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Impacts of U.S. Foreign Policy and Intervention on Guatemala: Mid-20th Century

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Impacts of U.S. Foreign Policy and Intervention on Guatemala: Mid-20th Century

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to President Juan José Arévalo who long ago challenged the North American people to learn of the effects of U.S. foreign policy and intervention on our neighbors and friends in Latin America. With this work I have heeded his call.

I also dedicate this work to my friend, Greg Plantamura, who has sought the best for me, as he holds high expectations for productive use of my education, in our common search for peace and justice.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ iii

Chapter One: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1

Chapter Two: Literature Review .................................................................................................. 12
   On Realism and National Interest ............................................................................................... 14
      Hans J. Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations, and James E.
      Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.’s Contending Theories
      of International Relations ........................................................................................................ 14
   On Imperialism .......................................................................................................................... 16
      Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers ......................................................... 16
      Chalmers Johnson’s Blowback ................................................................................................. 18
      Ronald H. Chilcote’s Theories of Comparative Politics ....................................................... 20
   On Sovereignty and Intervention .............................................................................................. 23
      C. Neale Ronning’s “Intervention, International Law, and the Inter-
      American System” .................................................................................................................... 23
   “American Exceptionalism”, U.S. Political Leadership and Alternate
   Views ........................................................................................................................................... 26
      Samuel P. Huntington’s The Dilemma of American Ideals and
      Institutions in Foreign Policy, and Hans J. Morgenthau’s
      “Repression’s Friend” ............................................................................................................. 26
      Peter H. Smith’s Talons of the Eagle ....................................................................................... 28
      Lars Schoultz’s Beneath the United States ............................................................................ 30
   Historical Background of Guatemala-U.S. Relations .............................................................. 32
      Stephen Schlesinger & Stephen Kinzer’s Bitter Fruit .......................................................... 32
      Richard H. Immerman’s The CIA in Guatemala ................................................................. 33
      Susanne Jonas’ The Battle for Guatemala .............................................................................. 34
   Learn the History of Latin America ........................................................................................... 36
      Noam Chomsky’s Turning the Tide ...................................................................................... 36
      Juan José Arévalo’s The Shark and the Sardines ................................................................. 37
   Freedom of Information Act and Declassified Information Sources ........................................ 39

Chapter Three: Economic Considerations .................................................................................... 41
   Contextual Background: Guatemala, the United States and the World ................................ 41
   Agrarian Reform and Labor Protection ...................................................................................... 50
   Specifics of Land Reform .......................................................................................................... 54
## Chapter Four: Guatemala and the Cold War

- Varying Perspectives on Communism .................................................. 59
- Preparation for Ouster of Arbenz through Coup d’état .......................... 66

## Chapter Five: 1954 Coup d’état

- Guatemala Is “Liberated”: Operation PBSUCCESS .................................. 71
- Results of the 1954 Coup ......................................................................... 83

## Chapter Six: Militarization: Legacy of “Liberation”

- Castillo Armas Secures His Power ......................................................... 86
- Guatemala Was Not Always Militarized .................................................. 93
- Counterinsurgency Begins ....................................................................... 97

## Chapter Seven: Conclusions

- Effects of U.S. Foreign Policy and Intervention ...................................... 100
- Economic and the 1954 Coup d’état ......................................................... 100
- Cold War and Communist Containment ............................................... 103
- Militarization of Guatemala .................................................................... 105
- U.S. Intervention: Not the Only Factor, But an Essential Factor .......... 111
- Sovereignty Is Important ......................................................................... 113
- What Can Be Done With This Knowledge? ............................................ 115

## Works Cited

................................................................................................................. 118
ABSTRACT

International Relations theory includes realist concepts of sovereign nation-states interacting in an anarchic world as they rationally determine their own national interests based upon ever-changing competition for power. In this interplay for power, nation-states may affect each other politically, economically, ideologically or militarily. This thesis focuses on effects of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. intervention in Guatemala in the time period surrounding the Guatemalan Revolution (1944-1954), with its “liberation” in 1954, and then into the early 1960s as the Guatemalan state began to be militarized. In this thesis I will answer the following question:

How did the United States affect the sovereign nation of Guatemala, through economic policy, Cold War rationale, and military operations and thereby contribute to and facilitate the establishment of the nature of the Guatemalan counterinsurgency state?

Through historically documented and officially acknowledged events an assessment will be made as to how these three elements singularly and also collectively influenced the internal workings of the Guatemalan state.
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Foundational principles in Political Science and International Relations include concepts such as the sovereignty of the individual nation-state, with concerns of national security within each nation. These theories can be at odds with what happens in the real world. A prime example of this is Guatemala, where power politics—economic power, military power and ideological power of the United States—all affected another sovereign nation. Many people believe that the effects of U.S. foreign policy and intervention efforts set in motion the tragic situation in Guatemala resulting in what some members of the international community conclude was genocide.

In Richard N. Adams’ study in Guatemalan social anthropology *Crucifixion by Power*, he acknowledges the understanding that the nation-state is the basic unit of investigation. He says that in a world of sovereign nations, the nation-state claims ultimate authority in wielding power within its own domains (Adams 1970, p 4-5). Sovereignty of the individual nation-state is considered to be an absolute right, one which seeks to ensure full interior autonomy and independence from external forces, this according to C. Neale Ronning in his “Intervention, International Law, and the Inter-American System” (Ronning 1961, p 252). Ronning emphasizes this idea with this quote from the Sixth International Conference of American States (1928): “No state has a right to interfere in the internal affairs of another” (Ronning 1961, p 251). “If that right is not
consecrated and is not protected in absolute form, international juridical harmony does not exist” (Ronning 1961, p 252).

These concepts are identified and defined within the field of Political Science and International Relations. It is understood that intervention in another nation-state is considered to be a threat to its independence. In spite of this, officially sanctioned historical accounts as well as actual U.S. Government documents demonstrate clear evidence that the U.S. Government was responsible for a number of events in Guatemala surrounding the 1954 coup d’état and throughout Guatemala’s civil war (1960-1996). The U.S. involvement which affected the internal governance of the sovereign nation of Guatemala can be considered through a number of objectives. In his article “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Radical Change: Covert Operations in Guatemala, 1950-1954” Gordon L. Bowen observes the controversy which arises among scholars in their differing views on which of several U.S. roles in Guatemala might be understood to be the most significant. He points out that for some people, U.S. economic motivations seem most important. Other people stress the importance of the evolution of anti-communist doctrine. Bowen’s analysis takes a third direction which deals with military institutions as guarantors of U.S. foreign policy objectives (Bowen 1983, p 88-89).

Another undeniable influence is land reform.

Scholarly works and historical accounts characterize the Guatemalan civil war (1960-1996) as what was one of the longest and bloodiest in the Western Hemisphere (Jonas 2000, p 17). Extensive research has been conducted through first hand testimonials carried out by a number of impartial organizations. For instance, the Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH or Comisión para el Esclarecimiento
Historico), a truth and reconciliation commission, was established through the Accord of Oslo in 1994 “to clarify with objectivity, equity and impartiality, the human rights violations and acts of violence connected with the armed confrontation that caused suffering among the Guatemalan people”. The task of the Commission was not to judge, but rather to clarify the history of more than three decades of fratricidal war (Guatemala Memory of Silence 1999, Prologue). From these efforts came the March 1999 report “Guatemala Memory of Silence”. One of the CEH report’s conclusions is that the number of Guatemalans killed or disappeared during this confrontation exceeded 200,000 (Guatemala Memory of Silence 1999, Conclusions I. 2).

In his *Turning the Tide: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace*, Noam Chomsky names a factor which he says is often missing when assessing relations between the United States and other countries. That missing element is an historical identification and analysis of the effects of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. intervention on the internal governance of individual sovereign nations. Chomsky contends that features of the United States’ international behavior are often suppressed, ignored or denied (Chomsky 1985, p 1). He perceives that “reality is often concealed or deformed by the reigning doctrinal system, which pervades the media, journals of opinion and much of scholarship” (Chomsky 1985, p 1).

In consideration of the CEH and other similar reports, new information from recently declassified documents, and scholarly work which has been done throughout history regarding the 1954 Guatemalan coup and civil war, I have chosen to research the Central American country of Guatemala. This I do in partial response to Chomsky’s observation of the gap in knowledge which I believe also exists in the case of Guatemala.
With this thesis I will identify and analyze various effects of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. intervention on the internal governance of the sovereign nation of Guatemala. I will explore these effects in the time period following World War II, throughout Guatemala’s “Ten Years of Spring” (1944-1954), with the resultant “liberation”/coup d’état of 1954, and then during the early part of the Cold War into the 1960s.

Why would it be important to research the events of the Guatemalan civil war so many years after the fact? Susanne Jonas has a long record of academic research on the history of Guatemala. In her *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power* she articulates the view that Guatemala has been profoundly shaped by the Central Intelligence Agency intervention of 1954 and also by subsequent interventions by the United States. Similarly to Chomsky, Jonas expresses concern that the “fruits of those interventions have been veiled in a vast shroud of silence in the U.S. press and public domain” (Jonas 1991, p 2). It is because of this that she felt an obligation to write for U.S. audiences about Guatemala.

In view of past scholarly research of U.S. intervention in Guatemala both pre- and post- Guatemalan civil war, and more recent research from organizations and the CEH truth and reconciliation commission, there is much to learn about the historical roots of that armed confrontation. The CEH report recognizes that the Guatemalan civil war and militarization of that country did not take place through a simple progression of history (Guatemala Memory of Silence, 1999, Conclusions I. 13). The report determined that the Cold War and National Security Doctrine of the United States fed the armed confrontation and the militarization of the Guatemalan state and society (Guatemala Memory of Silence, 1999, Conclusions I. 13, 14 and 37).
It is because of what may be residual effects of mid-20th century intervention by the United States in Guatemala that I feel drawn to research this topic. In considering academic work from various sources, there are a number of distinctions in Guatemalan history which I find compelling. For instance, it has been historically documented and officially acknowledged that the United States has been directly involved in and has influenced Guatemalan internal affairs. Of particular note is involvement of the United States in the CIA sponsored coup d’état which replaced the democratically-elected government of Guatemala in 1954. Many scholars contend that it was after this coup that U.S. participation and guidance helped to set the stage for the Guatemalan civil war.

An excerpt from The National Security Archive notes the distinction of Guatemala being the country in which the CIA carried out its first covert operation in Latin America (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 5). Diplomatic historian Nicholas Cullather identifies this as Operation PBSUCCESS. From Cullather’s access to agency records and secret operation files, his overview describes PBSUCCESS as an account of how President Eisenhower came to be convinced to order the forceful removal of a democratically-elected leader, due to Cold War concerns (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 5). Various scholars posit that U.S. financing and planning helped to shape governance and leadership in Guatemala.

Jonas points out that Guatemala has been called the “laboratory” where counterinsurgency in Latin America was developed (Jonas 1991, p 71). She calls it a “test case” in suppression of Latin American social revolution (Jonas 1991, p 9). Some scholars express their belief that it did not take long for the same types of U.S. foreign policy and intervention to affect other countries after Guatemala. Jonas opines that the tactics
developed in Guatemala later became standard operating procedure in counterinsurgency wars throughout a number of countries in the hemisphere (Jonas 2000, p. 120).

Jonas identifies Guatemala as the first country to experience death squads and “disappearances” which actually targeted the Guatemalan civilian population (Jonas 1991, p 71). In considering the truth commission reports, both the CEH and the report of the Guatemalan Archdiocesan Project for the Recuperation of Historical Memory (REMHI), Rachel May attests to the “brutal nature of the violence perpetrated by the state” of Guatemala (torture, disappearance, massacres) (May 2001, p 13). She classifies Guatemala as “one of the world’s most tragic cases of civil conflict and state-sponsored terrorism in the late 20th century” (May 2001, p 13). May asserts that the “state took on the characteristics of a terrorist regime, and that the state is responsible for the commission of genocide” (May 2001, p 14).

Learning of these distinctions compelled me to become more knowledgeable about Guatemalan-U.S. history. This knowledge could provide a deeper understanding and promote awareness to effectively lift part of the “shroud of silence” which Jonas has perceived. From these distinctions, and inspired by the factor which Chomsky previously identified as missing, that is, historical identification and analysis of the effects of U.S. foreign policy and intervention on internal governance of individual sovereign nations, I am motivated to ask the following thesis question:

How did the United States affect the sovereign nation of Guatemala, through economic policy, Cold War rationale, and military operations and thereby contribute to and facilitate the establishment of the nature of the Guatemalan counterinsurgency state?
This question can be generalized as follows: What were the effects of the United States on the economy and the governance of Guatemala? What were the effects on land tenure and proposed land reform? How did the United States project perceptions of a communist threat onto Guatemala and to what effect? Did the United States play a role in militarizing Guatemala? Is Jonas’ contention correct that intervention by the United States through these components singularly or collectively helped to set the stage for the Guatemalan civil war?

I will attempt to answer these questions through a case study of Guatemala. I will consider aspects of U.S. foreign policy and intervention in three general categories: economic, Cold War communist containment rationale, and then militarization of Guatemala. These aspects must be put in context both within Guatemala internally, and also considered through external effects—for the purposes of this paper, primarily effects from the United States. To those ends this thesis will begin with background information on the state of the world economy (macro) and then move toward Guatemala’s internal (micro) economy.

Whole societies or nations (macro units) can be studied using concepts such as democracy, sovereignty and nonintervention, however these concepts are often identified and recorded as experienced by Anglo-Americans (Chilcote 1994, p 372). Some scholars don’t see these generalized concepts as very useful. Ronald H. Chilcote claims that the study of politics is muddled in its terminology and so meanings must be clarified (Chilcote 1994, p 374). Clarification can take place through case studies as they are helpful in observing deviations from established conceptual generalizations. Models bring parts together and demonstrate relationships. Models can simplify representations
of what is happening in reality (Chilcote 1994, p 372). In using Guatemala as a model, it can be observed whether or not Guatemala's sovereignty was respected by the United States. Through a single case study during a specific time period one can observe political activity and indicators of intervention through empirical interrelationships between Guatemala and the United States.

To make these observations, this thesis provides content analysis using existing research along with primary documents. Some of the primary documents which I use come from the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. I used excerpts from the CIA archives (U.S. Senate, 1961: 865-866) text of the Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, in regards to the “Communist Threat to the United States through the Caribbean”. I also used another Department of State Publication regarding “Intervention of International Communism to Guatemala” (Department of State Publication 5556, 1954). My declassified CIA sources on the Guatemalan destabilization program came from The National Security Archive available through George Washington University.

The analysis in this exploratory study will be qualitative in nature, not quantitative, and largely descriptive (Chilcote 1994, p 373). Specific observations of U.S. foreign policy and intervention will be used inductively to infer generalizations (Chilcote 1994, p 370). Chilcote states that methodology guides inquiry and the search for solutions to problems in the real world (Chilcote 1994, p 3). He predicates that methodology gives shape to inquiry. Concepts of sovereignty and nonintervention are well formulated. These can be observed qualitatively, as can be demonstrated through
intervention or nonintervention. “Dissimilar patterns of behavior become important in the study of politics” (Chilcote 1994, p 370). From specific observations one can conclude whether or not the United States intervened in Guatemala.

Political phenomena have been studied including government and governmental institutions, but a broader range can also be observed in other types of organizations (Chilcote 1994, p 3). Politics can be assessed looking at many forms of political activity—governmental as well as nongovernmental (Chilcote 1994, p 4). The title of Chilcote’s book indicates that he is “search(ing) for a paradigm” in reconsidering political science and comparative politics. Chilcote’s work moves past mainstream theories of system and state, political culture, development and underdevelopment, and theories of class. His search leads him to the study of political economy (Chilcote 1994, p 363). Chilcote uses the definition of political economy as a “social science dealing with the interrelationship of political and economic processes” (Chilcote 1994, p 340). He observes comparative politics and argues that “the study of politics cannot be isolated from social and economic questions” (Chilcote 1994, p 12).

In looking at political economy theories, Chilcote delineates varied emphases on theories such as imperialism, dependency and underdevelopment amongst others (Chilcote 1994, p 12). He sees these as a means of organizational arrangement around political economy. He calls attention to the fact that the idea of political economy is not new, as Karl Marx’s “Das Kapital” is actually subtitled “A Critique of Political Economy” and deals with commodities, money, surplus value and accumulation of capital (Chilcote 1994, p 340). Chilcote makes note of Marx’s questioning of commonly accepted concepts regarding liberated individuals in free competition (Chilcote 1994,
In Marx’s examination of the state, in the times in which he lived, Marx differentiated between the state and civil society, and saw these as being separated in a system which was reinforced by capitalism (Chilcote 1994, p 341). Chilcote observes that Marx and Engels looked at the state in relation to the productive base of society. He saw the “Division of labor and private property tend to promote contradictions between individual and community interests so that the latter takes on an independent form as the state separates from the real interests of individual and community” (Chilcote 1994, p 341). We will observe an example of this type of contradiction as we consider how the Guatemalan state represented its majority population, the indigenous people, in matters of land ownership, their well-being, and in civic action such as voting.

In assessing social science and government in Latin America, Chilcote notes that “connections between U.S. universities and defense and national security projects constituted gross violations of the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries” (Chilcote 1994, p 41). In his assessment Chilcote tries to elucidate connections among government, the academic world, and multinational corporations (Chilcote 1994, p 47). He writes that ideological assumptions permeate political science and comparative politics, and these assumptions also affect policies and actions of governments, universities and the corporate world (Chilcote 1994, p 47). The values and beliefs of political scientists are tied to and reflect the world around them, where the capitalistic world has been most prevalent. In recognizing the interplay of ideological relationships in these various fields this paper considers not only nation-states as actors, but broadens the perspective to include news media, clergy, and corporations such as the United Fruit Company in Guatemala.
International political economy includes theories of imperialism and dependency. Chilcote also observes inclusiveness of non-state actors as analysis turned “from competitive capitalism to monopoly and oligopoly and assessed the role of the giant corporations and their managers” (Chilcote 1994, p 357). He assesses ideas relevant to U.S. foreign policy and its impact on the expansion of U.S. business. Chilcote considers scholarship on “the coincidence of the military and political presence of the United States overseas, the dominant position of U.S. capital in the multinationals, and the dominance of multinational banking” (Chilcote 1994, p 357). Chilcote directs inquiry toward imperialistic tendencies of the United States through U.S. aid and trade. These impacts of varied forms of U.S. foreign policy and intervention are included as subjects of this thesis on Guatemala.

In my attempts at answering the aforementioned questions I will not provide an event-by-event history, but rather I will identify individual historic actions and interventions by the United States. I will then analyze the effects of U.S. foreign policies and interventions on the sovereign nation of Guatemala.
CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

Scholars define international politics as the effort made by one state or non-state international actor, to influence another international actor in some way (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 2001, p 20-21). Dougherty and Pfalzgraff note that this influence may come in the form of actual or threatened military force, or it may come from inducements, be they economic or political. The international system is macrocosmic or global, made up of micro units of nation-states (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 2001, p 31). As the world has globalized there has been discussion as to the continued centrality of the nation-state, however, the nation-state has remained the central unit of analysis. Nation-states will be the primary units of analysis in this case study, however, politics can be assessed looking at many forms of political activity–governmental as well as nongovernmental (Chilcote 1994, p 4).

History has focused on the nation-state as sovereign, that is, as independent and with its own imperative for self-determination (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 2001, p 13). Within this international system, Hans J. Morgenthau posits that states are rational actors who use power in seeking their own national interests and security. National interests and security can be understood in a number of ways, as we will see in this thesis.

Knowledge of history is necessary in international relations so as to broaden theory. For this reason I have chosen to do a case study on Guatemalan history which
spans the time period surrounding its Ten Years of Spring or revolutionary period (1944-1954), during the 1954 coup d’état, throughout the governance of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, and into the early 1960s. This thesis will consider three thematic impacts of the United States on the politics of Guatemala, those being effects felt through economic policy, Cold War rationale, and then early stages of militarization of Guatemala. These can be considered singularly or in combination, as U.S. foreign policy during this time took place within the context of the Cold War.

In assessing the impacts of U.S. foreign policy and intervention on the nation-state of Guatemala, this literature review will present varied concepts from the field of Political Science and International Relations. We will consider foundational scholarship of realist principles through power politics and the concept of national interest. We will look at key components of theories of imperialism and repercussions of imperial control. We will consider national sovereignty through differing perspectives on intervention. Next we will look at the work of three prominent scholars on Guatemalan history who will chronicle background information on Guatemala-U.S. relations during the mid-20th century. This review will examine the ideas of another scholar who considers what may be the underlying cause of intervention in Latin America that is the concept of “American exceptionalism”. Another author describes Cold War logic in inter-American relations as being headed up by U.S. political leadership. We will counterpose these ideas with two other authors, one who contends that people in the United States perceive human beings in Latin America as people who are “beneath” them. The second author is a former President of Guatemala who held office during some of the years of this case study period. Since much of history during this time was lost to the American public this
President’s 1961 letter “to the American reader” will provide a Guatemalan perspective of U.S. foreign policy near to the time of the 1954 coup d’état and shortly thereafter.

In looking at this information through the lens of a case study on Guatemala, a particular U.S.-Guatemala history about which many Americans were not and may not be aware, this literature review ends with an author who puts forth a challenge of sorts. He asks that we learn about U.S. geopolitical conceptions and institutional structures whose resultant actions have contributed to oppression and misery in other parts of the world. He calls upon us to inform ourselves and simply be honest about past history. This case study on Guatemala provides but one tragic example from which Americans may learn.

On Realism and National Interest

Hans J. Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations, and James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.’s Contending Theories of International Relations. Hans J. Morgenthau is credited as having impacted political realist theory more than any other person in the 20th century (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 75). Realist concepts include self-interest/national interest which is determined rationally through power, and balance of power relationships. These relationships take place in what is assumed to be an anarchic world. Within the scope of international relations where nation-states are the central actors, this equates to making rational determinations about political acts and their consequences based upon historical data (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 76). It is understood that historical evidence bears out the view that political leaders determine national interest based upon power. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff offer Morgenthau’s
interpretation as follows: “A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 77).

According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, international politics are understood through national interests in a process based upon diplomacy or war. Sovereign nations compete for power (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 76). Foreign policy is based on survival at a minimum; national interest corresponds with national survival (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 76). Since the world is comprised of nations in an anarchic global setting, with national interest as the goal, the guiding principle is the struggle for power.

“Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place” (Morgenthau 1978, p 10). Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff explain that the morality of nation-states is understood to differ from individual morality. State morality is judged by political consequences. They posit that Morgenthau did not ignore ethical or moral considerations. They believe that Morgenthau “could envisage no conception of national interest that would condone policies of mass extermination, torture, and the indiscriminate slaughter of civilian populations in war” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 77). They theorize that Morgenthau believed that ethics could restrain political conduct. Their analysis posits that if international politics are framed in terms of power, as can be seen in Morgenthau’s words “we are able to judge other nations as we judge our own” (Morgenthau 1978, p 11).

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff put forth that national policies are designed to seek to preserve the status quo, to achieve expansion through imperialism, or to gain prestige
(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 77). They use the Monroe Doctrine as an example of a policy which was designed to maintain the status quo balance in the Western hemisphere. This thesis will demonstrate but one example of an effort by the United States toward maintaining the status quo in Guatemala. This they do through ideology, and economic and military power.

On Imperialism

Paul Kennedy’s *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. Kennedy’s book deals with national and international power and how strong nations have risen and fallen over the centuries. He describes his work as “interaction between economics and strategy” as powerful states work toward enhancing or maintaining their own wealth and power (Kennedy 1987, p xv). He explains that the term “military conflict” from the book’s subtitle must be examined in terms of economic change. He views the leading nations’ relative strengths as ever-changing (Kennedy 1987, p xv). In looking at the course of history he finds that the rise and fall of leading countries shows a long-term correlation between “productive and revenue-raising capacities on the one hand and military strength on the other” (Kennedy 1987, p xvi). This book looks at continuous interplay between strategy and economics in both peacetime and war (Kennedy 1987, p xxi). Kennedy offers this book to fill in a gap he sees in the study of shifts of economic and strategic power balances (Kennedy 1987, p xxv). Kennedy moves through history detailing politics of Eurocentric leading powers over 500 years. For purposes of this thesis we
look at his chapter on the 20th century bipolar world of the USSR and the United States with their Cold War ideological and economic differences (Kennedy 1987, p xx).

In looking at the imperialistic atmosphere of the early 1900s, Kennedy highlights the arrogance and ambitions of western imperialism. He believes that it brought with it seeds of its own destruction (Kennedy 1987, p 392). He notes that western imperialists accepted nationalism and self-determination for certain countries and “civilized” people (e.g. eastern Europeans) but these principles were not acceptable where the “imperialist powers extended their territories and held down independence movements” (Kennedy 1987, p 392). We will see in this thesis an example of the United States extending its influence to hold down the efforts toward independence and reform in Guatemala.

Kennedy writes that with 20th century power politics came a new trend, that of political fragmentation of the globe (Kennedy 1987, p 392). He discerns that as empires were being shattered, the forces of change resulted in what would be called the Third World. This reference to “third” world he postulates came about because “it insisted on its distinction from the American- and Russian-dominated blocs” (Kennedy 1987, p 392). He says that these countries were still tied to the superpowers, but they had other concerns: decolonization, concentration on issues other than the Cold War, and promotion of world change away from economic dominance by white men (Kennedy 1987, p 392-393).

In looking at the Cold War and the Third World, Kennedy states that one major element was the arms race between the two blocs and the creation of military alliances to support either side (Kennedy 1987, p 383). This U.S.-Russian rivalry created a competition to find new partners, or to prevent Third World countries from allying themselves
with the other power (Kennedy 1987, p 388). Kennedy says that early on this was more an American activity because of its post-1945 advantageous position, while the USSR was trying to rebuild after war. He points out for instance that the United States had outside garrisons and air bases. Kennedy describes “the view from Washington. . . that a master plan for world Communist domination was unfolding, step by step, and needed to be ‘contained’” (Kennedy 1987, p 389).

During this time many countries were looking for economic and military support from Washington (Kennedy 1987, p 388). Even so, Kennedy observes that at this same time the Third World was coming of age, as they were ridding themselves of the control of previous European empires. Many of these countries did not want to become mere satellites of superpowers, even if they could receive economic or military aid (Kennedy 1987, p 392).

The author insinuates that the Great Powers had to grapple with the fact that their universalist message was not automatically accepted by every other country in the world (Kennedy 1987, p 392). We will see one example of this independent thought process in the work of Juan José Arévalo in his *The Shark and the Sardines*.

**Chalmers Johnson’s Blowback.** This book’s subtitle, “The Costs and Consequences of American Empire” indicates what Johnson says is the subject of this book, that is the nature of a remaining empire and how this has changed over time (Johnson 2000, p 20). In this book Johnson moves away from more traditional definitions of imperialism which include extending rule or authority over foreign countries, holding colonies, or simply extending one’s state dominion over other nation-states. He deepens
his modern definition of imperialism to include “ideological or juridical concept(s)—
commonwealth, alliance, free world, the West, the Communist bloc—that disguises the
actual relationship among its members” (Johnson 2000, p 19-20). According to Johnson
these new empires come with an imposition of a social system (Johnson 2000, 19-20).

So what is “blowback”? Johnson defines blowback as “shorthand for saying that
a nation reaps what it sows, even if it does not fully know or understand what it has
sown” (Johnson 2000, p 223). Johnson predicts that world politics which took place in
the 20th century will have blowback effects in the 21st century (Johnson 2000, p 229).
These, he believes, are tangible costs of being an empire (Johnson 2000, p 223).

In spite of the United States’ substantial military and economic tools, and sense of
invulnerability, Johnson foresees that blowback effects will be felt within the United
States (Johnson 2000, p 223). He notes however that blowback is not only a problem for
the United States as the sole imperial power. He describes the United States as the
primary source of secret operations which hold up repressive regimes, and the world’s
largest weapons seller, as well as the world’s most prominent target for blowback
(Johnson 2000, p 11-12).

Johnson reasons that people who live in imperialist countries have short memories
of their imperial acts, however the memories of those at the receiving end of imperialistic
power have long memories. For instance, he contends that nations which have
perpetuated acts of genocide will be recipients of blowback. This would include some
Central American countries and, for the purposes of this thesis, Guatemala.

In his discussions on Central America, Johnson indicates how, in that geograph-
ical area, the United States historically behaved no better than the other superpower who
he refers to as Communist bureaucrats (Johnson 2000, p 229). He writes that both superpowers used Cold War rhetoric to justify their actions against smaller states (Johnson 2000, p 27). As he lists Guatemala as one of the countries affected by the U.S. anticommunist rhetoric, he denotes the idea of communism in Central America as “essentially absurd”. He points to the existence of propaganda apparatuses which disguised the “true roots of revolt” from their own people (Johnson 2000, p 27).

In regards to Guatemala, he writes that the U.S. CIA planned and organized the 1954 military coup as a result of modest land reform which threatened U.S. corporations (Johnson 2000, p 13-14). He sees this as a “striking example of American imperial policies” in its backyard (Johnson 2000, p 13).

**Ronald H. Chilcote’s *Theories of Comparative Politics***. The subtitle of Ronald H. Chilcote’s book indicates a “search for a paradigm” in political science and comparative politics which he believes leads to the study of political economy (Chilcote 1994, p 363). Chilcote compartmentalizes comparative politics theoretical direction into theories of system and state, political culture, development and underdevelopment, and theories of class. He summarizes and critiques each and challenges scholars to move past mainstream ideas, toward alternative approaches such as political economy (Chilcote 1994, p 339). Chilcote uses the definition of political economy as a “social science dealing with the interrelationship of political and economic processes” (Chilcote 1994, p 340). He stresses comparative political economy as he observes comparative politics and argues for assimilation of political questions. He writes that “the study of politics cannot be isolated from social and economic questions” (Chilcote 1994, p 12).
In looking at political economy theories, Chilcote delineates varied emphases on theories such as imperialism, and dependency and underdevelopment amongst others (Chilcote 1994, p 12). He sees these as a means of organizational arrangement around political economy. He notes that the idea of political economy is not new, as Karl Marx’s “Das Kapital” is actually subtitled “A Critique of Political Economy” (Chilcote 1994, p 340). This work deals with commodities, money, surplus value and accumulation of capital. Chilcote notes Marx’s questioning of commonly accepted concepts of liberated individuals in free competition (Chilcote 1994, p 340). In Marx’s examination of the state, in the times in which he lived, Marx differentiated between the state and civil society, and saw these as being separated in a system reinforced by capitalism (Chilcote 1994, p 341).

Chilcote observes that Marx and Engels looked at the state in relation to the productive base of society and saw the “Division of labor and private property tend to promote contradictions between individual and community interests so that the latter takes on an independent form as the state separates from the real interests of individual and community” (Chilcote 1994, p 341). We will observe an example of this in looking at the Guatemalan state along with the needs of the majority Guatemalan population, the indigenous people, in issues of land ownership, well-being of the populace, and in civic action such as voting.

For Marx, an examination of interrelationships in material production is necessary. Chilcote writes of Engels’ and Marx’s ideas that: “The base or economic structure of society becomes the real foundation on which people enter into essential relations over which they exercise little control. In contrast, the legal and political
superstructure is a reflection of that base, and changes in the economic foundation bring about transformations in the superstructure” (Chilcote 1994, p 342). Chilcote notes that comparative politics were traditionally directed at the role of government and state, and after the 1950s, some specialists turned instead toward the concept of political system. Taking such different approaches opened up discussion on imperialism and dependency, and consequent analysis of nations as seen as developed and underdeveloped (Chilcote 1994, p 342-343), and peripheral and core.

Chilcote looks for an holistic approach, and indeed he finds Marxist theory as “holistic, broadly ranged, unified and interdisciplinary in contrast to the ahistorical, compartmentalized, and often narrow parameters of the mainstream paradigm” (Chilcote 1994, p 343). He finds that Marxist study relative to political economy unites and synthesizes elements (Chilcote 1994, p 344), this in agreement with Chilcote’s advocacy for synthesis in understanding and explanation of societal problems. Chilcote believes that “the study of politics should be combined with economics” (Chilcote 1994, p 345).

In regards to theories of international political economy and theories of imperialism and dependency, Chilcote notes that analysis turned “from competitive capitalism to monopoly and oligopoly and assessed the role of the giant corporations and their managers” (Chilcote 1994, p 357). He considers work on “U.S. foreign policy and its impact on the international expansion of U.S. business” (Chilcote 1994, p 357). He looks at “the coincidence of the military and political presence of the United States overseas, the dominant position of U.S. capital in the multinationals, and the dominance of multinational banking” (Chilcote 1994, p 357). Amongst Chilcote’s work is emphasis on imperialistic tendencies of the United States through U.S. aid and trade.
On Sovereignty and Intervention

C. Neale Ronning’s “Intervention, International Law, and the Inter-American System”. According to Ronning, no clearer statements on the doctrine of absolute sovereignty can be found than those presented in discussions at the Sixth International Conference of American States held in Cuba in 1928, which read as follows: “No state has a right to interfere in the internal affairs of another” (Ronning 1961, p 251).

Further, Ronning provides an Argentine statement which he says represented almost every Latin American delegation:

“Sovereignty of states is the absolute right of full interior autonomy and complete external independence. That right is guaranteed to the strong nations by their power and to the weak through the respect of the strong. If that right is not consecrated and is not protected in absolute form, international juridical harmony does not exist. Intervention, diplomatic or armed, permanent or temporary, threatens the independence of states.” (Ronning 1961, p 252).

Ronning says that the United States finds itself “astride” Latin American conflicts in the last two decades (he was writing in 1961) and so non-intervention principles need to be reconsidered (Ronning 1961, p 249). He sees much difficulty in failure to treat international politics of Latin America as objective (Ronning 1961, p 250). In his understanding, “the problem of intervention in the Western Hemisphere has been viewed almost exclusively as a struggle where Latin-American states were defending themselves against intervention by the United States (and a few Great Powers in Europe) who sought to protect powerful economic interests and promote imperialistic designs” (Ronning 1961, p 250).
Ronning has little doubt that principles of non-intervention are fundamental to the inter-American system, and that American governments are “well aware that they are breaking the law when the resort to intervention” (Ronning 1961, p 269). In spite of this, for the 20 years previous to Ronning’s article he estimates that there were more cases of intervention in Central America and the Caribbean than anywhere else in the world outside of the Soviet sphere (Ronning 1961, p 269).

Regarding post World War II events, Ronning looks at Latin America. He makes note of growing social and political unrest and movements demanding fundamental change in the structure of society, such as political democracy and respect for human rights, and also “freeing the downtrodden masses from their economic and social bondage” (Ronning 1961, p 258). He states that these changes would deal with previous patterns of oligarchy and foreign control. He also asserts that totalitarian ideology was spread by clandestine subversive intervention.

Ronning recognizes U.S. concerns for its own security and says that when U.S. security is being threatened, or “when it is convinced that it is”, it looks for ways to get around principles of non-intervention (Ronning 1961, p 262). One such argument he provided was from U.S. delegate to the convention, Charles Evans Hughes when he tried to justify U.S. actions by contending that they were not intervention, but rather they were warranted for the protection of lives and property of American nationals (Ronning 1961, p 252).

In looking at the principles of nonintervention, and economic, social and political developments in the region, Ronning cites what he calls “collisions”. He writes that “the non-intervention doctrine confronts the facts of intervention, especially in Central
America and the Caribbean” (Ronning 1961, p 249). He also observes intrusion by the Cold War conflict, where he sees Cold War propaganda being used by both contenders as they profess a life of abundance under their respective political and economic systems (Ronning 1961, p 259).

Ronning calls Guatemala the prime example of intervention. He observes that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had maneuvered at the Tenth Inter-American Conference in 1954, with the Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against the Intervention of International Communism (Ronning 1961, p 262). Ronning points out that usage of this Declaration would give basis for similar action in other parts of the hemisphere.

In this work Ronning surmises that conference discussions contained a warning that “the principle of non-intervention, which was supposed to guarantee freedom and the right of self-determination, might well become the very means by which tyranny would be perpetuated” (Ronning 1961, p 252). Ronning concludes that the perspective of the United States did not provide solutions to this dilemma, but instead a remedy of unilateral intervention (Ronning 1961, p 253).

Ronning evaluates the United States looking primarily to its own security interests (Dulles) as a short-sighted approach (Ronning 1961, p 271) because it fails to relate hemispheric security to problems of economic and social well-being for Latin Americans (Ronning 1961, p 271). He says that Latin America in general resents U.S. intervention (Ronning 1961, p 251). Ronning contends that relating intervention exclusively to a threat for one state or a group of states provides no results.
“American Exceptionalism”, U.S. Political Leadership and Alternate Views

Samuel P. Huntington’s *The Dilemma of American Ideals and Institutions in Foreign Policy*, and Hans J. Morgenthau’s *“Repression’s Friend”*. Samuel P. Huntington describes American involvement in the world as national interest and power versus political morality and principles (Huntington 1981, p 3). He sees a difference between the realists and the moralists (Huntington 1981, p 4). Austin Ranney describes this publication as “the persistent, radical gap between the promise of American ideals, and the performance of American politics” (Huntington 1981, Foreword). Huntington recognizes antagonism between the American ideals of liberty, equality and hostility to authority, and the institutions and hierarchies which are necessary to carry out these same functions in a democratic society. He projects that these tensions will increase as time goes on. For the purpose of my thesis on Guatemala, this resource emphasizes the perceived need for U.S. power in world affairs to remain strong in order for liberty and democracy to continue.

Huntington examines choices made by American policy makers while they deal with the rest of the world (Huntington 1981, p 4). In his opinion, the conflict that Americans perceived between power and liberty within the United States leads them to project that same conflict as existing in countries outside of the United States. He notes an assumption which follows this reasoning—American power in dealing with other countries must also threaten liberty within those countries (Huntington 1981, p 4).
Huntington highlights the words of Hans J. Morgenthau in looking at U.S. involvement in the politics of other countries. Morgenthau refers to America as “Repression’s Friend” in a 1974 *New York Times* letter to the editor:

“With unfailing consistency, we have since the end of the Second World War *intervened* (emphasis mine) on behalf of conservative and fascist repression against revolution and radical reform. In an age when societies are in a revolutionary or prerevolutionary stage, we have become the foremost counterrevolutionary status quo power on earth. Such a policy can only lead to moral and political disaster” (*New York Times*, October 10, 1974, p 46).

In reaction to Morgenthau’s ideas, Huntington reasons that in the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, right-wing regimes are more susceptible to American/Western influence than left-wing dictatorships. He believes this influence to lean toward “liberty” (Huntington 1981, p 4-5). He sees Morgenthau’s reasoning as deficient. In Huntington’s view, U.S. influence in other societies in the mid-1970s was decreasing, as only a “pale shadow” of what it was 25 years earlier. Huntington goes on to credit the United States for the “imposition of democracy” on the defeated Axis countries (Huntington 1981, p 5-6).

As for American influence in Latin American countries in the early 1960s, Huntington also credits the United States for supporting free elections, something which he believes results in political stability (Huntington 1981, p 6-7, 9). He recognizes U.S. focus on economic aid, military assistance and training, and “propaganda efforts” in the 1960s. He sees the Alliance for Progress as the high point of democracy (Huntington 1981, p 7) for the United States during this time. During the 1970s he finds that a goal was “lowered” to attempts to “induce authoritarian governments not to infringe too blatantly the rights of their citizens” (Huntington 1981, p 9).
It is Huntington’s contention that U.S. power is less likely to be misused or corrupted than other governments. He attributes part of this to the American free press, and also to Congress’ powers of investigation which he says limit the potential to violate the values of American society (Huntington 1981, p 11). He talks of the “clean hands” doctrine—which he takes to mean that the United States sets an example for others when it keeps its own hands clean (Huntington 1981, p 12). He says “the power of example works only when it is an example of power... No one copies a loser” (Huntington 1981, p 13). For this reason he determines that liberty in the world is dependent upon the future of American power; the promotion of liberty abroad means that American power must grow (Huntington 1981, p 13).

Huntington writes about “American exceptionalism” and maintaining American ideals and institutions (Huntington 1981, p 15). He concludes that threats to the future of America can be reduced in a number of ways, one of which is to “believe in the universal validity of American ideals but also understand their limited applicability to other societies” (Huntington 1981, p 16-17).

This resource is a good example of the roots of the attitudes of “American exceptionalism” and possible explanations of U.S. actions during this time.

**Peter H. Smith’s *Talons of the Eagle.*** Peter H. Smith writes of “logic of inter-American relations” primarily as understood by U.S. political leadership. In this book he recognizes that Latin America was turned into a “battleground” through conflicts between capitalism and communism (Smith 2008, p 113-114). The United States’ anti-communist stance was to institutionalize military and political alliances within the Americas. It
collaborated with and supported authoritarian regimes. It tried to crush leftist and communist governments. It orchestrated the military overthrow of democratically-elected governments. All of this happened under the fear of a “Soviet menace”, a fear which Smith says was greatly exaggerated (Smith 2008, p 113-114).

Author Smith says that the United States did not favor authoritarianism over democracy, but rather it judged that dictatorial regimes would be more efficient against communists. This idea Smith labeled as a “cold-blooded calculation” (Smith 2008, 125). The Cold War thus proceeded not so much as a protection from extra-hemispheric threats, but rather a purported justification to penetrate the domestic realms of individual nations’ politics (Smith 2008, 126). According to Smith the question was whether or not the country was on “our side”, and if it was, effective dictators could expect continued support from Washington.

George Kennan, chief architect of Soviet containment policy, saw three goals, the first of which was the protection of “our (emphasis mine) raw materials”. U.S. producers saw Latin America as a major potential export market, and also an area for financial investment, thus, these ideas underlay U.S. policy. The second goal was the prevention of military exploitation of Latin America by the enemy. Within this effort the United States placed increasing emphasis on establishing contacts with militaries within Latin American countries. The third goal was the prevention of psychological mobilization of Latin America against the United States (Smith 2008, 121).

In regards to Latin America as part of the Third World, Smith notes the United States acted from both outside, and also through interventions within domestic politics of Latin American nations. Implicit in this U.S. understanding was that Latin American
countries would simply have to accept change, this to assure their own survival (Smith 2008, 134). Latin American countries were to accept the notion of gradual reform and not revolution. Revolution was seen by the United States as dangerous as it upset social order and destroyed political institutions. The United States posited that revolution could potentially lead to Marxist/communist gain. The United States preferred prevention of revolution, which would presumably provide time for the processes of socioeconomic modernization to take place. The United States preferred stability.

In Smith’s view, Cold War “promised neither victory nor peace” (Smith 2008, 117).

**Lars Schoultz’s *Beneath the United States***. Lars Schoultz’s book recognizes the following attitude which has existed on the part of people in the United States toward Latin America: Latin America is considered to be “beneath” the United States. The author attempts to explain the logic which underlies attitudes in the United States toward Latin America. He says that these attitudes are borne of the U.S. objective to protect its own interests. This is manifested in the manner in which the powerful nation, the United States, treats its weaker neighbors to the south (Schoultz 1998, p xii).

Schoultz evaluates the enormous disparities in power and wealth between the United States and Latin America. One indicator of this for him is the amount of money that the United States spends each year to alter the behavior of its Latin American neighbors, while the converse is not true. He gives two examples. First, he says that the United States monitors Latin American countries in their efforts to stop the flow of drugs into the United States, but no Latin American countries research the efforts the United
States is making to keep drug consumption down within its own borders (Schoultz 1998, p xiii). Second, he says that the United States has its armed forces throughout Latin America, while at the same time Americans don’t believe that the United States can learn much of anything from the militaries in these other countries. This attitude he views as a “fact of life” (Schoultz 1998, p xiii).

Schoultz calls this a hegemonic, one-way relationship, resulting from the realist concept of self-interest. In his view, this self-interest “requires ever-increasing efforts to influence the behavior of weaker people” (Schoultz 1998, p xiv). He acknowledges that these attitudes were simply taken as understood until the Cold War ended. After that time, the United States had to come up with new problems to continue its control in Latin America.

Schoultz identifies unchanging interests which serve the United States—among these are the nation’s security and also economic development. He recognizes the creation of formal organizations which protected U.S. economic and security interests. These organizations directed U.S.-Latin American relationships throughout the Depression, World War II and then the Cold War, the time period about which my thesis deals.

Schoultz’s book attempts to analyze the evolution of relationships between Latin America and the United States. In considering the self-interested “unpolished collection of beliefs” shared by many people in the United States, Schoultz attempts to broaden and provide additional knowledge (Schoultz 1998, p xvii). This he says will help to uncover beliefs which he perceives to preclude a policy based upon mutual respect (Schoultz 1998, p xvi). Schoultz recognizes negative attitudes toward Latin America as having
been easily projected through U.S. influence on the Guatemalan economy and military, through use of U.S. Cold War perceptions.

**Historical Background of Guatemala-U.S. Relations**

**Stephen Schlesinger & Stephen Kinzer’s Bitter Fruit.** In this book the authors reexamine the history around the 1954 Guatemalan coup with an emphasis toward U.S. intervention. As the title denotes, they consider this an “American Coup”. In writing this book they had at their disposal documents which had been opened up with the Freedom of Information Act. This allowed them access to information on U.S. foreign policy which had not been available before (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, Preface). For instance, they were able to examine State Department, National Archives, FBI and Naval Department documents. From this new documentation they provided in-depth information on U.S. foreign policy and conduct. Their work chronicles American influence and intervention in the inner workings of what was considered but one of a number of “banana republics”, the Guatemalan nation-state.

The authors chronicle the actions of early use of the U.S. CIA clandestine bureaucracy (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p xii). This they see being used in the name of National Security directives which presumably sought to keep communist encroachment out of the Western hemisphere, and promote democratic ideology within. Another result of this U.S. action kept the area safe for American interests. *Bitter Fruit* considers the interests of the United States in contrast to the interests of the United Fruit Company. In looking at purported U.S. efforts to keep communism out, the book also notes the exten-
sive negative consequences for the majority Guatemalan population. The newly accessible FOIA information provides details on U.S. efforts to remove the Guatemalan revolutionary government. It also provides a view into Guatemalan history and leadership after the coup along with continued U.S. involvement toward nurturing “willing partners” in Guatemalan governance who were much affected by U.S. foreign policy (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 247). The authors contend that the 1954 Guatemalan coup was the “central episode in modern history of that country” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 254).

**Richard H. Immerman’s *The CIA in Guatemala.*** Immerman declares that in writing this book he originally set out to “expose the perfidy of the CIA” (Immerman 1982, p ix). With the use of materials such as declassified FOIA documents, he broadened his original understanding of the U.S. intervention as being more than a covert operation by the United States to defend the United Fruit Company. With his new understanding, Immerman now comes to see the basis for the conflict as follows: “During the period of cold war tension, neither the United States government nor the public could understand Guatemalans” (Immerman 1982, p ix). As he works through this perceived misunderstanding, he cautions that what the United States considered a successful operation in 1954 may well come to be seen as a serious failure (Immerman 1982, p ix).

The author’s scholarship provides background information on U.S. foreign interests and Latin American policy within the framework of the Cold War. Through the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, he examines the road to intervention. He
assesses the preparation and details of Operation PBSUCCESS and then talks of its legacies.

Immerman denotes the irony and legacy of PBSUCCESS as that of producing the guerrilla struggle (Immerman 1982, p 200). In this book, more than 25 years after the 1954 coup, he looks at political violence in Guatemala, as he considers events in Iran, and Nicaragua and El Salvador. From these Immerman concludes that “strong-arm tactics can no longer control revolutionary change in Central America” (Immerman 1982, p 201).

The legacy of PBSUCCESS is a dilemma to Immerman—one which he says was a “dilemma of Washington’s own making” (Immerman 1982, p 197). He says that through U.S. anti-communist policies, cold warriors had “returned to power the very elements of society that had created the conditions that the 1944 revolution had tried to eradicate” (Immerman 1982, p 197-198). Immerman quotes the words of U.S. diplomat William O’Dwyer in his testimony in 1954 congressional hearings: “The foreign policy of the United States is . . . on trial in Guatemala” (Immerman 1982, p 198).

Susanne Jonas’ The Battle for Guatemala. Another notable scholar on the history of Guatemala during the 20th century is Susanne Jonas. In The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power, Jonas’ scholarship examines the origins of the Guatemalan civil war by looking at the changing economy and social structures, with particular attention paid to repeated interventions by the United States in its policy toward Guatemala. Jonas chronicles Guatemalan history moving from colonial legacies, through the Guatemalan Revolution, the counterrevolution with its violence and repres-
Jonas considers information on both internal Guatemalan influences, as well as the effects of external U.S. policies on Guatemala. In taking a comprehensive analysis of Guatemala’s internal factors, she emphasizes the importance of understanding that Guatemala is a peripheral nation in the capitalist world system (Jonas 1991, p 6). Because of this, Guatemala is affected by and vulnerable to international factors, one of which is influence of the United States. Jonas notes that for decades U.S. power played, and continues to play, an essential role in Guatemala (Jonas 1991, p 6). She denotes three protagonists in Guatemala: the “rebels”, the “death squads” who operate as part of the official security forces, and the United States (Jonas 1991, p 6).

As a person who travelled to Guatemala beginning in the 1960s and was affected by what she saw happening there, Jonas writes that she felt compelled to do something, or at least to communicate to the public domain about what she had witnessed (Jonas 1991, p 1). In the shaping of Guatemala, she identifies U.S. interventions by the CIA as profound (Jonas 1991, p 1). Among the effects she named were the CIA intervention of 1954, and then subsequent interventions after that. She refers to a revolutionary “crisis” in Guatemala which she defines as the “breakdown of the social order and structures of domination” (Jonas 1991, p 3).

Jonas does not offer her book as contemporary history but rather her goal is to “interpret the Guatemalan experience” (Jonas 1991, p 3). She sees that in the 20 years preceding this book, areas of theoretical inquiry had opened up or had expanded. These
included studies of Guatemala’s indigenous population, and also scholarship related to
gender, class and ethnicity (Jonas 1991, p 3).

In her analysis Jonas sees Central America as part of the U.S. “backyard” and thus
U.S. military and economic interests play a part in the domestic ruling coalitions of these
countries (Jonas 1991, p 8). Jonas’ analysis uses strong language in describing U.S.
intervention and foreign policy in Guatemala. She says that the United States made
Guatemala into “a test case of its ability to suppress social revolution in Latin America”.
Guatemalan history from 1954 to the 1980s is described by Jonas as a “laboratory of
counterrevolution” (Jonas 1991, p 9).

Learn the History of Latin America

Noam Chomsky’s Turning the Tide. In this book Chomsky looks at historical
background and geopolitical conceptions of U.S. policy. He takes a broader look at U.S.
national security policy during the Cold War, and concludes that U.S. government pro-
grams don’t have much to do with security, but rather are concerned with power struc-
tures and the global concerns of dominant institutions (Chomsky 1985, p 2). His sees
opportunities for constructive work to make changes to the existing system.

This book was published a short time after what is considered by many people as
the bloodiest years of the Guatemalan civil war. Chomsky gives details of the gruesome
slaughter and genocide of that time, as per Amnesty International and British Parliamen-
tary investigations (Chomsky 1985, p 28-29). Even so, he relates that U.S. President
Reagan and Elliott Abrams, his Human Rights specialist at the time, defended the strate-
gies, and Guatemala’s state security apparatus which was responsible for what Chomsky calls crimes. He contends that U.S. policies and U.S. military force resources which were used in Viet Nam, were also applied in Guatemala (Chomsky 1985, p 30). One such example was the use of “strategic hamlets” as part of U.S. foreign policy in Viet Nam, and the “auto defense units” which were modeled after those, in Guatemala. Chomsky emphasizes that Elliott Abrams actually blamed the violence on the guerrillas who were fighting the government. He says that the consequent violence and resultant mass of people seeking refuge from the violence, were the “price of stability” (Chomsky 1985, p 32). Many Guatemalans fled to Mexico at the time. Chomsky notes that the U.S. State Department reported that democracy was on track, even in light of Americas Watch observations that assassinations had doubled and abductions had quadrupled in Guatemala at the time (Chomsky 1985, p 32).

The author claims that the United States provided direct military assistance and thereby facilitated those who tortured, murdered and brutalized the Guatemalan people (Chomsky 1985, p 33). U.S. engineering of the 1954 coup, which restored military rule, resulted in Guatemala turning into what he calls a literal hell on earth. Military assistance was still being maintained by the United States at the publication of his book in 1985. From this we can see that Chomsky came to the same conclusions as other scholars in this thesis— the situation which existed in Guatemala was kept on course by U.S. intervention (Chomsky 1985, p 157).

**Juan José Arévalo’s The Shark and the Sardines.** A Guatemalan perspective on what was happening in that country in the years after 1954 is encapsulated in the words
of President Juan José Arévalo in his *The Shark and the Sardines*. This book contains a letter from former President Arévalo and is addressed “To the American Reader”. In this letter he warns Americans that his book is considered controversial. He communicates to the American people that what he writes is not meant to cast blame on all North Americans, as he carefully distinguishes between the American government and the American people. He says that he understands that the American people are also victims of “imperialist policy of promoting business, multiplying markets and hoarding money” (Arévalo 1961, p 9).

Arévalo’s letter credits the ideologies of the founding fathers of the United States and notes their moral values (Arévalo 1961, p 10). He says that the world applauded what was the new nation of the United States, but change came in the 20th century as the White House adopted a different policy. Arévalo came to view the U.S. Government as an “entrepreneur for business and protector of illicit commercial profits” (Arévalo 1961, p 10). With the advent of people like Rockefeller came greed (Arévalo 1961, p 10) says Arévalo. He states that with these changes the United States was no longer a state of religion or law, but rather a mercantile state (Arévalo 1961, p 10).

Arévalo looks at his own country, Guatemala, and writes of the “international scandal” (Arévalo 1961, p 11) when President Eisenhower and then U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles assaulted his country through the 1954 coup d’état. In looking at U.S. political activity in Latin America, Arévalo believes that the U.S. military apparatus manipulated a system of local revolutions (Arévalo 1961, p 11). These he believes were financed by Wall Street or the White House, which he considers to have merged and were now working together. He notes that big business had changed North
America as it now exploited and victimized Latin American countries and their people
(Arévalo 1961, p 10). This exploitation he says was done with shrewdness, coldness,
harshness and great arrogance (Arévalo 1961, p 11).

In light of what he lays out was happening in Latin America, he claims that people
there could not be friends with the government of the United States (Arévalo 1961, p 11).
Although he felt that friendship could be rebuilt, he maintains that the White House
would first have to view and treat Latin Americans differently.

Arévalo closes this Letter still referring to the North American people as friends.
He does however ask that they accept his words as a “voice of alarm” so that they may
make themselves aware of the many crimes which have been committed in the name of
the North American people (Arévalo 1961, p 13).

**Freedom of Information Act and Declassified Information Sources**

Official historical documentation, which was not available closer to the actual
events of Guatemalan history in the mid-20th century, has been made available more
recently through a number of sources. Schlesinger and Kinzer along with Immerman
note the availability of documents which they used in making requests for their research
through the Freedom of Information Act. New information sources at their disposal
included State Department, National Archives, FBI and Naval Department Documents.
My research also includes documents from the U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Historian. I used excerpts from the CIA archives (U.S. Senate, 1961: 865-866) text of the
Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, in regards to the “Communist Threat to the United States through the Caribbean”. I used another Department of State Publication regarding “Intervention of International Communism to Guatemala” (Department of State Publication 5556, 1954). My declassified CIA sources on the Guatemalan destabilization program came from The National Security Archive available through George Washington University. Kate Doyle and Peter Kornbluh’s information on “CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents” was released by the CIA on May 23, 1997. Documents which I refer to from this source come from the resultant National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 4, and are identified by the word “Document” with numbered sections (e.g.–#1 from CIA History Staff Analyst Gerald K. Haines; #2 “A Study of Assassination”; #5 from Staff Historian Nicholas Cullather). Additionally, I used a White House Memorandum “Declaration of Castillo Armas” which was released by the CIA Historical Review Program as “Sanitized” in 2003.

The reason I include this section in the Literature Review is to demonstrate that much of what Americans knew in the mid-20th century about what was happening in Guatemala, information which I present from scholars in my thesis, was not available at the time it took place. Use of these materials on past history provide in-depth information and broaden understanding of U.S. foreign policy and conduct, covert operations, and overall U.S. intervention in Guatemala.
CHAPTER THREE

Economic Considerations

Contextual Background: Guatemala, the United States and the World

In looking at historical events, Bowen acknowledges that both internal Guatemalan forces as well as external forces affected Guatemala in the late 19th century as capitalism expanded in the world. One such external force (macro) was the state of the world economy. Throughout the Industrial Revolution which was taking place in Europe and the United States, wealth was concentrated in key sectors of the industrializing economies (Jonas 1991, p 19). As the United States rose as a world power after its Civil War, industrial capitalism flourished domestically within the country. A concentration of wealth accrued which then prompted a search for expansion of opportunities overseas where new markets could be established for export commodities. New international markets also provided opportunities where profits might be invested. The industrial economies also sought control of raw materials throughout the world (Jonas 1991, p 19). As a result, U.S. capital and influence expanded simultaneously in the Caribbean and Central America. This thesis will evaluate that U.S. influence on the country of Guatemala.
Paul Kennedy’s book deals with national and international power. He recognizes that strong nations enhance or maintain their wealth and power through “interaction(s) between economics and strategy” (Kennedy 1987, p xv). He says that there is “constant interaction between strategy and economics” and that periods of both wartime and peace must be examined in terms of economic and technological change (Kennedy 1987, p xxi).

In her *Battle for Guatemala*, Susanne Jonas asserts that a comprehensive analysis would take into account the integration of Guatemala, a peripheral nation, into the capitalist world system. She indicates that internal factors should be considered along with the impacts of international factors, especially pressure from the United States (Jonas 1991, p. 6). Jonas claims that U.S. intervention can be decisive at particular moments.

The armed uprising of revolutionary forces that drove the dictator Jorge Ubico y Castañeda (1931-1944) from power in 1944 is identified as a particular decisive moment by Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost (Vanden and Prevost 2011, p. 299). The year of the 1954 coup d’état is a decisive moment for Jonas (Jonas 1991, p. 6). Both of these moments were significant in altering the course of Guatemala. In order to understand impacts of the U.S. on Guatemala leading up to and during the 1954 coup, background information is necessary to provide the context of what was yet to come. At the turn of the 20th century U.S. capital investment was higher in Central America than any other part of Latin America according to Edelberto Torres Rivas. For almost the next 30 years more than 40 percent of U.S. direct investment in Central America went to Guatemala (Torres Rivas 1993, p 48). Of primary importance are the events when leadership in Guatemala allowed the U.S. based United Fruit Company (UFCO) into that country.
The United Fruit Company came to prominence in Guatemala in the early 20th century during the presidencies of Manuel José Estrada Cabrera (1898-1920) and General Jorge Ubico y Castañeda (1931-1944). It was Estrada Cabrera who allowed the United Fruit Company into Guatemala. Estrada Cabrera signed a contract with UFCO in 1904 which gave tax exemptions, land grants, and control of railroads to UFCO (Chapman 2007, p 56-57).

In the 1930s the Ubico regime further opened Guatemala’s economy to the foreign capital of United Fruit Company. UFCO financed the construction of Guatemala’s national railroad, International Railways of Central America, and the electric company, Electric Bond and Share. As a result UFCO held controlling shares of capital stock in these companies. Because of this, Guatemala’s national economic infrastructure—its railroads, its telegraph and its electricity—all came to be held under private control. The United Fruit Company opposed the building of highways which might compete with the monopoly it held on the railroad lines. UFCO also had de facto control over Guatemala’s Puerto Barrios.

This foreign investment capital brought with it preferential treatment. Jonas writes that in addition to gaining control over a huge part of Guatemala’s most productive land and resources it was also given preferential treatment in financial matters. There were exemptions from paying taxes and also from paying duties on imports. Unlimited profit remittances were allowed. Labor practices were not regulated (Jonas 1991, p 19). These financial considerations meant that the Guatemalan government often deferred to the interests of the United Fruit Company.
Foreign investment capital also brought along with it political considerations. For instance, President Ubico began his career working with the health board of the Rockefeller Foundation (Immerman 1982, p 32). He had ties with the U.S. State Department as early as 1919. Not surprisingly, President Ubico was the son of a Guatemalan lawyer and politician. He was well-connected and privileged. Ubico had studied at prestigious institutions in Guatemala, as well as in the United States and Europe.

As a wealthy aristocrat, President Ubico protected the economic interests of Guatemalan elites, the urban bourgeoisie and owners of large tracts of land. Most notably much of Guatemala’s arable agricultural land had been ceded to the United Fruit Company. Because of this, foreign business interests often were in control of management and labor relations within Guatemala. Ubico supported foreign interests in labor relations by protecting them from the complaints of the Guatemalan working class and unions.

In her *Terror in the Countryside: Campesino Responses to Political Violence in Guatemala, 1954-1985*, May explains:

“If Guatemalan history is clear on this point: the elites of this country have historically oppressed the campesino majority, and they have violently suppressed any attempts by the popular sectors to organize or demand conditions that would allow them to live with the barest essentials necessary to maintain basic human dignity” (May 2001, p 14).

Not surprisingly then, Immerman comments that it was Ubico’s personal belief that “general prosperity bred revolution” (Immerman 1982, p 34). Indeed, Ubico took action to avoid revolution by opposing all forms of organized labor activity (Immerman 1982,
An example of this includes Ubico’s disbanding of unions in the 1930s. The labor movement continued its efforts to increase wages in spite of this.

President Ubico was head of Guatemala during the world depression in the global market. The effects of the depression were felt primarily through Guatemala’s most important crop—coffee. It was during the depression that coffee prices fell to less than one-half of their previous value (Immerman 1982, p 31). After 1939 and throughout World War II, Guatemala didn’t have access to European markets. Because of this, and like other coffee producing countries in Latin America, Guatemala became dependent upon the U.S. market (Immerman 1982, p 31). This resulted in an overall reduction in the price of coffee and also decreased coffee exports, causing Guatemala to lose revenue. Consequently unemployment rates also increased (Immerman 1982, p 32).

The majority population in Guatemala was indigenous, so naturally Indians made up the majority of Guatemala’s labor force (Immerman 1982, p 35). During Ubico’s leadership he practiced political, economic and social discrimination, especially toward indigenous people. This could be seen in the system of vialidad and vagrancy laws. These policies obligated each male Indian to pay a head tax which most could not afford to pay (Immerman 1982, p 36). They were required to do wage work for at least 150 days per year. The proof of whether or not they had done this work was marked in a libretto/government book. Indians were required to carry this libretto with them. If they could not prove that they had met the work requirement then they would either be jailed or forced to do unpaid labor such as road construction (Immerman 1982, p 36). This system assured that the indigenous population would be forced to work in the capitalist export-oriented sector of the economy and that the state would have a cheap or even a free labor
force for its public works programs. This repression and suffering was not readily accepted by the majority population. Many people came to see Ubico as a repressive dictator.

In the existing authoritarian state, productive wealth was concentrated in the hands of the minority. Control of productive sectors of the economy within Guatemala was shared through alliances between the Guatemalan bourgeoisie and foreign interests. Jonas also points out that the aforementioned railway and electric enterprises were created and given concessions by the Guatemalan state. The largest landowner in Guatemala, the United Fruit Company, monopolized banana production (Jonas 1991, p 19). Jonas writes that its subsidiary, International Railways of Central America, monopolized transport facilities. Electric Bond and Share controlled Guatemala’s electrical facilities (Jonas 1991, p 19). These three Guatemalan companies had unchallenged privilege until the mid-1940s.

These monopolies operated as “states within a state” as described by Jonas (Jonas 1991, p 19). She asserts that they exerted political power over government policies. They also had influence over the people who governed Guatemala. This system was maintained by close ties between the Guatemalan oligarchy and their related U.S. interests. Jonas depicts this liberal model as a “strong” state which yielded control of national resources, and production to private, primarily foreign interests (Jonas 1991, p 20). The strong state’s functions were to protect private interests and to preserve law and order (Jonas 1991, p 20). Essentially the Guatemalan state was there as protector and guarantor of the existing system.
The existence of this type of authoritarian state resulted in productive wealth being concentrated in the hands of the minority. This was mostly due to those who owned and controlled Guatemalan land. Prevost and Vanden note that large landed estates in Latin America were remnants of colonial conquests—tracts of land originally granted by Spanish monarchs. They were similar to the feudal landed estates which had existed in the Iberian Peninsula (Prevost and Vanden 2011, p 10). Prevost and Vanden posit that from colonial times to the present, those who held ownership to land reflected the power configuration of the whole society (Prevost and Vanden 2011, p 10).

It was through this power configuration, Immerman writes, that perhaps the final injustice came. The policies of Ubico’s Decree 2795 (Immerman 1982, p 37) granted land owners the legal authority to actually shoot people who were hunting for food on private land. These people were poor indigents who were mostly Indian. Such oppressive and unjust actions—forced labor, and allowing landlords to practice capital punishment, all in the interests of maintaining the status quo, were bound to result in problems for the Ubico regime.

Problems could be seen for Ubico during the World War II years as Ubico lost some support from Washington as Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer note in their *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 26). Ubico did cooperate with the United States in enabling agents of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation to oversee the confiscation of German-owned properties. The agents also supervised the internment of German Guatemalans (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 26-27). In spite of this, the Americans who were in charge did not fully trust Ubico. According to these authors the U.S. military air base which was
established near Guatemala City was there not only to oversee the Panama Canal, but also to watch over Ubico (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 27).

It was during this time that the Assistant Secretary of State Nelson Rockefeller tried to get Latin American countries to obligate themselves with loans. The loans were offered by the U.S. government and also by private banks. While borrowing this money might have encouraged economic development in Guatemala, it would also have increased financial ties with the United States. Ubico was a fiscal conservative so he refused these loans.

By the mid-1940s the Guatemalan economy had actually stabilized and substantial growth had taken place, as acknowledged in “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Guatemala” from the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. This encouraged the emergence of an upwardly mobile middle class. Schlesinger and Kinzer note that through the use of short wave radios Guatemalans were able to observe the global warfare of World War II (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 26). This communication exposed Guatemalans to the promises of democracy. Guatemalans came to learn of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “four freedoms”, those being the freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. Schlesinger and Kinzer believe that hearing of these freedoms inspired Guatemalans. It made them aware of the inequities in their own society. The ideas of Roosevelt’s New Deal policies awakened Guatemalans’ aspirations for a government which would dedicate itself to the public good (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 26). Encouraged by FDR’s four freedoms many Guatemalans demanded political change. They became determined to replace the Ubico tyranny with democracy.
The high point of revolution, as identified by Prevost and Vanden, was 1944 when an armed uprising removed General Ubico from power (Vanden and Prevost 2011, p 299). A rebel movement of students, workers and dissident army officers set up a government through what was known as the October Revolution. It began with civil unrest through protest of Ubico’s regime and was carried out by schoolteachers who appealed for higher wages (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p. 27). Teachers and students along with others began nonviolent demonstrations. Soon the middle and upper classes joined them in protest, along with bureaucrats. This resulted in the largest protest Guatemala had ever experienced (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p. 27). Junior military officers demanded that Ubico step down. The end of the Ubico regime in Guatemala came through a coup d’état in 1944 which overthrew the thirteen year dictatorship. This allowed for a national election in Guatemala.

The onset of this revolutionary era began with what is considered the first ever democratically-elected leader in Guatemala. Through fair and open elections held in December of 1944, a university professor, Juan José Arévalo Bermejo won wide support. Arévalo took office in 1945. His goal was to move Guatemalan governance from the previous military dictatorship toward a representative democracy.

In his inaugural address Arévalo promised to “give civic and legal value to all people who live in this Republic” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990 p. 34, translated from El Imparcial, March 16, 1945). He ended this address dedicating himself to the ideals of FDR about whom he said “He taught us that there is no need to cancel the concept of freedom in the democratic system in order to breathe into it a socialist spirit”. A reporter who attended this inauguration interviewed the American diplomat Spruille Braden who
was quoted as saying that the U.S. was “happy to see that Guatemala now occupies the high place of one of the hemisphere’s democracies” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 34).

**Agrarian Reform and Labor Protection**

Arévalo set out four priorities: the consolidation of political democracy, agrarian reform, protection of labor, and a better educational system (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 37). He created a new constitution with social and economic policies. He divided powers amongst the executive, legislative and judicial branches (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 33). He encouraged the formation of political parties. Social guarantees were made. These included freedom of speech and freedom of the press. A maximum forty-hour work week with the assurance of one day off was instituted (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 34). Workers were able to unionize and to collectively bargain (Vanden and Prevost 2011, p 299). Equal pay for men and women was required. Individual rights were guaranteed. Equality was emphasized as husbands and wives were declared equal before the law. Racial discrimination was made a crime (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 33). The Arévalo government prioritized spending on houses and schools and hospitals (Vanden and Prevost 2011, p 299).

According to a U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian article, Arévalo espoused a philosophy called “spiritual socialism”. This was a nationalistic philosophy which stressed the “dignity of man”. In one of Arévalo’s speeches he articulated his views:
“We call this post-war socialism “spiritual” because in the world, as now in Guatemala, there is a fundamental change in human values. The materialistic concept has become a tool in the hands of totalitarian forces. Communism, fascism and Nazism have also been socialistic. But that is a socialism which gives food with the left hand while with the right it mutilates the moral and civic values of man” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p. 39-40).

Arévalo was widely supported as he believed that government could be vital in improving the lives of the populace. He found communism distasteful, as can be understood from his statement “Communism is contrary to human nature, for it is contrary to the psychology of man. …Here we see the superiority of the doctrine of democracy …” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 32).

Within Arévalo’s new leadership were provisions for moderate reform. One of these was Article 92 which empowered the Guatemalan government to expropriate land for the needs of society at large. Although Arévalo did not expropriate any land during his tenure, this legislation alarmed the landed elites and caused them to begin to label him a communist.

The U.S. State Department’s Office of Historian reports that U.S. perceptions of Arévalo were favorable until he signed the 1947 Labor Code. This Labor Code was modeled after the American National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act) with its provisions of guaranteed rights to organize trade unions, to engage in collective bargaining, and to strike if necessary (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 38-39). Ironically, despite its usefulness for American Labor Relations, the Guatemalan Labor Code was a major factor in the American intervention in Guatemala which was soon to come.

Like the American Labor Relations Act, the Guatemalan Code provided protection for Guatemalan labor. Urban workers had rights to organize unions. They could
collectively bargain and strike. Minimum wages were established. Both women and children workers were protected. These were revolutionary changes for peasants in contrast to the previous libretto (government labor card) days of forced labor (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 39). The Labor Code caused concern for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the intelligence gathering agency for the United States at the time in Guatemala and Latin America. Allegations were made that Arévalo was influenced by communists because of his legalization of labor unions (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 40).

Most of the reform measures planned in the 1940s were only partially carried out, as mentioned by the authors of Bitter Fruit (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 41). One important result of the proposed planned reforms may have been that ordinary Guatemalans could see that the government had the ability to work for their needs (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 42). Immerman says that the October Revolution was a popular victory which presented hopes for the advent of a new era. He holds that the overwhelming majority of Guatemalans saw this as their revolution, and looked forward to a new government which would dedicate itself to developing programs in their interests (Immerman 1982, p 42-43).

The next phase of the revolution resulted in the election of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán (1951-1954). He was the second democratically-elected President in the history of Guatemala. Arbenz spoke of three objectives in his inaugural address (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 52, from El Imparcial, March 16, 1951). The first was to move Guatemala from being a “dependent nation with a semi-colonial economy to an economically independent country”. Second, he wanted to “convert Guatemala from a backward
county with a predominantly feudal economy into a modern capitalist state”. Third, his plans were directed to “raise the standard of living of the great mass of our people” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 52, from El Imparcial, March 16, 1951).

Arbenz directed that Guatemala’s economic policy should be based on strengthening private initiative and developing Guatemalan capital. He stated that “Foreign capital will always be welcome as long as it adjusts to local conditions, remains always subordinate to Guatemalan laws, cooperates with the economic development of the country, and strictly abstains from intervening (emphasis mine) in the nation’s social and political life” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 52, from El Imparcial, March 16, 1951).

Arbenz was a nationalist who was determined to carry forward a number of reforms. In his enthusiasm toward transforming Guatemala into a modern capitalist state he strategized to limit the power of foreign companies by direct competition. To do this he soon began the construction of a publicly-owned port to compete with UFCO’s Puerto Barrios; a highway which would provide an alternative to the International Railways of Central America railroad monopoly; and a hydroelectric plant which would be run by the government and would provide electricity cheaper than the U.S. controlled Electric Bond and Share monopoly (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 53). As important as these actions were, it was just as significant what Arbenz did not do—he did not nationalize existing businesses. This exemplifies that his plans were directed toward capitalistic development through direct competition.
Specifics of Land Reform

Arbenz’s political platform had advocated strongly for agrarian reform so it was logical that he would begin to work hard for this important aspiration. Arbenz’s objective was to redress the historically inequitable distribution of land. While some progress had been made during Arévalo’s presidency, even so, the majority Guatemalan population was still waiting for land reform. To put this in perspective, the 1950 Census indicated that 2.2 percent of the landowners owned 70 percent of Guatemala’s arable land (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, 50). Four million acres were owned by plantation owners but less than one fourth of this land was actually being cultivated. This meant that the large majority of available productive farmland was not put into production. This situation existed even while the majority population, that is 97.8 percent of the Guatemalan people, did not have any land of their own. In acknowledging the magnitude of this land tenure disparity it is not difficult to understand efforts to redistribute the land for the benefit of the majority population of Guatemala.

Because 90 percent of the Guatemalan people lived in rural areas, Arévalo’s reforms had brought little change for the majority of the population (Prevost and Vanden 2011, p 299). Arbenz’s goal was to extend Arévalo’s reforms to the rural areas. Conceivably, land reform would benefit the majority population of Guatemala, the landless peasants and rural workers. It was Arbenz’s plan to address socioeconomic problems through agrarian reform.

According to the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Historian, the Communist Party in Guatemala (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo) supported Arbenz’s ideas
and participated in drafting legislation regarding land reform. In June of 1952 the Agrarian Reform Law passed which was also known as Decree 900 (Decreto Numero 900). This Law mandated that large tracts of unused land were to be redistributed to peasants. Previous owners of the expropriated land were to be compensated. Terms were drawn up to compensate landowners with government bonds which would pay a three percent return over a 25 year time period. The value of the compensation was based upon the land value declared in the tax returns of the owners. Using this value raised major concern for the previous land owners as they had likely undervalued their properties on their tax returns. If that were the case, then it could be understood that this undervaluation of what the land was actually worth, would have withheld large amounts of tax revenue from the Guatemalan treasury, and for many years.

Decree 900 was a “model of orderliness”, says Stephen M. Streeter in Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961 (Streeter 2000, p 19). He writes that laws were strictly followed and attempts were made to address grievances. Specific details of this agrarian reform measure created a network of local agrarian councils which administered the expropriation of unused land (Streeter 2000, p 18). Farms under 224 acres in size were left intact. Farms between 224 and 672 acres were exempted if two thirds of the land was under cultivation (Streeter 2000, p 18). Only those estates larger than 672 acres were affected. It is significant to emphasize that expropriations were planned for land which was not being cultivated.

People receiving expropriated land parcels had two choices. First they could choose to privately own the land. Using this arrangement they would have to pay the government 5 percent of their annual harvest over 25 years. The second alternative was
that they could hold tenure over the land for their lifetime. For this they would pay just 3 percent over 25 years (Streeter 2000, p 18). This was the largest land reform in the history of Guatemala.

Contrary to reform critic’s predictions, Streeter observes that the agricultural production of corn, rice and cotton crops increased between 1952 and 1953 (Streeter 2000, p 19). It seems that agricultural production was not affected negatively from these changes. Even Eisenhower officials recognized privately that Decree 900 was “a long-overdue measure of social and economic reform” (Streeter 2000, p 19).

In spite of these positive results U.S. government officials came to oppose the reforms. Streeter explores why that might have been the case. One explanation was due to personal and financial interests that existed between U.S. officials and the United Fruit Company. The U.S. Secretary of State during the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidency was John Foster Dulles. Previous to this position Dulles had been a partner in the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell which specialized in international finance. This law firm had drafted a 1936 contract which gave UFCO control of International Railways of Central America and other privileges for 99 years (Streeter 2000, p 19).

Another attorney and Dulles brother, Allen, was also part of Eisenhower’s administration as he served as head of the Central Intelligence Agency. He had done legal work for UFCO and also sat on its board of directors. These personal alliances between U.S. officials and UFCO clearly posed the potential for conflicts of interest for the then current U.S. administration cabinet members.

The effects of the Agrarian Reform Law—what many people considered modest land reform policies—were a challenge to large land owners, most notably to UFCO.
Even though the reforms were modest, this proved too much for the country’s oligarchy and related U.S. powers.

The 1952 Land Reform Bill was a significant turning point for Guatemala as part of the October Revolution, as seen by Schlesinger and Kinzer. They note Arbenz’s own words:

“I do not exaggerate when I say that the most important pragmatic point of my government and of the revolutionary movement of October is that one related to a profound change in the backward agricultural production of Guatemala, by way of an agrarian reform which puts an end to the latifundios and the semi-feudal practices, giving the land to thousands of peasants, raising their purchasing power and creating a great internal market favorable to the development of domestic industry” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 54).

The revolutionary governments of Arévalo and Arbenz (1945-1954) with their plans for political reform and land redistribution, demonstrate clearly a people’s movement, both figuratively and literally. This was not just philosophical political maneuvering. It was obvious that many Guatemalans’ lives were affected through their hopes and expectations for democratic governance in Guatemala. The U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Historian article notes that Guatemala’s majority population, the peasants, were exuberant with prospects of the reforms.

Enacting land reform was also an actual geographical movement of people, as more than a half million Guatemalans would have benefitted from the program out of a total population of three million. About 1.4 million acres of land were redistributed to these people in plots which averaged around 10 acres (Streeter 2000, p 19). These figures demonstrate that almost one out of five Guatemalan citizens would be able to move to their own land, a place of dignity and potential self-sufficiency. The reformist ideas of
Presidents Arévalo and Arbenz held the possibilities for being a peoples’ movement in the truest sense of the words.

This was the largest land reform in the history of Guatemala. This peoples’ movement was part of what authors Schlesinger and Kinzer say that Arbenz considered as his greatest dream–land reform. Ironically, the authors add that the passage of the land reform legislation also turned out to be “the fatal moment for Arbenz” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 54).
CHAPTER FOUR
Guatemala and the Cold War

Varying Perspectives on Communism

Having looked at the historical context of Guatemala including the time period around the world depression and World War II, and having examined economic conditions within Guatemala during that time, we will now consider differing perspectives relating to the influence of communism on Guatemalan national politics. Anti-communist rhetoric was an issue used to depose Guatemalan President Arbenz through the 1954 coup.

For many Guatemalans the coup which removed President Arbenz brought to an end what they considered “Ten Years of Spring” in the politics of their nation (Streeter 2000, p 13). May refers to the coup as the “overthrow of Guatemala’s revolution” (May 2001, p 8). In contrast, Schlesinger and Kinzer assess activity around the time of the coup and note that the U.S. government referred to it as a “Liberation’ movement” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 13). These differing perspectives depend upon who stood to gain, and what they stood to gain.

This chapter will include information on activities which the National Security Archive recently declassified CIA documents (released on May 23, 1997) refer to as “the
secret archives on the Guatemalan destabilization program” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997). We will analyze U.S. manipulations of Cold War ideology and the role of the CIA in planning U.S. sponsored covert Operations PB FORTUNE and later PBSUCCESS. These operations ultimately resulted in the 1954 coup d’état and the removal of the freely elected leader of Guatemala.

Both of the democratically-elected Presidents, Arévalo and Arbenz, worked for a more participatory and egalitarian society. Popular support for their efforts could be seen as “Between 1944 and 1954 … Popular organizations (including labor unions and campesino organizations) thrived” (May 2001, p 4). For many Guatemalan social sectors, their revolution was a time of democratization and a time of welcome reforms.

As a nationalist leader, President Arévalo espoused what he called “spiritual socialism”. The U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Historian (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Introduction) describes this philosophy as one which promoted “freedom of spirit” as it stressed the “dignity of man”. Arévalo’s principles emphasized human moral and civic values, while at the same time he criticized totalitarian forms of communism. The Historian’s Office records that U.S. perceptions of the Arévalo presidency were initially positive. This changed in 1947 when Arévalo signed the labor protection law. It was then that cables were sent from the American Embassy in Guatemala City which charged that Arévalo allowed communists to organize. Even though Arévalo got rid of both right-wing and left-wing extremists from government, he was still labeled a communist. The Historian’s Office acknowledges that Arévalo was even hesitant to work with communists.
President Arbenz was clear about his goal to transform the Guatemalan oligarchic society (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 49). This he would do through direct competition with foreign companies. His words communicated his intention to transform Guatemala into a “modern capitalistic state” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 52 from El Imparcial, March 16, 1951). Even so, he permitted communist participation. He met with communists in 1951 to help draw up the Agrarian Reform Law/Decree 900. Because Decree 900 antagonized the landed gentry and the urban bourgeoisie, he too was accused of supporting communism. There were contentions that Arbenz was influenced by members of the Communist Party in Guatemala (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo) who served in the Guatemalan Senate. President Arbenz continued similar work to that of his predecessor, Arévalo. Both men used nationalistic efforts to challenge the status quo and long-standing practices of economic feudalism. Although some of their reform efforts were likened to those of Roosevelt’s New Deal, and patterned after U.S. labor law, Guatemala’s political and economic governance became worrisome to factions in the United States as well as to political and corporate interests in Guatemala. It was obvious that the wealthy Guatemalan conservatives’ rights to private property would be affected. The landed elite opposed the government’s policies. These minority groups began to allege that communists had infiltrated their government.

Early on, U.S. government officials were not concerned with Guatemala as it enacted its nationalist programs. The National Security Archive notes that the CIA viewed Guatemala as a mere “Banana Republic” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997). As the proposed reforms moved forward, the U.S. State Department began to perceive Guatemala’s behavior as a geopolitical threat since it might be used as an example for
other countries in the area to follow. This can be understood from the following quotation from the State Department’s Inter-American Bureau Officer, Charles Burrows:

“Guatemala has become an increasing threat to the stability of Honduras and El Salvador. Its agrarian reform is a powerful propaganda weapon; its broad social program, of aiding the workers and peasants in a victorious struggle against the upper classes and large foreign enterprises, has a strong appeal to the populations of Central American neighbors, where similar conditions prevail.”
(Gleijeses 1991, p 365)

Arbenz continued his reformist agenda and would not be deterred. He insisted on Guatemala’s right to tend to its own political and business interests. Arbenz felt that agrarian reform was necessary to improve the country’s economy and the lives of many Guatemalan people. He made it known that foreign interests would be subject to the laws of Guatemala. There would be no exceptions made for UFCO.

The State Department’s Office of the Historian describes the skewed distribution of resources in the late 1940s and early 1950s. During that time, two percent of the population controlled more than 72 percent of Guatemala’s arable land. Since Guatemala’s economy was largely dependent upon agriculture, poverty and malnutrition were widespread in the country. Less than 12 percent of the privately-held land was actually being cultivated. As a private owner of land, the United Fruit Company was most definitely affected by Arbenz’s land reform. In both March and October of 1953, and again in February of 1954, the Arbenz government expropriated portions of UFCO’s unused farmlands. As a consequence of Decree 900 more than half of UFCO’s 550,000 acres of banana land on both the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts was expropriated
(Streeter 2000, p 20).
The Guatemalan government decided that fair compensation for the expropriated land would be the value which United Fruit Company itself had declared on its tax returns. UFCO’s returns indicated the value of the land to be $1.85 million. The Guatemalan government offered this amount in compensation to UFCO for its land. As the expropriation was enacted UFCO took exception and contested that this value was too low. UFCO asserted that the true value of the property was actually $19.35 million (Streeter 2000, p 20).

The May 3, 1954 *Time* magazine article entitled “Square Deal Wanted” reported that “communists and agrarian reformers who run Guatemala’s government grabbed . . . UFCO’s best banana reserve (emphasis mine) lands”. UFCO then asked the U.S. Government for help. This *Time* article stated that the United States formally billed Guatemala for UFCO’s full claim. This was the “biggest claim presented to any foreign government on behalf of a private U.S. firm since the Mexican oil expropriation of 1938” (Square Deal Wanted, May 3, 1954). Secretary of State Cordell Hull insisted that sovereign governments do have the right to expropriate property, but that amongst other conditions, payment must be “adequate”. The *Time* article stated that the U.S. government served notice that “the matter had become one for the two governments to handle”. The U.S. Government was acting “for U.S. citizens” in negotiations to arrive at a “square deal”. The Arbenz government of the sovereign nation of Guatemala rejected this higher valuation of the land.

As workers emphasized their rights they began to challenge the exploitative practices of Guatemalan business interests, like the United Fruit Company. Because UFCO held huge tracts of land it also employed a large part of the Guatemalan work
force. It recognized that it would be affected by the reforms and perhaps moreso than any other land holder.

It was not long until allegations began which contended that President Arbenz was a communist. In the time period of McCarthyism with its exaggerated views on communism, it became convenient to apply what was then referred to as the “duck test”. Immerman recounts what Ambassador Richard Patterson explained to a 1950 Rotary Club audience (Immerman 1982, p 102). Patterson asserted that if an unidentified bird looked like a duck, walked, swam and quacked like a duck, that it could be considered a duck, even if the bird wasn’t wearing a label which indicated that it was a duck. This analogy was then applied to President Arbenz in 1954. United States Ambassador John E. Peurifoy told the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that if Arbenz talked, thought or acted like a communist, even if he was not a communist, then he “will certainly do until one comes along” (Streeter 2000, p 21). The Department of State’s Historian’s Office relates that the rationale used to try to justify that he was a communist is that if Arbenz tolerated known communists, then that would make him a “fellow traveler” with them, or possibly a communist himself. During the Cold War era this was a serious charge.

In the context of the Cold War it was not difficult for the United States to inject geopolitical considerations into the reformist choices the Guatemalan Government was making. Guatemalan land reform programs were soon asserted to be communist intrusions from the USSR. U.S. intelligence agencies expressed concern that Soviet economic and political ideologies were infiltrating into what the United States considered to be its
own back yard—Latin America. CIA Director Allen Dulles alleged that Guatemala could become a communist beachhead in the Americas.

The expropriation of land through Decree 900 turned out to be an opportunity to combine economic and political interests, as presented by CIA Director Allen Dulles, to his brother John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State. Land expropriation was now being used in anti-communist propaganda against the Guatemalan Government. A disinformation campaign pushed President Eisenhower toward getting the U.S. Government involved in the private business dealings of UFCO.

The United Fruit Company had asked both the Harry Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower administrations to act against Decree 900. In 1953 the Boston-based UFCO had actually requested that the Eisenhower Administration confront Guatemala’s Government in order to reverse the Decree. President Eisenhower was reluctant to get involved at first. To counter this, UFCO hired the advertiser Edward R. Bernays, who is regarded as the father of public relations. Regarding Bernays’ campaign, a Harvard article puts forth that “right messages can even spark revolution” (Buday 2000, p 10). It goes on to say that “Bernays worked the press and skillfully exploited America’s fear of communism”. They claim that, partly because of Bernays’ efforts, the Guatemalan leftist regime was overthrown (Buday 2000, p 10). Bernays’ multi-media campaign to spread disinformation alleging that the Arbenz government was actually communist did in fact change American public opinion and also the President’s stance. Eisenhower did not want to appear to be soft on communism, so the successful results of this campaign caused him to get involved in this issue.
For critics of Decree 900 and people in Washington who sought such a rationale, these assertions provided them with what they needed. They alleged that communism had been established in the Americas, specifically in Guatemala. Jonas contends that it was the role of United States which made the situation in Guatemala into a “Cold War civil war” which could provoke an East-West confrontation (Jonas 2000, p. 119). The State Department Historian’s Office reports that critics concluded that the problem in Guatemala was not agrarian reform—rather the problem was communism.

**Preparation for Ouster of Arbenz through a Coup d’état**

In looking at possible explanations for U.S. intervention in efforts to destabilize the Guatemalan government through removal of a democratically-elected leader, we must consider the timing of possible explanations to determine their plausibility. The basis for intervention put forward by the U.S. government was that agrarian reform was an indicator of Soviet style ideology, and this brought with it the potential of communist infiltration into the Western Hemisphere. According to the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Historian, the CIA drew up contingency plans to remove Arbenz from office as early as 1951. The Historian’s Office acknowledgement is remarkable as it is clear that the covert 1951 plans were made well before the Agrarian Reform Law of 1952 was even written.

The Historian’s Office recounts that the 1951 plans were drawn up by the CIA under orders from the U.S. State Department under the name Operation PBFOURNT. The National Security Archive indicates that PBFOURNT was actually authorized by
President Truman in 1952 (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997). Accordingly, the PBFOURTUNE plot began in September of 1952 with plans to supply counter-revolutionary rebel groups with funds and matériel to depose Arbenz if he was deemed to be a communist.

Early allegations of communism can be seen in February 1952 planning memos for PBFOURTUNE from CIA Headquarters (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997). One such manual contains the title “Guatemalan Communist (emphasis mine) Personnel to be disposed of during Military Operations” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 4). Categories were established through which some people would be “neutralized”, others imprisoned or yet others exiled from Guatemala. In time, the CIA secret plans for PBFOURTUNE were discovered and so this operation was terminated in October of 1952.

In assessing the declassified CIA secret documents, the National Security Archive notes that Operation PBFOURTUNE was the precursor to Operation PBSUCCESS. Both were covert operations to oust Arbenz, however Operation PBSUCCESS actually achieved this goal. Documents from the CIA’s Operation PBSUCCESS were released in 1997. According to these documents this effort was authorized by President Eisenhower in 1953 (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997).

As part of the National Security Archive, one narrative history of the 1954 coup was provided by a diplomatic historian named Nicholas Cullather (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 5). He worked for one year on a contract with the CIA where he accessed CIA secret documents in order to produce an overview called “Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala, 1952-1954”. What Cullather discovered was a “surprisingly critical study of the agency’s first covert operation in Latin America” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 5). He described this operation as an
intimate account of what rationale was used to convince President Eisenhower to authorize the ousting and forceful removal of the democratically-elected President of a sovereign country, that is, President Arbenz.

The National Security Archive denotes that Operation PBSUCCESS had a budget of $2.7 million. It was planned as “psychological warfare and political action” and “subversion” which were to be carried out in a paramilitary war (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997). The Archive documents reveal from the CIA’s “K program” that “the option of assassination” of President Arbenz was considered, even up until his resignation on June 27, 1954. Cullather documents information regarding a CIA narrative history of details of organizing and executing a planned coup through Operation PBSUCCESS (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 5).

In June of 1995 in a search of the National Security Archive’s materials about Guatemala, CIA staff historian, Gerald Haines, wrote a brief history on the “CIA and Guatemalan Assassination Proposals, 1952-1954” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 1). One conclusion reached from his historical report indicates that as early as January of 1952 lists were compiled by CIA headquarters of names of individuals who would be “eliminate(d) immediately in event of [a] successful anti-Communist (emphasis mine) coup” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 1). CIA planning for assassinations included budgeting, armaments transfers, training programs, creation of lists of people to target and also hit teams.

The training files of Operation PBSUCCESS revealed an unsigned, undated how-to guide book on political killing, entitled “A Study of Assassination” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 2). It details procedures and instruments to be used to carry
out assassinations. The guide advises “The simplest local tools are often the most efficient means of assassination”. It instructs further that it would be sufficient to use “anything hard, heavy and handy” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 2). Trainees are cautioned in the use of body cavity puncture wounds and told that “Absolute reliability is obtained by severing the spinal cord in the cervical region”. The guide book explains that plausible deniability is provided if assassination instructions are not written or recorded. It states outright that murder “is not morally justifiable” but then goes on to advise that “persons who are morally squeamish should not attempt it” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 2).

A National Security Archive declassified document dated March 31, 1954 which was used in planning for Operation PBSUCCESS contains one of many assassination lists. This particular list is a request from a CIA division chief asking to obtain the names of Arbenz government leaders, communist party members, and persons “of tactical importance whose removal for psychological, organizational or other reasons is mandatory for the success of military action (emphasis mine)” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 3).

Now convinced that Guatemalan leadership had ties to communism, interested parties in the United States proceeded with the paramilitary invasion named Operation PBSUCCESS. A “liberation army” (el ejército de liberación) was recruited, trained and armed by the United States’ CIA. This paramilitary effort was led by a man named Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas who was handpicked by the CIA. He was a graduate of U.S. military training in Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas (Jonas 1991, p 29). The mercenary soldiers used in this operation were Guatemalan exiles who were trained outside of
Guatemala. What began with a CIA campaign to misrepresent, then depose President Arbenz, now became a military action.

Was Arbenz a genuine threat to the United States? In *Bitter Fruit*, an account of “The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala”, Schlesinger and Kinzer ask if instead he was more a threat to the principal U.S. monopoly, the United Fruit Company (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p xiii). In her *Battle for Guatemala* Jonas encapsulates the history of this time period by writing “the overthrow of Arbenz is one of the clearest examples in modern history of U.S. policy being affected by direct ties of public officials to private interests” (Jonas 1991, p 32). She charges that the history of the United Fruit Company clearly demonstrates U.S. complicity in the state affairs of a sovereign country.

Jonas concludes that diplomatic, economic and military actions on the part of the United States resulted in the 1954 coup d’état, and consequently the Guatemalan civil war (1960-1996). Her scholarly work details U.S. participation and guidance which portrayed ideological and political overtones of a “Cold War civil war” (Jonas 2000, p 17). U.S. intervention in Guatemala helped to set in motion what Jonas describes as the longest and bloodiest civil war in the hemisphere (up until that time).
CHAPTER FIVE

1954 Coup d'état

Guatemala Is “Liberated”: Operation PBSUCCESS

In the previous chapters we highlighted economic interests and anti-communist assertions. Streeter’s analysis combines these emphases. He contends that the Eisenhower administration’s policy toward Guatemala regarded communism as the primary concern, while the changing conditions for UFCO were the “subsidiary” issue (Streeter 2000, p 20). An analogy used by Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1947) for perceived communism was that Guatemala was considered as a rotten apple in a barrel that could infect other apples around it (Streeter 2000, p 23). The conditions in Guatemala had to be changed in case other surrounding countries also decided that they could defy the United States. Streeter puts forth the argument that the Eisenhower administration wanted to maintain U.S. hegemony in Guatemala and by extension to “prevent other Latin American countries from straying from the U.S. orbit” (Streeter 2000, p 23). This could be attempted through military intervention.

It is not the aim of this thesis to chronicle every activity leading up to and during the 1954 coup d'état. The purpose is to point out how the United States influenced
Guatemala during this time period, and to highlight specific activity and intervention efforts by the United States which may have affected the internal workings of Guatemala.

Activity surrounding the coup can be best understood through steps taken toward “reliance upon Third World official military institutions as guarantors of U.S. foreign policy objectives” argues Bowen in “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Radical Change: Covert Operations in Guatemala, 1950-1954” (Bowen 1983, p 89). Bowen uses declassified documents in researching the “Guatemalan affair” in the context of international relations in the Western Hemisphere. He believes that interests in both Guatemala and the United States were in jeopardy, so they “acted symbiotically, if not jointly” in the 1954 coup in Guatemala (Bowen 1983, p 89). Because the United States was the preeminent military power in the region, it followed that the Eisenhower administration used its control there. In the case of Guatemala, it was decided that U.S. foreign policy objectives would not be served by controlling the existing military institutions there, but rather they could be “liberated” and then the existing military could be replaced.

One strategy to keep Guatemala in check was through an arms embargo which the United States had put in place during the Arévalo administration (Bowen 1983, p 92). The United States had refused to sell arms to Guatemala since 1948 (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 148) even while it continued to sell weapons and airplanes to Guatemala’s neighboring countries such as Nicaragua and Honduras (Bowen 1983, p 92-93). Not only did the United States not sell arms to Guatemala but it also blocked arms purchases by the Guatemalan Government from other countries. The Guatemalan Government recognized its diminishing military strength compared to its neighboring countries. It also recognized from its intelligence gathering that there were indications of an impending
paramilitary invasion by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 149).

In its recognition of the need to reinforce its own armed forces, in the spring of 1954 the Guatemalan Government bought munitions from Czechoslovakia. The United States tried to halt that shipment of arms but was unable to do so. The munitions were delivered to Puerto Barrios by the Swedish ship *Alfhem* on May 15, 1954 (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 147-148). This weapons shipment consisted of small arms, ammunition, and light artillery pieces from the Skoda arms factory (Eisenhower 1963, p 421-426). Because Czechoslovakia was a satellite country of the Soviet Union, this event turned out to be an opportunity for the CIA to insinuate to the American press and thus to the American public that the arms purchase was evidence of communist subversion in Guatemala.

The CIA’s reaction to news of the shipment was “one of relief” in Schlesinger and Kinzer’s view. They posit that the agency had been looking for a credible pretext to justify a plan which involved Castillo Armas (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 150). The CIA then used this shipment to go forward with their Operation PBSUCCESS. As quickly as the day after the delivery of the arms shipment, on May 16, CIA Director Allen Dulles met with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The following day Dulles met with the National Security Council and convinced Eisenhower’s strategists to aid Castillo Armas and his fellow mercenaries. The date for the invasion was then set for the following month (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 151).

Bowen claims that a regional campaign was orchestrated by the United States. Fellow Central American countries El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and
Panama were part of a propaganda campaign and also part of active efforts directed against the policies of both the Arévalo and Arbenz governments. These Central American countries held discussions amongst themselves while excluding Guatemala. Bowen writes that when Castillo Armas invaded Guatemala, the Salvadoran head of state, Major Oscar Osorio, not only had prior knowledge of this event, but had advised CIA operatives that he had 2,500 soldiers on reserve to assist in case they were needed (Bowen 1983, p 93-94). In other Central American cooperation, Castillo Armas’ expatriate army trained in Nicaragua in 1953-1954. Interestingly enough, it trained on the Anastasio Somoza family estate. It was from Nicaragua that Castillo Armas based his air support during the attack on Guatemala. Financial support was also provided by both Somoza and the dictatorial leader of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo (Bowen 1983, p 94).

Arbenz’s adversaries were also living in and communicating with Castillo Armas from Honduras. Bowen posits that hostility of the Honduran government toward Arbenz was maintained by the United States. This can be understood from the following statement from the 1954 American Ambassador to Honduras, Whiting Willauer:

“I certainly was called upon to perform very important duties particularly to keep the Honduran government—which was scared to death about the possibilities of themselves being overthrown—keep them in line so they would allow this revolutionary activity to continue, based in Honduras” (U.S. Senate, June 5, 1961, p 866).

Ambassador Willauer recognized the fear in the Honduran government. Bowen notes that hostility was maintained in order to carry out what the United States had planned. This is much like the continuing campaign which existed to manipulate the ideas of the American public toward Guatemala with the fear of a communist menace. As part of this campaign, the CIA and UFCO’s press officers tried to direct public opinion through
restricted coverage in the American press. Bowen points out that CIA Director Allen Dulles spoke to the \emph{New York Times} publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger and asked him to keep reporter Sydney Gruson away from Guatemala. Gruson was stationed in Mexico City but reported on Guatemalan issues. Allen Dulles shared concerns with the \emph{Times} publisher that both he, and his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, did not believe that Gruson was inclined to reporting “objectively” on the Guatemalan situation (Bowen 1983, p 95). Two examples of Gruson’s reporting follow.

Gruson’s May 22, 1954 \emph{New York Times} article was entitled “Guatemala Says U.S. Tried to Make Her Defenseless”. This article commented on the United States’ ban on arms shipments to Guatemala, and Guatemala’s desire to buy arms for the purposes of its own defense, or to repel a potential invasion. In this article Guatemalan Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello was quoted as saying: “For us, Communist-controlled territory is the Soviet Union. Other countries are sovereign.” He later added “Guatemala is not a colony of the United States nor an associated state that requires permission of the United States Government to acquire the things indispensable for its defense and security, and it repudiates the pretentions of this Government [the United States] to supervise the legitimate acts of a sovereign government” (Gruson, May 22, 1954, \emph{New York Times}).

In this same May 22, 1954 \emph{Times} article, Gruson reported on Guatemalan reaction to the United States and UFCO’s demand for the higher dollar value in compensation for UFCO’s land expropriation. Foreign Minister Toriello was quoted as saying that he deemed the demand for the higher value to be “open \emph{intervention} (emphasis mine)” in Guatemala.
In another Gruson news story reported after the Alfhem ship delivery, as noted by authors of *Bitter Fruit*, Gruson observed that Guatemalans and other Latin Americans reacted with support toward Arbenz in light of the American attacks (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 154). In the news story, Gruson wrote “The reaction has served to remind observers that the dominant feeling among articulate Guatemalans is not pro- or anti-communist or pro- or anti-Yankeeism but fervent nationalism” (Gruson, *New York Times*, May 24, 1954). News content of this type was counter to what the CIA desired. Schlesinger and Kinzer report that Gruson was about to investigate the Castillo Armas invasion of Guatemala but was restricted in his efforts until after the coup d’état had already taken place (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 155).

The CIA also went as far as to enlist the aid of American Catholic hierarchy in its plans to affect people’s thinking. The CIA asked New York’s Cardinal Francis Spellman to clandestinely contact Guatemalan Archbishop Mariano Rossell Arellano. As a result of this request a pastoral letter was written and then read to Guatemalan churches on April 9, 1954. The letter asked “the people of Guatemala . . . [to] rise as a single man against this enemy of God and country” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 155). The CIA also arranged for thousands of leaflets with this same message to be airdropped in remote areas of Guatemala.

It is noteworthy that during Operation PBSUCCESS much of the Guatemalan populace did not know of many of the events which were taking place in their own country. This is because the CIA was controlling significant modes of communication in Guatemala. The agency launched a clandestine radio campaign about seven weeks before the invasion (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 167). The goal of the campaign was to
spread fear and panic throughout Guatemala via a radio station called Radio Liberation/Voix of Liberation (Voz de la liberacion). In May and June of 1954, pro-Castillo Armas messages were transmitted through CIA radio transmitters. Broadcasters and technicians in this effort had been trained by the CIA. This station presented itself as if it were being broadcast from the jungle in Guatemala; in actuality it had connections in Nicaragua, Honduras, the Dominican Republic and even the U.S. State of Florida.

In order to urge people to join the Castillo Armas Liberation movement this station represented itself as the voice of Guatemalan patriots who were opposed to the Arbenz government (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 168). The broadcast presented information about nonexistent things such as civilian uprisings and military defections. When the official Guatemalan station tried to truthfully deal with these erroneous rumors, Radio Liberation used jamming equipment which was located in the U.S. embassy to block reception of the government station. It imitated the music and bells of the official Guatemalan station and presented its own broadcast as if it were the official government station’s broadcast.

Immerman focuses on a CIA memorandum to Eisenhower that U.S. efforts alone looked doubtful and would not be enough (Immerman 1982, p 161). The CIA’s acting assistant director for current intelligence explained to President Eisenhower that the “controlling factor” was the loyalty of the regular Guatemalan army officers (Immerman 1982, p 161). They felt that if the regular Guatemalan forces chose to fight, then without much difficulty, they could resist the invasion. Castillo Armas did not have enough military power himself to oust Arbenz. The CIA communicated that the entire effort would depend upon psychological impact rather than military strength.
Using the radio they could create the impression that there were rebels everywhere in Guatemala (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 169). Using airplanes they even parachuted dummies into rural areas to give the impression to Guatemalan peasants that rebels were near. It was the job of the Castillo Armas effort to “create and maintain for a short time the impression of very substantial military strength” (Immerman 1982, p 161). This was a “psychological war”—a “war of nerves” (Immerman 1982, 162-163). One use of the radio was to raise the anxiety of and to frighten the Guatemalan people. These efforts were also directed at undermining the confidence of the Guatemalan military by splitting them from their loyalty to Arbenz (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 168). In the end it was designed to cause President Arbenz to abandon his post and to resign.

As we highlight efforts made by the United States, we see that Bowen objectively takes note of the changing situation in Guatemala. He says that the time period when the reforms were taking place was not trouble free. In his assessment of the internal security of Guatemala during 1953 and 1954, he acknowledges that violence was actually taking place. Some disunity and division were present within the Guatemalan armed forces. Bowen believes that U.S. analysts perceived doubt in the Guatemalan military corps. The analysts questioned whether or not the Arbenz administration could maintain the place that military had held in Guatemalan society. United States analysts believed that this doubt could be exploited and perhaps be used to enact a coup d’état.

One key person who kept himself informed of the changes in Guatemala was American Ambassador to Guatemala, John Peurifoy. Bowen asserts that Peurifoy developed contacts within Guatemala who could advise of internal vulnerabilities. He wanted to be sure that the United States could use these adversaries and their information for the
benefit of U.S. planning. Contacts were developed over time and Bowen says that by January of 1954 officers regularly reported to CIA officials (Bowen 1983, p 92). Through related planning they projected that in four or five months there would be a change in Guatemalan leadership.

Bowen writes that by June 15 the CIA was reporting to the Eisenhower administration that top Guatemalan army officers were in contact and discussing plans for Arbenz’s overthrow (Bowen 1983, p 95). A final meeting on Operation PBSUCCESS was held with Eisenhower, the Dulles brothers, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff all in attendance (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 170). Operation PBSUCCESS was approved on June 15, 1954. The plan was for Castillo Armas to invade Guatemala to provoke a coup which would result in the overthrow of Arbenz.

The continuing covert nature of this well-planned coup can be understood from a June 18, 1954 excerpt from the Diary of James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to President Eisenhower. The Press Secretary’s diary entry states: “Allen Dulles called early in the morning to tell me that his organization expected there would be an anti-Communist uprising in Guatemala very shortly. Officially we don’t know anything about it. The story broke late Friday night” (Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers, June 18, 1954).

This operation was designed very much in advance, as can be understood from a secret memorandum released as sanitized by the CIA’s Historical Review Program in 2003. This Memo was addressed to “Chief, WH [White House]”. The Subject line indicates “Declaration of Col. Castillo Armas”. The one sentence message states “Attached is a translation of a proposed ‘declaration’ by Col. Castillo Armas.” The date
of the Memorandum was February 1, 1954—which is more than four months before the June 1954 coup (CIA “Declaration of Col. Castillo Armas” Memorandum, February 1, 1954). Any pretense from the previous paragraph’s diary entry of Press Secretary Hagerty to the President, which claims it had no official knowledge about the imminent “uprising” does not seem to be factual.

As far as specific events surrounding the coup, we have already seen that the CIA used Radio Liberation and aerial drops of literature to carry out a propaganda campaign. The United States had also handpicked Castillo Armas as the man who would lead the anti-Arbenz operation. Castillo Armas was a right-wing Guatemalan army officer who had been exiled from Guatemala. On June 13 Castillo Armas went to Tegucigalpa, Honduras to meet with his troops. This was the first time the troops had ever met with their commander. The CIA had transported around 170 soldiers to Honduras (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 170). Like Castillo Armas these were mercenary soldiers. They were Guatemalan exiles, and/or a mixed number of Central Americans, and/or American soldiers of fortune, who had been trained by the CIA in Nicaragua. Forty-eight hours before the invasion, the troops were sent to small border villages in Honduras, where the CIA provided them with bazookas, machine guns, grenade launchers and rations (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 171).

The day before the invasion, more Liberation troops were delivered to Honduran border towns via CIA-chartered DC-3 planes. On June 18 Colonel Castillo Armas crossed into Guatemala in his command car which was followed by several vehicles. Since no spontaneous revolt took place they were told to stay put (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, 171). On the morning of the invasion the CIA sent a pilot to drop leaflets over Guatemala
City. Other pilots were sent by the CIA to provide aerial harassment and to intimidate Arbenz into submission. In one case a grenade and a dynamite stick were dropped from a plane onto fuel tanks which caused an explosion and intimidating noises at the port (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 172).

Between June 17 and June 27, 1954 the CIA directed the impression of warfare toward the Guatemalan people. Panic resulted from their propaganda in efforts to support Castillo Armas, Bowen recounts (Bowen 1983, p 96). These carefully used tactics can be understood from the following memo from the CIA to President Eisenhower on June 20, 1954:

“… it will be seen how important are the aspects of deception and timing. . . in arousing other latent forces of resistance [to Arbenz]. . . the entire [Castillo] effort is thus more dependent upon psychological impact rather than actual military strength, although it is upon the ability of the Castillo Armas effort to create and maintain for a short time the impression of very substantial military strength that the success of this particular effort primarily depends. The use of a small number of airplanes and the massive use of radio broadcasting are designed to build up and give main support to the impression of Castillo Armas’ strength as well as to spread the impression of the regime’s weakness” (Bowen 1983, p 96).

From the previous quotation Bowen emphasizes the “latent forces of resistance” which he identifies as the Guatemalan military officers who were part of the official Guatemalan armed forces. He explains that these officers were the primary object of U.S. anti-Arbenz policy. According to Bowen, the United States was displeased about the role of communists in the social mobilization which was taking place in the country. He contends however that the goal of American policy was “not a popular conquest leading to an anticommunist revolution” but instead “American policy sought to foment a military coup” (Bowen 1983, p 96). And indeed it did.
On June 18, 1954 Castillo Armas’ army of liberation invaded Guatemala from several border points. The use of several points was to give the impression that Guatemala was being invaded by a large force. Much deception was used to advance this small band of mercenaries. Psychological warfare continued and was meant to provoke panic among the people. The Voice of Liberation broadcast gave the impression that Castillo Armas and his men were being welcomed.

The invasion did not go as planned. The Guatemalan Army was able to turn back efforts by Castillo Armas to seize several towns (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 171). Heavy equipment slowed them down. The Guatemalan Army defeated mercenaries at some locations, and mercenaries were killed and captured. Botched and unsuccessful attacks resulted in several requests through Allen Dulles to send airplanes (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 177). The planes were finally provided. Over the next few days with the use of these planes and the overall well-organized psychological warfare, this ultimately resulted in the intimidation and demoralization of the Arbenz forces (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, 192). Although the threat from the mercenaries was not significant, Castillo Armas and his liberation army were able to advance into Guatemala.

Specific actions related to the coup d’état took place between June 17 to June 27, 1954. As President Arbenz saw his support base dwindle, he addressed the country by government radio and resigned on June 27 (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 199-201, from *El Imparcial* July 28, 1954). This ended the October Revolution or the Ten Years of Spring (1944-1954).

Bowen concludes that “the U.S. role was the very essence of Castillo Armas’ part of the ‘liberation’” (Bowen1983, p 96). This chapter depicts U.S. assistance in the
overthrow of (what some people refer to as) the “liberation” of the Guatemalan Government in 1954. Castillo Armas took power in Guatemala that same year. The United States then established diplomatic relations with the new “anti-Communist” Guatemalan Government on July 13, 1954 (Waggoner July 14, 1954 *New York Times*).

**Results of the 1954 Coup**

As stated at the outset of the preceding chapter, the Revolution for many hopeful and expectant Guatemalans was replaced with a new regime. Schlesinger and Kinzer carefully document that “the United States government was in fact the secret creator and sponsor of the ‘liberation’ movement” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 13). “Liberation” is commonly understood as the securing of equal social and economic rights for a particular group. In looking at this understanding of the concept of liberation, it can be questioned as to which particular group or groups gained rights, or social or economic opportunities as a consequence of either Operation PBFOURTUNE or PBSUCCESS, or the 1954 coup.

As for the overall effects on the country of Guatemala, as a result of President Eisenhower getting the United States involved, the U.S. State Department reduced aid to Guatemala. It also limited trade with Guatemala. This was particularly significant because the United States was Guatemala’s largest trading partner. Streeter notes that by the early 1950s, around 70 percent of Guatemala’s exports went to the United States, and around 64 percent of Guatemala’s imports were from the United States (Streeter 2000,
The disinformation campaign and resultant actions by the United States had a huge negative impact on the Guatemalan national economy.

After World War II, economic options in Latin America were very limited, as Vand en and Prevost write. This was due to the overall power of the United States and also U.S. perceptions during the Cold War (Vanden and Prevost 2011, p 327-328). The authors observe that it was difficult to find an alternative path for economic and political development. Prevost and Vanden take the position that Guatemala was the most dramatic example of the price paid by Latin Americans in their pursuit of a path which was unsupported by the United States.

What effect did this so called liberation have on the Guatemalan people? As a result of U.S. sponsored intervention, Guatemala was “liberated” from its democratically-elected President. As a result of U.S. intervention, the Constitutional laws of Guatemala’s land reform ceased from being enacted. Land reform was to have redistributed an average of 10 acres each to almost one out of every five people. This change in Guatemala’s leadership and the cessation of planned land reform resulted in the deterioration of hope and exuberance of the majority campesino and rural labor population.

Bowen reaches several conclusions relative to U.S. covert operations in Guatemala from 1950-1954. He writes that U.S. policy was overseen at the highest levels of American Government, that being the Eisenhower Presidency and his administration. United States diplomatic personnel worked in concert toward the enactment of clandestine operations (Bowen 1983, p 98). In hearings before the U.S. Senate in 1961, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras Whiting Willauer proudly boasts of the part that he played in
Guatemala, from his post in Honduras. Willauer testifies that Allen Dulles himself sent Willauer a telegram after the fact in which he stated that “the revolution could not have succeeded but for what I did” (U.S. Senate, 1961: 865-866).

Bowen recognizes the impact of political institutions and socioeconomic priorities on national self-determination. He states that the paramount political lesson learned by the United States in the Guatemalan Affair was the reliance “on local militaries to serve as junior partners with U.S. covert operatives in the protection of U.S. interests” (Bowen 1983, p 99).

Following the Guatemalan Affair, Bowen posits, the U.S. Government’s primary objective was “the cultivation of pro-American attitudes in and actions by official military hierarchies” (Bowen 1983, p 99). In the chapter which follows we will discuss U.S. influence as it pursued that stated objective in the developing military hierarchies of the Guatemalan State.
CHAPTER SIX

Militarization: Legacy of “Liberation”

Castillo Armas Secures His Power

In terms of successful CIA clandestine military operations during this time period, Guatemala was one of two countries about which the CIA boasted (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p xii). (The other country was Iran.) As noted previously, the goal of Operation PBSUCCESS was to remove President Arbenz from power and to replace his government with one headed by Castillo Armas. We have seen that Arbenz did indeed resign. As a result of the 1954 coup both he and his top aides fled from Guatemala (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997). The United States established relations with the new government of Castillo Armas. As we will see, the coup was just the beginning of the militarization of Guatemala, which continued through a several decades-long civil war.

Castillo Armas proceeded to replace local administrators and magistrates with his own people. He repealed the 1945 constitution. In its place he issued a “political statute” which gave him all executive and legislative functions (Immerman 1982, p 199). The political changes he made were authoritarian in nature, as it wasn’t until two years later, in 1956, that Castillo Armas actually instituted a new constitution. Castillo Armas attempted to ensure that there could be no organized opposition to his regime (Immerman
1982, 199). He prioritized the securing of his position of authority by using military power against potential opposition within Guatemala. Paul P. Kennedy’s June 6, 1954 New York Times article reports that within days the new Castillo Armas government swiftly labeled almost 2,000 people who opposed him as “communists” (Kennedy, New York Times, June 6, 1954). So many people were arrested that jails were overloaded and so concentration camps had to be set up.

Immerman recounts that Castillo Armas proclaimed July 12 as Anti-Communist Day. Accordingly he announced his personal intention to use the law to publicly execute criminals and people who were found responsible, as an example for future generations to know “crimes against freedom are crimes against the fatherland” (Immerman 1982, p 198). There was actually no legal basis in Guatemalan law for prosecuting citizens for simply holding political beliefs. With the repeal of the 1945 constitution and his “political statute” (Immerman 1982, p 199) in place, with both legislative and executive powers under his control, nothing stood in his way. Jonas writes that the United States now proceeded to directly supervise a “wide-ranging witch hunt and McCarthy-style repression campaign” (Jonas 2012, p 309). Castillo Armas would then intimidate and eliminate possible enemies by removing the rule of law and intensifying the anti-communist witch hunt.

According to the National Security Archive, the last stage of PBSUCCESS was a “roll-up of Communists and collaborators” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997). In carrying forward this anti-communist program Castillo Armas created a National Committee for Defense against Communism. This Committee conducted surveillance, arrested people
who were deemed to be dangerous, and deported foreigners even without the legal recourse of a trial (Immerman 1982, p 199).

To aid in these efforts, Castillo Armas formed a special police force which was led by José Bernabe Linares, the man who had done the same job in the pre-revolutionary Ubico regime. Bernabe Linares was said to have used electric shock baths or a head-shrinking steel skullcap in his methods as the “enforcer” for the dictatorial Ubico (Immerman 1982, p. 199). Under Castillo Armas’ leadership Bernabe Linares went on to investigate anyone in Guatemala who had ever been a member of a union, anyone who had signed a petition, or anyone who had received a homestead during Arbenz’s tenure. This resulted in the creation of police files on tens of thousands of people.

According to Immerman, thousands of people were arbitrarily jailed during this time for purposes of “security” (Immerman 1982, p 199). The National Security Archive says that after the CIA installed Castillo Armas into power, hundreds of Guatemalans were rounded up and killed. Jonas puts the post-coup repression campaign death toll at some 8,000 people. She estimates that thousands more people went into hiding or were exiled from Guatemala (Jonas 2012, p 309). Numerous scholarly works indicate that many Guatemalans were executed and many simply “disappeared”.

On another matter of great significance, that of land reform, one of Castillo Armas’ first official acts was to return to the United Fruit Company 99 percent of the land which had been expropriated from it. Castillo Armas also did away with taxes on interest, dividends, and profits which would have been payable (Immerman 1982, p 198). Immerman recounts that Castillo Armas gave the national farms back to the state, and
took back land—often forcibly—from peasants who had acquired it through Decree 900. Castillo Armas also got rid of cooperatives.

As part of Castillo Armas’ crafting of a new agrarian reform program, the United States now helped with advice and money (Immerman 1982, p 198). Details of this plan assured that private property would be exempted from expropriation. This exemption meant that the only land available for distribution to the masses of people was state-owned land or land that was either undeveloped, inaccessible or of poor quality (Immerman 1982, p 198). According to economic historian and sociologist Andre Gunder Frank, using the land distribution program proposed during the post-Arbenz years (1955-1961), taking into account a zero population growth, it would have taken “148 years for all peasant families to receive some land” (Frank 1969, p 270).

In her work on the effects of political violence on popular organizations during this same time period, May writes that “Because the organized urban and rural working classes were a key support of the Revolution, Carlos Castillo Armas dismantled the labor organizations almost immediately upon his arrival into Guatemala City” (May 2001, p 4). May claims that “Within a week of the fall of the Revolution, Castillo Armas replaced the head of the Department of Labor” (May 2001, p 4). Immerman notes that Castillo Armas cancelled the registrations of over 500 unions (Immerman 1982, p 199).

“While this did not outlaw the actual organizations, it did invalidate their leadership and the organizational structure (i.e., their constitutions, autonomous internal procedures, and leadership). The law stated that the affected labor organizations were allowed three months to restructure themselves and to remove communists from their membership…This prohibited a resurgence of the former unions after the three-month ‘trial period’ “(May 2001, p 4-5).
With these changes came disruption of leadership in the organizations, their constitutions and their internal procedures. This disorganization in effect dismantled the political institutions of popular organizations such as labor unions, agrarian committees and political parties. In comparison to Arbenz’s last year in office, these changes negatively impacted union membership as it declined to 10 percent of what it was, by the end of the decade (Immerman 1982, p 200). It was not long until major labor organizations, cultural organizations and other popular organizations were actually outlawed through Decree 48. Not only did Castillo Armas cancel over 500 union registrations, he also revoked Arévalo’s 1947 Labor Code (Immerman 1982, 199). Further, Castillo Armas created a law which put future union charter approval under his Committee for Defense against Communism (Immerman 1982, p 199-200).

In Jonas’ description of the immediate aftermath of this new government, she also acknowledges the quick reversal of previous land reform and labor laws. She agrees that under Castillo Armas’ leadership political parties and pro-revolution organizations were made illegal. She relates that even literacy programs were seen to be part of “pro-communist indoctrination” (Jonas 2012, p 309). This is particularly noteworthy as a July 1954 New York Times article reports of another new decree in the immediate post-Arbenz presidency era–that of limiting suffrage to persons who were literate. The new Guatemalan leadership considered literacy as fundamental to authentic democracy, and it noted literacy as one characteristic of responsible citizenship. This same Times article reports that 73 percent of the Guatemalan population was illiterate at the time this decree was enacted (New York Times, July 7, 1954). It is not difficult to understand that the effect of this decree would exclude the majority population from being able to vote.
The repressive and undemocratic changes instituted by Castillo Armas, which we have noted took place with the aid of the U.S. Government, were not readily accepted by the majority population of Guatemala. This can be seen through a news article written two years into Guatemala’s “liberation” under the Castillo Armas regime. Reporter David Graham describes conditions in Guatemala at the time in *The Nation* in his July 1956 article (Graham, *Nation*, July 14, 1956). He points out again that Castillo Armas had led by the pre-1956 Constitution, executive decrees. Graham likens this to recent elections where only seven percent of the Guatemalan people chose to vote. He notes Castillo Armas’ ability to clamp down on the press, and also the new Constitution allowing him to cancel civil liberties.

Graham reports that even the “government’s hand-picked labor leaders are crying out against government policies” as witnessed by labor leader L.F. Balcarcel’s May Day speech printed in *Prensa Libre*. This labor leader acknowledged that labor and agrarian laws had aggravated problems such as scarcity of land and scarcity of work (Graham, *Nation*, July 14, 1956). Graham considered existing working conditions under the Castillo Armas regime as shocking. He reports that in rural areas hundreds of small farmers were forced off their lands. This cut production of corn and beans, the basic foods eaten by Guatemalans. Graham reveals that landowners seized the property of the peasants by burning them out. He recounts an example published in *Time’s* June 11 Latin American edition when 32 dislocated peasants had appealed to the authorities about their need to plant corn to feed their families. When the meeting took place the Indians were surrounded by the town’s police chief and officers, and the mayor. They were trucked off and charged with being communists. One of the large landowners who had dispossessed
them of their land was a minister in the government. The point that Graham makes with this example is that respectful pleas were struck down by government tribunals as “Communist agitation”.

In this same July 1956 article, Graham chronicles existing conditions which include the dissolution of Congress, the whittling down of the electorate, and laws passed against “dangerous thoughts”. He refers to United Fruit Company as “Central America’s traditional boss”. Graham acknowledges the solidarity which exists between those who put Castillo Armas in power, foreign capital and domestic feudalism. He says that during Castillo Armas’ reign these relationships had become more concrete.

Graham expounds that the Arévalo-Arbenz regimes had been intensely nationalistic and hence suspicious of the United States. This, he says, comes as a consequence of what people who are “south of the border” universally believe, that the United States had been controlling and exploiting Central America for sixty years. He describes the liberation as being “hoisted into the saddle by U.S. intervention (emphasis mine) and secured with good old-fashioned fascist decrees” (Graham, July 14, 1956). The Nation reporter pondered what kind of labor movement might exist in the United States if union leadership had to be cleared by Senator McCarthy.

Graham describes the Guatemalan army as a police force which “has been armed to the teeth by Dulles under the ludicrous pretext that it can help the defense of the continent”. He mentions that fortunately there are “sizeable military elements who stand ever ready to make lightning adjustments to political change” (Graham, July 14, 1956). Under these conditions Graham conjectures whether or not, in light of public demonstra-
tions at Easter time, on May Day and in June, Castillo Armas might be asking himself: “How loyal is the army?”

According to Graham, two years into Castillo Armas’ leadership, the Guatemalan Bar Association was sensing a change in the politics of Guatemala. Graham recounts a prominent businessman’s observation that the “dictator’s prestige has never been lower” and that politicians who aren’t already committed to Castillo Armas wouldn’t go near him. The businessman goes on to venture that if United States’ support for Castillo Armas were to be withdrawn, then the government would collapse. Graham concludes his article by referring to Castillo Armas as the man who is regarded by both friends and enemies alike as the “chief instrument of Yankee intervention” (emphasis mine) (Graham, Nation, July 14, 1956).

Under these conditions it is not difficult to understand that President Castillo Armas was assassinated one year later, in 1957. The assassination took place in the National Palace and was carried out by one of his previous bodyguards. In response to the news, President Eisenhower announced that the assassination was a loss not only for Guatemala but for the world. He even sent his own son, John Eisenhower, to attend the funeral.

Guatemala Was Not Always Militarized

Richard N. Adams notes in his Crucifixion by Power: Essays on Guatemalan National Social Structure, 1944-1966, that the United States was a crucial ally of the Guatemalan military. He specifies support came from U.S. diplomatic, commercial and
military communities (Adams 1970, p 260). We have explored economic/commercial and diplomatic elements in the previous chapters. We will now consider the buildup of the military in Guatemala during this early Cold War period.

In looking at the military in Latin American countries, Adams counters the erroneous belief which many people hold that these nations had been under military governments ever since they gained their independences. In his view, this assumption obscures how fast the militaries of Latin American countries grew in more recent years. In the case of Guatemala, Adams clarifies that while Ubico was a dictator, this does not mean that Ubico’s was a military government (Adams 1970, p 238). In Adams’ assessment, the structure of the Guatemalan military after the Ubico regime developed, took on a new role in Guatemala–this with particular involvement by the United States (Adams 1970, p 238).

Before we consider this accelerated growth of the military in Guatemala, we will first look at the time period prior to World War II. According to Adams, it was during this time that there was a running feud between landowners and the military. Labor was in short supply during this time (Adams 1970, p 259). An accessible source of men was available in the rural labor force. Landowners needed laborers for use in their agricultural work. The Guatemalan army also needed men and preferred to draft these men into the military. Because of the competing needs, Adams asserts that at this time landowners viewed the military as a parasite (Adams 1970, p 259).

Cold War ideology soon brought the landowners and the military together as perceptions of a communist threat were projected onto Guatemala–this in spite of the claim by Immerman that the communist movement in Guatemala in the 1940s and 1950s
was actually weak. He discerns that by enacting anti-reform programs which were harmful to the Guatemalan masses, the efforts to reverse the reform movement had actually “fueled the very communist movement that the Eisenhower administration overestimated in 1954” (Immerman 1982, p 200).

Adams notes that the United States had worked semi-openly in Guatemalan government affairs since the time of Estrada Cabrera. One indicator of this was U.S. involvement in Guatemala’s Escuela Politécnica, its military academy. This academy is the place where future officials of the Guatemalan Army (Ejército de Guatemala) were trained. He points out that by the early 1930s this school was headed up by an American military officer (Adams 1970, p 260). The United States had been concerned about the defense of the Panama Canal during World War II and so it had a large military presence in Guatemala. U.S. military attachés and mission officers had been stationed in Guatemala since that time–even during the Ten Years of Spring (Adams 1970, p 260).

The military presence in Guatemala developed over time. This grew through what Adams calls the “assumption ofregnancy”. He describes this as part of growing corporateness and continuing politicization of the military in the affairs of government (Adams 1970, p 262-263) as the military took more responsibility in the ruling of the country. Military involvement was not new as Adams explains. Part of Guatemala’s recent past included using the army to augment the police, as well as a substitute for the police (Adams 1970, p 263). This demonstrates that the Guatemalan military was involved in leadership in the country in the past, and this participation increased since 1944 (Adams 1970, p 263-264).
There was not complete acceptance in Guatemala of U.S. influence however. Around the time that Arbenz was ousted from his Presidency, ambivalence began in the Guatemalan military toward the United States. During this period the Guatemalan military was becoming dependent upon a continued supply of U.S. arms and training, but this dependence ran counter to the nationalistic pride of Guatemalan military officers (Adams 1970, p 260). The military saw part of the problem through the manner in which Castillo Armas came to be the leader of Guatemala. Military members felt that they had played a major role in the collapse of Arbenz as they had refused to come to the aid of Arbenz during the liberation. Because of this, military personnel believed that they had the right to choose who would succeed Arbenz in the presidency. As was noted previously, the United States had not only handpicked Castillo Armas but it had orchestrated the coup which put him into power. This antagonized the Guatemalan military and especially the Liberation Army which was used to install Castillo Armas (Adams 1970, p 260-261). Even so, they realized that the United States supported Castillo Armas, and the army was dependent upon the United States as a source of aid.

Technical and material aid from the United States to Guatemala after the liberation caused drastic changes in the structure of the Guatemalan state. Jonas asserts that the United States was directly involved in this restructuring (Jonas 1991, p 57). The increasing military support from the United States altered the previously existing power structure. U.S. military expenditures in Guatemala allowed those entities who received this support to expand their power and internal control. This resulted in an increased role for the military in central government. What evolved was a class-based corporate state headed up by the bourgeoisie and the armed forces. Control by the bourgeoisie was
indirect while at the same time the armed forces came to dominate operation of the state (Jonas 1991, p 57). This new arrangement was designed to defend the interests of the bourgeoisie (including transnational capital) while using the support of the armed forces, some of whose upper echelons became part of the bourgeoisie.

**Counterinsurgency Begins**

Because of hopes and expectations which many Guatemalans had experienced during the Ten Years of Spring, history could not be reversed. Graham notes that the Arévalo-Arbenz administrations gave Guatemalan people a sense of worth and self-respect (Graham, *Nation*, July 14, 1956). Jonas discerns that the same structural dynamics and conditions which existed for the majority of the Guatemalan people, the conditions which had caused the Revolution, still existed in the post-1954 period (Jonas 2012, p 310). The majority Guatemalan population saw their hopes dashed while better conditions presented themselves for the large landowners and foreign companies. It was not difficult to understand how an insurgency would develop in response to the changing conditions in Guatemala.

Jonas describes two political imperatives of the counterrevolution: to enable conditions for private investment, and also to drive out and do away with possibilities of future mobilization by popular organizations (Jonas 1991, p 59). In order to subdue the masses from mobilizing, a massive counterinsurgency campaign was developed by Guatemalan military leaders, this again with the aid of the United States (Doyle and

Democratic institutions were militarized with nearly all of Guatemala’s presidents after 1954 coming from military backgrounds (Jonas 1991, p 61). Power came to be effectively held by the military. At the local level, Military Zones were established using “military commissioners”–many of whom were former army personnel. According to Jonas, each town had representatives which in turn were part of a larger network. In their new posts as paramilitary forces they were entrusted to safeguard the interests of the rural property owners (Jonas 1991, p 61-62). These people spied on the local population and carried out vigilante activities. The courts were militarized. With this militarization of politics, indirect rule was established for the Guatemalan bourgeoisie along with foreign investors (Jonas 1991, p 62). This was done using the private sector political representation of a coordinating committee called Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (Jonas 1991, p 62). According to Jonas this was top-down authoritarian representation and it excluded popular participation (Jonas 1991, p 62). Overall, the military came to be a leading force in governance. Jonas says that this resulted in the loss of democracy which in time was replaced with outright terror (Jonas 1991, p 62).

In looking at the funding of this system, Jonas observes that in the mid-1950s U.S. aid to foreign countries was not yet common (Jonas 1991, p 57). Adams reports that the United States didn’t give much military support to Guatemala during World War II or even up until Arbenz was deposed (Adams 1970, p 264). In looking at U.S. Department of Defense data regarding aid from the United States to Guatemala between 1956 and
1964, Adams notes that aid was considered relatively low at $0.4 million dollars until 1961. This was very early in the Guatemalan civil war (1960-1996). In 1962, U.S. aid more than tripled to $1.3 million, and that number doubled to $2.6 million in 1963. This is according to the United States Department of Defense. (Adams 1970, p 264: U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Assistance Facts*, 15 February 1965). Adams asserts that “it can hardly be a coincidence that the first time in recent Guatemalan history a military government has taken over the entire control of the country occurred after it had received some millions of dollars worth of equipment from the United States” (Adams 1970, p 264).

It is not within the scope of this thesis to chronicle the 36 years of the civil war. From previous chapters we can see a progression of U.S. intervention going from effects in economic and political areas of Guatemala, to now acknowledging official approval by the United States in funding of military operations in Guatemala. All of this took place within the context of the Cold War.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusions

This thesis has focused on effects of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. intervention on Guatemala in three areas: economic policy, Cold War rationale, and military operations. We have considered a number of perspectives on Guatemala-U.S. interactions in the mid-20th century. From these we will now look at the aforementioned three elements singularly and also collectively to determine if U.S. influence and intervention contributed to and facilitated the establishment of a counterinsurgency state in Guatemala.

Effects of U.S. Foreign Policy and Intervention

Economic and the 1954 Coup d’État. We will first assess U.S. influence and intervention surrounding the 1954 coup d’état in Guatemala. In reexamining the history of the coup with an eye toward U.S. intervention, Schlesinger and Kinzer use FOIA information to actually detail efforts by the United States to remove the Guatemalan revolutionary government. In the title of their book they even name this political action as an “American coup” (Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala). Of major concern for Schlesinger and Kinzer in looking at the deposing of
Arbenz during the coup were economic interests—most particularly interested parties in the United States like those of the United Fruit Company (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 19). Chalmers Johnson writes that the U.S. CIA planned and organized the 1954 military coup in Guatemala as a result of modest land reform which threatened U.S. corporations (Johnson 2000, p 13-14).

Johnson sees this as a “striking example of American imperial policies” in its backyard (Johnson 2000, p 13). Ronning’s assessment agrees with Johnson’s as he writes that Latin American states tried to protect themselves from intervention which was “protect(ing) powerful economic interests” in its “imperialistic designs” (Ronning 1961, p 250). The major country from which they were defending themselves against intervention is identified by Ronning as the United States. Guatemala is just one country which dealt with the problem of intervention in the Western Hemisphere.

The ideas of the man whom Smith identifies as the chief architect of the U.S. Soviet containment policy, George Kennan, acknowledged three goals of the United States. Latin America was considered by U.S. producers as a major potential export market, as well as an area for financial investment. Kennan noted the desire to protect what he already considered to be “our (emphasis mine) raw materials” (Smith 2008, p 121). These ideas underlay U.S. foreign policy and rationale for intervention in Guatemala.

One person with first-hand knowledge of both the coup and the economic effects of the United States on Guatemala was former President Juan Jose Arévalo, who served during the first years of the revolutionary period from 1945-1951. In the early 1960s
Arévalo wrote the book *The Shark and the Sardines*. In this book Arévalo characterizes Latin America as “easy prey” and the “immediate victim” of big business through the changing North America (Arévalo 1961, p 10). He mentions that Latin Americans were looked upon as “braceros” (Arévalo 1961, p 10-11) essentially day laborers or hired hands. Latin Americans, he said, were exploited with shrewdness, coldness, harshness and great arrogance (Arévalo 1961, p 11). He says that as a consequence of this, Latinos migrated to the North. Progress in Latin America was halted as the United States became great.

Arévalo says that Latin Americans have a different identity than the “businessman mentality” (Arévalo 1961, p 12) and because they are different, they want to be accepted as they are. With indignation he declares that “international treaties are a farce when they are pacted between a Shark and a sardine” (Arévalo 1961, p 13). This allegory regards the United States as the shark and Latin American countries as sardines. Arévalo denounces diplomatic systems which serve the interests of the shark. Likewise he denounces hemispheric legal devices which inevitably lead to imperialism. He says that the White House is subordinate to business and the U.S. military has been converted to being policemen for big business. He observes that wealth is siphoned out of the South to the North. Arévalo recognized–even in the early 1960s– that interests of millionaires in the United States are not necessarily even tied to the United States.

From the perspective of former Guatemalan President Arévalo and many scholars and news writers we can see that U.S. foreign policy and intervention in Guatemala’s economy and through the 1954 coup did indeed change and redirect the Guatemalan national government and as a result the lives of the Guatemalan people. The CIA
effectively removed the Arévalo government and replaced it with one headed by a leader of its own choosing—Castillo Armas. This change redirected governmental efforts away from priorities like revolutionary land and labor reforms, and toward efforts which could be more easily maneuvered. One such example is noted in Guatemala: Never Again! as it describes the Guatemalan Army’s strategy to “militarize the social fabric” (Guatemala: Never Again! 1999, p xxxiii) through forced recruitment of Guatemalans into Civilian Self-defense Patrols. The REHMI report states that this strategy “dragged the civilian population into war” as it militarized their daily lives. Regarding the impact of militarization the report indicates that “people’s lives were transformed into a battleground” (Guatemala: Never Again! 1999, p xxxiii).

Schlesinger and Kinzer contend, because of the coup, that in the long-run American interests were damaged in Guatemala. The authors write that antitrust legislation affected the United Fruit Company as in 1958 it accepted a consent decree and was thus forced to cut back on business in Guatemala and give up some of its land (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, 229). It also had to give up ownership in the railroad. Ultimately, the United Fruit Company sold the rest of its land holdings to the Del Monte corporation. By the 1970s UFCO merged into United Brands Company (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, 229). I would seem that the effects of UFCO on the Guatemalan economy and internal politics outlived the company itself.

**Cold War and Communist Containment.** This section will include an assessment of the effects of U.S. foreign policy and intervention on Guatemala through Cold War rhetoric. Part of the title of Immerman’s book about Guatemala indicates that
its subject matter deals with the CIA and U.S. “Foreign Policy of Intervention”. In this book the author provides background on U.S. foreign interests and Latin American policy within the framework of the Cold War. Through the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, Immerman assesses the road to intervention.

Diplomatic historian Cullather says it was Cold War concerns which convinced President Eisenhower to have another President–Arbenz– forcefully removed from office through Operation PBSUCCESS (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 5). Peter H. Smith looks at U.S. political leadership in the Americas during this time. In his book he recognizes that Latin America was turned into a “battleground” through conflicts between capitalism and communism (Smith 2008, p 113).

Johnson recognizes that it was both superpowers which used Cold War rhetoric to try to justify their actions against smaller states (Johnson 2000, p 27). Ronning also observes the use of Cold War propaganda by both the United States and the USSR as they each professed a life of abundance under their respective political and economic systems (Ronning 1961, p 259).

Clearly there is agreement that Cold War policies had much to do with some of the changes in the governance of Guatemala. This can be attested to in Guatemala Memory of Silence. The Conclusions section of the report writes of underlying causes of armed confrontation, and follows that up with information on the role of the United States through the Cold War and National Security Doctrine. According to the report, the United States provided support for strong military regimes in what it considered to be its strategic backyard (Guatemala Memory of Silence, 1999, Conclusions I. 13). With respect to Guatemala, the report says that U.S. training was provided for the Guatemalan
military officer corps in counterinsurgency techniques. Military assistance reinforced the Guatemalan intelligence apparatus. The report concludes that these were key factors in human rights violations throughout the armed confrontation (Guatemala Memory of Silence, 1999, Conclusions I. 13).

Guatemala was but one of many countries which was affected by U.S. anticommunist rhetoric (Johnson 2000, p 27). Johnson writes of the existence of propaganda apparatuses which disguised the “true roots of revolt” from their own people. He goes further and contends that the idea of communism in Central America is “essentially absurd” (Johnson 2000, p 27). Smith’s ideas are similar as he asserts that the fear of a “Soviet menace” was one which was greatly exaggerated (Smith 2008, 114).

**Militarization of Guatemala.** In looking at the expanding role of the Guatemalan military in the mid-20th century, Adams reviews conditions which contributed to this increase. One such condition was the technical and military aid from the U.S. military. This aid increased the power of the Guatemalan central government (Adams 1970, p 263-264). As was detailed previously by Adams, during World War II and the years before Arbenz was deposed, the United States gave relatively little support to the military establishment in Guatemala. Changes in U.S. rationale for involvement were soon to come.

Adams observes that in 1959, according to the Mutual Security Act, if internal security of Latin American countries was involved, Presidential approval was necessary as the basis of military assistance programs. The improvement of internal national security in Latin American countries was actually one method the United States used in
its anti-communist efforts. In looking at changing rationale for U.S. military assistance programs to Latin America, Adams reports that in 1964 the State Department now understood that “. . . this administration is seeking to orient the military assistance program in Latin America away from the outmoded concept of hemispheric defense toward greater emphasis on meeting the internal subversive threat” (Adams 1970, p 264-265).

Military expenditures show documented increases, as seen through the doubling of U.S. aid to Guatemala from 1960 to 1961, its tripling between 1961 to 1962, and doubling again from 1962 to 1963 (Adams 1970, p 264, U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Assistance Facts, 15 February 1965*). Through this we see a shifting of rationale and increase in involvement in the internal affairs of Guatemala. This shifting U.S. rationale from anti-communist rhetoric, to what was then considered “internal subversive threat(s),” is representative of U.S. foreign policy and intervention in Guatemala. This was U.S. involvement not only in deposing the leader of Guatemala, but now in the internal governance of that country.

In considering the Cold War within the Third World, Kennedy examines the arms race between the two blocs and the resultant creation of military alliances to support either side (Kennedy 1987, p 383). This U.S.-Soviet rivalry created a competition to find new partners, or alternatively to prevent Third World countries from allying themselves with the other competing power (Kennedy 1987, p 388). In Kennedy’s view, in the years after World War II, America was more involved in this activity than the USSR. This he attributed to what he said was a U.S. advantage over the USSR in that the Soviets were then occupied in a post-war rebuilding mode.
Smith writes of Kennan’s conception of U.S. goals to prevent military exploitation of Latin America by whomever the United States considered to be its enemy (Smith 2008, p 121). Within these efforts the United States placed increasing emphasis on establishing contacts within the militaries of Latin American countries. The United States used its anti-communist stance to institutionalize military and political alliances within the Americas. In so doing, Arévalo claimed that the military apparatus manipulated a new system of local “revolutions” (Arévalo 1961, p 11). He posits that these were financed by Wall Street or the White House, which he viewed to have evolved to become one and the same. If people tried to deal with the companies or the bankers, Arévalo contended that the U.S. response was to send in the Marines.

In regards to Latin America as part of the Third World, Smith notes the United States acted both from the outside and also through interventions inside domestic politics of Latin American nations. Implicit in this was the understanding that Latin American countries would simply have to accept change to ensure their own survival (Smith 2008, p 134). Leadership in the United States alleged that revolution could potentially lead to Marxist/communist gain; Guatemala was one country in which the United States preferred to prevent revolution. Smith maintains that the U.S. Government emphasized that Latin American countries were to accept the notion of gradual reform and not revolution. Revolution was seen by leadership in the United States as dangerous, as it destroyed political institutions and upset social order (Smith 2008, p 134).

Morgenthau also recognized the foreign policy goal of the United States to maintain the status quo. In his letter to the New York Times editor, Morgenthau wrote that the United States had become the “foremost counterrevolutionary status quo power on
earth” (*New York Times*, October 10, 1974, p 46). Likewise Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff put forth that the intention of national policies is to seek to preserve the status quo (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 77). They note that Morgenthau gives the Monroe Doctrine as an example of a policy which was designed to maintain the status quo balance in the Western hemisphere (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 78).

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff write that national policies are also designed to achieve expansion through imperialism (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 77). Kennedy states that western imperialists accepted nationalism and self-determination for certain countries and “civilized” people (e.g. eastern Europeans) but these principles were not acceptable where the “imperialist powers extended their territories and held down independence movements” (Kennedy 1987, p 392). Guatemala is not alone as a country in which the United States extended its influence as it held down popular efforts toward independence and reforms.

Schlesinger and Kinzer’s work chronicles Guatemala-U.S. history in what they deem to be some of the earliest uses of the U.S. CIA clandestine bureaucracy (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p xii). They describe how National Security objectives were said to be directed against communist encroachment in the Western hemisphere, and also toward promoting democratic ideologies within (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p xii). In contrast to this presumption of promotion of democratic ideals, Morgenthau describes the United States as “repression’s friend” (Morgenthau, *New York Times*, October 10, 1974, p 46). In the *New York Times* Morgenthau writes that since the end of World War II the United States had intervened “on behalf of conservative and fascist repression against revolution and radical reform”. Smith acknowledges what he calls the exaggerated fear
of the “Soviet menace” as being used by the United States to crush leftist and communist governments. In so doing it collaborated with and supported authoritarian regimes (Smith 2008, 113-114).

In looking at historical roots of what later turned into armed confrontation in Guatemala, the Commission for Historical Clarification surmised that the Cold War and U.S. National Security Doctrine “fed the armed confrontation” and militarization of the Guatemalan state and society (Guatemala Memory of Silence, 1999, Conclusions I. 13, 14 and 37). Immerman denotes the irony and legacy of the CIA’s PBSUCCESS as that of actually producing the guerrilla struggle (Immerman 1982, p 200). He concludes that through U.S. anti-communist policies, cold warriors had “returned to power the very elements of society that had created the conditions that the 1944 revolution had tried to eradicate” (Immerman 1982, p 197-198). Chomsky writes of U.S. engineering of the 1954 coup, which restored military rule, and resulted in Guatemala turning into what he calls a literal hell on earth.

From this it can be observed that U.S. foreign policy and intervention influences interplayed in political, economic, ideological and military aspects in Guatemala. In her analysis of various U.S. interventions, Jonas points out that Central America is regarded as part of the U.S. “backyard” and as such U.S. military and economic interests are enabled through the power structures of those countries (Jonas 1991, p 8). Jonas’ analysis uses strong language in describing U.S. intervention and foreign policy in Guatemala. She asserts that the United States made Guatemala into “a test case of its ability to suppress social revolution in Latin America”. Guatemalan history from 1954 to the 1980s is described by Jonas as a “laboratory of counterrevolution” (Jonas 1991, p 9).
points out that for decades U.S. power played an essential role in Guatemala (Jonas 1991, p 6). Jonas identifies three protagonists in Guatemala: the “rebels”, the “death squads” who operate as part of the official security forces, and the United States (Jonas 1991, p 6).

Author Chomsky claims that the United States provided direct military assistance and thereby facilitated those who tortured, murdered and brutalized the Guatemalan people (Chomsky 1985, p 33). He emphasizes that Elliott Abrams actually blamed the violence “on the guerrillas who were fighting the government” (Chomsky 1985, p 32). Many Guatemalans fled to Mexico at the time and he reflects that the consequent violence and resultant mass of people seeking refuge from the violence were the “price of stability” (Chomsky 1985, p 32). Chomsky notes that the U.S. State Department reported that democracy was on track, even in light of Americas Watch observations that assassinations had doubled and abductions had quadrupled in Guatemala at the time (Chomsky 1985, p 32).

As Jennifer Schirmer looks at Guatemala from 1944 and moving toward the 1970s, she sees a change in the Guatemalan military’s purpose going from internal and external defense, to becoming the “locus of state power” (Schirmer 1998, p 7-8). In her chapter on A Military View of Law and Security, Schirmer notes that “law, like ideology, serves a belief system and interests about the proper order of things” (Schirmer 1998, p 125). She maintains that law can be used toward justice just as it can be used to invent institutions which oppress. In dealing with political conflict, law can be used two ways. Schirmer writes that it can be used coercively “to limit and absorb conflict to preserve the status quo” or it can be used persuasively “to absorb or limit political conflict while presenting a rule-of-law image internationally” (Schirmer 1998, 125-126). Militaries and
nation-states can use conceptions of law both domestically and internationally to try to legitimate their activity. This thesis has demonstrated such a use of conceptions in attempts to legitimate U.S. foreign policy and intervention in Guatemala which ultimately affected the internal governance of that sovereign nation.

**U.S. Intervention: Not the Only Factor, But an Essential Factor**

It is clear from official documentation that U.S. foreign policy, intervention and provision of military expenditures and expertise were instrumental in moving Guatemala along its path toward civil war. This is not to say that involvement by the United States was the sole reason. During this time many countries were looking for economic and military support from Washington (Kennedy 1987, p 388). Even so, Kennedy observes that at this same time the Third World was coming of age, as they were ridding themselves of the control of previous European empires. Many of these countries did not want to become “mere satellites of a distant superpower, even if the latter could provide useful economic and military aid” (Kennedy 1987, p 392). As leadership was changed in Guatemala, so did the perspective of people in power as to whether they wanted to receive economic or military support from Washington. Leadership which followed that of Arévalo and Arbenz took its own direction, and so it is important to note that U.S. foreign policy and intervention could hardly have been carried out without the participation of Guatemalan nationals. That is not to downplay activity by the United States which was not the only factor, but was an essential factor.

In regards to U.S. intervention there is nothing more convincing than an actual
admission. It doesn’t get any clearer than a U.S. Ambassador actually admitting, and admitting with pride, that he and a team of U.S. Government representatives intentionally intervened to overthrow the government of the sovereign nation of Guatemala. This can easily be seen in U.S. Senate Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, in regards to the “Communist Threat to the United States through the Caribbean” (U.S. Senate, 1961: 865-866). In this investigation, American Ambassador to Honduras, Whiting Willauer admitted that he worked with U.S. Ambassadors from Costa Rica and Nicaragua, CIA operatives, and other U.S. high-ranking officers on a “team in working to overthrow the Arbenz government” (U.S. Senate, 1961: 865-866). He testified that efforts toward the coup were based in Honduras, and part of his duties were to keep Honduran leadership “in line”—that is, to allow the revolutionary activity to continue, lest Honduras also be overthrown. A New York Times article dated June 20, 1954 also notes regional cooperation in what Guatemalan Foreign Minister Toriello refers to as U.S.-supported “aggression”. Toriello states that “Honduras and Nicaragua were guilty of aiding and abetting the attack” (Szulc June 20, 1954, New York Times). According to Bowen, Willauer worked to maintain hostility between the governments of Guatemala and Honduras.

In Willauer’s testimony about his efforts in assisting in U.S. anti-communist efforts, Willauer proudly boasted of the role he played in the overthrow of the Guatemalan Government. As part of this Investigation, CIA archived excerpts note in a July 27, 1962 hearing, Willauer bragged that he received a telegram from CIA Director Allen Dulles in which he told Willauer “in effect that the revolution could not have
succeeded but for what I did”. Willauer also acknowledged receipt of another telegram from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles which complimented him on his work (U.S. Senate, 1961: 865-866).

**Sovereignty Is Important**

We have previously identified and defined several Political Science and International Relations concepts. From Ronning’s definitions we understand that sovereignty of the individual nation-state is considered to be an absolute right, one which seeks to ensure full interior autonomy and independence from external forces (Ronning 1961, p 252). The Sixth International Conference of American States (1928) is clear: “No state has a right to interfere in the internal affairs of another” (Ronning 1961, p 251). Intervention in another nation-state is understood to be a threat to its independence. “If that right is not consecrated and is not protected in absolute form, international juridical harmony does not exist” (Ronning 1961, p 252).

From the various authors in this thesis, we have seen the interplay and negative effects of the United States on the Guatemalan economy, effects of Cold War rhetoric and ideology, and the effects of U.S. military aid on Guatemala. U.S. foreign policy and intervention did indeed affect the governance of the sovereign nation of Guatemala. Ronning goes as far as to allege that American governments are “well aware that they are breaking the law when they resort to intervention” (Ronning 1961, p 269), this in spite of his belief that American governments do regard principles of non-intervention as fundamental to the inter-American system.
In consideration of these non-intervention principles, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff posit that even Morgenthau, one of the founding fathers of realism, “could envisage no conception of national interest that would condone policies of mass extermination, torture, and the indiscriminate slaughter of civilian populations in war” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 77). Results from unbiased international organizations which have investigated the civil war have concluded that Guatemala was a case of genocide wherein the majority of the killing was of innocent civilians, and was committed by the official Guatemalan Government. This is attested to in Guatemala: Never Again! as it compares its REMHI findings with those of the 1999 CEH, “Guatemala Memory of Silence” report. REHMI demonstrates disproportionate blame as it assigns 89.7 percent of the atrocities to the Guatemalan Government forces and their allied paramilitary bands, and 4.8 percent to the guerrillas (Guatemala: Never Again! 1999, p xvi). The CEH report attributes 93 percent of the atrocities to government forces/paramilitary bands, with only three percent to the guerrillas. This Official Report of the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala points out further that acts of genocide were targeted against Mayan communities (Guatemala: Never Again! 1999, p xvi). The REHMI report explains that we have come to know this information because of a decision made by the U.S. administration to declassify and release sensitive documents. From these documents, the REHMI report identifies the “unhelpful role of certain U.S. agencies during the war” (Guatemala: Never Again! 1999, p xvi).

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff theorize that Morgenthau believed that ethics could restrain political conduct. Their analysis posits that if international politics are framed in
terms of power, in Morgenthau’s own words “we are able to judge other nations as we judge our own” (Morgenthau 1978, p 11). Contrary to this, we have seen that during the mid-20th century the United States helped to set up and to support the Guatemalan State, from which the CEH report concludes:

“At no time during the internal armed confrontation did the guerrilla groups have the military potential necessary to pose an imminent threat to the State. The number of insurgent combatants was too small to be able to compete in the military arena with the Guatemalan Army, which had more troops and superior weaponry, as well as better training and coordination” (Guatemala Memory of Silence, 1999, Conclusions I. 24).

The Guatemalan Army was provided much of this training and weaponry by the United States. From this we can understand that the United States, in looking after its own sovereignty and national security, was complicit in the denial of these same principles to the majority civilian population in Guatemala.

What Can Be Done With This Knowledge?

Chomsky puts forth that America tends to denounce the crimes of those it views as enemies, even while it dismisses or attempts to justify its own crimes (Chomsky 1985, p 2). He asks us to be honest about relations between the United States and what he calls our southern neighbors. Chomsky is straightforward in his assessment that many people live in self-deceit. He is hopeful that we can become cognizant that our actions may contribute to oppression and misery elsewhere, resulting from “longstanding geopolitical conceptions and institutional structures” (Chomsky 1985, p 2). In Chomsky’s view we can learn truth about who we are and how we affect the world (Chomsky 1985, p 1). He
has faith that those of us who have access to wealth and privilege, who can act freely without fear of state terror, can help to bring about change to policies and institutions (Chomsky 1985, p 1).

Following are examples of how people may inform themselves about effects of U.S. foreign policy and intervention in Guatemala specifically. First, in considering the immigration of certain groups to the United States, historical assessment and a recognition of the effects of U.S. foreign policy could shed much light on why they came and when they came. Measurement of trends of migration from Guatemala since the 1954 “liberation” and through the decades since that time could perhaps indicate causality in the growing population of Guatemalans in the United States. Statistical Census data from the United States, and Mexico, and other countries where there are large populations of Guatemalans, could provide insight into what was happening concurrently—politically and economically—in Guatemala as people left that country. Are these Guatemalans economic migrants or are they war refugees? Could these immigrants be considered as part of what Johnson defines as “blowback”, that is, “unintended consequences of policies that were kept secret from the American people” (Johnson 2000, p 8)? A news release from the U.S. Census Bureau with results of the 2010 U.S. Census indicates that the Guatemalan population in the United States now surpasses one million people (U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau News, May 26, 2011). Answers to questions such as the aforementioned would be valuable and necessary for Americans to have in order to engage in informed, responsible and honest discussions about immigration reform. The same type of investigation could be done through analysis of the effects of regional trade agreements on migration over time.
The second example comes from historical information available only since early 1999 regarding Guatemala during its civil war, which deals with numerous documents which were declassified by the U.S. Government from the independent Historical Clarification Commission. Some of these documents indicate U.S. involvement and intervention in the internal affairs of Guatemala leading up to and throughout the civil war. About a month after the release of this information, U.S. President Bill Clinton visited Guatemala City. While there he addressed the Guatemalan people with the following words:

“It is important that I state clearly that support for military forces or intelligence units which engaged in violent and widespread repression of the kind described in the (Truth Commission) report was wrong.” “And the United States must not repeat that mistake” (Kettle, *The Guardian* March 11, 1999).

With these words President Clinton personally acknowledged and admitted wrongful acts by the United States to the people of Guatemala. Even with this admission, the American general public today seems unaware of U.S. involvement in Guatemalan internal affairs during the mid-20th century.

It seems prudent for us as Americans to educate ourselves with details of historical events which were not available to us—or were perhaps hidden from us, according to some scholars—at the time they were happening. Like truth and reconciliation commissions, we must first acknowledge what actually happened, before we can move forward productively to work for principled and just change to policies and institutions, as Chomsky envisions. Let us begin with honesty and a willingness to learn.
WORKS CITED


