Tampa Bay History

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On the cover: “Spanish spy captured by the ‘Guasites,’” by William J. Glackens. Glackens was one of many illustrators hired by newspaper and magazine publishers to cover the buildup to the Spanish-American War, as well as the actual war in Cuba, in 1898. Glackens drew this unpublished sketch in Tampa, though the exact location is unknown. (Courtesy of the Library of Congress)
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Welcome to the first re-issue of *Tampa Bay History*. The Tampa Bay History Center, in partnership with the University of South Florida Libraries’ Florida Studies Center, is proud to bring about the return of this wonderful publication. The original *Tampa Bay History* was published biannually, from 1979 to 1998, by the USF History Department. Longtime editors Robert Ingalls and Gary Mormino published the journal largely on their own, with valuable department office staff assistance.

The journal’s new team is headed by editor Rodney Kite-Powell, the Tampa Bay History Center’s Saunders Foundation Curator of History. Mark I. Greenberg, History Center Board of Trustees member and Director of USF Libraries’ Florida Studies Center and Special Collections Department, serves as the book review editor, and Andrew Huse, Assistant Librarian with Special Collections and Florida Studies Center, is the assistant editor.

Creation of the new journal’s editorial board was our first priority. The board consists of twelve scholars, all leaders in their respective areas of Florida history, anthropology or archaeology: Jack Davis, James M. Denham, Paul Dosal, Maxine Jones, Robert Kerstein, Joe Knetsch, Jerald Milanich, Gary Mormino, Susan Parker, Cheryl Rodriguez, Aaron Smith, and Doris Weatherford.

The next step was to establish what kind of content we wanted for the journal. In this we followed the path of the original, in that articles will cover a wide range of topics, including social, political and environmental history, archaeology, anthropology and geography. Though we will focus on the Tampa Bay area, we also want to extend into what is termed “Historic” Hillsborough County, the roughly twenty-county area included within the original 1834 boundaries of Hillsborough County.

Four essays, each focusing on a different aspect of the region’s history, are featured in this issue. The first is by Thom Foley, winner of the 2007 Leland Hawes Essay Prize in Florida History for best graduate paper. Foley’s award-winning essay on the Tampa Bypass Canal provides the reader with a unique perspective on the status of the Hillsborough River and on water management issues – issues that become more important as the state’s population continues to climb towards 20 million people.
The second article, by Rosanna Ensley, focuses on the first ten years of the Gasparilla festival. Ensley’s examination of the formative years of the Tampa tradition builds on previous narratives, exploring the people and events with a fresh perspective.

Chris Day looks at an often neglected chapter of Florida’s World War II history in his piece on civil defense and the Florida motorcycle corps. The corps and its founder, Guy Allen, helped protect the state from the perceived threat of a Nazi attack. Day’s article gives proper attention to this statewide effort. The forth article is written by editorial board member Joe Knetsch. Knetsch has studied the Spanish – American War for many years and has pulled together an amazing and diverse collection of sources for his most recent study on the late 19th century conflict. Readers familiar with local history will recognize Knetsch’s attention to detail and meticulous research skills at work in this piece.

Mark Greenberg has assembled an interesting selection of book reviews. In addition to the reviews, readers will be able to learn of the newest releases in local and state history in our “books in brief” section. Both of these sections will be regular fixtures within the pages of *Tampa Bay History*.

We are actively seeking submissions for our next publication. As was the case with the original *Tampa Bay History*, we want to produce a quality, scholarly publication that is of interest to a diverse audience. To that end, we will follow the guidelines established by the editors in 1979 — that “academics write so that nonprofessionals could read and enjoy their work and that nonacademic historians [or experts in other fields] meet scholarly standards for documentation.”

Like all worthwhile endeavors, production of this journal could not have been completed without the help of many people. First among them is Elizabeth Dunham, the History Center’s Director of Public Programs. Her support was indispensable. History Center Collections Manager Travis Puterbaugh also provided invaluable assistance. I would also be remiss if I did not thank copy editor Susan Brady and graphics guru Bill Wilson for the help and support they provided me during my first effort at editing a journal.

A special thank you goes out to our members and supporters. We appreciate all you do in support of our efforts to bring regional history to life.

*Rodney Kite-Powell*
Once upon a time, the rhythms of Florida’s Hillsborough River were tolerated and endured by those living within range of the waterway’s expansive floodplain. For most of the twentieth century, the residents of Tampa, Temple Terrace, and surrounding communities were subjected to the regular flooding of the Hillsborough River. Draining an immense river valley, the Hillsborough funneled accumulated waters through the midst of an ever-growing metropolis. Once, rainy spells and hurricane seasons resulted in frequent urban flooding. Wet years produced worse floods, but even in dry times a significant tropical blow or hurricane pushed the river up over its banks, sending tannin-hued water streaming through the streets of Seminole Heights, Sulphur Springs, and the environs of Tampa. The modern era of flood-control systems and regional water management, initiated in the aftermath of Hurricane Donna in 1960, has rendered the seasonal swells of the natural river a historical memory. A sketch of the successful taming of the Hillsborough River—and how Tampa became a city on a moat—explains how area residents have achieved the luxury of ignoring the river that once dominated the city, and how, at the same time,
another watercourse was transformed into an ecological nightmare, a regional version of the Kissimmee River syndrome writ small.

The Hillsborough River forms of rain and seepage and gravity-fed rivulets in the Green Swamp, the 870-square-mile water-warehouse that straddles west central Florida between Orlando and Tampa. The marshes, uplands, low-lying flatlands, and hardwood hammocks of the Green Swamp are also the birthplace of three other major river systems in addition to the Hillsborough, each radiating toward opposing compass points: the Withlacoochee to the north, the Ocklawaha to the northeast, and the long Peace River flowing southward, stretching to the Gulf at Charlotte Harbor. The Hillsborough percolates southwest out of this river-generating swamp, winding some 54 miles to Tampa, then turning south to pour through the heart of the city into Hillsborough Bay and eventually Tampa Bay and the Gulf of Mexico. Along its course, the rural portion of the river weaves through the woodlands of Polk, Pasco, and Hillsborough Counties, where many small streams and five major tributaries join its steady flow. Crystal Springs adds about 40 million gallons a day to the growing waterway, before sending it rolling west past Hillsborough River State Park, near Thonotosassa, toward the long, sweeping curve that allows the river to descend into Tampa.
After arching east around the neighborhoods of Temple Terrace, the Hillsborough widens into the U-shaped Tampa City Reservoir, formed by a dam at Rowlett Park, some five river-miles ahead. The approximately 1,300-acre reservoir can hold up to 1.6 million gallons and has served as Tampa’s primary source of drinking water since it was constructed in the mid-1920s. Below the reservoir, the Hillsborough broadens into an urban river, influenced by the tides of distant Tampa Bay. The Hillsborough concludes its run from swamp to bay past some of Tampa’s oldest residential and industrial areas, below new and historic bridges, growing wider and deeper as it moves south. Root-stabilized riverbanks modulate slowly into erosion-mitigating piles of rocks and masonry blocks, and finally into the cement seawalls that contain the river as it passes through what a journalist once described as the “densely packed canyons of commerce” of downtown Tampa.1

Southwest Florida Water Management District records indicate that particularly intense flooding of the Hillsborough occurred in 1921, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1945, 1947, 1959, and 1960. Most were associated with tropical storms or hurricanes, and sometimes resulted in loss of life and damage to structures, property, and roads. The Hillsborough river basin, including its major tributaries—Blackwater Creek, Cypress Creek, New River, Trout Creek, and Flint Creek—channel the water of some 675 square miles of forested Florida toward and through the city of Tampa.2

The Hillsborough River’s varied names, flowing backward through time, speak to the long history of human interaction with the waterway. The contemporary designation of the river—and county—honors Lord Hillsborough, Britain’s colonial secretary in the late 1760s, and was bestowed during that nation’s brief reign over East and West Florida. To the Seminoles, this dark persistent stream was dubbed Lockcha-Popka-Chiska—river one crosses to eat acorns. To don Francisco Maria Celi, a pilot of the Spanish Royal Fleet who sailed into Tampa Bay to chart its waters in 1757, the heavily forested river was the Rio de San Julian y Arriaga. To Hernando de Soto and other Spanish explorers in the sixteenth century, the stream may have been Mocoso. History does not record what the Tocobagan or Timucuan peoples—or their aboriginal ancestors—called this dynamic river system, but evidence of human use dates to late Paleo-Indian times, some ten thousand years ago, when the ecosystem of the region was that of a vast, wet prairie.3

Within a half dozen years after the 1824 establishment of Fort Brooke on the eastern bank of the mouth of the Hillsborough River, settlers had found their way to Six Mile Creek. The accurately named stream flows six miles northeast of the nascent military fort, on the direct path that would take one to what is now Plant City and points inland. The creek drained from a forest of oak, pine, and palm, past the properties of the Collar and Dixon families, who in 1828 had transferred their homesteads from the Hillsborough River’s western bank to the relative seclusion of Six Mile Creek. The stream meandered gently south into what would one day be called Palm River, then flowed west into the waters of today’s McKay Bay. Seven years later, in December 1835, as tensions between settlers and Seminoles escalated rapidly toward war, the early settlers along Six Mile Creek barely escaped an avenging war party of Seminoles—by poling their boats down the creek. The hapless Dixon and Collar families survived to watch from a distance as the Indians set fire to their homes.⁴

Julia Daniels Moseley, an Illinois “transplant” to Florida in 1882—the same year that Fort Brooke was deactivated—visited Six Mile Creek in May of that year and described her impressions of the place in one of the many letters she wrote to a lifelong friend back in Illinois: “There were tall palms with some trunks bare and smooth, others full of the broken stems and they, in their decay, are such a medley of soft tints—delicate pinks, deep reds and soft browns, often covered with moss and tall ferns and air plants growing among them.” Moseley rhapsodized over the Six Mile Creek hammock, with its “Old cedars, bushes of lantana in bloom, scarlet honeysuckle, and thousands of yards of trumpet vines trailing in wild abundance down the moss grown paths.”⁵

Within three decades, descriptions of the area included the trappings of increased settlement. In 1992, Tampa resident Neva Scruggs Ennis published an article in the Tampa Tribune that recounted her childhood memories of Six Mile Creek in the years 1915–17.

Traveling six miles east from Tampa by Seventh Avenue (Broadway) through Ybor City, through Gary, passing Bryan’s and Litsey’s Corner, then passing farms, pastures, and dairies, you would arrive at Six Mile Creek. You would cross the creek on a narrow wooden bridge with iron framework; if you stayed on this road for 14 more miles you would be in Plant City. My grandparents, Gus and Molly Scruggs, lived in a large, two-story house with several acres north of the road and west of the creek. A picket fence enclosed the sandy yard, shaded by large oaks.⁶

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⁴ Canter Brown Jr., Tampa before the Civil War (Tampa: University of Tampa Press, 1999), 31, 48.
Six Mile Creek was still an untouched stream when this postcard was made in the early 20th century. The creek, as it appears in this postcard, no longer exists. It is now a part of the Tampa Bypass Canal system.
Ennis’s description of the location of her grandparents’ property on Six Mile Creek—considering that it was a nearly eighty-year-old reminiscence—was remarkably precise. Hillsborough County Plat records from 1916 document the location of the Scruggs property exactly as she recounted, “north of the road” (Seventh Avenue today becomes Broadway and later Columbus Drive) and “west of the creek,” which on contemporary maps is in the vicinity of U.S. 301. That section of Six Mile Creek no longer flows past the former Scruggs property.7

The bucolic character of Six Mile Creek described by Julia Daniels Moseley and Neva Scruggs Ennis would fade, of course, as developing Tampa impressed itself upon the landscape. The wilderness hammock of Moseley and the pastures and farms of Ennis would be absorbed by twentieth-century urban growth. The grid, development, roads and highways, sewers, electricity and telephones, neighborhoods, industrial plants, strip-stores, malls, and other accruements of urbanity would eventually erase the natural setting these women described. But the water of Six Mile Creek—for the first six decades of the century—continued to meander east of Tampa, flowing south into Palm River, then west into the bay. The winds of change that would seal the fate of this watercourse would not blow across Florida until 1960.

Hurricane Donna, spinning a trail of ruin and wreckage across the state late in the summer of 1960, has often been cited as the pivotal event that launched the modern era of water management in Florida. The timing of Donna—as well as weather patterns that preceded the tempest—likely played as much a role as did the storm itself. When Donna crossed Florida in early September 1960, the hurricane arrived at the end of a six-year pendulumlike swing of weather extremes for the Sunshine State. For three years, 1954–56, Florida baked in a severe and extended drought. Then, moving from one extreme to the other, the three years preceding Donna, 1957–60, were among the wettest ever recorded. Total rainfall for 1959, for instance, increased substantially from a yearly average of 54 inches to a record-setting 88 inches in the Tampa Bay area. Only two months of that soggy wet year offered less than normal rainfall figures, February and November, and for six months, January, March, April, May, June, and October, more than double the usual amount of rain drenched Florida’s west central coast. May was particularly wet, with eleven rain days during the second half of the month. June witnessed the heaviest one-day rainfall of the year on May 18, when nearly 5.5 inches fell on the city, and July offered twenty-seven days of thunderstorms. On August 19, National Guard troops were ordered to assist flood-relief efforts in north Tampa’s Forest Hills area, where some fifty families were evacuated. The St. Petersburg Times, in an early 1960 analysis of the previous year’s weather, reported that Weather Bureau records dating to 1890 indicated the period from July 6 to August 25 was the longest on record in terms of continuous days of rain.8

7 Hillsborough County Plat Book, 1916 (Plat of Township 29 South, Range 19 East), 50.
In mid-March 1960, some six months before Hurricane Donna, a four-day deluge hammered central Florida from Tampa Bay to the Atlantic. The press reported 25 inches of rain falling on one area of Pasco County, north of Tampa. Other sections of the Tampa Bay area received 15 to 20 inches of rain during the four-day inundation. Dozens of roads in Hillsborough, Pinellas, Polk, and Pasco Counties were washed out by the downpour. U.S. 301 was underwater south of Zephyrhills. The Hillsborough River, already near capacity, burst its banks, and a 30-foot breach in a flood-control levee at Lake Magdalene, less than 3 miles northwest of Temple Terrace, released floodwaters that spread over 8 square miles. Initial overflow was kept to a minimum by the suction of an outgoing tide, but when floodwaters later met an incoming tide, 1,500 people were forced to abandon their homes. In the Forest Hills region near Lake Magdalene, some 800 people were evacuated. It would be three more days before the swollen Hillsborough reached its crest. By then another break in the Lake Magdalene levee flooded another section of the sodden city, sending river water along streets to depths of 4 feet. Before it was over, the March 1960 flood, called the worst since 1933, saw nearly 8,000 Hillsborough County residents evacuated from their homes.9

Six months later, in early August—a month before Hurricane Donna—rains from tropical storm Brenda again filled the Hillsborough River, which spilled into some sixty homes along the watercourse. The next day, when flashboards reinforcing a dam north of the business district collapsed, about one hundred families had to be evacuated from their riverfront homes.10 By the time Hurricane Donna began swirling into shape off the Atlantic coast of Africa, Hillsborough County and its extensive drainage basin were saturated.

On Monday, September 5, a month after tropical storm Brenda passed across Florida, Gordon Dunn of the Miami Weather Bureau issued a warning that a powerful storm headed for Puerto Rico—with winds upwards of 140 miles per hour—was following the same path as two of the most destructive hurricanes that had ever struck Florida, the hurricanes of 1926 and 1928. Red Cross officials were dispatched to Puerto Rico, Miami, and Wilmington, North Carolina. On Tuesday, the hurricane—now named Donna—struck Puerto Rico, leaving a reported 102 dead in its path. The *New York Times* reported that forecasters hoped the storm would shift northward and spin into the Atlantic. Despite forecasters’ hopes, in the early hours of Saturday, September 10, Donna clobbered the Florida Keys city of Marathon. A Navy convoy, battling intense winds and rain, found utter destruction at Marathon at 9 a.m. that morning. The city of Key West, less than fifty miles to the southwest of Marathon, escaped with minor wind damage.11

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Donna careened through Florida. After colliding with the Keys, the storm swung northwest to unleash a tempest upon Everglades City, Naples, and Fort Myers, then turned northward, inland, brushing past Sarasota and St. Petersburg. The gale turned again, hard to the northeast, whipping across the spine of Florida to the east coast, near Daytona, where it moved over the open water of the Atlantic. Donna left a brutal trail of damage in her wake. Ft. Myers was without electricity, cut off from the world after midnight Saturday. The roof blew off the National Guard Armory in Dade City, where more than 150 evacuees were sheltered. Among the cities hardest hit were Venice, Punta Gorda, Sarasota, Bradenton, St. Petersburg, Clearwater, Bartow, Winter Haven, Dade City, and Lakeland, where winds of 100 miles per hour were reported. Some forty thousand people were evacuated from low areas along the gulf before Donna hit land. Damage to Florida’s multimillion-dollar citrus crop, which was reported in the New York Times ahead of the death toll and other damage, was expected to be significant since the orange and grapefruit crops were almost ripe.12

On Sunday, waters driven into the gulf by the power of the storm were expected to flood back to land. The counterclockwise motion of the advancing gale had sent coastal waters far into the gulf. The edge of the water was reported 100 feet farther out than normal along the west coast at Venice, Sarasota, and St. Petersburg. Roland Johnson, Pinellas County’s civil defense director, reported that water had been sucked nearly completely out of some bays in the St. Petersburg Beach area. As the storm passed, the point where winds began coming from the west turned those waters back toward land. Flooding along the west coast, well into Tampa Bay, was severe. An estimated fifteen thousand people were forced to evacuate from the gulf beaches along Pinellas County. A day later, President Eisenhower designated sections of Florida affected by Hurricane Donna as major disaster areas. Military units were dispatched to restore five smashed bridges on the Overseas Highway connecting the Florida Keys with the mainland.13

Donna provided the last drop in the region’s long deluge. Waterlogged residents demanded change. Hillsborough County in 1960 was midway through a twenty-year growth explosion that witnessed the population doubling from 250,000 in 1950 to nearly 500,000 in 1970. The newly launched University of South Florida, with property along the river, anxiously opened its doors in the fall of 1960. During the decade before Donna, the population of the county had swollen by 150,000 people. Pressures on housing, water supply, sewage, drainage, and other infrastructure elements for the mushrooming population made the disruptive behavior of the river intolerable. Efforts of the eleven-year-old Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, created by the Florida Legislature in 1949, had failed to control the

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untamed Hillsborough River. Within a year of Hurricane Donna, elected officials responded.¹⁴

Under a “fast-tracked” special act of the legislature, in 1961, the State of Florida created the Southwest Florida Water Management District (SWFWMD, or, more commonly, Swiftmud), an independent special district of the State of Florida. District boundaries were developed on the basis of surface water drainage and hydrologic divides, not political borders. The new agency—which would come to serve as a model for four additional special water districts statewide—was charged with the management, regulation, and protection of regional water resources for a broad sixteen-county region. The fledgling water district was directed to “collect and analyze water-related data, design and operate flood control facilities, manage the consumptive use of water, supervise well construction, regulate surface water systems, and evaluate water supplies within its jurisdiction.” Dale Twachtman was appointed executive director, a post he held for the first ten years of the agency’s existence. Twachtman spearheaded the local drive to build the Tampa Bypass Canal, which constituted one part of a far-reaching plan proposed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which since 1899 had been the federal agency overseeing the nation’s navigable rivers and harbors.¹⁵

The Army Corps of Engineers, whose bulldozers at the time were just about to begin converting Florida’s 103-mile-long Kissimmee River into a 56-mile-long sewer called the C-38 Canal, proposed the Four River Basins Project, an elaborate system of canals, reservoirs, and flood-control structures designed to deal with managing the waters of the four major rivers of the Green Swamp: the Hillsborough, Ocklawaha, Withlacoochee, and Peace rivers, as well as their extended river basin areas. All told, some 6,000 square miles of central and southwest Florida, from Yankeetown to Port Charlotte, were targeted by the plan. The Tampa Bypass Canal—the only portion of the Four River Basins Project to be completed—was a multimillion-dollar strategy for diverting floodwaters from the Hillsborough River at a point upstream from the cities of Tampa and Temple Terrace, then rerouting the excess water through an area east of Tampa into nearby McKay Bay. Two of the three original components of the Tampa Bypass Canal System were the 14-mile canal itself, cut from a lowland natural reservoir along the Hillsborough River, near its confluence with Trout Creek, to a point some 8 miles due south to the headwaters of Six Mile Creek, which grows into Palm River, then deeper and wider for the canal’s brief run into McKay Bay. Plans called for the shallow stream, meandering from eastern Tampa into McKay Bay, to be


dredged to a depth of 20 feet, and widened to 400–600 feet. The second component of the plan—the Harney Canal—involved a nearly 2-mile-long canal connecting the proposed bypass with the Hillsborough River below Temple Terrace, but upstream from the reservoir. A third component, the Thonotosassa Canal, was planned to run from Eureka Springs, a dozen miles into Lake Thonotosassa and along Flint Creek to the Hillsborough River. The Thonotosassa Canal, like the Four River Basins Project in general, was never completed.16

The Four River Basins Project generated controversy and opposition nearly from its inception. The Polk County Property Owners League, early in 1962, challenged the Corps’s cost estimate of $104 million to pay for the plan. The league’s own engineering study estimated that the initial cost of the project would near $210 million, more than twice the estimate of the Army engineers. Raymond Stuck, a former Civil Works Division head for the Corps, conducted the study for the property owners. Stuck concluded that Corps’ Four River Basins Project was prepared “too hurriedly,” and that it was inadequate due to “serious omissions,” including a failure to deal with seepage under dams, ground clearing and preparation, and the costs

of hauling dirt from borrow pits to final placement on dams. Stuck charged that the Corps report also neglected to consider grassing and seeding of levee slopes to prevent erosion. The Tampa Bypass Canal portion of the Four River Basins Project was expected to cost nearly $30 million.17

Contention surrounding plans to tame the Hillsborough River was not the only force flooding Tampa during the early 1960s. During the same period, the rising tide of the civil rights movement washed through Tampa as activists demanded and demonstrated for integration and desegregation of public accommodations. A series of lunch counter sit-ins in 1960, organized by members of the local NAACP Youth Council, brought the national movement’s challenge to vestigial Jim Crow laws to the streets, bus stations, motels, and restaurants of Tampa. The black vote impacted local elections. The 1963 Tampa mayoral election, wherein former mayor Nick Nuccio defeated the incumbent Julian Lane, was in part decided by the shifting allegiances of several blocs of voters reacting to the twin tides of civil rights and the government’s failure to provide adequate flood-control measures. The African American community had joined with residents of Ybor City and West Tampa to help elect Nuccio as the city’s first Latin mayor, then deserted him for Lane in 1959 because of Lane’s willingness to work with civil rights activists. Lane attributed his 1963 citywide defeat to his support for integration, but he also lost support in his home district of Seminole Heights, as well as the waterlogged communities of Sulphur Springs and Forest Hills. An active citizens’ group in Forest Hills that had backed Lane in his first campaign because previous administrations had not dealt with the flooding issue realigned with Nuccio in his successful bid to regain the mayor’s office. The same mind-set that accepted segregation as “natural” likewise saw nothing unnatural about building homes and business within the floodplain of a major river system.18

Design work and right-of-way acquisition for the Bypass Canal project was time-consuming. The $1 million effort was beleaguered from the start with expense overruns and other problems. The most significant problems would eventually be viewed as a lack of environmental safeguards and an insufficient engineering design. The plan called for private contractors to construct the Corps-designed canal. In April 1966, Southwest Florida Water Management officials approved a proposal to extend the projected Bypass Canal a quarter mile into McKay Bay. They noted that the shallow bay—2 to 3 feet deep—would otherwise act as a dam to the 20-foot-deep canal. At the same time, water officials also granted authority for the filing of condemnation proceedings for parcels within the 15,000 acres between Hillsborough River State Park and Fowler Avenue, land required for a basin reservoir. A month later, the Corps of Engineers awarded Trans-State Dredging Company of Ft. Pierce

the $999,250 contract for construction of the downstream end of the Bypass Canal. The contract covered dredging from the Twenty-second Street Causeway, northwest across McKay Bay and up Palm River to the U.S. 41 bridge. Two years later, in April 1968, the Corps awarded a nearly $2 million contract for dredging between U.S. 41 and State Road 60, to Potashnick Construction Inc., which had submitted the lowest of eight bids for the work. The first section of the canal was completed in 1968. What was essentially a “moat” around Tampa was finished in the early 1970s, and the final section, where the river crosses north of the canal near Fletcher Avenue, was completed in 1983. During periods of high water, canal flood-control gates are closed to reroute potential floodwaters from the river, around Tampa and Temple Terrace, south past Harney Flats, Orient Park, Palm, and into McKay Bay.\(^9\)

Since completion, the canal has become more than merely a flood-control measure. With the population of Hillsborough County doubling again between 1970 and the turn of the century, from just under 500,000 to 1 million, the demand for potable water—and waterfront property—increased proportionately. Water from the Bypass Canal has been used to augment the city’s reservoir during dry seasons. During a prolonged drought in the early 1990s, for instance, when the normal flow of the Hillsborough River was cut in half, officials began pumping about 40 million gallons a day from the canal to supply the city with drinking water. The water in the Bypass Canal has become one of many additional water sources for the burgeoning population of Hillsborough County.\(^{20}\)

The Tampa Bypass Canal System tamed the Hillsborough River. Dale Twachtmann, the Southwest Florida Water Management District executive director who spearheaded the canal project in the early 1970s, expressed pride in the canal in a 1994 interview with the *Tampa Tribune.* “It’s one of those projects where people can’t realize its importance because it caused something not to happen,” said Twachtmann. “Tampa never has flooded since [1960] and won’t. The canal was the total solution.”\(^{21}\)

The drive to tame the Hillsborough River was not without problems. It had a devastating effect on the Six Mile Creek–Palm River system. Critical design flaws, coupled with an augmented impact from industrial pollution, combined to poison and suffocate life from the once-lively stream. The Bypass Canal did not cause polluters to congregate along its southern flank, but a design flaw at the U.S. 41 bridge exacerbated pollution problems. A mid-1970s study prepared by the


U.S. Department of the Interior, examining the hydrologic effects of the canal, acknowledged that “The canal system will breach the underlying artesian Floridan aquifer in several places. Thus, it will cause drainage from the aquifer into the canal system and will affect ground-water levels over a large area.”

In 2005, Tampa Bay Watch executive director Peter Clark called the dredging and straightening of Palm River a “west coast version of the Kissimmee River.” Polluted runoff from the industrial sites on both sides of the waterway became concentrated and swiftly moved into McKay Bay, where circulation problems had existed since the 1920s, when the Twenty-second Street Causeway was constructed between Hooker’s Point and the east shore of the bay. During World War II and the postwar decades, Hooker’s Point became a shipbuilding center and entrepot. Oil storage facilities dot its landscape. Circulation problems were exacerbated when Palm River was channelized for the Bypass Canal project. The *Tampa Tribune* reported in 2005 that the Bypass Canal contains sediment laced with carcinogenic materials such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and two pesticides considered toxic to bottom-dwelling creatures. Clark was quoted in the press as characterizing McKay Bay, post-canal, as a “contaminated mix of toxins, fertilizers, oils, and other pollutants incapable of supporting much of the marine life that historically inhabited its waters.”

The presence of PCBs in the canal had been noted for more than thirty years. The U.S. Geological Survey, while gathering data for the Corps’s Bypass Canal project, had noticed PCBs in soil samples taken in 1975. Over the next six years, all but one of twenty additional samples contained some amount of PCB, which had been banned around the same time—in the mid-1970s—after researchers discovered the chemical’s carcinogenic properties. PCB is a manufactured compound once used in a variety of industrial products, including electric transformers, plastics, lubricants, ink, paper, and adhesives. A 1981 *St. Petersburg Times* account that officials with the Geological Survey had written to the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) about their discovery and concerns sparked a flurry of press reports and editorials, as well as calls for further study.

In 1980, the U.S. Congress created a trust fund that became known as “Superfund” to pay for cleaning toxic sites when the responsible polluter cannot be identified or is unable or unwilling to pay. A tax levied on companies prone to polluting, mostly oil and chemical concerns, financed the Superfund. The idea was

22 Motz, 37–38.
that chemical plants, oil refineries, and other industries that created toxic materials would be held accountable, and when they weren’t, cleanups would be funded by the tax. In 1995, a GOP-controlled Congress allowed the Superfund tax to expire, and the administration of George W. Bush indicated that it was not in favor of reauthorization. The amount in the trust—which peaked in 1996 at $3.8 billion—plummeted to $28 million by 2003. At a time when the Public Interest Research Group estimated that one in four Americans lived within 4 miles of a Superfund site, the responsibility of funding toxic cleanups shifted, under President Bush, to the American taxpayer. 25

In addition to Superfund toxic waste cleanup sites, the category of “brownfield” sites developed as a means of dealing with less contaminated locations—former sites of activities associated with pollutants, such as paints, solvents, battery acid, and cleaning fluids—which had rendered the properties undesirable to investors. The concept of official “brownfields” held that with the targeted property inventoried and the likely contaminants identified, potential buyers could be offered tax credits and other incentives to spur privately funded redevelopment. Seeking a federal grant of $200,000 to compile a list of such properties, Hillsborough County designated a

16-square-mile area between Tampa city limits on the west and Interstate 75 on the east, and between Harney Road to the north, and Palm River Road on the south. The Tampa Bypass Canal flows directly through the center of this 16-square-mile “brownfield” region.26

Pollution had long been synonymous with the community of Orient Park, situated along the west bank of the former Palm River, now the channelized Bypass Canal. Orient Park was originally developed in the 1920s as a site where the so-called “Tin Can Tourists” who traveled to Florida after the First World War could set up their tents. With both rail and port access, the area evolved into an industrial zone and came to be considered home to one of the largest clusters of toxic waste sites in the state. As of 2004, no fewer than five Superfund sites were located within a mile of Orient Park. Today some three hundred families live in the community, most in small houses, apartments, and mobile homes. In response to concerns that polluted groundwater was infiltrating residential well fields, the Hillsborough County water department began providing water services to residents in the 1990s.27

Three of these particularly egregious Superfund sites are concentrated together along the Tampa Bypass Canal. The Alaric, Helena Chemical, and Stauffer Chemical sites represent past and future environmental threats to the region. The Superfund site at 2110 N. Seventy-first Street, today the location of an aluminum contractor, is named for Alaric Inc., a plastics recycling firm that occupied the property between 1981 and 1986. Alaric shared the 2-acre site with Dana Marine Labs, which handled marine varnishes. Before Dana Marine, a concrete equipment repair company operated at the location. The EPA declared Alaric a potential health threat to the estimated nine thousand people living within a 4-mile radius who relied on well water. State public health officials disagreed, maintaining that even though the groundwater is indeed contaminated by cleaning solvents, it is not a health hazard because nearby residents have been allowed to obtain their water from the City of Tampa. Davis Daiker, of the Health Department’s Bureau of Environmental Epidemiology, offered that the nearest municipal wells are more than a half mile from the site, and that the groundwater contamination plume from Alaric is moving south, toward an industrial region. Residential areas are generally to the north of the Alaric site. In 2000, the EPA reported that groundwater sampling turned up evidence of tetrachloroethylene, trichloroethylene, a dry-cleaning chemical called PCE, and traces of vinyl chloride, a liver toxin and carcinogen. A year later, EPA project manager Brad Jackson reported at a public meeting that groundwater contamination at the Alaric site “seemed to have doubled in size the last two years.”28

The Alaric site is located just west of another pair of Superfund sites, the Helena Chemical Co. and its immediate downstream neighbor, Stauffer Chemical Company. In 2000, the *Tampa Tribune* reported that regulators were worried about pumping contaminated groundwater at the Helena site because of fear of altering the drift of the Alaric plume. The Helena site was built for the production of sulphur, which was used in the processing of phosphate, in 1929. Helena Chemical Company purchased the property from Flas Sulphur in 1967 and converted the facility to the production of agricultural chemicals, including pesticides. Drains in the pesticide manufacturing areas emptied into a series of three pollution-control tanks, where hazardous chemicals were mixed with caustic soda, then stored onsite. Pesticide production transferred to the company’s facilities in Georgia in 1981, but repacking, warehousing, and distribution of agricultural chemicals and liquid fertilizers continued at the Tampa location. One of the control tanks was filled with concrete, and the above-ground portions of the other two were knocked down; the remaining structures were capped with concrete after being filled with sand and gravel. Arsenic, zinc, and chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides such as aldrin, heptachlor, endrin, and DDT were found in soil, sediment, and groundwater associated with the Helena site. Drainage on the property was directed to a concrete culvert that channeled into a pond. When the pond overflowed—which it did at least once a year between 1979 and 1990—a concrete spillway allowed outflow to pass under Orient Road and east into the Tampa Bypass Canal.29

Other forms of toxic pollution have assailed Palm River since it and its Six Mile Creek headwaters were terraformed into the Tampa Bypass Canal. A notable example occurred when high levels of the pesticide malathion made it into the canal during the scorched-earth campaign the city waged against the medfly in 1997.

When the Mediterranean fruit fly was discovered in a Tampa residential area in May 1997, the finding initiated an aggressive campaign to protect Florida’s $3.6 billion citrus industry, as well as other commodities favored by this insect-scourge of agriculture. An initial component of the campaign involved aerial spraying with the organophosphate insecticide malathion, conducted by Lee County Mosquito Control and a company called K & K, which used refitted DC-3 bomber planes to apply the toxicant. Within a month, the targeted area had expanded from the city of Tampa to all of Hillsborough County and to Polk and Manatee Counties. The EPA granted Florida’s request for an emergency exemption from the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act—the defining regulation for those engaged in chemical pest-control. The exemption allowed usage of the pesticide malathion in volumes that exceeded the chemical’s limited labeling mandates. Despite strict bans against spraying malathion near or over water, sampling tests found “unacceptably

high levels in the Hillsborough River and Tampa Bypass Canal.” An editorial in the Sarasota Herald Tribune thundered about water pollution when a pilot for the private contractor hired to spray the chemical flushed residues from his airplane spray tanks over the Gulf of Mexico. Witnesses also reported a DC-3 plane spraying malathion over the Tampa Bypass Canal at a time when up to 40 million gallons of water a day were being diverted from the canal to augment Tampa’s drinking supply. “The river and canal were never identified as potable supplies to program directors,” the Sarasota newspaper reported, adding that “the pollution of the water supplies shouldn’t have happened.” The instruction label for malathion states: “Keep out of lakes, streams, ponds, tidal marshes, and estuaries. Do not apply where runoff is likely to occur.” A mixed message about the program came from the EPA, which assured the public that the aerial campaign was safe, and that “despite extensive studies, malathion, as used in the eradication program, has not been linked to long-term human health problems.” Nevertheless, the EPA went on to advise, “As a precaution, residents are warned to remain indoors, avoid contact with the spray, rinse homegrown fruits and vegetables, cover outdoor surfaces, and bring laundry, children’s toys, and pets indoors.” The release of sterile medflies by the Florida Department of Agriculture in late July put an end to the aerial bombardment and the malathion controversy.30

Equally problematic to the issue of chemical additives and toxic sediments in the former Six Mile Creek/Palm River is the matter of a pair of design flaws that date back to the construction of the Bypass Canal. The U.S. 41 overpass was already in place when contracts were awarded for the dredging of the canal. One company cut the canal from McKay Bay to the U.S. 41 overpass, and another dredged north from U.S. 41. As journalist Susan Green reported in the late 1990s, rather than rebuild the bridge and replace the pilings, the Corps simply left the shorter pilings in place, creating an underwater dam. Depth readings in 1997 ranged from 15 feet on the west side of the bridge to 8 feet under the bridge, then down to 20 feet on the east side. The natural underwater flushing of the waterway has been prevented since the canal was created. The trapped water “stubbornly clings to its measure of zero oxygen levels on the east side of the U.S. 41 overpass,” Green wrote. Stagnant water and perpetual algae blooms are the result. Stephen Grabe, an environmental supervisor with the Hillsborough Environmental Protection Commission in 2003, reported that about a third of samples taken from the bottom of the river show no signs of life. However, Grabe said, it is hard to know whether the primary cause is the pollutants or the lack of dissolved oxygen. The main contaminants in the sediment are PCBs, Chlordane, and DDT because the river is not flushed. An official with the EPC pointed out that the northern part of McKay Bay, at the mouth of Palm River, also has sediment containing moderately high levels of hydrocarbons such as oils and grease, but it is shallower and flushes out more, which helps wash out pollutants.31


Multimillion-dollar restoration plans for the traumatized river way have been discussed for years, and some small steps have been taken. An organization—the Palm River Management Committee—formed to address efforts to restore Palm River. The committee was founded in 1988 by river resident Sandy Odor, in response to fish kills. The committee included representatives of the County Environmental Protection Commission, the water department, Swiftmud, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, and Tampa Bay Watch. In 1997, Peter Clark, director of Tampa Bay Watch and a member of the Palm River Management Committee, declared that “Palm River has the worst quality of any system in Tampa Bay. It has algae blooms all year round.” Clark labeled the river a “killing field” and proposed a major project to replace dredged material back into the river, raising it from 20 feet deep to its historic depths of 10 to 12 feet. The committee plan called for shoreline improvements and the creation of marshes and small tributaries destroyed by the dredging of the canal. Clark characterized the restoration plan as a small-scale version of the 56-mile Kissimmee River restoration project. Clark focused on the problems caused by the “box-cut” procedure used to dredge the canal, which made steep cuts along the shoreline and left a flat bottom. The former gentle slope allowed plants to grow, Clark pointed out. The Palm River Committee also believed the restored river would not hinder flood control. A year later, the restoration plan—reduced from 3.3 miles of the canal to partial restoration of about 2.5 miles—remained in the discussion stage. Backers of the plan pointed out that since the original Four River Basins Project was never completed, the Tampa Bypass canal is woefully overengineered. It is designed to handle additional waters from Lake Thonotosassa and Flint Creek, portions of the original plan never realized. Clark told a reporter for the *Tampa Tribune* in 1997: “This is the most highly disturbed tributary in the Tampa Bay system. Let us not forget the river that’s been destroyed.”

Two years later, the plan was still being discussed. Tom Cardinale, an assistant water management director of the Hillsborough County Environmental Protection Commission, agreed in 1999 that the Bypass Canal need not be so wide or so deep. “The thing I’m really wishing for,” Cardinale told a *Tampa Tribune* reporter, is that the Corps of Engineers “will admit that they over-designed the system and over-dug it and come back in and refill it to a more natural depth.” Two years later, in April 2001, the restoration plan was described as “in the state and federal funding pipeline,” but that “work is probably two or three years away.” The following year, with Corps backing and a price tag that had climbed to an estimated $4.4 million, the plan received a lukewarm endorsement at a 2002 meeting of environmental scientists in St. Petersburg. Experts noted that the canal bottom is virtually devoid of life, and the Corps plan to remove the underwater berm below the U.S. 41 bridge probably won’t change that. The assembly concluded that despite the fact that the original plan that

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32 Susan M. Green, “Palm River Restoration Pushed,” *Tampa Tribune*, February 18, 1997; Green, “$6 Million...”
created the canal system had been approved on a “fast track” between 1960 and 1962, altering the design could be expected to take at least five years and cost far more than the estimated $4.4-million. Meanwhile the former Six Mile Creek and Palm River are no more. Collectively, and then some, they are Canal 135 of the Tampa Bypass Canal System.

Once upon a time, the Hillsborough River was tamed. Today, the still-growing population of Tampa and its surrounding sprawl is not forced either to suffer the routine flooding of a natural river or—unless individually inclined to do so—to consider the existence of the Hillsborough River at all. The city is well protected by its moat. But in the progression from the pastoral scenes remembered by Neva Scruggs Ennis to the Superfund Waste sites of Orient Park, some of the cost of that historical amnesia and relative safety is buried below the paved-over regions of the former creek bed, and hidden in the sediments in the murky depths of Canal 135.

The Gasparilla Festival has, since its inception, both reflected and shaped civic events and public perceptions in Tampa. A harbinger of the nation’s imperialist and demographic expansion in the first decade of the twentieth century, Gasparilla was attached to celebrations of the Panama Canal’s construction and of Tampa’s population growth as reported by the U.S. Census. The festival was part of spectacles that featured the first cars and airplanes in Tampa, heralding modernity.1 Gasparilla was further affected by national issues as it was put on hold during economic downturns and both World Wars. In 1924, Gasparilla engaged an Egyptian theme to honor the discovery of King Tut’s tomb, and during the Great Depression, former participants (“pirates”) too poor to pay their dues to the organization sponsoring the celebration received keys to the poorhouse instead of keys to the city, their usual bounty.2 A powerful social indicator, the festival also came to shape cultural consciousness. When Tampa was awarded a National Football League franchise in 1974, piracy already so thoroughly dominated the iconography of the area that Buccaneers seemed the only fitting choice for the team’s mascot.3

Until 1991, the mayor of Tampa traditionally surrendered the keys to the city to Gaspar’s band of rogues. That year, the coincidence of the local spectacle of Gasparilla with the national spectacle of Super Bowl XXV illuminated inequalities in the organization of Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, which sponsors the parade. With

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750 members at the time, Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla was considered the most prestigious and secretive of Tampa’s clubs. When faced with the demand to admit twenty-five black members, the Krewe withdrew their sponsorship of the parade rather than comply. By the next year, however, Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla had admitted some African American members and again resumed sponsorship of the parade as Krewes more representative of Tampa’s diversity were formed.

The 1991 controversy demonstrates the festival’s importance as an indicator of change and social conflict. Chroniclers of Gasparilla’s early years, however, have presented the festival as a popular, apolitical, inoffensive civic ritual. Further, scholars have paid little attention to the motivations of Gasparilla’s organizers—members of the urban elite attempting to work out their own sense of identity. Indeed, the festival seems to stem from elite efforts to create and call attention to a sense of community in Tampa. Though newspaper accounts of the festival from 1904 to 1914 portray the crowd as passive viewers, not active participants, the evolution of the festival’s form demonstrates that Gasparilla provides a dynamic and viable connection between Tampa’s business and working class. By 1914, Ye Mystic Krewe had changed its collective visage from the courtly pirate, a figure that called particular attention to class, to the more inclusive rogue pirate. And yet, as the 1991 controversy illuminated, while Ye Mystic Krewe had adopted styles of inclusion in form, in practice the group often maintained mechanisms of exclusion and hierarchy.

The story of the first years of the Gasparilla Festival is one of appropriation, where piracy was featured as an aggressive element that effected a twofold takeover of Tampa’s public space and public consciousness. The festival celebrating King Gasparilla had always featured piracy as its organizational theme. In the carnival’s first few years, however, Gasparilla’s band of merry followers, Ye Mystic Krewe, affected all the rituals and mannerisms of courtly life. Further, the Gasparilla Festival itself was originally tangential, an amusing distraction from other expositions meant to glorify the city of Tampa and help the state of Florida assume a place of dominance in the New South. But the thematic content of Tampa’s festivals quickly changed from glorifying the nation and imperialism, to addressing the state’s agricultural industry, and finally to venerating the city itself and its appeal as a tourist destination. As the Gasparilla Carnival assumed more importance, imagery of the rogue, criminal pirate came to increasingly dominate the appearance of the festival itself. The specter of pirates invading the city and seizing the keys was both a symbolic and literal process. During this time, organizers adopted a more aggressive form—that of the bloodthirsty pirate—to inform visitors that Tampa’s leaders would stop at nothing to achieve the prominence their city deserved.

Gregory Bush notes that this powerful combination of promotion and

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myth had the ability to create, or at least accentuate, new modern modes of urban engagement. In his work on Miami, the author notes that primary accounts of the city in the first decades of the twentieth century combined vigorous promotion with active myth-making as they described tourists and new residents alike flocking to public festivals. These accounts emphasized attendance at these spectacles, along with the progress of the south Florida land boom and Miami’s fast-paced way of life, to portray the city as an idyllic vacation destination and a place to procure instant wealth.6

French anthropologist André-Marcel d’Ans, too, examines the power of myth as promotion in his work on Tampa’s most famous festival. D’Ans claims that José Gaspar completed his most successful conquest by transcending historical knowledge to commandeer the public consciousness, becoming the primary cultural identifier for Tampans.7 Like its inspirational nucleus, the Gasparilla Festival, too, has transformed from its humble origins. What started as a carnival sideline, a thrilling interruption

6 Gregory W. Bush, “‘Playground of the USA’: Miami and the Promotion of Spectacle,” Pacific Historical Review 68, No. 2 (May 1999), 54.
of an otherwise ordinary parade, has become Tampa’s foremost civic ritual. In this way, the Gasparilla Festival has embarked on its own hegemonic process, different from the imperial and agricultural celebrations of which it was originally a part. Over the course of a few years, Gasparilla so consummately completed this process of legitimation that Tampans appear to have forgotten the time when it was not so.

Previous scholars have examined the Gasparilla Festival only from an anthropological perspective, seeing it as a redistributive or quasi-religious ritual. D’Ans, in his 1980 article, examines the genesis and structure of the legend of the festival’s inspiration, José Gaspar, to understand how and why the Spanish pirate became the patron of Tampa. D’Ans, like all who have written about the festival, looks to the legend of Gaspar to historicize his work, virtually ignoring the Festival of Gasparilla as a historical phenomenon. D’Ans focuses on the legend of Gaspar as it expressed “striking features” of the local elites who chose to adopt the myth and organized the festival. Further, Gaspar’s story possessed the necessary characteristics to encourage and sustain the participation of the other social classes who shared in the legend and voluntarily engaged in the festival.

D’Ans examines the debate that lies behind the festival concerning the historical authenticity of José Gaspar. He recounts the various narratives of Gaspar’s life, claiming that the absence of records in the United States and Spain proves that Gaspar never existed. Thus, d’Ans is able to loudly discredit the existence of Gaspar while pointing to his cultural importance as Tampa’s most famous legend. To d’Ans, the very absence of historical authenticity merely proves that José Gaspar’s story has indeed become legend. Further, the historical truth of Gaspar as a legend can be found in its annual celebration. Initially, Gaspar’s tale was transmitted orally, but, fittingly, the very first written version of the Gasparilla legend can be found in an advertising brochure for a railroad company. All other written accounts reference for authenticity the stories of an eyewitness, Juan Gomez. Gomez, though a real person, was a very unreliable source. He claimed, among other things, that he was a forty-three-year-old sailor aboard Gaspar’s ship in 1821, which would have made him 122 years old upon his death in 1900.

The creators of the festival universalized the story of Gaspar and shifted to a symbolic interpretation to suit their purposes and move the legend away from its territorial association with Charlotte Harbor. D’Ans contends that Tampa’s elite purposefully hid the legend of Gaspar behind an apparatus of fabrications to make it appear authentic without losing too much of its romantic character. All the written works on the pirate Gaspar, despite some differences, had to make claims to historical truth. The existence of written historical accounts of Gaspar’s legend, despite authorial intent, has helped preserve the legend in the collective consciousness of Tampans.

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8 Ibid., 9-10.
9 Ibid., 5, 9.
10 Ibid., 13-14.
11 Ibid., 15.
12 Ibid., 22-23.
The organizers’ adoption of the myth of Gaspar speaks to the ethos of Tampa’s business class, who helped create the festival in his name. The legend, itself a product of a specific historical context, would come to act upon the circumstances in which it was created. The legend of Gasparilla provided a rationale and historical character that the local elite used, in D’Ans’s words, to “glorify its power and wealth.” A different popular version served to “brighten the Florida landscape.” For all classes, then, the powerful myth of Gasparilla made life more pleasant than historical reality could have. According to d’Ans, the legend of Gasparilla, despite its Latin origins, is product and property of Tampa’s Anglo establishment, reflecting the social and ethnic divisions within the city. D’Ans examines the festival as a fraternal ritual that ameliorated violence and class tensions. But the spectacle was only the most visible part of a phenomenon whose “primary function lay elsewhere.” The large crowd the festivals attracted made possible the central role that redistribution played; d’Ans characterizes the festival as a ceremony similar to potlatch. But the actual redistribution of wealth that was central to potlatch was never a part of Gasparilla since the Krewe distributed worthless tokens and, more recently, plastic beads. Still, the population expected the “system itself will provide its own rewards,” and symbolic gifts proved enough to demonstrate cross-class cooperation and the efficacy of the festival as a safety valve.

Like that of d’Ans, the main focus of other historical accounts has been on the pirate Gaspar and not on the festival as a historical phenomenon. Edwin Lambright’s 1936 account identified the festival as a Tampa institution that had attracted nationwide attention. He set out to record the Krewe’s annual appearances and provide a biography of the real Gasparilla, creating “the first and only authentic story of the pirate himself.” He emphasized his desire to give graphic descriptions of both Gasparilla’s life and the annual festival, imparting to the narrative the “accuracy of history” while leaving the “appeal of romance and adventure.” Lambright’s publishers maintained that his purpose was to make a book of “history, reminiscence, record and reference,” that would become a “prized possession” of all who were a part of or interested in the exploits of Ye Mystic Krewe.

Gasparilla organizers commissioned Lambright, then the Tampa Morning Tribune’s editor, to create the magisterial version of events that would become the Ye Mystic Krewe’s bible. This publication was never marketed commercially and was maintained only among Krewe members and their families. Lambright designed his version of Gaspar’s story to give it every appearance of historical reality by relying
on the coincidence of the geographic place-names of Gasparilla, Sanibel Island, and Captiva Island. Lambright further embellished his courtly version of Gaspar’s story to make him appear the “most gallant [and] tender of men, except that he was a pirate,” emphasizing the respectability of Gaspar and the festival that bore his name.

19 Tampa’s ruling class already emulated the ideals and mannerisms of Lambright’s Gaspar as piracy became a mystique to the Mystic Krewe.20

The festival emerged just as Tampa’s business class was consolidating its power during a period characterized by social conflict and the arrival of large trusts.21 As Tampa possessed both a railroad connection and the possibility of an improved port, business leaders organized a Board of Trade in 1885 whose function was to promote growth in the community.22 With the end of the pioneer era, these Anglo-Saxon,

19 Ibid., 18.
20 Ibid., 19.
21 Ibid., 13.
22 Kerstein, 24.
Protestant men became the city's new elite. Very quickly, though, the celebration the elites created evolved from entertainment by and for the city's leaders to "grandiose festivities designed for popular consumption." Nevertheless, only wealthy Anglo-Saxon men were allowed to join the exclusive Mystic Krewe. \footnote{D'Ans, 19.}

The carnival, as Gasparilla was initially labeled, was born out of casual conversation between the \textit{Morning Tribune}'s society editor, Louise Dodge, and George Hardee, who suggested using the story of the already known pirate, José Gaspar, in an effort "to develop a spectacular and merrymaking feature in connection with the [May] Festival." Hardee, from New Orleans, ensured that Gasparilla would be modeled on Mardi Gras from its inception. José Gaspar would give the festival a "name, a foundation, the Spanish atmosphere" and would serve as the "nucleus for a fête." \footnote{Lambright, 44.} In Gasparilla's first few years, observers expected sumptuous costumes and pageantry and trappings of royalty, not bloodthirsty rogues. Elites perhaps desired to overtly demonstrate their authority and so fashioned themselves as royalty. José Gaspar was likely conceived in this majestic manner to strengthen this association. Newspaper accounts detailing his life labeled him the "pirate Prince," though these accounts never explained how or why he obtained this title. \footnote{Tampa Morning Tribune, February 22, 1914.} These early years of Gasparilla seemed to reflect elite attempts not only to rationalize their authority but also to exaggerate it.

D’Ans discusses Gasparilla’s first years, when the parade was initially coupled with commercial fairs to attract businessmen from other cities. Gasparilla served a special function during these celebrations as a demonstration of the power and authority of Tampa’s business class and the resources the city itself offered. At this time, Gasparilla’s display was aimed primarily at outside businessmen, not the greater public. \footnote{D’Ans, 26.} But if Tampa’s festivals were to truly emulate the great expositions in St. Louis and Chicago, they also needed an element of popular amusement, a midway. These amusement avenues served as “cathartic respites from social upheaval." \footnote{Robert W. Rydell, \textit{All the World’s a Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876-1916} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 94.} It appears that Gasparilla fulfilled both functions—it was a show of strength and resources to outsiders and an entertaining distraction for its citizens.

The year 1904 marked the first Gasparilla celebration, but Tampa businessmen were more concerned with national matters. The city was hosting the Panama Canal Convention, to which delegates from all southern states were invited. It was the first convention in the United States devoted to the development of the waterway, and Tampa’s leaders, because of the city’s geographical location, expected to benefit greatly from the canal’s construction. \footnote{Tampa Morning Tribune, April 21, 1904.} Florida’s governor, William Jennings, preached that the
canal would contribute to the development of Florida’s rich resources and encourage an industrial revolution throughout the state. He predicted that the waterway would eventually transform Florida into a great manufacturing state. President Theodore Roosevelt himself encouraged the convention and the interest it would arouse. In Tampa, the Panama Canal Convention was unequivocally considered the great event of the festival. The May Festival was further designed to encourage visitors and their capital to the city. To this end, the Tribune informed citizens that “everything that helps Tampa helps you individually.”

In his 1936 work, Lambright describes the first announcement of Ye Mystic Krewe as a cause for statewide concern as Tampa’s citizens and outside newspapers anticipated the coming of Gasparilla and his men. The third day of the May Festival signaled the beginning of the Panama Canal Convention, and the parade marked the first appearance of Ye Mystic Krewe as “distinguished guests and citizens stood in respectful salute.” Interestingly, the first King Gasparilla did not participate in the parade but sent a proxy instead. Lambright speculated that Colonel Edward Gunby declined to participate out of modesty or fear he would be recognized, making it the only occasion the reigning king did not lead his court in the carnival parade. Whatever the reason, whether humility or the desire to create an air of secrecy, the first king’s behavior characterized the beginning years of Gasparilla—exaggeration and self-congratulation coupled with a sense of insecurity. The Tampa Morning Tribune noted that while all eyes turned toward the Krewe, all failed to pierce the mask that hid “his presumably handsome features.” Unable to see the king, many still had faith in his innate superiority. The round of applause that greeted the king and his court during the inaugural ball showed “no ill will was felt for this sudden attack upon [their] peaceful borders.”

Lambright described the virginal white gown the queen wore at the coronation ball that “enhanced her dark beauty and regal carriage,” making the respectable woman appear dark and exotic, like José Gaspar himself. A Morning Tribune reporter, writing about the whole spectacle, was delighted by the ball and thrilled that Gasparilla would become a permanent institution with plans for annual appearances. Lambright noted that Tampa society and the Tampa public, both the working and business classes, were likewise so enthusiastic about the invasion that they demanded the organization be made permanent and a carnival produced each year. The account, however, was furnished by the fair’s participants, who likely stood to benefit from the transformation of the invasion into tradition.

29 Ibid., April 29, 1904.
30 Ibid., April 30, 1904.
31 Ibid., May 2, 1904.
32 Lambright, 45.
33 Ibid., 47.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 49.
36 Tampa Morning Tribune, May 10, 1904.
The next year, the carnival was moved to coincide with the Florida State Fair, a decision Lambright stated the Krewe members “deemed best.” The Krewe again invaded the city without any sort of vessel, but Lambright noted they assembled “presumably just ashore from a pirate craft.” It was in the second year of Tampa’s annual festival that new “horseless carriages” were used in the parade as Gasparilla II led a parade of what Lambright labeled “trusty pirates.” In this phrase, Lambright employed a description perhaps never before used on a group typically characterized as entirely untrustworthy as he highlighted the civic virtue of Gasparilla’s pirates and dismissed their transgressive nature.37

That year the pirates—or knights, as they fashioned themselves—staged various tournaments. The use of regal nomenclature in the first years of the festival is intriguing. The festival’s promoters could have merely been confusing powerful archetypes, or perhaps they desired spectators to conceive of them as royalty. It is simple enough to assume that elites merely enjoyed regal titles, but it is more problematic to consider why they chose to mix these archetypes of authority with those of transgression. Perhaps King Gasparilla and his court enjoyed their liminal status, appearing to promote transgression from the pedestal of privilege. The legend of José Gaspar that Ye Mystic Krewe propagated so vigorously served an important

37 Lambright, 53.
function since the pirate's life represented a vital link between respectability and depravity. The connection between pirates and monarchs was nevertheless strange since, by the first decades of the eighteenth century, pirates had become targets of the Atlantic empires. Marcus Rediker notes that these imperial powers, led by Britain, embarked on a vigorous international campaign of extermination and terror, hanging pirates throughout Great Britain and the New World.

The *Tampa Morning Tribune* noted in its coverage of the first year of the festival that Prince Gasparilla made his first official proclamation stating he would *visit*, not *capture*, the city. In fact, the proclamation made no mention at all of Gaspar as a pirate. He was the sovereign, surrounded by knights and his royal court paying friendly visit to the beautiful city. Accounts that followed referred to Gasparilla merely as “his majesty.” It was not until the day before the May Festival that the *Tribune* mentioned Gasparilla as a pirate king. The paper barely mentioned Ye Mystic Krewe, except as the carnival feature of the May Festival exercises. The following week, the Krewe debuted in the opening parade on horseback. The paper noted that “mounted pirates will be something of an innovation,” but added that the men were sure to be as adept in the saddle as they were on the decks of their buccaneering ship. In this first appearance, Ye Mystic Krewe behaved more like medieval knights than the eighteenth-century pirates from whom they descended. The closing evening of the May Festival witnessed Gasparilla’s coronation ball. The *Morning Tribune* labeled it the social highlight of the week and delighted in the royal court’s display of pomp and pageantry. Descriptions of the parade and the ball dwelled on the ancient court dress and made no mention of piratical deeds. It seems that in the first year of the festival, King Gasparilla did not invade Tampa to pillage and plunder—he was merely on vacation.

Despite proclamations of the May Festival’s success, organizers scrapped the celebration the following year, and Tampa leaders focused their attention on the State Fair to be held in November 1905. The *Morning Tribune* depicted the festivities as becoming more opulent each year, and organizers promised the fair would eclipse anything before imagined. That year, organizers focused on displaying the prosperity of Tampa and the agricultural wealth of Florida. The fair, not without its amusement features, would benefit every soul in the state. Dedicated to the untold wealth the future of Florida held, the president of Gulf Coast Railroad, Charles Brown, subverted the adage “see Naples and die,” urging southerners to “see Florida and live.”

King Gasparilla was again to embark on his invasion of the city and effect his

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38 D’Ans, 18.
40 *Tampa Morning Tribune,* April 23, 1904.
41 Ibid., May 1, 1904.
42 Ibid., May 10, 1904.
43 Ibid., November 5, 1905.
44 Ibid., December 1, 1905.
“peerless pageant,” but Tribune writers still characterized the festival as an innocuous amusement. The Gasparilla Carnival was not even the only pageant of the fair, though all were employed to signal the state’s “era of prosperity.” As expected, all descriptions of the Gasparilla Carnival and its participants were couched in regal vocabulary.45 Further, King Gasparilla’s coronation was only one of two balls to be held that year, and the event was still by invitation only.46 An observer of the opening parade described His Majesty, who wore royal purple and carried the scepter of authority, as looking “the picture of a monarch.” His band of merry followers even staged a knightly tournament to entertain the crowds. In these first two years, not only were Tampa’s celebrations not about the Gasparilla Festival, but Gasparilla was not even about pirates.47 The Morning Tribune’s summaries of the fair further noted the industrial parades and expositions, against which the knightly pageantry of Gasparilla must have seemed a ridiculous anachronism.48

In its first years, King Gasparilla appeared only during the opening parade and closing ball, and by 1906 the Gasparilla Carnival had become even more obscure. The Morning Tribune made no advance mention of any invasion, either royal or piratical. In fact, the opening parade was cut altogether. The fair’s committee decided the parade delayed other opening-day activities and distracted participants from the exhibit booths. The interests of all should have been assisting in making Florida “the greatest State south of the Mason Dixon line.”49 Gasparilla was to have its own parade during the afternoon but would not be the focus of the day. Indeed, the Morning Tribune made clear that all could amuse themselves by observing the Gasparilla spectacle, but that they were then expected to attend the many agricultural and industrial exhibits.50

Gasparilla was still accompanied by a royal band, and in 1906 he arrived “without incident,” not in a pirate ship but rather in a “stately galleon.”51 He was labeled the Carnival King, mildly transgressive but more benevolent and regal. For the first time, Gasparilla rode on a float, but he still carried his scepter of authority evoking the pleasant memory of a “modern Camelot.”52 The coronation ball was still the most prominent social event of the season, and invitation was “absolutely essential for admittance.” The “kingly” invasion ended, and the Krewe returned to their distant home.53 These first three years, the Gasparilla Krewe carried themselves with a royal demeanor, reflecting the exclusivity of their functions.

The first lapse in Gasparilla’s celebration occurred from 1907 to 1909.

46 Ibid., November 15, 1905.
47 Ibid., November 16, 1905.
48 Ibid., December 1, 1905.
49 Ibid., November 13, 1906.
50 Ibid., November 11, 1906.
51 Ibid., November 14, 1906.
52 Ibid., November 15, 1906.
53 Ibid., November 18, 1906.
Lambright cryptically stated “various causes conspired to disband the organization.” Notably, Lambright admitted there was no auspicious local occasion to which the festival could have been connected during these years “to enlist its interest and prompt its activity.” It was not that Gasparilla was illegitimate, according to its proponents, but rather that there was merely nothing spectacular enough to warrant the king’s appearance. Again, Lambright ascribed to the festival an imaginary level of importance. D’Ans proffers a different reason for Gasparilla’s hiatus in 1907, claiming it was a result of financial crisis due to the “Rich Man’s Panic” that depressed the nation’s economy. Either way, in these early years the festival clearly lacked the viability to exist on its own.

The opportunity to stage another fete presented itself in 1910 with the Panama Canal Convention. As Tampa was deemed the closest adequate port to the canal, it was in the advantageous position of receiving the new commerce the construction would help produce. That year the knightly tournament was abandoned. Gasparilla the next year was part of a celebration of Tampa’s growth and magnificence. The census celebration, which marked Tampa as having the largest growth of any city east of the Mississippi River, provided the legitimizing opportunity for the appearance of

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54 Lambright, 55.
55 D’Ans, 16.
Gasparilla. Clearly, the first ten years of the twentieth century had afforded Tampa
great cause to celebrate.56 The year 1911 was the first in which the Krewe arrived by
ship. It was also the first year that the mayor would surrender the key to the city to Ye
Mystic Krewe.57 By the following year, the Krewe and their admiring onlookers would
abandon their rigid adherence to courtly ritual and royal vocabulary and, possibly
recognizing the arrival of modernity, would fashion more aggressive identities for
themselves.

The year 1912 proved to be a turning point for Gasparilla. It was the first
year the invaders of the city were continuously identified as pirates, and although the
festival was a part of another celebration, George Washington’s birthday, organizers
acknowledged their active emulation of New Orleans and Mardi Gras. That year the
“bloodthirsty” Krewe arrived under the Jolly Roger intent on capturing maidens and
carrying them to their distant island. In fact, the outlaws would bodily take the city,
as Tampa’s mayor surrendered the golden key. The Tribune mentioned José Gaspar as
the inspiration for the festival for the first time since Gasparilla’s inception, signaling
a rebirth for the pirate and the festival that bore his name.58

Pirate bands and pirate captains led the parade and carnival attractions.
The coronation ball, originally the quintessence of royal excess, featured different
decorations that year—electric lights and walls covered in skulls and crossbones.
The Tribune labeled the costumes for the ball more splendid than any previous year.
While Krewe members still wrote many of the articles for the Morning Tribune, it
appears that the more the Krewe presented themselves as criminal pirates, the more
popular the festival became.59 Tampa’s leaders even acknowledged that the festival
had taken a darker turn and that the city itself was changing. At the ball, Tampa’s
mayor surrendered two sets of keys to the city, a gold key representing the city’s joys
and a black key to the city jail, meant to signify Tampa’s own dark side.60

In 1913, the Gasparilla Festival witnessed another breakthrough. Realizing the
importance of the festival, Tampa’s merchants paved the way for a more “elaborate
presentation.” Desiring to further emulate Mardi Gras, merchants went on record
stating they would assist Ye Mystic Krewe in implementing all its future plans. While
their promises were vague, merchants for the first time acknowledged the significance
of the festival and the need for its continuation.61 The legitimation that Tampa’s
merchants afforded Gasparilla in 1913 would help transform the festival the next
year and make the 1914 celebration a watershed moment for Gasparilla. Any hint of
the festival’s illegitimacy or the need to attach it to other celebrations vanished. It was
the most important event, unrivaled by any other. That year, the Tribune mentioned

56 Lambright, 55.
57 Ibid., 57.
58 Tampa Morning Tribune, February 22, 1912.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., February 23, 1912.
61 Ibid., February 19, 1913.
Washington's birthday only to call attention to how incidental it had become, stating, “it will be marked by nothing more than the closing of banks and the city hall.” Indeed, the 1914 festival was a rebirth for Gasparilla as a modern celebration. The *Tribune* also took care to publish the festival’s mythical inspiration and its actual origins. The newspaper even featured a special border for Gasparilla Week—a one-eyed pirate with a cutlass in his teeth. Further, Krewe members grew more militant in their proclamations. The *Tribune* announced the “bloody crew,” death’s head flying, would arrive and capture the city, “putting to death all persons who dare resist [their] orders.” Gasparilla was still a mighty monarch, this time reigning over a festival that “would not be second in point of brilliancy to even the world-famed Mardi Gras festivities.” King Gasparilla would appear before the city’s fathers demanding surrender, “with death and destruction as the alternative.”

By 1914, organizers consciously abandoned royal terminology in favor of more piratical vocabulary as they self-consciously modernized the festival. Gasparilla was actively molding itself after and competing with Mardi Gras, as organizers used New Orleans artists to design parade floats. Like Mardi Gras, Gasparilla finally existed in its own right, occurring annually for the sake of itself. The *Tribune* estimated record-breaking attendance and great crowds of tourists. The paper even presented in a positive light the need for Pinkerton guards to control crowds, reporting that the guards had described the behavior of Tampa’s citizens as “first-class.” By 1914, Tampa’s leaders appear to have recognized the need for a celebration that was exclusive to the city to boost its appeal as a tourist destination as they outlined their intentions for Gasparilla. They aimed to please the people of Tampa while advertising the city and amusing its visitors.

Meanwhile, Krewe members continued to project a frightening image. While complimenting Tampa and her brave citizens, they declared themselves prepared to “devastate; to kill; to burn and destroy,” stating that they would demand the city’s keys and her daughters. Pirates had taken over the visage of the Gasparilla Festival just as surely as they had taken over the city. In mock relief, the *Morning Tribune* remarked that fortunately the Krewe had committed no acts of depredation in capturing the city. At week’s end, Ye Mystic Krewe staged their coronation ball, at which they still clung to regal imagery, thus inverting the Victorian paradigm of public respectability and private depravity. The Krewe’s public face was the fearsome countenance of the bloodthirsty pirate; it was during their invitation-only coronation balls that members again behaved as royalty.

The willingness of organizers to transform Gasparilla during its first few years

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63 Ibid., February 21, 1914.
64 Ibid., February 24, 1914.
65 Ibid., February 22, 1914.
66 Ibid., February 23, 1914.
67 Ibid., February 24, 1914.
ensured it would remain viable for the next century and demonstrates that festival’s sensitivity as a social indicator. In 2002, in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, one of the Gasparilla Krewes invited New York firefighters to ride the float of their patron saint, Saint Florian.\(^6\) But cannons booming and guns ablaze had assumed new meaning after 2001, and, in light of that tragedy, the image of invasion by bloodthirsty pirates that the festival’s organizers had so carefully cultivated over the past century may have added overtones more unsettling than lighthearted. In addition to the new vigilance against terrorism, officials dealt with their chronic concern with controlling the drunken, rowdy fans integral to the celebrations.\(^7\) More ubiquitous than the Pinkertons of 1914, Tampa police and federal agencies stationed officers every ten feet along the parade route.\(^8\)

Had Tampa’s affair with pirates been permanently contaminated? Marcus Rediker argues that pirates indeed utilized terror to accomplish their goals—to obtain money, to inflict punishment, to exact revenge, and to instill fear in all who wished to resist them. And yet, pirates have become cultural heroes.\(^9\) Had their image come full

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70 Amy Scherzer, “NY Firefighters.”
71 Rediker, 5.
circle, from terrorist to hero, back to terrorist again? If the festivities that marked Gasparilla’s one-hundredth anniversary in 2004 and celebrated its continuing cultural significance are any indication, the answer is “no.” The imagery of pirates in Gasparilla and the festival itself still truly resonate with Tampa’s citizens and visitors alike.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, Gasparilla’s organizers, namely Ye Mystic Krewe, seemed to have recognized the need to democratize the festival and the legend of José Gaspar. Once the Krewe adopted representations of rough, criminal piracy, the festival evolved from merely an annual elite appropriation of public space to an active event that incorporated Tampa’s citizens. Indeed, the 1991 controversy seems to have forced Ye Mystic Krewe to shed even more of its elements of hierarchy, secrecy, and exclusivity as the local festival was thrust into the national spotlight. In its first years in the early twentieth century, a period where festivals often fell by the wayside with variations in the economy or public opinion, the Gasparilla Festival proved itself a success, becoming the most popular public spectacle for perpetuating Tampa’s growth and celebrating the city’s prominence in Florida and the New South.
In the first half of the twentieth century, two events dominated the historical landscape: World War I and World War II. The first conflict led to the creation of a calamity beyond comparison and scope. The rise of Nazi Germany has been a favorite topic of historians for decades following the end of hostilities in Europe, but Nazi Germany was not the only story of the period. The Allies stood in the face of a modernized German onslaught, but the Allies learned quickly and adapted to this form of warfare. Many countries learned new methods of destruction from one another. For example, the Japanese learned how to attack naval bases in shallow waters from the British, who did so to the Italian fleet anchored at Taranto. The lessons of war were not only found in the waters of Taranto. The American military was watching the events in Europe closely and started planning for the eventual conflict. At the same time, the American civilian population was also aware of the German Blitzkrieg and the success of the Panzer divisions. One such civilian was a Tampa resident by the name of Guy Hobson Allen.¹

Allen was a branch manager for the American Oil Company and a member of the American Legion, which was planning to write handbooks on civilian defense based on information from Britain. Allen was aware of the events transpiring in Europe and believed that he needed to do something to protect his home and country. It would be easy to judge Allen’s motivation to start a defense program as an opportunity to further his career in the oil business or bolster his own position in the community at large, but perhaps his time had a different outlook on life. Allen was a World War

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¹ Guy H. Allen to Claude Pepper, June 20, 1940, folder titled: 1940—Organizational Plans #1, “Florida Motorized Unit,” Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1. R. A. Gray Building, Florida State Archives, Tallahassee.
Iveteran and a family man. As a former soldier, he could be simply characterized as a patriotic man furthering the ideals of his country, but it was probably the sense of duty to his fellow citizens that drove him to start the Florida Motorcycle Escort Unit. This was Allen’s response to the German Panzer Blitzkrieg. He concluded that if the Nazis were able to strike quickly, the United States, if invaded, must be faster and better prepared.2

Allen was a motorcycle dispatch rider during World War I and was familiar with the vehicle’s advantages.3 In a letter to Florida senator Claude D. Pepper, he wrote, “I feel that we are in sore need of a modern cavalry mounted on motorcycles.”4 As early as 1940, Allen believed that the United States needed to defend itself against enemy attack from within and abroad. He feared the activities of Fifth Column groups that sought to further their political and military aims through sabotage.5 The goal of the motorcycle troops was to put down any Fifth Column uprising or any other disturbances made by “isms,” as well as coastal defense. Allen was elaborate in his description of what the troops would be capable of doing. For example, for coastal defense he outlined how the troops would be able to quickly move to the coastline of Florida to defend against enemy landings. The unit, using fast automobiles and trucks, would have antiaircraft guns in tow that could be used to shoot down enemy planes. He believed mobility was the key to a successful motorized cavalry.6

Allen reasoned that since Florida’s western coastline was only six hours from Mexico, defense was needed against parachute troops from these areas. It is unclear exactly how Allen came to this conclusion, but the concern was there. If enemy personnel did indeed land on American soil, he planned for the unit to participate in guerrilla warfare in order to disrupt enemy advancement. They could also be used as an advance unit in an effort to scout American troop routes, as well as provide flank and rear guard protection for military personnel. Lastly, Allen envisioned a unit that would be used as Engineer and Dynamite Squads, which would mine roads used by the opposition and attack disabled tanks and armored cars quickly and effectively. The possibilities, as evidenced by its author, were limited only by the imagination of the coordinator. He listed ten ways in which the troop could be used in a military setting. Allen’s outline appeared to be a wish list of things that could be done with a

3 “Tampa Motorcycle Riders Form Unit for Armed Defense,” Tampa Morning Tribune, August 26, 1940, folder titled: Sub-Division Publicity (Scrapbook), Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
4 Guy H. Allen to Claude Pepper, June 20, 1940, folder titled: 1940—Organizational Plans #1, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
6 Guy H. Allen to Claude Pepper, June 20, 1940, folder titled: 1940—Organizational Plans #1, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
motorized cavalry and expressed the ambition he had for the project. Before any of his wishes could be realized, Allen first had to find the right type of person to fill this position of protection.\(^7\)

The personnel of the motorized cavalry had to fit a certain profile. Allen wanted them to be recruited from “the ‘Cracker’ type young men of the South and the West for in those sections you find real Americans.”\(^8\) He did not want any men picked from foreign families even if they had been naturalized. His opinion was that the West and the South still produced tough men who would fight to the end for their country. As far as men from foreign families were concerned, Allen felt that the American government could not have any confidence in men “representing the melting pots of all nations.”\(^9\) Allen believed that the personnel outlined would form a motorized cavalry group that would renew the memory of J.E.B. Stuart, Nathan Bedford Forrest, and other historical cavalrymen.\(^10\)

According to Allen’s initial plan, when the troop was organized it would fall under the command of two different military branches, depending on the situation. First, he proposed that it could be organized under the National Guard so that, if needed, they could travel across state lines in times of emergency. If the situation proved more drastic, the unit could be commanded by the regular army, with the troop acting as part of the army reserves.\(^11\) This particular question about acknowledgment was the focus of Allen’s work during 1940 and 1941. He tried to receive some sort of recognition from either the state or the federal government. Allen sent the letter outlining his plan to Senator Pepper because he wanted Pepper to see if he could find a way to make this outfit part of the American military. Senator Pepper at the time was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and an interventionist. Allen wrote, “Please understand that the motive behind this move is purely patriotic and that again I would like to advise that if some form of official or semi-official recognition is made of these troops that I would like to turn the outfit over to an experienced Army officer who is trained in this type of service.”\(^12\) Pepper replied, commending Allen on his work and stating that he supported Allen’s efforts. Pepper’s support may have only been superficial, but an article from the September 5, 1940, Tampa Morning Tribune noted that Pepper had given a plan to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs regarding home guard units.\(^13\)

Senator Pepper was not the only person Allen contacted to try to get national recognition. Within his own company, American Oil, he corresponded with

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\(^7\) Ibid.  
\(^8\) Ibid.  
\(^9\) Ibid.  
\(^10\) Ibid.  
\(^11\) Ibid.  
\(^12\) Guy H. Allen to Claude Pepper, August 24, 1940, folder titled: 1941—Organization Plans #2, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.  
\(^13\) Claude Pepper to Guy H. Allen, August 30, 1940, folder titled: 1940—Organizational Plans #1, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
Lieutenant Colonel J. B. Osborn, who was a branch manager in Atlanta, Georgia. Allen hoped that Osborn could contact some people he knew in Washington D.C., and pass on the information about his proposed motorized cavalry. Osborn was later contacted by the U.S. military and informed that these types of cavalry units had already begun forming at Fort Knox in Kentucky and Forts Benning and Oglethorpe in Georgia. It was stated that they had been watching the events that had transpired in Europe and were responding accordingly.14 This letter signaled the end of Allen’s pursuit of affiliation with the U.S. military. He now turned his attention to the state of Florida.

Allen began his search for that recognition during the 1940 election year that witnessed Spessard Lindsey Holland’s victory in Florida’s gubernatorial race. Allen sought out Holland in an effort to gain some acknowledgment from the governor-elect. By that time, troops were organized in three cities, Tampa, St. Petersburg, and Orlando. Allen wanted the troops to get together and participate in the governor’s inauguration day parade.15 This was just one way that Allen tried to get the attention of

the governor-elect. In December 1940, Holland accepted an invitation from Allen to come and inspect the motorcycles troops. Allen wrote to Williams Salinas, member of the St. Petersburg troop, “You realize that this inspection will aid us greatly in getting some kind of recognition of our outfit from the Governor who will have charge of all future Home Guard organizations.”

Holland inspected the troops from Tampa and St. Petersburg. The group from Orlando was unable to attend. Holland was pleased with what he saw and took a copy of Allen’s file back to Tallahassee in order to discuss it with the State Defense Council. Allen later contacted Governor Holland to inform him that the Tampa troops had been organized through motorcycle clubs and that it would easy to use the same method throughout the state.

Allen did not stop at Governor Holland in his quest to become part of Florida’s defense. He contacted Florida’s adjutant general, Vivien B. Collins, to find out if they could be a part of the state guard. Allen told Collins he felt “sure that we can promise a representative group of riders from these cities to join the State Guard.” The State Guard did not take on the motorcycle troops as part of their organization. Allen’s group did not officially become a part of a state organization until May 1941, just a few months before the United States was hurled into the war by Japanese bombers. By that time, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had already called for a state of emergency and proposed the Lend-Lease Act, placing America in a more active role in the war. These efforts had an impact on the chances of Allen’s group getting recognized. The national government began planning for civil defense under the leadership of Fiorello H. LaGuardia, and Florida fell into line with the plan right away.

The State Defense Council was created in October 1940, when Governor Fred P. Cone called together a group of leaders representing the interests of the state to begin planning for civil defense. After Holland won the election, he set out to continue what Cone had started in late 1940. Holland approved of the men selected by Cone to head the council. By doing this, Holland was able to create continuity and nonpartisanship in the call for defense. In his message to the joint session of Congress in 1941, the governor called for volunteers and stated that they would be accepted for their merits. He believed that this would create an environment in which

all patriotic Americans could participate. Until the congressional session opened for business in April, the Defense Council was maintained by the Governor’s Emergency Fund, which gave them about $50,000. Holland believed that this amount could not sustain the organization and pleaded with the legislators to pass a bill that would create a Defense Council as part of the regular state activities until the national emergency was over. He further stated, “I beg to advise that this Act is sponsored by the American Legion and other patriotic societies and that its passage is strongly urged by our National Government and by the National Defense Agencies.”

House Bill 30, calling for the creation of a State Defense Council, passed on April 15, 1941, by a unanimous vote. This was the state office that Guy Allen had been anticipating.

Before Allen’s chase for governmental legitimacy, he began organizing a motorcycle troop in Tampa in July and August 1940. The majority of the members came from Tampa’s Gasparilla Motorcycle Club. Allen believed it would be easier to organize units from local clubs, because the members already knew each other and could be easily contacted en masse. He corresponded with L. W. Patrick, the president of the Florida Motorcycle Association (FMA), because he understood that Patrick was willing to assist in the formation of troops through various motorcycle clubs. In the beginning, Allen looked to use this idea to branch out onto the national level. The Gasparilla Motorcycle Club was charter member 545 of the American Motorcycle Association (AMA). E. C. Smith of the AMA liked the idea of forming motorcycle units. He stated, “It will certainly add much favorable publicity for your club as well as the sport in general, all because it is a worthwhile community effort.”

This particular option for Allen was not pursued with enough vigor to spread out nationally.

Allen focused on Florida’s motorcycle unit and its beginnings in the Gasparilla Motorcycle Club. He gave speeches attempting to rally the members to his cause. In an address given to the club on August 16, 1940, Allen expressed his fears that when the Nazis conquer Europe their next target would be the United States. He supported his assertion by stating that Nazis had been found in Argentina with rifles and ammunition. He truly believed that this proved that America would be a target and needed to defend itself. At this point Allen may have appeared paranoid, but he

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22 Ibid., 7.
24 Ibid., 91.
25 Guy H. Allen to L. W. Patrick, September 26, 1940, folder titled: L. W. Patrick—Chairman Motorcycle Escort Units, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
26 F. D. Wessner, secretary of Gasparilla Motorcycle Club, to Claude Pepper, August 24, 1940, folder titled: 1941—Organization Plans #2, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
27 E. C. Smith of the American Motorcycle Association (AMA), 8 East Long Street, Columbus, Ohio, to Gasparilla Motorcycle Club, 622 Zack Street, September 7, 1940, folder titled: 1940—Organizational Plans #1, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
was not alone. Many Americans believed that if Britain fell, the United States would be next. The general population was not privy to Hitler's real intention of invading the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Allen was able to rally the Gasparilla members to his cause and was able to form a troop of twenty-seven members. The majority of the men were married and about thirty years old. These were Allen's "Cracker type" men, and the group practiced infantry skills on Wednesday nights at Plant Park and on Sunday practiced fast and cross-country riding near the outskirts of Tampa.

Troop formations did not stop in Tampa; St. Petersburg, and Orlando also began to organize units. The St. Petersburg troop was led by Carl Plummer, and it was formed in the hope of becoming a part of the home guard unit there. At the time of Governor Holland's inspection, it had twenty members to its credit. In Orlando, Sidney Crenshaw, who worked for the Orlando Linen and Towel Supply Co., organized a unit. They were not ready for Holland's inspection, but at the time they had eighteen members. Allen hoped to expand troop mobilization to other cities in the state, but the creation of two other troops in the state without government assistance was quite an accomplishment. Not all of these tasks were simple because the draft and the need for traditional home guard units affected troop formation in early 1941.

Age restrictions created problems for Allen as early as October 1940. In a letter to Senator Pepper, he mentioned that since 90 percent of the membership was within the age restrictions of selective service, activities had been suspended until a solution could be determined. This sentiment was relayed to Governor Holland by Allen, who told the chief executive that the group would remain organized until "something definite could be arranged." This issue continued to plague the troop's existence. None of the evidence showed that something definite was ever arranged, but as will be seen later, many units had trouble maintaining their numbers because members were being picked for military service.

In the formation of a defense unit, some form of hierarchy must exist or the group would cease to be organized. Allen did not approach the situation without a plan of action. Since he had a military background, he relied on his previous experiences to incorporate a hierarchical command. While he was seeking national recognition,

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29 Guy H. Allen to L. W. Patrick, September 26, 1940.
30 "Motorcycle Corps Formed for Defense," August 26, 1940, folder titled: Sub-Division Publicity (Scrapbook), Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
31 William Salinas (St. Petersburg) to Guy H. Allen, November 20, 1940, folder titled: 1941—Organization Plans #2, Record Group 191, Series, 1316, Carton 1.
34 Guy H. Allen to Oscar Johnson, secretary to Senator Claude Denison Pepper, October 31, 1940, folder titled: 1941—Organization Plans #2, Record Group 191, Series, 1316, Carton 1.
Allen created a chain of command based on a military model. During a proposed wartime scenario, he decided cities such as Miami Beach, Tallahassee, Pensacola, and Jacksonville would have 250 men in their ranks.36 These individual groups would be officered by a captain, two first lieutenants, and four second lieutenants, and each troop would be under military regulation. These troops would then be divided into three squadrons. The chain of command based on military protocol was concurrent with his vision of a viable unit of the armed forces. This was also evident in the equipment that he proposed was needed for the troop.37

During the initial planning stages, Allen wanted the troops to be furnished with a variety of equipment including sidearms, grenades, gas masks, bowie knives, and ammunition bandoliers. It must be mentioned that the men in the troop provided their own motorcycles. The necessary items did not stop with the gear carried by troop members. Allen went on to explain how the motorcycles could be modified for combat. It was proposed that the motorcycles have shields for the motor and

36 The peacetime force would consist of 50 members.
37 Guy H. Allen to Claude Pepper, June 20, 1940.
tires, a front shield that extended above their heads with bulletproof glass, and also, if the motorcycle had a sidecar, it would be used to carry machine guns. These were to be heavily armored and armed motorcycle riders, but Allen did not stop there. In order to make them more self-sufficient in the field, he wanted armored trucks for a mechanic squad, field kitchen, ammunition supply, and radio station. This was quite an endeavor, but how realistic was this wish list, and what, in the end, did the motorcycle troop become?

After the motorcycle troop became part of the State Defense Council in May 1941, the plan went through a few changes and even expanded from a motorcycle troop to a unit that had trucks, emergency cars, and later a taxicab unit. The next installment of the proposal was a streamlined version of the one given to Senator Pepper. Allen reported to the senator that the State Defense Council had accepted his plan with a few modifications. The first state plan once again created a military hierarchy beginning with the overall command of a captain. This rank was followed by a first lieutenant, three second lieutenants, and a first sergeant. The motorcycle, emergency car, and auxiliary truck platoons were directly headed by one of the second lieutenants with a line sergeant communicating directly with the men in the platoon. This version of command did not vary greatly from the previous design.

The possible duties of this group were different than the earlier proposal given to Senator Pepper. Instead of a swift attack force, the motorcycle troop became an escort group. The purpose of the group now was to guard truck and car convoys within the state while focusing on speed in cases of emergency. Other possible duties were to include scouting, advanced patrols, guarding bridges during marches, and convoy coordination. The men in the platoon were supposed to have an excellent knowledge of the roads in their local area, which made them the best candidates to find the fastest route for military or other convoys in the case of emergency. Instead of being a frontline assault force, the units had been formed as a support group to make military operations move faster and more safely throughout the state.

Since the duties of the troop had changed, did the membership also adjust? In the original plan, Allen wanted “Cracker”-type southern men as well as those from the West. He wanted rough-and-tumble men who could weather the ills of war and who were between the ages of eighteen and thirty. The qualifications were made more succinct in the new version. It called for white males ages eighteen to forty-five who could pass a mental and physical examination, be an American in heart and mind, take an oath of allegiance, and never have belonged to any un-American organization. These qualifications allowed for only a select group of individuals to

38 Ibid.
40 Memorandum to All County Chairmen of the Division of Transportation and Communication, State Defense Council of Florida from Guy H. Allen, Bulletin no. 1, May 25, 1941, folder titled: 1940—Organizational Plans #1, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1, p. 3.
41 Ibid., 1.
join the Motorcycle Escort Unit. It was clear that the initial intention was not to allow African American or women to participate, but war can change everything. After a group of eighteen select white men were formed, a unit could be created. In order to do this, the unit had to be sponsored by three men of excellent reputation and standing in the community. The sponsor's role was to coordinate public events with the chairman of the unit. Allen stated that public relations were necessary for “building up prestige for the unit.” The sponsors were supposed to give legitimacy to the corps and use this to bring more members to the organization. An example of the type of people considered applicable sponsors were found in Tampa. They were Port Tampa mayor A. T. Rollins, former president of the Tampa Chamber of Commerce Frank M. Traynor, and former president of the Ybor City Chamber of Commerce John Diaz. These particular sponsorships were going to men who had strong ties in the community and could organize the necessary support for the troop. They could only be categorized as recruiters because they had no authority over how the unit was managed. This portion of the organization did not exist very long after the State Defense Council became involved.

Allen's project became part of the Defense Council’s Division of Transportation and Communication. Under that title, the actual group came under the heading of Subdivision of Motor Escort and Transportation, with Cody Fowler, a lawyer from Tampa, as the chairman. After receiving Allen's proposal in May 1941, Fowler made a few modifications and sent out a finalized version of the organizational plan on July 2, 1941. Fowler's revisions structured the group under the guidelines of the state-recognized plan. The motorcycle troops were considered a civilian operation and not military. Therefore, military titles would no longer be used in reference to those in charge, and it was also unnecessary for the unit to participate in formation drills. Its objective was to stay organized and be ready to be called a moment's notice. The leadership of the escort unit now consisted of group leaders and chiefs with directors and assistant directors over them. This seemed to take the military luster out of the motorcycle corps. No longer would they be seen as the frontline group, but in the end Allen accomplished his goal of setting up a defense force that, if necessary, could save lives.

The plan sent out by Fowler did not greatly change the duties of the Motor Escort Unit or the qualifications for membership. It did eliminate the need for sponsors. The County Defense Council chairmen became the new recruiters, and

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 2.
44 Clipping from *Tampa Daily Times*, August 26, 1940, folder titled: 1941—Organization Plans #2, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
45 Memorandum to All County Chairmen of the Division of Transportation and Communication, State Defense Council of Florida from Guy H. Allen, Bulletin no. 1, May 25, 1941, 2.
46 Memorandum to All County Chairmen of the Division of Transportation and Communication, State Defense Council of Florida from Cody Fowler, July 2, 1941, folder titled: 1940—Organizational Plans #1, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
they used vehicle registrations to find potential volunteers for the unit. This idea did
pose problems for organizers in later years because the numbers on paper did not
always match usable participants. Along with the changes in Allen’s original plan
came the organization of car units. When the unit was still referred to as Motor
Patrol and Transportation, a memorandum was sent out detailing the organization
of automobile units. Allen had never ignored the necessity of cars, but the unit
structure created by this helped solidify the use of cars.47 The subdivision maintained
this organization through 1942, but made some minor alterations, which included
changing the Emergency Car Group into an Automobile Unit. The Auxiliary Truck
Group moved out of the subdivision, and the Taxicab Unit took its place. The
Subdivision of Motor Escort and Transportation became a group that would assist in
evacuations, first aid, supplies, and convoy assistance. Despite all of this organization
and the numbers on paper, the State Defense Council did not know exactly what the
group was capable of doing. They got their first and only real test in the mobilization
and movement toward Winter Haven.

In December 1941, orders went out to the county chairmen of the Division
of Transportation and Communication calling for the mobilization of their units

47 Memorandum to chairman, Division of Transportation and Communications, from Cody Fowler,
chairman, Division of Transportation and Communications, folder titled: Advisory Board M.P.T.—
Bulletins—Sub-Division, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
and their movement to Winter Haven on Sunday, January 11, 1942. Eleven counties and 740 vehicles—including 68 motorcycles—participated in the event. After the units mobilized and made their way to Winter Haven, they traveled into the city and paraded through the town. It was not clear exactly why Winter Haven was chosen as the place for this to occur. It did not seem to have any value as a military target, and it was not a place vital to the security of Florida. The only thing of significance there was that Governor Holland’s brother and personal representative to the State Defense Council, Frank L. Holland, lived in that town. It was quite possible that the organizers of the event felt it was relevant to bring the units to him for review. Regardless of the motives for picking Winter Haven, the organizers needed the test mobilization to determine if there were any problems or defects that needed to be handled.

In order to make sure that everything went well, Cody Fowler sent out field orders to the county chairmen so that they knew exactly what to do, where to go, and how to get there. Part of these orders dealt with the rules of the march. The order of the march, the distance between vehicles, and the speed of motorcade were all established before the units were called to participate. For example, the summary of rules sent to James L. Ferman, chairman of the Hillsborough County Division of Transportation and Communication, clearly outlined vehicle placement within the column. It started with the county division chairman’s car in the lead followed by the subdivision chairman and his staff. Then the Motorcycle Units followed them with the Auxiliary Truck and Car Units in tow. This large group had two motorcycle scouts ahead of them in order to monitor road conditions and alert them to any problems they might encounter.

Not only was the order of the march strenuously demarcated, but so were the speed and the spacing of the cars. The units were supposed to be fast and safe at the same time because wrecked vehicles were not useful. The maximum speed set for the exercise was forty miles per hour. Each vehicle was to maintain a distance twice the amount of its speed in feet. For example, if a car were traveling at twenty miles per hour, it would have to maintain a distance of forty feet between it and the car in front of it. That spacing was just between the cars in the group. Each team had to remain ninety feet away from another team, groups had to be 120 feet apart, and units had to be 150 feet apart. This was how the columns should maintain their formation, and it required discipline and practice that had not occurred on this scale.

48 The counties that participated were Hillsborough, Polk, Pinellas, Pasco, Sarasota, Manatee, DeSoto, Hardee, Osceola, Indian River, and Highlands.
50 Cody Fowler to James L. Ferman, December 28, 1941, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
51 Ibid.
The test mobilization took place in three different columns traveling to Winter Haven. Each column had set criteria and a route to travel so that one group could connect with another as they traveled to their destination. For example, Column #1 originated in Pinellas County and traveled State Road 17 and State Road 2. The group was due to arrive in Plant City in order to meet up with the Plant City and Tampa units. All of these movements were placed on a schedule. Then they proceeded east on State Road 17 through Lakeland and stopped in Auburndale to meet up with the unit from Pasco County. The entire group then moved along State Roads 17 and 2 until they arrived at their final destination outside Winter Haven. There were detailed instructions on how to meet, where each group should be in reference to the column, and how long to wait at each point. Columns 2 and 3 received similar directions, and all of them were supposed to end up outside Winter Haven, where they would be assembled for a parade through the city.  

While these units were mobilizing, ten airplanes with ten observers and four passengers circled above, watching the movement of the convoy below. The observers were supposed to report on whether the units arrived at their assigned points on time, conditions of the formations, mishaps en route, safety precautions when columns halted, number of vehicles in column, and any other information they felt might be important. Planes flew out of the Tampa airport and traveled toward Winter Haven and observed on their way. Then they landed in Winter Haven and gave a report to Al R. Hathaway, chairman of aviation participation. The pilots then took off again and went toward Auburndale and observed the column once again. The observers then landed a second time to give another report before taking off and returning to Tampa.  

After the test mobilization, Allen had all of the reports compiled and sent out a memo indicating issues of concern. The problems that occurred during the test were not of great significance. It must be remembered that this was a civilian group whose members may or may not have a military background, so they may not have been used to responding to certain commands. Most of the issues that arose were lack of timing, not responding to the forward march call, confusion, and spacing. These mistakes were probably caused by lack of practice in a large-scale scenario, but there were two incidents that caused some concerns about safety. The first was that some of the participants arrived under the influence of alcohol, which helps to explain the problems of spacing, and the second was that when a column halted on the side of the road, the participants got out of their cars and congregated in the middle of the road, becoming a traffic hazard. Even with these minor issues, the Winter Haven test mobilization was considered successful, and the lessons learned were valuable for future operations. 

53 General Instructions, folder titled: Test Mobilization—Winter Haven (Reports), Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
mobilization was considered a success.\textsuperscript{54} Cody Fowler remarked about the event, “this mobilization proves that this division is not a ‘paper’ organization.”\textsuperscript{55}

The test mobilization was a high point for the Subdivision of Motor Escort and Transportation, but as the war became more demanding of the resources of the United States, the makeup of the units began to change. In order for a country to be successful in a time of war, it needed the participation of all its citizens as a team. Nobody could be left on the sideline because some people in society did not regard them as worthy. The units in late 1942 and into 1943 began to lose valuable members to military service. This was one of the problems that it faced in its maintenance of their membership strength. The Florida state government realized the necessity of bringing everyone together for a common cause. Women were brought into the defense council during its early stages of planning in order to deal with the needs of health and home. African Americans were later asked to help organize their communities for civil defense in 1941, which some had already started doing. The motorcycle escort units were not an all-white male organization. Even though the initial call for members was directed specifically to white men, African American men also became part of the organization along with women.

In the days before the American entrance into the war, the question of how to bring in the African American community was one of the items discussed by Governor Holland and Frank Holland. The latter stated that African Americans would be “extremely important in labor and other auxiliary groups, may present a terrific problem in morale if we are actually subjected to a severe attack, and as a class are the most fertile field for subversive propaganda by enemies of our nation.”\textsuperscript{56} He believed that blacks would be an important source of labor, but at the same time did not trust that they would support their country. It was a mistake to think that blacks did not view the United States as their country. This was evident in the correspondence between Allen and L. W. Patrick from Miami. In a letter dated December 29, 1941, Patrick wrote: “I have been approached by the Colored district asking to help set up a motorcycle unit of colored riders only.”\textsuperscript{57} Why would African Americans volunteer to start a unit if they did not feel that their country was in danger? Allen replied to the letter by stating: “The colored question is being considered now. There will be a definite place for them in this work. Just keep in contact with them until you receive


\textsuperscript{56} Memorandum to Spessard L. Holland from Frank L. Holland, June 20, 1941, folder titled: Gov. Holland Defense Council, State–1941, Box 24, FF 9, Record Group 102, Series 406, Box 24: 1941–1944.

\textsuperscript{57} L. W. Patrick to Guy H. Allen, December 29, 1941, folder titled: Advisory Board M.P.T.—Bulletins—Sub-Division, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
definite ruling from the council.”

In early 1942, Patrick did begin to organize the black riders in Miami along the lines of the state defense plans. He wrote:

Mr. Allen back to this colored subject again, it seems that when there is a job to be done the colored people are most always the first to complete the job that has been assigned to them, now don’t get the idea that I love them but you must give credit to them for being patriotic. These people wanted the motorcycle boys in uniforms and raise money to get same. No white people have even thought to [do] such a thing here as yet.

This comment was in direct contrast with the ideas of Frank Holland. The African American population in Florida was not a foreign group that happened to live in America. They were Americans living in Florida.

On October 28, 1941, the State Defense Council approved a plan that started the organization of blacks in Florida. The resolution stated that all programs needed

This photograph, likely taken in Miami in 1942, shows nine members of the African American motorcycle escort unit, including one woman (seen sharing the second motorcycle from the right).

58 Guy H. Allen to L.W. Patrick, December 31, 1941.
59 L.W. Patrick to Guy H. Allen, February 2, 1942.
to be extended to blacks. This was justified because blacks composed one-third of the total population of Florida. The information bulletin stated that neglecting blacks meant overlooking “numerous . . . patriotic citizens,” and it would be a “costly loss of willing assistance.”\(^{61}\) This call for participation did not direct the activities, but it created a situation in which blacks could work with local and county organizations. This resolution created the Negro Defense Committee headed by Florida A & M College president John Robert Edward Lee.\(^{62}\) Following these events, counties began organizing local African American taxicab units. For example, three units were formed in Monroe County, four in Marion County, and one in Leon County. In April 1942, it was reported that Leon County had completely organized the African American Escort Cars and Drivers. Several different counties saw the creation of black taxicab units and automobile units, and in Dade County two motorcycle escort units were created.\(^{63}\) This proved that blacks were willing to take an active part in the defense of the country as well as the state. Lastly, in 1943 President Lee reported that the organization of blacks in the state had gone well. He stated, “Negroes in Florida have gone ‘all out’ for defense.”\(^{64}\)

During World War II, women played a significant role in the defense of the nation and the buildup of wartime industries. This was as true in Florida as elsewhere in the United States. From the beginning of the organization of the motorcycle troops by Allen in 1940, women participated in the unit. Seven women from the Gasparilla Motorcycle Club’s ladies auxiliary signed applications to join the Tampa troop.\(^{65}\) In 1942, the only female member of the Tampa troop under the Subdivision of Motor Escort and Transportation was Evelyn Harger. Her husband, John Harger, was the director of the unit.\(^{66}\) This did not mean that she rode around on the back of his motorcycle and was considered a member. She had her own motorcycle and was her own member. All over the state, women were becoming part of the defense force. This occurred more in the car units though, especially when circumstances forced organizers to use women instead of men.

This occurred in Dixie County, where 866 automobiles were registered for defense, and 81 of them were driven by women. When Allen found out about this, he wanted to know if county chairman W. R. Pratt was taking his job seriously.\(^{67}\)

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\(^{61}\) Memorandum to Council Chairmen and Secretaries, from George L. Burr Jr., executive director, Informational Bulletin no. 4, November 10, 1941.

\(^{62}\) Ibid.


\(^{66}\) “Tampa Motorcycle Escort Unit Does Speedy Efficient Job,” Tampa Daily Times, July 27, 1942, folder titled: Sub-Division Publicity (Scrapbook).

\(^{67}\) Guy H. Allen to Cody Fowler, February 16, 1942, folder titled: Dixie County—Cross City, FL., Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
Pratt’s response was that most of the automobiles in Dixie County were being used to transport workers to the local mills, whose business was 75 percent defense contracts. Since the county was thinly populated and most of men were working defense jobs, he decided that the best and only way to accomplish the task at hand was to enlist women. Allen replied that Pratt had done an excellent job considering the adversity that he faced. Allen wrote, “Results are the things that will count most from here on out.” He also wanted Pratt to send him a picture of the women’s unit and expressed his appreciation for their spirit. Surprisingly, Allen was not any more understanding about the women’s car unit formed in Quincy under the direction of Gadsden county chairman T. P. Harvard. The unit was led by Mary Celia Davidson, and it was comprised of thirty-eight cars. After he received the report, he told the chairman of the automobile unit, motorcycle unit, and taxicab unit that Harvard needed some guidance in his organization. Even though some disapproved of certain roles for women, the fact remained that they were an essential part of the defense of Florida because without everyone participating, the numbers needed could not have been achieved.

Even with all of this unity, the Subdivision faced problems that could not be controlled. As they later found out, war industries need everyday resources. The two main resource problems that affected them were tire and gasoline shortages. As early as 1942, the group began to feel the pinch when it came to tires. Allen hoped that the federal government would give them some relief because they were part of the defense force. He also asked for some sort of modification of the law that would allow his units to get tires, especially for the motorcycle riders. He felt that if they were not allowed to get tires, they would be forced to disband. This problem, coupled with gasoline shortages, made it difficult for the unit to function and practice like they did in Winter Haven. In an article from the *Tampa Morning Tribune* Allen urged people not to get discouraged because of the gas and tire shortages. He told people not to sign up for conflicting duty even though they were not able to practice at this time. He said that even though they feel as if they were doing nothing, they were helping the war effort just by staying organized and allowing themselves to be called at a moment’s notice.

68 W. R. Pratt, chairman, Dixie County Division of Transportation and Communications, to Guy H. Allen, February 19, 1942.
71 Guy H. Allen to Don McKay, chairman, Automobile Unit, L. W. Patrick, chairman, Motorcycle Escort, and Erskine W. Landis, Chairman, Taxicab Unit, July 1, 1942–Subject Gadsden County M. E. & T.
72 Guy H. Allen to L. W. Patrick, district chairman, Subdivision of Motor Escort and Transportation of Transportation and Communication, February 10, 1942, folder titled: Advisory Board M.P.T.—Bulletins—Sub-Division, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
74 "Auto Defense Units Urged Not to Become Impatient," *Tampa Morning Tribune*, March 28, 1942, folder titled: Sub-Division Publicity (Scrapbook), 16.
Apathy was another problem that Allen had to face. In the beginning, people were willing to join due to outrage over the tragedy at Pearl Harbor, but as time passed the sentiment faded. In a letter from Harry F. Stearns, Hillsborough county chairman of the Motor Escort Unit, he stated that he only had about ten members who were willing to make the personal sacrifices necessary to maintain their position in the unit. He complained that some were taking defense halfheartedly and only attended meetings when it was convenient. Stearns wrote that one man said, “Uncle Sam never did anything for him, why should he do anything for Uncle Sam.”\(^75\) Stearns asked him to leave. The same sort of difficulties occurred in Pensacola as well. The chairman there stated that it was “difficult to make the population here, away from actual submarine sinkings and similar disasters, realize there is a war going on.”\(^76\) This, along with the fact that most of the people in the town were part of the Navy, made it difficult to recruit in Pensacola. Apathy and loss of members to the draft made maintenance of the unit an arduous task.

\(^{75}\) Memo from Harry F. Stearns, chairman of Motorcycle Escort Unit, Hillsborough County, n.d., folder titled: 1943—Various Activities, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.

\(^{76}\) Brown Rainwater, chairman, Transportation and Communications, Escambia County Defense Council, to Guy H. Allen, April 29, 1942, folder titled: Escambia County—Pensacola.
By 1943 and 1944, the need for the Motor Escort Unit began to diminish. The tide of the war had turned in favor of the Allies, and fear of a German or Japanese invasion had lessened. It is difficult to determine exactly when the group formally dissolved, but the correspondence and memos for the group lessened dramatically in 1943 and disappeared in 1944. Guy Allen created a civil defense force in his free time, and it was propelled from a local organization into a viable state defense unit. Allen was not seeking to promote his company or himself to any large degree. He did receive recognition for his work by being named chairman of the Subdivision of Motor Escort and Transportation, but he did not start it for titles. Allen was a soldier who remembered the horrors of World War I and was keenly aware of the terrible things taking place in Europe in 1939 and 1940, and how those events had affected the civilian population more than the events of the first war. He was a man of duty and believed that as a citizen of the United States, it was in his power to protect it any way he could. World War II made many people rise up and join the team for victory.
In 1898 officers headed to the newly erupting conflict between the United States and Spain in Cuba were handed a valuable piece of information. Entitled “Military Notes on Cuba” and issued by the Adjutant General’s Office, Military Information Division (MID), this document provided the young commanding officers with valuable data on nearly every important city, railroad, harbor, etc. on that long-suffering island. The intelligence gathered to create this useful and carefully documented volume came from our military attaché’s, the Spanish archives (and those of other countries), consular reports, travelers and numerous unnamed “insurrectionists” both in and outside of Cuba, many living in Tampa. Its compilation began with the efforts of Captain (later Brigadier General) George P. Scriven of the Army Signal Corps in 1892, a full three years before the outbreak of the revolution of 1895. Scriven not only gave a picture of the physical characteristics but also an explanation of the Cuban railway system, Cuba’s topography and it contained a general discussion of the military situation on the island. Some personal reconnaissance was also included in the volume but its most important components came from Cubans. As Colonel Bruce W. Bidwell has explained in his “History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff,” (the unpublished version), “In addition to this source, a well-organized Cuban Nationalist Junta had been functioning in New York City ever since 1868. Having engineered the still smouldering revolt against Spanish rule which opened in 1895, its members remained perfectly willing at all times to furnish the War Department with desired
information about the Caribbean area. When supplemented by a considerable amount of further research along similar lines, these two main sources enabled the Military Information Division, AGO, in June 1898, to publish a very comprehensive pamphlet entitled “Military Notes on Cuba …” This book was placed “at the disposal of every officer” of the Army headed to that troubled land.¹

The gathering of military intelligence by the U. S. Army in an organized, bureaucratic sense did not begin until Adjutant General R. C. Drum, on his own initiative, established the Military Intelligence Division in the fall of 1885. This was three years after the U. S. Navy had created its own intelligence agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Like the Navy the Army was very soon attaching Military Attaches to our foreign legations throughout most of Europe and the major capitals in Latin America and Asia. Drum created the MID from the Reservations Division of the Miscellaneous Branch of the Office of the Adjutant General. He placed the new organization under the command of Major William J. Volkmar, the chief of the Miscellaneous Branch. The assignment of the new agency was to gather as much information as it “deemed useful and beneficial to the Army at large.”² Maps were gathered in great quantities from all available sources both at home and abroad and checked against each other for accuracy and other fine points that may be strategically useful. Reports from the newly appointed attaches also added to the depth of the Division’s knowledge and these officers were required to search newspapers, reports, libraries, archives for useful data and to question travelers about things they witnessed or saw in the country while visiting. The Division’s avid collecting demanded that the space and numbers allotted to it should be increased which soon brought it to the attention of the head of the Signal Corps who felt it was his office’s duty to collect this data. The infighting soon became very bitter and counterproductive.³

Briefly told the Signal Corps under the dynamic leadership of Brigadier General Adolphus W. Greely was certain that it had been assigned the duty of intelligence gathering and was not willing to share the responsibility. Greely based his assumption on an act of Congress passed in October of 1890 stating that the Signal Corps would “collect information for the Army by telegraph and otherwise.” By the beginning of 1892 Greely was ready to put up a full fight for this duty. Unfortunately for him, Drum had the strong support of Secretary of War, Stephen Elkins, and Lieutenant General of the Army, John M. Schofield who was then the Commanding General of the Army. By March 1892 the War Department General Orders were issued that gave the task of gathering “military intelligence” to the MID. Not only was the Division given this daunting task but it was also assigned the duties of making and

² Bruce W. Bidwell. History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff: 1775-1941. Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1986. 54-55.
³ Ibid., 55.
issuing all military maps, books and instructions for use by the Army and militia officers and State troops. It was also to develop and prepare plans for mobilization and the transportation of volunteer units and State troops “and for the concentration of the military forces of the United States at the various strategic points on or near the frontiers of the country.” In other words the MID was to take on the functions of a smaller General Staff, which the United States had not yet implemented. Under the leadership of Major Arthur L. Wagner the Division soon began organizing for these tasks with a staff of eleven officers in addition to forty state based officers and sixteen military attaches. One of the most strategically placed attaches was Captain Tasker Bliss whose reports from Madrid, when added to the information provided by the Junta and exiled Cubans in Florida, allowed the Army to compute, “with unusual accuracy” the actual strength of the Spanish Army units located throughout Cuba.\(^4\) Wagner’s men also cooperated with the Secret Service in identifying Spanish

spies attempting to infiltrate American units headed for Cuba in Tampa after the war began.5

The Navy also was just beginning its intelligence service in this era and had actually preceded the Army’s organization by a couple of years. The emphasis here was also with the attaches and their duties overseas. The Office of Naval Intelligence was created as a part of the Bureau of Navigation in 1882. There had been a movement within the naval establishment to modernize the United States Navy and a wide recognition of its decline since the Civil War in comparison to other navies. The reformers included Admiral Stephen B. Luce, Captain French Chadwick, W. W. Kimball, Charles C. Rogers and a young officer just then entering the main part of his career, Alfred T. Mahan. The first chief of the office was Lieutenant Theordorus Bailey Myers Mason, a widely traveled and savvy collector of data. At first, Mason tried to work with the established Naval Institute but found that this was too cumbersome and the participants were interested in the mechanical modernization but not intelligence gathering and distribution. Mason worked well with his bureau chief, Commodore John Grimes Walker, who appreciated his subordinate’s talents and tenacity. They were fortunate in having William H. Chandler as the new Secretary of the Navy who supported most of their efforts. At the 25 July 1882 meeting between Mason and Chandler the Secretary outlined a plan to gather intelligence, compile, record and correct information and he created fourteen categories into which each type of intelligence would be placed and organized. Following a period of political interference with the intelligence gathering by Under Secretary of the Navy James Russell Soley, the ONI underwent a dramatic change for the better with the appointment of French E. Chadwick as the new chief in 1892. Budget cuts in the election year of 1892 did not enhance the gather of intelligence preparatory to the war with Spain. The attaché staff was cut and the collection of overseas intelligence fell as a result. Chadwick did not have a chance to reform or improve the product since he was in only for about a year. The second Cleveland administration did not have its eyes on collecting intelligence since it opposed the Republican expansionist program and was forced to deal with the Panic of 1893-94, domestic violence, labor disputes and inflation. Luckily, ONI had one ally in the new administration, Secretary of the Navy Hilary Herbert. Herbert allowed observers to go into the Sino-Japanese War area and sent intelligence agents to observe the harbor at Rio de Janeiro during the Brazilian rebellion of 1893-94. Herbert allowed ONI to dispatch attaches and others throughout Latin America, including Venezuela where the United States had a major disagreement with Great Britain. Despite the presence of a report that Spain had approached Great Britain about a possible anti-United States alliance, the ONI did not become involved in the immediate planning for naval operations in the Atlantic, Caribbean or Asia. Not until Lieutenant Commander Richard Wainwright took over ONI with the new McKinley administration did the office begin to gear for war.

5 Jeffreys-Jones, 26.
Wainwright shared many ideas with the old reformers with whom he had graduated from the Naval Academy and with the new Under Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt. In agreement with Mahan, Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and others, Wainwright shared the “large picture” concept.\(^6\)

Wainwright had to face the immediate task of getting vast amounts of information ready for distribution. Japanese interest in Hawaii had been brought to the fore with the pressure of the Hawaiian Revolution, the large Asiatic population in the islands and the development of U. S. interests in the Asian market and expansion. At the same time the German fleet had increased dramatically under the skillful guidance of Admiral Von Terpitz. Disputes with Great Britain over seals in the Pacific Northwest, Venezuela’s boundary and other little problems made the increasingly important Anglo-Saxon alliance between the United States and Britain unlikely although paraded constantly in the press and popular magazines.

By the advent of the McKinley administration the situation in Cuba was rapidly heating up. The war had begun in 1895 and was dragging on with neither side the apparent winner. The limited resources of Spain were being rapidly used up as was its eligible military-age population. With the beginnings of the revolution in the Philippines the end was clearly on the horizon. Getting information to answer policy questions and military inquiries meant that the ONI (and the other intelligence agencies) would have to greatly increase their presence. At the same time, the Naval War College was organizing and planning for the coming war by producing numerous scenarios that could be applied given certain situations. ONI was called upon to supplement the information available at the college and to quietly assist in implementing the plans should war come about in the near future. One of the major problems was where to focus the attention. In response to some alarming reports and Roosevelt’s public statements more attention was actually paid to German aims than those of Spain. Not until the sinking of the *Maine* was the attention entirely drawn to war with Spain.\(^7\)

ONI relied heavily upon the reports of attaches during this crucial period, especially those stationed in Europe. From Madrid Lieutenant Commander George L. Dyer reported in 1897 the Spanish rumors of war against the United States. The Spaniards, according to Dyer, had full faith in their squadrons and believed that if an encounter should take place they could defeat the U. S. Navy and destroy our commerce. Brash talk in Spanish circles of attacking the American coastline was also bandied about in Madrid. From Germany came the warnings of Albert Niblack that Spain had purchased two Italian cruisers more heavily armed than the *New York*, thought to be the best in the U. S. Navy. Roosevelt required ONI to produce a number of papers on coaling stations, fire power of opposing vessels, cruising range of


\(^7\) Ibid., 55-59.
both our ships and those of Spain, and other vital intelligence for military planning. With the small staff allotted over the recent years and the many areas to be explored it is no surprise that the intelligence system was not up to the standards of the day and both the Navy and Army had much to learn in a very short time.8

Tensions with the government of Spain in Cuba were adding to the increased need for information. Many Cubans had migrated to the United States primarily to go into business to assist their families and friends back home. Many of these men and women brought back information concerning conditions in Cuba and the problems of the Spanish administration and army. This led to the arrest of numerous individuals who held such citizenship and put the United States in an awkward position relative to the disposition of their cases. The arrest in 1896 of Mark (Marcos) E. Rodriguez, Luis Someillan y Azpeitia and Luis Smoeillan y Vidal created such a sensation that the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs investigated the matter. Rodriguez was taken in broad daylight while boarding the Olivette, of the Plant Steamship Line, for a return trip to Tampa. All three men were arrested and

8  Ibid., 60-62.
charged with sedition and rebellion. Senator Wilkerson Call of Florida led the charge to get these men released and returned to their families. Just what information these men could pass on is in question but the Spanish government was sure that they were spies assisting the rebels and refused to release them in a timely matter.9

When it came to raising the diplomatic and emotional heat no one was better suited to the task than the great Cuban revolutionary, Jose Marti. Much has been written about this intriguing figure but one of the most important services he performed for his country was in getting the people of Florida, and especially Tampa, directly involved in supporting the revolution. As historian Joan Steffy has written: “Thus it was Tampa which became the catalyst for the movement to join all Cubans in the struggle for independence. It was in Tampa that Marti proposed his ideals of national unity, of democratic revolutionary activity, and the joining of all groups under a common banner.” It was also in Tampa where the Spanish government allegedly attempted to assassinate the writer-turned-revolutionary by poisoning his wine. From that time on each visit to Tampa found him in the home of Ruperto and Paulina Pedroso, an African-Cuban couple whom Marti trusted. Marti’s interest in Tampa was the cigar-workers and their associations. In these he found followers and contributors to the extent that the money donated by the people of Tampa and Key West grossed more than that received from all other Latin American countries combined. Almost all of the funds raised went to the purchase of arms, ammunition and medical supplies for the revolutionary army in Cuba.10

Tampa was looked upon as “the very heart of the American conspiracy,” to free Cuba from Spanish control.11 It was in Tampa that Marti announced the creation of the Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC) and the place where the party organization began to take shape in the form of many localized “juntas”. Many of the local juntas, organized by the cigar workers and some of the manufacturers, were actively involved in fund raising and campaigning on behalf of Cuban independence. More directly some of the juntas in Tampa and elsewhere “coordinated support of filibustering expeditions leaving Florida for Cuba.”12 That these organizations were infiltrated by Spanish spies is undoubted but they were remarkably tight in their local security measures.

One of the stories of clandestine warfare, the notification of the revolutionaries in Cuba that the “grito de Guerra” was to begin, was sent wrapped in a special cigar marked by two tine yellow specks by Blas O’Halloran in the O’Halloran cigar factory in West Tampa. Miguel Angel Duque de Estrada carried the message through the

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10 Joan Marie Steffy. “The Cuban Immigrants of Tampa, Florida: 1886-1898.” Masters Thesis, University of South Florida, 1975, 43-74. The author would like to thank Consuelo Stebbins at the University of Central Florida for sharing her work regarding the Cuban Revolutionary parties in Tampa and Key West during this time period.
11 Steffy, 78.
tight Spanish customs office and delivered the message to Juan Galberto Gomez who set the final date for February 24, 1895.\textsuperscript{15} Recent scholarship and the publication in Havana of Juan Gualberto Gomez’s memoirs have brought to light the facts in this matter. In actuality the message was too large for any cigar to hold and it did not go through the closely watched Tampa Juntas but it was sent through the more tightly controlled Cuban Convention in Key West. The chain of curriers began with Gonzola de Quedada in New York through to Juan de Barrios thence to Manuel de la Cruz who delivered the final message in Cuba to Gomez. Although these men were known to the Spanish officials their quick and silent work within the growing network made their mission a success.\textsuperscript{14}

Publication of the Spanish correspondence between its Consuls and the Ministry of Ultramar by Dr. Consuelo E. Stebbins indicates the intensity of the intrigue at this stage. Since many of the revolutionaries were participants in the Ten Years War it was somewhat easier to follow them and report on their contacts in Tampa and Key West. In a report dated March 8, 1895, Pedro Solis, the Consul in Key West noted: “This consulate is closely observing and reporting on the activities of the Separatists, not only in Key West but also in Tampa and other cities in Florida. Since I assumed the responsibility of this office several years ago, I have maintained constant surveillance of the insurgents, and I have sent detailed reports of their plans to Cuba and Washington D. C. …” Solis then noted the eminent threat of an expedition to be led by Generals Carlos Roloff and Serafin Sanchez. It left Big Pine Key and landed in Las Villas province on July 24, 1895. Even with foreknowledge the consul could do little but inform those in charge of enforcement.\textsuperscript{15} The documents clearly show an active consular service but also the constant frustration it experienced in trying to halt the numerous filibustering expeditions or the revolutionary fund raising especially by the cells of the Central Revolutionary Council in Key West or the numerous clubs in Tampa.\textsuperscript{16} Even when Enrique Collazo was “organizing a council of war in Tampa,” the frustrated consul, M. R. Esudero, was advised not to even press charges as it would be a waste of time and money. Convinced that this assessment of the situation was accurate the consul did not press for charges knowing that no conviction could be won against the insurgents who had the support of the populace in both Key West and Tampa.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{13} Steffy., 79-80.
\textsuperscript{14} Consuelo E. Stebbins. “Key West Declares War on Spain.” Unpublished paper delivered to the Florida Historical Society annual meeting, Clearwater, Florida, May 26, 2007. See also Juan Gualberto Gomez. Por Cuba Libre, Havana: 1905, 348-349; and Manuel Deulofeu. Marti, Cayo Hueso y Tampa. Cienfuegos. ND. 285. The author would like to thank Dr. Stebbins for her assistance in seeing these sources and sharing her work in progress.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 177-233.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 232.
This map shows the proximity of the various encampments, the docks at Port Tampa City and the City of Tampa. Henry Plant’s single track railroad, connecting Tampa and Port Tampa, was overwhelmed by the number of people and amount of supplies that had to travel its nine-mile length.
Filibustering relied upon secrecy and tact in the face of constant observation. The Ten Year War had proven that the Spanish Navy could not stop all such traffic and this was to be true in the War for Independence too. However, Marti and company were not always successful in getting their arms and supplies to their compatriots in Cuba. In one of the most conspicuous captures made by the Spanish and American customs agents during the period before United States intervention the insurrectionists were stopped in mid-shipment in Fernandina. Simply put the plot at hand was the smuggling of arms and ammunition to Cuba through the sleepy port of Fernandina, which had little in the way of military shipping in early 1895. Marti, using the name of D. E. Mantell, a wealthy “Englishman” about to sail on a cruise to the West Indies, chartered the yacht Lagonda through the good offices of his friend, Nathaniel Barnett Borden, a prominent Fernandina businessman. Borden’s warehouse held a number of ammunition crates variously labeled and destined for the Lagonda. Two other vessels were hired for the adventure, the Amadis, out of Rockland, Maine, and tramp steamer Baracoa then in harbor at Boston. The latter was hired out to one “Abe Moreas of Tampa. The claim of Borden was that around two hundred men, laborers, would be picked up at various ports in the West Indies and transported to work on one of the islands, name unspecified. Such uncertainty aroused the suspicions of one of the captains. The New York World got wind of the sailing of the Lagonda and alerted its Fernandina correspondent, T. A. Hall, to be on the look out for anything suspicious because rumor on the New York docks had it that a filibustering expedition might be sailing from the quiet port. Hall, a county judge, showed this dispatch to the local Collector of Customs, George L. Baltzell who began to pay closer attention to the comings and goings of some newly arrived vessels. In New York City, an informant, James Batewell, wrote to Secretary of the Treasury John G. Carlisle, that the Lagonda and the Amadis had been chartered for a filibustering expedition. The fate of the expedition was therefore sealed before the arrival of the final ship. The agents of the customs service, including special agent S. W. Paul of Tampa, descended upon Borden’s warehouse and seized the vessels in the harbor. The expedition had been crushed. However, it did have a positive impact on the Cuban cause and, as historian Antonio Rafael de la Cova has noted, it inspired the cause with greater energy and determination to organize even more expeditions to obtain national independence for Cuba.18

For many in the United States the first real indication that the nation had an intelligence network was the assignment given to Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan. Rowan was perfect for the job which entailed getting into Cuba, making contact with General Calixto Garcia Iniguez, commander of Cuban forces in the eastern end of the island. Like many others who preceded him to the island, he took advantage

of the network established by the filibusterers in obtaining passage to Cuba. Rowan had experience at intelligence gathering in the field having made an inspection of the entire length of the Canadian Pacific Railroad. He also had experience in Cuba and authored a book on the island’s resources. In addition to contacting Garcia Rowan was also to attempt to contact General Maximo Gomez y Baez the leading military officer in the insurgent ranks and, like Garcia, a holdover from the “Ten Year’s War” from 1868-1879. Rowan’s mission was an overwhelming success but hardly the daring-do adventure written up in the famous “Message to Garcia” piece of Elbert Hubbard. Garcia was to give Rowan the layout of the Spanish forces on the island, their numbers, weapons, dispositions, etc. For MID this was not all new information but it supplemented that which was already known through other Cuban sources, namely the exiles in Florida and New York. For Americans reading the adventure published by Hubbard, it romanticized the roles of the filibusterers and others daring to flaunt the power of Spain.

On a less adventuresome level, local intelligence gathering took on some typically peculiar twists. In her charmingly brief “My Service in the Spanish-American War, 1898,” Mabel Bean (Williams) tells her story of minor but important espionage. Ms. Bean worked in her father’s store and post office at Port Tampa. After describing the impact of thousands of troops descending upon the town she tells of her sitting in the family parlor when Colonel Groesbeck arrived. The Colonel was an old friend of her parents and could be trusted to look after the young lady in her new role – following the activities and mailings of two well-known Spaniards suspecting of spying on the operations in Tampa. These men were regular customers and often seen in the vicinity. Her job was relatively simple. Keep an eye on these men and search their mail. She was to report her findings to General William R. Shafter, Commander of Fifth Corps, personally. There she often translated the documents for the general and presumably his staff. The bright young, curly headed girl in the trim sailor suit would hardly be suspected of being a spy by the men and that was what Groesbeck expected. As she summed up her experience: “Gen. Shafter, Col. Groesbeck and my father all seemed pleased with the work I had done but I couldn’t see that it amounted to much. Perhaps it did prevent contraband information from going through the mail.” Whatever she delivered it had to account for more than just general information for her to be reporting it directly to the commanding officer. In espionage little things add up to larger things and in the bigger picture it could be very important.

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Few areas indicate the nature of the intelligence war during the Cuban Revolution and the Spanish-American War of 1898 than the episodes involving the filibusterers, most leaving from Florida ports. The United States was neutral in the war between Cuban insurgents and the Spanish government and therefore was required by international law to forbid and prohibit such exploits as filibustering. Raids into Cuba from the United States were of long tradition. The most famous of the early expeditions were those of Narciso López in the period from 1849-52. During the Ten Years War there were many attempts to get arms to the Cuban insurgents and many of these came from Florida and Louisiana. The most famous affair in this era came with the capture and execution of Captain Fry and the crew of the *Virginius*. As soon as the war of 1895 began the boats coming from Florida, New York, Pennsylvania and other points along the eastern coast of the United States appeared to be a continuous flotilla. The Revenue Service was drawn into a constant game of cat and mouse all along the coast. The *Morrill*, the *McLane*, the *Forward* and the *Hamilton* all attempted to halt the traffic in arms, ammunition and men headed for Cuba. They received constant tips from the Spanish Ambassador, the Spanish Consular service and numerous spies up and down the coastline. The *George W. Childs*, the *Lark*, the *Commodore* and the *Laurada* were all part of the early ships attempting to land articles of war and men on Cuba’s beleaguered shores. In November, for example, the Spanish Ambassador requested that the Customs Service detain and search the *James W. Foster* as she sat
off of the Delaware Breakwater. In January of 1896 the Spanish minister stated that the steamer *J. W. Hawkins* was just leaving New York to rendezvous with the *Commodore* somewhere near Palm Beach and that the arms confiscated earlier at Cedar Keys figured into the mix headed towards Garcia’s army. By March of that year the minister was complaining once more about the schooner *S. R. Mallory* taking its cargo from Cedar Keys to meet with the schooner *Adel* off of Tampa where they would later connect with the famous *Three Friends* which would make the final leg to Cuba. This last exploit even stated that the *S. R. Mallory* contained thirty tons of supplies for the insurgents and that the *Adel* was transporting Enrique Collo and a body of men to join up with the *Three Friends* after leaving Longboat Key (stated as Longport Inlet in the report) and rendezvousing somewhere near Alligator Key. Such specific information could only have come from a rather sophisticated spy network operating out of Tampa and Jacksonville. The *S. R. Mallory* was seized in this instance but soon released for lack of direct evidence showing a violation of the neutrality laws.  

According to a report to the House of Representatives given in February of 1898 the U. S. Customs Service allegedly put its entire eastern force of 2,408 men onto the task of suppressing the trade in arms and the shipment of men to Cuba. This same report stated: “That only 6 out of 13,585 American vessels succeeded in reaching Cuba and that less than 50 have had any share in these expeditions …” It bragged that the U. S. citizens were thereby proven to be law abiding and that a “wholesome and repressive fear” kept those more disposed to undertake such action in line. The Service even produced an impressive chart to show the results of sixty attempted expeditions, which it claimed very few ever reached Cuba. According to Dr. Samuel Proctor, Napoleon Bonaparte Broward’s biographer, the *Three Friends* alone had eight successful voyages to Cuba providing weapons, men and hospital supplies to the insurgent army. The *Three Friends* was assigned a “shadow” in the Revenue Cutter *Boultwell* while in Jacksonville, however there were many well known escapades where the captain of this cutter simply waived goodbye after *Three Friends* crossed the bar. The same report stating that the Revenue Service had stopped so many of the expeditions also noted how many times (complete with dates) these same vessels actually delivered their cargoes to Cuba. In light of most of the evidence and the numerous newspaper reports of these exploits the report can only be viewed as “window dressing” for the Spanish government and an answer to its charges that the United States had been too lenient with the violators. 

The Cuban Revolution of 1895-1898 was financed heavily by Cubans and their sympathizers in the United States, especially in Tampa and Key West, Florida.
Many of the funds raised by the efforts of the Cuban Junta and its numerous suborganizations went directly to fund the guns, ammunition and hospital goods shipped by the filibusterers. According to historian James Robertson, “General Maximo Gomez, commander-in-chief of the Cuban Army, early and continually emphasized the importance and necessity of promoting filibustering as a means of sustaining the revolutionary movement, …”24 Cuban historian Jose Rivero Muniz has also noted that even though the attempts to raise money for the revolution were publicly known and promoted in the local press, United States authorities did little if anything to prevent them. The nearly constant military preparations which the Spanish Ambassador and others denounced and demanded a halt to were almost totally ignored by the powers in Washington and throughout Florida. Clearly the sympathy and admiration for the Cuban cause was one that struck a responsive cord in the hearts of Floridians and other citizens.25 Tampa’s denizens in particular were very supportive of the Cuban cause and donated as much from this one town as was raised in all the other Americas.26 Indeed, the cigar-makers of Tampa contributed the astounding amount of twelve to fifteen thousand dollars per month, or $150,000 per year (in round numbers).27 The centers of Cuban emigrant population, Tampa, Key West and New York were the most fertile fields for fund-raising. With a combined population of over 8,000 Cubans Tampa and Key West were quick to raise needed funds.28

Probably the most famous intelligence coup of the war came with the discovery of the whereabouts of the fleet of Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete. This fleet was well undermanned, incomplete in composition and did not have all of its guns and turrets in place, yet as a “fleet in being” it presented a threat, especially to the frightened and nearly hysterical governors of the New England states who feared the bombing of Plymouth or some other coastal community. It had to be found and destroyed before a land invasion of Cuba could be attempted because the Army could not sail unprotected to Cuba in open boats. Two operatives of the Navy Department, not linked to ONI, were Ensigns Henry H. Ward and William H. Buck who chartered yachts to cruise off of the Spanish coast and keep watch on the fleets of Cervera and Admiral Miguel de la Camara. Thrown into the intelligence mix in Europe were the various operatives of the Naval Attaches, including Edward Breck, a former fencing champion who went in disguise to Spain and played the role to the hilt and did not get caught. Unfortunately, none of these operatives or attaches could locate the vital fleet of Cervera once it left the Cape Verde Islands. Not until it reached Curacao on 14 May 1898 did the United States Navy have an idea where it was headed. It

27 Muniz, 101.
had been assumed that Cervera would head to Havana where coal and naval stores awaited him. The North Atlantic Fleet, under Admiral William T. Sampson was charged with the blockade of Cuba, especially the northern coast. The blockade was extended east and west of the capital city but covered little of the southern coast. The second assumption was that if not Havana then Cienfuegos would be the next logical port of call. The “Flying Squadron” under Admiral Winfield Scott Schley was called upon to prevent this possibility. Yet, for ten complete days, so the old story goes, the fleet of Admiral Cervera was lost to Naval Intelligence. This is surely not the case.

At the official declaration of war President William McKinley ordered the head of the U. S. Army Signal Corps, A. W. Greely to take control of all telegraphic lines in the country. This order included both cable and land lines. Most important were those from Havana to Key West and from Cienfuegos to Haiti. This latter was cut under severe circumstances on 11 May. The line from Havana to Key West was not cut during the war for good reason, it provided too much intelligence, including on 19 May the arrival of Cervera’s fleet in the harbor at Santiago de Cuba. Captain James Allen had been assigned to Key West and this energetic officer soon recruited the local manager of the telegraphic service, Martin L. Hellings. Hellings immediately offered his services and those of his men in Havana, in whom he had explicit trust. He had done the same for Captain Charles Sigsbee arrived in Key West with the battleship Maine. Besides the control of the official telegraph office and staff, Allen now had access through to the highest offices in Cuba. It was through one of these operatives, named Villaril that the arrival of Cervera’s fleet became known. This information was immediately sent to Washington where Greely states he gave his assurance to the President and Secretary of the Navy Long that it was for real and reliable. Commodore George C. Remey, then commanding at Key West, was given the information directly and he also vouched for its authenticity. As Remey related: “The next morning, May 19th, about 9 A.M. Captain Allen U.S.A. the chief Signal Office, came, excited, and evidently in great haste, and said that [he] had a very important dispatch to tell me. So I cleared the room, and he informed me that his office had, a few minutes before, received a telegram from Havana, stating that Admiral Cervera’s fleet was entering the harbor of Santiago de Cuba.” Remey then sent the message onto Washington where, he later learned, the officer of the day at the Navy Department did not believe the story until he got several stories over the next few hours. Admiral Sampson was notified of the event and he soon sent his message to Schley, then on the way to Cienfuegos, to continue on to Santiago de Cuba and blockade that port. Schley did not believe the story either and delayed for several days before actually confirming the story by direct observations done by

29  Dorwart, 64-65; and O’Toole, 195-97.
Lieutenant Blue aided by his Cuban guide. Inner-service rivalry appears to have been the culprit in not getting Schley into position earlier and the fact that Schley was upset that Sampson was over him even though he had longer service made it doubly bad and forced the two men into a disagreement that led to Congressional hearings and public disgust.

A final note to this episode came with the publication of Willis Moore's account of the founding of the West Indian Weather Service, a branch of the Department of Agriculture. According to Moore's story, the important message was encoded into the weather observations from Belene College in Havana and deciphered at Key West. If this is the case the President's fear of a hurricane and its effects on the fleet made an important contribution to the war effort.32

In one of the strangest fetes of imagination the Cuban Army does not receive any credit for its role in the five month campaign conducted by the United States in Cuba which brought about the end to the Cuban Revolution and the Spanish-American War. The movement of Fifth Corps, under the command of General William Rufus Shafter, was slow and ponderous. There was little secret as to its destination once Cervera was bottled up on Santiago's narrow harbor. Prior to their leaving Tampa the S. S. Florida took 312 Cuban volunteers from Tampa and other Florida cities and landed them near Banes. The Rowan mission had also introduced General Nelson Miles to two of Garcia's most trusted subordinates, General Enrique Collazo and Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Hernandez. These gentlemen gave the Major General some of the most vital information on the strength of the Spanish forces near Santiago, the entrenchments and the possible reinforcements available to General Linares commanding Santiago. Miles sent a message back to Garcia and asked him to provide more details and broached possible cooperation. Garcia replied on 9 June that he would consider Miles' orders as his orders and cooperate any way he could. He offered almost exact numbers of Spanish troops in the area and promised to hold the forces at Holguin in place. When Shafter and the Fifth Corps finally arrived, the officers immediately disembarked and rowed to shore to meet with Garcia unopposed by any Spanish guns. Garcia's forces had cleared the area before the shelling of the “forts” by Schley's fleet and few were left to oppose either the officers' landing or the disembarking of the Fifth Corps. Reinforcements from Manzanillo, Holguin and Guantanamo had been blocked by smaller forces under Garcia. When Shafter and the Army landed at Daiquiri and Siboney on 22-24 June they were unopposed. All of this thanks to Garcia’s forces and a feint of about 500 men attacking from the west of Santiago under his command. Miles acknowledged the contribution of the Cuban Army and noted that they held the most strategic locations on the western side of the town and harbor and assisted in the assault on the entrenchments before the town.33 Yet no where do you see this contribution mentioned in the text giving the history of this war.

This cursory review of the Cuban Revolution and the Spanish-American War’s intelligence battles is not meant to be all inclusive. However it should bring questions to mind as to why Shafter, Miley and others testified in front of the Dodge Commission into the Conduct of the War that they had little intelligence concerning the forces in front of them. Given the “Military Notes on Cuba” compiled so carefully by Scriven, the very large number of exiles willing to give information, the forces of Garcia and Gomez who assisted in the landing of United States troops and the nearly four hundred years of interaction with the island these assertions ring very hollow.
Almost every harbor and the road network surrounding it were mapped and available to the commanding officers. The train schedule and other transportation facilities were well known as was the topography of most of the island. The Consular reports and the information gleaned from our attaché corps added even more depth to the available knowledge. To make the claim that there was little intelligence to use is almost ludicrous.

In one of the more revealing letters of the day, Brigadier General William Ludlow, then Chief Engineer, wrote to Adjutant General Henry T. Corbin the following: “The Spanish strength has been greatly exaggerated. They claim to have had 250,000 troops. They never had them. They have existed on paper doubtless, and drawn pay, but 150,000 would cover all they had. Of these, many have been sent home, many have been killed, and very many have died of disease in their filthy and unsanitary barracks and hospitals.” Ludlow continued: “At this time, from detailed and specific information, checked from several well informed sources, I cannot find more than 70,000 Spanish soldiers in the entire island of Cuba, and these are divided into scattered garrisons. I can approximately locate them from recent data.” Ludlow then became very specific as to how many forces were in what locations. Most importantly for the operations around Santiago, he noted that the eastern troops were almost totally isolated from the middle and western groups and that the transportation system did not allow any rapid consolidation or concentration of Spanish forces. He also speculated that it would be very difficult, even with four rail lines leading into Havana to concentrate any more than 40,000 troops for the capital’s defense. General Ludlow then stated that with the Spanish treasury nearly broke, the fall of Manila in everyone’s mind, the constant sighting of the Navy cruising along the coast intercepting all traffic, knowledge that their fleet was bottled up in Santiago and knowing that the Cubans were constantly being further supplied by the expeditions sent by the Army and supporters in the United States that the only course open to thinking Spaniards in Cuba was a rapid capitulation. The letter is dated 5 June 1898, and was sent from Tampa. Just three days before the first order to sail was given and executed General Ludlow was in possession of some very specific data that allowed him to give such an accurate picture of what was going on in Cuba. The problem was not enough or accurate information but how to put it to use during the campaign. That is the crux of the problem for Major General William Shafter and his staff. It would take this type of campaign complete with all the errors and faults to bring about the most important change in the Army, the creation of a real General Staff.

34 Henry T. Corbin Papers: Library of Congress. Container No. 1, Folder “Gen. Wm. Ludlow.” Manuscript Division. Washington, D.C. The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Gerard Casale of Bethesda, Maryland for his procuring of this document.

Readers of Florida history will be familiar with the events of Sunday, August 3, 1952. Ruby McCollum, a thirty-seven-year-old well-to-do African American mother of four, walked into the Live Oak medical office of State Senate nominee Dr. Clifford LeRoy Adams and shot him dead. In the “official” version of events, a dispute over a medical bill provided McCollum’s motive, but it soon emerged that she had been Adams’s unwilling and abused mistress. Adams was the father of one of her daughters and was alleged to have fathered the child she was carrying at the time of her arrest. On December 20, McCollum was convicted of first-degree murder, and there was no recommendation of mercy from the all-male, all-white jury, which included former patients of Dr. Adams. A month later, a defense motion for a new trial was denied, and McCollum was sentenced to death on January 17, 1953. She was remanded to Suwannee County Jail rather than the state prison farm at Raiford while her case was appealed to the state supreme court. Eighteen months after her conviction, in July 1954, the court reversed the death sentence and ordered a new trial, but this never took place. In September, McCollum was deemed mentally incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the state mental hospital at Chattahoochee, where she would spend the next twenty years.

By utilizing many court, private, and published sources, as well as a range of theoretical tools, to analyze the competing narratives surrounding the murder and its central actors, Evans presents an intriguing and compelling study of the race, gender, and class dynamics of segregated small-town Florida at mid-century. As a native of Live Oak, and growing up as part of its political and economic white elite, albeit a decade or so after the McCollum-Adams case, Evans offers insights that have particular salience with regard to the conundrums of private, public, and historical memory (especially as the murder is not freely discussed by Live Oak residents fifty years on). Indeed, she describes her study as “dialectic both with and against memory” (xxvi).

Divided into three main chapters, the study begins with an exploration of the use of silence in southern myth making and how this shaped media and popular explanations for McCollum’s actions. “Silence” is indeed the central trope in the study.
Life in the segregated South was characterized by silence and denial. As Evans reminds us, white communities were governed by, and white supremacy was perpetuated by, codes of silence and surveillance. In order to fully understand the complexities of southern history and culture, scholars must attempt to unravel the ways in which dichotomies of race, gender, and class created and perpetuated acts of silence that in turn could both shield people from and expose them to inequality and indignity. In the second chapter, which focuses on McCollum's courtroom experiences, Evans unravels the discursive formations of religion and law that surrounded McCollum's "silence-filled" trials. Full exposure of Adams's relationship to Ruby and her wealthy, bolita-operator husband; the extent of local officials' involvement in illegal gambling and other dubious activities; and a frank discussion of McCollum's motives for shooting her abuser would have levied a serious blow to white supremacy and patriarchy. Thus, court officials and politicians sought, with the complicity of Live Oak's black and white residents, to shape and censor the testimony to conform to an acceptable narrative and to shore up a corrupt and nefarious system. The third chapter provides fascinating insight into the relationship between Zora Neale Hurston and William Bradford Huie, both of whom covered the case for northern black newspapers, published articles and a book on the McCollum-Adams case, and tried unsuccessfully to establish a connection with McCollum and to uncover the "real" story of the murder.

As the book's title underlines, the study focuses on the silencing of Ruby McCollum by legal and community members, but Evans considers also the reasons why McCollum herself may have chosen not to or been unable to articulate her version of events, perhaps as a means of self-preservation to avoid execution. Nonetheless, as Evans notes, "Ruby McCollum is—and has always been—what the words of others have made her" (14). Despite the author's best investigative efforts (for example, in the search for her burial site as detailed in the conclusion), McCollum remains an enigmatic figure—and perhaps aptly so.

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Daniel Murphree asserts that for more than two and a half centuries whites (Europeans) constructed an identity for Florida Indians that changed little from the time of the early Spanish *entradas* until the American Revolution. Colonial Florida offers a good venue to explore this idea because it was the area of the earliest, longest,
and most constant interaction between Indians and Europeans. Colonial Florida encompassed much of the Southeast, reaching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Mississippi River, from the Florida Keys to well into today’s Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi.

Murphree contends that colonial-era Europeans and Euro-Americans (whites born in the Americas) perceived and described Indians in terms that we today would consider “racist.” But racism, he says, did not fit the mind-set of the colonials. Their “racialization” of the Indians was not done to “gain social, legal, or political privileges (9), which are the goals of racism. “Racialization consisted of the articulation primarily in written form of collective European perceptions regarding the character, behavior, spirituality, intellectual capacity, and physical appearance of the native peoples of the Floridas” (8). For example, through racialization, Europeans came to associate Indians’ skin color with laziness.

Experiences and impressions of early colonial adventurers recounted in works published in Europe provide the material for the author to trace European perspectives. Murphree looks to well-known works, such as Garcilaso de la Vega’s story of the expedition of Hernando de Soto (published 1605) and Antonio de Herrera’s General History (1601). James Adair, an English trader in the Gulf South, and a perennial favorite, naturalist William Bartram, provide their observations for the end of the period under study. Bartram, however, falls outside of Murphree’s criteria. American-born Bartram’s travel account was published in 1791 in Philadelphia in the new United States. Other descriptions come from whites who spent many years in the Floridas—French and Spanish colonial officials and missionaries. Their descriptions appeared in reports and other communiqués seen by few eyes. Thus the writings of the short-term observers were more widely disseminated than those with repeated, long-term contact with the Indians.

Murphree asserts that Spanish, British, and French opinions differed little from one another, and that through racialization Europeans “achieved common ground” (123). He claims that Europeans saw Indians as part of the natural environment and as barriers to European plans. When Europeans’ schemes founded or failed, Europeans scapegoated the Indians as the cause of failure. Europeans employed written words to erect psychological borders between themselves and Indians. Through this “othering” process, Europeans diminished the individuality of tribes and clans and facilitated the relegation of Indians to an inferior though undefined category.

Murphree poses an interesting approach to questions about identity formation. The process of identity formation by whites living in the Americas has been well explored, usually focusing on how colonials living in the Americas saw themselves in comparison to their contemporaries in Europe. Murphree takes a different approach and looks at the path of the colonials’ relation to the Indians, concluding that “racialization helped colonists define their own identity in the Floridas” (10). But, he does not address that for most colonials the relation to things European was far more important. On both sides of the Atlantic, items, ideas, and persons originating
in Europe almost always were considered socially superior to things American. Murphree combines similar remarks made over three centuries about Indians to illustrate unchanging attitudes, but he does not deal with the changing attitudes and behaviors of the Europeans making the observations. The early explorers left a European world where religion ordered daily life and international relations. Three centuries later, Reason and the modern state had replaced religion’s role in shaping European perspectives on both sides of the Atlantic. For the early Spanish in Florida, religion was the defining element. Heretics were worse than heathens, making wrongheaded Europeans worse than uninformed Indians. Europeans’ methods in Florida changed as well. “Conquistadoring” ended with Juan Pardo’s 1568 expedition into the southeastern interior.

We must ask if the Europeans’ constructed views of Indians differed much from their constructed views of “others.” Yes, Europeans demeaned the skin color and the indolence of Indians, but Europeans employed the same language toward other Europeans. An anonymous British spy of the 1740s described the Spanish in Florida to be “of swarthy complexion,” adding that the women were “very brown.” Lack of industry brought disapproval toward any group. Murphree quotes French official Villantray de la Sauvole, who noted in his journal that the Indians of the Louisiana-Florida region were easily manipulated because “they are very lazy” (77). South Carolina governor Nathaniel Johnson in 1719 called the Spanish in Florida “very lazy, raw fellows.” His successor, Sir Francis Nicholson, complained that his own Carolinian soldiers were “inactive and morose and lazy and mutinous.” Did the negative remarks arise because Indians and soldiers were not “improvers,” not changing the land for profit?

Murphree takes a fresh and interesting approach, but the discussion is not full enough for his conclusions to be convincing. The problem may be the short length of the book at 158 pages. More information about the most important published works is needed for the reader to assess the works’ influence and understand their audience. Who, in fact, had access to the publications and who read them? It is unclear just who is doing the racializing: high officials in Europe making imperial decisions, Europeans traveling through Florida, residents in Florida? This is an important distinction if current identities indeed remain little changed after five centuries as Murphree claims on his book’s first page.

Susan Richbourg Parker
St. Augustine Historical Society

In this eloquent elegy to a disappearing time and place, award-winning author Bill Belleville tells the very personal story of how creeping development eventually forced him to move from what had been a rural Florida homestead. The reason *Losing It All To Sprawl: How Progress Ate My Cracker Landscape* resonates so loudly is that it is really the story of Florida’s last century—the tale of all-consuming, cancerous development, misuse of natural resources, the end of neighborliness, and the “grief of loss” that accompanies the recognition of what the state was and is becoming.

Whether a person has been in Florida for four months or four generations, the impact of sprawl and its attendant furies of infrastructure overload, cookie-cutter development, loss of native lands, and water abuse are evident on a daily basis. It is a complex issue, but Belleville reaches the heart of it by sharing his narrative of passion and pain, interwoven with hard facts, history, and literature that illustrate this problematic, changing landscape.

In 1990, Belleville fell in love with a Cracker-style home on a dirt road in what was then the rural outskirts of Sanford. Others may have quickly dismissed the thought of living in a house without air-conditioning where the wooden floor sagged from the work of termites and the sheet metal roof reverberated in rainstorms. But Belleville saw that the 1928 heart cypress home was built in wise accommodation to the Florida environment—large windows for circulation, elevated on blocks for air and water flow, wide gables and overhangs to reduce sunlight, and rooms configured to deal with seasonal changes.

“The place made wonderful sense—in fact, it had a very real vernacular wisdom literally built into it,” he writes, noting the house was built to withstand Florida weather “far better than the more modern hermetically sealed block and stucco ranch homes that require thick insulation and a constant running of the central air or heat to make them inhabitable” (13).

It immediately felt like home, just as novelist Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings sensed when she moved in 1928 to a similar cottage in Cross Creek outside Gainesville. Belleville often quotes her eloquent prose to express the sense of place he finds in his home—an affinity that too many Floridians lack, he sadly decides. As residents lose their connectedness to the land and to each other, growth becomes a “maelstrom.” (xx).

With a naturalist’s curiosity and a journalist’s nose, Belleville investigates his landscape, meeting neighbors and talking with people who once lived in the house. He worries about the wildlife and homeless people that inhabit nearby woods and is disheartened when the acreage is leveled for a new development. Soon he also will be pushed out of his home, the victim of sprawl that has already consumed rural acreage and replaced it with a mall, big-box stores, and chain restaurants. In the meantime, he uses this chronological account to detail the steady hum of growth that is music to the ears of Florida’s pro-growth leaders, cheering news media, and out-of-state developers who promise to be “good neighbors” but will never be neighbors at all. The conflicting message offered by promoters has long been, “We’re a beautiful
place. Come on down and help us build it out,” Belleville notes, characterizing it as “delusional and vaguely hallucinogenic” (37).

In his ruminations, Belleville tells the story of the geological formation of the land, describes the long-disappeared native Indians who once populated the area, and recounts how early white entrepreneurs brought big schemes and created an agricultural boom that has since given way to bedroom communities and strip malls. Belleville shows that sprawl creates hidden problems and costs for everyone. State attempts to manage growth are laudable, but have been manipulated by politicians who didn’t see the forest for the trees.

When things get bad enough, this modern-day Thoreau escapes to nearby state forests, preserves, and rivers for long hikes and kayak paddles in relatively untouched habitat. He finds that there is still much to discover in the 25 percent of land that has been preserved by the state, including endangered species, rare plants, and that elusive peace of mind. When the sound of wind reverberates through an untouched cypress-lined lake, Belleville finds that his “hope for wild Florida places . . . is rekindled once again” (113).

In this book of love and loss, Belleville makes the subject of sprawl, long detailed by journalists and historians, a personal story of loss and a cautionary tale for anyone living in the state.

Leslie Kemp Poole
Rollins College


“Florida on Film” is the title of a college course I have taught for fifteen years, and I look forward to literature on the subject. In 1983, Richard Nelson opened the scholarly gates with his two-volume study Florida and the American Motion Picture Industry, 1898-1980. Nelson examined chronologically the entrepreneurs, studios, stars, and films through historical and mass communications perspectives from the first newsreels to the rise of television in the post–World War II era. In 1992, James Ponti helped promote the study of cinema and the rise of the industry in Orlando with Hollywood East: Florida’s Fabulous Flicks. Ponti applied the knowledge and training he received at the University of Southern California’s film school in witty and sharp synopses of a number of films.

Susan Doll, a professor of film at Oakton Community College, and David Morrow, an editor of reference works, draw on both of these approaches. They divide
their study into nine chapters: Silent Florida; The Golden Age; Florida Noir; Starring Miami; Florida Bust; Flori-Drama; Fun in the Sun; Florida as Paradise; and Florida Façade. Each chapter starts with an essay placing the time period and genre into context. Next, the authors provide a tight interpretation of more than eighty films. “Selection was based on how well the films fit into the central topic of each chapter and on what unique characteristics they could add to the coverage of Florida. Care was taken to ensure that all regions of the state would be represented. Special attention was paid to people with a direct connection to Florida filmmaking, such as Burt Reynolds, Ricou Browning, and Victor Nunez” (xiv). The coverage is wide: The Idol Dancer, Key Largo, Cape Fear, Scarface, Rosewood, Where the Boys Are, Parenthood. And finally, Doll and Marrow offer a quick tour of the places the films were either shot at or about: Cypress Gardens, St. Petersburg, Tarpon Springs, the Everglades, the Keys, Panama City Beach. The research is broad-based: biographies, autobiographies, histories, professional journals—but no studio archives, unless accessible on a Web site.

The films addressed comprise a selective, rather than comprehensive, list. There will be some complaints on the selections. How could The Yearling, or the pilot for Miami Vice, be left out? But choices had to be made. The content of each chapter varies according to the technological advances, complexity of texts, stars’ and studios’ significance, and contributions to culture. Beneath the Twelve Mile Reef, for example, focuses more on Hollywood’s responses to the challenge posed by television (that is, 3-D, spectaculars, widescreens, behind-the-scenes visits) than on the texts of the film. There are times when the analysis comes up short. How could Cross Creek be discussed without reference to the misinformation on Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings’s life and career that the biopic conveyed and ingrained in the public mind? Her first marriage, relocation to Florida, drinking habit, relationship with her editor, Maxwell Perkins, have all been messed up. A chapter titled “Florida Bust” will educate and entertain most readers with its accounts of movies that bombed: Blood Feast, The Cape Canaveral Monsters, The Fat Spy, Health, and Jaws 3-D among others. The authors observe that “cost and artistic accomplishment is not necessarily related” (160). Poor quality, timing, sequels, studio politics, vanity projects, limited release, and finishing a contract can be contributing factors.

When all is said and done, Florida on Film is an insightful and informative reference guide that advances our understanding of the art and craft of cinema, of the movie industry, of the role the Sunshine State played in film aesthetics, and how the study of cinema should be approached.

Robert E. Snyder
University of South Florida, Tampa
Gary Monroe’s book on Highwayman Harold Newton (1934–1994) comes six years after the publication of his book *The Highwaymen: Florida’s African-American Landscape Painters*. Monroe’s first book was successful partly because it came at a time when the Highwaymen were just beginning to be collected seriously and there was little in print about the artists.

The Highwaymen story is compelling. A group of young African American artists, centered in Ft. Pierce and more or less associated with the white painter Albert Ernest Backus, created brightly colored Florida landscapes that were originally sold along the Florida roadways. The “Highwaymen” name was bestowed on the artists by an early collector. Monroe’s 2001 book about these artists helped define this group of young men and one woman, most of whom began painting in the 1950s and 1960s.

Monroe’s book on Harold Newton has been created in the same format as his book on the Highwaymen, probably in an effort to replicate his earlier success. There are twenty-six pages of text and about the same number of color plates (fifty-nine in the first book, sixty-two in the Newton book).

*The Highwaymen* provided readers with a foundational story of determination, inventiveness, talent, and camaraderie, all in the context of the segregated South. Since its publication in 2001, other books, articles, and even a few films about the group have appeared. In 2004, Alfred Hair (who is often identified as the leader of the group) and the Highwaymen were placed in the Florida Artist Hall of Fame. *Harold Newton* is less satisfying than *The Highwaymen*. The twenty-six pages of text provide little insight into the man, offering instead only tidbits of information: The artist didn’t learn that Harold was his first name until he was in his fifties. He drew when he was young and was already an artist before meeting Backus and working with Hair. He sold paintings on the road during his pre-Backus days, although not very successfully. He was a drinker. In his early years, he painted Christian themes on velvet. He loved to fish. He was basically a loner except when he drank. He liked the comics.

Perhaps the most appealing part of the story has to do with Dorothy, Newton’s early love interest, whom he married late in life. Her description of Newton, however, portrays him as an irresponsible womanizer who finally settles down in his later years. He had maybe eleven children out of wedlock.

We learn little about what drove Newton to paint and how he thought about the landscape. Monroe plays down issues of segregation, poverty, and Newton’s relationships with other Highwaymen. In fact, Monroe goes so far as to dismiss racial issues when he writes, enigmatically, “The Highwayman’s story transcends race” (18), a comment that he leaves largely unexplained. Is this because there is a moral to the
story? Can this story be told without talking about race? Does it matter that there were no African American artists in any of the art history books at the time the Highwaymen began painting with Backus? Monroe seems to think not.

The twenty-six pages of text are not well organized and are sometimes vague and uninformed. The author could have given us far more insight into the man and his artwork by drawing more carefully on his own earlier work and the scholarship, exhibitions, and films on the Highwaymen that have been completed in the last several years. The book has no bibliography, and there does not seem to be any attempt on the author’s part to curate the paintings in the book in chronological order or in any other manner that would have given us a new perspective on the artist. Still, many of the paintings are delicious. In fact, the best insight we get about Newton in this book is from looking at the reproductions of his work, which are superbly photographed and presented. Newton did portray light beautifully.

In spite of some stunning images of Newton’s paintings, Monroe is not convincing when he says that this artist’s “paintings provided the measure of excellence that the other artists could only dream of achieving” (3). And Monroe’s claim that the story of the Highwaymen is “the last great untold tale of modern Florida” (preface) is simply mind-boggling—try convincing Carl Hiaasen of that! Comments like this make it hard to take the author seriously.

Nonetheless, Harold Newton: The Original Highwayman is useful because it presents a Florida artist who painted Florida as longtime Floridians understand it. And for serious collectors and historians of Florida art, the paintings make it a book worthy of a place on the bookshelf.

Kristin G. Congdon
University of Central Florida


Martin Dyckman’s Floridian of His Century provides a journalist’s reflections on LeRoy Collins, Florida’s most important governor of the twentieth century. Dyckman briefly chronicles Governor Collins’s formative years and initial foray into politics during the Great Depression and Second World War, before turning to his main subject, Collins’s gubernatorial career. Highlighted as a matter of course are Collins’s battles with the Florida legislature over reapportionment and his management of crises brought on in Florida—and, consequently, in his own political career—by the struggle for racial equality in the United States. The story of Collins’s
postgubernatorial activities is handled in terms of the 1960 Democratic national convention, chaired by Governor Collins; his stormy tenure as head of the National Association of Broadcasters; his career-breaking position as President Lyndon Baines Johnson's director of the Community Relations Service, and his last, badly managed, 1968 campaign for George Smathers's seat in the U.S. Senate.

Dyckman provides a more comprehensive perspective on Governor Collins than anything previously available to readers and students of Florida history. While Tom Wagy’s pathbreaking 1985 study, Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida: Spokesman of the New South, remains a standard work, Dyckman develops the political campaigns waged by Governor Collins in 1954 and 1956 to a far greater degree than anything previously published. Dyckman is spot-on in his conclusion that these campaigns were the most pivotal in Florida’s history, particularly given the gubernatorial alternatives of Charlie Johns and Sumter Lowry during the daunting, racially charged political atmosphere of the mid- to late 1950s.

Drawing on a long career as a journalist for the St. Petersburg Times, Dyckman heavily employs his stock in trade: the interview. While Dyckman has consulted most written works on Florida history and the people and events of Collins’s era, and has culled a fair amount of material from the Collins papers deposited at the Florida State University, the University of South Florida, as well as the State Archives, his writing is largely informed by the oral histories he has collected. His perspective, too, is undoubtedly impacted by his own experiences as a young journalist living through the era that Governor Collins so greatly influenced and changed. Yet, Dyckman is willing to look beyond the aura created around Collins after his “moderate view on civil rights” was vindicated during and after the 1970s, and to point out Collins’s struggles and failings.

While Dyckman quickly touches on Governor Collins’s philosophy on good governance and the role of government in a chapter entitled “The Glory of Government,” he does not develop this important aspect of Collins’s career throughout the narrative. Though this represents a missed opportunity, as do the muted roles assigned in Dyckman’s study to Spessard Holland and Dan McCarty, these are relatively small problems in such a good body of work.

The largest success of Dyckman’s book is his tracing of LeRoy Collins’s “courage” from Collins’s early days as an advocate of the status quo, white-supremacist South, to his acknowledgment that segregation was not “morally” defensible, but probably not something that mere laws could change, to his active participation in attempting to heal the racial rift in American society. It was a journey taken by many Americans, but not many had to display their itinerary in such a public fashion as one of Florida’s most public figures was required to—and chose to—do.

As a broader view of the most consequential politician of twentieth-century Florida, Floridian of His Century deserves a place on the shelves of any person interested in the tumultuous political history of Florida during the period of the 1950s and 1960s. Martin Dyckman has written a highly readable, insightful, and sometimes
challenging volume that treats LeRoy Collins as something more than the sainted figure he is sometimes portrayed as being. In Dyckman’s narrative, Collins emerges instead as a real person, with his courageous character helping to overcome his flaws.

Brian Lewis Crispell
Florida College


In July 1536, three Spanish men and a black Moroccan, all dressed like and accompanied by Indians, stumbled across a group of Spanish slavers in Mexico. After eight exhausting years, the Pánfilo de Narváez expedition had mercifully ended. This attempt by Spain to conquer Florida and the American Southeast began with four hundred well-armed men and unbridled optimism. When it ended, only these four men remained alive, thanks to little more than a combination of luck and their willingness to do anything to survive.

In this gripping and often compelling narrative, Paul Schneider reconstructs the harrowing story of the Narváez expedition. The journey—which began in Tampa Bay, hugged the Gulf coast to modern-day Texas before crossing to Mexico’s western coast and South Sea—hardly lived up to expectations or the precedents established by Cortes and other conquistadors. The lone four survivors had traveled five thousand miles before they escaped their travails, and their journey could hardly be measured by the geographical distance they traveled. During their eight years as conquerors-turned-refugees, they “had become killers and cannibals, torturers and torture victims, slavers and enslaved. They became faith healers, arms dealers, canoe thieves, spider eaters, and finally . . . they became itinerant messiahs” (2). In short, their journey was physical, emotional, and psychological.

Brutal Journey creatively addresses the problem of sources that complicates all attempts to describe the early American interactions between Natives and Newcomers. In the case of the Narváez expedition, only two firsthand accounts exist. Álvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca published the best-known version in 1542, and Spanish authorities in Spain and Hispaniola authored the second. Schneider treats both sources with suspicion as they were both written to justify actions that occurred after the fact. Schneider augments his close reading of translated versions of these sources with various archaeological findings and ethnohistorical studies of the region. He also relies heavily on studies of other expeditions in the Americas to provide indirect insights when the direct sources are silent.

In a few places, hyperbolic and unnecessary rhetoric in Brutal Journey detracts
from the text. For example, Narváez’s expedition was not, as the book’s subtitle suggests, the “first crossing of North America,” and comparisons to Lewis and Clark are both misplaced and often lead to mischaracterizations of both journeys. Perhaps just as importantly, the volume’s rhetoric implicitly but unmistakably draws what seem to be unnecessary parallels to today’s current conflict in Iraq. Discussions of “quagmires” (5) and “peoples waiting to be ‘liberated’” (4) gloss over the nature of the expedition and the more complex Spanish outlook on the world and Native peoples.

Academics will likely be disappointed by the sparseness of citations in the volume. This is more than academic quibbling. Schneider certainly provides citations for all of his quotations, but one of his great achievements is to piece together a wide range of sources and to sift through conflicting evidence. For example, in several places Schneider’s infers “further details about the expedition . . . from the many other, better-documented Spanish intrusions into the region during the same period” (2). Too often, Schneider provides little insight into how he arrived at his conclusions. In addition, Schneider’s selected use of ethnohistorical evidence leads him to see a “myriad [of] mysterious inconsistencies” (248) in the behavior of Native Americans. For example, Schneider sees a contradiction in the Mariame Indians’ plucking of the facial hair of their Spanish captives before befriending them. A quick glance at the literature on captives and adoption rituals in the American Southeast and Southwest would clear up any uncertainty about whether this was designed to be “torture.”

Schneider is the first writer to bring this tumultuous story to the general public. Academics have long explored the topic, with contentious debates over the precise paths taken by the conquistadors-turned-refugees, the nature of the Indian societies they confronted, and the validity of the sparse written sources that retell the tale. This volume is largely free of these squabbles, and instead offers a rather consensual view of these issues. The result is a remarkably engaging, well-written, evenhanded, and often sophisticated narrative.

Despite its academic shortcomings, Brutal Journey deserves a wide readership. It successfully augments the historical record with materials from a variety of disciplines, most notably from archaeology, in a rather seamless and engaging manner. The result is a work of nonfiction that proves the truism that sometimes truth is stranger than fiction.

Andrew K. Frank
Florida State University

Today, little remains of historic Ybor City, except for aging buildings and fading memories. And these remains do not speak for themselves. They require a historical context to explain their meaning and significance. To Frank T. Lastra's credit, he places his own experiences and those of friends and family in the context of the much larger history that he constructs in *Ybor City: The Making of a Landmark Town*.

Drawing heavily on the work of previous writers, Lastra adds his own perspective, giving his book a personal touch. In the extensive footnotes, for example, he frequently cites “Frank T. Lastra's personal memory” or “Author's personal observations.” His own background undoubtedly explains the book's decidedly Spanish flavor. A product of Ybor City, Lastra is the son of a Spanish father from Galicia and a Sicilian mother. Born in 1922, Frank Lastra experienced both the highs of the 1920s and the lows of the Depression years before leaving to serve in World War II and then earn a degree in engineering from Georgia Tech. In the 1960s, he returned to Tampa, where he became active in Ybor City organizations and began writing about his birthplace. This book is the culmination of those efforts.

While noting the contributions of many ethnic groups, including Romanian Jews and Germans, as well as the more numerous immigrants from Cuba and Italy, Lastra stresses Spanish influences in the creation of Ybor City and its culture. From the lingua franca to the first cigar-factory owners, the roots of the community lay in Peninsular Spain, but they were also deeply entangled in Cuba, the birthplace of the single-largest group of immigrants to Tampa.

Lastra describes a qualitative difference between Spaniards and other immigrants. “The attitudes of workers and residents alike in [Ybor City's] formative years were strongly rooted in firm, positive underpinnings of Peninsular Spanish mores,” he writes in the introduction. “A solid sense of propriety, correct manners, law and order, and the ethic of hard work were hallmarks of the time. . . . These Spanish values that I speak of were the ones we learned at home” (xviii). In contrast, Cubans in Tampa initially focused on winning the island’s independence from Spain, and according to Lastra, they “found themselves in a situation unsuited to raising families, pursuing education, or setting down roots. This impeded the early growth of new Cuban families in Ybor City, and the concomitant affirmation of schools, churches, and other family oriented cultural institutions” (103). Such judgments reflect common ethnic stereotypes, especially among local residents of Spanish and Italian heritage, but Cubans undoubtedly saw things differently. Their views remain largely unrecorded, except perhaps in the novels of José Yglesias.

Lastra's recounting of the history of Ybor City from its founding to World War II covers familiar ground, but he enlivens the story with his own memories and details of his family's history. In addition, he brings the past alive through the use of hundreds of photographs, some never before published.

The book's most original contribution is its coverage of the years since World War II. Lastra devotes fully half of his text to the little-known years of Ybor City's
steady economic decline and physical destruction under the federal “urban renewal” programs that bulldozed decaying structures in the 1960s but failed to fulfill promises to redevelop the community. Lastra traces in great detail the litany of broken government promises and the unrealized dreams of local Latinas who championed a variety of proposals to revitalize the former Latin enclave after the collapse of the handmade cigar business and the relocation of local Latinas to other areas.

Amidst this saga of political and economic failures since the 1950s, Lastra also documents the vitality of Ybor City institutions and the people behind them. Despite various obstacles, surviving institutions include most of the social clubs, the Columbia Restaurant, the Ybor City Chamber of Commerce, the Spanish Lyric Theater and La Gaceta, the trilingual newspaper run by the Manteiga family since 1922. New organizations, such as the Barrio Latino Commission and the Ybor City Museum Society, also have emerged as part of the drive to preserve what remains of historic Ybor City.

_Ybor City: The Making of a Landmark Town_ should appeal to both longtime residents familiar with local history and newcomers who want to find out what made Ybor City so special. The book’s features include not only its many illustrations, but also a very useful index and numerous appendices containing data on the cigar industry, lists of businesses, and the names of leaders of social clubs and other community organizations since their founding. The volume is a tribute to Frank T. Lastra’s commitment to relating the history of Ybor City as he knew it.

Robert P. Ingalls
University of South Florida, Tampa


With _Sunshine in the Dark: Florida in the Movies_, Sarah J. Fernandez and Robert P. Ingalls have written a guide for watching any film about Florida. Pretty much every movie about Florida is here, regardless of genre or quality. The authors cover critically acclaimed Florida films like _Scarface_, _Cocoon_, and _Key Largo_, but they also devote plenty of time to _Ace Ventura: Pet Detective_, _Nightmare Beach_, and _Clambake_. And they write about movies long consigned to the back racks at the video store—how many of us have actually seen _Juke Girl? Sixteen Fathoms Deep? Big Trouble? Curdled?_ Fernandez and Ingalls have watched them all.

Divided into three parts—settings, plots, and characters—_Sunshine in the Dark_ groups films by theme in eleven chapters with titles such as “Re-Creation:
Starting Over in Paradise” and “Workers and Retirees.” Some movies crop up in more than one place—Sunshine State, for example, is discussed in terms of its images of African American women and its portrayal of the built environment in Florida. Black-and-white photographs illustrate each chapter, and a color section with more pictures appears in the middle of the book. A helpful appendix lists films with Florida scenes in alphabetical order, including the year and genre of each.

Sunshine in the Dark is unapologetically nonargumentative. “Our modest goal is to analyze what we see as dominant messages of films about Florida and to examine how these messages have changed over time,” write the authors in the introduction. “This book is not specifically directed at academics or specialists in film studies, but rather at general readers with an interest in images of Florida and Floridians” (11).

The discussions, accordingly, are unfettered by academic jargon, with only the occasional foray into film theory. But this straightforwardness does mean that much of the book relies upon plot summary. Demonstrating which films are alike and into what categories they fall often includes fairly comprehensive retellings of the movies’ stories.

The authors meticulously parse the various Florida images and themes within big-name Florida movies such as Scarface, which is notable for its portrayal of Cuban Americans as well as that of the drug underworld and Miami. They also discuss the recent film Adaptation, with its forays into the murky world of orchid collecting and southern eccentrics. The picture-within-a-picture situation of Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings, who came to Florida from New York and wrote The Yearling, the north Florida novel that became a movie, recurs in many chapters, especially when layered with the more recent film Cross Creek, which tells the story of Rawlings and the writing inspired by her move to Florida.

Fernandez and Ingalls pull no punches. “While continuing his life of crime in south Florida, Junior meets Susie Waggoner (Jennifer Jason Leigh),” they write of the Alec Baldwin film Miami Blues, “a dumber-than-dumb hooker from Lake Okeechobee” (81). Although they claim not to review the films, the authors can’t help but stand up for Florida and its people, such as in the discussion of Cross Creek, with its depiction of north Florida’s agricultural communities. “Rawlings’ associations with rural Floridians provided her with rich sources for characters, but this particular film fails to portray either the author or her subjects with the depth that her writing and her biographers have revealed” (217).

The book delivers on its promise of broad range. The authors cover settings from Miami to north Florida and approach characters with a similarly broad reach. “Within these plots,” they write, “a wide array of peculiarly Florida characters appeal—Seminoles, crackers, retirees, Cuban immigrants, astronauts, Spring Breakers—along with various heroes, criminals, warriors, and athletes” (10).

The most outstanding accomplishment of Sunshine in the Dark is that for all of its claims to be nonargumentative, the writers do have a point to make about filmic representations of Florida, which is that Florida occupies the farthest reaches
of any spectrum. Onscreen, Florida is a place with no gray areas, representing instead a space of sun-drenched happiness and a prime location for failed hopes; in short, Florida is anything from “dreamland to nightmare” (251).

For anyone who loves both the movies and Florida in all its many forms, *Sunshine in the Dark* will prove a rich read. With this book, readers will learn ways to categorize and consider the next Florida film they see, whether it portrays a holiday in paradise or a journey to hell.

Eliza McGraw
Washington, D.C.
Since Florida has the longest recorded history of any place in the present-day United States, readers might wonder how the University of Florida historian Michael Gannon managed to present *The New History of Florida* (1996) in just 480 pages. His previous *Florida: A Short History* (1993) had condensed Florida’s Spanish, British, Spanish, territorial, and statehood eras to only 182 pages. Imagine, in Gannon’s latest volume, 494 years of Florida history in just forty minutes—in barely seventy pages of text!

In response to requests from Leadership Florida to put in writing his oft-delivered lecture to its annual statewide leadership class, Gannon has highlighted ten key populations, periods, groups of periods, and factors that shaped Florida history. They include the original inhabitants; the first Spanish settlers; the Franciscan missions; the British; the Spanish restoration and American territorial periods; early statehood, the Civil War, and Reconstruction; the Flagler era; the 1920s runaway land boom; the Second World War; and, finally, air-conditioning, mosquito control, and Veteran Administration loans.

Gannon can say little about each topic in the few hundred words and handful of evocative illustrations given to each era, but that is not the point. Even if Florida history were routinely taught in the public schools, barely one-third of the state’s 18 million residents were born here. How many people, for example, can name the five flags that have flown over this land or the two railway barons that laid the path for millions of future settlers?

Too busy to read the history of Florida in forty minutes? The book comes with an audio CD containing Gannon’s melodious voice reading his text.

Mark I. Greenberg
University of South Florida, Tampa

Much of Florida’s African American history remains undocumented. In this volume, written by a well-known authority on Florida literature, history, and culture, Kevin McCarthy identifies current landmarks in the Tampa Bay area, and throughout Florida, of which many readers may be unaware. African American Sites in Florida is Kevin McCarthy’s fourth book exclusively treating Florida’s black history. McCarthy also discusses the origins of each Florida county, introducing readers to key events and conditions that shaped its unique history, including Native American and African American interactions.

McCarthy’s research both involved field studies and was built upon existing documentation of regional African American history. Through the assemblage of archival research and public records, McCarthy helps the stories and voices of African Americans to find their rightful place in the broader narrative of North American history.

Sherri Anderson
Washington, D.C.


Originally issued by the Missouri Historical Society in 1927, eight decades later Florida Plantation Records remains an essential resource for the study of plantation slavery in antebellum Florida. Containing transcripts of plantation journals, overseers’ reports, slave inventories, and other records, it documents life and work at El Destino and Chemonie, two large cotton plantations near Tallahassee owned by Georgia planter George Noble Jones (1811-1876). Jones was an absentee landlord who relied on a series of overseers to manage his Florida estates. The frequent reports and meticulous accounting he required provide uncommonly detailed information about plantation operations, particularly the employment and condition of the slaves who constituted the most valuable part of his property. These records cover the period from 1832 to 1898. The majority date from the 1840s through the 1870s, though there is very little relating to the Civil War years.

Ulrich Bonnell Phillips (1877-1934), the leading historian of American slavery in his day, edited Florida Plantation Records, assisted by his doctoral student
James David Glunt (1895-1962), later a professor of history at the University of Florida. The University Press of Florida edition provides a facsimile of the complete 1927 text, with a new forty-page introduction by historian John David Smith of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. Smith’s introduction provides very useful perspectives on the original work and its creators in the light of current historiography. The 1927 book, which appeared in a limited edition of only five hundred copies, has long been ranked as a rare Florida collectible, and the subsequent 1971 reprint by the New York publisher Burt Franklin is also quite scarce, so the new University Press of Florida edition provides a welcome opportunity for libraries and individuals to acquire a copy of this Florida history classic.

Paul Eugen Camp
University of South Florida, Tampa


A meticulous transcription of a diary kept by a young army officer serving in the Second Seminole War (1835-42), Amidst a Storm of Bullets provides a unique firsthand description of military life in Florida during the longest and most costly of the nation’s Indian wars. Of the few personal journals and diaries chronicling the war that have survived, Prince’s is arguably the best of its kind in detail and readability. When the University of Tampa Press published the hardcover first edition in 1998, Canter Brown Jr., historian-in-residence of the Tampa Bay History Center, commented, “The Second Seminole War’s day-to-day reality can be discovered in no single original source better than through the Henry Prince diary.”

As a newly minted brevet second lieutenant, Maine native Henry Prince (1811-1892) began his Florida diary on January 10, 1836, less than two weeks after the war with the Seminoles began. With only two breaks, his Florida service spanned virtually the entire war—the last entry in his diary being April 25, 1842. Lieutenant Prince was an observant, articulate writer who recorded his impressions of life and war in Florida in descriptive, readable prose, often written while the battles and other events he recorded were still in progress. He was also a skilled artist and draftsmen who embellished his daily entries with detailed sketches and maps. The entries relating to his several visits to Tampa and the sketches he made of Ft. Brooke and Ft. Foster will be of particular interest to readers in the Tampa Bay area.

Frank Laumer’s introduction and epilogue provide useful context, tracing Prince’s life before and after the period covered by his Florida diary, and Laumer’s
notes provide helpful explanatory detail about the people and places to which Prince refers. The book is well illustrated with all forty-six of Prince’s sketches and maps, including views of forts, camps, and other scenes. The cover is particularly attractive, being a full-color reproduction of Florida artist Jackson Walker’s painting The Battle of Camp Izard, Day Two, February 29, 1836, which includes an officer representing Lieutenant Prince writing in his diary while bullets chip the pine trees overhead. The hardcover first edition of Amidst a Storm of Bullets is now out of print, so this new paperbound version, including the complete text block and illustrations of the original, makes Prince’s diary available to Florida historians and general readers at about half the cost of the earlier edition.

PAUL EUGEN CAMP
University of South Florida, Tampa


Using the mockingbird as an emblem of the American South, Kirby presents a postmodernist’s narrative exploration in story and song. His Ecological Landscapes roams literary, historical, musical, and cinematic works to yield a personal, reflective examination of a region marked by waves of prosperity and neglect, by cross-cultural encounters and exodus. In surveying vistas from the earliest civilizations to the present day, Kirby perceives a diverse region loosely united in its paradoxical relationship with the land. What does the mockingbird have in common with the Coen Brothers’ O Brother, Where Art Thou? or the greater South for that matter, but an ability to reconcile difference through homogenization, coupled with a certain degree of indifference?

A Florida resident himself, Kirby begins his analysis of the South’s ecological history with the ill-fated de Soto expedition, the Spaniards’ arrival in Tampa Bay, and their eventual journey to Mexico through the mouth of the Mississippi. Florida reappears in nuanced homages to Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings and Zora Neale Hurston, and in an account of Henry Morrison Flagler’s ambitious efforts in St. Augustine. The ecological devastation of Florida’s pine forests through lumbering and the Everglades through canalization, as well as the detrimental introduction of the water hyacinth and nutria into the environment, provide sobering vignettes of one generation’s progress becoming another’s bane.

KELI RYLANCE
USF Tampa Library Special Collections Department

Bobby Braddock’s memoir Down in Orburndale: A Songwriter’s Youth in Old Florida upholds the promise of its title. The legendary country music songwriter shares his life experiences of growing up in central Florida’s citrus land of Auburndale. His memoir highlights southern life as he carries his readers through his boyhood, adolescence, girls, youthful pranks, adventures around Lake Stella, love, music, and travels throughout the South on his path to success. Bobby Braddock has written multiple hit country songs such as “D-I-V-O-R-C-E,” performed by Tammy Wynette; “Time Marches On”; and the contemporary country hit “I Wanna Talk about Me.”

Cyrana Wyker
University of South Florida, Tampa

The Spirit of the Bay: Tampa, St. Petersburg, Clearwater. By Steve Otto. (Tampa: Community Media Corp., 2007. 400 pp. Introduction by mayors of Tampa, St. Petersburg, and Clearwater, index to advertisers. Price to be determined.)

In The Spirit of the Bay, longtime Tampa Tribune columnist Steve Otto captures the essence of life in the Tampa Bay area through both historic and contemporary perspectives. Otto makes the case that from the time of the earliest explorers to this region to that of the transplants who now call the Tampa Bay area home, this is a community built on diversity. This can best be seen today in the rich heritage of the communities featured in the book: Tampa, St. Petersburg, and Clearwater. Otto explores the big-city neighborhoods and beachfront communities of Hillsborough and Pinellas Counties, bringing both their unique character—and unique characters—to life. From the cigar rollers in Tampa to the sponge divers in Tarpon Springs to the carnival culture of Gibsonton, Otto leaves no stone unturned in a book that proves revealing to natives and transplants alike. In addition to the compelling stories and anecdotes offered by Otto, the imagery from page to page should satisfy any photo buff. Vintage black-and-white photographs provide balance to the stunning contemporary images that perfectly illustrate the spirit of Tampa Bay.

Travis Puterbaugh
Tampa Bay History Center
The Tampa Bay History Center is a community oriented cultural institution that seeks to enlighten and enhance the lives of the residents and visitors of Tampa and Hillsborough County to the more than 12,000 years of Florida history. The History Center's mission is to serve and educate the community through discovery, preservation and interpretation of the rich cultural heritage of the people of Historic Hillsborough County and the Tampa Bay region and their relation to the state of Florida and the United States.

The Florida Studies Center draws upon the University of South Florida Libraries' extensive Floridiana collections and expertise to promote interdisciplinary teaching and research and to help the Tampa Bay community develop a better understanding of Florida's past, present, and future.
Postcard from the 1914 Gasparilla celebration. The image of a bloodthirsty pirate seems incompatible with tourism, but an increase of visitors was the desire of Tampa’s leaders in promoting “Gasparilla Week.” (Hillsborough County Collection, Tampa Bay History Center, 1996.051.455)