Psychopolitics of the Current Nationalism

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Introduction

Behavioral science can help explain the current rise in worldwide nationalism. Jerrold Post’s framework for understanding extreme leader-follower behavior has relevance to understanding followers of nationalist ideologies.¹ According to this framework, charismatic leaders and their excessively devoted followers have an extreme psychological complementarity. Complementarity is a social psychological phenomenon where the meeting of reciprocal goals leads to satisfaction in relationships.² The complementarity in this framework, however, goes beyond that experienced in typical relationships, and is grounded in a psychodynamic process whereby those with unmet psychological needs find emotional gratification in each other. The followers who show excessive devotion have narcissistic needs and draw to the grandiosity and perceived omnipotence of the charismatic leader because affiliation with those characteristics complement the followers’ needs.

In this article, the charismatic leader *writ large* is the ideology of nationalism, which provides the psychological gratification needed by followers with a damaged sense of self in relation to society. This wider perspective is warranted considering that the current rise in nationalism is not confined to a country or even a continent. Charismatic leaders such as an Adolf Hitler, a Jim Jones, or an Osama bin Laden do not control followers of the Western nationalist movements. A charismatic leader did not suddenly elicit nationalist stirrings in a disinterested population or incite a cult of personality. Though the nationalists do have leaders of their political groups, those leaders are not the ones who attracted the followers. The ranks of nationalist movements appear to have swelled with volunteers in an informal and bottom-up manner without resorting to extraordinary outreach attempts. The recent rise in nationalist sentiment has surprised political observers.³ These nationalist platforms, however, have been around for years but have gained political traction as socioeconomic factors have made their ideas more salient.⁴

Because the worldwide nationalist surge does not have a singular leader, it can appear unconnected. Yet, the ideology of nationalism, which is so accessible through modern communication, can indulge the narcissistic needs of its adherents and thereby complete an important function of the charismatic leader. In this way, the unconnected yet ideology-driven form of the current nationalist sentiment appears aligned with Marc Sageman’s concept of leaderless jihad. The term leaderless jihad denotes a scattered, unconnected, global phenomenon where adherents to radical Islamic ideology carry out activities in the name of jihad without centralized direction or support. The followers, who are sometimes Westerners, simply choose the path of radicalization and jihad for their own psychopolitical reasons.

Though totally different belief systems, the current Western nationalist following and radical Islamists share a starting point in psychopolitical narcissistic injury. A psychopolitical narcissistic injury is a deep personal conflict at the interface of sociopolitical context and individual identity. As elucidated below, the rise of globalization has marginalized many Westerners, which has left them in search of a way to reclaim their lives. Similarly, since the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, Muslims have perceived numerous humiliations at the hands of Westerners. This sentiment has metastasized into the radical Salafist ideology fueling jihadists today. In addition, just as Arab policy (and Arab nationalism) failed the state-of-affairs in the Arab world that led to the current state of Islamism, Western policy has the potential to overlook its psychopolitical crisis and foment malignant forms of nationalist ideology.

It is conceivable that Western society would not have to wait long before malignant forms of nationalist ideology proliferate. The networking capability of social media can be a powerful coordinating tool for social movements. Domestic political actors or foreign adversaries can target propaganda to inflame sociocultural fault-lines through the internet’s promulgation of information and disinformation, such as fake news. Russia, for example, showed how effective disinformation is in evoking responses from unwitting

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actors in its operations in Crimea and Ukraine. The extensive social networking exists as a latent potential waiting for the point of critical mass. As Catarina Kinnvall noted, globalization in the twenty-first century has compressed time and space, which has resulted in real differences in the scale, speed, and cognition of changes when compared to the globalization of the twentieth century. Policy impacts therefore seem larger and more abrupt and resonate differently today than they did a generation ago. This suggests that malignant nationalism may have a shorter germination period in the twenty-first century.

Individual Psychology and Nationalism

Jerrold Post describes the ideal-hungry follower as a narcissistically wounded person whose psychological needs attracts him to rhetoric that compensates for his feelings of alienation and inadequacy. People with an ideal-hungry personality gravitate toward strong leaders and causes because the affiliation with strength and the promise of hope offers ideal-hungry personalities an answer to a pervasive, and at the extreme, pathological feeling of ineffectiveness in their lives. Whether a person gravitates toward messages of power, hope, and renewal is a matter of degree not kind. This is because the ideal-hungry personality emerges from a common human developmental process. A person’s need for affiliation with an idealization, therefore, is not an either-or proposition; rather, people will have varying levels of this need. An agenda that promises to reclaim a glorious past, and, as a result, taps into this psychological need may not interest some, may interest some only modestly, and for those with the ideal-hungry personality, it may be reason for total devotion. When socioeconomic changes such as industry disappearance, non-transferable skills, and permanent loss of income make it difficult for a person to satisfy his or her own narcissistic needs, that person may move along the ideal-hungry continuum in search of gratification.

Post’s description of the ideal-hungry personality bears much resemblance to the fanatic described by Hoffer. Both characterizations describe a person who finds psychological fulfillment in a political movement and who is willing to go to great lengths to serve the movement. Both characterizations also suggest

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12 Post, Leaders and Their Followers, 195.
that circumstances play an important role in filling the ranks of ideal-hungry fanatics. Jerrold Post provides an example of how the effects of the Versailles Treaty inflicted a massive narcissistic injury on the German mindset, which left a sizable portion of the German people susceptible to the politics of the Nazis.\(^3\) For some of the narcissistically wounded German population, the Nazis’ rhetoric offered them a radical way to reclaim their lost glory. Fanatic nationalism associated with Nazi Germany illustrates how far a narcissistic-based psychopolitical crisis can go.

The ideal-hungry personality explains the current rise in Western nationalism. The sociocultural and economic effects examined in this article are only recent manifestations of massive change-policies that have been going on since at least 1971, the year the World Economic Forum began. Samuel Huntington described the world elites who attend the World Economic Forum as *Davos People* who have a *Davos Culture*, which reflects an elite’s view of how the world should function and that is generally out-of-touch with most of the world.\(^4\) A global elite-driven mindset such as this goes back further to the founding of the United Nations. As such, almost three generations of globalization policy have been in effect with a clear acceleration of such policy in 1991 after the fall of the Soviet Union. Generations of this policy has left groups of people on the shifting sands of global change. For many in the middle and working classes, the effect has been loss of socioeconomic standing and cultural change. This has created a push to slow or stop the ongoing changes, or it has people seeking a return to the past. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is one example of a global policy criticized as favoring elites at the expense of workers. Critics blame NAFTA for the loss of American manufacturing jobs and the lowering of American wages due to competition across the US border.\(^5\) Critics also blame NAFTA for having a destructive effect on Mexico’s agriculture and small business sector, which led to an upsurge of undocumented immigrants into the United States and the depression of American low-skilled worker salary.\(^6\)

Surveys of Western perception illustrate how negatively some in the West perceive globalization. A survey of thirty-nine countries revealed that over

\(^6\)Faux.
half (51 percent) view the global economy as a major threat to security and 39 percent view migration as a major threat.\(^{17}\) A look at France’s contemporary nationalist movement, the National Front, indicated that over half view engagement in the global economy as bad for France, 61 percent view the EU negatively, and most think refugees will take jobs and import terrorism.\(^{18}\) Negative perceptions of a global economy has basis in reality as globalization has contributed to the maldistribution of its benefits within and across countries.\(^{19}\) In the 1990’s for example, the richest 10 percent in the United States received over a quarter of US income, while the poorest 10 percent received only 1.5 percent of the wealth.\(^{20}\)

The effects of globalization now reflect in political action as nationalist groups have moved out of the periphery and have assumed greater political prominence because more people are simply supporting their political platforms. The ideology of nationalism provides a sense of empowerment to groups psychologically wounded by globalization. Ideal-hungry personalities have gravitated to nationalism to shore up wounded personalities and have found hope in the prospect of reclaiming a glorious past. Those who see lost jobs, decreased wages, prospects of unemployment, cultural change, and an uncertain future on the horizon may see nationalism as a way to change course in their favor. The imago of nationalism may generate empathy from those it speaks to, which creates a deep, feelings-based attachment to the nationalist message. Nationalism may harken back to a time (real or imagined) of better jobs, better pay, and a better grasp on destiny. Nationalism provides a romantic return to the past.

**Why Nationalism, Why Now?**

Nationalism, for some, is an intuitive and discoverable ideology of mass movement that is a response to rapid change in the modern world.\(^{21}\) Modern history is replete with examples of nationalist movements arising in response to social change. The modernizations of Japan and Turkey in the twentieth

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\(^{20}\)Keohane and Nye 251.

century, for example, illustrated the channeling of nationalist fervor to constructive ends. Nationalism, however, has mostly had a sordid history. Nationalism, along with contemporaneous lines of thinking in militarism and social Darwinism, played a key role in the series of escalations that turned a Balkan conflict into the First World War. Moreover, although Germany’s nationalist program to combat the Great Depression made it look more vibrant than other European countries, Nazi Germany’s channeling of nationalism contributed to its epic debasement of humanity.

The type of nationalism that emerges in the twenty-first century, and ways to address it, will depend to some extent on whether it is discovered or constructed. A constructed nationalism emerges when a political organization seeks commitment to its institutions and ideology. This type of nationalism is top-down in organization. The established authority, in this case, searches for a common heritage to serve as a foundation for strengthened allegiance to its central authority. China’s ongoing claims to the South China Sea, for instance, illustrate attempts at constructed nationalism to support its claims to the territory. China has a pattern of scouring its history to piece together statements, often from questionable sources with questionable exposition, to support territorial claims in the South China Sea. This narrative pushed down from governmental leaders not only serves as evidence to dispute international claims to the territory, but it also serves as a narrative around which nationalist sentiment can be formed. Though constructed nationalism has significance in the twenty-first century, this article will address discovered nationalism, which has a more clearly identifiable psychopolitical origin.

Discovered nationalism occurs through a “romantic return to the national past.” In this case, some pervasive societal change is so repudiated that a group of people marginalized by the change begin to search their cultural past for identity and feelings of power. This process has historically been associated with romanticism, which suggests that feeling and imagination over and above reason play a central role in the search for idealization. The many cultures dominated by the Ottoman or Austrian empires for example,

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22 Hoffer p. 5.
24 Jarausch, p. 231.
27 Winks and Neuberger, p. 58.
such as the Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks, spawned their own cultural nationalist movements during the nineteenth century through a romantic search of their folk cultures for identity and solidarity. The massive imperialist changes incurred under Ottoman or Austrian rule fueled a search for the national self because the sociopolitical and cultural sullying that went along with domination by a larger power wounded their national identities. More than a mere cognitive review of one’s history, however, the romantic search is an empathic attunement with a real or imagined national identity.

The foregoing discussion makes the question, Why nationalism, why now? more understandable. Globalization has ignited profound social, cultural, political, and economic changes around the world. Globalization as it stands has already had a particularly negative impact on the American working class. International trade has cost the non-college educated worker in America approximately $1,800 annually, which amounts to a 5.5 percent depression of their earnings. Globalization has also affected the European economy with a 10 percent Eurozone unemployment rate, shrunken economies, such as Greece’s, which lost one-third of its economy since the Great Recession, and decreased living and welfare standards when compared to sixty years ago.

In addition to serious economic problems, Europe is experiencing a cultural challenge brought on by the migration crisis. In 2015 alone, Europe received more than 1,000,000 mostly Muslim migrants. Europeans have overwhelmingly perceived the ongoing migration to Europe negatively as 59 percent of European Union (EU) countries perceive the migration as a harbinger to terrorism and increased burden on the welfare state. These Europeans tended to have a negative view of the diversity brought into their countries by the migration, with approximately 60 percent of those responding indicated that migrant diversity would not better their countries. The current crisis in Europe occurs against the backdrop of anger

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28Winks and Neuberger, p. 59.
33Poushter.
at EU policies, which create conditions favorable to overwhelming migrant influxes and cultural dissolution. One such troublesome policy is the Schengen Agreement. The Schengen Agreement, an EU policy that abdicates internal nation-state border control for streamlined movement throughout the EU, is criticized for its role in poor migrant regulation and increased Islamic-based terrorism in Europe.

The current rejection of the other in favor of one’s own kin is not only a Western nationalist manifestation, however. Elements of the Islamic world have a history of antipathy towards the West and this antipathy has taken on a nationalist character, exemplified by the Arab nationalism so prominent in the mid-twentieth century. Today, Islamic Fundamentalists continue the rejection of the West in favor of an Islamist agenda. The Islamic Fundamentalist rejection of the West runs deep and includes Western political structures and even systems of thinking grounded in reason-based Greco-Western philosophy. Islamic fundamentalism abhors everyday Western influences as intrusions into Islamist society, which even views global brands as worthy of a consumer jihad. Islamic fundamentalists also abhor the Arab leaders they perceive to be apostates because of their embrace of the West.

The current challenge for Western countries affected by rises in nationalism is how to address the systemic crisis that caused such a political shift. If national and international policy have contributed to the socioeconomic conditions that have catalyzed the nationalist movements, the remedy then, is policy. This raises the question of whether traditional political establishments are willing to yield their agendas to mitigate the negative impact of their policies.

Policy and Security

A security dilemma exists within the political context of increasing worldwide nationalism. A classic security dilemma may ensue if states that have large nationalist support assume a nationalist foreign policy. Nationalism as an ideology has been associated with wars, atrocities, and other violations of human rights that found their justification in the supremacy of one’s

34Ahmad Moussalli, Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Quest for Modernity, Legitimacy, and the Islamic State (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999), 50.
ethnocultural group over others. As nationalist oriented states compete for scarce resources, security, and nationalist-inspired initiatives, each state will expect not to be outdone. A world of increased nationalism, therefore, forewarns of increased isolationism that runs counter to the capitalist approach of interdependence characterized by today’s international system.

Politicians who find their states in such a political context may deceive themselves by thinking that a state of economic interdependence will prevent nationalist-driven hostilities because to engage in such conflict would harm one’s own economy. Would nationalist-led states want to jeopardize their way of life over an ideology, political leaders may ask? Remember, however, that the economic repercussions of war did not stop belligerents from engaging in the hostilities that led to the First World War even though a world economy existed at the time. Therefore, it may be a faulty assumption to think economic interdependence in the twenty-first century alone is enough to prevent nationalist-inspired wars.

Domestically, nationalism brings problems that may inflame sociocultural fault lines within states with heterogeneous populations. Unchecked, nationalism can foment a great deal of internal turmoil as nationalist adherents and detractors compete within the confines of their state. Though this type of situation can remain peaceful, it is also possible that it can spiral out of control. Information warfare used to attack institutions, such as systems of justice, legislature, or finance, which play a critical role in maintaining stability in societies, make this type of situation more likely to spiral out of control. Calling the institutions of a state into question can cause a cascade of internal violence to occur because it undermines the important tension management role the institutions have. Russia’s operations in Crimea and Ukraine demonstrated how information warfare could discredit government institutions and inflame demographic-based divisions. The Russia-Ukraine model provides a glimpse into what an internal nationalist battle along sociocultural fault lines may look like.

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Alternatively, politicians and elites may attempt to alienate the nationalists from their states’ political process before the nationalists become too politically powerful. This may manifest in explicit or implicit social exclusion, which could take the form of ignoring, stigmatizing, or denouncing nationalist political ideas. Those in the nationalist camp, no matter where they lie on the continuum of nationalist devotion, get placed in the same basket of extremists. In this way, nationalists become excluded from the political mainstream and left alone with their ideology. Such an insult-to-injury (for an already wounded group) could foment an even greater reaction from nationalists.

The forcing of nationalists underground could lead to a radicalization process like that undertaken by jihadists. Indeed, Sageman’s framework for understanding the radicalization process appears consistent with the pull to nationalism. In Sageman’s scheme, radicalization begins with a sense of moral outrage at some local or global issue, which is interpreted in a specific way, for example, a larger affront, that resonates with an individual’s personal experience, and the individuals are eventually mobilized through networks. Nationalists already experience a great deal of moral outrage at their experience in relation to globalization. Their existing threat-tainted lens for the world would filter stigmatization and exclusion as further affronts. A specific interpretation for nationalists, for example, may be one of further injustice to them at the hands of the globalists and elites. This experience would resonate with nationalists excluded from the political process. The result might then lead to mobilization, which might include some type of violent activity if the injustices appear to be too great. Many ethno-nationalist terrorist groups such as the Irish Republican Army, Tamil Tigers, and Palestine Liberation Organization originated in a context of perceived injustice and political exclusion. In the extreme, Western nationalists may act as non-state or sub-state actors seeking to realize political aims through violence.

Policy Recommendations

It is rational for Western societies to look at their policies for potential solutions to this psychopolitical phenomenon because globalization fueled Western nationalism. Western societies will have to determine how much they are willing to change, if at all, to mitigate the injury associated with global policies. It will nevertheless be hard to avoid globalization in a globalized world.
world. Still, it is conceivable that some global policies are superfluous to success in a global society and therefore more easily modifiable. For example, is something such as the Schengen Agreement necessary to remain viable in a globalized world, or does it place unnecessary strain on changing societies?

Ultimately, policy makers must square with the effects of globalization in their societies. Only they will know their country and culture well enough to know what social, economic, or political policies should be changed or modified. Policy makers should keep in mind the psychopolitical nature of the crisis during their decision-making process. If certain policies have been so unfruitful that millions of citizens have made rather dramatic personal and political shifts, then those unfruitful policies may be where changes should occur. One example of such a policy change is the United States withdrawal from the Tran-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP is a comprehensive, multi-nation trade agreement that aims to boost exports, reduce tariffs, and open access to more markets. The TPP projected to bring 57 billion dollars to the United States over fifteen years. Yet, the TPP expected to displace more American workers. The US policy decision to withdraw from the TPP therefore counters some of the effects of globalization that have been at the center of the Western psychopolitical narcissistic injury. Movement away from nationalism may happen when people have a more realistic national identity with which to empathize. Whatever social or economic changes are made, the effects will likely measure in generations.

It is best to keep nationalist-minded citizens engaged in the political process rather than alienated from it. Pushing these groups further out of the mainstream increases the potential for radicalization. Without a legitimate political outlet, groups of nationalists can become extreme. Engagement with the democratic process may have a mitigating effect just by being part of it. Jones and Libicki showed that even terrorist groups are capable of being absorbed into the political process. At the same time, their research showed that nationalist terrorist groups could be quite persistent. Many of the nationalist terrorist groups identified in their study were still active at the time of their study’s publication, and those that did dissolve experienced a

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splintering of the group, suggesting that the group’s terrorist influence still existed after the dissolution of the group.

Social and news media have had a role in the rise of Western nationalism in the twenty-first century. Kinnvall’s assertion that change associated with globalization has accelerated in terms of scale, speed, and cognition has much to do with the media’s saturation of Western society. Increased restrictions on social media in the West, however, could potentially do more harm than good because prohibitive restrictions could undermine important Western freedoms expressed through social media. Law enforcement agencies already have a presence on social media, which they could hone to intercept deviant strains of nationalist activity.44

Additionally, the West could take measures to improve the state of its news media. In the United States, for example, only 32 percent of Americans say they have a great deal or a fair amount of trust in the news media.45 One key reason for this perception is that it appears the lines between news and partisan opinion have blurred. Based on this partisanship, news outlets may be more susceptible to propaganda and disinformation (fake news) that can inflame sociocultural fault-lines. One potential solution is that news programs should receive a rating that discloses their level of objectivity to viewers much like film ratings disclose their level of graphic content. This may entail having an agency, such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) administer standard rating scales measuring a news outlet’s level of information vetting, level of anchor/reporter partisanship, history of accurate reporting, political donations, and other conflicts of interest that may affect objectivity. This type of system would give viewers a way to accurately identify the information they receive, for example, real story, sensationalized story, fake news, or opinion, and in doing so, protect an important American institution—the press.

Tensions and Counterarguments

This writing considered Kenneth Waltz’ critique of applying behavioral science to macro-level problems.\(^{46}\) However, behavioral science has advanced well beyond its rudimentary state at the time of Waltz’ writing. Behavioral science has specialized in forms that offer expertise in political, social, and group behavior. This expertise is evident in subfields of political psychology and social psychology. The specialization of behavioral science has made the field more responsive to Waltz’ ultimate critique—behavioral science fails to consider political and international significance in its recommendations.\(^{47}\) Therefore, a contemporary behavioral science perspective can offer value to an analysis on the political and international levels.

Critics generally recognize globalization’s effect on the economy, but they dispute its impact and suggest that globalization is not as pernicious as suggested. Critics suggest the causality associated with globalization is too difficult to pinpoint because of the other changes occurring at the same time of globalization.\(^{48}\) They assert that the rise of technology, the change in the composition of the work force, and the weakening of labor unions cause worker displacement and wage depression, not just globalization. This position, however, does not give adequate weight to the reality of permanent job loss due to industry migration linked to policy. This position also does not address the sociocultural aspect of globalization. A focus on globalization policy, therefore, adequately addresses these claims.

\(^{46}\)Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 76.
\(^{47}\)Waltz, p. 76.
\(^{48}\)Keohane and Nye, p. 251.