking like a Middle Easterner, they say that he is working in a group, he is a terrorist. This is because of the media organizations who are funded by different groups. They want the media to portray stuff in a certain way so that the audience will think in a certain way. Does that sound like a conspiracy theory? That’s how I see it. There is no such thing as an objective media and that’s a problem. (Interview conducted October 22nd, 2013, Tampa, FL)

In sum, Muslim Americans see how they are racialized as a result of the War on Terror. Muslims have unofficially been characterized as the enemy in this war. Respondents primarily saw the media as promoting this message, not the U.S. government. To demonstrate the duality in the War on Terror, “whites” who commit the same type of extremist acts are understood as mentally disturbed, not terrorists. Whites are able to commit these extremist acts without being labeled as terrorists since “white” people are not terrorists. Terrorism happens “over there” by Others. The racialized Other in the United States, Muslim Americans, commit terrorists acts, just like the Others in the Middle East. Therefore, Muslim Americans have to operate in an environment in which they understand that they are the targeted Other. Yet, these same individuals must try to conform to what society deems the “good Muslim” or else they will be grouped in with the dangerous Other. As such, Muslim Americans are trapped. They cannot freely express their disapproval of the U.S. government and its policies due to the fear of being pegged as dangerous extremists. Instead, those who want to survive in America during the War on Terror must suppress who they are and conform to white America’s view of the “moderate” Muslim.
Assimilating or Integrating?

I also asked respondents a series of questions to discern whether they felt that they were part of the American national identity. These questions focused on whether they were assimilating, becoming part of the larger national identity, or integrating, incorporating their religious group into the larger national identity. This is an important distinction to make since the former is much more inclusive than the latter. However, assimilation as I have noted assimilation is a problematic concept which has been adapted in the popular mindset to mean that an immigrant is retaining too much of their ethnic identity. Therefore, I refer back to Kymlicka to clarify what I mean by assimilation.

According to Will Kymlicka, there are differential rights between ethnic and national groups. For the former, they are expected to assimilate within the larger national culture. This is due to these ethnic groups freely choosing to move to a new nation-state for better opportunity. This free movement obligates them, if they are to become a citizen, to adopt the majority culture. For the latter, they are pre-existing within the nation-state. Therefore, these national groups, as a sense of justice, deserve the same rights afforded to the larger national majority. Moreover, in a liberal society, liberty affords the right to revise conceptions of the good. Only by allowing national minority groups the right to debate the good life does their culture have an equal opportunity to revise conceptions of the good.

A problem arises when within minority groups there is a lack of tolerance, and instead the minority imposes its beliefs on its group’s members. As a tenet of Liberalism, these national minority groups deserve to have their culture recognized
and preserved. However, in some cases these national groups are not Liberal in orientation. This means that they find it acceptable to force their members to act in a certain way and to retain particular values, even if the members do not particularly agree with the group’s conceptions. This situation often arises because the minority group believes that if they are to survive externally, they need to be homogenous internally. Kymlicka believes that those groups which are not Liberal and who will abuse the rights of their internal members should not be afforded Liberal protections. Just the same, Kymlicka is against imposing Liberal values on illiberal groups. The parallel here is between the minority group imposing its beliefs on its group’s members and the larger nation-state imposing its values on others.

Therefore, assimilation demands that to find acceptance you are required to give up what makes you different and assimilate the characteristics of your host, e.g. become like them. Recognition demands that you find acceptance while retaining your difference and otherness. Yet, as Kymlicka notes, “the separation of state and ethnicity precludes any legal or governmental recognition of ethnic groups, or any use of ethnic criteria in the distribution of rights, resources, and duties” (Kymlicka, 1995: 7). As such, there is a tension between assimilation and recognition given that the state represents the dominant group’s values and beliefs.

In distinguishing between assimilation or integration, I asked the subjects a series of questions about the American dream. That is to say, I asked if you work hard in America, can you achieve any goal that you set your mind to? Again, I asked this type of question not because it is somehow good or unproblematic to think of American nationalism as necessarily requiring assimilation or integration. Rather, I asked this question because it is the dominant, white ideology that
implicitly frames American nationalism. That is to say, the American dream is an ideological construct that perpetuates the belief that in American anyone can “make it,” as long as they assimilate into the dominant culture of the United States. Respondents were almost evenly divided in their responses.

P stated:

There’s no guarantee, especially in this country. If you put in the time and the energy in the effort you were to succeed, you will succeed. There are certain jobs that I may not have gotten due to the way I look, but that will provide other better other opportunities. The sky’s the limit here. It is what you make of it. (Interview conducted August 26th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

Many other respondents in my study shared this view by P. Respondents were trapped between assimilation and recognition. Muslim Americans were conflicted as to whether they should give up what makes them particular and accept the dominant view of white America. Of course, this track would increase the chance of Muslim Americans to achieve the American dream and to be accepted into white America. However, they would be giving up what makes them particular to America and losing their identity. The other option for Muslim Americans was to choose recognition, and to embrace their otherness. Several respondents did choose this track, with the knowledge that they would be operating at a disadvantage in America in areas such as employment and equal access to public goods.
I also asked respondents whether it was permissible for a Muslim to marry a non-Muslim. 92 percent of respondents stated that is impermissible for a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim man. 72 percent of respondents believed that it is permissible for a Muslim man to marry a non-Muslim woman. This statement was usually caveated with the statement that the woman must “be of the book” or that the woman should have the intention of converting to Islam.

C stated:

Islam does allow a Muslim male to marry a Jewish or Christian woman. The whole idea was that people followed the faith of the father. Nowadays people might be more likely to follow the faith of the mother... It is probably better to marry someone who is more consistent with your faith-based values.

(Interview conducted October 23rd, 2013, Tampa, FL)

X, age 19, female, born in the U.S., undergraduate student stated:

Women are equal in the eyes of God, but they have different rights and responsibilities. They can go to paradise for different reasons. A woman can enter into heaven for having a baby, something a man can never do. A man can enter into heaven and being a great leader of his family. A man is given the burden of having to go out to be the provider. Through the different rules, things become balanced. It is something we do out of love and understanding for the relationship. For a woman, she is supposed to listen to the man, and he listens to God. Therefore, it would only be a make sense for me to marry a Muslim, someone who has the same principles as opposed to someone of a different religion who has different rules. There would be difficulty in me keeping my faith and satisfying their wants. Muslim men can marry people of
the book because of his oneness of God. (Interview conducted September 30th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

The question of freedom to marry was important to this study since intermarriage with non-Muslims, especially with “white religions” such as Christianity or Judaism, would facilitate access to white America. As such, I asked this question to find out if respondents believed that there was an “escape hatch”\(^5\) that they knew of to escape this non-white Otherness in America. Overall, most respondents were trapped by religion and unable to access the escape hatch. These respondents followed the patriarchy of Islam and held that women had to marry within the religion. Accordingly, these individuals by not marrying outside of their religion could not access white America. Rather, the Otherness of Islam itself reinforced the Otherness of these individuals in America.

The final questions I asked in this regard was if they changed their physical appearance since 9/11. I also asked respondents what were their feelings in regard to the *hijab*.

As Y claimed:

> When I was younger, I would dress more modestly. I rebelled against my parents since they are more secular. I’ve told my friends that of I lived in the

\(^5\) The concept of “mulatto escape hatch” comes from the work of Carl Degler and his comparison of race relations in Brazil and the United States (Degler, 1971). Degler held that Mulattos in Brazil can escape the black-white racial characterization due to their intermediate social position. Consequently, Mulattos could become white due to the racial intermixing in Brazil and their emancipation from and abolition of slavery. These factors meant that lighter skinned blacks could become part of a higher socioeconomic strata in Brazil. Although this concept has largely been discredited (Telles, 2004) due to a lack of empirical evidence of Mulattos in Brazil, the Mulatto escape hatch does retain some symbolic value in that the belief in the concept impedes social group formation. As such, this concept is adopted for this research as a way to explain how Muslim Americans may believe that they can escape their Otherness and become part of the American national identity. This is not to say that such an “escape hatch” exists, but rather to claim that the belief in such a concept alters the perceptions of Muslim Americans.
Muslim world, I would not wear the *hijab*. However, if I was in a country that respected Islam, I would wear the *hijab*. I would never want to create the impression that says I’m doing this because I was told to. Too many people believe that the religion is about their physical appearance. (Interview conducted October 22nd, 2013, Tampa, FL)

X adds:

If you’re living in a society where it’s more dangerous to wear the *hijab* than to not wear, you should use practical logic. God does not want you to put yourself in danger for his own sake. I know women who have just worn hats or find a way to wear turtlenecks. They’re accomplishing the same intention, but there are ways that are more socially acceptable... [Regarding wearing the *hijab*] I know people say things about me. It’s about the passing of the eyes. It’s enough for me. It symbolizes so much in such a look of hate and disgust. It is hard to smile back, because you know what they are sending off and you know what you’re receiving. (Interview conducted September 30th, 2013, Tampa, FL)

Again, the question about the *hijab* was similar to that regarding marriage. The clothing that some Muslim Americans wear reinforces their Otherness. Non-Muslim Americans easily identify who the enemy in the War in Terror is by the way that Muslim Americans dress. If Muslim Americans are to change the way that they appear, they would lose one of their symbols of Otherness in America. If they choose to retain their modest dress, then Muslim Americans accept that they choose the path of recognition.
Comparing the Micro to the Macro

In the Publication *Muslim Americans: No Signs Of Growth In Alienation Or Support For Extremism*, the Pew Research Center interviewed 1,050 Muslim American respondents in 2007 and 1,033 Muslim Americans respondents in 2011, asking the same set of questions. In the 2007 study, the median age was 25 years old; a ratio of 54 percent male to 46 percent female; and a ratio of 50 percent Sunnis to 16 percent Shia. For the 2011 study there was a median age of 24.75 years; a ratio of 55 percent male to 45 percent female; and respondents were primarily Sunni (66 percent) rather than Shia (11 percent) (see table 8).

**Table 8: Sample Demographics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007 sample</th>
<th>2011 sample</th>
<th>2013 sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median age</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24.75</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male to female</strong></td>
<td>54/46</td>
<td>55/45</td>
<td>14/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sunni to Shia</strong></td>
<td>50/16</td>
<td>66/11</td>
<td>20/5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I replicated aspects of 2013 Pew study with Muslim Americans from Tampa Bay. The first question I asked by which was also asked by the Pew research Center in both 2007 and 2011 was: *Since the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, has it become more difficult to be a Muslim in the US, or hasn’t it not changed very much?* In 2007, 53 percent of Muslim American respondents answered that it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the US; 40 percent stated it hasn’t changed very much; and 1 percent claimed it has become easier to be a Muslim in the United States. In 2011, 55 percent of Muslim American respondents answered that it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the US; 37 percent stated it hasn’t changed very much; and 2 percent claimed it has become easier to be a Muslim in
the United States. Of my sample from 2013 in the Tampa Bay area, 60 percent claimed it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S. and 40 percent stated that it hasn’t changed very much (see table 9). While conducted on a smaller scale, my numbers come within a few percentage points of those from Pew. Therefore, I conclude that my numbers are reflective of the nationwide belief amongst Muslim Americans that it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S. since 9/11. However, I cannot draw further conclusions about the Muslim American population due to my small sample size.

**Table 9: Has it become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S.?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Since the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, has it become more difficult to be a Muslim in the US, or hasn’t it not changed very much?</td>
<td>53% it has become more difficult</td>
<td>55% it has become more difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40% it hasn’t changed very much</td>
<td>37% it hasn’t changed very much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1% it has become easier</td>
<td>2% it has become easier</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the question, *what do you think are the most important problems facing Muslims living in the United States today*, the top five responses in 2007 are as follows: 19 percent stated no problem; 19 percent claimed that the most problem is discrimination/racism/prejudice; 15 percent claimed it was being viewed as terrorists; 14 percent stated ignorance /misconceptions of Islam; and 12 percent said stereotyping/generalizing about all Muslims. In 2011 the top five answers were as follows: 19 percent stated discrimination/racism/prejudice; 16 percent no problems; 16 percent stereotyping /generalizing about Muslims; 15 percent stated
ignorance/misconceptions of Islam; and 9 percent said being viewed as terrorists. In my sample of Tampa Bay Muslim Americans the top five responses were: 40 percent claimed ignorance/misconceptions of Islam; 16 percent said not treated fairly/ harassment; 16 percent said discrimination/racism/prejudice; 10 percent stated stereotyping/generalizing about all Muslims; and 10 percent said hatred/fear/distrust of Islam (see table 10). Perhaps as a result of my small sample size my numbers were inflated. However, in comparison to levels of importance, my numbers are comparable with those from Pew.

Table 10: The most important problem facing Muslims?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What do you think are</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the most important</td>
<td>19% no problems</td>
<td>19% discrimination/racism/prejudice</td>
<td>40% ignorance/misconceptions of Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>problems facing</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims living in the</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States today?</td>
<td>14% ignorance/misconceptions of Islam</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12% stereotyping/generalizing about all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perhaps as a result of my small sample size my numbers were inflated. However, in comparison to levels of importance, my numbers are comparable with those from Pew.
In 2011 Pew asked, *do you think most Muslims who come to the U.S. today want to adopt American customs and ways of life or do you think that they want to be distinct from the larger American society?* 56 percent of the Pew’s Muslim American respondents answered that Muslims who come to the U.S. today should adopt America customs; 20 percent stated that they should remain distinct; and 8 percent said both. In my sample from 2013, 36 percent of respondents claimed that Muslims that come to the U.S. should adopt American values; 24 percent said that they should remain distinct, and 40 percent stated both (see table 11).

**Table 11: Muslim American integration?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you think most Muslims who come to the U.S. today want to adopt American customs and ways of life or do you think that they want to be distinct from the larger American society?</td>
<td>56% should adopt America customs</td>
<td>36% should adopt American values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20% they should remain distinct</td>
<td>24% should remain distinct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8% both</td>
<td>40% both</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My numbers do not necessarily compare with the numbers published by Pew in 2011. Regarding adopting American culture verses remaining distinct, my respondents favored the latter just as did Pew respondents. Based purely on speculation, perhaps respondents favored the “both” option because due to a large number of them being college students (60 percent). This is a time in which Muslim American students are exposed to new ideas and old ideas are challenged. This
situation may have influenced their view of how others should acculturate when coming to America.

In 2007 and 2011, Pew asked respondents: have you been singled out by airport security? In 2011, 18 percent of Muslim Americans said that they had been singled out by airport security and 81 percent claimed that they had not been singled out by airport security. In 2011, 21 percent said that they had been singled out by airport security and 77 percent claimed that they had not been singled out by airport security. In my sample from 2013, 16 percent said that they had been singled out by airport security and 84 percent claimed that they had not been singled out by airport security (see table 12). Therefore, my numbers are comparable with those published by Pew, but again, I cannot draw larger conclusions due to my small sample size.

Table 12: Airport Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you been</td>
<td>18% have been singled out</td>
<td>21% have been singled out</td>
<td>16% have been singled out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>singled out by</td>
<td>by airport security</td>
<td>by airport security</td>
<td>by airport security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>airport security?</td>
<td>81% have not been</td>
<td>77% have not been</td>
<td>84% have not been</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>singled out by</td>
<td>singled out by</td>
<td>singled out by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>airport security</td>
<td>airport security</td>
<td>airport security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2007, Pew asked subjects: Do you think of yourself first as an American or first as a Muslim? Both and neither were also acceptable responses to this question. In 2007, 28 percent of respondents identified first as American, 47 percent first as a Muslim, 18 percent as both, and 6 percent as neither. In 2011, 26 percent of respondents identified first as American, 49 percent as Muslim, 18 percent as both,
and 4 percent as neither. In my sample from 2013, 24 percent of Muslim American respondents thought of themselves first as American, 40 percent as Muslim, and 36 percent as both (see table 13). These numbers are comparable except for the “both” category. As with the acculturation question, my respondents are much more inclusive. Again, since other variables such as age, religious sect, and sex closely match in both surveys, this may be a result of the college experience and the open-mindedness that these individuals are exposed to in academia.

Table 13: Muslim and/or American?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do you think of yourself first as an American or first as a Muslim?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First as American</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First as a Muslim</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pew also asked Muslim Americans in 2007 if they thought that anti-terrorism policies single out Muslims for increased surveillance and monitoring. 54 percent of Muslim American respondents thought the U.S. government did single out Muslims, while 31 percent did not think so. In 2011, 52 percent of Muslim American respondents thought that the U.S. government did single out Muslims, and 34 percent did not think so. From my 2013 sample, 52 percent of respondents thought that the U.S. government did single out Muslims, while 48 percent did not think so (see table 14).
Table 14: Anti-terrorism policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you think anti-terrorism policies single out Muslims for increased surveillance and monitoring?</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54% think the U.S. government does single out Muslims</td>
<td>52% think the U.S. government does single out Muslims</td>
<td>52% think the U.S. government does single out Muslims</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31% do not think the U.S. government singles out Muslims</td>
<td>34% do not think the U.S. government singles out Muslims</td>
<td>48% do not think the U.S. government singles out Muslims</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data from both Pew and my own research displays that Muslim Americans feel Othered. The data clearly shows an increase since 2007 of more Muslim Americans indicating that it is more difficult to be a Muslim in the United States. Moreover, when asked, respondents in all three surveys claimed that discrimination/racism/prejudice; being viewed as terrorists; and stereotyping/generalizing about all Muslims were the three most important problems that they faced. Evidently, as the data shows, being a Muslim American has become more difficult during the War on Terror.

The data also indicates that almost a quarter of Muslim Americans believe that immigrants coming to the United States should remain distinct, while almost four in ten Muslim Americans view themselves first in religious terms. My sample data indicates an increasing trend after 9/11 for Muslim Americans to identify religiously first and to embrace their distinctiveness as non-white Americans. The trend is only reinforced by the belief amongst Muslim Americans to see themselves as targets of U.S. anti-terrorism policies. As such, my data corresponds with the national level data indicating a growing racialization of American Muslims, but it is not representative of the beliefs of Muslim Americans across the country.
Conclusion

Racialization is not new to America, especially in times of foreign crisis. Just as Japanese Americans were not white enough during WWII and as such were grouped in with the evil Other, Muslim Americans today have not achieved the status of belonging with America, meaning "white" America. Instead, they are seen, as were Japanese Americans, as a fifth column within the U.S. Therefore, it is not surprising that many American Muslims are having difficulties assimilating into the U.S. In fact, there is reluctance both within and outside the community to keep them in a separate religious enclave.

The pressures from within the community to keep themselves separate from mainstream America largely stem from the experience of 9/11. Muslim Americans have seen how they were treated in the aftermath of 9/11 and view integration into America with caution. No matter their dedication to the state, their fellow white citizens have treated Muslim Americans with suspicion. As such, Muslim America was brought closer together by their experience of exclusion. These stronger Muslim American communities are displaying their resolve by entering into politics, through NGO’s and voting. They are also resisting the framing of Muslims as terrorist by openly wearing the *hijab*. Muslim America, although American, is carving out their own separate niche within the white America state. Whether this niche will one-day incorporate into mainstream America and achieve the status of whiteness remains an open question.

Moreover, Muslim Americans can see the double lives that they live. They are the Other within. Although the U.S. government has gone to great lengths to state
that America is not at war with Islam, empirical reality paints a different picture. In the past 10 years, America has gone to war against three different Islamic-majority countries. The evil Other during these episodes was a revisionist danger to the peace. The goodness of America was at war with totalitarian, backwardness. This Other, although not explicitly stated by the U.S. government was Islam. Muslim Americans, and most Americans, were aware of this framing. They understood that they were perceived as dangerous others within virtuous America. Yet, Muslim Americans were also aware that they were American citizens. Muslim Americans, just as their Japanese American predecessors are living a life of dual consciousness.

While understanding their racialized status as non-white, some Muslim Americans still attempt to operate with the American political system. The non-white status of Muslim Americans means that they cannot assimilate into America. As such, Muslim Americans must demand recognition, at least in the near term. That is not to say that Muslim Americans can never achieve the status of “whiteness.” It is to say that in the current racialized environment characterized by the War on Terror will cause them to be viewed as less than American (e.g. white) while the U.S. is engaged in conflict with Muslim-majority countries.
CHAPTER 4: The Views of a Muslim American

To gain further and deeper insight into the dynamics of the processes of racialization, double-consciousness, and identity, I conducted one intensive open-ended interview, which lasted one hour and forty minutes on October 28, 2011. Through this method, I thought to triangulate the already achieved insights, hypothesis, and tentative explanations in order to either confirm, reject, or refine the explanations I had already gained previously through the shorter and more structured interview process. We discussed major U.S. foreign policy episodes towards the Middle East since the time she immigrated to America. These events include the first and second Iraq Wars, 9/11 and the War on Terror, the Afghanistan War, the Libyan intervention, and the Syrian crisis.

It is important to uncover what she thinks about American foreign policy, because it directly relates to double-consciousness, racialization, Otherness, and identity. As discussed in Chapter 2, racialization happens both outside and within groups. In my case, outside racialization is the way in which the War on Terror framed the Other. Again, in this context, the Other is the dark skinned, non-Judeo-Christian, who is oppressed by their cultural-religious identity. The racialization that occurs within emanates from the way in which Muslim America understands the framing of the War on Terror. Although American foreign policy is not explicitly anti-Muslim, if Muslim America perceives American foreign policy to be anti-Muslim than that group will see themselves as Othered. That is to say, racialization is also a
process of internalization. Therefore, it is critical to understand how Muslim Americans are shaped by American foreign policy and how they understand it.

The responses from my subject confirm my hypothesis that American foreign policy towards the Middle East is Othering Muslim Americans due to the framing of who constitutes the dangerous Other. My subject’s responses also confirm a secondary hypothesis about when this subjective framing occurred, which to her was after September 11th. Finally, the subject also confirms the hypothesis that American foreign policy over time has eroded her sense of Americanness.

This individual, who I will henceforth refer to as J, is a graduate student, age 50. She originally immigrated to the United States from Syria at 17 and was born in Damascus. During her time in Damascus, she came from a family that was well to do, living a very comfortable life in an upscale neighborhood. She immigrated to America since she became married to someone already living in the United States. Therefore, she had U.S. immigrant status when she was already living in Syria. While living in Syria, J thought about becoming an American citizen. These thoughts were due to the conditions in Syria, which were not promising at that point in time. Given these conditions, she did not see a future for herself in Syria. Rather, she looked to the United States, since as she claims, “it markets itself as a democracy, as a place of upward mobility.”

As this quote illustrates, at the earliest stage J understood that being an American meant that everyone had a chance to advance their lives in America. The United States was a place for J that was governed by all of its members. She did
not distinguish between being white or Muslim in America. Rather, she accepted the premise that America was a place where she too, a Muslim, could succeed.

Prior to moving to the U.S., J viewed the United States as a superpower that was looking out for its own interests. At the same time, she did not see the United States as very friendly to Muslim countries. She did not see the U.S. as friendly to Muslim countries as a result of the United States position in the 1967 Six-Day War, in which America took the side of Israel. Yet, her perceived position of the U.S. as being anti-Islamic did not hinder her Muslim American individuality. J stated that she did not have any hindrances in the United States, in that she was able to freely attend college, even when the United States was involved militarily with Muslim countries in the 1980s. During this time, her belief of American foreign policy remained consistent in that the United States was not friendly to Muslims. However, it did not affect her views as an American citizen. In fact, J states she did not connect the two, meaning domestic and foreign policy, until after September 11th occurred.

When she got to the United States in 1984, J did not experience any discrimination as a Muslim student. Nobody bothered her about her headwear and there were no comments about her physical appearance, religion, or ethnicity. When her children were young, she stated, her children’s teachers were interested in J giving presentations on Islam to the class. She felt that these presentations were more about curiosity than hostility. Yet, J also noted that she felt a little out of place giving these presentations. This was ascribed to her feeling as though she never quite totally conformed to “Americanness.” Despite this feeling, she sidelined
her doubts and did not pay heed to them. When asked why she did not feel as though he could conform, J stated that it was due to talking differently, dressing differently, and not drinking alcohol.

J claimed she viewed Americans as narrow-minded and busy with their daily lives when asked how she understood Americanness. To J, Americans are not concerned with the international community. Americans also have no clue on what goes on of the U.S. Further, to J, those that might know what was going on outside the U.S. simply did not care. She could not understand this foreign policy obliviousness especially since “what happens in the Middle East affects the gas prices of Americans.” Despite this negative view of Americanness, J believed that America was a very practical place, especially for women in terms of education and career advancement.

First Gulf War, Israel, and Policy Ramifications

With the first Gulf War in 1991, J stated that she cried when missiles began raining down in the night on Iraq. She felt that this act was unjustified. Although she did not like Saddam Hussein, J believed that the Iraqi people would pay the highest price by the war. She also believed that America got involved with Iraq because of their oil wealth. As such, it was not surprising to hear her describe American foreign policy as “hostile in pursuit of grabbing resources.”

J did not perceive a change in American identity with the first Gulf War. However, she began to distance herself from American foreign policy because of the
1991 Gulf War. She did not believe that America became more bigoted during this period. This may be due to her location at that time since she was a college student in Virginia where a lot of the professors were against the war. Therefore, as a consequence of her environment, she felt she was not the only one against the Iraq war.

After the First Iraq War, Israel was pressured by the United States to talk with the neighboring Middle East regimes in order to seek peace. Although there was a peace process that followed, J and many on the “Arab street” never saw the leaders of any of these Muslim countries as legitimate. The lack of legitimacy for these Middle East leaders is due to none of the leaders in the Muslim world coming to power via popular support. Rather, many of these leaders represent small segments within their states, and often use their position to hoard the resources of the state. Moreover, these same leaders often make state decisions for the benefit of their group rather than in the best interest of the state. Since the leadership disadvantages the majority of the residents in these states, the population tends to not support the decisions made by state leaders. Therefore, whatever happened with the peace process would not represent the average Middle Easterner, and as such would not be legitimate. At the time, J did not believe that the peace process was going to go anywhere and that it was meaningless. She felt that the parties chose to engage in the peace process because the United States told them to so. She stated her belief that if the Arab leaders did not engage in the peace process, the U.S. would replace them. That is to say, to J, these leaders of sovereign states “had to obey the master.” J stated that “the master” wants cheap oil prices and
hegemony over the region. She went on to state the United States wants puppets
to do their job for them.

To J, U.S.-Middle East foreign policy was not just about Islam or oil. To J, U.S.-Middle East foreign policy was also about the sense of being oppressed. In particular, American foreign policy for the Middle East was about Muslim values being oppressed. When asked to elaborate, J responded that Muslim values are justice, equality, and fairness. She viewed American foreign policy as standing in contradiction to these Muslim values. However, she did not believe that U.S. foreign policy was trying to be anti-Islamic per se. Rather, she said, the U.S. is trying to control Muslims, and if they cannot do that, she believed that the United States government would oppress Muslims. She also stated her belief that people in the Middle East have a common knowledge that America wants control over their resources and that the U.S. supports Israel “to be in the best position to control them.”

This is a clear indicator of racialization in that J felt that Muslim Americans are targeted because they are Muslims. These Muslim Americans did not come out as enemies of the U.S. state, but since they stood in opposition to the United States they were framed as a threat. Further, Muslim Americans were not only a threat because they stood in opposition to U.S. foreign policy, but rather because they would not submit to the control of the U.S. state. In J’s view, since Muslims were not submitting to this total control, they were being framed as uncontrollable Others that could not fit into the racial hierarchy, and therefore had to be kept suppressed.
When asked why people would to still come to America if it was such an oppressive place, J equated it with joining the enemy. However, she separated the foreign policy of the U.S. from the American people. Yes, she said, America is a democracy, but “the American public does not know what the government does overseas.” As such, she wanted to become part of the American people, not part of the American government that drafts and carries out U.S. foreign policy. To J, U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East is domineering because domestic lobbies control the American government. In particular, she stated that the Israel and oil lobbies control the U.S. government. She went on to express that she did not believe democracy promotion is in the interest of the United States foreign policy towards the Middle East. Instead, democracy promotion was a way of interfering in the Middle East and maintaining stability in the Middle East, in particular the stability of Israel and the stability of oil prices. She stated that as a consequence of this foreign policy, Muslim states in the Middle East were hostile to America.

J went on to elaborate feelings regarding Israel. She stated that Israel was born on occupied land and that it is in Israel’s best interest to suppress any opposition. She stated that rather than the American state being behind this objective, Israel leads the United States in this endeavor. Therefore, to her, Israel was able to achieve this objective due to the power of the Israel lobby. She went on to express the belief that the United States was shooting itself in the foot with its Israel position, and if the U.S. “ditched” Israel or was neutral towards Israel, it would achieve much better relations in the Middle East. J also believed that if Israel allowed the promotion of true Palestinian democracy, then one day Israel could be a legitimate state in the Middle East.
We then discussed the sanctions against the Iraq regime in the 1990’s and the Oil-For-Food Program. United Nations program was extremely corrupt and did not affect Saddam Hussein or his inner circle. Rather, United States-led sanctions hurt the Iraqi people. Over half a million Iraqi children were killed by the sanctions regime. I asked J how she felt about these sanctions and she responded that “as a Muslim, it was an unjust action. It only hurt the poor people in Iraq. It did not hurt the Iraqi regime.” When I asked why the United States would pursue this action even though it would not harm Saddam Hussein, J stated that the U.S. chose this plan of action to suppress any opposition to Saddam Hussein within Iraq. She believed the United States did not want Saddam Hussein to be removed by his own people, which could result in a representative, legitimate government. Instead, J believed, the U.S. wanted a puppet to control Iraq since the United States did not have a replacement ready for Saddam Hussein.

As such, J is expressing, the U.S. foreign policy does not support genuine Muslim democracy. The United States does not support or trust Muslims to run their own country. Instead, to J, the U.S. needs a strongman to suppress the wild, unruly Other. To J, if the United States does not have this pliable dictator ready to implant, the U.S. will simply choose to dominate the entire state and keep all Muslims subjugated. This view may have parallels domestically. As J mentioned, Muslim Americans are not involved domestically in American politics. Since the U.S. state does not have a strong representative in Muslim America to speak for all of their co-religionists and to lead other Muslims, the United States suppresses Muslim’s political activity via the War on Terror. Again, if the United States cannot co-opt and control, the American state uses a blanket policy to repress all Muslim Americans.
To J, American citizens at this point time did not care about what was going on in Iraq. As a result, to her, there was not a perceivable change in American national identity. Yet, at this point time in time she became even more disenchanted with American foreign policy. She stated that the face of American foreign policy was “getting uglier and uglier. It was becoming more aggressive. Before the 1990s, the answer to problems in American foreign policy was not simply bombing.”

**Almost White Before 9/11**

Moving to September 10, 2001, the day before her identity as an American changed, she felt that Muslim Americans were making headways with politicians and with the American political scene. She noted how President Clinton recognized the Muslim vote and President George W. Bush recognized the importance of the Muslim demographic. She felt that Muslim Americans were finally making progress. By this time, many Muslim Americans became politicized because of the sanctions regime on Iraq and the conflict with Israel. The one mistake, she noted, was that Muslim Americans focused on foreign policy, rather than on national politics. To J, in hindsight, this was the wrong focus.

During this pre-9/11 period, Muslim Americans were becoming more politically aware and were getting more involved with political parties. She claimed that Muslims were becoming party members, which was not the case before the 1990’s. She also stated that American foreign policy drew them to the political parties. As J stated, “all politics are local” and she believes that Muslim America
should have “first gained a true foothold in the domestic sphere rather than jumping all the way to foreign politics.” In practice, she notes, the Muslim American community did not have an impact on U.S. foreign policy. Rather, it had the opposite effect. Muslim America became seen as the enemy. Politically active Muslim Americans were advocating not giving aid to Israel and not bombing Iraq. As a consequence, Muslim American views of American foreign policy were simply seen as being against the current foreign policy. Muslim Americans were seen as a fifth column in America. This point was the zenith of politically active Muslim America.

J and I also spoke about how in the literature on Muslim America, scholars speak about how before 9/11 Muslim Americans almost became “white.” That is to say, many scholars believe that Muslim America was almost part of mainstream America. In fact, Middle Eastern Americans are considered Caucasian in the U.S. census. J mentioned how early Syrian and Lebanese immigrants that came to America were Christians, and therefore were considered white. She also claimed that many Muslim Americans claimed this white status since they did not want to be lumped in with blacks in the United States. This black community was of lower racial status and therefore by claiming whiteness, Middle Eastern Americans could be part of the mainstream, despite their religious otherness as Muslims.

9/11 and the War on Terror

J stated that before September 11th, she felt almost white. When asked to define being white in America she claimed it meant “being part of the mainstream and
acceptable.” This also meant not being looked down upon and not being discriminated against in jobs. By contrast, today J feels nonwhite. She has openly been called a rag-head, obviously a derisive term for non-whites, and has been discriminated against when she has applied for jobs. She stated that it is not obvious discrimination. Rather, it is a more subtle discrimination, such as being the last one considered when it comes to employment. For instance, she stated: “they won’t tell you that you won’t get the job because you’re Muslim, but you know that’s why.” That is to say, J found herself behind the veil, in the words of W.E.B. DuBois, burdened with the same double-consciousness that characterizes African-Americans, who also always have to ask themselves if they are being treated badly because they are black.

Regarding September 11, 2001, she stated that on that day she was outside her husband’s office when she heard that a couple of planes crashed into the World Trade Center towers. At the time, she thought nothing of it. She thought, perhaps, that it was just an accident. It was not until later that evening at dinner that it hit her. It was at that point that she saw the magnitude of the problem she would face as a Muslim American.

At this point, I asked J why she had a delayed reaction to what was about to be a foreign policy crisis impacting the American homeland. She responded that previously there was the TWA plane crash and the Oklahoma City bombing, both of which were not carried out by Muslims, and therefore she really did not think anything of it. She did note that with the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 the media rushed to say that Muslim extremists carried it out, and she felt it was
unfair. It was at that point, with Oklahoma City, that she “woke up to the feeling of being discriminated against.” She felt that with the Oklahoma City bombing, Muslims were becoming a target, but it was a subtle feeling and the “alarm bells in her head were not very loud.”

She stated that there were other alarms, but “they are more subtle, like being considered different. That’s an alarm.” J felt like all non-European immigrants hear this alarm. To her, European immigrants do not hear this alarm since they look like Americans, meaning they are white, and probably have the same religion. Middle Eastern immigrants will typically not have these same characteristics and therefore will always be considered different by the American mainstream. J claimed that the imagined face of the Middle Eastern immigrant in mainstream America is that of the terrorist. When pressed as to where this image is created, she stated that the media promote the terrorist face, which to J is just another arm of the U.S. government.

Again, while seemingly making the assertion that the government is anti-Islamic, J denied that this is the case. J did not believe that the U.S needed to be in conflict with Islam since “American values are very much compatible with Islamic values.” Instead, to her, the foreign policy of the United States is what is not compatible with Islam. As such, she felt, if American foreign policy toward the Islamic world changed, the United States would not find itself at odds with Muslim countries.

After the attacks occurred on September 11th, J “definitely” saw a change in her American identity. She claimed that what she immediately noticed was the
amount of discrimination she faced and witnessed. In fact, gun shots were fired at her mosque after 9/11. She also recounted how after 9/11 during a visit to Wal-Mart people would ridicule her. J stated that out of fear she did not want to leave the house. She feared for her physical safety and for the physical safety of her friends and loved ones. She did not want to be treated differently within her own homeland due to resembling the targeted Other in the War on Terror.

She stated that after 9/11 Muslim Americans males were more prone to being attacked than were Muslim American females. J believed this due to men being seen as more a threat than women, including women who wear the hijab. J felt that Muslim men are targeted because the new face of the Other post-9/11 is that of a Muslim male terrorists, not a female terrorist. To J, the face of the Muslim terrorist is a brown face, any shade of brown, just as long as it is nonwhite. This face also has a beard, and possibly wears a turban. Meanwhile, to J, the Muslim women’s face in the American popular imagination is that of “an oppressed face,” the women behind the veil.

After 9/11, J did not change her physical appearance, such as adding or removing a hijab, nor did any of her friends or loved ones. However, she was aware of others who changed their physical appearance. She believed those that did change their physical appearance did so because they were going through turmoil. To J, they were experiencing an inner struggle between keeping their faith or mixing into mainstream America, essentially a choice between assimilation or recognition. She stated that even if she did change her physical appearance she would still “be different.” J went on to say:
I’m still from the Middle East, so I am still different. I still have a foreign name. I can change that, but to what extent do I change myself. Do I want to completely lose my identity in order to fit in?

J’s quote illustrates the challenge for Muslim Americans post 9-11. Muslim Americans realize that they are fundamentally different that the current conception of Americanness. Muslim Americans realize that they are different than the idealized image of a Muslim American. In fact, Muslim Americans realize that they have characteristics which are closer to that of the ambiguous, unnamed enemy in the War on Terror. J knows that she is not affiliated with this shadowy enemy. However, she sees that other Americans view her as part of the enemy. Therefore, J has a choice. She can assimilate due to the racialization caused by the War on Terror or she can demand recognition and withstand the assault on her identity. The first choice is the easier one to make, but it will mean that J will lose a large part of herself in order to fit in, a big sacrifice to make for acceptance. The second choice is the more difficult choice. It will mean that J will continue to face harassment, but she will remain true to herself. As such, J chooses to embrace her Muslim identity despite all of the negative connotations of this identity brought on by the War on Terror.

J also expressed the observation that in the U.S. Americans have a notion that women who wear the *hijab* are oppressed. She felt that the United States uses this notion to vilify the Other. She felt that this notion was used to justify invading other states, such as with Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, J recalled, the United States claimed it was going to liberate Afghani women. In reality, to J, the U.S. cared less
about women’s rights. To her, it was a simply a means for America’s end goal of dominating the Middle East and ensuring rights to their resources.

**Foreign Policy at Home**

J claimed that as a result of the War on Terror, the U.S. government had infiltrated her Muslim American community. For example, she recounted how a man started coming to her mosque following 9/11. She stated that this man was caught holding the Koran upside down. Even when he prayed, she stated, he did know how to pray, and a couple of months later he disappeared. Thereafter, he was identified as “not belonging here” by her community.

J believes that as a result of this and other episodes, her community is being singled out by U.S. anti-terrorism policies. However, rather than blame this claim on the United States government being anti-Islamic, she believes that this targeting is due to financial purposes. That it is to say, since the United States is going through financial hardships, each U.S. bureaucracy is trying to maximize its funding. Therefore, to J, the FBI wants to show numbers to justify their funding, and a result they are setting up Muslim Americans.

J claimed that she did not know of any people who were pushed to be radical Muslims due to U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. However, she felt that within the United States following the invasion of Afghanistan, America was becoming less tolerant of Islam. At this point, J felt as though she was “an Other within my own country.” This feeling for J has not changed, as to this day she still feels as an
Within America prior to 9/11, she felt some sort of Americanness, but not totally American.

When asked as to why America was in this current condition with the Muslim world, J felt that it was due to the American empire deteriorating. To keep its position in the world, she believed the United States was attacking other countries in order to keep its position in the world. By dominating these countries, the United States could secure resources and ensure their position at the top in the international system. Internal issues, like increased corruption, she claimed, caused the deterioration of America. J believed that it is inevitable that the United States will eventually lose its position in the international system. When pressed as to whether should would like to prevent that fall, J stated that as a Muslim American she would absolutely want to help out country. However, she did not believe that she could make an impact since real decisions in America are made by the powerful.

The impact of this statement is that J sees the United States as needing to dominate Others. This domination feeds United States foreign policy. The Middle East, the birthplace of Islam, is one area in which the U.S. is currently dominating every aspect of life. J feels this domination since she has roots in the Middle East. She sees that the people who are being dominated look a lot like her. Therefore, how can she not feel as though she is part of the targeted Other? Yet, rather than position herself as against the United States government, J also embraces her newer identity as an American. She wants to reform the way in which America works. However, J believes she cannot affect the policies of the United States since
she is not part of the influential in America. As such, J is living two different lives in the U.S. At the same time she an Other and part of the “us.” She is part of the majority and the minority in America. J is both racialized and privileged. The ideational duality for J emerges from the War on Terror, but is caused by the racialized construction of the enemy.

**Afghanistan**

J was not supportive of the American foreign policy objective in Afghanistan to promote democracy. She stated that “democracy comes from below. It’s not a top-down process.” She added that it is not in Afghanistan’s tradition to have Western-style democracy. Instead, she believed it should be the United States foreign policy objective to let Afghans decide their own form of government.

J also viewed the American’s response to 9/11 as naïve. She saw how the American public immediately rallied behind the president and the government. J saw how the United States’ public was ready to attack the Muslim world without any real questioning of going to war. Yet, she also understood that nobody in America wanted to see the September 11th attacks, and it caused them to feel “that the attack was a threat to their lifestyle.” Interestingly, J says “their lifestyle,” not our lifestyle. This is a clear indication that at this point J does not feel J is part of the American national identity. She has now disaggregated herself as a result of the targeting of Muslim communities following 9/11.
Following the attacks on the World Trade Center, J also began to think of the Japanese-American internment camps or how Italians and Germans were treated in the United States during World War II. She began to feel that Muslim American would experience the same treatment internally as a result of American foreign policy. She believed that the War on Terror was going to be “an all-out war in the Middle East and all Muslims were to be a target of this war.”

When the U.S. invaded Afghanistan about a month after the 9/11 attacks, the feeling that J had about American foreign policy did not change. She claimed that this invasion was staged to justify U.S. access to resources in Afghanistan, in particular running an oil pipeline through that country. Therefore, it hurt J to see American soldiers dying for oil rights when they were told that they were fighting for their country.

Again, J sees herself as belonging to the American culture. She feels the pain of American soldiers dying. It saddens and sickens her to see her co-nationals dying in a Muslim state under supposedly false pretenses. However, she still sees American foreign policy as dominating a Muslim country for no other reason than to dominate a Muslim country which will not bend to its will. She feels conflicted in what she believes. She is living a double life as a Muslim and an American.

This doubleness may explain J conspiratorial beliefs. Obviously, J is wrestling with two identities, between being a religious Muslim or a patriotic, nationalistic American, during a time of foreign policy crisis. Unwilling to suppress her Muslim identity and needing to justify her American identity, she understands why America is invading Afghanistan, yet she is horrified by the deaths of innocent Muslims in
Afghanistan. Therefore, J explains the United States foreign policy action as being staged, or to put it another way, as not completely real. She understands the American foreign policy act more by the spectacle than by the action. For J, this rhetorical justification allows her to retain both her religious and national identities while avoiding ideational confliction.

**Iraq**

J stated that when the United States targeted Saddam Hussein for a second time in 2003, “it was even more egregious act than in 1990.” She stated: “Saddam Hussein had no part in 9/11. What is the justification for that now?” To her, this act against Iraq definitely now looked like an oil issue. This foreign policy decision to invade Iraq caused her to become “really disgusted with American foreign policy.”

To J, Muslims did not have the same feeling of empowerment like they did before September 11th. Therefore, Muslim Americans stopped talking to politicians about trying to change foreign policy, since they were trying to fend for themselves domestically. As such, Muslim America turned inward. J believed that the groups that were formed to advocate for Muslim America were now weaker in foreign policy matters and stronger in domestic political matters. Yet, J did not perceive a change in public opinion toward Islam. To her, there was still negative public opinion about Muslims and a perception that they are a threat; that Islam is a violent religion; that Islam is oppressive to women; and that Islam is threatening the American way of life.
When asked if America’s foreign policy is anti-Islamic, J did not believe that was the intent. She specifically mentioned that George W. Bush, the man, was not anti-Islamic, since he met with former University of South Florida professor Sami al-Arian. Interestingly, J believed that during the George W. Bush administration, the War on Terror was a war on Islam. She stated that terrorism was a code word for Islam. Therefore, George W. Bush’s foreign policy was anti-Islamic. Put another way, J believed, that if Islam stood in the way of American hegemony there was going to be a conflict between the two ideological systems. Therefore, what determined American foreign policy was resources, and American foreign policy used the fight against Islamic extremism as a means to a hegemonic end in an effort to secure resources in the Middle East.

J recounted that with the insurgency in Iraq, “it showed that America was not as strong as it believed.” Showing her desire to be part of America, she saw the deaths of American personnel as tragic. She felt disgusted and powerless as young men and women lost their lives to the Iraqi insurgency. When asked how she felt about Muslim Americans who sign up for the military, she claimed to understand. J believed that after signing up for the military Muslim Americans would be making a living, yet due to military indoctrination, their understanding about their Americanness would remain incomplete. This was due to Islam and American identities being compatible, but in foreign policy at odds with one another. As J states:
If you go overseas and are fighting a war against Islam, and if you are required to kill people, how can you be a Muslim or American? I find it very difficult to reconcile.

J was asked whether post-War on Terror it would be possible to reintegrate Muslim Americans into the American identity. She stated that in order to incorporate Muslim Americans, the United States would have to change its entire foreign policy towards the Middle East. To her, it would take more than just physically leaving these Muslim countries. Rather, the United States would have to be sincere about promoting democracy in Middle East. The United States would also have to be more transparent and fair when dealing with the Arab-Israeli issue.

When asked how she felt when Osama bin Laden was killed, J stated that she was relieved and happy that he was out of the picture. She made this assertion despite killing not being an Islamic or an American value. J stated: “maybe killing is wrong, but it’s one less problem that we [Muslim Americans] have to deal with.” She also believed that the larger Muslim American community was relieved that bin Laden was killed. Yet, she noted, that if you go to places like Pakistan, the people there are angry that bin Laden was killed since they view him as a man that stood up to the United States.

Regarding bin Laden, J did not see him as a Muslim. However, she did view him as the face of the War on Terror. His was the Muslim face, a Muslim face that looked like many faces in America. As such, J was happy bin Laden was killed, although it was un-Islamic, since it removed the main image and target, internationally and domestically, from the War on Terror. Yet, in reasserting her
Muslim identity, she was quick to point out that Muslims across the world still celebrate bin Laden. Bin Laden was a man who refused to be oppressed and as such chose to lead a movement against United States foreign policy. While J does not explicitly endorse his movement, she did make sure to add the caveat that bin Laden, the man, was not hated everywhere. I interpreted this caveat to mean that she feels a division between her Muslim and American identities, a split which was accentuated by the War on Terror. The split for J, was due to being Othered by the War on Terror. J does not the United States, rather she hates being targeted as the enemy. Accordingly, to J, the simple act of resisting domination by bin Laden was an act to be admired since he refused to submit to a lessened non-white, non-American, non-Judeo-Christian position.

Libya and Syria

When the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya occurred, J did not believe the intervention was due to oil, since relatively speaking Libya has a miniscule amount of this resource. She also did not believe that Muammar Qaddafí was a Muslim. She agreed with the decision to intervene in Libya since the U.S. had a coalition of countries attacking the Qaddafí regime and had U.N. approval. J also approved of this foreign policy action since it did not put NATO boots on the ground in a Muslim country, and she viewed the intervention as consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals of defending democracy.

Regarding, America foreign policy toward her country of origin, Syria, J stated that the United States should stop dictating what the opposition should do
and should not do in Syria. She believed that the Syrian people should decide the political solution in Syria and the United States should not dictate who comes to power. As a Syrian-American, she was in favor of a U.S. attack against the Assad regime in 2012. In fact, J was “so disappointed when the United States backed down.” That being said, she did want the United States to remove Assad, only to destabilize his capabilities.

Accordingly, J is disappointed in the United States foreign policy because of its “hypocrisy” regarding Syria. As she notes, American foreign policy wants democracy, but in the case of Syria, the U.S. was unwilling to do anything against a dictator. Again, she did not want the U.S. to remove Assad. Rather, J believes that “American foreign policy can do Syria smarter by promoting democracy on the ground and not putting troops on the ground.” For comparison, she noted Iran’s spreading of soft power across the Middle East. Specifically in Syria, Iran has been spreading its influence through proselytizing the Shia religion, and using cash payments for a destitute population as an incentive to convert. Mirroring this soft power push, she believes the United States foreign policy in Syria should be targeted at promoting values like individualism, free trade, pragmatism, and democracy. In promoting these values, she believes that Syrian people would find American values very compatible to their own, and as such the Syrian population would be less hostile to America.

In relation, J believes that there is definitely a sectarian war occurring in the Middle East right now between Sunnis and Shiites. However, she does not believe that the U.S. is promoting this war. Yet, that is not to say that the U.S. it not
influencing this war, possibly unwittingly. J thinks that U.S. foreign policy in the region “does not know what it is doing.” The end result of this foreign policy, or lack thereof, is that, to J, Shiites are winning. She noted how with the removal of Saddam Hussein, a nominal Sunni himself, the Shiites now have far more influence than they did in Iraq.

J also found the possible rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran as troubling. She believed that the animosity between Iran and the U.S. is “only show below the table.” Instead, she believes that the two countries are not really enemies, despite the hateful rhetoric that is espoused from both sides at times. I pressed J on why these countries may want to be friends in the open if they could remain friends below the table. She expressed the belief that there is “some conspiracy against Sunni Muslims, since the West would rather see a Shiite Middle East rather than a Sunni Middle East. Why I don’t know... Maybe it’s the Arab spring that sparked this friendship. There is now a common enemy, Sunni Muslims.”

These naive beliefs toward U.S. foreign policy could be a result of J’s Othered status within America. She feels under threat in her country, and as a result, feels the need to explain her out of the ordinary experience. J cannot make sense of the fact that although she is part of the most powerful state on earth, she is also somehow part of the enemy. Therefore, J relies on conspiracy to explain her situation. She sees the U.S. as wanting to have a Shiite-led Middle East without any evidence.
Perhaps, as an explanation, there is a parallel in her experience. The Middle East, from where she originates, is a Sunni lead region. Yet, J, a Sunni, feels her relatively privileged position slipping away in the Middle East much as it is in America. In both places, she is becoming an Other within. In Syria, J, the Sunni-Muslim is a Syrian national under an Alawite (a quasi-Shia sect) regime. As a result, in Syria, J is an enemy terrorist against the state and its own War on Terror. In America, J, the Muslim is part of America, yet also the targeted enemy in the War on Terror. Table 15 below illustrates this dual life. J is under threat in both of her homes, and therefore needs to rationalize this threatening environment by way of conspiracy.

**Table 15: Timeline of J in the United States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Sense of Americaness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Gulf War (1991)</td>
<td>Disagreeing with American foreign policy but not feeling Othered as a result of it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to September 10, 2001</td>
<td>Making headway in America; approaching a sense of Americanness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War on Terror (September 11, 2001-current)</td>
<td>Targeted; pushed out of the American identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (2001)</td>
<td>Conflicted; trying to make sense of her Otherness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Gulf War (2003)</td>
<td>Conflicted; targeted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria (2012- current)</td>
<td>Even more targeted, specifically as a Sunni Muslim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Abrahamic America?**

Regarding the future of American national identity, I asked J whether one day the U.S. might be able to identify itself as an Abrahamic-nation, meaning a country for Christians, Jews, and Muslims. She believed that if such a future was possible,
Muslim Americans would “have to do their part in order to change that. I don’t know that they’re in a position to do that.” She stated that if the next generation can become white, just like Jewish Americans did, they can affect American politics. She also expressed the opinion that a lack of engagement in the American community is the biggest problem facing Muslim Americans. J believes that American Muslims need to find ways to be more represented in American politics.

J believes that one reason Muslim Americans are not involved in American politics is because they have “the immigrant mentality.” To her, this means that immigrants will always be immigrants, “with their orientation always focused on where they came from.” She did not believe that the old country should interfere with their current political activism. Despite this belief, J noted that she “knows a lot of people around me that care a lot less about what goes on in the local community. They’re thinking about what’s going on back home in the Middle East.” She believed that this problem has grown in significance due to advancements in communication, which allow immigrants to know about what is going on back in the homeland. J felt that this technological advancement for immigrants is a hindrance to becoming integrated into the American identity.

Therefore, to J, for Muslims to make it in America they will have to become “white.” To her, Muslim Americans will have to first conquer domestic politics before they can worry about international politics. As such, Muslim Americans will have to lose their immigrant mentality and integrate into mainstream white America. To J, Muslim Americans will have to find their way to Abrahamic America in spite of the framing that keeps them labeled as Others in their homeland.
Conclusion

The interview with J displayed a convergence in terms of similarities with other Muslim Americans in my sample. Her open-ended responses matched with the close-ended responses of my sample. J’s contribution was that she gave depth and substance to these responses. She was able to express why specific American foreign policies racialized the Muslim American identity. J was also important in showing the mind of a long-time Muslim immigrant. Moreover, J exhibited how what is happens abroad in American foreign policy impacts the internal formulation of the Muslim American community.

J was also representative of my sample in that the key event in her life as a Muslim American was the 9/11 attacks and the resulting War on Terror. Before this event, J was coming ever closer to feeling American. That is to say that she believed she was coming closer accessing the white American identity, Although she did not believe she would ever become totally American, she thought at some point she could approximate a sense of Americanness. Indeed, she believed that she was coming closer to that point of white Americanness after the election of George W. Bush, a man whose foreign policies she disagrees with but also a man she does not believe to be anti-Islamic.

J also seemed torn regarding the purpose of U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East. At times, she believed that the American foreign policy was oppressive to Muslims. Yet, at other points, she wanted the U.S. to do something in the Middle East, such as in Syria. I believe these conflicted desires stem from her identities as a Syrian, an American and a Muslim. J, who is a Sunni, does not want to see Assad,
an Alawite, continue to dominate her sect. As such, her beliefs about American foreign policy in the Middle East are tempered by her personal feelings. I do not doubt this feeling is unique to J, as many Americans view United States foreign policy in a negative light, yet manage to make an exception or to find a grey area when it meets their needs.

Finally, another important observation was the conspiratorial views of J. This was not uncommon amongst others in my sample. Several respondents felt under threat from a force that they could not explain. They saw this force first during the War on Terror. J recognizes that Muslim Americans are targeted in America, but she cannot explain the force behind the targeting. Despite the conceptual vagueness of this threat, J sees how white America has framed her as a dangerous Other. Yet, J continues to subscribe to the idea of the American Dream. As such, J is experiencing double consciousness. She sees herself as an Other and an American. Consequently, J cannot explain the disconnect between the American dream and her Muslim American nightmare.
CHAPTER 5: Findings and Reflection

Muslim American Demographics

American foreign policy towards the Middle East impacts the identity of Muslim Americans. My study effectively demonstrates that Muslim Americans in the Tampa Bay region feel racialized by U.S. foreign policy. Repeatedly, research subjects stated that they have been grouped in with the foreign Other as a result of U.S.-Middle East foreign policy. Subjects overwhelmingly felt that the turning point at which they became racialized was the War on Terror. During this critical foreign policy juncture, respondents felt that their Muslim identity was equated with the “terror” in the War on Terror. Undoubtedly, my sample of Muslim Americans did not ascribe this characteristic unto themselves. The equating of Muslim with terror came from outside their group. The equation of these two terms came from the dominant group in the U.S., white America.

Most respondents did not feel that the U.S. government was explicitly anti-Muslim or was promoting an anti-Islamic message. Many of these same respondents often stated that the foreign policy of the United States dominated Muslims in its foreign policy because the Middle East, the birthplace of Islam, happened to be the place that also had resources that America wanted to control. Therefore, the United States had to dominate the people in the Middle East so that they could ensure cheap and easy access to oil. Put another way, white America
wanted to retain its privileged access resources. As such, to respondents, the War on Terror was a war to subjugate Muslims in order to control their resources.

Since Muslim Americans were ascribed a particular identity, either explicitly or implicitly, some Muslim Americans during the War on Terror started to borne out this identity. That is not to say that these respondents became the evil Other. Rather, respondents accepted their religious identity since they were denied the “American national identity.” This embrace of their Islamic identity meant that although some of my subjects did not outwardly appear to be Muslim, the respondents retained cultural aspects of Islam to sustain a communal understanding of their group.

Accordingly, it was not surprising to hear the majority of my respondents represent themselves as Muslim Americans, not American Muslims. My respondent’s religious identity comes first. I suspect since Muslim Americans have been racialized, it has only caused my respondents to identity less with the American national identity. Further, this racialization pushed Muslim Americans closer together, thereby giving more prominence to their religious identity. Put another way, these individuals are grouping together as Muslims under threat, not as Americans under threat.

The threatening environment of the War on Terror does not mean that America and Islam are incompatible. Respondents overwhelmingly believed that Islamic and American values are compatible. What was not compatible was their targeting in the War on Terror, which equated Islam with the enemy. Many respondents felt that this targeting was implicit and not necessarily driven by the
U.S. government. Respondents often saw this framing as being projected by the U.S. media. Despite this view, no respondent could empirically explain why the U.S. media would choose to target Muslim America.

Thus, post-9/11, Muslim American groups have acknowledged their place in the racial ordering of America. Muslim Americans understand that they are second status citizens within their own country. This fact is in spite of Muslim Americans attempting to reach out to the dominant social group to assist in fighting the War on Terror. Rather than allow Muslim Americans to be part of “us” and to fight against the terrorists, Muslim Americans have been labeled as part of “them,” or the target of the War on Terror. This targeting brought on by U.S. foreign policy has caused Muslim Americans to have racial epitaphs aimed at them from their co-nationals and to be discriminated against in employment.

Further, Muslim Americans have been racialized to the point that they have been implicitly barred from higher public office, thereby keeping American politics dominated by whites. Accordingly, it is not surprising to hear respondents remark that one of the main problems facing Muslim America is their lack of engagement in U.S. public affairs. Being denied access to political participation is simply one more symptom of the process of racialization in the United States. A clear way in which Muslim in America has been racialized is with the political attacks aimed at President Barrack Obama. In order to discredit his message, many white groups pushed the narrative that the President is a secret Muslim. While not a substantive criticism directed at any particular policy, this narrative was able to convince some that the President should not be trusted. As such, a Muslim during the War on
Terror is politically equated with evil, insidious, and adversarial. This discrimination keeps Muslim Americans largely out of public office and unable to significantly alter domestic or foreign policy.

Interestingly, there was a difference in my study regarding age in how Muslim Americans chose to embrace their identity and how they chose to navigate this identity in white America. According to my research, the primary fault line in age centered on whether a Muslim American immigrated to the United States or if a Muslim American was born in the United States. For the former, foreign policy typically did not impact their sense of American identity. Rather, these individuals focused on bettering their socioeconomic situation in America. Many of these Muslim Americans chose to remain distinct, thereby not assimilating into United States culture. Had these Muslim American immigrants been able to access resources in the United States, perhaps, then they would have integrated into the American identity. However, given their current economic situation, these individuals were more impacted by American domestic policy.

Young Muslim Americans, meaning those who grew up after 9/11 but during the War on Terror, were more able to assimilate into the American national identity. These individuals did not have to worry about accessing resources, since their immigrant parents provided for their wellbeing. This situation meant that younger Muslim Americans could spend more time learning the white American national identity, and recalibrating their sense of self in an attempt to fit into the national identity. In fact, in some Muslim households, the younger generation was actively
encouraged by the older generation to Americanize and to downplay their religious identity.

Recalibration is central, given that post 9/11, what it meant to be an American changed. Muslim Americans were no longer seen as being almost white. Rather, they were the non-white Other. In order to re-identify with the “us,” some Muslim Americans downplayed their Islamic identity. As some respondents noted, Mohammed, became Mike or some Islamic Middle Easterners instead chose to identify themselves by another ethnicity, such as Mexican or Italian.

These identity modifications were not accessible to all Muslim Americans, such as religiously devout women. A Muslim American woman wearing the hijab was the embodiment of an idealized notion the Islamic woman. For Muslim American women that wore the hijab, there was a belief that to escape from being Othered one could remove their headwear. Many Muslim American women were not willing to take this step. Rather, these women became the defenders of the Muslim faith in America.

As such, not all younger Muslim Americans chose to shift their Muslim identity. Some Muslim Americans chose to embrace their Otherness. This was especially true of those Muslim women that chose to wear the hijab and religiously devout men who chose to grow out their beard. Many of these men and women became the defenders of their faith. They knew that Muslim Americans were the Others in American foreign policy. Yet, these individuals chose to counter the perceptions held by some in the American public, reaching out to their communities in order to humanize their identity. Thus, education was extremely important to
Muslim Americans since it allowed Muslim Americans to educate a curious public on what they are and what they are not. Education was also a way to gain consciousness and to break out from behind their double consciousness. Muslim Americans saw education as a way of countering negative perceptions of themselves and reducing their Othered status.

Within my Muslim America sample there was an idea that young people should go to college in order to pursue lucrative careers. The thinking by the Muslim American community is that post-collegiate career success will provide Muslim Americans with an easier life to live in America. Interestingly, economic success was seen by some respondents to have an effect on Muslim identity. Some respondents held that it caused individuals to become more religious and secure in their Muslim identity. In these cases, Muslim Americans were more likely to make religious trips back to the Middle East and to tithe more often. Other respondents provided contrary anecdotal accounts in which Muslim Americans became less religious and more secular as a result of economic success. In these circumstances, Muslim Americans would downplay their Islamic identity in order to fit into “white” American social circles.

My respondents also commented on their interactions with other social groups in America. Respondents significantly noted the tension between their belief system and how it matched with the platform of the Republican Party, but also how the Republican Party due to demographics excludes Muslims. On the other hand, respondents noted how they fit with the Democratic Party demographically, but ideologically they do not match with the party’s platform. Respondents were also
more likely to interact with other Abrahamic religions, e.g. Christianity and Judaism, than non-Abrahamic religions.

Related to exclusion, many respondents noted the segregation that they faced in the United States. The discrimination that Muslim Americans face was largely attributed to most Americans misunderstanding Islam. While there is a great awareness of Islam post-9/11, the conclusions drawn about Muslim Americans, respondents felt, were largely misinformed. Since many non-Muslim Americans had tainted views of Islam, they tended to treat it as a violent religion. Thus, due to this largely negative perception, there was an effort by some Americans to exclude Muslim Americans from employment in the United States or to treat them as second status citizens.

Interestingly, several respondents made light of the discrimination they face in America. I attribute this to Muslim Americans trying to fit in with white America. Accordingly, if respondents laughed at the jokes directed at them perhaps by white America, then they could be seen as any other American which views Islam in a negative light. I believe that many of the Muslim Americans in my study would rather play down the daily discrimination they face and rather join with the majority through quiescence.

**American Foreign Policy and Double Consciousness**

As my study illustrates, although variables such as gender, education, socioeconomic status, and age do impact the identity of American Muslims,
American foreign policy was the primary causal variable that shaped how they are viewed and view themselves in the United States. The aforementioned variables: gender, education, socioeconomic status, and age were really casual variables of second order in that they caused Muslim Americans to view their exclusion via American foreign policy through different lenses. Yet, these different lenses all operated behind the same veil, in that American Muslims, no matter their demographics, were Muslim first and American second. The ordering of Muslim first and American second was not self-imposed by many Muslim Americans respondents. Rather, this ordering was constructed and externally imposed by the dominant white society of America. Consequently, as a result of American foreign policy towards the Middle East many Muslim Americans were looking at themselves through the eyes of others.

However, to the extent that these individuals operated behind this veil, Muslim Americans did not necessarily see their difference as a negative quality. That is to say, most respondents did not resign themselves to the fact that they were not included in white America. Instead, many respondents embraced their Islamic identity and wanted to represent it to the dominant white American culture. Moreover, the Muslim Americans in my sample wanted to prove to the dominant American identity that there is nothing incompatible with Islam and America. Indeed, my respondents felt that they were displaying their American identity simply by disagreeing with American foreign policy towards the Middle East.

Many of the younger respondents in my study noted how the national security state and war in the Middle East had become normalized during their
lifetimes. These younger individuals had grown up in an America that promoted the myth of acceptance and prosperity for all, yet these same individuals experience an Otherness that did not allow them to access the American national identity. As such, due to the Muslim American identity being excluded from the American national identity, some individuals chose to embrace other elements of their identity. For these individuals, the simple fact that they were Muslims kept them in an Othered condition in which they were the enemy of U.S. foreign policy.

For some Muslim Americans, no matter how hard they might try, they could not fit in with what it means to “be American.” These individuals instead chose to embrace their adverse identification and turn to radicalism. These Muslim Americans believe that no matter what they do, their condition as Others will never change in the United States. Therefore, these individuals reify what it means to be an Othered American Muslim and embrace their oppositional identity. The only individuals I had state that he followed this oppositional mentality were two African-American Muslims. Given that these individuals were doubly Othered, I chose not to include them in my research since their experiences were not representative of my overall sample. Nevertheless, these individual’s experiences demonstrate how radicalism can emerge from within a community when the Othered community is excluded from the national imagined community.

As stated, American foreign policy towards the Middle East is symptomatic of the U.S. imagined community. Therefore, it was not surprising that of the Muslim Americans in my study, all the subjects viewed American foreign policy towards the Middle East negatively. I believe their reactions to American foreign policy are
reciprocal since due to American foreign policy towards the Middle East, Muslim Americans are Othered and since they are Othered they view American foreign policy negatively. Therefore, because of this reciprocal relationship, Muslim Americans live a double life as both one of “us,” at least in terms of formal citizenship and as of “them” in everyday experience.

The subjects in my study also believed that Islamic countries were treated different than other non-Muslim countries. However, subjects did not usually believe that these countries were treated differently because they were Islamic. Rather, most held that the reason these countries were treated differently was because the U.S. wanted to access and control the resources in those countries. Israel was also mentioned frequently as a reason as to why the United States treats Islamic countries differently. Again, respondents did not claim that the Muslim countries were treated differently because Israel is a Jewish state. Put another way, respondents did not buy into a “clash of civilizations” thesis to explain U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East. Instead, respondents held that the relations were due to the alliance between the United States and Israel. A final common reason held by respondents that the U.S. treats Islamic countries differently than other countries was because the Islamic countries in the Middle East did not submit to American foreign policy. As such, to respondents, America foreign policy aimed to suppress these countries and to maintain permanent bases in the region in order to control them.

Despite these views of American foreign policy towards the Middle East, my subjects were split on whether the U.S. should intervene in the Middle East.
Perhaps this was due to respondents buying into the American foreign policy narrative that the United States should spread democracy around the world. More definitively, respondents tended to see the Middle East as a fractured, dangerous place. This condition was often claimed to be a result of American intervention in the region. Nonetheless, more intervention by the United States was sometimes given as a prescription for the region’s woes! Thus, respondents either wanted the United States to leave the region; to intervene only as a last resort; or both.

One overriding theme by respondents regarding U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East is that the United States needed to be more thoughtful. This criticism came on different levels. First, many respondents claimed that if the U.S. was going to be the guarantor of democracy, it needed to be so in every case. That is to say, the United States should not be selective as to when to intervene in support of democracy. For instance, if the U.S. was going to support democracy in Libya then it also needed to do so in Syria. Second, regarding the means of action, if the United States was going to intervene in the Middle East, respondents preferred that the U.S. not use military power but rather diplomatic and soft power.

Respondents tended to view Muslim Americans that resorted to radicalism in a negative light. Put another way, respondents did not support those Muslims that commit extremist acts. Several respondents noted the irony of extremist Muslims, who would not be able to express themselves as freely in their ancestral countries, but as a result of the freedom they have in the United States extremist Muslims can express their dissatisfaction with American policies.
Subjects claimed that radicalism within the Muslim community was often caused by a failure to assimilate. As has been noted, Muslim Americans have been denied entry into the larger community due to American foreign policy. Hence, subjects believed that since some Muslim Americans were pushed out of this larger community via Othering, their response was radicalism. Often times, many respondents felt that this Othering was only one casual variable, but a critical variable nonetheless, leading to the radicalization of Muslim Americans. This foreign policy variable mattered in both how Muslim Americans were treated in America and how their fellow Muslims were treated in the Middle East. Other variables included finances, family situations, educational issues, and social causes.

Unquestionably, respondents claimed that there is a double standard between Muslim Americans that commit extremist acts and non-Muslim Americans that commit the same type of extremist acts. This disparity is without a doubt a product of the War on Terror. As respondents noted, when a Muslim American does anything that could be construed as radical, that person is automatically a terrorist and part of a larger Islamic terror plot. Conversely, when a non-Muslim goes on a shooting rampage, for example, this person is mentally ill. To respondents, there is a disconnect in how American’s view terrorism and the type of people that commit terrorist acts.

As such, Muslim Americans need two faces to survive in the United States. They must at once be the good Muslim, while also recognizing that they are being viewed as terrorists by their co-nationals. If a Muslim American deviates from this social imposed identity and challenges American foreign policy, then they further
embed their Othered status. Therefore, Muslim Americans in the current environment of the War on Terror must operate behind a veil.

As Muslim Americans are excluded from the sphere of belonging in the United States, assimilation post-September is not an option. All of the Muslim Americans I interviewed wanted to be accepted as equal co-nationals. Yet, as most respondents noted, total assimilation into the dominant culture would require white America being open to their inclusion. Therefore, since the since assimilation route is currently blocked, many Muslim Americans are demanding recognition by the dominant culture. Recognition of Muslim America means that white America accepts their difference. While Muslim America’s Otherness may eventually find acceptance, it does not mean that Muslim Americans will receive the same rights, resources, and duties of the dominant culture.

Blocked access to the dominant culture means that Muslim Americans will not be able to access the mythological “American dream.” Rather, since Muslim Americans are demanding recognition, they are instead pursuing the Muslim American dream. Accordingly, Muslim Americans have a choice. They can chose to give up what makes them distinct and try to become “American” or they can retain their Othered identity, while remaining true to themselves, and continue operate at a disadvantage relative to white America.

Thus, many Muslim Americans are simply asking for recognition. To Charles Taylor, recognition is for those that have been left outside the nationalist project and are demanding rights and recognition. Taylor states that over time, many minority groups have been misrecognized by the majority culture thereby
oppressing their sense of self. Taylor argues that these people have the right to “purge themselves of this imposed and destructive identity,” and thus Taylor emphasizes that any liberal society must also follow the liberal tenet of equal respect.

Taylor also states that within liberal democracies not all voices are heard. This is due to a culture’s standard of worth which judges the hegemonic culture to be the most worthy. Accordingly, any other culture which is a measured against this metric will fall short and thus is not deserving of promotion or protection. This troubles Taylor, who posits that in any multicultural society multiple voices and views must be heard. As a sense of justice, people also have the right to have their minority culture affirmed by the majority culture. This means that the majority culture must protect minority rights for Muslim Americans (Taylor, 1994).

Returning to the choice between assimilation or recognition, I asked respondents about marrying someone outside their religion. I asked this question for two reasons. First, someone who marries outside of their religion and into the dominant religion of the country is has more of a chance to assimilate and become more like “us.” Secondly, knowing that Islam is a very patriarchal religion, if Muslims Americans chose to marry outside their religion then it shows that they are adopting American customs, such as marital openness. As such, if Muslim Americans did choose to marry outside of Islam then they could access the religious escape hatch and become like the dominant culture.

Unsurprisingly, respondents displayed the patriarchal nature of Islam in their responses. Most claimed that it was okay for a man to marry outside of Islam,
while also overwhelmingly claiming that it is impermissible for a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim man. In the cases where respondents did make exceptions, they claimed that if a non-inter-Islamic marriage did take place it should be to someone else of the book (e.g. Christian or Jewish) with the intention of converting their partner to Islam. Clearly, most Muslim Americans in my study were not incorporated the American custom that it is okay to marry whomever you love.

A final question I asked respondents about assimilation and recognition was whether they changed their physical appearance post-September 11. Several respondents stated that if they are in physical danger, religiously they are not required to wear Islamic dress. As such, some respondents selectively wore the hijab because of the danger posed by the War on Terror. Other respondents chose to embrace their Otherness and to wear the hijab. They were also aware of the fear and hatred that the hijab causes other co-nationals. While aware of these negative repercussions, some Muslim American women have chosen recognition of their difference.

**Pew Research**

The these responses by my sample converged in terms of similarities and attitudes with what has been reported in the responses to the 2007 and 2011 Pew surveys. For example, the Muslim Americans in my sample largely matched the demographics of the Pew surveys. In my sample, the media age was 27 years, while in 2007 it was 25 years and in 2011 it was 24.75 years. Based on age, my sample was 60 percent male and 40 percent female, while for Pew in 2007 it was
54 percent male and 46 percent female and in 2011 it was 55 percent male and 45 percent female.

Regarding sectional differences, my sample did not as closely approximate the Pew study. However, I do not believe that this has an impactful difference on my results since Muslim Americans are Othered equally in American regardless of sect. In my sample, I had 80 percent Sunni Muslims and 20 percent Shia Muslims. For the 2007 Pew sample there was 50 percent Sunni Muslims and 16 percent Shia Muslims, while in 2011 there was 66 percent Sunni Muslims and 11 percent Shia Muslims.

These numbers and the responses given by respondents come extremely close to the research done by Pew. For instance, regarding the question, *Since the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, has it become more difficult to be a Muslim in the US, or hasn’t it not changed very much?*, 60 percent of my respondents claimed that it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the United States since 9/11. This number compares with Pew’s polling in 2007 (53 percent) and in 2011 (55 percent). Not only do my sample numbers closely match Pew’s numbers, they also showed that the number of American Muslims that are having more difficulty in the United States is increasing over time.

Regarding the question asked in my research project and by Pew: *What do you think are the most important problems facing Muslims living in the United States today?*, my respondents placed more emphasis on ignorance/misconceptions of Islam (40 percent) than did those in Pew studies from 2007 (14 percent) and 2011 (15 percent). My respondents were comparable on another choice,
discrimination/racism/ prejudice (16 percent), while Pew in 2007 was 19 percent and in 2011 was (16 percent). My respondents also matched closely on stereotyping/generalizing about all Muslims (10 percent), since Pew in 2007 was 12 percent and in 2011 was 16 percent. The other two choices made by my respondents, not treated fairly (16 percent) and hatred/fear/distrust of Islam (10 percent), did not rank in the top five choices with Pew. Unfortunately, data is not available from Pew to show if Muslims were experiencing the same problems before September 11th. Therefore, regarding this question, I cannot conclusively state that it is because of U.S. foreign policy that American Muslims are experiencing particular problems. However, I can state that the Muslim Americans in my sample are still experiencing discrimination and problems associated with being Muslim in the United States today.

A third question I replicated from the Pew study was: *Do you think most Muslims who come to the U.S. today want to adopt American customs and ways of life or do you think that they want to be distinct from the larger American society?* This question was important to ask given that it would measure Muslim American’s sense of inclusion in the American national identity. In my study, 36 percent of respondents stated that Muslim immigrants should adopt American values; 24 percent said that they should remain distinct; and 40 percent said both. In the 2011 Pew study, 56 percent said that Muslim immigrants should adopt American customs; 20 percent said that they should remain distinct; and 8 percent said both. While the numbers in both studies do not match, they do show that there is a common belief that Muslim immigrants should either adopt American customs or retain some of their original customs while adopting some American values.
Therefore, this response shows that amongst Muslim Americans, there is widespread belief that immigrants should try to adopt, at least partially, an American identity.

I also replicated the question asked by Pew in 2007 and 2011, *Have you been singled out by airport security?* This question measures whether American Muslims believed that they were singled because of their Islamic identity. My numbers matched closely with those of Pew. Yet, the interesting point about the data is the small amount of American Muslims that feel that they have been singled out at the airport. I assumed prior to asking this question that I would record something higher than 16 percent of respondents feeling they have been singled out by airport security, and that Pew would have higher numbers that 18 percent (2007) and 21 percent (2011). Therefore, this question may not be a good way to measure exclusion from the American national identity.

A question which does get to the core of the identity question is *Do you think of yourself first as an American or first as a Muslim?* 24 percent of my respondents thought of themselves first as an American; 40 percent first as a Muslim; and 36 percent as both. These responses were comparable to Pew’s in 2007 (28 percent first as an American; 47 percent first as a Muslim; and 18 percent both) and 2011 (26 percent first as an American; 49 percent first as a Muslim; and 18 percent both). These numbers show that since 2007, almost half of Muslim Americans have consistently thought of themselves first in religious terms, while only about a quarter of those in the sample see themselves first in nationalist terms.
Finally, my responses matched closely with those of Pew for the question: *Do you think anti-terrorism policies single out Muslims for increased surveillance and monitoring?* 52 percent of my respondents believe that the U.S. government does single out Muslims, while 48 percent do not believe that the U.S. government singles out Muslims. These numbers closely match to the 2007 sample with 54 percent believing that the U.S. does single out Muslims and 31 percent not believing that U.S. government singles out Muslims. The numbers remained steady for 2011 with 52 percent believing that the U.S. government does single out Muslims and 34 percent not believing that the U.S. government singles out Muslims. These responses show that the Muslims in the United States do feel that U.S. government during the War on Terror singles them out because of their religious identification. As such, it provides compelling evidence that U.S. Muslims feel that the American government has Othered them during the War on Terror.

**A Face of Muslim America**

As my discussion with J demonstrates, September 11th was the definitive moment in the identities of Muslim Americans. J was an ideal subject for this research project given that she has lived in the United States through several American foreign policy crises (e.g. Operation Desert Storm, War on Terror). Accordingly, J was able to demonstrate that over time, American foreign policy towards the Middle East is what Othered Muslim Americans. She was also able to demonstrate that this Othering occurred after 9/11. Finally, she was able to reveal that this Othering occurred because of the way in which the War on Terror is framed. This last point
on framing is important because it means that American foreign policy, implicitly or explicitly, has socially constructed all Muslims as the evil Other. Therefore, to J, American foreign policy has created the perception that the United States is at war with Islam.

As 9/11 approached, J felt that Muslim Americans were making headway in American politics, and indeed, they were almost “white.” This status changed with 9/11 and the resulting War on Terror. With the War on Terror, J felt explicitly targeted. While she cannot explicitly point to an organized plot by the U.S. government to Other Muslims, she does feel that as a result of the War on Terror, she was lumped in with the targeted Other.

As a targeted Other, J has chosen to move away from the American national identity and closer to her Islamic identity. She knows that she could change her identity, but it would be extremely costly to sense of self. Instead, J has chosen to remain true to herself and to face the harassment and intolerance brought on by the War on Terror. She now recognizes that she is the Other within her own country because she does not have certain American features and characteristics.

As an Other within America, J feels conflicted with current American foreign policy towards the Middle East. She does not believe that the U.S. is intervening in Muslim majority countries for security interests. Rather, she believes that the United States is intervening in places like Iraq in order to suppress Muslims so that it can control their resources. Despite these misgivings, J still wishes to access the American national identity. This desire is evident when she states that she feels horrible when she sees U.S. servicemen and women dying in Afghanistan and Iraq.
J remains skeptical that her Othered status will change in the near future given that the United States continues to target Muslim countries. Yet, she does believe that if the identity of Muslim Americans does change, it will have to come through the political efforts of Muslim Americans. She also believes that Muslim Americans will have to overcome their “immigrant mentality” and assimilate into the American imagined community. These efforts, to J, may one day create the conditions in which Muslims are not framed as the evil Other in American foreign policy.

**Critiquing the Theoretical Literature**

As this research shows, US foreign policy towards the Middle East is a significant contributing factor to the racialization of Muslim Americans. Returning to the literature on American foreign policy, this term, American form policy, eschews easy definition. Given that the United States has two branches of government that are involved in foreign policy decision-making, it is impossible to say that the United States speaks with a singular voice regarding American foreign policy. Therefore, I return to the works by McDonnell and Hastedt on American Foreign Policy, to identify stages and patterns in U.S foreign policy. McDonnell and Hastedt speak to the “American national style” to identify what makes up the U.S. national interest. This approach describes U.S. national interest in terms of past actions and contingencies in the present. Despite this conceptual ambiguity, the Muslim American in my sample understood what American foreign policy towards the Middle East is today.
The Muslim Americans in my sample did not need to know about these subjectively drawn patterns of U.S. foreign policy. My research subjects knew, as their responses indicate, that the U.S. frequently involves itself internationally. Yet, the myth of the U.S. as an isolationist country is perpetuated to this day. However, as history indicates, the United States has never been an isolationist country. Rather, this myth shows the rhetorical framing of U.S. foreign policy. Supposedly, the U.S. kept to its own hemisphere throughout much of its history in order to balance against the European powers. In reality, the U.S. was just as involved in overseas adventurism as the European powers. The distance between the rhetorical framing and empirical evidence is enormous.

This enormous gap draws parallels between what Muslim Americans are told about U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East and what they experience. As evidence of this rhetorical framing by white American elites, Americans were presented with a vague concept called the War on Terror. Americans were told that this War on Terror was to kill or capture the Al Qaeda operatives that were responsible for the 9/11 attacks, or “to rid the world of evil.” To those with unquestioned loyalty to the white American nation-state this seems simple enough. However, the War on Terror was much more. The War on Terror was nation building in Afghanistan and democracy promotion in the greater Middle East. The 2003 Iraq war also was lumped in with the War on Terror. Stronger support for Israel in the Middle East was somehow part of the War on Terror. As the list grew as to what actually constitutes the War on Terror, Muslim Americans realized that Islamic countries were the targets. This realization brings back the question of what the American nation is.
The easiest way to define American nation is by identifying what it is not. The American nation is generally not a political space for peoples of non-European origins. While exceptions to this rule can be made out of political necessity, it generally excludes peoples of Middle Eastern ancestry. Yet, the American nation does simply exclude by nation of origin, race, or ethnicity. The idea of the American nation excludes to maintain the privilege of the white elite. Therefore, whiteness is understood as privilege. This privilege does not necessarily equate to skin color, in that there are many whites with “white skin color” that are privileged and there are peoples with “non-white skin color” that are part of the privileged elite, and vice-versa. Whiteness as a privilege corresponds to social status. Social status can include being part of a higher socioeconomic class, but that identification is not sufficient. Rather, whiteness as status means the ability to wield power. Therefore, the War on Terror was a strategy by a nation-state ruled by whites to retaliate against a non-white people that broken the status quo, and then to maintain their power over non-white people.

As such, many of the Muslim Americans in my study realized that the War on Terror had little to do with fighting terrorism. They realize that the War on Terror was about maintaining a global racial hegemony. However, the Muslim Americans subjects also realize how close they were to becoming part of that racial hegemony before the attacks of 9/11. While it is impossible to say that Muslim Americans would have become “white” had 9/11 never happened, there is a belief both within the literature on Muslim Americans and within my sample that Muslim Americans were on the precipice of becoming white in America. This belief may have been an illusion. As I have already acknowledged, America is an elitist democracy where
ideas such as freedom and liberty are spread, not because it is accessible to all citizens within the state, but rather because it helps the white, elitist group retain their position. These ideas of freedom and liberty keep hope alive for those that have not yet quite “made it” in America. This American dream keeps non-whites from challenging the status quo, all the while keeping the hope alive that they too can one day become part of the select few within the American “democracy.” As such, many Muslim Americans bought into this American dream. As my research describes, some within my Muslim American sample still cling this dream, while others have awoken from the dream and realize the Othering they experience in today’s world. This is not to say that this Othering did not occur before 9/11 or that it is not more deeply embedded in American nationalism. Rather, it is to say, that some of the Muslim Americans in my sample became cognizant of the Othering in the United States post-9/11.

Tying a growing awareness to the racialization Muslim Americans experienced after 9/11 and the stages or patterns of U.S. foreign policy, one can distinguish a connection between how elite’s frame U.S. foreign policy and the objective of keeping non-European peoples in a state of submission. Hastedt’s patterns of unilateralism, legalism, and moral pragmatism as well as McDougall’s “New Testament” of American foreign policy stages including progressive imperialism, internationalism, containment, and global meliorism clearly speak to long-term project of keeping white nations, particularly the U.S., as the dominant actors in the world. Synthesizing the approaches of Hastedt and McDougall, the U.S., founded by white Europeans, has tacitly kept European peoples ascendant and Other, non-Europeans submissive. This racial contract between European
whites has divided the world into those that matter (whites) and peoples who do not matter (non-whites). This racial contract has become institutionalized through colonialism and corresponds to the internationalism and legalism stages described by Hastedt and McDougall.

In the other stages described by Hastedt and McDougall, the U.S. with other European powers was forcefully implementing white-majority rule across the globe in the stages corresponding to unilateralism, moral pragmatism, and progressive imperialism. In the stages after which the racial contract was implemented globally, U.S. foreign policy corresponds with the stages of containment and global meliorism. In these stages, the U.S. framed its foreign policy in terms of fighting communism and global meliorism. In the stage of containment, the U.S. went to the corners of the globe to fight against non-white peoples, supposedly to contain the spread of communism. As history has shown, these battles against communism are highly suspect, and show that the United States wanted to suppress the rights of non-whites peoples that simply wanted their own nation-state. That is to say, the United States wanted to continue dominating non-white peoples, sometimes after their white European partners had lost similar battles in suppressing nationalist aspirations. Regarding global meliorism, the U.S. unrestrained by other powers, has become the patriarch to the non-white world. The U.S. in this foreign policy stage knows how to best solve the problems of non-white peoples. That is to say, the U.S. has a solution to continue dominating these countries, be it through democracy promotion or the Washington Consensus. In either case, the solution is to try and be more like the U.S., or ,more simply to impose cultural hegemony. Of course, this solution keeps the narrative alive that there is a hope to become
privileged like the United States. Only when the non-white world looks past these illusory policies will they realize the United States hegemonic aspirations, which equate to ruling by consent rather than by coercion.

The foreign policy stages of U.S. domination are closely linked with racialization, nationalism, and Othering. In dominating non-white peoples, the U.S. racializes entire nation-states. The backwardness ascribed to the Middle East is case in point. The Middle East is viewed as the exotic Other. The Middle East is portrayed as a place where women are dominated by men, and violence is the way political disputes are resolved. Further, the narrative extends, the Middle East is a place that is undemocratic because of its culture. Clearly, the Middle East is much more complex than this stereotypical portrayal. Nevertheless, this convenient portrayal is used to justify United States intervention into the Middle East due to the racialized narrative.

The portrayal is racialized in that the non-white peoples of the Middle East are ascribed characteristics such as fanatic, undemocratic, patriarchal, and violent. These characteristics supposedly describe an entire group of ill-defined people. Therefore, the U.S. uses this understanding to oppose the racialized characteristics ascribed to the Middle East. The U.S. as a “civilized” nation brings enlightenment to these non-white peoples.

While Muslim Americans in the United States may ascribe to American culture and values, which itself is a racialized concept understood as whiteness, these individuals are grouped in with the dangerous Others of the Middle East. Some Muslim Americans have embraced this racialized identity, which may explain their
violent acts. The majority of other Muslim Americans, as this study illustrates, see the racialization brought on by the War on Terror, but refuse to act out the racialized part ascribed to them. Rather, these individuals are attempting to understand and negotiate their place within the American nation-state.

Hence, the imagined community of the United States is highly racialized. The United States projects itself as a nation-state for all, regardless of race or religion. In reality, these founding myths are simply window dressing. The idea of a liberal America is prompted by white elites to keep racial minorities suppressed. The aim of this American dream is to keep minorities suppressed with hope so that they will be less likely to revolt against the white-dominated system. Therefore, the idea of what is the nation is key in keeping the idea of an inclusive America alive.

Elites that control the media are able to disseminate stories about minorities achieving the American dream. Elites are able to repress media stories about racialized discord in the American nation. Further, elites are able to project images of what America looks like, thereby normalizing the conception. Yet, the most important tool elites have in shaping the American nation is the ability to frame the complex social world that everyone inhabits. Framing by elites displays and rewards “good” behavior, while stigmatizing and marking deviant behavior which challenges notion of the American nation. Again, the media is key to controlling what the “good citizen” is in America.

So, what can be done for Muslim Americans, and other minorities for that matter, if they are unable to access the privileged social status of whiteness in America? Moreover, with the illusion now exposed, should they want to become part of the white majority group? These are not easy questions to answer, nor are
there necessarily answers to them. Nevertheless, I return to the literature to address these questions.

The ethnic difference that Muslim Americans are now more aware of post-9/11 demonstrates that they are not part of (white) America identity. Following the work by Mamdani and Waters, ethnicity difference arises from groups that on the periphery. When groups are in the core, everyone is like “us” there and everyone belongs. The ethnic difference that Muslim Americans are now more aware of takes the form of non-Europeanness. Accordingly, those who were in the United States before Muslim Americans belong. They are part of the old, European immigration. These immigrants defined what America is. Those that came after, and in particular, those not from Europe, are viewed disparagingly since they do not reflect old American values. This difference is known as ethnic difference.

To reiterate, whiteness is not simply defined in terms of skin color. Whiteness is defined in terms of inclusion, recognition, privilege, power, and possibility socio-economic opportunity. These characteristics have never been open to all individuals in America. Minority groups want to become white so that they can access these status benefits. American nationals want to preserve their status, and if this status is open to all, it diminishes their privileges. As such, the American identity continues to erect roadblocks to exclude Others from becoming part of “us.” Racializing Muslim American is just one more roadblock to keep them from becoming white. Consequently, the War on Terror was a coincidental roadblock that allowed white America to keep Muslim Americans out of their social status. While it is speculation, I believe that had the War on Terror not occurred, white America would have found another way to exclude Muslim Americans.
The idea of an exclusive American identity makes assimilation and integration into the American national identity problematic, if not impossible. Muslim Americans, if they are understood as an ethnic group, are expected to assimilate into the larger national group. As Kymlicka holds, if individuals voluntarily immigrate to a new nation-state they are obligated to adopt the majority culture. However, as noted, assimilation into nation-states defined in terms of whiteness does violence to the identities of non-white minority groups. It follows that a second option for Muslim Americans is to demand recognition in America. Notionally, recognition would mean that Muslim Americans find acceptance within white America. Given the case I have presented, recognition is also untenable for Muslim Americans. Recognition means that white America gives up some social status to a non-white group. Any loss in social status for whites redistributes privilege in America. Hence, since assimilation and recognition are currently untenable, what is needed is increased group awareness amongst Muslim Americans. Muslim Americans need to become conscious that recognition in the American national identity, at least as it is currently understood, is impossible. The War on Terror was simply the symptom to the exclusionary disease of American nationalism. As a result, for Muslim Americans, the cure must not treat the symptoms, but address the deeply-rooted disease of America nationalism.

**Future Research**

In future research on the same research topic, I would like to add more in-depth, open-ended interviews. J provided exceptional insights into the Muslim American
experience. Moreover, J showed the impact of American foreign policy on her identity over time, thereby demonstrating the saliency of the foreign policy variable on her identity.

Another addition I would like to include is an ethnographic component. I believe it would add validity to my study to record how Muslim Americans within their social-religious groups construct their identity in relation to American foreign policy. Accessing these groups is extremely time consuming, and therefore, given time constraints I was unable to create trusting relationships with these groups. If I was able to record how these Muslim American groups operate internally, it would strengthen my findings as it would give me another vantage point from which to view how Muslim Americans are impacted within by American foreign policy.

Accessing data prior to 9/11 would also be extremely rewarding. This data would allow me to strengthen the finding that a shift in how Muslim Americans view themselves occurred because of the War on Terror. As it stands in this research project, I am relying on anecdotal accounts of how Muslim Americans viewed themselves prior to 9/11. Obviously, this calls into question whether individual’s memory is reliable. Having access to data recorded before the 9/11 event would eliminate this problem.

Finally, in future research I would like to collect data on class consciousness of subjects. While it is difficult for many to assess what class they belong to, I believe it would be beneficial to discover how the socioeconomic levels of respondents affects their identity. This data would also allow me evaluate connections between social status, recognition, and class. Currently, in this
research I view class identity as a possible characteristic of social status. With more resources in future research, I could determine whether social status and class are at opposite end of the (mis)recognition spectrum, and how it impacts how Muslim American interpret American foreign policy towards the Middle East.
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Appendix A: Research Questions

1. Please tell me about yourself (age, gender, political affiliation, ethnicity, religious sect)

2. Do you belong to any political groups? If so, how does your group influence Americans politics?

3. Are there differences in how older Muslim Americans understand their American identity when compared to younger Muslim Americans?

4. Are there differences in how male (or female) Muslims understand their identity when compared to female (or male) Muslims?

5. Do you think formal education influences how Muslim Americans view their American identity?

6. Do you think that economic class influences how Muslim Americans view their American identity?

7. What is the primary influence on your identity as an American?

8. What are all the ways in which you would describe American identity?

9. Is it possible to be both a Muslim and an American at the same time?

10. Are certain groups (political or otherwise) more accepting of your Muslim identity?
11. How do you feel about Central Command being located in Tampa? Does it affect you personally?

12. How do you think most non-Muslim Americans perceive Muslim Americans?

13. Do you feel as though you are treated equally? If not, what are some experiences you have had with discrimination?

14. Has there been a change in your view of American identity over the past 12 years?

15. How did you feel as an American prior to 9/11?

16. What are all the ways in which you would describe American foreign policy?

17. Does American foreign policy treat Islamic countries different than other countries?

18. With the U.S. beginning to transition out of the Middle East, has it affected how you feel as an American?

19. If you could change anything about American foreign policy what would it be?

20. How would you feel as an American if the U.S. decided to intervene in Syria?

21. How do you view Muslim Americans who have resorted to radicalism within the U.S.? What do you think caused this?

22. Is there a double standard with Muslims who commit extremist acts and non-Muslims who commit extremist acts?
23. Which comes closer to your view? (One) Most people who want to get ahead can make it if they're willing to work hard, or (Two) Hard work and determination are no guarantee of success for most people.

24. Do you think of yourself first as an American or first as a Muslim? (both and neither are also acceptable options)

25. For those who attend mosque regularly (once a week or more/one or twice a month/ few times a year/ seldom never), do you think of yourself first as an American or first as a Muslim? (both and neither are also acceptable options)

26. Do you think Americans coming to America today should adopt American customs/ remain distinct from U.S. society/ both/ neither?

27. Do you think Muslims in the U.S. are becoming more religious/less religious/ not changing/don’t know?

28. Is it okay for a Muslim to marry a non-Muslim?

29. Is it more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S. since Sept. 11?

30. What is the most important problem facing U.S. Muslims?
   (Discrimination/racism/prejudice, Being viewed as terrorists, Ignorance about Islam, Stereotyping, Negative media portrayals, Not treated fairly/harassment, Religious/cultural problems, War/U.S. foreign policy, Radical Islam/extremists, Hatred/fear/distrust of Muslims, Jobs/financial problems, Lack of representation/not involved in community, Other, Don’t know, No problems)

31. Do anti-terrorism policies single out Muslims?
32. Are you worried that women wearing the *hijab* will be treated poorly?

33. How often have you been treated with suspicion in the past year/called offensive names/been singled out by police/been physically attacked or threatened?

34. Have you been singled out by airport security in the past year?
Appendix B: Anthropology Principles of Professional Responsibility

Anthropology—that most humanistic of sciences and scientific of humanities—is an irreducibly social enterprise. Among our goals are the dissemination of anthropological knowledge and its use to solve human problems. Anthropologists work in the widest variety of contexts studying all aspects of the human experience, and face myriad ethical quandaries inflected in different ways by the contexts in which they work and the kinds of issues they address. What is presented here is intended to reflect core principles shared across subfields and contexts of practice.

These core principles are expressed as concise statements which can be easily remembered for use by anthropologists in their everyday professional lives. Each principle is accompanied by brief discussions placing that principle in a broader context, with more detailed examinations of how each affects or may be helpful to anthropologists in different subfields or work contexts. These examinations are accompanied by resources to assist anthropologists in tackling difficult ethical issues or the new situations that inevitably arise in the production of knowledge.

As a social enterprise, research and practice always involve others—colleagues, students, research participants, employers, clients, funders (whether institutional, community-based or individual) as well as non-human primates and other animals, among others (all usually referred to as ‘research participants’ in this document). Anthropologists must be sensitive to the power differentials, constraints, interests
and expectations characteristic of all relationships. In a field of such complex rights, responsibilities, and involvements, it is inevitable that misunderstandings, conflicts, and the need to make difficult choices will arise. Anthropologists are responsible for grappling with such difficulties and struggling to resolve them in ways compatible with the principles stated here. These principles provide anthropologists with tools to engage in developing and maintaining an ethical framework for all stages of anthropological practice – when making decisions prior to beginning projects, when in the field, and when communicating findings and preserving records.

These principles address general circumstances, priorities and relationships, and also provide helpful specific examples, that should be considered in anthropological work and ethical decision-making. The individual anthropologist must be willing to make carefully considered ethical choices and be prepared to make clear the assumptions, facts and considerations on which those choices are based.

Ethics and morals differ in important ways. The complex issues that anthropologists confront rarely admit to the simple wrongs and rights of moral dicta, and one of the prime ethical obligations of anthropologists is to carefully and deliberately weigh the consequences and ethical dimensions of the choices they make — by action or inaction. Similarly, ethical principles and political positions should not be conflated; their foci of concern are quite distinct. Finally, ethics and law differ in important ways, and care must always be taken in making these distinctions. Different processes are involved in making ethical versus legal decisions, and they are subject to different regulations. While moral, political, legal and regulatory issues
are often important to anthropological practice and the discipline, they are not specifically considered here. These principles address ethical concerns.¹

Although these principles are primarily intended for Association members, they also provide a structure for communicating ethical precepts in anthropology to students, other colleagues, and outside audiences, including sponsors, funders, and Institutional Review Boards or other review committees.

The American Anthropological Association does not adjudicate assertions of unethical behavior,² and these principles are intended to foster discussion, guide anthropologists in making responsible decisions, and educate.

Notes


1. Do No Harm

A primary ethical obligation shared by anthropologists is to do no harm. It is imperative that, before any anthropological work be undertaken — in communities, with non-human primates or other animals, at archaeological and paleoanthropological sites — each researcher think through the possible ways that the research might cause harm. Among the most serious harms that anthropologists should seek to avoid are harm to dignity, and to bodily and material well-being, especially when research is conducted among vulnerable populations. Anthropologists should not only avoid causing direct and immediate harm but also should weigh carefully the potential consequences and inadvertent impacts of their work. When it conflicts with other responsibilities, this primary obligation can supersede the goal of seeking new knowledge and can lead to decisions to not undertake or to discontinue a project. In addition, given the irreplaceable nature of the archaeological record, the conservation, protection and stewardship of that record is the principal ethical obligation of archaeologists. Determining harms and their avoidance in any given situation is ongoing and must be sustained throughout the course of any project.

Anthropologists may choose to link their research to the promotion of well-being, social critique or advocacy. As with all anthropological work, determinations regarding what is in the best interests of others or what kinds of efforts are appropriate to increase well-being are value-laden and should reflect sustained discussion with others concerned. Anthropological work must similarly reflect deliberate and thoughtful consideration of potential unintended consequences and
long-term impacts on individuals, communities, identities, tangible intangible heritage and environments.

2. Be Open and Honest Regarding Your Work

Anthropologists should be clear and open regarding the purpose, methods, outcomes, and sponsors of their work. Anthropologists must also be prepared to acknowledge and disclose to participants and collaborators all tangible and intangible interests that have, or may reasonably be perceived to have, an impact on their work. Transparency, like informed consent, is a process that involves both making principled decisions prior to beginning the research and encouraging participation, engagement, and open debate throughout its course.

Researchers who mislead participants about the nature of the research and/or its sponsors; who omit significant information that might bear on a participant’s decision to engage in the research; or who otherwise engage in clandestine or secretive research that manipulates or deceives research participants about the sponsorship, purpose, goals or implications of the research, do not satisfy ethical requirements for openness, honesty, transparency and fully informed consent. Compartmented research by design will not allow the anthropologist to know the full scope or purpose of a project; it is therefore ethically problematic, since by definition the anthropologist cannot communicate transparently with participants, nor ensure fully informed consent.

Anthropologists have an ethical obligation to consider the potential impact of both their research and the communication or dissemination of the results of their research. Anthropologists must consider this issue prior to beginning research as
well as throughout the research process. Explicit negotiation with research partners and participants about data ownership and access and about dissemination of results, may be necessary before deciding whether to begin research.

In their capacity as researchers, anthropologists are subject to the ethical principles guiding all scientific and scholarly conduct. They must not plagiarize, nor fabricate or falsify evidence, or knowingly misrepresent information or its source. However, there are situations in which evidence or information may be minimally modified (such as by the use of pseudonyms) or generalized, in order to avoid identification of the source and to protect confidentiality and limit exposure of people to risks.

Notes


3. In this document, when we use the term “compartmented,” we are referring generally to any research project in which the principal investigator is part of a research project, conducted on behalf of a third party, in which researcher has neither control nor knowledge about the overall goals, structure, purpose, sponsors, funding, and/or other critical elements of a project. Such projects may have government or private funding and may or may not entail classified information.
Any research project that limits the anthropologist’s access to decisions, information and/or documentation that enables her/him to understand and responsibly explain the structure, goals, risks, and benefits of the research to potential subjects is problematic. This is because the researcher’s limited understanding and control makes it impossible to present potential participants with a clear and honest statement of risks, benefits, and outcomes. (back)


3. Obtain Informed Consent and Necessary Permissions

Anthropological researchers working with living human communities must obtain the voluntary and informed consent of research participants. Ordinarily such consent is given prior to the research, but it may also be obtained retroactively if so warranted by the research context, process, and relations. The consent process should be a part of project design and continue through implementation as an ongoing dialogue and negotiation with research participants. Normally, the observation of activities and events in fully public spaces is not subject to prior consent.

Minimally, informed consent includes sharing with potential participants the research goals, methods, funding sources or sponsors, expected outcomes, anticipated impacts of the research, and the rights and responsibilities of research participants. It must also include establishing expectations regarding anonymity¹ and credit². Researchers must present to research participants the possible impacts
of participation, and make clear that despite their best efforts, confidentiality may be compromised or outcomes may differ from those anticipated. These expectations apply to all field data, regardless of medium. Visual media in particular, because of their nature, must be carefully used, referenced, and contextualized.

Anthropologists have an obligation to ensure that research participants have freely granted consent, and must avoid conducting research in circumstances in which consent may not be truly voluntary or informed. In the event that the research changes in ways that will directly affect the participants, anthropologists must revisit and renegotiate consent. The informed consent process is necessarily dynamic, continuous and reflexive. Informed consent does not necessarily imply or require a particular written or signed form. It is the quality of the consent, not its format, which is relevant.

Anthropologists working with biological communities or cultural resources have an obligation to ensure that they have secured appropriate permissions or permits prior to the conduct of research. Consultation with groups or communities affected by this or any other type of research should be an important element of the design of such projects and should continue as work progresses or circumstances change. It is explicitly understood that defining what constitutes an affected community is a dynamic and necessary process.

Notes


4. Weigh Competing Ethical Obligations Due Collaborators and Affected Parties

Anthropologists must weigh competing ethical obligations1 to research participants, students, professional colleagues, employers and funders, among others, while recognizing that obligations to research participants are usually primary.2 In doing so, obligations to vulnerable populations are particularly important. These varying relationships may create conflicting, competing or crosscutting ethical obligations, reflecting both the relative vulnerabilities of different individuals, communities or populations, asymmetries of power implicit in a range of relationships, and the differing ethical frameworks of collaborators representing other disciplines or areas of practice.

Anthropologists have an obligation to distinguish the different kinds of interdependencies and collaborations their work involves, and to consider the real and potential ethical dimensions of these diverse and sometimes contradictory relationships, which may be different in character and may change over time. When conflicts between ethical standards or expectations arise, anthropologists need to
make explicit their ethical obligations, and develop an ethical approach in consultation with those concerned.

Anthropologists must often make difficult decisions among competing ethical obligations while recognizing their obligation to do no harm. Anthropologists must not agree to conditions which inappropriately change the purpose, focus, or intended outcomes of their research. Anthropologists remain individually responsible for making ethical decisions.

Collaborations may be defined and understood quite differently by the various participants. The scope of collaboration, rights and responsibilities of the various parties, and issues of data access and representation, credit, acknowledgment and should be openly and fairly established at the outset.3

Notes


3. Concerns Before You Start
When you begin considering an employment opportunity, there are a few documents to carefully review before agreeing to become an employee. First, most organizations will have an employment contract, personnel manual or some type of document that governs the relationship between the employee and the organization. Read this document(s) carefully. It usually spells out the conditions of employment, the employer’s responsibilities and the employee’s responsibilities. In these documents you should also find rights and responsibilities about data and publications. This is where you need to be clear about ownership of data, what is considered data, who has the right to review publications and final clearance on documents for distribution. If you believe that the terms are inappropriate, you should speak directly to the employer about your concerns. Be aware however, that the employer does not have to change their position; these documents have been carefully developed and reviewed by a variety of professional resources. In some situations, you may find these documents can be modified and it is an opportunity to help to educate the employer about your concerns and the issues raised by this code of ethics. You may be able to negotiate terms that you find appropriate based on this code of ethics. In any case, it will be up to you to work with the employer to modify the terms of employment. If you review these documents carefully before becoming an employee, you will be fully informed and can then make a considered decision about whether to accept an offer of employment.

If you are applying for a grant or contract there will be language in the application forms that spells out the rights and responsibilities of the funder and the grantee/contractor. These documents should be carefully reviewed so that you are clear about the conditions of award that you will agree to if your proposal is
successful and you accept the grant or contract. If there are conditions which are contrary to the principles in this code, you can bring it to the attention of the funder and attempt to negotiate appropriate language in the grant or contract. However, the funder has in most cases carefully considered their requirements, has obtained professional reviews and believes that the terms and conditions best serve their needs. You may find that many funders, particularly foundations are eager to have their work disseminated and you find willing partners. At the same time you may find that some funders place restrictions on how you may use the data collected and who controls review of reports or articles submitted for publication. It is your responsibility to carefully review the terms and conditions of the grant or contract award before you sign the document.

As examples, the full citation for FAR: 52.227-14 Rights in Data—General is provided in order to give the reader a clear understanding of the completeness and detail that becomes incorporated into an federal RFP or contract concerning “Rights in Data.” A second document provides examples of contract and grant language regarding Rights in Data from a Non-profit organization and a foundation. These last two examples represent actual contract/grant language.

5. Make Your Results Accessible

Results of anthropological research should be disseminated in a timely fashion. It is important to bear in mind that these results may not be clear cut, and may be subject to multiple interpretations, as well as susceptible to differing and unintended uses. In some situations, limitations on dissemination may be appropriate where such restrictions will protect participants or their cultural
heritage and/or tangible or intangible cultural or intellectual property. In some cases, dissemination may pose significant risks because once information is disseminated, even in a limited sphere, there is great likelihood that it will become widely available.¹ Thus, preventing dissemination may sometimes be the most ethical decision. Dissemination and sharing of research data should not be at the expense of protecting confidentiality.

Anthropologists should not withhold research results from research participants, especially when those results are shared with others. However, restrictions on disclosure may be appropriate and ethical, such as where study participants have been fully informed and have freely agreed to limited dissemination, or where restrictions have been placed on dissemination to protect the safety, dignity, or privacy of research participants or to minimize risk to researchers. Proprietary, classified or other research with limited distribution raises ethical questions which must be resolved using these ethical principles.

**Relevant sections in ethics codes of other organizations:**

1) Association of American Geographers
2) Register of Professional Archaeologists
3) American Sociological Association
4) American Educational Research Association
5) American Historical Association
6) American Psychological Association
7) Archaeological Institute of America
8) American Political Science Association
6. Protect and Preserve Your Records

Anthropologists have an ethical responsibility\(^1\) for ensuring the integrity, preservation, and protection of their work. This obligation applies both to individual and collaborative or team research. An anthropologist’s ability to protect and use the materials collected may be contingent upon complex issues of ownership and stewardship.\(^2\) In situations of disagreement, contestation, or conflict over ownership, the primary assumption that the researcher owns her or his work product applies, unless otherwise established. Other factors (source of funding, employment agreements, negotiated agreements with collaborators, legal claims, among others) may impact ownership of records.\(^3\) Anthropologists should determine record ownership relating to each project and make appropriate arrangements accordingly as a standard part of ethical practice. This may include establishing by whom and how records will be stored, preserved, or disposed of in the long term.
Further, priority must be given to the protection of research participants, as well as the preservation and protection of research records. Researchers have an ethical responsibility to take precautions that raw data and collected materials will not be used for unauthorized ends. To the extent possible at the time of data collection, the researcher is responsible for considering and communicating likely or foreseeable uses of collected data and materials as part of the process of informed consent or obtaining permission. Researchers are also responsible for consulting with research participants regarding their views of generation, use and preservation of research records. This includes informing research participants whether data and materials might be transferred to or accessed by other parties; how they might be transformed or used to identify participants; and how they will be stored and how long they will be preserved.4

Researchers have a responsibility to use appropriate methods to ensure the confidentiality and security of field notes, recordings, samples or other primary data and the identities of participants. The use of digitalization and of digital media for data storage and preservation5 is of particular concern given the relative ease of duplication and circulation. Ethical decisions regarding the preservation of research materials must balance obligations to maintain data integrity with responsibilities to protect research participants and their communities against future harmful impacts. Given that anthropological research has multiple constituencies and new uses such as by heritage communities, the interests of preservation ordinarily outweigh the potential benefits of destroying materials for the preservation of confidentiality. 6 Researchers generating object collections have a responsibility to ensure the
preservation and accessibility of the resulting materials and/or results of analyzed samples, including associated documentation.

Notes


2. The National Science Foundation now requires prospective Principal Investigators to submit a Data Management Plan with all proposals. See National Science Foundation, “Data Management and Sharing Frequently Asked Questions.” The University of Connecticut provides helpful background about this requirement (“Why Create a Data Management Plan?”) and advice about “Writing a Data Management Plan”; further guidance and resources are available from the University of California’s DMPTool.

The National Institutes of Health requires data sharing (“NIH Data Sharing Policy”). In 1999, the Office of Management and Budget issued a revision to OMB Circular A-110, which requires that Federal agencies that award research and development dollars ensure that all data be available to the public under the requirements of the

Anthropologists who pursue federal projects that result in the development of intellectual property, particularly those which generate licenses and/or patents, should be aware of the University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, popularly known as the Bayh-Dole Act, as well as their own institutions’ policies regarding intellectual property and technology transfer. Bayh-Dole is the 1980 legislation that enabled universities to assume exclusive control over intellectual property resulting from federally-funded research and development, for the purpose of further development, transfer to industry, commercialization and provision to the public.


6. For informational and instructional materials on archiving and preserving qualitative data, see the following resources:

   Irish Qualitative Data Archive and Tallagt West Childhood Development Initiative. “Best Practice in Archiving Qualitative Data.”

   UK Data Archive. “Create and Manage Data.”


   For information on anonymization software, see:

   University of Pennsylvania Malawi Longitudinal Study of Families and Health page on QualAnon software

   and the Irish Qualitative Data Archive (IQDA) Qualitative Data Anonymizer.
For information on data repositories, visit:
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, the Qualitative Data Repository, and the UK Data Service. (back)

7. Maintain Respectful and Ethical Professional Relationships

There is an ethical dimension to all professional relationships.¹ Whether working in academic or applied settings, anthropologists have a responsibility to maintain respectful relationships with others. In mentoring students, interacting with colleagues, working with clients, acting as a reviewer or evaluator, or supervising staff, anthropologists should comport themselves in ways that promote an equitable, supportive² and sustainable workplace environment. They should at all times work to ensure that no exclusionary practices be perpetrated on the basis of any nonacademic attributes.

Anthropologists may gain personally from their work, but they must not exploit individuals, groups, animals, or cultural or biological materials. Further, when they see evidence of research misconduct, they are obligated to report it to the appropriate authorities.³

Anthropologists must not obstruct the scholarly efforts of others when such efforts are carried out responsibly. In their role as teachers and mentors, anthropologists are obligated to provide instruction on the ethical responsibilities associated with every aspect of anthropological work. They should facilitate, and encourage their students and research staff to engage in dialogue on ethical issues, and discourage their participation in ethically questionable projects. Anthropologists should appropriately acknowledge all contributions to their research, writing, and other
related activities, and compensate contributors justly for any assistance they provide. They are obligated to give students and employees appropriate credit for the authorship of their ideas, and encourage the publication of worthy student and employee work.
Appendix C: Methodology of 2007 Pew Research study, Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream

Muslim Americans constitute a population that is rare, dispersed, and diverse. It includes many recent immigrants from multiple countries with differing native tongues who may have difficulty completing a public opinion survey in English. The intense attention paid to Muslims in the aftermath of 9/11 may have made them more reluctant to cooperate with a survey request from an unknown caller.

Collectively, these characteristics present a significant challenge to anyone wishing to survey this population. Despite the challenges, the Pew study was able to complete interviews with 1,050 Muslim American adults 18 years old and older from a probability sample consisting of two sampling frames. Interviews were conducted by telephone between January 24 and April 30, 2007 by the research firm of Schulman, Ronca & Bucuvalas, Inc. (SRBI). After taking into account the complex sample design, the average margin of sampling error on the 1,050 completed interviews with Muslims is +/-5 percentage points at the 95% level of confidence. This chapter describes how the study was designed and executed.

1. Sample Design

In random digit dial (RDD) surveys of the English-speaking U.S. population, roughly one-half of one percent of respondents typically identify themselves as Muslim in response to a question about religious tradition or affiliation. This
extremely low incidence means that building a probability sample of Muslim Americans is difficult and costly. The demographic diversity of the population – especially with respect to race and national origins – adds to the challenge. Moreover, analysis of previous research indicates that the Muslim population is not concentrated in a few enclaves but is highly dispersed throughout the U.S.

Pew’s sample design attempted to address the low incidence and dispersion of the population by employing two separate sampling frames:

1. An RDD frame divided into five strata, four of which were based on the estimated density of the Muslim population in each county of the United States as determined through an analysis of Pew’s database of more than 125,000 survey respondents and U.S. Census Bureau data on ethnicity and language. To increase the efficiency of the calling, the lowest density stratum – estimated to be home to approximately 5%-21% of U.S. Muslims – was excluded. A disproportionate sampling strategy was employed to maximize the effective sample size from the other three geographic strata (total N=354). The fifth stratum was a commercial list of approximately 450,000 households believed to include Muslims, based on an analysis of first and last names common among Muslims. This stratum yielded completed interviews with 533 respondents.

2. A sample of previously identified Muslim households drawn from Pew’s interview database and other RDD surveys conducted in recent years. Recontacting these respondents from prior surveys yielded 163 completed interviews for this study.

The strength of this research design was that it yielded a probability sample. That is, each adult in the U.S. had a known probability of being included in the
study. The fact that some persons had a greater chance of being included than others (e.g., because they live in places where there are more Muslims) is taken into account in the statistical adjustment described below (section 4). One limitation of this design is that the samples were of landline telephone numbers. Thus, Muslims living in homes with no telephone or who only have a cell phone had no chance of being sampled for the study. To account for this, we used the most recent government data on telephone service to adjust our estimate of the total size of the Muslim population.

_RDD Geographic Strata_

Pew Research Center surveys conducted in English typically encounter a little more than four Muslim respondents per thousand interviews, an unweighted incidence rate of 0.42%. This rate has varied somewhat over the past seven years, ranging from a high of 0.57% thus far in 2007 to 0.33% in 2005. The rate is also very similar to that encountered by other national surveys (for instance, see Tom Smith’s “The Muslim Population of the United States: The Methodology of Estimates” in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Fall 2002). This low incidence means that the costs of building an RDD sample of Muslim Americans by screening a general public sample are prohibitive. Accordingly, it was necessary to develop alternative approaches that would allow for estimation of the probabilities of selection but increase the yield from screening.

An analysis of the geographic distribution of the Muslim population was undertaken, using several different sources of data. A key resource was the Pew
Research Center database of more than 125,000 telephone interviews conducted between 2000 and 2006 (when planning for this project was completed); it was used to estimate the density of Muslims in each U.S. county. Another resource was data from large government surveys. The U.S. Census Bureau does not collect information about religion, but it does include measures of ancestry, nationality for immigrants, and languages spoken. These measures were used to analyze the geographic distribution of adults who are from (or whose parents are from) countries with significant or majority Muslim populations, or who speak languages commonly spoken by Muslims. This yielded additional county-level estimates of the density of Muslims.

These measures were highly correlated and were used to sort counties into four different groups based on the estimated incidence of Muslims in each county. We refer to these mutually exclusive groups as the geographic strata. The lowest density stratum accounts for 5% of all Muslim interviews conducted by Pew over the past seven years; the second lowest accounts for 29% of Muslim interviews; the medium density stratum accounts for 51%; and the highest density stratum accounts for 15%.

Drawing on the analysis of previous Pew surveys, Census Bureau data, and the results of a pilot test, an optimal sampling allocation plan was developed for the RDD geographic strata. The sampling plan called for conducting roughly 33% of all RDD screening interviews in the lower density stratum, 53% of all RDD screening interviews in the medium density stratum, and 14% in the high density stratum. In
total, 57,549 screening interviews were completed, and the distribution of completed interviews was nearly identical to the original allocation plan.

The lowest density stratum, which included 5% of all U.S. Muslims in Pew surveys (and up to 21% as based on estimates derived from U.S. Census Bureau data), also includes 47% of the total U.S. population. As a practical matter, the analysis of the Pew database indicated that 25,000 screening interviews would have to be conducted in this stratum to yield an estimated 10 Muslim respondents. In order to put the study’s resources to the most efficient use, this stratum was excluded from the geographic strata of the RDD sample design, although persons living in these counties were still covered by the list stratum and recontact frame.

The danger in excluding this very low density stratum is that the individuals excluded may be significantly different from the rest of the population. To assess this potential bias, interviews from the list stratum and the recontact frame were used to compare Muslims in the lowest density stratum (the excluded area) with those living in the higher density areas. Muslims in the excluded area are more satisfied with their financial situation, somewhat more tolerant of homosexuality, less likely to say that it has become harder to be a Muslim in the U.S. since 9/11, and somewhat more secular in their approach to religion. However, Muslims living in the lowest density stratum comprise a relatively small proportion of all U.S. Muslims, and these differences are not so large that their exclusion would be expected to significantly affect the overall estimates.

**RDD List Stratum**
Within the RDD frame of U.S. telephone numbers, we used a targeted, commercial list to identify roughly 450,000 numbers that had a relatively high probability of belonging to a household with a Muslim adult. We defined this list as its own stratum within the RDD frame. This list was constructed from a commercial database of households where someone in the household has a name commonly found among Muslims. The list was prepared by Experian, a commercial credit and market research firm that collects and summarizes data from approximately 110,000,000 U.S. households. The analysis of names was conducted by Ethnic Technologies, LLC, a firm specializing in multicultural marketing lists, ethnic identification software, and ethnic data appending services. According to Experian, the analysis uses computer rules for first names, surnames, surname prefixes and suffixes, and geographic criteria in a specific order to identify an individual’s ethnicity, religion and language preference.

In late 2006, Pew purchased Experian’s database of more than 450,000 households thought to include Muslims. This list consists of contact information, including telephone numbers. A test of the list, combined with the results of the screening interviews conducted in the course of the main survey, found that the Experian list was a highly efficient source for contacting Muslims; roughly one-third of households screened from the Experian list included an adult Muslim. The list does not, however, by itself constitute a representative sample of American Muslims. Muslims in the Experian database earn higher incomes, are better educated, are more likely to be of South Asian descent and are much less likely to be African American compared with Muslim Americans as a whole.
By combining the Experian list with the RDD frame, however, the list can be used as one component of a probability sample. All telephone numbers drawn for the geographic strata of the RDD frame were compared to the entire Experian list of numbers. Any numbers that appeared in both the RDD geographic sample and the Experian list were removed from the former, and were available to be sampled only as part of the list stratum. This method makes it possible to determine the probability that any given Muslim has of being sampled, regardless of whether he or she is included in the Experian list. It also permits estimation of the proportion of all Muslims in the U.S. who are covered by the Experian list, which in turn makes it possible, in the final analysis, to give cases from the Experian sample an appropriate weight. More details on the statistical procedures used to incorporate the list into the overall sample are provided below.

Recontact Frame

In addition to contacting and interviewing a fresh sample of Muslim Americans, the phone numbers of all Muslim households from previous Pew surveys conducted between 2000 and 2006 were called. Adults in these households were screened and interviewed in the same manner used for the RDD frame. No attempt was made to re-interview the same respondent from earlier surveys. Pew’s survey partners, Princeton Survey Research Associates International (PSRAI) and SRBI, also provided lists of Muslims interviewed in the course of other national surveys conducted in recent years. In total, the recontact frame consisted of phone numbers for 796 Muslims interviewed in recent national surveys; 309 of these
households were successfully screened, resulting in 163 completed interviews with Muslims.

The greatest strengths of the recontact frame are that it consists entirely of respondents originally interviewed in the course of nationally representative surveys based on probability samples and that it includes respondents who live in the geographic stratum that was excluded from the RDD sample. However, there also are certain potential biases of the recontact frame. Perhaps most obviously, since all of the previous surveys from which the recontact frame was drawn were conducted either entirely in English, or in English and Spanish, Muslims who do not speak English (or Spanish) are likely absent in the recontact frame. Another potential source of bias relates to the length of time between when respondents were first interviewed and the current field period; respondents still residing in the same household in 2007 as in an earlier year may represent a more established, less mobile population compared with those from households that could not be recontacted.

Analysis of the survey results suggests that there are some differences between Muslims in the recontact frame and those in the RDD frame. Not surprisingly, Muslims from the recontact frame are more likely than others to own their home. They express somewhat higher levels of satisfaction with their own financial situations, report lower levels of mosque attendance and religious salience, and express somewhat higher levels of dissatisfaction with the direction of the country. These differences, however, are not sufficiently large so as to be able to substantially affect the survey’s estimates.
2. Questionnaire Design

The principal goal of the study is to provide a broad overview of the Muslim population in the U.S. since very little is known about it. Among the key topics of interest are the demographics of the population, their religious beliefs and practices, social and political attitudes, and their experiences as Muslims living in the U.S. Thus, the questionnaire needed to cover a wide range of topics, but also needed to be short so that respondents would be willing to finish the interview. Where possible, questions were taken from Pew’s U.S. and Global Attitudes Project surveys to provide comparisons with the U.S. public and Muslim publics in many other nations, including those in Western Europe.

From its initial planning stages, the project sought the advice of scholars and experts in the field of Islamic studies. The project created a panel of eight leading experts on Muslim Americans, headed by Princeton University Assistant Professor Amaney Jamal, which met twice in Washington to provide advice on the project. Two members of the advisory panel conducted six focus groups of Muslim Americans in four U.S. cities to explore topics and potential reactions to questions for the survey. These groups included Arab Americans in the Detroit area, African American Muslims in Atlanta, a mixed group of Muslim Americans in Washington, D.C., and Iranian Americans in the Los Angeles area.

Because this population includes many immigrants who have arrived in the U.S. relatively recently, the survey was translated and conducted in three languages (aside from English) identified as the most common among Muslim immigrants -- Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi. Census Bureau data, considered in
conjunction with the results of the survey, make it possible to estimate the proportion of Muslims in the U.S. who speak these languages and cannot speak English well. Analyzing these data produces an estimate that between 9% and 22% of Muslims in the U.S. fall into this category. A total of 131 of the 1050 interviews were conducted in these languages, or 17% of the weighted cases.

All three translated instruments were back-translated by native speakers. Project staff and the back-translators then compared the original English and the back-translated versions, and the back-translators also compared the translated versions. On the basis of this review, several changes were made and the translated instruments were modified accordingly.

After a draft questionnaire was constructed, two extensive English-language pretests were conducted, along with a separate test of several open-ended questions.

Another issue confronted in the questionnaire design was the sensitivity of the population to being interviewed. The survey clearly shows that many Muslim Americans believe they are targeted by the government for surveillance. Many are also concerned about stereotyping and prejudice directed toward them. These attitudes plausibly lead to greater reluctance to be interviewed and thus a potential nonresponse bias. Several aspects of the study were tailored to deal with this.

The initial phase of the questionnaire included neutral or innocuous questions about satisfaction with the community, personal happiness, and personal characteristics such as home ownership, entrepreneurship, and newspaper subscription. After these items, respondents were asked about their religious
affiliation, choosing from a list that included major Western traditions such as Protestantism and Catholicism but also non-Western traditions of Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam. Respondents who identified as Muslim proceeded to the substantive portion of the questionnaire, and those who were not Muslim were asked if anyone in the household practiced a different religion; in 58 households where a non-Muslim answered the phone, it was determined that there was a Muslim living in the household, and 52 of these subsequently yielded a completed interview.

After identifying as a Muslim, a respondent was told that: “As mentioned before, this survey is being conducted for the Pew Research Center. We have some questions on a few different topics, and as a small token of our appreciation for your time, we would like to send you $50 at the completion of this survey.” After this introduction, a relatively short series of questions followed (including presidential approval and political and social values such as homosexuality, immigration and poverty, and opinions about the war in Iraq and Afghanistan). At the conclusion of this series, respondents were told that “The Pew Research Center conducts many surveys on religion and public life in the United States. Earlier, you mentioned that you are a Muslim, and we have some questions about the views and experiences of Muslims living in the United States. I think you will find these questions very interesting.”

The logic for revealing the principal focus of the study – a practice not common in survey research – was that Muslim respondents would quickly discover that the study was focused on Muslims and Islam, and that there would be a
greater chance of establishing a bond of trust by revealing the intent of the study earlier. Indeed, in initial pretesting of the study without the early presentation of the goal, some respondents expressed suspicion about the purpose of the study and eventually broke off the interview.

These efforts to convince Muslims to complete the survey were reasonably successful: overall, 79% of respondents who identified as Muslim eventually completed the interview. This compares with an average of 85% to 90% in other Pew Research Center surveys. Given that the average survey length was 30 minutes, a slightly higher-than-normal breakoff rate was not unexpected. (The 79% completion rate does not include respondents who dropped off during the short screener interview prior to answering the religion question; this was approximately 3% of households that answered at least the first question in the screener.)

Whether this nonresponse results in a bias in our estimates is difficult to determine. For the most part, nonresponse in well-designed surveys has not been shown to create serious biases because the reasons for nonresponse are not related to the key survey measures. But because of the motivation for some of the nonresponse in the Muslim community, it is possible that reluctant Muslims hold different views on key questions than those who easily consented to the interview. To assess this possibility, we compared respondents in households who completed the survey easily (i.e., within the first four attempts) with respondents with whom it was more difficult to obtain a completed interview (i.e., a successfully completed interview was obtained only after five or more attempts).
This analysis revealed some differences between the two groups. On many questions, respondents who were more difficult to interview were somewhat more likely to express no opinion. (This may reflect, in part, that respondents interviewed in foreign languages were more numerous among the group who required five or more attempts compared with respondents who spoke English). And respondents who required multiple attempts appear to be somewhat more traditional in their approach to the practice of Islam. Approximately half (51%) of those requiring five or more attempts pray all five salah daily, compared with 33% of those requiring fewer attempts. The harder to reach are also more likely to interpret the Koran literally (67% versus 53% among the easier to reach). Muslims requiring five or more attempts before completing the interview were no more likely than others to say suicide bombing is justifiable or to express favorable views of al-Qaeda, nor were they more likely to doubt the sincerity of the war on terror. And they seem to be about as content with their lives as are other Muslims, expressing comparable levels of personal happiness and agreement with the belief that those who work hard can get ahead.

Nonresponse bias can also be assessed by comparing the opinions expressed early in the questionnaire by Muslims who did not complete the interview with the views of those who did complete the interview. Here, there were only minor differences; there was no evidence that the survey estimates were affected by respondents breaking off the interview. Those who terminated the interview expressed slightly higher levels of personal happiness; 34% reported being “very happy” compared with 28% among those who completed the interview. They also were slightly more likely to express belief that those who work hard can get ahead.
And, as might be expected, those who eventually terminated the interview are more likely than others to offer no opinion in response to many questions. All in all, though, the substantive views of those who terminated the interview appear to be comparable with those who completed the interview.

3. Issues in Survey Administration

The administration of this survey posed four challenges. First, the volume of interviewing was very large. The survey firm that conducted the interviewing, SRBI, estimated that 20,800 interviewer hours within a 14-week timeframe would be needed, with the bulk of this devoted to screening to locate this rare population. A total of 59,770 households were screened, with 560,863 unique phone numbers and 1,737,509 phone dialings made over a period of 14 weeks. This was achieved by deploying 357 English-speaking and 6 foreign language-speaking interviewers.

Recruitment, supervision, and training of foreign language interviewers posed another operational challenge. SRBI has four interviewing centers, but the center with the greatest success in recruiting highly educated foreign language interviewers was located in the university city of Huntington, West Virginia. The six interviewers (who spoke Arabic, Farsi or Urdu) recruited for the study were highly educated and motivated. All had college degrees. As a data quality check, foreign language interviewers monitored each other’s performance, and many of the foreign language interviews were recorded and reviewed by Pew’s project staff who spoke the relevant languages.

Building trust with respondents was critical for the survey’s success. For the RDD sample, fewer than 1 out of 100 households screened included a Muslim. This
made it extremely important to minimize mid-interview terminations. Hence, it was important for all of the interviewers – Muslim and non-Muslim – to have experience in interviewing this population. To achieve this, all interviewers worked on the Experian list sample first; after having completed a few interviews with Muslim respondents, they were allowed to dial the RDD geographic sample.

To compensate respondents for their time and to make participation in the survey more attractive, an incentive of $50 was offered for completing the interview. The study began with $25 incentive, but this was subsequently increased to $50 to further minimize mid-interview termination. Three-quarters of the respondents provided name and address information for receiving the incentive payment.

In addition, for the RDD sample, all qualified Muslim households and Muslim language barrier cases (Arabic, Urdu, Farsi) that we were unable to complete during the initial calls were sent, where possible, a letter explaining the purpose and scope of the study. All language-barrier letters were translated into the respective languages. A total of 258 such letters were mailed.

Determining and achieving an accurate balance of male and female interviews was a further challenge. Pew Research Center surveys have found that a significant majority of Muslim American respondents are male (about 67% in Pew polls conducted since the beginning of 2000); this finding has been corroborated by other survey organizations and also noted in the 2004 NEP exit polls. An analysis of Census Bureau data on adult immigrants from the countries thought to provide the largest numbers of Muslim immigrants found that a majority of these immigrants
are male. The final results of the study indicate that there likely are, in fact, more
Muslim American adult males than females in the population (54% male, 46%
female), but the imbalance is not as great as indicated by the male-female
distribution among respondents in the earlier surveys. But cultural differences in
willingness to be interviewed may still be important. To mitigate any potential bias
in this respect, the interviewing protocols attempted to match male interviewers
with male respondents, and female interviewers with female respondents, a
practice that is common among survey researchers conducting face-to-face
interviews in majority Muslim nations. After a period of testing the default strategy
of asking first for males (the Pew Research Center practice with U.S. general public
samples), it was determined that gender matching was yielding higher levels of
cooperation. Accordingly, the experiment was terminated and all further contacting
entailed men asking for men and women asking for women. If a respondent of the
interviewer’s gender was not available, the interviewer asked for the youngest
available adult of the other gender.

Response rates for the study were comparable with other RDD surveys
conducted by the Pew Research Center. A response rate of 27% was achieved for
list sample, 58% for the recontact sample and 29% for RDD sample, using the
Response Rate 3 definition devised by the American Association for Public Opinion
Research (AAPOR). Detailed AAPOR sample disposition reports are provided at the
end of this section.
4. Weighting

Several stages of statistical adjustment (weighting) were needed to account for the use of multiple frames and higher sampling rates in certain geographic areas. The first stage involved identifying all of the adults (Muslims and non-Muslims) who completed the screener in the RDD frame. These cases were adjusted, based on their probability of being sampled for the survey. This adjustment accounted for three factors: (1) the percent of telephone numbers that were sampled in the stratum; (2) the percent of residential numbers that were completed screeners in the stratum; and, (3) the number of adults in the household. This can be written as:

\[bw_{hi} = \frac{N_h}{n_h} \times \frac{R_h}{C_h} \times A_{hi}\]

where \(N_h\) is the number of telephone numbers in the frame in stratum \(h\), \(n_h\) is the number of telephone numbers sampled, \(R_h\) is the number of telephone numbers that are determined to be residential, \(C_h\) is the number of completed screener interviews, and \(A_{hi}\) is the number of adults in household \(i\) in stratum \(h\). As noted earlier, telephone numbers on the Experian list (irrespective of whether they were sampled) were excluded from the RDD geographic strata.

Whenever a substantial proportion of the population is not sampled due to expected low incidence of the target population, the method of adjusting the estimates to account for the exclusion is important and yet difficult because of the lack of data from the survey itself. As noted earlier, the lowest density stratum (those areas that were identified as having very low incidence rates of Muslim Americans), were excluded from the RDD sample. The base weights for the RDD
sample were adjusted differentially depending on whether the respondent was Muslim American. The coverage adjustment for those who were not Muslim Americans was 1.64 and for those who were Muslim Americans it was 1.25. The 1.25 factor was derived from the proportion of the entire Experian list that fell into the areas that were excluded from the RDD sample; this proportion was consistent with the 2000 Census counts of U.S.-born persons whose ancestors lived in predominantly Muslim countries, but higher than the Census counts of persons born in predominantly Muslim countries and speaking Muslim languages. The coverage factor for those who were not Muslim Americans was determined by examining the percentage of all adults in the excluded areas from the Census (47%), and the percentage of all RDD interviews in previous Pew studies in the excluded areas (53%). The factor was further adjusted to account for the fact that the Experian list did not exclude these areas. The Experian list and recontact cases did not require coverage adjustment because they did not exclude any areas of the country.

These cases from the RDD frame (including both Muslims and non-Muslims alike) were then statistically adjusted to match (weighted to) known totals for all U.S. adults. The cases were balanced on sex, age in categories, education categories, race/ethnicity and region. This set of respondents and weights was used to estimate the total number of Muslims and the proportion of all adults in the U.S. that are Muslim. Only cases from the RDD frame were used to estimate population totals.

Having estimated population totals, the next objective was to estimate characteristics of the Muslim American population (e.g., percent Sunni). First, all
non-Muslim cases were dropped from the analysis at this point. We sought to increase the precision of estimates for Muslim Americans by combining cases from the RDD frame with the recontact cases. Prior to this combining, it was necessary to address several outstanding issues.

The outstanding issue in the RDD and list samples was residual nonresponse bias. Based on screener information, it was clear that certain segments of the Muslim population were overrepresented in the combined RDD and Experian sample. In particular, the estimate from the screener respondents was that 61% of adult Muslims were male, but household roster questions indicated that only 54% of the American Muslim population is male. We attempted to correct for this disparity by aligning (raking) the distribution of gender*education level among all Muslims screened with this distribution among Muslims completing the full interview. This adjustment relies on the problematic assumption that the respondent education distribution by sex is the same as the education by sex distribution for the entire U.S. Muslim population. That said, this adjustment seems the most reasonable given limited alternatives. Large-scale government surveys, which are the most common source for such population distribution estimates, do not collect data on religious affiliation. This realignment was sample-based, so it retained the variability in the estimates of the number and type of Muslims observed in the screening estimates.

One outstanding issue in the recontact sample was accounting for the probability of selection into the Muslim American study. Recall that the recontacts are Muslim adults who live in households in which a Muslim had previously been
interviewed for an unrelated survey conducted between 2000 and 2006. Each of these previous surveys was based on an independent, equal probability RDD sample. For weighting purposes, we assume that the population totals did not vary over the 2000-2006 time period. The initial adjustment for the recontact cases accounts for two factors: (1) the standardized weight from the previous survey; and, (2) the sample size of the previous survey. This can be written as:

\[ bw_i = 100 \times \left( \frac{w_{std,i}}{N_i} \right) \]

where \( w_{std,i} \) is the standardized weight for household \( i \) in the previous survey and \( N_i \) is the sample size of the previous survey in which the household participated. This formula essentially created weights from the previous surveys as if the previous surveys all had the same sample size. An attempt also was made to adjust for differences in response rates between recontacts from the older versus the more recent surveys. There were too few recontact cases, however, for this adjustment to be fine-tuned.

At this point, we had accounted for the selection probabilities in both sampling frames. The penultimate step in the process was aligning the recontact cases with sample-based control totals for the entire Muslim American population. We derived the control totals from the RDD and list samples and weighted up the recontact cases to match them. This ensured that the totals for the categories of sex, race/ethnicity, region, and education were consistent with the estimates from the RDD and list samples.

Finally, we combined the RDD frame with the recontact frame. Had we simply added them together, they would have estimated twice the Muslim American
population total. Rather than dividing the weights of both frames by 2 (equally weighting the samples), we used a factor that was proportional to the effective sample sizes. This worked out to be 0.8 for the RDD frame and 0.2 for the recontact cases.

Due to the complex design of the Muslim American study, formulas commonly used in RDD surveys to estimate margins of error (standard errors) are inappropriate. Such formulas would understate the true variability in the estimates. Accordingly, we used a repeated replication technique, specifically jackknife repeated replication (JRR), to calculate the standard errors for this study. Repeated replication techniques estimate the variance of a survey statistic based on the variance between sub-sample estimates of that statistic. The sub-samples (replicates) were created using the same sample design, but deleting a portion of the sample, and then weighting each subsample up to the population total. The units to be deleted were defined separately for each of the three samples (RDD geographic strata, list, recontacts), and within each frame by the strata used in the sampling. A total of 100 replicates were created by combining telephone numbers to reduce the computational effort. A statistical software package designed for complex survey data, WesVar 4.2, was used to calculate all of the standard errors and test statistics in the study.

5. Assessing bias and other error

Surveys whose target population includes large numbers of immigrants may be subject to sources of bias in addition to those known to have the potential to affect even those surveys with relatively few immigrants. It is important, for
instance, for this survey to accurately reflect the views of Muslims born in a wide
variety of countries, as well as the views of those who do not speak English.

It is possible to assess the degree to which screening interviews included
respondents from a variety of countries. Analysis of the U.S. government’s 2005
American Community Survey (ACS) makes it possible to estimate the proportion of
all Americans born outside of the U.S. In order to compare these estimates with the
results of the survey, the analysis of the ACS is restricted to respondents who
speak English at least well or very well. The ACS indicates that among English
speaking people in the U.S., 88% were born in the U.S.; nearly 5% were born in
Latin America (including Mexico, Central America, South America, and the
Caribbean); roughly 2% were born in Europe; and 2% were born in Asian countries
outside of South Asia. Perhaps most important for the purposes of this survey, the
ACS estimates that 0.1% of the population was born in Iran; 0.3% were born in
Arab countries; and nearly 1% were born in South Asian nations. Overall, the
screener interviews for this survey closely match the ACS estimates for these
countries, providing confidence that the survey adequately covers the immigrant
population.

The ACS data also make it possible to estimate the proportion of Muslims
who do not speak English. These analyses suggest that between 78% and 91% of
Muslims in the U.S. speak English well enough to complete a survey in English; the
lower estimate assumes that only those people who speak English at least very well
could be interviewed in English, while the higher estimate assumes that all those
who speak English at least well could be interviewed in English. The weighted
results of the survey line up closely with these projections; 83% of interviews were conducted in English, 11% in Arabic, 3% in Farsi, and 3% in Urdu.
Appendix D: Methodology of 2011 Pew Report, Muslim Americans No Signs Of Growth In Alienation Or Support For Extremism

Muslim Americans constitute a population that is rare, dispersed, and diverse. It includes many recent immigrants from multiple countries with differing native tongues who may have difficulty completing a public opinion survey in English. The intense attention paid to Muslims in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and increased attention to Islamic extremism may have made them more reluctant to cooperate with a survey request from an unknown caller. Collectively, these characteristics present a significant challenge to anyone wishing to survey this population.

Despite the challenges, the Pew Research Center study was able to complete interviews with 1,033 Muslim American adults 18 years old and older from a probability sample consisting of three sampling frames. Interviews were conducted by telephone between April 14 and July 22, 2011 by the research firm of Abt SRBI. Interviews were conducted in English, Arabic, Farsi and Urdu. After taking into account the complex sample design, the average margin of sampling error on the 1,033 completed interviews with Muslims is +/- 5.0 percentage points at the 95% level of confidence. This section describes how the study was designed and executed.

Sample Design
In random digit dial (RDD) surveys of the English-speaking U.S. population, roughly one-half of one percent of respondents typically identify as Muslim in response to a question about religious tradition or affiliation (or about 5 out of every 1,000 respondents). This extremely low incidence means that building a probability sample of Muslim Americans is difficult and costly. The demographic diversity of the population – especially with respect to race and national origins – adds to the challenge. Moreover, analysis of the 2007 survey and other previous research indicates that the Muslim population is not concentrated in a few enclaves but is highly dispersed throughout the U.S. And since 2007 the proportion of people who can be reached only by cell phone has grown.

The sample design attempted to address the low incidence and dispersion of the Muslim American population, as well as cell phone coverage, by employing three sampling sources: an RDD landline sample, an RDD cell phone sample and a sample of previously identified Muslim households.

1. **Landline RDD:** The landline RDD frame was divided into five strata, four of which were based on the estimated density of the Muslim population in each county of the United States as determined through an analysis of Pew Research’s database of more than 260,000 survey respondents and U.S. Census Bureau data on ethnicity and language. To increase the efficiency of the calling, the lowest density stratum – estimated to be home to approximately 8%-19% of U.S. Muslims – was excluded. A disproportionate sampling strategy was employed to maximize the effective sample size from the other three geographic strata; a total of 131 interviews were completed in the three strata included. The fifth stratum was a
commercial list of 608,397 households believed to include Muslims, based on an analysis of first and last names common among Muslims. This stratum yielded completed interviews with 501 respondents.

2. **Cellular RDD:** The cellular RDD frame was divided into the same four geographic strata as the landline RDD frame based on the estimated density of the Muslim population. As with the landline frame, the lowest density stratum was excluded in order to increase data collection efficiency. All Muslim adults reached in the cell sample were interviewed, regardless of whether or not they also had a landline. The fact that people with both types of phones had a higher chance of selection was adjusted for in the weighting as discussed below. The incidence rate of Muslim Americans was roughly three times higher in the cell frame than the landline frame (excluding the list stratum). A total of 227 interviews were completed in the cell RDD frame.

3. **Recontact sample:** In addition, a sample of previously identified Muslim households was drawn from Pew Research Center’s interview database and other RDD surveys conducted in recent years. This sample contained both landline and cell phone numbers. Recontacting these respondents from prior surveys yielded 174 completed interviews for this study.

The strength of this research design was that it yielded a probability sample. That is, each adult in the U.S. had a known probability of being included in the study. The fact that some persons had a greater chance of being included than others (e.g., because they live in places where there are more Muslims) is taken into account in the statistical adjustment described below.
**RDD Geographic Strata**

Pew Research Center surveys conducted in English (and some with a Spanish option) typically encounter about five Muslim respondents per 1,000 interviews, an unweighted incidence rate of 0.5%. The rate is also very similar to that encountered by other national surveys (for instance, see Tom Smith’s “The Muslim Population of the United States: The Methodology of Estimates” in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Fall 2002). This low incidence means that the costs of building an RDD sample of Muslim Americans by screening a general public sample are prohibitive. Accordingly, it was necessary to develop alternative approaches that would allow for estimation of the probabilities of selection but increase the yield from screening.

An analysis of the geographic distribution of the Muslim population was undertaken, using several different sources of data. A key resource was the Pew Research Center database of more than 260,000 telephone interviews conducted between 2007 and 2011; it was used to estimate the density of Muslims in each U.S. county. Another resource was data from the American Community Survey (ACS), which is the U.S. Census Bureau’s replacement for the decennial census long form. The Census Bureau does not collect information about religion, but the ACS does include measures of ancestry, nationality for immigrants, and languages spoken. These measures were used to analyze the geographic distribution of adults who are from (or whose ancestors are from) countries with significant or majority Muslim populations, or who speak languages commonly spoken by Muslims. This yielded additional county-level estimates of the density of Muslims.
These measures were highly correlated and were used to sort counties into four different groups based on the estimated incidence of Muslims in each county. We refer to these mutually exclusive groups as the geographic strata. The lowest density stratum accounts for 8% of all Muslim interviews conducted by the Pew Research Center over the past five years; the second lowest accounts for 30% of Muslim interviews; the medium density stratum accounts for 38%; and the highest density stratum accounts for 24%. Drawing on the analysis of previous Pew Research surveys, ACS data, and the results of a pilot test, an optimal sampling allocation plan was developed for the RDD geographic strata. In total, 41,599 screening interviews in the RDD geographic strata were completed: 21% in the high density stratum, 52% in the medium density stratum and 27% in the low density stratum.

The lowest density stratum, which included 8% of all U.S. Muslims in Pew Research surveys (and up to 19% as based on estimates derived from ACS data), also includes 45% of the total U.S. population. As a practical matter, the analysis of the Pew Research database indicated that 15,000 screening interviews would have to be conducted in this stratum to yield an estimated 10 Muslim respondents. In order to put the study’s resources to the most efficient use, this stratum was excluded from the geographic strata of the RDD sample design, although persons living in these counties were still covered by the list stratum and recontact frame (a total of 113 interviews were completed in the lowest density areas from the list stratum and recontact frame).

**List Stratum**
Within the landline RDD frame of U.S. telephone numbers, a targeted, commercial list was used to identify 608,397 numbers that had a relatively high probability of belonging to a household with a Muslim adult. This list was defined as its own stratum within the landline RDD frame. This list was constructed from a commercial database of households where someone in the household has a name commonly found among Muslims. The list was prepared by Experian, a commercial credit and market research firm that collects and summarizes data from approximately 113,000,000 U.S. households. The analysis of names was conducted by Ethnic Technologies, LLC, a firm specializing in multicultural marketing lists, ethnic identification software, and ethnic data appending services. According to Experian, the analysis uses computer rules for first names, surnames, surname prefixes and suffixes, and geographic criteria in a specific order to identify an individual’s ethnicity, religion and language preference.

In 2011, Abt SRBI purchased Experian’s database of more than 608,000 households thought to include Muslims. This list consists of contact information, including telephone numbers. A test of the list, combined with the results of the screening interviews conducted in the course of the main survey, found that the Experian list was a highly efficient source for contacting Muslims; roughly three-in-ten households screened from the Experian list included an adult Muslim. The list does not, however, by itself constitute a representative sample of American Muslims. Muslims on the Experian list are somewhat better educated, more likely to be homeowners, more likely to be foreign born and of South Asian descent and much less likely to be African American or to have converted to Islam compared with Muslim Americans as a whole.
By combining the Experian list with the RDD frame, however, the list can be used as one component of a probability sample. All telephone numbers drawn for the geographic strata of the landline RDD frame were compared to the entire Experian list of numbers. Any numbers that appeared in both the landline RDD geographic sample and the Experian list were removed from the former, and were available to be sampled only as part of the list stratum. This method makes it possible to determine the probability that any given Muslim has of being sampled, regardless of whether he or she is included in the Experian list. It also permits estimation of the proportion of all Muslims in the U.S. who are covered by the Experian list, which in turn makes it possible, in the final analysis, to give cases from the Experian sample an appropriate weight. More details on the statistical procedures used to incorporate the list into the overall sample are provided below.

**Recontact Frame**

In addition to contacting and interviewing a fresh sample of Muslim Americans, the phone numbers of all Muslim households from previous Pew Research surveys conducted between 2007 and 2011 were called. Adults in these households were screened and interviewed in the same manner used for the RDD samples. No attempt was made to reinterview the same respondent from earlier surveys. Pew Research’s survey partners, Abt SRBI and Princeton Survey Research Associates International (PSRAI), also provided lists of Muslims interviewed in the course of other national surveys conducted in recent years. In total, the recontact frame consisted of phone numbers for 756 Muslims (552 landline numbers and 204 cell phone numbers) interviewed in recent national surveys. From this frame, 262
households were successfully screened, resulting in 174 completed interviews with Muslims.

The greatest strengths of the recontact frame are that it consists entirely of respondents originally interviewed in the course of nationally representative surveys based on probability samples and that it includes respondents who live in the geographic stratum that was excluded from the landline and cell RDD samples. However, there also are certain potential biases of the recontact frame. Perhaps most obviously, all of the households previously interviewed in the recontact frame were interviewed in English, or for a small number, in Spanish. Another potential source of bias relates to the length of time between when respondents were first interviewed and the current field period; respondents still residing in the same household in 2011 as in an earlier year may represent a more established, less mobile population compared with those from households that could not be recontacted.

Analysis of the survey results suggests that there are some differences between Muslims in the recontact frame and those in the landline and cell RDD frames. For example, Muslims from the recontact frame are more likely to be a homeowner, less satisfied with national conditions, and less likely to have worked with others in their community to solve a problem compared with Muslims as a whole. These differences, however, are not sufficiently large so as to be able to substantially affect the overall survey’s estimates.

**Questionnaire Design**
As with the 2007 Muslim American survey, the goal of the study was to provide a broad description of the characteristics and attitudes of the Muslim American population. Thus, the questionnaire needed to cover a wide range of topics but be short enough that respondents would be willing to complete the interview.

Much of the content was drawn from the 2007 survey so that any changes in attitudes could be tracked. New questions also were taken from the Pew Research Center’s U.S. surveys and the Pew Global Attitudes Project’s surveys to provide comparisons with the U.S. public, U.S. Christians and Muslim publics in other countries.

Because this population includes many immigrants who have arrived in the U.S. relatively recently, the survey was translated and conducted in three languages (in addition to English) identified as the most common among Muslim immigrants -- Arabic, Farsi and Urdu. Translation of the questionnaire was conducted by a professional translation service under the direction of Abt SRBI. A three-step process was used including translation by a professional translator, back translation to English by a second translator, followed by proofreading and review for quality, consistency and relevance. The translated questionnaires were independently reviewed by translators retained by the Pew Research Center, and revisions were made based on their feedback. A total of 925 interviews were conducted in English, 73 in Arabic, 19 in Farsi and 16 in Urdu. Another issue confronted in the questionnaire design was the possibility that members of this population are reluctant to reveal their religious identification because of concerns
about stereotyping and prejudice. Both the 2007 and 2011 surveys show that many Muslim Americans believe they are targeted by the government for surveillance and some also report personal experiences with discrimination and hostility. Several features of the questionnaire were tailored to deal with these concerns.

The initial questions were chosen to be of a general nature in order to establish rapport with respondents, asking about satisfaction with the community, personal happiness, and personal characteristics such as home ownership, entrepreneurship, and college enrollment. After these items, respondents were asked about their religious affiliation, choosing from a list that included Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist or “something else.” Respondents who identified as Muslim proceeded to the substantive portion of the questionnaire, and those who were not Muslim were asked if anyone in the household practiced a different religion; in 39 households interviews were conducted with someone other than the person who was originally selected. If there was no Muslim in the household, the respondent was asked a short set of demographic questions to be used for weighting.

At this point in the interview, respondents were told that: “As mentioned before, this survey is being conducted for the Pew Research Center. We have some questions on a few different topics, and as a token of our appreciation for your time, we would like to send you $50 at the completion of this survey.” After this introduction, a series of questions followed (e.g., satisfaction with the state of the nation, presidential approval, civic involvement, everyday activities, opinions about political and social issues). At the conclusion of this series, respondents were told:
“Just to give you a little more background before we continue, the Pew Research Center conducts many surveys on religion and public life in the United States. Earlier, you mentioned that you are a Muslim, and we have some questions about the views and experiences of Muslims living in the United States. I think you will find these questions very interesting.”

The logic for revealing the principal research focus of the study – a practice not common in survey research – was that respondents would quickly discover that the study was focused on Muslims and Islam, and that there would be a greater chance of establishing trust and rapport by revealing the intent of the study before asking questions specific to experiences as a Muslim or about the Islamic faith. Indeed, in initial pretesting of the 2007 study without the early presentation of the study’s purpose, some respondents expressed suspicion and eventually broke off the interview.

As was true with the 2007 survey, a high percentage of respondents identified in the screening interview as Muslim – 78% -- eventually completed the survey. This completion rate is somewhat lower than average for other Pew Research Center surveys, where completion rates of 85% to 95% are more common. But given that the mean survey length was 32 minutes (12 minutes longer than the average survey conducted by the center), a somewhat higher-than-normal breakoff rate was not unexpected. The 78% completion rate does not include respondents who dropped off during the short screener interview prior to answering the religion question.

_Pilot Test and Pretest_
For the pilot test of selected questions from the survey, 97 interviews were completed with Muslim American adults sampled from the Experian list. The interviews were conducted March 10-13, 2011; interviews were conducted in English. Among households completing the screener, the Muslim incidence was 32%. The completion rate among qualified Muslims was 82%. The average interview length for pilot test interviews with Muslims was 14 minutes. Based on the results of the pilot test, a number of changes were made to the questionnaire and interviewer training procedures.

The pretest of the full survey resulted in 21 completed interviews with Muslim American adults sampled from the Experian list. The interviews were conducted March 31-April 3, 2011; interviews were conducted in English. Among households completing the screener, the Muslim incidence was 36%. The completion rate among qualified Muslims was 60%. The average interview length for pretest interviews with Muslims was 29 minutes. Additional changes were made to the questionnaire and interviewer training procedures based on the results of the pretest.

Survey Administration

The administration of this survey posed several challenges. For example, the volume of interviewing was very large. The survey firm that conducted the interviewing, Abt SRBI, devoted 24,500 interviewer hours to the study over a 14-week timeframe, with the bulk of this spent screening for this rare population. A total of 43,538 households were screened, with 706,945 unique phone numbers
dialed over the field period. This was achieved by deploying 480 English-speaking and 12 foreign language-speaking interviewers.

Multilingual interviewers on staff were utilized for the project. Additional multilingual interviewers were recruited, first tested by an accredited vendor on their language proficiency then evaluated and scored before being interviewed and hired by Abt SRBI. All Non-English interviewers first go through the standard Abt SRBI initial training process that all interviewers go through. Bilingual interviewers with more proficiency and interviewing experience were given supervisory roles and worked with the interviewers in their language monitoring surveys, assisting in training and debriefing.

Building trust with respondents was critical for the survey’s success. For the landline RDD sample, fewer than 1 out of 200 households screened included a Muslim. This made it extremely important to minimize mid-interview terminations. Hence, it was important for all of the interviewers – Muslim and non-Muslim – to have experience in interviewing this population. To achieve this, all interviewers worked on the Experian list sample first; after having completed a few interviews with Muslim respondents, they were allowed to dial the landline and cell RDD geographic samples.

An incentive of $50 was offered to respondents near the beginning of the survey, after it was determined that the respondent identified as Muslim in a response to a question about religious affiliation. The decision to offer an incentive was based on two principal considerations. First, the survey entailed a substantial commitment of time for respondents. The mean length of an interview was
approximately 32 minutes (considerably longer than the average of 20 minutes for other Pew Research Center surveys). And about 18% of the interviews lasted 40 minutes or longer. Second, incentives have been repeatedly shown to increase response rates, a critical consideration in studies of rare populations where substantial effort is devoted to locating qualified respondents.4 The use of incentives has been shown to be particularly helpful in improving participation among reluctant respondents. Most respondents (84%) provided a name and address information for receiving the incentive payment.

In addition, all qualified Muslim households and Muslim language barrier cases (Arabic, Urdu, Farsi) that were unable or unwilling to complete the interview during the initial calls were sent, where possible, a letter explaining the purpose and scope of the study. All language-barrier letters were translated into the respective languages. A total of 705 such letters were mailed.

To mitigate potential gender biases in the composition of the sample, the interviewing protocols for landline households attempted to match male interviewers with male respondents and female interviewers with female respondents. This practice is common among survey researchers conducting face-to-face interviews in majority Muslim nations. Interviewer/respondent gender matching was not implemented, however, when calling cell phone numbers because cell phones are predominantly used as a personal (rather than household) device.

The screening effort yielded a response rate of 22% for the geographic landline RDD sample, 20% for the cell RDD sample, 18% for the list sample, and 54% for the recontact sample, using the Response Rate 3 definition devised by the
American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR). Detailed AAPOR sample disposition reports are provided at the end of this section.

The completion rate for qualified Muslim respondents was 78% for the geographic landline RDD sample (excluding the list), 81% for the cell RDD sample, 74% for the list stratum of the RDD sample, and 90% for the recontact sample.

**Weighting**

Several stages of statistical adjustment (weighting) were needed to account for the use of multiple sampling frames and higher sampling rates in certain geographic areas. The first stage involved identifying all of the adults (Muslims and non-Muslims) who completed the screener in the landline (geographic + list strata) and cell RDD samples. These cases were adjusted, based on their probability of being sampled for the survey. This adjustment accounted for four factors: (1) the percent of telephone numbers that were sampled in the stratum; (2) the percent of telephone numbers sampled in the stratum for which eligibility as a working and residential number was not determined; (3) the percent of residential numbers that were completed screeners in the stratum; and, (4) the number of eligible adults in the household. This can be written as:

\[ bw_{hi} = \left( \frac{N_h}{n_h} \right) \left( E_h + \frac{U_h E^*}{E_h} \right) \left( R_h / S_h \right) A_{hi} \]

where \( N_h \) is the number of telephone numbers in the frame in stratum \( h \), \( n_h \) is the number of telephone numbers sampled, \( U_h E^* \) is the estimated number of working residential numbers among those with unknown eligibility, \( R_h \) is the number of telephone numbers that are determined to be residential, \( S_h \) is the number of
completed screener interviews, and $Ahi$ is the number of eligible adults in household $i$ in stratum $h$.

The value of $Ahi$ depended not just on the composition of the household but also on whether the number dialed was for a landline or a cell phone. For landline cases with no Muslim adults in the household, $Ahi$ is simply the total number of adults in the household. For cell phone cases with no Muslims, however, no within-household selection was performed and so the $Ahi$ adjustment equaled 1. For cell phone cases in which the person answering the phone was Muslim, there was also no within-household selection performed, and so the adjustment also equaled 1. In instances where the initial cell respondent was non-Muslim but reported that there was a Muslim adult in the household, one Muslim adult was randomly selected. The $Ahi$ adjustment in these cases equaled the number of Muslim adults in the household. Similarly, for all landline cases in which there was at least one Muslim adult in the household, the $Ahi$ adjustment equaled the number of Muslim adults in the household.

The probability of selection adjustment for recontact sample cases was computed differently. Recall that the recontacts are Muslim adults who live in households in which a Muslim had previously been interviewed for an unrelated survey conducted between 2007 and 2011. Each of these previous surveys was based on an independent, equalprobability national RDD sample. For weighting purposes, we assume that the population totals did not vary over the 2007-2011 time period. The base weighting for the recontact cases accounts for two factors:
(1) the standardized weight from the previous survey and (2) the sample size of the previous survey. This can be written as

$$100 \times \frac{w_{\text{std},i}}{N_i}$$

where \( w_{\text{std},i} \) is the standardized weight for respondent \( i \) in the previous survey and \( N_i \) is the sample size of the previous survey in which the household participated. The standardized weights were computed by dividing the final weight for respondent \( i \) in the original survey by the average of the final weights in the original survey.

After the calculation of the base weights, the next step was to account for the overlap between the landline and cell RDD frames. Adults with both a residential landline and a cell phone (“dual service”) could potentially have been selected for the survey in both frames. The dual service respondents from the two frames were integrated in proportion to their effective sample sizes. The first effective sample size was computed by filtering on the dual service cases in the landline RDD sample (list + geographic strata) and computing the coefficient of variation (\( cv \)) of the final screener base weight. The design effect for these cases was approximated as 1+\( cv^2 \). The effective sample size \( (n1) \) was computed as the unweighted sample size divided by the design effect. The effective sample size for the dual service cases in the cellular RDD sample \( (n2) \) was computed in an analogous way. The compositing factor for the landline frame dual service cases was computed as \( n1/(n1 + n2) \). The compositing factor for the cellular frame dual service cases was computed as \( n2/(n1 + n2) \). Separately, we integrated the dual service cases in the recontact sample. The process for computing the compositing
factor for these cases was analogous to the process described above for the fresh RDD plus Experian cases.

Once the landline and cell RDD samples were integrated, we sought to address the fact that adults living in counties assigned to the lowest density stratum had been excluded from the landline RDD and cellular RDD geographic samples. Whenever a substantial proportion of the population is not sampled due to expected low incidence of the target population, the method of adjusting the estimates to account for the exclusion is important and yet difficult because of the lack of data from the survey itself. To adjust for these exclusions, the base weights for the RDD geographic samples were adjusted differentially depending on whether the respondent was Muslim or non-Muslim.

The coverage factor for those who were not Muslim Americans was determined by examining the percentage of all adults in the excluded areas (44.6%) based on 2009 county-level figures from the Census Population Estimates Program. The adjustment for non-Muslim cases was \( \frac{1}{1-.446} = 1.81 \). The coverage adjustment for Muslim cases was compiled from several sources. According to 2005-2009 ACS counts of U.S.-born persons whose ancestors lived in predominantly Muslim countries, about 19.2% of Muslims live in the excluded areas. This is higher than the estimates based on ACS counts of persons born in predominantly Muslim countries (13.5%) and speaking Muslim languages (15.2%). Taking the most conservative estimate of 19.2% exclusion, the adjustment that we used for Muslim cases was \( \frac{1}{1-.192} = 1.24 \). The Experian list and recontact cases
did not require coverage adjustment because they did not exclude any areas of the country.

The dual frame RDD sample of non-Muslims and Muslims was then balanced to control totals for the US adult population. The sample was balanced to match national population parameters for sex, age, education, race, Hispanic origin, region (U.S. Census definitions), and telephone usage. The basic weighting parameters came from a special analysis of the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey’s 2010 Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) that included all households in the continental United States. The cell phone usage parameter came from an analysis of the July-December 2010 National Health Interview Survey. After this calibration was performed, all the non-Muslim cases were dropped from the analysis.

The next step in the weighting process was to evaluate whether some Muslim adults were more likely to complete the survey than others. Specifically, we investigated the possibility that Muslim males were more likely to participate than Muslim females by using responses to questions about the total number of adult Muslim men and adult Muslim women in the household. We used this distribution, which was computed with a household-level weight, to develop an adjustment for propensity to respond by gender. The adjustment aligns the respondent sample to the roster-based distribution for gender as well as respondent reported data on education. Large-scale government surveys, which are the most common source for such population distribution estimates, do not collect data on religious affiliation.
This realignment was sample-based, so it retained the variability in the estimates of the number and type of Muslims observed in the screening estimates.

After the dual frame RDD Muslim cases were calibrated to the US population controls and adjusted for residual nonresponse, we estimated control totals for the adult Muslim American population. We then calibrated the base weighted recontact sample to those estimated totals. This ensured that the totals for the categories of age, gender, education, race, Hispanic ethnicity, region, and phone service were consistent with the estimates from the dual frame RDD sample.

The recontact and combined RDD cases were then integrated in proportion to their effective sample sizes. The final weighted sample aligns with the sample-based totals for the Muslim American adult population. Had we simply added them together, they would have estimated twice the Muslim American population total. Rather than dividing the weights of both frames by 2 (equally weighting the samples), we used a factor that was proportional to the effective sample sizes. This worked out to be 0.858 for the dual frame RDD cases and 0.142 for the recontact cases.

Due to the complex design of the Muslim American study, formulas commonly used in RDD surveys to estimate margins of error (standard errors) are inappropriate. Such formulas would understate the true variability in the estimates. Accordingly, we used a repeated replication technique, specifically jackknife repeated replication (JRR), to calculate the standard errors for this study. Repeated replication techniques estimate the variance of a survey statistic based on the variance between sub-sample estimates of that statistic. The sub-samples
(replicates) were created using the same sample design, but deleting a portion of the sample, and then weighting each sub-sample up to the population total. The units to be deleted were defined separately for each of the three samples (landline RDD, cell RDD, recontacts), and within each frame by the strata used in the sampling. A total of 100 replicates were created by combining telephone numbers to reduce the computational effort. A statistical software package designed for complex survey data, Stata v11, was used to calculate all of the standard errors and test statistics in the study.

**Assessing Bias and Other Error**

A key question in assessing the validity of the study’s findings is whether the sample is representative of the Muslim population. If Muslims who are difficult to locate or reluctant to be interviewed hold different opinions than those who are more accessible or willing to take part in the survey, a bias in the results could occur. For most welldesigned surveys, nonresponse has not been shown to create serious biases because people who do not respond are similar to those who do on key measures in the survey. Whether that is true for the Muslim American population is difficult to determine. To assess this possibility, we compared respondents in households who completed the survey easily with respondents with whom it was more difficult to obtain a completed interview. Comparisons were made between respondents reached within the first few attempts and those who required substantially more attempts. Comparisons also were made between respondents in households where at least one attempt to interview was met with a refusal and those that never refused to participate. In effect, reluctant and
inaccessible respondents may serve as a rough proxy for individuals who were never reached or never consented to be interviewed.

This analysis indicates that there are few significant differences between amenable and accessible respondents, on the one hand, and those who were harder to interview. Respondents who required more call attempts were somewhat more likely to be interviewed in one of the three foreign languages used in the study, an unsurprising result given the necessity to first identify a language barrier case and then to arrange a mutually convenient time for an Arabic, Farsi or Urdu-speaking interviewer to administer the interview. Perhaps related to this, harder to reach respondents were somewhat more likely to be born outside the U.S., to say they arrived in the U.S. after 1999 and to have a higher level of religious commitment. On the majority of questions in the survey, however, the differences between the hard to reach and other respondents were modest.

Nonresponse bias also can be assessed by comparing the opinions expressed early in the questionnaire by Muslims who did not complete the interview with the views of those who did complete the interview. About half of those who quit the interview did so in the first five minutes, prior to the point when the purpose of the study was revealed. Those who broke off were somewhat more likely to own their own home and to be self-employed or a small business owner. As is true in many surveys of the general public, those who broke off were somewhat less likely to report following what’s going on in government and public affairs “most of the time.” But on the available attitude questions for comparison, the differences were
mostly small and non-systematic. All in all, the substantive views of those who did not complete the interview appear to be comparable to those who did.

**Assessing Possible Sample Bias**

The validity of studies of groups with large immigrant populations depends in part on the extent to which the sample accurately reflects the diversity of the countries of origin and languages spoken by the groups. Overall, this sample conformed closely to expectations based on government surveys.

Data from the 2009 American Community Survey (ACS) provides estimates of the proportion of all Americans born outside the U.S. In order to compare these estimates with the current survey, the analysis of the ACS data is based on respondents who speak English at least well or very well or who speak Arabic, Farsi or Urdu. Focusing on areas with large Muslim populations, the ACS estimates that 0.4% of the U.S. population were born in the Middle East or North Africa, 0.2% were born in Iran, 0.1% were born in Pakistan, and 0.8% were born in other South Asian countries. Overall, the screener interviews for this survey closely match these ACS estimates, indicating that the survey adequately covers the potential Muslim immigrant population.

Analysis of the survey in comparison to ACS data also suggests that people who speak Arabic or Farsi were screened at appropriate rates; those who speak Urdu were screened at rates slightly below what was expected. The ACS data suggest that of the U.S. population who speaks one of the four languages in which interviewing was conducted, 99.76% of the population speaks English very well,
and 99.91% of the population speaks English well; by comparison, 99.79% of the screening interviews for this survey were conducted in English.

The ACS data estimate that between 0.05% and 0.13% of the target population speaks Arabic (and speaks English less than well or very well); 0.17% of screening interviews were done in Arabic. The ACS data estimate that between 0.03% and 0.07% of the population speaks Farsi (compared with 0.04% of screeners completed in Farsi), and that between 0.02% and 0.04% of the population speaks Urdu (compared with 0.01% of screeners completed in Urdu). These findings also indicate that the survey provided adequate coverage of these non-English speaking populations.

Finally, the ACS data make it possible to estimate the proportion of Muslims who do not speak English. Analysis suggests that between 83% and 93% of Muslims in the U.S. speak English well or very well, compared with between 4% and 10% who speak Arabic, 1-2% who speak Farsi, and 2-6% who speak Urdu. With the exception of a small underrepresentation of Urdu speakers, the weighted results of the survey line up closely with these projections.

**Verifying Religious Affiliation**

As an additional check on the quality of the data, a validation study was conducted to verify the religious preference of survey respondents. The study was fielded by Abt SRBI from June 2-July 24, 2011. A random subset of respondents was selected for the study among those who had completed the original survey in English, had accepted the incentive and were not part of the recontact sample who had completed a previous survey. Those selected were recontacted by telephone after
they had received the incentive for their participation in the original survey. A total of 153 validation interviews were completed (82 by landline and 71 by cell phone). The validation rate for religious preference was 98%; only 3 of the 153 respondents to the validation study did not choose Muslim when asked about their religious affiliation (two chose a different religion and one refused to provide a response).