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Editors’ Introduction

In June 2016 shortly before the International Network of Genocide Scholars (INoGS) Conference in Israel, the Journal for the Study of Antisemitism published a piece by Israel Charny. In his article—based on an online survey and his readings of some articles—Charny declared the Journal for Genocide Research as biased. More concretely, he stated that the journal publishes articles that minimize the Holocaust and/or are anti-Israel and anti-Zionist. Charny refers explicitly to several articles, and names their authors. The Genocide Studies and Prevention (GSP) Editorial Board has decided to give the Senior Editor of the Journal for Genocide Research, Dirk Moses, and the authors named in Charny’s article the room to react to the criticism. Their submission underwent an internal review by the Editorial Board of GSP and was accepted for publication.

In addition to this response piece, this issue contains five research articles, covering a wide variety of subjects. Eltion Meka addresses the question of minority rights and the interplay of European integration and ethnic reconciliation in Macadonia. Genevieve Parent evaluates the psychosocial consequences of genocide denial in the aftermath of extreme violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In their article, Riccardo Armillei, Nikki Marczak, and Panayiotis Diamadis explore two so-called hidden genocides, those of Assyrians and Romani within the wider contexts of the rather well known Turkish Genocide of Armenians and the Holocaust, respectively. And, finally, two articles seek to expand the scholarship of the Rwandan Genocide in new directions. Claudine Kuradusenge discusses the Rwandan Hutu diaspora in Belgium and its struggles to relate to the former motherland and the genocide, while Daniel Rothbart and Jessica Cooley investigate the motivations of rescuers during the Rwandan Genocide.

This issue also features for the first time a research field note in GSP’s “State of the Field” section. This section contains essays written by expert practitioners and scholars that are relevant to the current state of research and practice in the field of atrocity, violence, and genocide prevention—broadly and inclusively defined. In this issue, anthropologist Julie Fleischman describes her ongoing work with human remains from the Cambodian Genocide.

The wide range of topics, disciplines, histories (both geographically and temporally), and author nationalities and institutional affiliations, demonstrates not only the widths but also the internationality of the field of genocide studies. Several years ago, the Executive Board of the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS)—taking advantage of new European Union tenure requirements to publish in open access double-blind peer-reviewed journals, and the demand around the world to make scholarship of the highest quality free and accessible through digital formats—decided to partner with university publishers and platforms that could support the distribution of GSP as an open-access journal. This decision has yielded important results. As of October 2016, GSP has surpassed 43,000 unique downloads in the past year. IP addresses downloading issues of GSP have been recorded from academic institutions on every continent on in the world. Individual articles—especially on understudied cases—have been downloaded over 3,000 times. For example, Kjell Anderson’s article on West Papua in Issue 9.2 has been, to date, downloaded nearly 3,100 times. This represents tremendous reach for a scholarly journal, with levels of readership that rival major disciplinary publications. As a result of this new global readership, GSP is beginning to receive manuscript submissions from scholars all over the world. Looking ahead to 2017, we at GSP are excited to continue cultivating and sustaining a global conversation on the prevention and study of genocide, mass violence, and other issues closely related to our field.

Mentorship Program
GSP, in partnership with the IAGS Executive Board, is pleased to announce a mentorship program for emerging scholars. In its early stages, the mentorship program will focus on assisting emerging scholars (i.e., students in graduate programs who intend to work in genocide studies; post-doctoral researchers; non-tenure-track Ph.D. holders; and recently-graduated scholars who are within the first three years of their first professional position) with advice on preparing a specific piece of work for publication.

The manuscript in question should be of regular journal length and at a stage where it is very near ready for publication. Manuscripts that are underdeveloped, improperly formatted, or in a
state that is far from being suitable for external peer-review, may be denied access to the mentoring
program until they are revised. To support this program, IAGS and GSP are seeking the following:
• Volunteer, established scholars, who are IAGS members and are willing to work with an
  emerging scholar in readying a journal article or book chapter for publication. Please send
  us your name, contact information, areas of expertise, and the languages you are able to
  work in. You will not be asked to work with more than one emerging scholar per year,
  unless you specifically state your willingness to do so. If you receive a manuscript that you
  feel is not yet ready for mentoring, you may request it be returned to the emerging scholar
  for further revision.
• Emerging scholars who would like advice from an established scholar to help ready
  a journal article or book chapter for publication. Along with your name and contact
  information, please send an abstract for the specific piece for which you would like to be
  mentored and the language in which you would like to mentored. We will do our best to
  accommodate your request, but remain dependent on the availability of a suitable mentor.
GSP will also refer journal submissions to this program when they receive articles that show
promise, but require further polishing before being distributed for peer review. Publication in
GSP is not guaranteed through this program. This is a volunteer-based program solely designed
 to build helping networks between established and emerging IAGS scholars—it is not available to
non-members.

Please send all information to awoolford@genocidescholars.org, Andrew Woolford, IAGS
President.

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Israel Charny's Attack on the *Journal of Genocide Research* and its Authors: A Response

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**Abstract:** Israel Charny has published an article, “Holocaust Minimization, Anti-Israel Themes, and Antisemitism: Bias at the *Journal of Genocide Research*” (*JGR*) in the Journal for the Study of Antisemitism. His specific allegations are bundled together in a single sentence: “minimization of the Holocaust, delegitimization of the State of Israel, and repeat[ing] common themes of contemporary antisemitism.” We write as the authors of articles and contributors to the *JGR* attacked by Charny. His allegations are false and we reject them. This article shows how they are based on distortions, misquotations, and falsifications of our work.

**Keywords:** Holocaust, genocide, antisemitism, historiography

**Introduction**

Israel Charny has published an article, “Holocaust Minimization, Anti-Israel Themes, and Antisemitism: Bias at the *Journal of Genocide Research*” (*JGR*), based on a survey of genocide scholars, in the *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism* (*JSA*). He summarized its arguments in a piece in the *Jerusalem Post Magazine* (*JPM*), and the *JSA* editor promoted it on the email listserv of the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS). The *JPM* then published a letter by Yehuda Bauer criticizing its decision to publish such an attack on another journal, defending author Raz Segal, and questioning the methodology of Charny’s survey. A week later, it printed an abridged...
letter signed by 30 scholars that expressed shock at Charny’s article and deplored its publication in the *JPM*.  

Evidently, these 30 scholars were struck by Charny’s rhetorical excesses. Among them, his *JSA* article refers to *JGR* authors as “hate-mongering genocide scholars,” and compares the president of the International Network of Genocide Scholars (INoGS) to the Ugandan dictator, Idi Amin (notes 1 and 23). “Antisemitism” in particular hangs in his article, never defined, never justified, and left to his respondents to rate, featuring in his title less as insinuation than denunciation. The specific allegations are bundled together in a single sentence: “minimization of the Holocaust, delegitimization of the State of Israel, and repeat[ing] common themes of contemporary antisemitism” (3).

We write as the authors of articles and contributors to the *JGR* attacked by Charny in the aforementioned publications. His allegations are false and we reject them. They are based on distortions, misquotations, and falsifications of our work. As such, his articles are thus unworthy of scholarly consideration. But as they are publicly accessible, and because he levels such grave accusations, we respond in detail, even though the academic community has already dismissed them. We proceed as follows: first, we analyze the methodology of his survey, and then each author dissects Charny’s treatment of his article. We conclude by contextualizing Charny’s article in various strands of Holocaust and Genocide Studies.

**The Survey**

Charny conducted a scientifically meaningless survey of people he regards as genocide scholars. In the first instance, he personally invited a large number of people to take part (46 responded), and then another 30 apparently completed the survey after it was (inadvertently) advertised on the IAGS listserv. It broke most of the principal rules of social survey construction, which has well-established and accepted methodological standards.  

We briefly itemize the flaws.

First, the survey was based on a biased sample. Because the sample aimed to represent the views of Holocaust and genocide scholars, it should have been based on a recognizable, inclusive, and verifiable list of the members of the field, such as the membership of the IAGS and INoGS. Instead, it was based on a personally selected mailing list that is unavailable to any other scholar to verify. Moreover, as Charny admits, the sample deliberately excluded those likely to present views contrary to his own, viz. members of INoGS, which publishes *JGR*, further skewing the sample.

Second, Charny prejudiced the survey further by advertising his own views when inviting people to participate; the respondents knew in advance the results he expected. Moreover, he “sent out [many of the invitations] individually often with personal comments added to the standard draft,” possibly influencing the respondents’ results further. He describes the second wave of respondents (who were not hand-picked) as championing the *JGR*: in other words, he explains the apparently more positive assessments by the second wave of respondents by depicting them as partial to the *JGR* rather than reflecting a less biased sample, thereby illustrating his own lack of open-mindedness on the issue.

Third, Charny selected a small sample of *JGR* articles on the basis of his own preoccupations rather than offering a sample justified by a representative analysis of its content. He then provided the respondents with biased summaries and extracts of these articles; respondents were not furnished with the articles or their abstracts. (The bias of his summaries is analyzed in the following sections.)

Fourth, to evaluate the articles, Charny offered only three questionable categories, none of which is clearly defined. The first category, the “minimization of the Holocaust,” seems to mean

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4 Yehuda Bauer, letter to the editor, *JPM*, June 10, 2016. Dirk Moses’s letter was published next to Bauer’s. “Shock” and “deplore” are taken from the collective letter published on June 17, distributed on the IAGS listserv on June 22; it appears as an appendix to this article with an extended list of scholars who agreed to add their name after its publication.

the minimization of its significance and implications, rather than of the events and their horror. Because this distinction was not made clear to the survey respondents, how they understood “minimization” is thus unknown. Even more opaque was the following option given to respondents in assessing the article summaries and extracts: “This is legitimate criticism of the Holocaust” (8). While, presumably, Charny meant legitimate criticism of Holocaust memory, this option injected another dose of uncertainty into how respondents understood the survey.

Charny’s second dimension, “delegitimization of the State of Israel,” was defined in emotive terms that imported a political position into the criterion of scientific analysis:

The founding of Israel is no longer to be recognized as an expression of a heroic national movement called Zionism, or that the wish for a Jewish nation was in response to ongoing pogroms, mass killings and antisemitic events building up to the Holocaust. The attack on the basic legitimacy and moral justification of Israel sets a stage as well for far less [sic.] tears in the future should any of the current dangers to Israel’s existence ever materialize (7).

The third dimension, repeating “common themes of contemporary antisemitism” (3) was again undefined. Charny appears to assume a version of the idea of the “new antisemitism,” in which some types of criticism of Israel are axiomatically considered antisemitic, but he does not explain or engage with the difficulties of this highly contested idea. Even the standard of the US State Department definition of antisemitism holds that “criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as anti-Semitic.” These considerations may have been evident to most of the survey respondents, for they disagreed with Charny’s antisemitism allegation. They also may have registered that a miniscule number of pieces in the JGR touch on Israel: five out of some 130 since 2010.

Overall, given the survey’s construction, it is remarkable how many respondents did not follow Charny’s assertions, undermining the article’s major hypothesis about antisemitism. He does not recognize, let alone account for, this disjuncture between allegation and outcome, yet the former appears in the article’s title as an implied fact. The JSA editor, Steven Baum, claimed on the IAGS listserv that Charny’s study is an “objective, scientific study.” Plainly, it is no such thing.

Raz Segal and Rethinking the Holocaust in Hungary

Charny begins with an article by Raz Segal that addresses a key question about the role of the Hungarian government in the mass deportations of Jews from Hungary during World War II. What is striking here is that Charny does not actually refer to the article at all. He quotes a few sentences from the abstract—one is misquoted—disregarding the main arguments and the significant number of diverse primary sources in the article, including accounts by Jews.

One main argument in Segal’s article is that wartime Hungarian authorities targeted Jews as part of a broader Hungarian policy of mass violence against non-Magyar groups, with the goal of

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using windows of opportunities during the war to establish an ethno-national “Greater Hungary.” This project, anchored in the modern history of Hungary, at times clashed with German interests and plans, and at times coincided with them. Thus, it was German authorities in east Galicia that stopped the mass deportations of Jews and Roma from Hungary, across the Carpathian Mountains, in July and August 1941, while a bit less than three years later, the Nazi genocide of the Jews intersected terribly successfully with what today we would call Hungarian designs of “ethnic cleansing.”

Charny, for his part, writes that understanding this complex history means nothing to the suffering of Jews. Yet, the suffering of victims—not only Jews—is not the subject of the article, and in fact, Segal has written extensively about Jews and their suffering during the Holocaust. Furthermore, describing and comprehending complex historical events and processes—as historians of any period and topic do—is of particular significance for Holocaust and genocide scholars: as we analyze states today poised to engage in mass violence, it is precisely such analyses that we hope will encourage efforts to prevent or at least minimize genocide and mass violence, and hence the suffering of victims.

What troubles Charny, however, is Segal’s use of quotation marks for the terms “final solution” and “the Holocaust.” It is unclear why putting a Nazi term—“final solution”—in quotation marks is problematic, and how precisely it gives the impression that the destruction of Jews in Hungary during World War II was “not that real” (3): it is standard in German-language historiography. Note how Charny in effect suggests that Segal is a Holocaust denier, but what scholars are signaling here is merely that they are using a Nazi term.

By contrast, Segal’s choice of “the Holocaust”—with quotation marks—serves to emphasize that it is a concept that could cloud more than clarify all the processes and events of genocidal violence that together we call “the Holocaust.” This is, to be clear, the exact opposite of saying that the Holocaust was not real; indeed, it is meant to uncover and explain more of its reality—in this case, how and why the mass murder of around half a million Jews from Hungary unfolded during World War II. Ironically, Charny’s distortion of Segal’s article stands as a stark disservice to the memory of the victims he allegedly so cherishes.

What is at stake here for Charny is the idea of the Holocaust as central, above and beyond any other event in history. It is, in other words, an attempt to maintain at all costs a hierarchy of mass violence, and it is dogmatic in its rejection of evidence to the contrary. Adhering to this dogma means that we simply miss a major part of the history of the Holocaust in Hungary—the drive to create a “Greater Hungary” with as small a non-Magyar population as possible. This does not at all mean that Jews were not targeted as Jews by the Hungarian state; the broader approach Segal adopts helps us understand better why and how they were targeted as Jews. It allows us to see how they were integral parts of multiethnic and multi-religious societies that the Hungarian state sought to destroy, independently of the twists and turns of German anti-Jewish policies. Holocaust historiography is advancing by integrating anti-Jewish polices and practices in these densely inter-related contexts. Charny’s zero-sum logic, in which attention to the fate of non-Jews somehow detracts from the specificity of Jewish experiences, stands in the way of this scholarship by tagging historians as antisemites.

Thomas Kehoe on the Intentions behind Nazi Propaganda for the Arabs during World War Two
Charny misquotes and consequently badly misrepresents Thomas Kehoe’s arguments about how the Nazis formulated their propaganda for the Arabs during World War Two. His summation of Kehoe’s argument for participants was: “About Nazi propaganda for the Arabs in World War Two, ‘This study casts doubt...[that] the [Nazi] calls to violence [by the Arabs] were an effort to expand killing of Jews beyond Europe... Anti-Jewish rhetoric figured third [the implication is as a

low priority] in the hierarchy of target themes” (13). Charny’s misquoting is apparent from the full context in the section of Kehoe’s article Charny dissected and reassembled:

Full of vitriol, violent invective and hate, there can be little doubt that Nazi Arabic propaganda aimed to incite an Arab revolt and conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims, including mass killing of Jews. Certain authors have addressed these calls to violence as an effort to expand the killing of Jews beyond Europe. The content study performed in this article casts doubt on the extent to which their analyses fully explain the propagandists’ goals. Anti-Jewish rhetoric figured third in the hierarchy of target themes. Furthermore, the Nazi propagandists reshaped it from a paranoid, European anti-Semitism into a threat of foreign domination that complemented the dominant, anti-imperialist message focused on the British and US presence in Arab lands.13

In the next paragraph, Kehoe reiterates the Nazi focus on killing Jews and its significance to the Holocaust, writing: “[The Nazis] seized on well-known Arab anti-imperialist sentiment whilst simultaneously fanning the flames of Jew-hatred, all in the service of inciting Arab insurrection and violence”.14

Beyond the blatant reorganization of Kehoe’s words, when his writing is seen in its full context it should be apparent he did not argue that killing Jews was a “low priority” or that his study casts doubt on Nazi attempts to extend the Holocaust, as Charny claims (13). The opposite is the case. There is no doubt the Nazis were keen to encourage Arabs to murder Jews. Charny’s assertion that Kehoe ignored the Nazis’ Holocaust policies in the Middle East overlooks Kehoe’s discussion of this issue in the first pages of the article. Indeed, he writes, “The Nazis almost assuredly intended the destruction of North African and Middle Eastern Jewry”.15

Kehoe was concerned with the question of how the Nazis formulated their Arabic propaganda and their key aims. His analysis of this question was confined to the context of an ongoing war in North Africa, which he clearly explains. A simple analysis of the propaganda’s content indicated a focus on anti-imperialist themes. This is a quantitative reality, and one that Jeffrey Herf, the other scholar to have written on this topic, also acknowledges as fact.16

The debate around how the Nazis constructed their Arabic propaganda is about formulation, not overarching intention. Kehoe agrees with the other scholars who have examined this propaganda that the Nazis intended Jewish extermination and tried to motivate Arabs to kill Jews. The reason Kehoe suggests for a high rate of anti-imperialist messages in the Arabic propaganda is developed from the consensus of analyses regarding how the Nazis formulated their propaganda, which holds that the Nazis targeted known sources of tension in their intended audience in order to shape actions they desired.17 In the case of their Arabic propaganda, anti-imperialism was the issue the Nazi propagandists deemed most likely to provoke Arab support for the German war effort, which would of course have meant violence against Jews and Allied forces. The reason that “anti-Jewish rhetoric was third in the hierarchy of target themes”, as Kehoe writes, was not because the murder of Jews was unimportant to the Nazis, but because the Nazis believed other themes would more likely motivate the violent responses they wanted from their Arab audience. This argument is further supported by documents from the Nazi Foreign Office. A memo from mid-1942 provided a step-by-step guide for constructing radio propaganda that targeted—what the Nazis believed to be—sources of Arab tension. Arab violence would have served a dual purpose, benefiting the immediate German war effort and killing Jews. If the Germans had won, there is no doubt Middle Eastern Jewry would have been destroyed.18

13 Kehoe, “Fighting for Our Mutual Benefit,” 152. Charny’s selected parts are italicized.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.,142.
16 Jeffrey Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arabs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 5.
17 Kehoe, “Fighting for Our Mutual Benefit,” 140-141. See also Herf, Nazi Propaganda, 262–263.
18 Kehoe, “Fighting for Our Mutual Benefit,” 141.
Charny misquotes Kehoe, and in so doing misrepresents a nuanced argument about how the Nazis constructed their Arabic propaganda. He has consequently betrayed the fundamental principles of good scholarship and honest intellectual debate, creating a quintessential straw man. There is no doubt the Nazis sought the destruction of all Jews, a truly horrible intention and crime that should be remembered and memorialized forever. The dispassionate academic analysis of how they sought to achieve such ends, through waging a wider war of conquest, encouraging foreign support, and motivating different forms of violence, does not detract from this reality.

Gerhard Wolf on the Wannsee Conference and Nazi Living Space

Regarding Gerhard Wolf’s article, it seems that Charny is most appalled by Wolf’s claim that the Wannsee Conference, and by extension the Holocaust, should be analyzed in the larger context of the quest for German living space. When it comes to the Holocaust, this is by now a fairly uncontroversial argument, with the various steps of radicalization of anti-Jewish policy regularly explained as embedded in a complicated web of events at home, at the front, and in the occupied territories. All were aimed, at least in part, at expanding the German Volksgemeinschaft beyond the borders of the Reich. Hardy any historian would question, for example, that it was the invasion of Poland that finally pushed the persecution of inmates of mental asylums and so-called asocials towards mass murder. And as we have known since at least Henry Friedlander’s work from 1995, aptly titled The Origins of Nazi Genocide, techniques and procedures used to kill over two million Jews in places like Treblinka were pioneered here, during Action T4, the first mass murder campaign of the Nazi regime. Before Herbert Lange became the first commander of the first extermination camp in Kulmhof, he headed a unit that had killed thousands of Polish inmates of mental asylums in a gas van. And when the regime opted to kill all Polish Jews, it was the T4 team that designed and staffed the extermination camps. Charny’s claim that one of the reasons for the archetypal significance—read: uniqueness—of the Holocaust was the first use of gas chambers is another example of how unfamiliar he is with this research (19).

One could point to very similar dynamics in the administration of the occupied territories, and in the way the war was waged. It is exceedingly obvious, for example, that the self-imposed constraints and dystopian aims of the Germanization policies in Poland and the failure of the ghettoization and deportation plans radicalized anti-Jewish policies there, and that the specific targeting of the civilian population, Jews and non-Jews alike, during the invasion of the Soviet Union first facilitated the murder of Jews in large numbers.

Wolf’s re-interpretation of the Wannsee Conference is part of this wider discussion, i.e. the attempt to embed and analyze anti-Jewish policies in the wider context of violent German policies to remake the demographic composition of conquered Europe. Some of the arguments he presents are not even particularly new. Interrogating the role of the Wannsee Conference in the history of the Holocaust started decades ago. Most historians now agree that if it was an important milestone in the history of the Holocaust, this was less for any decision taken there, than for the successful attempt by Heydrich to have the state bureaucracy accept his coordinating role in anti-Jewish policy.

Charny also seems annoyed by Wolf’s claim that Wannsee “did not call for a systematic and immediate mass murder of all Jews” (3). This discussion, too, has been underway for years. Wolf is by no means the first to argue that we should take the wording of the minutes more seriously. In the past, the most notorious passage about forcing “Jews fit to work … eastwards constructing

roads” was read as a badly veiled statement proposing the immediate killing of all European Jews in the extermination camps in the east. This consensus has now dissipated, with ever-more historians arguing that, when set against the developments within the SS apparatus and Himmler’s ambitious plans to install the SS as a principal force in the Germanization and settlement of the occupied east, as detailed in the Generalplan Ost, the intention to use Jews as slave laborers and kill them through murderous building projects might accurately represent SS planning at the turn of the year 1941/42.

Wolf’s article builds on these discussions, showing that the impact of Germanization policies for understanding the Wannsee Conference might be even greater—a reflection not merely of plans for the future, but of lessons from the past, i.e., the shortcomings and failures in Poland. His article tries to show how intertwined were anti-Jewish and anti-Polish policies, and how both aimed at ethnically cleansing annexed Poland.

For Charny, in his follow-up article in the JPM, this notion is “crazy.” He fears that showing that anti-Jewish policies were not formulated and did not operate in a vacuum would “minimize” the Holocaust. Even more perversely, he also claims in this article that Wolf would argue that the “Wannsee Conference was not about Jews!” The exact opposite is the case. What Wolf tries to show is that because of various developments—mainly the enforced cessation of deporting Poles and the further radicalization of antisemitic violence in other parts of the occupied east—Heydrich tried to reclaim lost influence by centralizing antisemitic policies in the RSHA. For this reason, the Wannsee Conference was solely about Jews, unlike the other two conferences he headed in the previous two years.

This argument has not been made before. Obviously, Wolf’s interpretation is just one intervention into an ongoing discussion. Given that little material on Wannsee has survived, every analysis of the role of the conference is dependent on its perceived context. If, for example, one holds the position that the decision to kill all Jews had been taken already before the end of the year 1941—a position not primarily influenced by what happened at Wannsee—then one will be much more inclined to interpret the minutes as just another example of Nazi cover language. However, if one is open to the argument that this decision emerged a few months later—retroactively legitimizing crimes already under way, or even to a model that downplays discrete decisions and instead stresses the process of radicalization—then his explanation makes more sense.

What makes Charny’s treatment of this article more outrageous still is that he is not content with insulting Wolf. He also denounces the entire University of Sussex as a “hotbed of anti-Israel and Holocaust downgrading scholars.” Needless to say, this claim, again, is not backed up by anything resembling evidence. As before, the opposite is correct. Only a few years after the university was established in 1961, the Columbus Centre for Studies of Persecution and Genocide was established, the first of its kind and a stimulating environment that produced pioneering studies like The Aryan Myth by Leon Poliakov and Warrant for Genocide by Norman Cohn, the center’s founder. During the following decades, the study of violence, genocide and the Holocaust became an important part of research across the university. Charny evidently knows none of this history.

He is equally ignorant of the present. He claims absurdly that Wolf argues that the Wannsee Conference “was not part of the final solution,” only to then speculate what the staff of the Museum

22 As reprinted in Mark Roseman, The Villa, the Lake, the Meeting: Wannsee and the Final Solution (London: Allen Lane, 2002), 113.
24 Charny, “Genocide Scholars Who Minimize the Holocaust.”
25 Ibid.
of the House of the Wannsee Conference would think of this notion. He seems ignorant of the fact that Wolf worked at the museum for eight years before starting at Sussex University. He seems also not to know that Wolf is the Deputy Director of the History Department’s Centre for German-Jewish Studies at Sussex, the only one of its kind in the UK. Founded in 1994, the Centre’s research focuses on the history of German-speaking Jewry in Europe, houses a large archive spanning over 300 years, and offers a wide teaching portfolio, from Moses Mendelssohn and the Haskalah to the so-called Kristallnacht pogrom and the Holocaust and to current Jewish life in Germany. In addition, the Centre hosts events aimed at a wider audience, like the annual Hannah Arendt Lecture and Holocaust Memorial Day, which attract hundreds of visitors from outside the university. Very recently, the History Department has also broadened its expertise in the research of Israel and the Middle East by appointing David Tal to the Yossi Harel Chair in Modern Israel Studies. This chair was made possible by generous donations by Lord Weidenfeld and others, who clearly did not think that Sussex was a “hotbed for anti-Israel scholars.” We agree that antisemitism has not vanished and constitutes a serious problem in Europe and beyond. In combatting it, however, one is ill advised to cheapen the problem by hurling accusations of antisemitism at colleagues who do not necessarily share one’s own partisan views. These unfounded accusations are not only inimical to any academic discussion, but also minimize the seriousness of the problems about which Charny himself claims to be concerned.

Amos Goldberg, Yad Vashem, the Holocaust and the Nakba

Charny attacks two of Amos Goldberg’s articles. The first one critically analyses the Israeli Yad Vashem Holocaust museum. The article claims that the museum portrays what some theorists call “a redemptive narrative” which tends to deny any part of the story that distracts from its mythical mission. Charny does not challenge Goldberg’s overall thesis, but relates to his critique that the museum hardly relates to other victims of Nazism. Charny actually agrees with this critique. Moreover, he even goes as far as saying that “Goldberg is also correct in that Yad Vashem fails to confront criticisms of its ignoring other peoples” (5). However, Goldberg’s way of making the argument was not to Charny’s taste, and therefore he concludes: “but in his remarks there is a suggestion of a possible innuendo of joining in contemporary ‘New Left’ attacks on Israel” (5). (Emphasis added). So here is the allegation: The article appears to express “a minimization of the Holocaust, delegitimization of the State of Israel, and repeat common themes of contemporary antisemitism” because it possibly suggests an innuendo that could be somehow considered as mirroring some vicious “contemporary ‘New Left’ attacks on Israel” (5).

What is this “contemporary ‘New Left’ attack on Israel”? Why is it an illegitimate critique? And how is Goldberg’s wording associated with such an illegitimate attack? Charny fails to even hint at answers to these questions, leaving crucial gaps in his argument. In footnote 16, he repeats this structure once again and writes: “I consider the criticism of Yad Vashem for not relating its exhibition to the genocides of other peoples, as correct, but the statement edges toward a possibly nasty twist” (emphasis added). So this possible nasty twist (which again is not explained) is enough for Charny to define Goldberg as an antisemitic de-legitimator of the State of Israel, and a Holocaust minimizer.

The second article to which Charny refers was co-written by Goldberg and Bashir Bashir two years later. It suggests a way for Jews and Palestinians to jointly deliberate on the Holocaust and the Nakba. The article suggests that only if the two peoples will acknowledge each other’s traumatic histories may they attain a historical reconciliation. The article, which is theoretical in nature, explores the conditions for such a joint conversation. It repeatedly emphasizes that one cannot compare the two events, for obvious reasons. However, as they both function as the two nations’ “foundational pasts” (Alon Confino), they should be addressed together. Bashir and

Goldberg mostly draw on Dominick La Capra’s concept of “empathic unsettlement,” which was coined by LaCapra in his writings on the Holocaust, and which means that in the wake of the Holocaust and other catastrophes of the twentieth century, a moral obligation exists to empathize with the other while acknowledging his utter otherness.30

However, Charny’s main allegation here does not have to do with what is written, but with what Bashir and Goldberg fail to mention: that the Zionist Jews who committed the Nakba were actually the victims of the Arab assault that threatened to annihilate them once again three years after the end of the Holocaust.

As is well known, these issues are hotly debated among scholarly specialists on the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is beyond the scope of this article to rehash this debate in order to show how complex this chapter of history really was—far beyond Charny’s ideological clichés. The major point that should be made here is that the article did not relate to the origins of the 1948 events. It tries to explain why Jews and Palestinians find it so difficult to talk about these historical events. It asserts that: “[t]he vast majority of Israeli Jews generally perceive the Holocaust as a catastrophe that justifies their Zionist position favoring a Jewish nation-state on the land of Israel/Palestine. There is a prevalent sense among many Jews, including many Holocaust survivors, that they must establish a robust sovereignty of their own in the wake of the Holocaust.”31 At the same time, “Many Palestinians … regard Zionism and the State of Israel as bearing prime responsibility for their catastrophe and suffering.”32

But the most absurd of his allegations comes when he claims that the authors fail to acknowledge “that the wish for a Jewish nation [sic] was in response to ongoing pogroms, mass killings and antisemitic events building up to the Holocaust” (7). This allegation is a complete absurdity, as this is precisely one of the major points of this article. Acknowledging the bloody history of the Jews in Europe disrupts the traditional Palestinian national narrative, just as acknowledging the Nakba disrupts the Zionist traditional narrative. This double move should lead, according to this article, to recognizing “the right to national self-determination of both national groups,” while insisting on a solution along binational lines, while emphasizing “that this right ought not be realised in the form of an exclusive ethnic state.”33

Thus the issue at stake here is not the history of Zionism and the conflict, but whether there is only one legitimate way to historically narrate Zionism and the conflict. It is time for Charny to acknowledge that while he might think “[t]he founding of Israel [should] … be recognized as an expression of a heroic national movement called Zionism” (7), there are others who think differently—among them even Zionists. Not everyone who fails to tell the Zionist story the way Charny wishes it to be told is expressing antisemitism, delegitimizing Israel, or minimizing the Holocaust.

Martin Shaw and the Palestine-Israel Debate
As we have seen, Charny has a highly idealized view of Zionism (“a heroic national movement”) and sees the establishment of the State of Israel only as a “response to ongoing pogroms, mass killings and antisemitic events building up to the Holocaust.” (7) Although he recognizes that Israel committed atrocities in its founding war, and refers to the “Nakba,” his motivation in dealing with these issues is not to understand the tragic sequence of events through which the persecution and mass murder of European Jews were combined with the destruction of Arab society in Palestine, but to uphold “the basic legitimacy and moral justification of Israel” and ward off what he perceives as “the current dangers to Israel’s existence” (7).

It is in this light that Charny approaches a contribution to JGR by Martin Shaw. He states that “an article was presented in which the author claimed from the outset that Zionism was based on a genocidal ideal, and that Israel’s War of Independence in 1948 was in fulfillment of that intention”

30 Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 40–42.
31 Goldberg and Bashir, “Deliberating the Holocaust and the Nakba,” 81.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 94.
(4). In fact, Shaw did not write an article in JGR, but engaged in a short debate (originally conducted by email) with Omer Bartov\(^{34}\) about an article he had earlier published in Holy Land Studies.\(^{35}\) As in the case of Segal, Charny does not appear to have read the article in which Shaw laid out his full case: he does not reference it, and is obviously ignorant of those of its arguments that were not repeated in the short JGR exchange. He merely presents three quotations from the debate out of context.

Charny charges Shaw with ignoring “the plain facts that the Nakba developed in response to the threatened destruction of the Jewish community in the newly founded State of Israel after Israel had accepted the U.N. partition into Jewish and Arab states” (6). However, these are not “plain facts,” as becomes clear once we admit other, related facts about the historical context: e.g. that the Arabs, the majority of Palestine’s population, rejected the plan because it gave the larger part of the territory to the Jewish minority; that (as Benny Morris documented 30 years ago) deliberate Zionist policies contributed to the removal and flight of the Palestinians in 1948;\(^{36}\) and that the intentional character of the process was confirmed by Israel’s refusal to allow Palestinian return in the aftermath.

As to Charny’s allegations that Shaw stated that “Zionism was based on a genocidal ideal, and that Israel’s War of Independence in 1948 was in fulfilment of that intention” (4), if Charny had read the original article, he would have known that Shaw cited Morris to the effect that the 1948 war “was initiated by the Arab side”;\(^{37}\) that he acknowledged that “Zionist rejection of coexistence between Jews and Arabs in Palestine was conditioned by Arab attacks on Jewish communities, especially during their 1929 uprising”;\(^{38}\) and that he argued (citing Mark Levene) against the idea that the Zionist movement had a single, long-term “intention” to remove the Arab population.

Obviously, Charny’s main concern, reflecting his commitment to the State of Israel, is with Shaw’s application of the idea of genocide to Palestine. Shaw pointed out that “none of the ‘revisionist’ historians who now dominate the field doubts that deliberate Israeli policies made a substantial contribution to the destruction of the larger part of historical Arab society in Palestine.”\(^{39}\) Shaw argued that this was true whether the 1948 removal was the result of Israel’s taking advantage of the “opportunity” to remove it, as Morris continues to argue,\(^{40}\) or also of extensive “pre-planning,” as Ilan Pappe’s more recent research suggests.\(^{41}\) In this light, Shaw proposed that, within the framework of a broad Lemkinian concept (in terms of which “ethnic cleansing” can be considered genocide\(^{42}\)), there is “prima facie a strong case for considering the [1948] events partially within a genocide framework.”\(^{43}\)

Charny is unable to engage with this proposition in conceptual or historical terms, but only through the starkly political lens of the “delegitimization” of the state. If Charny had paid attention, he would have seen that Shaw warned against politicizing genocide studies, and made it clear that for him the implication of his argument was only that Israel should “come to terms with the genocide of 1948 and its enduring injustice,” if it is to hope for security.\(^{44}\) In response to Bartov, he

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\(^{37}\) While Charny approves of Morris’s work, he does not engage with Shaw’s use of it.

\(^{38}\) Shaw, “Palestine in an International Historical Perspective,” 13.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 11.

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 13, cited in Shaw and Bartov, “The Question of Genocide,” 245.


\(^{44}\) Shaw, “Palestine in an International Historical perspective”. 17.
explicitly refuted the contention of “delegitimization.” Elsewhere, he has publicly advocated a two-state solution.

Why Now? The Emotional Challenges of Studying Genocide

As with any genocide, scholars need to approach the Holocaust with sensitivity because of the understandable emotions it evokes. It is not yet the kind of past about which all historians can easily write with detachment, as they do, say, of the sixteenth-century Reformation, which remained the subject of intense intra-Christian polemics until relatively recently. The Holocaust and other modern genocides remain instances of “hot” rather than “cold” memory, in part because scholars include(d) among their number surviving victims and perpetrators, witnesses, and their children, who, like everyone, are liable to the emotional pull of collective identification. A vivid sense of the past’s presence is conveyed by an online response to an article about Holocaust literature:

The Holocaust, at least for we Jews, is a very real event in our own personal history. It has meaning and consequences for our lives far more immediate than any fiction could represent. Not even historical scholarship is adequate to the event. For us our understanding of its lessons within the context of our Diaspora experience represents nothing less than life and death.

Scholars should not deny others the intense emotions they may feel about the subject, whether existential angst or anticipatory fear; experiencing them is all too human. Nor can they extricate themselves entirely from such formative contexts, as the famous Israeli historian Jacob L. Talmon observed in an essay entitled “Uniqueness and Universality of Jewish History”:

No historian … can be a complete rationalist. He must be something of a poet, he must have a little of the philosopher, and he must be touched just a bit by some kind of mysticism. The sorting out of evidence, the detective’s skill in ferreting out inaccuracy and inconsistency, are of little help when the historian strikes against the hard residue of mystery and enigma, the ultimate causes and the great problems of human life.

Of the Jewish historian in particular, Talmon continued that he

becomes a kind of martyr in his [sic] permanent and anguished intimacy with the mystery of Jewish martyrdom and survival. Whether he be Orthodox in belief or has discarded all religious practice, he cannot help but be sustained by a faith which can neither be provided nor disproved.

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51 Ibid., 89.
That Talmon, who was born in Poland in 1916, wrote in such terms fifty years ago is hardly surprising given the calamitous lows and dizzying highs of Jewish experiences in the first half of the twentieth century. But can historians like Talmon speak for the communities they purport to ventriloquize? We know many scholars of genocide who, though at times anguished, neither experience states of intimacy with mysteries of any kind, nor are tempted by the metaphysics of martyrdom.

Even so, continuing intense anxieties about trends in genocide research and status of Holocaust memory, evident in Charny’s articles, indicates that Talmon’s observations are pertinent. Take Walter Reich, former director of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., and currently Yitzhak Rabin Memorial Professor of International Affairs, Ethics and Human Behavior at George Washington University in the United States. He itemized those anxieties in the following terms:

- Distorting the very definition of the Holocaust—6 million vs. 11 million
- Trivializing Holocaust memory
- Dismissing the victimization of the Jews to advance the victimization of others
- Distorting the Holocaust in popular culture, especially film
- Academicizing the Holocaust
- The effects of Holocaust kitsch
- The effects of the seamier efforts to recover Holocaust assets
- The effects of using the Holocaust to achieve political, diplomatic, and military ends.52

Trivializing the Holocaust is a particularly common complaint, as is the objection to its categorization as “just another case of genocide” or an example of “man’s inhumanity to man.”53

For the traumatized subject and those who identify with them, these perceived trivializations seem outrageous. This subject requires absolute certainties as a psychologically essential cognitive structure. Without the consolation of abiding truths, the suffering of such subjects may be literally unbearable.54 Scholarship is thereby confronted with a challenge, for it presumes that “the living inhabit the present and … the dead inhabit the past.”55 How does it deal with the fact that scholars of genocide can be emotionally implicated in its causes and consequences, and experience permanent and anguished intimacy with the mystery of martyrdom and survival?

The American-Polish writer Eva Hoffman, daughter of Holocaust survivors, responds to this dilemma by positing a scholarly maxim: “It behooves us, with utmost care and compassion, to use our vantage point outside traumatic history itself in order to bring to it interpretations that may not be available to the victims; and perhaps, even, in our thinking and analysis, to move beyond the point of trauma itself.”56 The scholar need not be captured by the traumatic history, she is arguing.

Studying genocide, then, requires two operations: separating oneself from all participants’ perspectives, and engaging in comparative analysis in time and place. The benefit of hindsight confers an epistemological privilege: “An international, cross-cultural, or culturally intermingled perspective comes to us as easily as certain kinds of exclusive ethnic and religious attachments came to our ancestors,” writes Hoffman. “Translated backwards, this can lead to a comparative approach to history.”57 Hoffman understands the social scientific challenge for all scholars of genocide: “If we want to call upon the Shoah to deepen our comprehension of atrocity, then we need to study not only anti-Semitism but the process of ethnic and religious hatred, the patterns of

57 Ibid., 197-199.
fanatical belief, the causes of neighborly violence, and the mechanisms through which these can be contained.”

A scholar’s analytical rather than affective self should be prioritized when publishing in an academic forum. Self-control and critical self-reflection are preconditions for non-dogmatic scholarship.

The potential for such scholarship is embedded in Charny’s stated commitment to comparison and eschewal of uniqueness claims. He has promoted Genocide Studies in Israel, where it has been marginalized, and he has suffered at the hands of Israeli authorities for his advocacy of recognition for the Armenian genocide. He spoke from conviction when he averred that “He is committed to the ideal that understanding the processes which brought about the unbearable evil of the Holocaust be joined with the age-old Jewish tradition of contributing to the greater ethical development of human civilization, and that a unique memorial to the Holocaust be forged in the development of new concepts of prevention of genocide to all peoples.”

Holocaust memory is thus invested with a world-historical agenda of genocide prevention and the promotion of human rights, which will serve as a “unique memorial.” Functionally, his formulation repeats the idiom of uniqueness.

Anxiety about the viability of this agenda is apparent in Charny’s indignation that negotiations over the Universal Declaration of Human Rights immediately after the war were not motivated or accompanied by expressions of outrage about the Holocaust (2, 4-5, 22). This conclusion he disparages is based on study of the thousands of pages of documentation from 1946 to 1948 that are freely available on the website of the United Nations (UN). At no point did UN delegates explicitly refer to the mass murder of Jews during the proceedings of the relevant UN committees even as they invoked other instances of Nazi crimes. The reasons for this silence at the UN suggest, among other factors, a climate of latent antisemitism, as well as the active and passive complicity of some UN member states in the Holocaust itself. This finding is in line with the great mass of publications on postwar Holocaust memory, according to which the annihilation of European Jewry was often conflated with Nazi evil generally during the 1940s, with the distinctive features of the Holocaust were omitted or obscured, particularly outside of Jewish milieux. It gives no-one pleasure to discover that the genocide of Jews was not spoken of as a discrete phenomenon at the UN during the drafting of the Universal Declaration, at least not according to official UN documents. The article in question is simply reporting empirical findings.

Charny criticizes it for not reproducing his own imagination of the way things were (4-5, 22). Scholarship is impossible under such conditions.

This and other above-mentioned anxieties have a history. Ran Zwigenberg’s book about Hiroshima and the Holocaust provides important context for the current anxieties in Holocaust and genocide studies. Briefly, he identifies three stages in memory work concerning victims of the American atomic attacks on Japan and the Jewish victims of the Holocaust. In the first, from 1945 to the 1960s, triumphalist narratives incorporated the collective of victims into the risen/surviving nation. Individual survivors were largely ignored in this period of reconstruction that celebrated the pacifist or the partisan. In the second, which lasted until the late 1970s, the victims’ voices came to the fore as subjects of identification and empathy; now they were the heroes. Since the 1980s, in the third and ongoing phase, other victim groups emerged to challenge Japanese and Jewish claims to unique victim status. This skeletal version of the argument allows us to detect in the various defenses of Holocaust monumentalization the nostalgia of some scholars for the second memory phase, during which many of them were socialized.

The cultural contingency of such interpretations about the world historical status of major events or phenomena is indicated by the half-forgotten point that as late as the 1980s, “Hiroshima” (that is, atomic weapons) was routinely paired with “Auschwitz” (that is, the Holocaust) as the

58 Ibid.
principal challenge to human civilization. Beliefs about historical significance can change: this is the source of anxiety, as Zwigenberg found when he compared memories of the Holocaust and Hiroshima:

Bringing back Hiroshima does not diminish the importance of the Holocaust. This is not the view of many of my compatriots. For many in Israel, and among Jews especially in the USA, the Holocaust was a unique event that cannot be compared or tied to any other tragedy. This view is the lynchpin of a peculiar form of Jewish nationalism that centers on victimization and precludes any wider view of the tragedy. In the many presentations and talks I have given on the topic, I have always been confronted by some version of that view. In some cases, even the possibility of comparison is frowned upon. Many Israelis and Jews seem to fear even the suggestion of looking at the Holocaust in the context of postwar history in general; fearing context might lead to relativization and downgrading of the horror.

Zwigenberg’s report of his experiences mirror ours: judging by Charny’s article and its resonance with some readers, conducting research on the Holocaust threatens “a peculiar form of Jewish nationalism that centers on victimization and precludes any wider view of the tragedy,” as Zwigenberg puts it. This nationalism may indeed be one of the strongest influences on this perspective on the Holocaust. But, like many discourses, it has gained a wider currency, informing the common sense in the Holocaust Studies field, and complicating the conversation with Genocide Studies.

Conclusion

The current controversy shows that the marginal genre of feeling and reasoning that perceives enemies behind every corner is trying to set the general agenda of Genocide Studies. So far, the evidence suggests that this attempt has failed. This failure is an opportunity to reflect on the challenges of the field. Given our subject matter, intensity of commitments and emotions is hardly surprising. Hyper-vigilance can intrude into scholarship wherever the fate of human groups is at stake. We believe that good scholarship heeds the advice of Eva Hoffman, whose reflective capacities honed by the professional study of literature enable her to articulate and practice the necessary, almost austere self-discipline to temper hyper-vigilance: “we need to achieve a certain thoughtful separation from received ideas as, in our personal lives, we needed to separate ourselves, thoughtfully and with sympathy, from our persecuted parents.” In other words, our professional disciplining promotes our analytical self over our affective self, or at least separates them as much as possible. We control the latter, not only for the sake of our scholarship, but also to avoid the unconscious cultivation of aggression experienced as self-defense against putative attacks.

Such an approach entails studying the circumstances in which lethal ideologies of difference are generated, rather than taking their existence for granted. This is the program that Raphael Lemkin entreated in the scholarly study of genocide. In following Lemkin, Genocide Studies has made great strides in the last fifteen years; never before has the field been so plural and global. True, by treating the Holocaust like other historical events, these developments challenge the hegemonic status of Israel Charny’s favored memory regime, namely the compensatory redemptive narrative that he and others have invested in the Holocaust’s incalculable suffering. Robust debate about all these issues is essential to the vitality of Holocaust and Genocide Studies. Attacking colleagues and arguments in the manner we have experienced recently is not the way to engage in scholarly and intellectual exchange.

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63 Zwigenberg, Hiroshima, 9.
64 Ibid.
65 Hoffman, After Such Knowledge, 197–199.
67 Donald Bloxham, “Holocaust Studies and Genocide Studies: Past, Present and Future,” in Genocide Matters: Ongoing
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Appendix

The *Jerusalem Post Magazine* (June 17, 2016, p. 6) published an abridged version of this letter. The number of signers has been augmented by the names of scholars who wished to join the list.

**HOLOCAUST ‘MINIMIZED’**
We, the undersigned scholars of Jewish and European history, many of whom deal with the Holocaust and other genocides, were shocked by Israel Charny’s article (“Genocide scholars who minimize the Holocaust – and some who are coming to town”) in the *The Jerusalem Post* (May 25, 2016), and deplore the decision of this reputable newspaper to publish it. We support the eminent Journal of Genocide Research and we stand behind the scholars who publish their research in it. Our field enjoys a range of perspectives and methodological approaches, and this diversity is key to its vitality and continuing relevance. We are dismayed by Mr. Charny’s (who is not a Holocaust scholar) partisan orthodoxy that seeks to morally discredit those he accuses of biases—including antisemitism. And, although Mr. Charny is no statistician either, he grounds his claims in figures that lend an aura of credibility but in fact mean nothing. Far from advancing scholarship, Mr. Charny chills the room with character assassination.

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Minority Protection and Democratic Consolidation: The Role of European Integration in the Republic of Macedonia

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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to take stock of the European integration literature in reference to Eastern Europe in order to better understand how international forces affect minority rights. The article will focus on the status of the Albanian minority in the case of the Republic of Macedonia and attempt to illustrate how European integration has contributed to or hindered ethnic reconciliation between the ethnic Albanian minority and Macedonian majority through a historical-sociological analysis. Additionally, by linking the protection of minority rights to democratic consolidation, this article will show how the former is largely dependent on the latter.

Keywords: democratization, Eastern Europe, European integration, ethnic politics, ethnic reconciliation, Macedonia, minority rights

Introduction

At the time of writing, the Srebrenica Genocide of July 1995 is mourning its 20th anniversary. It has been over two decades since the beginning of the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, yet some of the former republics of the Yugoslav Federation are still struggling with building and maintaining modern democratic states. The Bosnian experiment has been an utter failure; Kosovo remains a contested state; while the Republic of Macedonia (henceforth Macedonia), once the frontrunner of European integration in the Western Balkans has fallen back on hard times. There are a number of peculiarities respective to each of the three aforementioned cases. However, what is common to all three has been minority rights issues and the failure to properly consolidate a modern democratic state.

The European Union (EU) has acted as a powerful stabilizing force in the region by providing a pathway to full EU membership. However, due to a combination of factors—enlargement fatigue after the 2004/07 Eastern enlargement and the recent global financial crisis—the EU’s influence in the Western Balkans has deteriorated as the region’s leaders have realized that another EU enlargement is not on the horizon for the near future. Coincidentally or not, at a time when the EU’s normative power in the region is being questioned, a number of states have reverted back toward authoritarian tendencies, with Macedonia being a prime example of this trend. The EU therefore, seems to be repeating a mistake it made in the 1990s. As British historian Garton Ash argued in a 1998 Foreign Affairs article, after the collapse of communism, EU leaders were too preoccupied with addressing the Union’s internal concerns, that they allowed Sarajevo to burn.¹

The post-communist transformation of Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans in particular were unique for a number of reasons as they relate to this article. Unlike previous political transformations from the developing world, East European transformations had to initiate change from two fronts—political as well as economic. Political in the sense of regime change, and economic in the sense of developing market economics. If the dual nature of Eastern transformations did not pose difficult enough choices for political leaders, Brzezinski has argued that the collapse of communism turned Eastern Europe into a “volcano of nations”.² Offe has interpreted this to mean that in addition to the dual nature of Eastern transitions, the question of nationhood for a number of states has resulted in a “triple transition”.³

The purpose of this article will therefore be to analyze the political transformation of Macedonia through a historical-sociological analysis with a particular reference to the status of the Albanian minority. Even though Macedonia hosts a number of other minorities, it is the Albanian one which has been the most difficult to accommodate, as well as the one through which ethnic politics have revolved around. As Macedonian scholar Daskalovski has argued, among all factors

that have influenced the political transformation of Macedonia, none has had as great an effect as the “disputing of the character of the state by Macedonian Albanians.” This is not to neglect the status of other non-majority communities in Macedonia, whose input is also relevant for the consolidation of democracy. Rather, by focusing on the largest non-majority group, the paper will be better positioned to analyze the development of minority rights, and the impact such rights have had on the consolidation of democracy.

Macedonia was chosen as a case study because it represents a rare case through which to study the situation of minorities in the democratic transition of a post-conflict or post-genocidal society. Genocide in the context of this article is defined as a political process that seeks to violently remove minorities from a political community or society. Additionally, according to Gurr, Macedonia represents a clear case of genocide prevention through the international community’s action early in the conflict. Macedonia therefore provides an important case study for post-conflict/genocidal studies and a number of anomalies as it relates to democratic theory and minority rights. For example, Macedonia was the first Western Balkan state to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU in 2001, which was supposed to serve as a stepping-stone for full EU membership. In 2005, Macedonia again became the first state in the region to be granted official EU candidate status, which was to signal the beginning of accession negotiations. Still, a decade later and negotiations are yet to begin. In fact, along with Turkey, which has been an official candidate since 1997, Macedonia has failed to satisfy EU demands in order to begin negotiations despite a decade of candidacy status. According to the 2014 Progress Report, which the EU produces annually to monitor a candidate’s progress, “the EU accession process for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is at an impasse.” The European integration literature has long established that the prospect for EU membership generates support for the consolidation of democracy. However, Macedonia seems to have resisted this theoretical expectation. Therefore, as defined by Eckstein, the Macedonian case will be regarded as a heuristic case study through which it would be possible to seek out potentially generalizable relations between European integration, democratic consolidation and minority rights.

It should also be emphasized at this early point, that this article will analyze the democratization and minority rights literatures concomitantly in order to better illustrate the relationship between the two sets of literatures. It is the argument of this article that democratic consolidation and minority rights are mutually inclusive. The article therefore asks: What is the relationship between democratic consolidation and minority rights in the case of Macedonia, and what role has European integration played in this relationship? In order to address the stated question, the first part of this article will take stock of the European integration literature as it relates to democratic consolidation and minority rights.

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According to the 2002 Macedonian census, Macedonians consist of 64.2% of the population, Albanians 25.2%, Turks 3.9%, Roma 2.7%, Serbs 1.8%, Bosnians 0.8%, and Vlachs 0.5%.

5 According to Shaw, “Genocide is a form of violent social conflict or war, between armed power organizations that aim to destroy civilian social groups and those groups and other actors who resist this destruction. Genocidal action is action in which armed power organizations treat civilian social groups as enemies and aim to destroy their real or putative social power, by means of killing, violence and coercion against individuals whom they regard as members of the groups.” See: Martin Shaw, What is genocide?, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 193.


Although the Macedonian case does not represent a clear post-genocidal case, Gurr has argued that Macedonia represents a rare case in which the international community acted proactively to try and prevent potential genocidal violence (Gurr, Options for the prevention and mitigation of genocide: strategies and examples for policy-makers).

Furthermore, the establishment of Macedonia as a state cannot be separated from the genocidal social and political context across the Balkans region in the 1990s which—to borrow a phrase from Hinton’s study of genocidal social processes—reified “manufactured identity-based differences” between people along ethnic and religious lines. See: Alexander Hinton, Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 211.


The second part will take an empirical look at the Macedonian case in order to contrast theoretical expectations with empirical realities. The third part will engage in a discussion, while part four will conclude the article.

Surveying the Literature
This article will work under the argument that democracy promotion, as applied through the European integration process encompasses the promotion of minority rights as well. At the conceptual level this should not be a problem. One can make a very strong argument that democracy promotion by definition encompasses the equal representation of the constituent minorities of a given state. However, this fusion becomes problematic when thinking of causal mechanisms, as the promotion of democracy requires different strategies and instruments from the promotion of minority rights when thinking of causal models, such as what type of promotion works and under what conditions. Thus, we must bear in mind this analytical difficulty when attempting to fuse the two concepts together. Nonetheless, this article will attempt to bifurcate the impact of the European integration process in Macedonia into two parts—the impact on democracy and the impact on minority rights.

The theoretical argument that European integration contributes to the consolidation of democracy first emerged after the Southern Enlargement of the EU in which Greece, Portugal, and Spain acceded into the European Economic Community. Since the 1980s democracy promotion through European integration, or otherwise referred to as the international dimension of democratization, has emerged as a growing body of literature in political science and international relations. The relationship between international and domestic forces in the process of democratization, however, remains unclear. Despite a large body of literature showing that a relationship exists between international democracy promotion and domestic change, the causal mechanisms of this relationship remain ambiguous. For example, in a recent assessment of the impact of European integration in Eastern Europe, Vachudova argues that despite an overreaching consensus, that under certain conditions external actors are able to make a positive contribution to democratization, the type of domestic change external actors are able to bring about remains unclear. In an influential earlier work, Vachudova, while reaching a similar conclusion was able to show how domestic factors, such as whether the local elites represented liberal or illiberal tendencies, mitigated the impact of European integration.

While Vachudova’s findings were able to show how domestic forces mitigate international forces, another set of literature has focused on the varieties of democracy promotion. Through an analysis of 36 countries in the immediate neighborhood of the EU (Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean) Schimmelfennig and Scholtzfind that the only incentive to prove effective in compelling democratic reforms has been the offer of EU membership. According to the authors, the conditionality principle, which the EU applies to all recipients of its democracy aid, proved

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effective only when a credible membership incentive was offered. Ethier takes a broader survey of democracy promotion by comparing EU, US, and World Bank initiatives and finds that conditional approaches work better than incentivized approaches; while at the same time strengthening the role of EU enlargement in democracy promotion by showing that conditionality works only in cases in which full EU membership is offered. While the literature shows that EU membership contributes to democratization, it remains unclear as to what type of political systems such as, parliamentary or presidential, multiparty or two-party, are better effected by democracy promotion.

The efficacy of human rights promotion is equally unclear. According to Moravcsik, “the most important preconditions for the creation of and compliance with the sort of highly refined regime norms found in Europe are strong pre-existing norms, practices and institutions of liberal democracy, which permit causal mechanisms to operate through civil society and semi-autonomous government institutions.” The first part of Moravcsik’s findings are clear—the presence of preexisting liberal norms are a precondition for the effective implementation of human rights regimes. The latter part, however, is ambiguous and it is precisely this part that human rights promoters struggle with. It is the creation of stable and effective civil society movements that poses difficulties for effective human rights protection. The highly influential edited volume of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, *The Power of Human Rights*, reaches a similar conclusion: “The more open a society and culture to Western ideas and the more a country had a liberal past which included the recognition of human rights, the less likely it was that norm-violating governments would deny the validity of the international norms.” In other words, as a number of other studies have concluded, international forces play only a secondary role as the adoption of minority protection legislation has largely been explained by domestic factors. Mitchell makes an eloquent argument in reference to the promotion of minority rights by stating that there is a limited extent to which we can expect international forces to change hearts and minds among groups in Eastern Europe.

Yet, even if we were to assume that the promotion of human rights would have a universal effect across cases, there still remain a number of important questions in determining the components of the promotion strategy. As Subotić has recently argued in reference to the post-conflict transitions of Eastern Europe, transitional justice scholarship has yet to answer important questions such as: How can a transitional justice system be setup in conjunction with a political transition; are the two compatible; what is the role of sequencing; and more importantly, should transitional justice systems be setup in illiberal democracies. Nitzova perhaps gives the most accurate account of the difficulty in assimilating Eastern European nationalist movements into the democratization process by arguing that unlike Western European nationalist movements which followed the pattern of “state first, nation second”, the reverse pattern appears to be the case in Eastern Europe.

The difficulty of assimilating nationalist movements in Eastern Europe therefore rests at the heart of state formation which the democratization literature has labeled as an absolute necessity for democratic consolidation. As Linz and Stepan have argued, “without a state, no modern democracy

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Thus, while transitioning societies are attempting on the one hand to consolidate a democratic system, on the other hand they are simultaneously struggling with the formation of a modern state.

The Macedonian transition to democracy following the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s represents an ideal case that infused democratization and nation building. As Daskalovski has argued, the “stateness” question in the Macedonian case has perhaps been the biggest issue in preventing the consolidation of democracy.

European integration, however, according to Subotić has not contributed to addressing the “stateness” question, as post-conflict Balkans leaders have prioritized EU accession and only superficially and reluctantly carried out political reforms. The effect that European integration has had on the Balkans, argues Subotic, is that it has instrumentalized transitional justice into a political tool which elites use to mobilize popular support. Furthermore, according to Koinova, the EU has advanced contradictory messages in Macedonia. On the one hand, democratization initiatives as outlined in the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership have consisted of one component of EU promotion strategies; while on the other hand, more pertinent security concerns have consisted of the second component. Koinova goes on to argue that as a result of the EU’s contradictory messages, Macedonian elites have learned to play a two-level game: having become cognizant that security concerns matter more to the international community than democratization concerns, politicians have learned to prioritize security issues and advance nationalist goals, while only minimal advancement has taken place in the fields of human and minority rights. Koinova’s findings therefore suggest that the impact of European integration in advancing human and minority rights has been only minimal in the case of Macedonia.

The Balkan experience with European integration is also echoed by the Slovakian experience. Through the analysis of the Slovak case, Nedelsky concludes that the combination of illiberal nation-building with authoritarian tendencies has a strong potential to result in an authoritarian regime. Macedonia in this respect seems to be following in the footsteps of Slovakia in the late 1990’s, which risked EU accession as a result of the authoritarian tendencies of the Mečiar government. However, unlike the Slovakian case in which the EU applied extensive public pressure in order to secure domestic change, in the Macedonian case such pressure is absent. Thus under certain conditions, European integration can have a paradoxical effect that strengthens and exacerbates ethnic divides rather than ameliorating them.

Bieber has even gone a step further by arguing that international actors have institutionalized ethnicity by legitimizing ethnic divisions. Following the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in August of 2001 which ended the armed conflict between ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian Government, Engstrom warned that the agreement might end up having the opposite effect to that indented by undermining state capacity and hindering ethnic reconciliation. A decade and a half later, Popovska and Ristoska have reached precisely that conclusion by arguing that Macedonia has not shown any signs of ethnic reconciliation.

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21 Daskalovski, *Democratic Consolidation and the ‘stateness’ Problem*, 52.
23 Ibid., 416.
25 Ibid.
27 Florian Bieber, *Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans: Managing Change in Deeply Divided Societies* (Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues Flensburg, 2004), 9.
The literature on democracy and human rights promotion has shown considerable gaps, while the EU itself has officially recognized that there is no “ready-made recipe for political reform; while reforms take place differently from one country to another [emphasis added].”30 The political transformation of Macedonia has in many respects epitomized the difficulty of a multiple transition particularly at it relates to its “stateness” problem. The literature itself has also shown that, under certain conditions, European integration can have a number of unintended consequences. The following two sections will therefore look at the empirical realities of the Macedonian transformation through a historical-sociological analysis in order to better understand how democracy and human rights promotion through European integration have affected minority rights and the consolidation of democracy.

A Historical-Sociological Analysis
Despite being the frontrunner for European integration in the Western Balkans, recent political crisis in Macedonia has caused the country’s integration process to reach an impasse. In February of 2015, the main opposition to the Gruevski government began leaking recordings of illegal wiretappings of some 5,000 officials, including high-level officials as well as the Prime Minister Gruevski himself.31 According to the EU’s recent investigation of the wiretaps, the current government has allegedly been involved in a number of illegal activities such as “electoral fraud, corruption, abuse of power and authority, conflict of interest, blackmail, extortion (pressure on public employees to vote for a certain party with the threat to be fired), criminal damage, severe procurement procedure infringements aimed at gaining an illicit profit, nepotism and cronyism.”32 For a society still struggling with ethnic reconciliation, particularly between the Albanian minority and Macedonian majority, the wiretaps also implicate Gruevski’s coalition partner, the ethnic-Albanian party, Democratic Union of Integration (DUI). The DUI has been complicit in the current government’s illegal activities, even in cases involving ethnic Albanians. For example, a recent International Crisis Group briefing reports that the wiretaps potentially implicate DUI in an alleged scapegoating effort by the current government in which seven ethnic Albanians were sentenced to life in prison for the murder of five ethnic Macedonians, despite the government “not knowing” who was guilty.33 The political crisis reached its peak in May 9th when an intense armed battle broke out in the northern city of Kumanova between Macedonian police forces and a group of ethnic Albanians. The details of the clash remain uncertain, yet what is certain is the deadly nature of the fighting which resulted in the death of ten gunmen and eight policemen. The Kumanova events have led many Macedonians (ethnic Albanians and Macedonians alike) to believe that the government staged the events in order to relieve pressure from the wiretapping scandal, which had resulted in mass protests in Skopje, as the government was refusing to step down and set up an interim government.34

The current political crises in Macedonia underpin a number of issues that have prevented not only the consolidation of democracy, but ethnic reconciliation as well. This section of the article will therefore provide a historical-sociological analysis of the political transformation of Macedonia in

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33 ICG, Macedonia: Defusing the Bomb, 7.

34 There have been numerous occasions in which the Macedonian government has supposedly engaged in dubious anti-terrorist campaigns, despite international observers such as NATO unable to confirm the occurrence of such events. See: Edward P. Joseph, “The Balkans, Interrupted: The Protests in Macedonia are Only the Beginning,” Foreign Affairs, (2015), accessed July 28, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeastern-europe/2015-05-10/balkans-interrupted.
order to better understand the current political crisis. In that respect, a brief historical overview of the early 1990s would provide an appropriate background through which to analyze the political development of the country.

The first post-communist elections of November 1990 produced three clear winners: the ethnic-Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) with 25 out of 120 seats in the national Parliament; the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) with 37 seats; and the Socialist Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) with 31 seats. The two Macedonian parties represent the opposite ends of the political spectrum with VMRO-DPMNE representing the opposition movement to the communist party and SDSM as the successor communist party. Kacarska has argued that despite the two parties identifying with different ideological labels, “their declared orientations have remained largely unrelated to their respective socio-economic policy choices.”

PDP on the other hand has focused exclusively on identity politics, while socio-economic issues are generally absent from the party’s program. In 1994, however, PDP splintered into two factions: the moderate faction which remained part of PDP and the more radical faction, the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA). PDP ultimately disappeared into political obsolescence, while a new ethnic-Albanian party, DUI, emerged as the leading ethnic-Albanian party after the 2001 conflict.

One of the first issues that stirred ethnic tensions in Macedonia came with the adoption of the new constitution in 1991. The constitution’s preamble declared Macedonia to be “the national state of the Macedonian people”, whereas the old Yugoslav constitution had defined the country as the nation of “the Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish minorities”. This has perhaps been the biggest matter which Albanians has taken issue with, as it reduced the Albanian population into a minority group rather than a constitutive nation. Unsurprisingly, according to survey data conducted in the early 1990s, Albanians felt alienated in the post-socialist constitutional order as 86% considered themselves second-class citizens.

PDP ultimately boycotted the special session on the approval of the new constitution, while the Albanian population boycotted the 1992 national census. Additionally, the new citizenship law adopted in 1992 gave ethnic Macedonians living abroad automatic citizenship, while Macedonian minorities were required to reside in the country for a period of 15 years. Discrimination reflected more broadly in government employment, as despite consisting of about 25% of the population, in 1997 Albanians represented only 10% of public servants and only 4% of the police force.

Despite the discriminatory politics of the Macedonian state, the events that led to the 2001 armed conflict were in a way spontaneous and opportunistic. There was no prior indication that Macedonia would be engulfed in an internal armed conflict. However, the 1999 Kosovo War provided for an environment where Albanian groups within Macedonia, as well as ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and Serbia began an armed insurgency against the Macedonian state. Daskalovski has argued that at the early stages of the conflict, the insurgent group labeling themselves as the National Liberation Army had no clear aims, and claimed to be fighting against the ‘Slavo-Macedonian’ oppression or a “Greater Albania”; while in the latter part of the conflict the rhetoric changed into fighting “for the human rights of Albanians in Macedonia.”

The conflict ultimately ended through an internationally brokered peace deal known as the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA). OFA aimed at addressing the concerns of the Albanian minority, particularly amending the preamble of the constitution; greater political decentralization; equal representation in the public

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34 Ibid.
33 Armend Reka, “The Ohrid Agreement: The Travails of Inter-Ethnic Relations in Macedonia,” Human Rights Review 9, no. 1 (2008), 58. Worth pointing out that according to the same survey, only 35% of the Roma community felt the same way, while the Turks did not consider it an issue.
30 Daskalovski, Democratic Consolidation and the ‘stateness’ Problem, 61.
sector; making minority languages official languages in local governance units in which 20% of the
population was a non-majority group; and finally a principle of double-majority in which national
legislation which affected “culture, use of language, education, personal documentation, and use
of symbols, as well as laws on local finances, local elections, the city of Skopje, and boundaries of
municipalities” would require the majority of representatives in the national Parliament as well as
the majority of votes from representative of non-majority communities.

OFA, however, was met with resistance by the Macedonian population. According to survey
data, 51% of ethnic Macedonians disapproved of the agreement, while only 44% approved it; the
Albanian population on the other hand approved it with 78%.41 The nationalist VMRO even
attempted to organize a referendum against the agreement, but ultimately failed in their effort after
pressure from the EU and US. The implementation of OFA, however, while effective in addressing
certain minority issues, has failed in others, while at the same time having a number of unintended
consequences. The most effective of OFA’s initiatives has arguably been the language initiative,
which has resulted in Albanian becoming an official language in 29 out of 85 municipalities. Yet
even the language initiative has resulted in a number of unintended consequences. As Mirjana
Maleska explains: language has become an impediment to ethnic reconciliation as not only is
either side been unwilling to learn the language of the “other”, but at the same time, language
is used as a mechanism of differentiation and separation.42 Equal representation has also been
effective to a certain extent. For example, by 2004, Albanian representation in the police force had
reached 13.3%43; while by 2015, Albanians were represented in 18.9% of non-managerial and 14.5%
of managerial jobs in the public sector.44 It is worth highlighting that the implementation of OFA
resulted in the negligence of other non-majority groups such as Turks, Serbs, Vlachs, and Roma.45

Other OFA initiatives, however, have had more negative consequences than positive ones. Take political decentralization as an illustration. According to an OSCE survey on decentralization
in Macedonia, most municipal leaders and administrators believe that there has been a significant
transfer of power to the municipal level, especially relating to education, communal services, and
urban planning; however, at the same time, most survey participants felt that the biggest challenge
to the effective implementation of their competences has been lack of financial resources.46 Thus, as
municipal leaders are dependent on the central government for financial resources, their autonomy
as decentralized governing units decreases. According to an International Crisis Group report, the
Association of the Units for Local Self Government has “fallen under the patronage of the ruling
parties.”47 In an analysis of decentralization in Macedonia, Lyon has gone as far as to argue that
while decentralization has increased the space of local citizens to participate in local matters, the
over-dominance of national parties has undermined decentralization and its potential benefits.48
The double-majority principle on the other hand which was supposed to act as a procedural
safeguard for minority interests in policy-making has been sidelined through legal loopholes which
has allowed the government to implement a major nationalist project (the Skopje 2014 Project)
without the approval of non-majority groups.49

It would be a hard sell to argue that Macedonia has achieved either democratic consolidation
or reconciled its ethnic grievances. While it would be even more difficult to accept that European

42 Reka, The Ohrid Agreement, 65.
43 Ibid., 61.
44 ICG, Macedonia: Defusing the Bomb, 8.
45 According to official Macedonian government statistics, from 2002 until 2006, it was only the Albanian non-majority
  group which benefited from the implementation of OFA in public sector employment, while the rest of the groups did
  not see an improvement in public employment. See: Koinova, Challenging Assumptions of the Enlargement Literature,
  823.
48 Aisling Lyon, “Political Decentralization and the Strengthening of Consensual, Participatory Local Democracy in the
49 ICG, Macedonia: Ten Years After the Conflict, 3.
integration has not had some negative consequences for the consolidation of democracy and ethnic reconciliation. In the following section, this article will engage in a theoretical discussion in order to better discern the mechanisms through which the political transformation of Macedonia, in conjunction with the process of European integration has failed to adequately protect minority rights.

Discussion
I will begin this section with a look at some of the theoretical debates on the link between ethnicity (minorities) and democratization. Conceptually, democracy is defined either in minimalist or in maximalist terms. Thus whereas a minimalist definition of democracy would constitute simply free and fair elections; a maximalist definition incorporates other democratic qualities such as a vibrant civil society, an independent judiciary, and even political culture. Therefore, in reference to the protection of minority rights, it is the maximalist definition of democracy that more accurately captures minority issues. Thus when this article refers to democratic consolidation, it is referring to the more maximalist definition of democracy. The relationship between the two—ethnicity and democracy—however, remains unclear as there is no consensus whether ethnicity hinders democratization. In an assessment of the relationship between the two concepts, Beissinger has argued that while ethnicity does matter for democratization, it seldom does so in a direct way. Similarly, in an assessment of the relationship between nationalism and democracy, Helbling finds that rather than being competing logics, the compatibility of the two is more a matter of degree. The role of minority rights in the failure of democratic consolidation in Macedonia has often been cited as one of the core causes. To a certain extent that is accurate. Minority issues have been at the forefront of Macedonia’s political transformation since the end of communism. However, without properly placing ethnicity in the process of democratization, it is hard to disentangle the causal mechanism of that relationship. As Schmitter and Santiso have argued, in addition to the what questions, that is, what to reform, politicians are also faced with questions of when. That is, when to change something, in what order, and what tempo. The temporal dimension of democracy is arguably as important as the structural and functional dimension and is of particular significance in divided societies as it interacts with heartfelt issues such as language, culture and identity. Thus when a transition is interacted with a divided society, political decisions are more likely to have unintended consequences.

For example, Beissinger has argued that the injection of political competition can result in “ethnic outbidding” as politicians seek to maximize popular support from particular ethnic groups. Furthermore, as politicians learn to play the “ethnic card” in orders to gain popular support, ethnic grievances are exacerbated. It is worth pointing out that during the early phase of the democratization process, ethnic politics are more pronounced, as the absence of interest-based politics turns ethnic politics into the only game in town, especially for ethnic-based parties. The Macedonian case exemplifies this effect very clearly. As was discussed earlier, the four major political parties in Macedonia have not shown any levels of ideological institutionalization along the left-right dimension, while ethnic-Albanian parties in particular have focused exclusively on identity politics. According to the latest Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index, it is difficult to see how the main political parties aggregate societal interests; while the perception among the population is that political parties represent only “narrow cliquish interests” that do not benefit the general welfare of society. The most interesting finding from a recent study on democratization in

54 Beissinger, A New Look at Ethnicity and Democratization, 85.
55 Ibid.
Macedonia shows that even the ethnic-Albanian party, DUI, has “disenfranchised Albanians who are not party members from potential positions in the local civil service and public administration.”

The politicization of the civil sector, particularly among ethnic-based political parties, perhaps provides the biggest indication of the manner through which minority rights have failed to be properly institutionalized in Macedonia. This is not a unique feature to the Macedonian political system, as the politicization of the civil sector is a common symptom of transitioning societies. Yet what is unique to the Macedonian case is the manner through which ethnic parties have been incorporated into the corruptive scheme of Macedonian politics. Ethnic parties have therefore failed to represent minority interests, as more narrow individual and cliquish interests have been prioritized.

When European integration is incorporated into this theoretical discussion, we can discern a number of patterns that have either hindered or advanced the protection of minority rights and democratic consolidation. The reason for this is the manner through which the EU has advanced the integration process. According to Grabbe, the EU has assumed that integration and democratization are part of the same process, regardless of the fact that “EU policies and regulatory models were created to fit economies and societies at a very different level of development.” Therefore, under certain conditions, integration is problematic for democratization and minority rights because it advances norms and policies that are not necessarily compatible with an effective promotion strategy. Rather, a one-size fits all approach is adopted as acceding states must adopt EU policies as they stand, otherwise the European project risks setbacks. In other words, under certain conditions, human rights and democracy promotion by the EU may not necessarily result in positive change.

In addition to the failure of the EU’s promotion strategies, enlargement as a foreign policy goal has lost priority, which in effect has diminished the Union’s influence in the Western Balkans. Part of this is attributed to enlargement fatigue and the recent global financial and Euro zone crisis. However, in the case of Macedonia, an accession perspective has lost further credibility as a result of the country’s enduring name dispute with Greece. Thus when in 2008 Greece vetoed Macedonia’s entry into NATO due to the latter’s name, the Gruevski government turned the rejection into a political victory by playing into ethnic Macedonian claims of historical grievances.

Interesting to highlight that despite the diverging views on a number of issues between the constitutive nations of the Macedonian state, most Macedonians and its non-majority groups are of the view that the name dispute is postponing integration toward Western led institutions such as EU and NATO. The name dispute has also prevented the beginning of accession negotiations with the EU despite the country’s candidate status since 2005. According to the latest Progress Report on Macedonia, the European Commission contends that it is ready to open negotiations, yet the name dispute with Greece has prevented that from happening (European Commission 2014). The failure of the EU to follow-up on its enlargement promise has therefore allowed for nationalistic tendencies to flourish within the current government.

According to the latest Freedom House Nations in Transit Report, Macedonia’s overall democracy score has deteriorated yearly since 2007, particularly the subcategories of media and judicial independence. As the current government is attempting to entrench its political power,
Macedonian society has also shown signs of democratic resilience. Following the release of the wiretaps in February of this year, large-scale protests began developing in Skopje calling for the step-down of the current government. What stood out as unique in the 2015 anti-government protests was the fact that ethnic Albanians and Macedonians alike protested together in solidarity against the present government. This is a rare occurrence, as according to Shikova, civil-motivated protests are generally absent in Macedonia as more ethnic and partisan motivated protest have dominated the sphere of civil unrest. The recent crisis therefore provided an opportunistic window through which to reconcile ethnic grievances between the major groups in Macedonia. Yet despite this opportune moment, the Gruevski government has managed to divert attention from the protests to the ethnically charged May events in Kumanova. It is highly likely that the early scheduled elections of December 2016 will result in a victory for the opposition. Yet what remains uncertain is the extent to which a change in administration will provide for an environment which ethnic reconciliation takes place, democratic qualities are improved, and integration toward Western led institutions begins in earnest.

Conclusion
What we’ve seen in the political transformation of Macedonia is the institutionalization of a pattern of politics that has disregarded and neglected minority rights. This conclusion is widely counterintuitive to what was discussed above, as there was clearly a minority rights component to the Macedonian transformation. However, while on the surface minority rights were at the forefront of the country’s political transformation, below the surface, individualistic power-driven and corrupt motives were the driver of political decisions, rather than genuine concerns for minority rights. This was most apparent in DUI’s politicization of civil sector employment, which disenfranchised ethnic Albanians not supportive of the party. The unwillingness of the Albanian based parties to demand genuine political change for minority protection was only exacerbated by the disapproval of the OFA by ethnic Macedonians, which provided ethnic Macedonian parties with popular support for nationalistic projects.

It is becoming apparent in the Western Balkans that as EU influence is diminishing, political reforms have ceased, and authoritarian tendencies have been on the rise. Macedonia exemplifies this regional trend more clearly than any other one. For the EU to improve its promotion strategies, however, it must first address some of its internal contradictions. In terms of democracy promotion, it must first develop country specific promotion strategies informed by previous experiences. Following the 2004/07 Eastern Enlargement and the troubling democratic performance of Bulgaria and Romania after accession, the EU took proactive steps to improve its enlargement policy. Specifically, this included the introduction of two new chapters in accession negotiations—Chapter 23 on Judiciary and Fundamental rights, and Chapter 24 on Justice, Freedom and Security. According to an EU official, lessons learned from the Eastern Enlargement—specifically the negligence of the political criteria—have resulted in the reinforcement of democracy promotion. Yet, even if we assume that the new enlargement policy is an improvement from the previous one, there is no reason to believe, for example, that the same policy will have the same effects in post-conflict Macedonia and Serbia compared to Albania, which did not undergo a violent conflict in the post-communist period. Additionally, in reference to minority rights, the EU has been criticized for a blatant display of hypocrisy. Minority rights consist of a major components of the EU’s enlargement policies, however, within its own territories, EU members have failed to apply the same protective measures as the ones promoted in Eastern Europe.

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64 Peter Simmons, The Impact of EU Democracy Promotion: The View from Brussels, (London: Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence in European Law and Governance: King’s College London, 2011), 22.
Perhaps the EU’s best course of action would be to tap into those common views that all
Macedonians share toward Western led institution, particularly by addressing Macedonia’s
name dispute with Greece, which has acted as a stumbling block for NATO integration and
the beginning of EU negotiations. Additionally, the EU has much experience to learn from.
The Slovak experience showed that European integration can be a powerful force in defeating
a “authoritarian” regime. Thus by applying public pressure in a highly euro-enthusiastic
society such as Macedonia, the EU can force domestic change. However, a delicate line must
be walked between security issues on the one hand which have the tendency to advance
nationalist goals, and minority concern which also have the tendency to institutionalize
ethnic divisions.

It should not, however, be misconstrued that this article is underplaying the importance of
international forces. Yet with that being said, it is the argument of this article that while on the
one hand international forces have been effective in preventing potential genocidal violence, on
the other hand, they have been less effective, and under certain conditions counterproductive
in reconciling ethnic tensions. It is therefore precisely in the context of a post-conflict/genocidal
legacy and an unconsolidated democratic system that ethnic reconciliation in Macedonia has been
particularly difficult to accomplish.

The findings of this heuristic case study have shown that not only are democratic consolidation
and minority rights protection mutually inclusive, but that an effective promotion strategy that
addresses only one of these issues, would under certain conditions negate the other. The case
study therefore confirms much of the preexisting literature—European integration is only
partially effective in promoting domestic change, while under certain conditions there is even
a possibility of unintended consequences. However, the Macedonian case does add something
particular, as unlike any of the Eastern Enlargement cases, Macedonia represents a post-conflict
situation in which minority concerns were more pertinent and delicate than previous cases of
European integration. It is highly unlikely that the failure of European integration in Macedonia
and the Western Balkans will lead to another genocidal war among the constitutive nations of
the region. However, it is up to regional organizations with a normative attraction to provide
an impetus through which s stagnated political transitions such as the Macedonian one can
move forward.

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Minorities at Risk Project (MAR). Chronology for Albanians in Macedonia. 2004-2015


Simmons, Peter. *The Impact of EU Democracy Promotion: The View from Brussels* (London; Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence in European Law and Governance: King’s College London, 2011).


Abstract: The denial of the Armenian genocide led to devastating effects on both the individual and collective levels which in many cases were passed down to their descendants. In BiH, many of the facts are not denied per se but the interpretation is such that genocidal intent is denied. While some research has been done on the consequences of trauma among BiH survivors, no in-depth studies are found on the effects of denial on the survivors’ psychosocial well-being. This article aims to fill in the gaps based on in-depth interviews carried out since 2011 in BiH, investigating the cognitive, affective and behavioral consequences of denial at both the intragroup and intergroup levels. This article also seeks to identify which forms of acknowledgement are the most meaningful to the survivors for preventing further victimization. Finally, this article examines the interconnection which exists between denial and acknowledgement for reconciliation and sustainable peace to occur.

Keywords: genocide, accountability, psychosocial rehabilitation, reconciliation

Introduction
During the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), approximately 104,732 individuals perished or disappeared, 1 350,000 were wounded, 2 20,000 to 60,000 women were raped 3 and 8,000 Muslim men and boys died in Srebrenica. 4 Former US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger reported that numerous charges were laid against the Serbs, and had expressed “the facts of which are indisputable.” 5 The information was delivered to the UN War Crimes Commission responsible for deciding whether to prosecute or not. Among the charges: the siege of Sarajevo (which, lasted 44 months, killed more than 11,000 and wounded another 50,000, including children); the attacks (bombings, beatings and killings) of Banja Luka’s 30,000 Bosniaks; the concentration camps in Banja Luka/Makaca, Brčko/ Luka, Krajina, Prnjavor, Moarska, Prijedor/ Keraterm, Trnopolje/Kozarac; the massacres of between 2,000 and 3,000 Muslim men and boys at a brick factory and a pig farm near Brčko. 6

A report by Tabeau, Żołtkowski, Bijak and Hetland presented in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) shows that extreme changes occurred to the Muslim population living in the “Milošević case area.” 7 The number of Bosniaks in seven municipalities—that are now part of the Republic of Srpska—was reduced by approximately 91.4 to 99.9 % between 1991 and 1997-1998. To illustrate the point, in 1997-1998, ten Muslim individuals were identified in

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6 Ibid.


Bratunac (formerly 16,284), six in Foča (formerly 14,559), seven in Višegrad (formerly 11,178) and three in Srebrenica (formerly 21,361). In Bijeljina, the Muslim population went from 24,314 (1991) to 1,429 (1997-1998). In Brčko, the number of Bosniaks declined from 20,309 to 546, as was the case in Prijedor where the number of Bosniaks declined from 40,075 to 397 in the same period. In Doboj (RS), the number of Bosniaks went from 23,406 to 239, and similarly in Zvornik, from 29,452 to 129. Due to Milošević’s death, no final judgment was reached in Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević. However, the Trial Chamber rejected Milosevic’s “motion for judgment of acquittal” and concluded that genocide had in fact been committed in Bijeljina, Bosanski Novi, Brčko, Ključ, Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Srebrenica.

A vast body of literature indicates that while the Serbs are not the only ones who committed crimes of war, they are the primary perpetrators of the 1990’s wars in ex-Yugoslavia, where the disproportionate suffering experienced by Bosniaks is indisputable. In BiH, many of the facts regarding the killings are not denied per se but the interpretation is such that genocidal intent is effectively denied. While some research in clinical, social psychology and psychiatry has been done on the consequences of trauma among BiH survivors, no in-depth studies are found on the effects of denial on the survivors’ psychosocial well being. The present article seeks to fill this gap in knowledge by investigating the cognitive, affective and behavioral consequences of denial at both the intragroup and intergroup levels in the aftermath of genocide. This article is essentially based on multiple interviews that were carried out in person during the course of several field research trips in BiH, Croatia and Serbia between April 2011 and July 2015. The interviews ranged from non-directive to semi-directive and focused predominantly on the accounts of the survivors of war from different municipalities of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In most cases, volunteer translators assisted the researcher / interviewer. At other times, a local translator was employed. The respondents were recruited via snowball sampling. This ongoing study makes use of phenomenology both as an approach and as a methodology, where the object of study is understood via the perspective of the lived experience of the survivors.

Following a discussion on the definitions and classifications of denial, this article explores its psychosocial effects, as experienced by the survivors interviewed in BiH. This article also seeks to identify the most meaningful forms of acknowledgement for the survivors in BiH, as it pertains to minimizing or preventing further victimization. Finally, this article examines the interconnection, which must exist between denial and acknowledgement for reconciliation and sustainable peace to occur. Without a good enough acknowledgement, the healing process is delayed or impeded, and retraumatization occurs.

Defining and Classifying Denial

The strategy of genocide denial is usually conceived of and carried out by the perpetrators, their successors as well as by individuals who support the perpetrators in their attempts to distort the truth and to persecute the victims yet again. Many types and classifications of denial are found

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8 See report by Tabeau et al. (2003) for more results and details
9 Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević: Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, Kosovo, Croatia & Bosnia, Trial Chamber, January 16, 2004, IT-02-54-T.
in the literature but Stanley Cohen and Israel Charny’s definitions and classifications are the most comprehensive to date. Stanley Cohen essentially defines denial as 1) an unconscious process or a defense mechanism that blocks off unimaginable and intolerable information to prevent it from reaching the conscious awareness and 2) as a conscious and deliberate choice to ignore reality or facts deemed counter to one’s comfort or advantage, purposes and/or needs. Cohen explains that one’s awareness of what is being evaded may be ambiguous. He adds that the knowledge of atrocities and suffering entails significant “grey areas between consciousness and unconsciousness.”

Cohen indicates that three forms of denial are possible with respect to what is being denied: literal, interpretative and implicatory. Literal denial implies that the knowledge or the raw facts are blatantly denied: “nothing happened,” “there was no massacre.” With interpretative denial, the raw facts are not denied but are attributed a different meaning: “it was population exchange” or “collateral damage” (and not a massacre). Implicatory denial refers to the denial or the minimization of its significance or of its implications: “these killings have nothing to do with me,” “why should I risk my life to intervene” or “it is worse elsewhere.” The author also assigns a psychological status to each type of denial. Literal denial may be a manifestation of genuine ignorance, a deliberate escape from an unbearable reality, or a calculated lie or disinformation. Interpretative denial can be linked to the incapacity to understand the meaning of the facts. It can also assign a different label in order to avoid social marginalization and legal accountability. Implicatory denial involves a degree of sincerity as well as the use of simple techniques to avoid psychological or moral demands related to the events in question. Cohen adds that denial entails cognition (no acknowledgement of the facts), emotion (not feeling disturbed), morality (no recognition of responsibility or of immorality), and action (perpetuating the violence or not acting on known facts). The author also allocates different levels (personal, official, cultural), different time frames (historical, contemporary), different agents (perpetrator, victim and bystander) and space (your own space, elsewhere) to denial.

Israel Charny’s classification groups forms of denial into six broad groupings. The category “malevolent bigotry” is associated with denials by perpetrators, non-perpetrators (fascism culture), groups that have been or are victim of genocide, and groups that are vulnerable to genocide because they are weaker (power imbalance) or they committed genocide. “Self-serving opportunism” constitutes another category and comprises denials that indulge individual or collective self-interest or power e.g. “careerism, pragmatism, exhibitionism and realpolitik.” The category “‘innocent denials’ and/or ‘innocent disavowals of violence’” consists of innocent denials via manipulation and lies to eradicate the knowledge or the credibleness of genocide. “‘Definitionalism’ or insistence on defining cases of mass murder as not genocide” is a category where denials are based on the definition of genocide and the cases it may include (or not) or the reduction of the significance of a genocide by relativizing, minimizing or rationalizing the events of genocide. The “nationalistic hubris or self-involvement which justify exclusion of others” category encompasses denials of the facts of genocide of others or of specific groups in particular.

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14 Cohen, States of Denial, 5.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 6.
17 Ibid., 7.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 8.
21 Ibid.
22 See Ibid., 9-29 for further details.
24 Ibid., 525.
25 Ibid., 526.
26 Ibid., 529.
27 Ibid., 532.
The deniers associated to this category may have suffered genocide themselves or share a history of past enmity with other people or groups of people. “Human shallowness—the dulling and depletion of a genuine sense of tragedy and moral outrage” is a category that involves denials based on the desensitization, the trivialization or the routinization of genocide-related events.28

Instead of classifying different forms of denial, Lemarchand distinguishes between denial and revisionism.29 The author defines denial as the contestation that genocide occurred because of the absence of demonstrable intent to annihilate. Revisionism implies the creation of new circumstances surrounding genocidal violence and the devising of new motivations where victims often turn out to be the perpetrators and each can be found on both sides.30 Lemarchand adds that denial and revisionism both entail the leaving out of some details and the manipulation of historical facts in order to portray the victims as being the aggressors and to exonerate the perpetrators.31 Hirsch contends that individuals and collectives tend to use the same strategies to block out or to silence an unbearable and horrendous memory or event: denial, the shifting of blame, rationalization and relativization.32 The author explains that the denial of facts is not so easy to contest and even necessitates counterintelligence efforts as deniers present “details as valid information.”33 Hirsh adds that historical evidence does not necessarily prevail over lies and oversimplification.34 In the case of blame shifting, the perpetrator becomes a victim by blaming others for what happened. Rationalization entails justification for the unacceptable behavior. Relativization explains the events and related immoral behavior that took place in comparison to others. Adam Jones identifies a number of denial strategies.35 Among them we find: portraying the atrocities as self-defense, understating the scope of the massacres, stating the absence of genocidal intent, pointing out the absence of clear or direct orders, downplaying the original population’s demographic weight, describing oneself and/or group as being pure and thus incapable of mass atrocities, or on the other hand, as being the real victims.36 Denial—the last stage of Gregory H. Stanton’s ten stages of genocide—occurs throughout each of the different stages and continues beyond the genocide.37 It is one of the surest predictors of future genocidal massacres. Stanton indicates that denial comprises covering up the evidence (e.g. burning the bodies, digging up the mass graves), denying their criminal deeds, blaming the victims and intimidating the witnesses.38 According to the author, arrests and prosecutions allow for the evidence to be heard and helps to combat impunity as punishment contributes to diminishing denial.39

The use of increasingly sophisticated cognitive strategies such as rationalization, contextualization, deconstruction and/or justification allows for mass killings to become a legitimate governmental response to an attack or the threat of an attack. Accordingly, the most dangerous form of denial (i.e. facilitating or reinforcing the committing of further atrocities) is interpretative denial. As previously seen, this implies the deliberate weakening of the factual foundation of genocide by mixing in elements of acknowledgement of historical facts and/or consideration for the violence and deaths suffered with lies and denials. As time passes, the tangible genocide-related facts incrementally disappear while the survivors’ memories and experiences are increasingly silenced. This kind of denial is dangerous not only because it disseminates uncertainty, ambiguity and even contradiction, but also for the reason that it has permeated different spheres of society (political

28 Ibid., 533.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 31.
34 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
and academia) under the principle of free speech where opposing points of view ought to be heard. Interpretative denials of genocide then become tantamount to diversity of opinion and can then easily be integrated in the media, publications, public forums (lectures, conferences and so forth). A number of academics—such as David Irving—have had much success denying genocide (see Smith and al. 1995, for a few examples). While a few countries such as Canada and Germany have legislated that denial of the Holocaust is subject to legal prosecution, interpretative denials are more discrete and difficult to identify. Holocaust deniers have not been criminalized in most countries, including the United States, UK and BiH. Adam Jones argued against imposing legal sanctions against deniers, opting instead for other strategies such as public refutation (proactive campaigns and denunciation informed by thorough research,) to minimize further damage from unethical denials. Other authors such as Smith, Markusen and Lifton stand for legal sanctions against genocide deniers.

Denial serves to numb, enables avoidance of the unthinkable or protects the psyche by blocking out awareness of cruelty and extreme horrors committed by some towards others, especially when members of one’s in-group are identified as mass murderers. However, denial also negates responsibility, revives painful and harmful memories, and further damages the victims and other individuals who are affiliated with them. Such distortions of truth and revisions of history aim to demolish the identity of the targeted group and to control people’s mind constructions about the events or a number of aspects related to genocide. While no link has been established between intentions and the conscious/unconscious processes at play, perpetrators and their allies deliberately use highly sophisticated strategies to further their goals. Other than the perpetrators and their supporters, ordinary individuals are drawn to denial for different self-serving reasons such as protecting one’s own position by accepting the institutional culture or to benefit from funds that will support his or her denial. Some authors such as Charny note that denials disseminated by non-perpetrators and apparently well-intentioned people (defending human rights and justice standards, for instance) are the most widespread form of denials and are especially dangerous as they are very damaging to the societal support of historical truth, justice and impartialness.

Interpretative Denial in BiH (and Beyond)

Everything the victims say is relativized, reduced in courts, denied by the perpetrators. Any such strategy used to modify the truth further damages the victim.

Interpretative denial, where facts or historical events are given a different meaning, is the view which is most prevalent in BiH. This form of denial has many supporters, most notably, among political leaders (international community, Serbia, Bosnian Serbs in eastern Bosnia) and academic experts. During the 1990’s, while the worst atrocities were taking place in Bosnia, political leaders avoided use of the term genocide as such acknowledgement would have required an intervention from those who had signed the Genocide Convention. As for Serbia, a draft resolution—recognizing genocide—was introduced in 2005 but the Serbian Parliament did not adopt it. In 2010, it acknowledged that a “crime” and a “tragedy” had occurred in Srebrenica but never

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45 Smith, Markusen and Lifton, “Professional ethics and denial,” 1-22.
47 Interview with woman (50-65 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, May 2012.
49 Michel-André Horelt, “Serbia-Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Different apology packages, different successes,” in Apology and Reconciliation in International Relations, ed. Christopher Daase et al. (New York: Routledge, 2016).
referred to it as genocide.\textsuperscript{40} Serbian authorities began arresting suspects of Srebrenica-related crimes in March 2015.\textsuperscript{41} In July 2015, Aleksandar Vučić—Serbia’s Prime Minister—attended the 20th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre, where he condemned “the crime” but did not use the term genocide.\textsuperscript{42} Vučić—a former ultranationalist politician during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war who is currently embracing the region’s efforts for joining the European Union—was attacked at the ceremony with water bottles and stones.\textsuperscript{51} Vučić had mentioned the following in the 1990’s: “for every killed Serb we will kill 100 Muslims.”\textsuperscript{52} Also in July 2015, Russia vetoed a UK and US-drafted UN Security Council resolution on the Srebrenica massacre of 1995.\textsuperscript{53} This resolution—meant to mark the 20th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre—would have formally condemned the massacre as genocide.\textsuperscript{54} Russia was the only country to veto the resolution. China, Nigeria, Angola and Venezuela abstained, while the other ten members of the Council voted in favor.\textsuperscript{55} The draft resolution failed, as a permanent member of the Security Council issued the veto. This veto only further hinders the reconciliation process in BiH.\textsuperscript{56} In the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska, denial remains strong.\textsuperscript{57} The notion of “equal guilt for equal crimes,” whereby the Serbs’ forces were not the only bad guys has been propelled by means of political, academic and journalistic discourses by members of the international community, Serbia and Bosnian Serbs in eastern Bosnia.\textsuperscript{58} Cushman explains that this relativism, among other factors, has been fuelling both the denial of Serbian culpability for the crimes that occurred during the 1990’s as well as the intensification of Serbian victimhood.\textsuperscript{59} Edina Bećirević underlines that “idea linkage distortion and time-sequence confusion” is a method of denial often used by individuals who point out genocide against Serbs during WWII to justify the atrocities carried out in BiH in the 1990’s.\textsuperscript{60} The author adds that those who disseminate this perspective disregard, among other facts, that both Bosniaks and Croats (and others, such as Jews) were “victims of WWII-era genocidal policies” adopted by certain Serbs.\textsuperscript{61}

In regards to the academic circles, Edward S. Herman—Professor Emeritus at University of Pennsylvania, a media analyst and a well-known revisionist—has repeatedly denied the genocide in BiH.\textsuperscript{62} Noam Chomsky—Professor Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{56} Dzidic, “Russia Vetoes UN Srebrenica Genocide Resolution.”


\textsuperscript{58} Bećirević, Genocide on the Drina River, 146 and 173 respectively; See also Marko A. Hoare, “Genocide in the former Yugoslavia,” Journal of Genocide Research 5, no.4 (2003): 543-563; Campbell, National Deconstruction.

\textsuperscript{59} Thomas Cushman, “Anthropology and genocide.”

\textsuperscript{60} Bećirević, Genocide on the Drina River, 173.

\textsuperscript{61} For more details see Bećirević, Genocide on the Drina River, 174.


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one of the most widely quoted intellectuals—wrote the foreword to Herman’s book *The Politics of Genocide* which denies the genocides of Srebrenica and Rwanda.63 Diane Johnstone—an American political essayist and columnist—also wrote a book which denies the genocide of Srebrenica.64 Robert Hayden—a professor in anthropology of law and politics at the University of Pittsburgh—portrayed the genocidal massacres that happened in BiH in the 1990’s as “removals.”65 However, a number of well-known authors such as Marko Hoare, Samantha Power, Martin Shaw, and Gregory Stanton have highlighted the detrimental political effects and consequences of academic denial on the prevention of genocide.66

With respect to the judiciary, both the ICTY and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have recognized that genocide did occur in BiH, but each relativized the facts.67 For instance, in 2007, the ICJ acknowledged that Serbia had violated the Genocide Convention, by not doing enough to prevent it from occurring, and yet still decided to release the Serbian state from full responsibility.68 As for the ICTY, through its settlements with war criminals offering the latter shorter sentences for confessions, it also contributed to the relativization of the mass atrocities committed in the 1990’s.69 Most of the interviewees who participated in the current study were of the opinion that a significant amount of information was revealed through judicial courts such as the ICJ, the ICTY and the War Crimes Chamber (of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina). However, they deplored the manipulation of information that seeks to minimize, rationalize, justify, deconstruct and/or deny the violent deeds perpetrated as well as their consequences. Nettelfield indicates that, despite criticism from a number of scholars such as Stover and Weinstein and Subotić, the ICTY led to a number of positive developments by enabling the creation of a space for exchanges, questions and discussions concerning the mass atrocities committed in the 1990’s.70 Among the positive impacts highlighted by Nettelfield, we find initiatives aimed at: informing and educating the population, working on decreasing collective guilt, helping in the legitimization of the survivors and family associations, locating war criminals and developing local capacity to prosecute war crimes in BiH.71 Over the years, a few reports have exposed a number of problems linked to interference by the executive and legislative bodies (as well as by political leaders), in the workings of the judiciary, resulting in lengthy court proceedings and often impunity for the perpetrators.72

Denial is pervasive throughout Serbia and Serb-dominated Republika Sprska. This denial is also supported and reinforced by members of the international community from diverse spheres (political, academic, media, law). However, as explained by Charny, personal interests—tangible and non-tangible—drive many individuals who were not initially perpetrators nor bigots to deny and even participate in massacres and genocide.73 Despite the ambiguity and the grey zones in terms of intentions and the purposes for denial of genocide, the latter has a profound negative impact on everyone concerned, especially the victims and their children. The denial of genocide goes beyond the manipulation, contradiction and/or rebuttal of historical facts, it recreates the conditions under which the victims’ extreme suffering is perpetuated and further victimization is made possible, yet again.

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66 Bećirević, *Genocide on the Drina River*.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Nettelfield, *Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina*.
71 Ibid.
The Effects of Denial in BiH at the Individual, Group and Societal Levels

In some cases, certain forms of denial can be considered as being potentially beneficial. The avoidance of situations that are reminders of trauma can constitute a practical coping mechanism. As explained by Joseph, William and Yule, this avoidance allows for an incremental process where facilitation and inhibition processes modulate and maintain the flow of traumatic information at tolerable doses.\(^{74}\) A (psychological) space where survivors are able to regulate and handle their experiences—cognitively, emotionally and behaviorally—is needed to allow for the development of the ability to move on. Overwhelming circumstances, where individuals face ongoing psychological invasions, provide few opportunities for (re)connecting with oneself, others and life in general. For instance, a person may have difficulties experiencing painful and enjoyable thoughts simultaneously, or feelings of distress and love or kindness. Psychological invasions or intrusions concern past as well as future-oriented events, especially for those who still live in the areas of conflicts. Wondering if oneself and his or her children will be accepted as equal citizens on account of his or her background is an example of a future-oriented event.

The denial referred to by the interviewees is a form that triggers new and/or perpetuates past trauma-related responses. As one feels or believes that he or she is in danger—psychologically and/or physically—traumatization increases. Repeated or continuous ordeals such as stressors inflicted with intent produce varying degrees of detrimental effects on both mental and physical health. Effects such as emotional numbness, anxiety, helplessness, frustration, anger, deep sadness, fear and somatisation are the most often mentioned by the interviewees. Symptoms that seem to fade away over time resurface again in response to other stressful situations. When this occurs repeatedly and over prolonged periods of a person’s life, the impacts are felt through one’s perceptions of negative stimulus, negative cognitions and negative emotions, which in turn influence behavior towards out-group members.\(^{75}\)

Drawing from the interviewees’ statements, denial is interpreted as an intrusion of the past into the present in which the individual is confronted to an account of violent events that does not correspond to (or contradicts) his or her own experience. Denial triggers repeated recollection of past traumatic events, rather than living in the present and contemplating a future. As noted by Charny, the survivors’ history, rationality and truth are negated.\(^{76}\) Denial effectively celebrates the past devastations experienced by victims as they are submitted to a falsified version of their own experience and history.\(^{77}\) Denial reaffirms ongoing indifference, dehumanization, hostility and aggression. As we will see, denial also obstructs and/or ends dialogue that ought to take place for the healing process to occur and to help prevent further traumatisation at both individual and collective levels. Most of the interviewees reported being significantly to severely affected by denial. The younger ones—between 18 and 25 years old—reported being more disturbed by their parents’ reactions and related daily problems (physical, psychological, economic, social). Four themes emerged from the interviews regarding the consequences or outcomes of denial at the individual level: 1) irritability, frustration and anger; 2) depressive symptoms; 3) anxiety symptoms; 4) survivor guilt. According to Hutchison, heed ought to be paid to the consequences experienced by the victims as they engender homologous responses i.e. extend beyond and between individual persons.\(^{78}\) At the group level, two themes were found: mistrust and fear.


\(^{77}\) Ibid.

Irritability, Frustration and Anger

Anger is attributed to the feeling that something bad, wrong or unjust, has occurred. The denial of extreme atrocities such as the ones which were perpetrated in BiH, and the resulting consequences, is considered by the interviewees as being deeply immoral and criminal. Different forms and levels of anger were expressed by all the interviewees. The survivors’ level of anger was essentially influenced by: the perpetrators’ denial of responsibility for what happened and/or denial of the victims’ sufferings; the absence of punishment or negative consequences for the perpetrators; the lack of acknowledgement of the perpetrators’ immoral deeds and the reinterpretation of past transgressions as being heroic. Also, most interviewees were explicit about feeling anger (or another level of anger) towards the perpetrators (versus the ethnic group as a whole). The following interviewees expressed anger in response to the perpetrators’ refusal to recognize the crimes committed and the losses suffered.

It is very frustrating to see them perpetually lying like that and not recognizing what they have done. This makes me extremely angry, every time I hear their lies. I don’t know what to say.

Who killed my husband and my two sons? I can’t even go back and live in Srebrenica anymore. I am beyond angry that Serbs are denying the genocide they perpetrated in Srebrenica!

Similarly, Kalayjian et al’s research indicates that the persistent Turkish denial of the 1915 Armenian genocide induced feelings of intense anger in many survivors. In regards to the current study, the lack or the absence of acknowledgement on the part of the perpetrators further fuels the interviewees’ feelings of powerlessness and profound sense of injustice regarding their past and present daily circumstances. Some internalize their anger while others displace it onto their family members, peers, acquaintances or unknown individuals. In this respect, Mira Giberovitch indicates that the survivors’ victimization continues when they are allowed to project their anger towards other individuals. Many interviewees expressed concerns regarding the effects of their anger on their own children and families, even those who internalized their anger. Some interviewees pointed out that they preferred isolating themselves rather than hurting their loved ones, especially their children.

Depressive and Traumatic Symptoms

Herman highlights that the presence of enduring depressive symptoms is the most common finding in studies on traumatized individuals. She also adds, “every aspect of the experience of prolonged trauma works to aggravate depressive symptoms.” Most of the interviewees spontaneously shared that they are still afflicted, to varying degrees, by their war-related physical and/or psychological sufferings. Little remains from the survivors’ pre-war existence. For too many, their families have been partially or completely decimated, friends and peers have been murdered. Moreover, many were left with little or no opportunity to bury and mourn their deceased loved ones. Their homes have been destroyed or taken, educational institutions and livelihood opportunities have been destroyed, and whole communities have been dismantled. Minorities have been strongly discouraged from returning to their homes as well. Many interviewees highlighted that their sense of loss and their pain was so great that it was difficult for them to express. Denial contributes to the survivors’ irrecoverable losses and this is further compounded by the lack of assistance and

Ibid.

Interview with woman (20-25 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2014.

Interview with woman (55-65 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2014.


Judith Herman, Trauma and recovery (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

Ibid.
support. Drawing from the interviewees’ accounts, the intensity of these symptoms appears to be affected by three main factors: the loss of loved ones (children, partner, parents, siblings and relatives), the magnitude of the losses endured, the ability of the perpetrators to carry on with their lives without experiencing any apparent negative consequences for their violent behavior. Many interviewees also emphasized that not being informed of the location of the body of missing loved ones considerably increases their pain and suffering. The younger interviewees were saddened and troubled by their parents’ grief and misery. The following testimonials reveal that the denial of the facts surrounding the genocidal events which resulted in their loved ones being killed was equivalent to reliving the ordeal, compounded by the knowledge that the very existence of their loved ones was being erased. This form of denial is tremendously damaging to the interviewees and prolongs the mourning process as the mourner feels obligated to cling to the person lost.  

Their denials revive the memories of the ones that we loved again... My husband was everything to me. It is as if my husband never existed. The mourning process keeps on occurring.

They killed my son and they live as if they did nothing and nothing happened. Nothing in the world can bring me happiness or pleasure. Deep inside, I am unable to be happy.

The survivors struggle on a daily basis in coping with inestimable hardships. Denial not only perpetuates their victimization but also devalues their existence before, during and after the 1990’s war. Kellerman observed that severely depressed (Holocaust) survivors were at a high risk for suicidal thoughts and attempts. Denial even led some of the interviewees to wonder why they had survived.

### Anxiety Symptoms

The denial of genocide-related events and their consequences provides a clear indication to most of the interviewees that if similar circumstances to those leading to genocide were to occur again, nothing would be done to stop the process. Most interviewees spontaneously mentioned a persistent subjective and/or objective psychological and physical insecurity linked to the threat of the reoccurrence of similar events. Such threats may be perceived as being very real for the survivor. As the survivors relive a threatening and frightening past, traumatic symptoms are triggered and resurface again in response to traumatic stressors. The older interviewees who directly experienced war as adolescents or as adults often expressed the most intense feelings of insecurity. The younger interviewees shared feeling anxious when their loved ones experienced symptoms like anxiety and/or fear. These interviewees underline that the denial of their experience puts them back in their painful memories, stimulates traumatic symptoms, and feeds the thought that these atrocities could occur again. Indeed, as raised by one of the following interviewees, the absence of accountability and the justification for the crimes perpetrated increases the likelihood of their reoccurrence.

Their denials and lies make me relive what happened all the time. Everything comes back, the jumpiness, the nightmares... but worse... the trauma, everything.

We were targeted by snipers for four years... always running to avoid being killed. I am still traumatized, always nervous. Serbs justify the bombings, deny the snipers... It makes me even more nervous to see that there is no accountability from their part.

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87 Interview with woman (45-55 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, July 2014.
88 Interview with woman (55-65 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2013.
90 Interview with man (40-50 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2014.
91 Interview with woman survivor (35-45 years old), Sarajevo’s siege, April 2011.
Two factors which significantly contribute to the survivors' symptoms of anxiety are: BiH's ongoing socio-economic problems and the ethno-nationalistic political leaders' inflammatory narratives which serve to revive traumatic memories from the 1990s. Emma Hutchison indicates that discourses of fear, anxiety and other similar emotions maintain and reinforce the power of a nation-state by promoting inside/outside dichotomies and antagonistic political allegiances as responses to keep the perceived dangers at bay. Increasing the intergroup distance diminishes the likelihood of a very much-needed intergroup dialogue that would diminish individual and collective anxiety symptoms.

**Survivor Guilt: Bearing Witness and Remembering Those Who Perished**

Survivor guilt does not exclusively refer to feelings often experienced by those who survived life-threatening events in which many others, especially their loved ones, perished. One’s perception that he or she did not do enough to save those who died and one’s feelings of being unworthy relative to those who perished are among the most frequent sources of survivor guilt. One may be prompted to bear witness and to keep alive the painful memory of those who were killed. All the interviewees who participated in this study indicated that they were significantly affected by the Serbs’ denial of genocide. They felt a strong obligation, placed upon them directly or indirectly, to be the bearers of the hopes of their family and/or of the Bosnian people. It was mentioned by a few that the survivor’s children grew up with a sense that because of this past and the sufferings of their parents, they ought to be successful (academically or in terms of employment) so as to bring about change that will lead to peace. However, the gap between the survivors’ expectations and/or hopes, and what their children perceive as being feasible is significant. The current challenging socio-political situation within BiH contributes to increasing the next generation’s difficulties in fulfilling these aspirations. The following testimony underlines the pressure felt by the younger generation to succeed in different spheres of their lives in a way that would compensate for the absence of acknowledgement for the extreme losses incurred. The younger interviewees underscore the pressure to bring about changes that are very much needed at both meso and micro levels of BiH. However, as noted by this interviewee, there are little to no opportunities, nor perceived possibilities, for the younger generations to satisfy these expectations.

I definitely feel that I have to succeed with every aspect of my life in order not to disappoint them (parents)... There is no acknowledgement of our losses from their part (Serbs) so I feel I ought to compensate to make things better. This is stressful because I cannot find a job right now. The situation is bad for all of us. We want to do well, we get diplomas but there are no jobs, no opportunities for us. The economic situation is very difficult in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Moreover, most of the younger interviewees often felt that they had to be mindful not to agitate their parent(s) for fear of triggering yet another episode of anger, anguish, anxiety or guilt. A vast body of literature indicates that a traumatized survivor’s behavior can be significantly impaired by his or her posttraumatic symptoms. A few interviewees shared their difficulties with emotional expression and intimacy, even with their partner and their children. Feelings of detachment, the incapacity to express emotions, numbness, irritability and nervousness are among the most frequently mentioned problems. Lauterbach et al. point out that the survivors’ traumatic symptoms

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92 Hutchison, Affective communities in world politics.


94 Interview with man (20-25 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2014.

95 See for instance Fawziyah A. Al-Turkait and Jude U. Ohaeri, “Psychopathological status, behavior problems, and family adjustment of Kuwaiti children whose fathers were involved in the first gulf war,” *Child and adolescent psychiatry and mental health* 2, no.1 (2008), 12.
such as numbness and avoidance affect their children who grow up in an environment lacking in intimacy and emotional expression.96

Drawing from the interviewees’ experience, in concurrence with literature in health psychology, traumatisation does not exclusively trigger psychological symptoms. A positive correlation is found between prior trauma and physical problems such as increased risk of cancer, vulnerability to infections and immunologic disorders, susceptibility to hypertension and atherosclerotic heart disease, as well as cardiovascular, neurological, pulmonary and gastrointestinal problems.97

At the group level, increased mistrust and fear were among the most prevalent emotions associated with denial from the perspective of the interviewees. Both emotions intensify intergroup distance and tensions.

Mistrust
Renewed trauma brought on by denial contributes to the erosion of social ties and the breakdown of trust as well as social polarization between individuals, communities and groups. Ultimately those belonging to out-groups become the negative other. Agger98 contends that the loss of trust in humankind following the betrayal of one’s neighbour or one’s family member constitutes the most traumatic and pervasive experience for war survivors to cope with. The following interviewees question how the perpetrators can be trusted again and allowed to be reintegrated in society when they do not take responsibility for the crimes they committed. How can trust be (re)built in such circumstances and/or when atrocities are celebrated by the other group?

It’s unimaginable! Parents have to live without their children, women without their husbands. Raped and tortured women are physically and psychologically damaged. Too many were killed, tortured, humiliated, molested and because of that, their future is ruined. How can one live a normal life after committing such deeds... and without punishment? How can we trust someone like that who does not admit and take responsibility? Someone who feels no shame for what he has done and who is even seen as a hero by his people? They were even rewarded for it!99

Trust cannot happen without truth. Criminals need to admit what they did to begin healing. It will happen again if they do not heal.100

Fear
Without exception, the interviewees mentioned that denial of what happened to them intensified their perception of being threatened, fuelled their fear of the other and amplified their sense of uncertainty regarding what the future holds for them. Stephan, Renfro and Davis indicate that threat perception arouses the emotion of fear.101 Fear of certain groups can become chronic and well integrated into the in-group’s history; and eventually transforms an ethnic conflict into an intractable war. Drawing from the interviews, we found that the effects of threats experienced (or perceived) may be psychological or behavioral in nature. The psychological consequences comprise cognitive (e.g. stereotypes) and emotional reactions (e.g. fear, anger). An important consequence of fear which affects intergroup relations is that fear focuses on threatening stimulus

99 Interview with man (40-50 years old), Sarajevo’s siege, June 2013.
100 Interview with woman (45-55 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2014.
and controls information processing where danger is increased and information (or events) are perceived and interpreted as being negative or threatening. Negative events and information attract more attention, are more readily memorized and thus more intensely affect perceptions, interpretations and behaviors of the antagonistic groups. Then, the fear becomes justified by an enhanced perception of danger posed by the out-group.

Fear impacts intergroup dynamics as well through increased group cohesiveness, increased acceptance of centralized leadership, and exclusion of non-conforming/deviant members. Intense fear associated with enhanced group cohesiveness breeds hostility toward the out-group. Avoidance of the out-group is another possible consequence of fear. Furthermore, the combination of fear and the negative characteristics of the out-group reinforces avoidance of intergroup contact. Among other reasons for this avoidance, we find the expectation that the interaction will go poorly or that negative outcomes will be experienced. Examples of such possible negative outcomes during intergroup interaction include: condemnation from out-group and/or in-group as well as being exploited or harmed (physically and/or psychologically). Under certain circumstances, fear influences the perceptions of threat from a hostile out-group, laying the foundation for defensive aggression. Denial intensifies perceptions of threat. The interviewees deplore the lack of recognition on the part of the perpetrators. They fear that, without such recognition, nothing will prevent the perpetrators from acting (again) with extreme violence in the future.

We are in need of not being afraid of the other. I do not see this as being possible after what they have done to us. They don’t even recognize their responsibility in what they did. What will be their next move? 102

Societal Level
At the societal level, the nationalistic discourse and fear of the other are notions, which are promoted throughout according to most of the interviewees. The political discourse—fear mongering along nationalistic lines—and its influence on the collective memories that reign in BiH pinpoint and dictate who the enemy is and what he or she did, meanwhile disregarding how members of each group were affected by the war. Given the fact that traumatic memories are emotionally overwhelming and involve extreme violence, it is easy to understand why fear-mongering is so effective, even more so when considering the enduring harsh living conditions.

The remembrance of war involves multiple layers of interaction and negotiation between the representatives of the state apparatus, the political elites and the non-elites i.e. the ordinary citizens. The participating parties do not carry equal weight in the determination of who did what, what happened during the war, and what these violent actions led to. Such determination depends on who is allowed to have a voice in the public sphere. All too often, a united front of political, military and bureaucratic elites devises a unilateral memory of the war that is untouchable. The official war narratives are then sustained through the selective referencing of individual testimonies and different types of documentation (audio-visual, written). Essentially, this is the extent of individual participation in the articulation of the collective memories of war. However, some individuals or groups who claim to know the truth are not allowed to have a voice in the public sphere, especially when their truth does not coincide with the official accounts of war. Allowance for a certain degree of deviation in the accounts related to war depends on numerous variables such as the degree of defensiveness and enemy-sensitivity in the dominant political culture. War-related narratives and war memories are repeated and reinforced by telling and listening. They are rendered tangible by war museums and documentation. Once these are well established, experiences that cannot be placed in the interpretative framework of these accounts are usually left out. The more individuals with divergent memories of what happened stay silent and conform to the official version, the less likely it becomes for these variations to be included in the collective memories of war. This, in turn, significantly reduces the possibility of mourning and for an impartial acceptance of the

102 Interview with man (45-55 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2013.
consequences of the war. Remembrance of war must be made to overcome the selective presentation and political sanitization of the memories of war. Otherwise a pseudo-healing takes places and prevents society from confronting the underlying problems which contributed to or emerged from the war.

**Acknowledgement in BiH**

*The Significance of Acknowledgement*

Clark argues that acknowledgement implies: 1) no denial nor minimization of war crimes, 2) an absence of competing versions of truth, 3) an agreement on how the past should be dealt with. Čehajić-Clancy et al. indicate that acknowledgement first involves the recognition of the victims’ victimization. Secondly, it implies the acknowledgement of responsibility for one’s participation. This, in turn, implies reparations that range from public apology and memorials to financial compensation.

The interviewees who participated in this study consider that acknowledgement involves a “genuine” recognition of the crimes perpetrated and of the losses incurred. They underlined that a genuine acknowledgement must be inclusive and respect the proportionality of suffering as some victims (and groups) suffered more than others. They all asserted that the perpetrators ought to take responsibility for their misdeeds. Many insisted that punishment was necessary, as impunity would lay the groundwork for the reoccurrence of mass atrocities.

Crimes happened on all sides but these are not equal. One side suffered the most and this ought to be recognized.

Based on the survivors’ accounts, acknowledgement serves a number of beneficial functions. First, acknowledgement lays the groundwork for a coherent narrative regarding the causes, actions and consequences of war i.e. the why, the how and the then what of war. Acknowledgement of the suffering and deprivation experienced is especially significant for the victims (to help facilitate the locating of their deceased loved ones and to obtain the relevant services for their own healing). Secondly, acknowledgement qualifies and/or justifies who is the victim and who is the perpetrator and/or labels the opposing sides. Acknowledgement of responsibility is especially meaningful for victims (as a way to ensure that those responsible will not commit similar crimes again). Overall, acknowledgement constitutes one of the main pillars of a sustainable and long-term peace in cases where severe human rights violations have occurred. However, despite the widely recognized importance of acknowledgement, there is currently a lack of empirical evidence indicating which processes and conditions best facilitate the psychological readiness to publicly and sincerely acknowledge in-group responsibility for violent past actions in intergroup conflict settings.

**Finding Different Forms of Acknowledgement in BiH**

As pointed out by this interviewee, whatever the form of acknowledgement, it should exclude cognitive strategies such as rationalization, contextualization, deconstruction and/or justification. Acknowledgement should not further harm the victims; rather it should allow the survivors to recover—to the extent possible—a certain level of normalcy.

Based on the interviews, the possible opportunities for acknowledgement are numerous but are seldom actually encountered in BiH. Among those opportunities we find: the criminal trials, the commemorations and memorials on each side and against each other, and an education system that disseminates different “truths” to each group. Very few of the interviewees benefited from the monetary compensation (for raped women or other victims) but many more reported the need to address more significant and urgent problems such as the lack of

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105 Ibid.

106 Interview with man (30-40 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2012.
health care and social services. The perpetrators’ acknowledgement was identified as being of utmost importance. Most also specified that making amends for one’s crimes or misdeeds was equally important. This could take many forms, ranging from a simple but genuine apology to tangible actions aimed at alleviating the victims’ losses. Such an acknowledgement would presuppose the disqualification of those leaders who were implicated in the 1990’s killings and who are still in government and continue to be involved in the decision-making process. More importantly, the interviewees felt that the victims’ suffering and losses ought to be acknowledged. As previously mentioned, the interviewees were of the view that such an acknowledgement should also help make possible the introduction of much needed healthcare and social support services. It is hoped that such assistance would ultimately facilitate the survivors’ efforts at progressively reintegrating a functional life (to the extent possible). According to those interviewed, a more substantial compensation would further improve the victims’ quality of life, especially for those unable to find and/or keep a job due to their posttraumatic symptoms.

Acknowledgement of what happened and the prevention of future occurrences of genocide was indicated by all the interviewees as being critical to the long term healing process. This acknowledgment was described in two forms: 1) inclusive memorials (acknowledging the disproportionate level and nature of suffering experienced); 2) education / dissemination of an inclusive and common “truth.” The parallel differentiated education of each ethnic group under one roof, a practice which still exists today (despite a number of initiatives to curb such a system), was deplored by all. Finally, the interviewees added that preventing future occurrences of violence has become imperative and urgent.

Considering the Threshold Between Acknowledgement and Denial

We just want to live a normal life but I do not see how this can happen without the perpetrators acknowledging what they did. It can only mean that they think what they did is moral and they will not hesitate to do it again. A criminal cannot change.107

Living in pain, misery and fear does not help lay the foundation for positive contacts between former enemies. Fear of the other needs to decrease and a basic trust needs to be (re)built in order to move beyond the “no war no peace situation.”108 The survivors interviewed in this study also pointed out that for reconciliation to occur, the victim ought to be satisfied and reassured that the perpetrator and his accomplices acknowledge their misdeeds, the sufferings they have caused and that measures will be adopted to prevent the reoccurrence of such behavior. However, the belief in the notion that one’s in-group suffering is much more important than that of the out-group’s serves to minimize the in-group’s sense of responsibility in the conflict. The interviewees noted that the perpetrators’ admissions of guilt and/or the expression of feelings of remorse are unlikely to occur. It has been widely recognized in the literature that acknowledgement—of what happened and of one’s suffering—is a crucial part of the reconciliation process.109 The different interpretations regarding what happened and the resulting consequences of war, who are to be labelled as the victims and who as the perpetrators, constitutes one of the most significant obstacles against any successful efforts of reconciliation and long-term peace. The interviewees also echoed the notion advanced by Fletcher and Weinstein, in which acknowledgement of the “truth” is not as significant as each party’s interpretation and subsequent actions.110 Survivors often give more importance to the confirmation of their experience as victims and that of their loved ones—deceased or disappeared—than for learning the truth, per se.

107 Interview with man (35-45 years old), Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2013.
108 An expression often use by many of the interviewees.
109 For instance, see Paula Green, “Reconciliation and forgiveness in divided societies: A path of courage, compassion, commitment,” in Forgiveness and Reconciliation, eds. Anie Kalayjian and Raymond F. Paloutzian (Santa Barbara: Springer, 2009).
110 Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the contribution of justice to reconciliation, Human Right Quaterly 24, no. 3 (2002), 589.
Most of the interviewees felt that a balanced approach, where a certain amount of denial (or the suppression of a certain amount of information), seemed necessary for positive intergroup contacts to occur. More specifically, reconciliation required integrating an undetermined degree of denial: in terms of what happened (notably the perpetrators’ violence), the losses encountered and the suffering endured. A threshold between acknowledgement and denial—a good enough amount of acknowledgement—is required before a certain degree of denial could be tolerated. When asked, a few interviewees explained that a good enough amount of acknowledgement implied: accountability of the perpetrator for his or her misdeeds, acknowledgement of the magnitude of suffering and losses, and the making of amends. However, a level of tolerable denial was more difficult to define for the victims. Most urged that at the very least, a tolerable denial must encompass: the acknowledgement of the victims’ status i.e. their suffering and losses, and the accountability of the perpetrator for his or her harmful actions. The interviewees were of the view that the victims’ survival needs ought to be met and that the perpetrators must be held accountable for their crimes as leniency may lead to a recurrence of the violence under similar circumstances. A vast body of literature in criminology indicates that the perpetrator’s accountability is crucial for his or her own healing. The lower the level of denial perceived by the victims, the higher the chances a reconciliation process might occur. Drawing from the interviewees’ experiences and in concurrence with the needs-based model of reconciliation, the reintegration of both the victim (taking control of their lives) and the perpetrator (being viewed as being morally and socially acceptable) is imperative.

The healing, of all parties implicated, ought to be promoted in order to minimize objective and subjective victimization. Without the healing of each former adversary, the balance between a tolerable denial and a good enough acknowledgement cannot happen. Healing will not only decrease the tendency to interpret facts exclusively from one’s point of view and dehumanize the other, it will also reduce the need to benefit from denial which, as previously mentioned, has numerous conscious and/or unconscious purposes. Herman contends that healing is a process that involves the reconstruction of the traumatic memory in order to reintegrate it into day-to-day life. As explained by the author, the traumatic memory is static and wordless and the survivor’s endeavor in confronting and uncovering problematic questions such as what happened and why is key. Indeed, for the healing process to occur, the survivor’s memory needs to be transformed into dynamic words through an individual and social reconstruction of the traumatic event. As discussed elsewhere, a better understanding of events entails multiple interpretations that connect the individual experience to a larger context while avoiding one-sided interpretations that emphasize the negative dispositions of the individuals belonging to the other group. The reconstruction of events leads to an understanding that brings forward factors that are changeable and which suggest possibilities of transformation and peace, rather than determining fixed factors such as the nature of the other that suggests the impossibility of reconciliation and peace. However, heed must be paid to prevent the manipulative insertion of justifications, rationalizations and minimizations as this would harm the victims and further slow down or impede the healing and reconciliation processes. In the context of such harmful practices, severe trauma may worsen and become entrenched. This may breed future violence and conflict.

Positive contacts allow for flexibility in looking at things from different points of view and helps in reducing the tendency to interpret events or facts exclusively from one’s own perspective. Čehajić and Brown argue that a shift toward acknowledgement is more significantly correlated to the establishment of positive contacts than: the ability to adopt the perspective of the other, or

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113 Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery (New York: Basic Books, 1997).
114 Ibid.
115 Anonymous.
beliefs in in-group victimhood, or a form of relationship with the adversary group where neither
time nor trust has been invested. The authors explain that meaningful cross-group relationships
with members of the victims’ group contributes to increased exposure to victims’ perspectives
and experiences, and facilitates acknowledgement of responsibility for in-group wrongdoings. In
BiH, there must be vigilance against the political leaders’ nationalistic narratives, which not only
retraumatize the survivors, but also contribute significantly to an absence of the much-needed
communication between stakeholders at the micro, meso and macro levels. Opening up the
possibilities of dialogue as well as the space necessary for positive contacts to occur between (ex)
antagonist parties has become imperative.

Conclusion
Denial is a concept which is fluid. It implies conscious and unconscious processes for both well-
tentioned and non well-intentioned individuals. This fluidity also complicates its detection as
well as its effects on micro, meso and macro levels. No fixed links have been established between
conscious/ unconscious processes and intentions. The ambiguity and the grey areas in terms of the
intentions and purposes for the denial of genocide represent a significant challenge for those who
seek to counter it. Indeed, a deep understanding of the diverse incarnations of denial is necessary
if one is to counter its effects by offering more effective initiatives that can be crafted and deployed
against the deniers.

A meaningful and sustainable peace process implies an impartial and unbiased view of the
past, the present and the future. The past has to be dealt with before one can benefit from the
present to its fullest extent and (re)build in preparation of a more peaceful future. When one’s
suffering intensifies under the influence of “old” and “new” stressors, one is left with precious
little resources to deal with his or her own daily battles and even less to (re)construct or transform
one’s environment and society. Denial prevents the survivors from moving on as he or she is
repeatedly thrown back into the past where they relive and attempt to sort out what happened,
why, how, and the then what. Having been repeatedly subjected to a falsified version of one’s own
experience and history, he or she is retraumatized and this incrementally shapes one’s perception
of negative stimulus, negative cognitions and negative emotions as well as influences the behavior
towards out-group members. In the long run, each victimization event, be it objective or subjective
is magnified and serves to further fuel the narratives which justify and rationalize mass death of the
other. Denial has a profound negative impact on everyone concerned, especially the victims and
their children. Furthermore, the denial of genocide goes beyond the manipulation, contradiction
and/or re-interpretation of historical facts, it recreates the conditions under which new atrocities
could occur.

While most of the interviewees felt that reconciliation required integrating an undetermined
degree of denial on their part, they all insisted that acknowledgement by the perpetrator was
imperative. Such acknowledgement, to a good enough level, must encompass the acknowledgement
of the survivors’ suffering and losses as well as making amends. More difficult to achieve, a good
enough acknowledgement also implies the perpetrators’ accountability for his or her misdeeds.
However, the perpetrators’ feelings of remorse and admission of guilt may not be guaranteed.
Healing, imperative for both victims and perpetrators, could help lay the foundation for reducing
the benefits linked to supporting denial; benefits such as political, economic and/or social gains. The
necessary space and flexibility to counter denial cannot take place without top-down support as the
socio-political context can impede such processes. A partnership between all levels of society must
be developed to not only address the survivors’ material and symbolic needs but also the structural
and the material inequalities underlying the conflict. Only once the healing process begins, a good
enough acknowledgement becomes possible. To facilitate a good enough acknowledgement,
peacebuilding initiatives and measures ought to look beyond the “good victim”/“bad perpetrator”
dichotomy and be receptive to more than just the one exclusionary and silencing truth.

116 Čehajić and Brown, “Silencing the Past.”
117 As argued previously (anonymous), the healing process is interlinked to the reconciliation process.
Acknowledgement implies verbal and/or behavioral action, which goes beyond practical needs; it seeks to restore post-conflict relations as well. Acknowledgement is based on a fundamental transformation in one’s perception of events where there is a shift from knowledge to acknowledgement, from exposure to events to understanding. It also reflects a shift in responsibility, not only for the perpetrator but also for the potential bystander as well. Indeed, one may not be morally responsible for failing to act when he or she lacks information about what is actually happening. It is only when a threshold of knowledge is met that we can begin to speak of a moral component: it is at this point that a person can no longer deny the evidence presented. Action then becomes possible, even when such actions do not directly or indirectly coincide with one’s interests.

Bibliography


Denied Victimhood and Contested Narratives: The Case of Hutu Diaspora

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Abstract: Based on 46 interviews conducted in a 2-month period, this article explored the identity narrative of three generations of the Hutu Diaspora community living in Belgium. Through an analysis of the Rwanda’s National Identity policy and political categories, the research aimed to explore important themes such as sense of self and other, victimhood, and homeland through the lenses of the perpetrator group. Moreover, it was essential to investigate the trans-generational impact the perpetrator label has on the next generations. By looking at the Hutu population, the study was opening the door to the exploration of contested memories of survival for the perpetrator group. The complexity of the Hutu identity and their contested and competing narratives offered a fascinating approach to the study of mass atrocity as well as the field of conflict Resolution. This new generation of well educated, young Hutu has the power to shape the future of Rwanda in a very important way.

Keywords: Hutu, diaspora, identity, victimhood, Rwanda

Introduction

Today, we are the Palestinians; the only problem is that we don’t have intifada and don’t have terrorists. Who knows, maybe we are creating the terrorists of tomorrow.
– Participant #17

In this article, I intend to explore the stories the Hutu Diaspora in Belgium tell about themselves and how they position themselves vis-à-vis Rwanda. As Diaspora, they have an important connection to their homeland. Their actions and understanding of who they are strongly impacts the sociopolitical decisions the Rwandan government’s Foreign Ministry make. In this article, I explore the creation of the official Rwandan narrative crafted by the Rwandan government and how this narratives has influenced its Rwandan citizens, through an analysis of the National Identity Policy, Law N. 18/2008 relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology, and Law N. 47/2001 of the 18/2008 on the Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Discrimination and Sectarianism. After analyzing the construction of this official narrative about what Rwandan identity is, I connect Rwanda with its Diaspora through a historical understanding of the diasporic waves of Rwandans moving in and out of Rwanda. Finally, through in-depth interviews, I connect Rwanda and its policies to the Hutu in Belgium. It is important to understand the connections Rwanda has with its Diaspora. The way the official narratives and laws are portraying the Diaspora has a great influence on the different, sometimes competing, narratives that are created in the diasporic communities.

The Rwandan Diaspora, as the Rwandan government refers to it, is a “negative Diaspora”—that is, a hostile Diaspora that stands against current Rwandan politics. Moreover, the Rwandan government mostly associates the “negative Diaspora” with Hutu communities. These communities are believed by the current Rwandan government to still support, or to be associated with, the government calls the previous “Hutu government” (including the “Hutu” regimes that committed the 1994 genocide). This negative Diaspora, therefore, is largely seen as a Diaspora that is primary composed of Hutus who are seen as enemies of the state. As such, this Diaspora has shaped a competing narrative to the official Rwandan narrative and highlighted the impact diasporic communities have on their homeland. As Lily Cho presents, the diasporic identity is not only a brand, it is an reminder of the past, a recollection of times when things were different, and most of all, it is an unsettling feeling of being caught in a time and place that are not necessarily right.

the mix of this diasporic status, the Hutu communities represent this complexity of being caught in a narrative that is a daily reflection of the darkest time in their history, yet being not totally part of the new vision of the state of Rwanda and experiencing an uncanny, unsettling feeling of not being home.

Identity in this article is taken to mean the process by which “people understand their relationship to the world, how that relationship is constructed across time and space and how people understand their possibilities for the future.” This multidimensional definition suggests that there is more than one identity within a person. People’s identities can be categorized into two different groups, a personal individual identity and a group identity. The individual identity is created in the “process of self-reflection or the understanding of the ‘self.’” Our individual identity exists in connection to the world, to understand what or who we are by understanding what or who we are not. Therefore, identity can be seen as a collection of different features from an “individual’s culture of origin.” Those features allow one to create relationships with people who share the same features. By creating a group of people sharing many of the same features, we identify ourselves, not only as an individual with a self-identity, but also as a member of a group possessing a collective or social identity. In the context of Rwanda where forms of identity based violence (genocide) were the primary reasons why so many people were forced into Diaspora between 1960 and 2000, studying identity formation and Diaspora consciousness is a crucial component to understand the trans-generational narratives created within the last couple decades. It is also an important competent to understanding and promoting justice and reconciliation among Rwandan communities in Rwanda and abroad.

The Construction of the New Rwandan Official Narrative

In a span of three months, Rwanda experienced one of the darkest and bloodiest times in its history. The 1994 genocide did not only traumatize Rwandans within, but it also affected Rwandans who were abroad, as well as the international community. Over two decades later, its aftermath is still very present in the minds, actions, and hearts of many. The genocide is usually described as an ethnic conflict, where Hutus decided to kill their Tutsi neighbors. Almost one million were killed and about two million became refugees.

In the wake of this tragedy, a new Tutsi government took over the destroyed country and intended to rebuild it. With time, the narrative of the events of 1994 changed. While the case started off being referred to as the Rwandan Genocide—implying that the genocide happened to all of Rwanda as a country and society—the narrative shifted to calling the events the Genocide Against Tutsi and Moderate Hutus. Finally, the narrative crystalized and was officially named by the Rwandan government, the Genocide Against Tutsi. This change of narrative was not only promoted by the government, but adopted legally through the enactment of a National Identity policy under law N. 14/2008 on 04/06/2008, and Law N. 18/2008 relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology, and Law N. 47/2001 of the 18/2008 on the Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Discrimination and Sectarianism.

The Rwandan government’s stated reason for implementing a national identity policy was to fight against “the radicalized mentality of the past.” The new government emphasized a national Rwandan “identity, hoping that [citizens could] replace ethnicity as a basis for identity.”

8 Helen Hintjens, “Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda,” Ethnicities 8, (March 1, 2008), 6.
Talking about ethnic identities became illegal because it was presumed that Belgian colonizers had installed them. Consequently, in order to enlighten and help the country progress and free itself from old mentalities, the Rwandan Patriotic Front attempted to erase the initial, ethnic identities of Rwandan citizens. Yet, though ethnic identification was prohibited, it remained an important part of the cultural and social fabric of the Rwandan society, continued to be expressed in private spheres, and continues to structure people’s lives. Unfortunately, “it can be said that the act of genocide and its memory have strengthened the boundaries and the self-identification on either side of the divide even as ethnic categories have disappeared from identity cards and official social and political engineering.” Due to the government’s imposition of a collective identity, the ethnic identities have become increasingly important, even more so than before the 1994 genocide. This government attempt to impose unity on the population by outlawing ethnicity and deploying a de-ethnicized discourse, Andrea Purdeková argues, stands paradoxically in contrast to the “silent engineering” of the Rwandan government to make ethnicity a de facto cornerstone of the practice of politics. One advantage of this de-ethnicized discourse is that to outside observers—especially observers in the West who associate African identities and conflicts with backwardness and violence—outlawing ethnicity makes Rwanda seem like a developed, progressive, and modern African country. Within the context of Rwandan politics inside and outside of Rwanda, furthermore, the discourse of removing ethnicity to create “unity” is important for creating the legitimacy of the current government. Through this construct, tacitly or explicitly asserting one’s ethnicity in public life is seen as promoting “disunity,” which marks individuals as targets of government or social suspicion because of their ethnic identity. The state policy of attempting to eliminate ethnicity as a dividing line between Rwandans—either by accident or by design—has therefore resulted in reifying ethnic identity and concretizing social and political lines between Hutus and Tutsis.

Hillary Power has argued that “such deep-seated identities and attitudes cannot be expected simply to disappear; though they may be publicly silenced, they may remain intact. Failing to address them negates the possibility of dismantling and neutralizing them.” The imposed, unified Rwandan national identity thereby silences people and attempts to erase their former identities through a one-dimensional narrative created by the government. Yet, as other narratives are dismissed and seen as illegal, people are still discriminated against and even persecuted based on the Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa identities. Ethnic identities were thereby transformed into newly created political identities that reflected the new policies the Rwandan government was implementing. Because these political identities are so closely attached to the official memory of the 1994 genocide, Rwandan citizens were essentially divided into categories of victimhood and perpetration. Mahmood Mamdani and with Eugenia Zorbas, have explored this categorization of Rwandans not only socially, but also in the legal system of the new Tutsi regime. As Mamdani has stated, the state language and official and popular discourse in Rwanda divides the population into five categories:

1. The returnees are mainly Tutsi exiles who returned to Rwanda after the RPF came to power in July 1994. They have not experienced civil war or genocide and their English (or Swahili) is frequently better than their Kinyarwanda.

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14 Ibid., 85.
15 Ibid., 86.

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2. The refugees can be either Old Caseload (OCL) refugees, pre-1994 mostly Tutsi refugees, or New Caseload (NCL), post-1994 mostly Hutu refugees.

3. The victims are both Tutsi and moderate Hutu. However, surviving victims are only Tutsi (see below), who either survived the genocide or who had survived previous anti-Tutsi massacres (OCL refugees). NCL refugees are not considered victims, or survivors.

4. The survivors are only Tutsi. The logic here is that the genocide was aimed only at Tutsi. It follows that any Tutsi who was in Rwanda at the time of the genocide and who is alive today is a survivor. The word is not used for any Hutu who was in the country during that same period.

5. The perpetrators category is perhaps the clearest evidence of the endurance of the Hutu/Tutsi dialectic, despite the official national unity ideology. “The assumption is that every Hutu who opposed the genocide was killed. The flip side of this assumption is that every living Hutu was either an active participant or a passive onlooker in the genocide. Morally, if not legally, both are culpable. The dilemma is that to be a Hutu in contemporary Rwanda is to be presumed a perpetrator.”

The Rwandan government generally avoids using Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa as political identities. But it has adopted what can be called a “genocide framework,” from which it categorizes the population politically. As Mamdani has argued, “the 1994 genocide is singled out as an event producing the only political correct categories for identification and guidelines’ for state policy.” By dividing the Rwandan population into victims, survivors, and perpetrators the government limited the process of overcoming the trauma of the genocide and any past suffering the country has experienced. The controlled, single-sided narratives and the suppression of the ethnic identities has created obstacles to the reconciliation process. It also deepens the societal and identity-based separations among the ethnic groups, and creates new understandings of the trauma experienced during and after the genocide by forcing people into categories.

Therefore, the one-sided narrative created by the government, that only the Tutsi were victims of the genocide, not the Hutu, dismissed other narratives that could have potentially evolved. The official narrative does not deny that Hutus also died, but rather that only Tutsi deaths represent deaths due to genocide. Thus, only Tutsi can be recognized as victims of genocide. To say that a Hutu is a victim of genocide is thereby an act of denying the Tutsi genocide—a criminal offense in Rwanda. This national identity policy, and the way the government has decided to implement it, has helped to deepen divisions, not promote reconciliation. Those seen as the victims, survivors, and returnees are principally Tutsis, while the perpetrators are almost exclusively Hutus. Rwandans are now divided into ethnic and political lines, paradoxically, through the government’s claim that it is removing ethnicity from politics.

This distinction of manufacturing a Tutsi identity as an identity of victim, survivor, or returnee, and a Hutu identity as an identity of perpetrators, can be observed in the political arena and justice system. A 2002 survey illustrated the extent to which the Tutsis, mainly the RPF members, held power in Rwanda:

- Of Rwanda’s twelve prefects, seven are Tutsi, five are returnees, and 11 of the 12 prefects are members of the RPF;
- Of the twelve commissioners on the National Unit and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), nine are Tutsi and four are returnees (no political affiliation is cited);
- Of the twenty-two Supreme Court Judges, fourteen are Tutsi and fifteen are returnees (no political affiliation is cited);
- Of the twenty-eight heads of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), twenty-three are Tutsi and twenty-four are members of the RPF (no figure available for returnee proportion);

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20 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. 266.

21 Ibid., 266.
Of Rwanda’s fifteen ambassadors, thirteen are RPF members, and twelve are Tutsi (no figure cited for returnees).22

In addition to control the narrative of the genocide and its population, since the RPF took power in Rwanda, private citizens, political opponents, journalists, human rights activists, and others have been persecuted, harassed, imprisoned, and tortured by the Rwandan authorities.23

Finally, what crystalized the official Rwandan narrative was Law N. 18/2008 relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology, which regulates freedom of expression, and Law N. 47/2001 of the 18/2008 on the Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Discrimination and Sectarianism. According to Law N. 18/2008 relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology, genocide ideology “is an aggregate of thoughts characterized by conduct, speeches, documents and other acts aiming at exterminating or inciting others to exterminate people based on ethnic group, origin, nationality, region, color, physical appearance, sex, language, religion or political opinion, committed in normal periods or during war.”24 Law N.47/2001 of the 18/2008 on the Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Discrimination and Sectarianism, defines discrimination as “any speech, writing, or actions based on ethnicity, region or country of origin, the color of skin, physical features, sex, language, religion or ideas aimed at depriving a person or group of persons of their rights as provided by Rwandan law and by International Conventions to which Rwanda is a party.” The law furthermore defines sectarianism as “the use of any speech, written statement or action that divides people, that is likely to spark conflicts among people, or that causes an uprising which might degenerate into strife among people based on discrimination mentioned in article one.” The law then proceeds to state that the “deprivation of a person of his/her rights is the denial of rights provided by Rwanda [sic] Law and by International Conventions to which Rwanda is a party.”25 Both laws were created to restrict the freedom of speech, to prevent Rwandans from openly expressing their disagreements with Rwandan policies, and one might say, to prevent reconciliation after the 1994 genocide in the name of promoting reconciliation. Due to the unclear language in the laws, the incumbent government in Rwanda has been using the laws to suppress opposition and censure human rights defenders and journalists.26 The selective narrative put forth by the government has left no room for discussion.

Through these laws, the Rwandan government has created legal means that ensure the promotion of one, single narrative, which holds that the Tutsi were the victims and the Hutus were the perpetrators. This has had several consequences. First, it has closed the door to anyone who could offer a counter narrative—even a modest narrative, such as one that did not deny the actuality of the violence and killing that happened in 1994, but merely suggested that moderate Hutus were also victims of genocide, would be illegal under these two laws. Second, the laws have shaped the political sphere, sideling parties that are in disagreement of the governments’ policies. Third—and this may be the most important consequence—the laws have left room for the government to interpret its own legal framework and apply it in the way it wants. This creates the arbitrary rule of law and allows the government to silence, repress, arrest, and kill citizens along de facto ethnic lines, in the name of preventing ethnic divisions.

Rwanda and its Diaspora

How do the dynamics in the politics of identity in Rwandan affect the Rwandan negative Diaspora that attempted to maintain a connection to their homeland? As Lily Cho has written, “no one is born

23 Joseph, Umuvugizi – The Voice of Rwanda “Amnesty International Report Puts Rwandan Among Top Human Rights Abusers.” (March 2016), accessed December 12, 2015, http://www.umuvugizi.com/?p=5423&lang=en&PageSpeed=noscript. One very good example among many for control the Rwandan government is exercising over its narratives is the blockage of the Umuvugizi website that was a controversial satire news outlet. The Umuvugizi website is not longer accessible.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
diasporic. Rather, one becomes diasporic through a complex process of memory and emergence [and resettlement].” The idea of a diasporic status and the Rwandan state has had a long connection. It first wave of Diaspora were Tutsi escaping the 1959 and 1960’s instabilities, which were created by the Rwandan struggle for independence and the establishment of a new Hutu state. In the immediate aftermath of the 1994 genocide, Hutus fled the country fearing that the RPF government was erecting a Tutsi protection government. This Hutu emigration constituted the second wave of the Rwandan Diaspora. Later, in the early 2000s, both Hutus and Tutsis fled an increasingly oppressive Rwandan government. In the immediate post-genocide years, those who returned to Rwanda are estimated to be 25-40% of the Rwandan population. These returnees are people who lived abroad in Uganda, Burundi, DR Congo, and Tanzania among other places, and trekked back to Rwanda for the first time since 1994. Even the current government is believed to be composed of Ugandan returnees. This first wave of Tutsi Diaspora has been described as a “victim Diaspora,” or as heroes since the RPF, the political party that stopped the genocide and took over the country, was largely composed of Tutsis returning to the country. Consequently, the second wave of Hutu Diaspora who left Rwanda after the RPF seized power has been seen as problematic, framed as the villains, and almost by definition anti-government because they are Hutu. Believed by the Rwandan government to be sympathizers of the former President Habyarimana’s regimes, many are seen as threat to the current Republic of Rwandan. Yet, in the face this attempt to forcibly define them politically accord to their ethnicity, many in this second wave Diaspora have questioned or rejected the official narratives of the genocide and attempted to create a counter-narrative that would incorporate a different side of the story.

As a Diaspora that exists because of conflict, the second wave Diaspora is similar to conflict-based Diasporas, which “frequently have a prominent role in framing conflict issues and defining what is politically acceptable.” As Lyons argues, such “Diaspora groups created by conflict and sustained by traumatic memories tend to compromise less and therefore reinforce and exacerbate the protracted nature of conflicts.” The current government is aware of the complex dynamic that constitutes the antagonized and isolate Diaspora communities. After all, many who are currently in the government were actively playing a role in Diaspora politics before the 1994 genocide, when they were in the Diaspora. Therefore, the current Rwandan government has created initiatives to reconnect with its Diasporas, by dividing the Diaspora into three categories: a positive Diaspora that supports the state, and a skeptical Diaspora whose members may be converted, and finally a hostile Diaspora beyond reach. With the creation of the Diaspora General Directorate (DGD), the Rwanda’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation embarked on a program to unify the Diaspora community who were willing to adhere to the new vision of Rwanda. The DGD created initiatives to carry out this policy objective, such as the One Dollar Campaign, which encourages people in the Diaspora to donate and support “vulnerable genocide survivors.”

The most skeptical members of the Diaspora were invited to come and witness the process the country had gone through. Those who remained critical of the direction of the country, politically and socially, were interpreted as being part of the negative Diaspora, and perceived to still be sympathizers of the previous Hutu governments. This distinction cast them as enemies of the

27 Cho, “The Turn to Diaspora,” 21
33 Lyons, “Conflict-Generated,” 530.
state of Rwanda, because they were believed to represent a potential danger to the well being of the state.36

These Hutu diasporic communities who are seen as potential dangers to the Rwandan state are the subjects of this research. Those who are still in exile, and still considered dangerous by the current Rwandan government, have been affected by the single-sided narratives and are even more marginalized because official narratives position them as genocide sympathizers, not genocide victims. This genocide labeling continues to have a great impact on the Hutu community, more than twenty years after the 1994 genocide. Many Hutus who lost loved ones cannot overcome the indignity of not being recognized as victims of the genocide by the Rwandan government. Hutus who had no role to play in the genocide have to live with the label of perpetrator, while Tutsis are recognized as the victims. If Hutus in Rwanda try to uncover objective truth or seek to complicate this simplistic narrative—either through scholarship or journalism, by simply asking around, or even expressing an opinion that might not be popular—they will most likely be incarcerated for violating law against genocide ideology. Those outside the country are confronted with strict censorship when trying to advocate for their loved ones. Like other Diaspora communities, the Rwandan Diaspora has created means to creating knowledge about their situation, and the situation of their networks of friends and family living in Rwanda. Some have taken to establishing watchdog groups, while others fight to have their victimhood recognized against an increasingly oppressive Rwandan state.37

In this article, I explored how Hutus have understood their own identity and what types of narratives that have used to cope with the 1994 Genocide as well as the Rwandan official narrative of the genocide. Going even further, I investigated how these narratives have shaped their trans-generational community dynamics and how the new generations have understood their place and roles vis-à-vis the current political tensions between Rwanda and its Diaspora. In order words, the official narrative of the genocide promoted by the Rwandan government has had an impact on the identity transformation of Hutus, as a whole, as well as on the individual level of identity transformation.

Narrative Analysis is a methodology used in the field of Conflict Analysis and Resolution (CAR) to explore the stories, or narratives, people tell about conflict. This approach recognizes—when it comes to how people respond to and act in conflict contexts—that it is the narratives people construct about their experiences that matter more than the actual historical events that happened to them or the things they actually did. It is through the exploration of people’s stories that we understand the interpersonal and intergroup dynamics and the context of events that led to people in conflict to make certain decisions, and respond in certain ways. Likewise, it is by exploring and understanding the constantly evolving and changing stories people tell about themselves that we can understand the dynamic and constantly changing context in which they are living. Consequently, the narratives are at the base of their understanding of who they are and are reflections of the processes where by people make and remake meaning of their past experiences. CAR scholars study these narratives in order to understanding how and why particular communities tell stories about themselves, in order to understand how conflict has shaped the dynamics with the community, especially when the stories are transmitted though generations. The goal is, therefore, through the analysis of people’s narratives of the past, to understand how people currently understand their own subject positions and see themselves as social actors.38

Through Narrative Analysis, I used different approaches to explore the stories that were constructed and told by my interview subjects. The first approach I used is what narrative scholars

in CAR call “Thematic Analysis.” Thematic Analysis emphasizes the “content of a text, ‘what’ is said more than ‘how’ it is said, the ‘told’ rather than the ‘telling.’” The second approach is a Structural Analysis, to focus on “the way a story is told. Although thematic content does not slip away, focus is equally on form—how a teller by selecting particular narrative devices makes a story persuasive.” Finally, an Interactional Analysis was used to highlight the dialogue or conversation taken place between the participant and the interviewer.

The Survey
This paper is based on 46 interviews conducted between July 2014 and September 2014. In-depth one-on-one interviews were intended to explore the diasporic Hutu identity formation through the stories and narratives that the participants provided. The interviews were divided using a thematic approach. Eight principle questions complementing the surveys’ information centered on narrative identity, conception of homeland, and sense of victimhood guided this study. I used both purposive and random sampling. Pre-determined characteristics such as ethnicity, age groups and gender helped determine my population sample. After doing so, I used snowball sampling by asking participants to refer me to the next person they thought I should meet and interview.

Interviews
The participants were divided into three age groups: from 18 to 30 years old, from 31 to 45 years old, and 46 years old and older. The first age group was composed of young adults who were either very young at the time of the 1994 genocide, or born in host countries. They are mostly influenced by their parents’ narratives and the media since they either did not experience the atrocities or were too young to understand what was happening. The second group was a little bit older. They were teenagers or young adults at the time of the genocide. They have a personal understanding of the narratives of the genocide, but still have been influenced by their host countries’ narratives and cultures. Their narratives are based on their own understanding of the conflict, and the narratives told by their elders and the external world. The third group was the generation of parents and grandparents. At the time of the genocide, they were active members of Rwandan society. Politically, socially, and economically, they were citizens. This was the group that lost the most, and developed deep chosen traumas that they could transmit to younger generations. This older group tended to be nostalgic for their lives before the civil war and genocide. Their narratives, their understanding of the conflict, and their roles in the Rwandan community are still influential.

Among the forty-six participants, eighteen (39%) were part of the group between 18 and 30 years old. Sixteen (34%) of the participants were part of the group between 31 and 45 years old. The last group, which was composed of the parents and grandparents who were 46 years old and older, represented 27% of all the participants. With all three groups combined, there were a total of forty-six participants, with twenty-three women and twenty-three men.

Privacy and anonymity was insured to the participants, which allowed them to fully express their opinion and potential criticisms. For this reason, I did not use the interviewees’ names, but rather numbered them. Safety was a major concern for many of them. This led to conducting interviews in different venues, times, and dates. Given that the subject group of these interviews are seen as, and treated by the Rwandan Government as, a negative diaspora, most of them expressed during our initial contact that they were willing to help and openly answer questions as long as they could not be identified. They feared that the Rwandan government might go after their family in Rwanda or abroad.

Results
Forty-six people were interviewed, both in French and Kinyarwanda, for this qualitative data
Table 1. Participant Data Collection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group I Participants (18)</th>
<th>Group II Participants (16)</th>
<th>Group III Participants (12)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 20, 21, 23, 24, 32, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41</td>
<td>1, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 33, 34, 36, 45</td>
<td>16, 17, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 37, 42, 43, 44, 46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 Women, 23 Men

collection. Three important themes based on the research question led the discussions. They were: identity, narrative, homeland. Within each group (group I – 18-30, group II – 18-45, group III – 46+), nuanced responses were observed. In terms of the theme of identity, the participants used very determined identities; some identities were more salient that others. Additionally, negative terms or terms related to otherness or unwantedness were used to describe how they felt, who they have become, and the perceived labels society has imposed upon them such as perpetrators and outsiders. The dominant themes that emerged in their stories of themselves—what can be called their narrative identity—were trauma and victimhood. Many recognized that they have not yet overcome their own traumas, and signaled that these traumas have increased in recent years with the competing narratives they have been facing. The politics of identity labeling, and the stigmas that come with them, have shaped their understanding of themselves and consequently have transformed and reshaped their own stories. Thus, the single-sided narrative of the genocide that presents Tutsis as a group as good, and Hutus as a group as bad, has transformed their narratives of their own identities into counter-narratives—a narrative of others, or outsiders external to Rwandan society.

In terms of how the interview subjects felt about their Diaspora and homeland, they feel closely attached to Rwanda and its politics. Very few, of course, contested the genocide itself. Most saw themselves as playing the role of watchdogs, and have assumed a responsibility to report and denounce the current Rwandan government and what they see as government crimes. Others have expressed the desire to just be left alone and be allowed to move on.

Discussion

The Transformation of Identities

The Hutu identity in diaspora has been shaped and transformed by the official narrative of the genocide as well as by the social labels and stigmas that came with it. Some have ignored or rejected their ethnic identity as Hutu, or even their national Rwandan identity, while others have embraced these identities, adopted them, and have strongly held onto them. Among all the participants, the youngest had created the most radical responses to their socially constructed understanding of what their Hutu and Rwandan identities were supposed to be. Yet, it is clear that identity or the lack of a chosen identity has affected the entire diaspora community. A very interesting example of identity transformation within the younger group was given by Participant #4, when she stated, “I don’t see myself as more Rwandan than Dutch or Belgian. I know I am because of my parents, but it does not define me.” In reaction to the different narratives that dictate her identity, she has chosen to accept or reject all identities. Others, like Participant #5, have not even tried to be immersed in their parents’ cultural identity. He stated, “I did not even know that I was Hutu. I knew that I was Rwandan and that my father was Hutu, but never really made the connection.” Both Participants #4 and #5 emphasized the saliency of their Belgian identity by stating things like, “I created myself here, I can’t see my plans coming true in Africa,” said Participant #4 and “I live here, grew up here, that’s all that mattered, expressed Participant #5.” Adopting or not the Hutu or Rwandan identity does not always seem to be a matter of choice. Growing up in diaspora has an impact on what type of information this young generation is exposed to, and how they relate it to who they are and their homeland, Rwanda.

This idea of not belonging to a single identity or nation is not specific to the younger group. In the words of Participant #34, “I stopped asking questions about my ‘Hutuness’ and embraced the
life and blessings I have now. I try to avoid conversations on identity and Rwanda.” Similar to both Participants #4 and #34, Participant #46 stated, “We should stop talking about Hutu, Tutsi, or even Rwandans. It does not help us to rebuild ourselves.” However, this idea of moving away from the identity debates was not very common. Of all the 46 participants, very few disassociated themselves from their identity—ethnic, national or other. Yet, very much like the Rwandan government’s position, Participant #46 stated that the concept of ethnic identity did not matter much but, unlike the Rwandan government’s position, the participants believed that the imposition of a national identity did not make much sense either. The discussion surrounding identity, and which identity should be promoted, in Participant #46’s view, detracts from the reconstruction and reconciliation of the Rwandan people.

Rather than rejecting or reshaping their identities to fit society’s expectations or their new lives built in the aftermath of the genocide, a large number of the participants have embraced both national and ethnic identities as way of reconstructing themselves. Some have taken on their Hutu identity and made it salient in reaction to their lack of acknowledged victimhood. Others have primary adopted their national identity. Participant #10 reflected on his identities by stating, “Among my numerous identities, the Rwandan is the strongest; sadly, I cannot embrace it... yet my Hutu identity has influenced my life in particular ways.” Participant #11 explained that first of all, he is Hutu because that’s what has shaped him, then he is Rwandan, then a refugee, and, last of all, a Belgian. Participant #33 supported the argument that part of her identity was formed and shaped by social pressures and stigmas. She stated, “I am the soul of my loved ones. Don’t ask me to change who I am because someone blames them for the worst. I am proud to be a part of them.” For many being Hutu is a reality. They see themselves as Rwandan, but as Rwandans who were born Hutu and had to take on this identity. As Participant #38 explained, being a Hutu Rwandan has affected the way people have treated and seen him. “I am Hutu because people don’t allow me to choose. It was an action reaction. I don’t deny or reject my parents’ identities. I am who I am and who my parents wanted me to be.”

Despite the fact that their Rwandan identity is the one used to describe them in most settings, their Hutu identity is still part of who they are and influences their environment. Socially, Hutus are called Rwandans, but their Hutuness is still influencing the ways they live and understand their roles within their given society. Participant #2, who was born and raised in Belgium, emphasis this idea of socially, forced dual identities, by stating:

Because I am black, people always ask me where I am from. I usually just say Rwanda, but then the famous questions are always asked. ‘Are you Hutu or Tutsi?’ And ‘Aren’t the Hutus the bad people who one day decided to kill their neighbors?’ Without even wanting it, I am labeled and classified by ‘other.’

Thus, many participants struggled with their identity. Participant #9 explained that despite her new Belgian identity, she was still not completely Belgian. She felt the same about her Rwandan identity; but, because it had been so long since she lived there, Rwanda did not really seem like home either. She said, “here you are a stranger because of your skin color; there you are stranger because you are not from there anymore.” This idea of belonging nowhere is a continuous factor in the interview subjects’ identity formation and sense of self, and Participant #9 used the terms “damaged or troubled identities” to define who they have become and how they see themselves. Participant #21 emphasized a similar idea of belonging nowhere when she said, “despite the fact that I’ve lived here for three-fourths of my life, I am not Belgian. If I go back to Rwanda, I will not be Rwandan either.” She used the terms “damaged or troubled identities” to define who she has become and how she sees herself. As Participant #32 explained her struggle by saying, “I traveled the world looking for myself, until I realized that I had lost my identity 20 years ago. Now, I am an empty vessel, a product of others’ mistakes.”

The interview subjects, by-in-large, expresses a sense of being caught between two competing social forces of exclusion and othering. On the one hand, they were living in a society that defined them as others because they had dark skin. On the other hand, they were being defined as others by the Rwandan government in its attempt to direct Rwandan society towards defining Hutus in
the diaspora as either genocidaires, genocide sympathizers, or at the least a socially and politically dangerous element. Give this double exclusion, “the question of identity is very complex, especially for Rwandans … the society will always define you as an outsider … which makes me seek that outside land, which is Rwanda,” stated Participant #15. He continued by saying, “for people like me, we would like to define ourselves as Rwandans, but we don’t know that country (Rwanda) we would like to define ourselves as Belgians, but the society does not define us as such; it is like we are stateless.” Being stateless, an outsider, or even unwanted are themes that prevailed in many interviews. Many of the participants expressed an emptiness that was created by the fact that the official narrative of the current Rwandan government presents them as this negative diaspora, as a danger to their own homeland. Yet, they do not have the sense that Belgium is their country either, but rather simply a host land. Being from nowhere and belonging nowhere is a traumatic fact that is affecting the younger generations, and has shaped their stories and narratives. Participant #11 expressed this theme when he stated, “I identify myself as a Belgian, originally from Rwanda; as a refugee because I am not home.” Participant #15 said, “I see myself as a Belgo-Rwandan, a refugee, as a young activist who loves his country…but when I was young, I couldn’t say I was Hutu.”

In conclusion, there is no single, well-drafted idea or definition of the Hutu diasporic identity formation. This study shows that there is no single framework that can incorporate all members of this diaspora into a single rubric. Some individuals have decided that they wanted, and needed, to move on and forget the past, which also meant getting away from the debates over ethnic and national identity. Others said they could not escape stereotypical understandings of what Rwandans and Hutus are, but rather had to learn how to live with them. Finally, others decided to embrace their Hutu identity because it was imposed on them by ways of promoted stereotypes and developed stigmas, which have been affecting them for years. This last group expressed a constant struggle within themselves over their sense of belonging and homeness. This was the group that largely saw themselves as stateless, caught somewhere in between Belgian and Rwandan society, in between a Belgian and Rwandan homeland.

Nothing is Better than Home

When someone thinks about diaspora and homeland, what comes to mind is well described by Participant #19. She said, “20 years ago, I lost my home. Now, I have a normal life here in Belgium, a family and a good job, but yet, I still feel empty inside because there is nothing better than home.” The idea of home, this magical place where one felt safe, has a challenging, paradoxical connotation when it comes to Hutus and Rwanda. As explained above, their narratives and recent identities have been formed by, and in response to, the labels and stories their homeland has promoted about and against them. Participant #45 explained the dilemma he has constantly faced. He said,

Home, where is home? Rwanda has taken away our pride, our heritage, and our loved ones. President Kagame has rebuilt the country on the blood of innocent Hutus, so how can I call Rwanda my home? Yet, it seems like I am [a] thorn. It is in my heart; it is who I am. My Rwanda might be not the same as before, but Rwanda is still the place [where] my parents taught me my values, and principles. Rwanda is the heritage I want to leave for my children.

For the Hutu Diaspora, their homeland is source of pain, but it still is their homeland. Participant #28 reaffirmed this idea of homeland as a special place when she stated, “I am my country; I am my ethnic group. It is on my mind, my language, my dreams, and blood.” She went on by saying “what saddens me is that I will probably die here, away from my country.” The oldest generation does not see any hope to ever go back home. The land they left behind has changed and is not the same as they remember.

Even the younger people who were born in Belgium or were brought there at a young age have an interesting connection to Rwanda. Participant #23 elaborated on Rwanda by saying, “I am a Rwandan, who was born in Belgium, grew up in Belgium, but Rwanda is my heart, my blood, and it is my heritage.” The country they know was created through their parents’ memories and stories. The land they cherish is challenged by the current Rwanda. Perhaps accepting that Rwanda would most likely never be the same is part of the daily struggle they have to deal with. Participant
Participant #16 said, “Rwanda is not the Rwanda we knew back then. The only thing we can pass on to our children is their brain.”

Sadly, according to the participants, Rwanda has become a faraway, almost unreachable homeland for Hutus. Its president and politics have limited critical thinking and open dialogue. The few that had gone back said that Rwanda is not what they once knew or what they had hoped. Participant #4 explained that there is “still pain in the air, even on the surface, we can feel unease.” Participant #12 said, “Rwandan politics is a lost cause. Look at those who go back and try to change things, they end up in prison.” This sense of unease is mostly based on the facts that Rwanda is not a democratic country, its laws are discriminatory, and its president is believed to have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of genocide, according to many participants. Participant #15 described the dominant and oppressive environment that has been imposed onto them. He stated,

> When we hear “Rwandan,” we hear genocide. I don’t think that there is a Rwandan on the earth who is proud to hear the word genocide, which made them deny their identity. When we hear ‘Hutu’ it is even worse. People see genocidaire; if you did not commit the genocide, your parents did.

Although they are in diaspora, Rwanda’s politics still affect them. One important point of agreement for all the participants is the role of President Kagame in the atrocities committed prior, during, and post-1994 genocide. Participant #3 raised several questions in which President Kagame is portrayed as the source of all conflict. He said, “What did Rwandans do, what did we do to God to give us a criminal like Kagame … Kagame is not only a criminal, he is a genocidaire … how can the international community support a genocidal regime?” Participant #14 continued by saying, “President Kagame committed crimes against humanity, war crimes, and even genocide. He does not hide it in his speeches. Those who believe that he did not are mistaken.” Participant #7 stated, “Justice in Rwanda needs to be based on democracy and there is no justice in Rwanda, it is only partial. Because the current government was involved in the genocide, justice can’t happen.” This idea that President Kagame is source of all problem in Rwanda and abroad undermines or questions the sincerity behind the different initiatives undertaken by the Rwanda government to reach out to all its diaspora community. It also reinforces the idea that the Hutu diaspora is dangerous to the ideology President Kagame has imposed on Rwanda. The participants see no real common peace, reconciliation, or sense of justice in their current homeland.

Therefore, according to the participants, a new regime needs to be established, and Kagame and the RPF should not be part of it. Rwanda needs to become democratic and most of all needs to have real justice, the participants tended to believe, not the justice created and implemented by Kagame. Participant #40 believes that “as long as Kagame is in power or protected by the international community, we [Hutus] are doomed to be the villains.” Participant #17 went on by saying “Today, we are the Palestinians; the only problem is that we don’t have intifada and don’t have terrorists. Who knows, maybe we are creating the terrorists of tomorrow?” This distinction between Hutus and...
and Tutsis goes against the Rwandan government’s national identity policy. The policy might seem like a step toward reconciliation but it is very widely criticized by all the participants. Policies such as the national identity have increased the criticism of the government and cast shadows over the justice system. Most participants thought it was contradictory for the government to use Tutsi narratives to present or portray the genocide and then illegalize the use of ethnicity, since Hutus are not seen as victims of the atrocities. According to Participant #7, this has made the reconciliation process unsuccessful. Participant #10 stated, “in the case of Rwanda, many feel that there was not justice. The Hutu, as a victim, he was never been heard in the local, regional, or international court.” He said of the term genocide, “The problem is its application. The discussion is that the amount of death responds to the criteria, but the circumstances were so mysterious that it does not always fit all the criteria.” Very critical of the different laws and initiatives the international community and President Kagame have established, the participants emphasized the importance of mutual dialogues among both Hutus and Tutsi as groups, and not under the umbrella of the imposed national identity policy. Many stressed that the recognition of their ethnic victimhood is essential for the reconciliation process and the creation of a new homeland.

Homeland and Victimhood Narratives
Before exploring the idea of homeland and victimhood, it is essential to mention that not everybody associates these two ideas (homeland and victimhood) with each other. Many did distance themselves from these concepts, trying to move on and begin a new life in Belgium. Yet, the idea of the only so-called real victims of genocide were the Tutsi victims, not Hutus, was a significant theme in the interviews. Participant #10 shared his opinion on this, saying, “I just want the world to know that I am innocent. I shouldn’t apologize for other’s mistakes... my family lost loved ones, where is the justice there?” Participant #32 also shared her pain by saying, “What about my loved ones who were murdered? Because I am not Tutsi, I cannot be called a victim.” This normative narrative that was created along the lines of victim and perpetrator, hero and villain, portray the dilemma many express. The single narrative of Hutu perpetrator and Tutsi victim has reinforced the pain and trauma the participants expressed when they talked about their personal suffering and their family lost. Many have lost family members, and struggle to reconcile their lack of recognition. Participant #41 expressed his dilemma by stating,

I have a hole in my heart. I grew up without my parents, so what kind of man am I supposed to become? If I am my father’s son and my grandfather’s grandson, then I am nothing more than a memory. My identity was shaped by my lost ones and the lies people tell about my people. I am a victim.

Hintjens echoed their concerns and pain by arguing “Hutu killed or injured because they refused to kill Tutsi, refused to use a gun, sought not to inform or tried to protect Tutsis [or simply refused to participate to the atrocities], should be considered victims of genocide, or survivors.” Participant #18 explained the level of trauma and victimization that most Hutu have to live with when she says, “Now people called what happened to them a ‘Hidden Pain.’ We are only surviving. There is not justice for Rwandans, only Tutsi justice. We show a good image but what is in our heart is not that, we are hurt, we have hatred.” Because of that she believes that people cannot forget. “How can I forget that my parents were killed, that my brother disappeared, that my loved one were killed that same day? I cannot forget.” This lack of the recognition of the Hutu victimhood seems to have affected interview subjects’ narratives of the events. The idea of forgive and forget has shaped their understanding of the reconciliation process. Not allowing them to mourn for their loved ones has pushed them to ask questions regarding the meaning of the justice process so highly spoken about in Rwanda.

In addition to feeling a lack of victimhood and believing that Kagame and his regime need to change, most participants struggle with the term genocide. They have a hard time agreeing on using

44 Hintjens, “Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda,” 23.
the term and its meaning in the case of Rwanda. Some denied it and others talked about a double genocide. For some, even the definition of genocide is problematic. Participant #10 explained, “We still need to work on the definition of genocide in Rwanda, because many people’s stories don’t fit the narrative.” Many of the participants reject the idea that what happened between April and July of 1994 was premeditated or deliberate, which is essential in the definition of genocide. Participant #18 elaborated this idea by saying, “based on my experience, there was not premeditation. Before the war, we used to live together. We were fine. When the RPF attacked Rwanda that is when the ethnicity became salient. Before then, we were fine.” Participant #11 expressed the same concerns when stating, “the word genocide is not properly used, but that is because of [the] media and propaganda. The RPF [was] the one that premeditated the genocide and helped it take place.” Many interview subjects disagreed with the genocide being depicted as one single event, with out any background context in most cases. For them, the civil wars that preceded the genocide, and the years that followed it, are as significant as the notorious 100 days in 1994 because this historical context helps portray a larger and more complicated picture, and helps redefine the understanding and symbolism behind narratives of perpetration and victimhood. Consequently, in order to really understand the civil war and genocide that took place, we should not limit the discussion to 1994, Participant #45 said. Participant #11 added, “Too often, people limit themselves at the 1994 period, and there forget the 1990 civil war and after July 1994. There have been other atrocities, so it is difficult to forget.” A large number of the participants follow the same reasoning as Participant #11, and blame the Rwandan government for focusing on one particular series of events in 1994 and dismissing the rest of the violence before and after as less severe because it was not genocide, and thereby institutionalizing the genocide narrative in Rwanda and abroad that Hutus were uniformly perpetrators and Tutsis were uniformly victims. It is believed that the general understanding on the genocide and the world’s attitude toward the victim and perpetrator labels have helped shape the dominant categorization created in the post-Rwandan genocide. By not linking the Rwandan civil war and the atrocities that took place after July 1994, the separation between the victims (Tutsi) and perpetrators (Hutu) is reinforced.

In addition to that, the term double genocide was mentioned several times regarding the 1994 genocide and the years that followed. Participant #16 stated, “In Rwanda, [there] was a Tutsi genocide, but there was also another genocide that started in 1990 that continued until 1999, against Hutu. Using the term double genocide is not denial [of] the Tutsi genocide. One genocide plus one genocide equal two not zero.” The same participant, Participant #11, continued, “the term Rwandan Genocide does not make sense, because we will need to know who and against who. It is more appropriate to say genocide against Hutu and a genocide against Tutsi.” Participant #14 stated “there was a Tutsi genocide in 1994, and a genocide of Hutu in the refugee camps and DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo], post-1994.” As noted in many cases, there is an irony behind using the term “genocide against Tutsi.” The participants agreed that if there is legally no ethnic groups in Rwanda, but only Rwandans, it is a paradox to create a narrative that would be so forcefully promoting the use of ethnicity as a way to understand the genocide, to rebuild the country, and promote reconciliation.

Interestingly, even the initial date of the genocide is contested.4 Out of the 46 interviews conducted, 28 specially talked about the fact that within a larger Rwandan community around the world, the narrative of when the genocide began is contested and highly political. Additionally, 21 participants said it began on April 6th, at the assassination of President Habyarimana. Seven said it began on April 7th.

4 Out of the 46 interviews conducted, 28 specially talked about the fact that within a larger Rwandan community around the world, the narrative of when the genocide began is contested and highly political. Additionally, 21 participants said it began on April 6th, at the assassination of President Habyarimana. Seven said it began on April 7th.
started with the killing of a Hutu president. In their interviews, both participants stressed that the date selected as the beginning of the 1994 genocide was a political move the RPF made in order to hide their actions in instigating the cycle of violence that ultimately resulted in the genocide, and to suppress the Hutu victimhood of that same cycle of violence.

Finally, the participants feel that even their status as a Diaspora community is controversial and contested by the Rwandan government. Participant #17 explained this point by saying that “according to the Rwandan government, Diaspora is only for Tutsi. You and I [Hutus] are not recognized as Diaspora.” Participant #11 added,

Here [in Belgium] the Diaspora is composed of the embassy representatives or RPF allies. It is like we are not allowed to be called Diaspora. For example, if there is a celebration, you cannot go because you don’t belong or are [not] recognized as Diaspora. If you go, you can be physically harmed.

Participant #13 stressed the issue of diaspora by stating “Diaspora, which Diaspora are we talking about? Last time I check[ed], Diaspora is only for Tutsi. Here, I am a Rwandan who is not allowed to be himself and enjoy his heritage.” Yet, they used the word Diaspora to describe Hutu communities of Rwandans. Participant #17 said, “as Diaspora, the first responsibility is to understand why we left home, the second is to accept his or her Rwandan identity in exile, and the third is to understand why we are Hutu in exile.” Not being accepted as part of the Diaspora, or part of the victim Diaspora, the participants are part of a group the Rwandan government contests, or at least questions, and attempts to delegitimize by saying that if they really wanted to go back to Rwanda, they could do it. To move from being part of the negative diaspora to the more accepted victim diaspora, the individuals would need to publically affirm and recognize the progress of the current Rwanda government and promote its narratives and sociopolitical evolution.

Conclusion
Exploring the Belgian Hutu Diaspora allows scholars to look past the label of negative Diaspora imposed by the Rwandan government, to examine the different narratives that were created in after the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Shaped by the labels created in the post 1994 Rwandan genocide, the people who live in these communities have experienced identity transformations that are not only influenced by the geographic location that defines their Diasporic status, but also by narratives created in Rwanda. The idea that only Hutus were perpetrators of the 1994 genocide has influenced the participants’ narratives and their understanding of their position vis-a-vis these narratives. These double or damaged identities helped mold their sense of otherness in relation to Rwanda, but also in the host-country Belgium. As many participants pointed to, their identities and stories were formed partially in response to the narrative established by the RPF, the party that emerged victorious from the Rwandan civil war in 1994, which was concretized through the National Identity policy under law N. 14/2008 on 04/06/2008, and Law N. 18/2008 relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology, and Law N. 47/2001 of the 18/2008 on the Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Discrimination and Sectarianism.

Transmitted from generation to generation, this narrative of trauma and otherness has become part of the daily struggle of the communities of the interview participants. The current Belgium Hutu Diaspora community is trying to made sense of its own struggle, with many fighting against what they see as unjust stigmatizations imposed on them by President Kagame’s regime. Some have returned to Rwanda to witness the changes and reconnect with their homeland, yet participants expressed an uncanny feeling regarding the culture of silence imposed by the law, and the self-silencing the population of Rwanda has imposed on itself to avoid reparations and prosecution. The interview subjects expressed a sense that Rwanda has become an authoritarian country willing to scare individuals in the Diaspora and intimidate them into silence. This fear that their own narratives could endanger family members who remained in Rwanda, and the sense of alienation imposed upon Hutus living in Belgium, has shaped the way this Diaspora has responded to and coped with its stigmatizations. Seen and treated as the wrong kind of diaspora, they have formed
themselves as in opposing to the current government and, like a self-fulfilling prophecy, created counter-narratives that are, for many of them, rightly founded.

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Bibliography


Hutus Aiding Tutsis during the Rwandan Genocide: Motives, Meanings, and Morals

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Abstract: During the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Hutu extremists who launched a propaganda campaign to demonize Rwandan Tutsis, accusing them of planning to exterminate Hutus. Embracing the propaganda, gangs of Hutus went on a killing rampage, roaming the streets and ravaging Tutsis who fell prey to their assaults. Yet, the framing of Hutus as perpetrators cannot capture the work of those Hutus who actively offered assistance to Tutsis. These Hutus provided safe haven, essential material goods and emotional support to an unknown number of Tutsis. Why did these Hutus risk their lives to save Tutsis? In addressing this question, we provide the results of a study in which a small number of Hutu explained their actions. In a clear case of altruism, their efforts arose from their moral obligation to others, an obligation that centers on their good heart. A good heart is a physical embodiment of their wisdom to discover the righteous path, compassion for the suffering of others, and courage to overcome the fear in of their own suffering in carrying out the commands of their faith.

Keywords: genocide, Rwanda, Hutus, Tutsis, assistance

Introduction

In 1994 a wave of mass killings swept through the small country of Rwanda—Hutu extremists orchestrating a campaign of extermination against Tutsis. Under the control of these extremists, government forces joined two large militias groups—the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi—in torrents of genocidal violence. A watershed moment that sparked the outbreak of the genocide was the death of the Hutu president, Juvénal Habyarimana, when his plane was shot down on April 6, 1994. The Hutu government accused the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) of orchestrating the president’s assassination, accusing the RPF of state treason. As the anti-Tutsi rhetoric escalated, collective fears of Tutsi conquest spread like wildfire.

The violence that followed was not merely a spontaneous eruption of rage. Meticulous plans for Tutsi extermination were fine-tuned by strategists. The state-run military made lists of important Tutsis to be killed first, followed by their families and neighbors.² The militants, who were predominantly young men, set up roadblocks and scoured communities where Tutsis could be hiding. Most attacks occurred in public places—schools, churches, marketplaces, roads and open fields. Militia groups also attacked Tutsis in their homes. Many Hutus were slaughtered in the process because they were perceived to have physical characteristics that are commonly associated with Tutsis, such as high cheekbones, or because of their economic status, such as owning cattle. The number of people who directly participated in the slaughter ranged from 175,000 to 210,000.³

The genocide ended only after the Rwandan Patriotic Front defeated the genocidal Hutu forces. By the end of the genocide, 800,000 Rwandans were murdered—one sixth of the country’s population. At least 500,000 were Tutsis.⁴ Yet, memorials in Rwanda to the genocidal violence have prompted considerable controversy, as Elisabeth King has shown.⁵

１We wish to thank the anonymous readers for providing valuable observations and recommendations for changes to earlier drafts of this paper.


³Scott Straus, “How Many Perpetrators were there in the Rwandan Genocide?” Journal of Genocide Research 6, no. 1 (2004), 94.

⁴Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 105.

⁵Elisabeth King, “Memory Controversies in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Implications for Peacebuilding,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 5, no. 3 (December 2010), 293-309.


http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.2.1398
But an unknown number of Hutu civilians resisted demands by the state military and local militias to deliver Tutsis over for the slaughter. These Hutus secretly offered Tutsis safe haven, material assistance, and emotional comfort. In some cases sympathetic Hutus directly confronted the militia groups, imploring them to stop killing Tutsis. While some would-be rescuers did succeed in saving Tutsis, an unknown number of them failed—and were themselves murdered in the process.

And herein lies the question: Why did some Hutus find the anti-Tutsi propaganda spurious, while a majority of Hutus accepted the messages of hatred and fear as truth? Why did some Hutus put their own lives on the line to save Tutsis? Addressing these questions, we examined the motives and conscious reasons for a select group of Hutus who sought to rescue Tutsis. For this research we drew upon the testimony of thirty-three self-identifying rescuers who were interviewed in Rwanda between July and August of 2010. At the time of this research approximately forty Rwandans were officially recognized as rescuers, with time and resources allowing for thirty-three interviews to be obtained for this study. The interviewees were selected by two Rwandan NGOs—Memos and IBUKA. Beginning in 2007, these two NGOs were responsible for identifying and officially recognizing Rwandan rescuers through a three-step process in order to assure the integrity of the rescuer title and prevent any fraudulent claims. First, the staff members would gather testimony of those survivors who claimed that they were rescued by a Hutu during the genocide. Second, an official from one of the NGOs would engage in an in-depth investigation of the claims for their accuracy. The investigator interviewed the potential rescuer without identifying their intention to identify rescuers, but just asking more general questions about the potential rescuer’s experience during the genocide. If the potential rescuer claims to have helped Tutsis during the genocide, the investigator would then interview any witnesses (i.e. neighbors, family members) to corroborate the rescuer testimony. The investigation process was designed to ensure that potential rescuers were not motivated by the lure of personal gain, and were simply acting in accord with a genuine intention to help. Third, staff members of the investigating NGO would render a judgment about the authenticity of the rescue itself. Currently, this is the only method of rescuer validation. For the purpose of this paper we rely on this methodology for officially recognizing rescuers, which depends heavily on the narrative and interpretative accounts of the rescuers’ memory of such events. Moreover, we do not claim to extend our findings to all rescuers.

Regarding the identification of rescuers in Rwanda, Lee Ann Fujii argues that the strict duality between perpetrators of genocidal violence and rescuers is quite misleading, since some people who acted to persecute Tutsis sometimes also acted to offer them aid. However, in Rwanda the official title of rescuer was granted by these two NGOs only to those for whom there was no evidence of any act of persecuting or harming Tutsis. Individuals who both participated in violence against certain Tutsis but then helped others were not declared to be rescuers.

Among the thirty-three interviewees, twenty-six were male and seven were female. Twenty-nine self-identified as Christians—Protestants, Catholics or Seventh-Day Adventists—one was Muslim, and three held the traditional beliefs of ancient Rwandans before Christianity came to the country. Five identified as poor, twenty as being well off and eight as rich. The SES classification used by the Rwandan rescuers interviewed differs from western SES categories. According to these rescuers, “well off” was quantified as owning land and cows and being able to afford school fees, with “rich” referring to having a lot of cows, land, and possibly cars. Regarding educational status, three held a university degree, three attended vocational or secondary school, seventeen attended or completed primary school, nine had no formal education and one was unknown.

Most of the interviews took place in a Kagali hotel or in the rescuers’ homes, which were often in close proximity to the rescue efforts. All the interviews were conducted in the local language, Kinyarwandan, with subsequent translation to English. Each interview took two to three hours, with audio and video recordings for all but two of them. A semi-structured interview format was utilized, which included questions meant to obtain demographic information about the rescuers’

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lives before the genocide, their experiences and actions during the genocide, their reasons for rescuing and what rescuing meant to them, as well as how their lives had been impacted since the genocide. (See Appendix for interview questions.) All these questions were posed to each interviewee in the order given below in the Appendix. Thematic analysis was deployed to all of the testimony for this research. The key points of the testimony were coded using the speaker’s language, followed by the construction of categories that captured the interviewees’ primary themes.

We believe that the investigation of rescuers during the Rwandan genocide is under-examined by academic studies of the Rwandan genocide, most of which focus primarily on the Tutsis’ suffering and Hutu killers’ motives, means, and mindset. Elisabeth King provides an excellent analysis of the memorials in Rwanda to the genocidal violence and the politics of creating public spaces for the victims. Two studies of rescuers acting during the Rwandan genocide are from Charles Kabwete Mulinda and Fujii. In 2004, the Kigali Genocide Memorial opened, using exhibits and documentation as a form of education and genocide prevention. Initially focusing mostly on survivors’ experiences, the memorial currently houses twenty-eight rescuer testimonies on their website.

We provide a broader historical context for rescuing under conditions of genocidal violence with a summary in section 1 of the rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust. Then in section 2 we examine the Hutus’ rescue efforts in Rwanda, defining such efforts in three distinct stages. In section 3 we present our findings about the motivations of the Hutu rescuers, with special emphasis on the role models that influenced their sense of self in relation to others. These motivations are then examined in section 4, specifically in relation to how the lessons the rescuers learned from their role models motivated their efforts to save Tutsis. We found that each Hutu interviewed purported to act out of compassion by offering Tutsis safe haven while knowingly placing themselves in mortal danger. We conclude in section 5 with summary observations about the rescuers’ sense of moral conviction drawn from the lessons they learned from their experiences during the genocidal violence.

We recognize that the term “rescuer” implies a savior, one who frees someone from confinement, or delivers from bondage. In recent years, some analysts have raised questions about the merits of using this term as a primary category of study. They argue that the term “rescuer” does not adequately capture the fact that, during the Holocaust, some Germans sought to offer assistance, comfort or support to Jews escaping the Nazi terror without actually saving them outright. A wide range of activities have been documented about individual acts of assistance to Jews. The term “helpers” is now widely used in place of “rescuers” to represent those people who sought to offer aid of any form to those targeted by perpetrators of genocidal violence. While finding merit in this use of “helpers,” we recognize that the interviewees gathered for this research on the Rwandan genocide were identified as rescuers by the NGOs with whom we worked. We defer to their usage of this term.

**Rescuers of the Holocaust**

To provide historical context to the rescuer efforts in Rwanda, we turn to the similar efforts of civilians living under Nazi occupation during World War II. The number of active rescuers during the Nazi occupation of Europe is low, comprising only one half of one percent of the total civilian population.

In the earlier writings on rescuers of World War II, many researchers advanced the notion that rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust represent a clear case of altruism, with the understanding

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that altruism is exhibited by some people for certain reasons under certain situations. What exactly is the meaning of altruism when referring to people who offer assistance to persecuted group members in the context of genocidal violence? Many researchers addressing this question endorse the presence of an altruistic personality, which is characterized by behavior that is perceived to be more kind, compassionate and helpful in comparison to others. Even the advocates for the presence of an altruistic personality—or some form of pro-social personality—recognize the critical importance of situational factors, that the character and kind of altruistic personality exhibit rests on situational factors.

One definition of altruism given by Oliner and Oliner rests on four defining factors. First, the rescuers intentionally aided Jews who were clearly in peril, offering them safe haven, material assistance, or psychological comfort. Second, the rescuers acted of their own free will—they were not compelled, commanded, or coerced to take such actions by outside forces, such as a militant group of partisans. According to one study, ninety-nine percent of the Holocaust rescuers were aware at the time of their efforts of the Nazi campaign to exterminate the Jews. Interestingly, this awareness of the Nazis’ regime was not limited to the Holocaust rescuers. Most non-rescuing civilians also knew about the extermination campaign during the war. But unlike the rescuers, these civilians acted from the standpoint of self-survival, fearing more the consequences they might face for helping the Jews, if discovered by German military forces—as if declaring, “They should take care of themselves; we have our own problems.” Third, rescuers recognized the mortal dangers that such deeds posed; they understood that, if caught, the authorities would execute them and their loved ones. Fourth, rescuers did not expect material or tangible reward for their efforts from anyone, including those seeking safe haven. Explanations for the rescuer’s deeds—why they risked their lives to save Jews during the war—have been elusive. These rescuers do not fit easily into a single sociopolitical category. In one study, many rescuers drew upon their moral conscience as a powerful psychic drive. For example, some rescues were driven by their ethical beliefs that made it imperative to help those in need. Other rescuers grounded their actions in socialist or communist doctrine, which called for resistance against the Nazi invaders. Still others were driven by a strong emotional attachment to individual Jews for whom the rescuers had special feelings or love, or to the Jewish people as a whole. The famous case of Oscar Schindler to save Jews illustrates how many Polish rescuers had some special affinity toward Jews.

But these rescuers did not limit their efforts merely to friends. In fact, approximately half of the people that the rescuers sought to save were total strangers to them. The relationship between rescuers and those rescued as reported by Jewish survivors is as follows: Strangers, 51%; Acquaintances, 21%; Friends, 19%; and Work with commercial ties, 9% (out of total number of 412).

In one study, the explanation for their rescue efforts is moralistic, with most rescuers coming from families with strongly held humanitarian values. When asked about their motivation, most rescuers (87%) invoked their deep ethical commitment to care for those in danger, grounded in a


12 Oliner and Oliner, The Altruistic Personality, 173, 249, 299.

13 Ibid., 289.


15 Ibid., 182-185.

strong belief in universal humanism, in particular, the belief in the inherent worth of each person.\textsuperscript{17} For a majority of these rescuers, this belief was not driven by their religious convictions, and the rescuers’ religious affiliations were not significantly different from those of non-rescuers—the range of participation in religious traditions was approximately identical for both groups.\textsuperscript{18} Yet the moral imperative to care for those in peril motivated them in their efforts to save Jews, particularly after witnessing Nazi brutality against Jews in their community.\textsuperscript{19}

During their efforts to save Jews, the moral bonds between rescuers and Jews intensified through the shared experience of the rescue acts themselves.\textsuperscript{20} Each episode of saving Jews brought personal satisfaction, a deep sense of pleasure in knowing that their deeds had such a profound moral impact.\textsuperscript{21} This self-satisfaction should not be confused with selfishness. The rescuers also experienced significant psychological distress from the intense fears that accompanied their courageous but dangerous actions. In Poland, for example, the hatred of Germans at that time contributed directly to rescuers’ empathy for the Jews, in part because Polish non-Jews experienced mass executions on a scale comparable to that of Polish Jews. Stunned by the Nazi brutality against the Jews, the Polish rescuers were driven by three primary motivations: political convictions, religious teaching, or moralistic lessons from family members such as parental figures.\textsuperscript{22} For example, a minority of Polish rescuers found inspiration in the humanist themes of Christianity. Some of these rescuers were priests motivated by the Christian values to show compassion, charity and generosity to those in need.\textsuperscript{23} In like manner, some Catholic bishops in France, Belgium, Holland and Italy openly denounced Nazi policies against the Jews.\textsuperscript{24} But religious conviction does not always correlate to efforts to save Jews.\textsuperscript{25} Many other priests, and parishioners with strong religious convictions, retained strong anti-Semitic sentiments stemming from a long tradition of bigotry against Jews by the Catholic Church in Poland. Some priests in Poland implored their congregants to denounce the Jews and report their presence to local officials; such priests declared that good Catholics should obey local authorities about political matters such as the treatment of Jews.\textsuperscript{26} In a later article Tec qualifies significantly her earlier claims about the altruistic action of rescuers, acknowledging those cases where the rescuing behavior of Gentiles was motivated by a desire for profit from the persecuted Jews.\textsuperscript{27}

Many of the early studies cited above of rescuers of Jews offer empirically rich examination of the rescuers’ motives for saving Jews, their character traits and their assumptions before and during the Holocaust about Jews. Most of the primary source data gathered for these studies came from interviews and questionnaires of the rescuers years after the war ended. But some analysts have questioned the veracity of such data since it rests on memory and memory can be fallible for a variety of reasons. Many psychologists have shown that memory is not a passive receptacle of pure “content” that presumably represents a true picture of the past and that memory of the past is never “carried down in pure form.” Memory is always subject to reinterpretation.\textsuperscript{28} Memory alters during one’s life, impacted by one’s emotions, moralistic commitments regarding notions of right or wrong, and one’s self-image in relation to others.\textsuperscript{29} Recognizing such fallibility, for purposes

\textsuperscript{17} Oliner and Oliner, The Altruistic Personality, 163-164.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 156, 289.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 38-39.
\textsuperscript{21} Oliner and Oliner, The Altruistic Personality, 249.
\textsuperscript{22} Tec, When Light Pierced the Darkness, 189.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 137.
\textsuperscript{24} Fogelman, Conscience and Courage, 172.
\textsuperscript{25} Tec, When Light Pierced the Darkness, 187.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 137.
\textsuperscript{28} Jeffrey Blustein, The Moral Demands of Memory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 67-68.
\textsuperscript{29} Suzanne Beer, “Aid Offered Jews in Nazi Germany: Research Approaches, Methods, and Problems,” Online Encyclopedia
of this study we adopt a narrative perspective on memory, according to which narratives of the past have their own history, and they are subject to reshaping, fine-tuning, revising, and ignoring elements of one’s memory over time. In memory we take on multiple roles of a drama, becoming the drama’s author, primary character and outside critic.

More recent studies of rescuing behavior in the context of the Holocaust have produced an extensive body of findings from a variety of research perspectives. Each perspective offers an analytical lens that rests on a model for understanding the breadth and depth of such behavior and related social processes. Of course, for each perspective the salience given to certain kinds of categories and processes has its limitations, blocking access to other sorts of categories and processes. We mention briefly four examples of such perspectives, with the understanding that a detailed summary of all of these perspectives surpasses the scope of this article.

1. One perspective privileges situational factors as motivating certain people to offer aid to those persecuted. For example, in one study German Gentiles were confronted by persecuted Jews who were pleading for their assistance, offering Gentiles a situation in which the opportunity for helping them arose. In others cases the pleas to would-be helpers did not come from the Jews directly but were conveyed by third party surrogates who sought assistance on behalf of the Jews. To be sure, the expressed motivation to offer assistance did not always conform to the “helpers” action. Abusive behavior by Gentiles was not uncommon, such as demands for payment or for sexual favors from Jews.

2. In another perspective researchers give primacy to character traits of so-called “doers” that are evidence in their tendency to take responsibility for the course of events, to make independent interpretations of the situation before them and to render judgments that may deviate from those of others.

3. The network perspective focuses on the influence of social groups that offer aid and/or support to those persecuted, reflecting networks of social relations. During World War II, some networks of relations were created before the genocidal violence erupted while other networks were formed during the violence. In one study a socialist group that flourished in Germany before the war—the Bund—offers sanctuary to Jews in Nazi Europe. In another study of a Holocaust survivor, the researcher categorizes the kind of help received as food, accommodations, money, and assistance in brokering connections with others.

4. Some researchers adopt an historical-societal perspective in arguing that the chances of European Jews surviving Nazi occupation depended upon certain historical and social conditions. For example, one study shows that the probability of survival is correlated to a relatively high number of Catholics in the area where Jews sought help. Other researchers deploy a broader analytical lens by probes the social-political-historical conditions that existed during and prior to efforts to assist Jews. One researcher explains the acts of rescuing Jews during World War II by examining the social contexts in which such acts occurred, such as cohesiveness of the prewar Jewish communities, the integration of these communities to larger non-Jewish society; and the prewar history of defying, or not, the authorities. In conjunction to these contextual factors, individual motivations for rescuing Jews were identified, such as religious conviction, humanitarian commitments, friendship, rejection of Nazi policies, and financial gain. We should not interpret such

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34 Bob Moore, Survivors: Jewish Self-Help and Rescue in Nazi-Occupied Western Europe (Oxford and New York City: Oxford University Press, 2010), 8-12.
perspectives as mutually exclusive; elements from multiple perspectives can be combined to account for the evidence on a case-by-case basis. We agree with those analysts who argue that a comprehensive study of helping requires attention to multiple perspectives that draw attention to some combination of behavior, motivations, situational factors, social networks and character traits. In our study of rescuers of Rwanda, we find relevance to factors from the above four perspectives, that is, to the situation of being confronted by persecuted Tutsis, the self-sense of taking responsibility for aiding Tutsis in clear defiance of the Hutu extremists orchestrating the propaganda campaign against Tutsis, a network of social relations to influential figures in their lives, and, to a lesser degree, the historical-social context.

Rescuing in Rwanda: As a Complex Interaction

Based on narrative analysis of the interviewees’ testimony, we focus on the rescuers’ interactions with Tutsis seeking sanctuary and their confrontation with the killers themselves. Probing their stated reasons for offering aid to Tutsis, we explore their beliefs before the genocide, their perceptions of the killers, and their apparent motives, rationale, and reasons for taking such risks. We give special attention to role of influential figures in their lives, those individuals who presumably gave them a moral education, instilling in them normative notions about what is morally right and wrong in relations with others. We begin with an account of the act—or, more accurately, acts—comprised by the rescue.

The process of rescuing Tutsis in Rwanda was neither momentary nor limited to a single action. Many rescue efforts began incrementally, hiding a few individuals for a short period of time. As word of the rescue efforts spread throughout the community, more Tutsis would appear at the rescuers’ homes, pleading for a safe haven. Before long, the act of sheltering a small number of Tutsis burgeoned to many, and their length of stay increased from a few days to many weeks. As the murderous gangs began to catch wind of the growing rescuing efforts, some rescuers took precautionary action by transporting Tutsis to Burundi or Zaire, using forged IDs or pretending that the rescuers were the parents of transported children.

Based on a distillation of testimony of interviewees, their rescue efforts involve three distinct stages: (1) witnessing the brutal treatment that Tutsis faced, either through direct observation or word-of-mouth, (2) finding and offering assistance to at least one Tutsi who faced mortal danger, and (3) interacting directly with the killers who were searching for Tutsis.

(1)

In the prelude to the 1994 genocide, Hutu extremists launched an intense media campaign prior to the genocidal violence, spreading tales of Tutsi plans to conquer Rwanda and brutalize Hutus. After Hutu extremists established the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) in 1993, they dominated the airwaves with horrific tales of Tutsis committing atrocities against the oppressed Hutus. Stoking the flames of aggression, the broadcasters reiterated the accusation that the Tutsi people planned to conquer the nation by infiltrating major institutions and claimed that Tutsis disguised their real intention of ultimate domination by lulling innocent Hutus into complacency. Broadcasters implored listeners to vent their anger by calling into the radio station and sharing their stories of power-hungry and domineering Tutsis. With such broadcasts, Tutsi evil deeds became a topic of social fascination, bordering on obsession, for the callers.

In like fashion, the newspaper Kangura ran story after story about Tutsi defects and offenses—wickedness, obsession with power, and insatiable thirst for domination. One article recounted the alleged nefarious practice of Tutsi women seducing innocent and unsuspecting Hutu men, thereby producing hybrid descendants, within a larger political plot of total Rwandan conquest. Other storytellers invoked the genocide of World War II, portraying Hutus as the “Jews of Rwanda,”
on the brink of their own holocaust at the hands of the “Nazi” Tutsis. In stunning irony to this metaphor, the propagandists also depicted Tutsis as insects or snakes who slither through the dark, spreading their venom to innocent Rwandans—a chilling reminder of the insect images that Nazi propagandists used to dehumanize Jews. In one story published in Kangura, March 17–18, 1993, Tutsis were demonized as Inyenzi, or cockroaches:

We are not mistaken in saying that a cockroach gives birth to another cockroach. All these attacks have as their objective to restore the monarchy and feudalism. The unimaginable crimes that the Inyenzi of today commit against the citizens remind one of those made by their ancestors: killing, plundering, raping girls, and women, and so on. If in our language someone calls something a snake, that by itself is enough.  

Such propaganda, with its vile characterizations of Tutsis, constitutes a form of psychological violence. It had its intended effect on many Hutus, but not all. The Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, who comprise the murderous gangs carrying out the genocidal violence, fully accepted the disseminated “truths” about Tutsi evils. For example, one such perpetrator of violence, in recounting his earlier belief that Tutsis were inherently subhuman, admitted, “We called them “cockroaches,” an insect that chews up clothing and nests in it, so you have to squash them hard to get rid of them. We didn’t want any more Tutsis on the land.” Another perpetrator, who served twelve years in prison for crimes committed during the genocide, recounts, “We no longer saw a human being when we turned up a Tutsi in the swamps.” Another perpetrator serving his twelve-year sentence in prison for murdering Tutsis recounts the days before and after the president’s death:

The radios were yammering at us since 1992 to kill all the Tutsis; there as anger after the president’s death and a fear of falling under the rule of the inkotanyi... The Hutu always suspects that some plans are cooking deep in the Tutsi character... He sees a threat lurking in even the feeblest or kindest Tutsi. But this is suspicion, not hatred. The hatred came over us suddenly after our president’s plan crashed. The intimidators shouted, “Just look at these cockroaches—we told you so!” And we yelled, “Right, let’s go hunting!”

The outset of the violence in April of 1994 was terrifying; the rescuers experienced intense fear at the sight of dead bodies in the streets, the sudden appearance of the Interahamwe prowling about, and the murmured stories of mass executions. A sense of dread washed over them, along with the feeling of impotence in the face of the overwhelming violence. Most of the interviewees claimed to have ignored the propaganda. One interviewee reported to have listened to the songs of the Hutu radio stations, but was disturbed by the hate-filled lyrics of music being blared in the streets: “I saw that there was a war behind these songs that would kill people.”

Rejecting the propaganda orchestrated by Hutu extremists, all the rescuers interviewed for this study resisted—and in some cases, actively obstructed—the killers’ extermination efforts. Their decision to protect Tutsis arose from the jarring experiences of witnessing or hearing about the violence in their midst. Prior to their rescue efforts, most interviewees directly observed government soldiers or Interahamwe killing local residents. One interviewee reported to have seen neighbors being killed, following by looting material items in the neighbors’ home. Another rescuer witnessed harassment of a Tutsi family living next door. Another rescuer reported that her father was killed because of his efforts to save Tutsis. He was targeted because his neighbors

39 Hatzfeld, Machete Season, 231.
40 Ibid., 231.
41 Ibid., 219.
42 Participant #3. Identifying information such as names, professions, dates, and areas of residence is being withheld to protect the anonymity of the interviewees. Interviews are cited, herewith, according to the participant number.
43 Participant #1.
44 Participant #3.
denounced him for listening to the pro-RPF radio broadcasts, which were cast as the “radio of the enemy.”

(2) For most interviewees, their rescuing efforts began with the desperate pleas of a few Tutsis. In one case, a close friend came to the interviewee’s home, lamenting that “this is our last day and then you will escort us” referring to her burial. The rescuer invited her to her home and offered anything that she wanted. Many of the interviewed took it upon themselves to save children. In another case, an interviewee witnessed people being killed while walking on the road. This rescuer picked up a young girl, who cried, “Please don’t kill me!” Comforting the girl, the rescuer brought her to the rescuer’s home. Another interviewee reported how her husband sought to rescue three children, but he was discovered and killed. One rescuer took care of Tutsi children whose parents were killed. Another rescuer hid children—her own and others—in her home. When she heard a knock on the door, fearing the worst, this rescuer recounted how she told the children, “It is now our time to die; let’s be killed together.” But the knock came from a man seeking refuge for himself and his family, all of whom were strangers to this rescuer. Some rescuers knew those whom they sought to save before the genocide. For example, a rescuer, who was known as a midwife, was approached by her patients. Bringing some to the hospital and others to her church, she claims to have saved thirty people. Other rescuers sought to protect both acquaintances and strangers. Five Tutsis stayed in one rescuer’s home and others (no numbers were specified) hid in the bush behind the home. Another rescuer, who was a pastor, was approached by many people—some members of his church and others strangers to him, seeking refuge. The pastor did not know each person prior to the genocide, but he was known for his kindness by local residents. One would-be victim pleaded, “Pastor, please hide me. They have killed my parents.” This pastor took in hundreds more, moving them from his home to his church. When killers demanded entry, he declared, “You cannot enter this church. You must kill me first before you kill them.” The killers left the church, vowing to return. The pastor then scattered the Tutsis in various locations. When the killers returned, the church was empty. The pastor claims to have saved 320 people.

Most of the interviewees recalled how they began hiding people in their own homes. Tutsis often used simple measures to avoid detection, such as hiding in the rescuers’ bedrooms, behind furniture, or in attics. In cases where the rescuers’ homes became overcrowded, the Tutsis were sent to the bush to hide. Fearing detection, the rescuers sought alternative locations, often based on momentary decisions. Some rescuers moved people from one hiding place to another as they witnessed more killing in their neighborhoods and feared detection by the murderous gangs. In another case, a rescuer produced a new ID card for a Tutsi woman, identifying her as a Hutu. This woman was saved as a result, escaping to Butare.

One rescuer reported, “We were worried that we would now be targeted, since this man [a Tutsi] was taking refuge in our home. People started being killed around the neighborhood. Fidel

45 Participant #11.
46 Participant #1.
47 Participant #6.
48 Participant #7.
49 Participant #1.
50 Participant #5.
51 Participant #5.
52 Participant #3.
53 Participant #4.
54 Participant #2.
55 Participant #2.
56 Participant #1.

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was killed the next day."57 As the murderous gangs roamed the streets, this rescuer felt that the only way to avoid detection was to hide in the ground—literally:

...We were really worried and we thought that we were going to die too. Then, I decided to dig a hole where everyone can go and hide. We made a big hole so that we had another place for hiding. Whenever we would dig, we would take the soil to be dumped about 200 meters away so that it wouldn't be obvious that we just made a hole. It wasn't easy, but then we covered it with grass. We hid everyone in the hole and almost right after we hid them, we had an attack come to our house... But by the help of God they did not find anyone who was hiding. Then another attack came. The second attack really gave us real trouble. We could hear [the killers] saying, "We must not leave any stone unturned because we must leave this place with some dead Tutsis because we know that they are hiding here."... This specific attack has left me traumatized because of the way they came in, how many of them there were and how they behaved towards us.58

This rescuer claims to have saved about thirty-five people through his efforts.

(3) Most of the interviewees recounted their terrifying encounters with the killers, which in some cases led to beatings. One interviewee described her husband’s efforts to hide children. Confronting the killers in their home, he refused their demands to turn over Tutsis, saying, “No, no, no, no.” He then insulted the killers’ intelligence. “You Hutus, you don’t look far from your nose,” which means they are not thinkers.59 Another interviewee recounted how her father reprimanded the killers:

During the planning meetings, the killers were openly telling us that “today we will kill you even though you did well to us. If we find you hiding Tutsis, because you have been suspected, we will kill you too.” They were telling us this without knowing that we were already hiding them...60

Another interviewee recalled how his uncle participated in the slaughter and demanded to know where the Tutsis were hiding:

The killers were my relatives. I knew them. They were family! They would come and demand the children. They even killed my cousin’s wife because she was a Tutsi. And after killing her, I really begged them to give me her corpse, so that I could go and bury her. So, we went to bury my cousin’s wife, and my uncle came—who was a big Interahamwe—and he asked me for the Tutsi children I was hiding... I told my sister’s husband... “I will not give you those children. I cannot let you kill them. I will kill them myself first.”61

This rescuer was willing to sacrifice the lives of these children, and probably himself in the process, rather than relinquishing the children to the killers. With this daring gamble, the rescuer was tacitly accusing the killers of depravity. Through his efforts, the rescuer claims to have saved five people. Some rescuers had the courage to bargain with the killers. Bribery was effective in some cases. One rescuer bribed the killers with food; when the food ran out, they stole all of the rescuer’s possessions. Another rescuer recounted how he offered his cow to the killers in exchange for leaving the children in peace. He claims that these children survived the war. Another rescuer was prepared to sacrifice himself if that would save those whom he was hiding. “I decided that when the killers came to my place, before killing these people, they must kill me.”62

57 Participant #9.
58 Participant #9.
59 Participant #7.
60 Participant #8.
61 Participant #1.
62 Participant #2.
Two interviewees recounted how they resisted the militia groups with force of arms. In one case, the interviewee joined community members who mobilized to protect about 150 people, brandishing guns and makeshift weapons, such as sticks, spears and arrows, to ward off the attackers. He reported, “We kept fighting the different raids that came and eventually [the Interahamwe] stopped coming back. The next day the RPF came and we became a protected zone.”

In another case a rescuer apparently witnessed the slaughter of Tutsis immediately after the president’s plane was shot down. He immediately called a meeting of people in his sector, requesting that everyone assist Tutsis who were engulfed in the campaign of violence. Not aware of his effort to undermine this campaign, the Interahamwe offered him money to join them in exposing Tutsis. After refusing their request, he took up arms against the killers. Preparing for one such attack by the Interahamwe, he joined a large group of resisters—about 120 Hutus in total—in armed resistance, positioning about fifteen people with guns around his house. He remembered well one such skirmish with the killers:

On April 8 [the Interahamwe] wanted to come to my sector to kill the Tutsis here. I went to the Tutsi families and told them not to worry. I told them that no one would be against them, and that if they die we will all die together. I asked them to come to my home, so that I could protect them. Five families came totaling 30 people… I had many of my trusted people who had guns, and we defended against the killers. I went fifty meters above my home where I could see [the killers] coming. And when they came around 8:00 pm, I started to shoot them. And they started to curse at me saying that I will run out of bullets. I said that if I do, then all of us will die together. I shot at them again and they ran away. They started to loot, eat cows and destroying houses. But we continued to protect everyone at my house and they all survived.

This armed counter-attack allegedly succeeded in saving many people, although he does not know the exact number.

Why Rescue?
What motivated a small number of Hutus to risk their lives to save Tutsis? After listening to the life histories of the rescuers and hearing about their experiences during the genocide, we chose to address this question by directly asking the interviewees why they rescued. Their testimony revealed consistent patterns; most interviewees repeatedly stated that their decision to rescue was directly connected to their sense of self and sense of interconnectedness with Tutsis. The interviewees unanimously expressed a clear identification with being a good person or a good Christian, which in turn meant having a good heart. As one interviewee explained, “It was my heart that made me do it. I could not let people die like that and then call myself a good Christian.” For this rescuer, identifying herself as a good Christian made rescuing a necessary action. When asking another interviewee why she risked her life to help her neighbors, she stated:

Rescuer: I feel that my heart convinced me to do so. I saw innocent people dying and I thought that it was better to die with a friend or relative than to live and let them die. Not helping was never an option.

Interviewer: Why do you think your heart convinced you to do this?

Rescuer: Because my heart knows that we are all the same.

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63 Participant #20.
64 Participant #18.
65 Participant #18.
66 Participant #31.
67 Participant #2.
For this rescuer, having a good heart implied their equal moral and social status with Tutsis. Again, this theme of equality was repeated by interviewees as a primary justification for helping. As another rescuer describes:

> Even though the leadership was sensitizing people to kill, I did this because I love people. I love all humans. I can tell you that a person is not supposed to die from another human in that way. They [the killers] had changed into animals when they were killing. I saw them change and they were no longer humans. On the outside they looked human, but on the inside they were not. To be able to kill young children, while they cry out for mercy is inhuman. I couldn’t be an animal like the others. As a human, I have to do the things that a human must do.

This testimony illustrates their claim that the act of killing nullifies the agent’s own humanity, reducing the individual to the status of an animal. For these interviewees, their choice to help was not conceived of as an option—where they could decide to help or not—and instead was more of an irrefutable characteristic or expression of their sense of self and their relationship to Tutsis.

Such replies then led us to inquire about social underpinnings of their notions of identity and difference. We sought to understand how such notions became pivotal to their decisions to offer aid to Tutsis, decisions that deviated markedly from the vast majority of Rwandan Hutus who acted as either participants or bystanders to the violence. All but two of the interviewees connected their equal positioning of the Tutsi and their identification as a good human or Christian to their experiences with significant role models. In their own words, they informed us that their concepts of themselves and the Tutsi were developed from their moral education that they had received early in life from influential adults. For example, after being asked how she came to develop the good heart to which she attributed her rescuing, one interviewee stated:

> What I can tell you is that I got this heart from my parents. I saw it from my parents. As I grew up, I saw that everyone, Hutu and Tutsi, were coming to my parents’ house. Everyone was welcome. My parents had good hearts and I got it from them.

Similarly, another rescuer explains:

> It was the personality that I got from my parents. I am a Christian, a born again. I was saved. My parents taught me about being a good person and then when I became a pastor I was a pastor for everyone. I had to help them because I was a servant of God and it was the heart I inherited from my parents.

For most of the rescuers interviewed, these significant role models were parents. There were also cases of auxiliary family members or community members taking on that role—uncles, grandparents, and in a few cases, neighbors or older friends. Regarding the rescue of Tutsis during the Rwandan genocide, a kind of grass roots network was created in the town of Mabare, leading to armed resistance against Hutu militia. These significant figures delivered an ethical education through their direct verbal teachings and their embodiment of ethical social practices. In the rescuers’ personal narratives, their attempts to save Tutsis were driven in part by what they learned as children through ethical instruction, moralistic stories, and inspiring actions of role models.

The rescuers were explicitly taught to live at peace with all people, Hutu and Tutsi alike, and they witnessed their role models demonstrate generosity, service, advocacy, and tolerance. The moral education that rescuers received from role models took three forms: (1) direct verbal instruction concerning the proper treatment of others, (2) stories told by role models about past

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68 Participant #1.
69 Participant #6.
deeds of compassion, typically including rescue efforts, and (3) the ethical deeds of these influential figures in their interactions with others, including Tutsis, that the rescuers themselves witnessed. Each of the three key elements of lessons, stories of past deeds, and demonstrated social practices has played an indelible role in the development of the rescuers’ present sense of self. In the process of ascribing their own behavior to the influence of their role models, the rescuers emphasized how those elements directly contributed to their decisions to rescue.

First, most of them expressed gratitude to a father, mother, uncle, or grandparent for providing them the foundational moral clarity needed to respond to the genocidal violence of 1994. They cited the direct verbal instructions given by their role models about how to live well with others. When asked why he rescued, one rescuer invoked the lessons he learned from his parents: “We talked about it and were not valuing it. When I got home I would ask my parents about it, and they told me that people are the same, and that no one has different blood.” This passage illustrates a pattern in which many rescuers invoked the same imagery used by their role models (in this case, the idea that humans share the same blood) when expressing their personal views as adults. This direct repetition of themes and metaphors was prominent throughout the rescuers’ testimonies. Clearly, one of the key principles of the rescuers’ moral education was to avoid ethnic division. Another rescuer also described his parents’ influence:

My mother (who was a Hutu) told me never to get involved in the hatred of the Tutsi. Our parents told us about the past wars and violence. My father was always saying, “Please my children, never, never get involved in burning someone’s home. I never want to hear that one of my children burned someone’s home.” So, if you teach this to children then they will not get involved in violence.

This rescuer’s parents were quite explicit about the importance of renouncing violence and ethnic divisions, and in the last sentence, we clearly see this rescuer making a causal link between one’s parenting and personal involvement in violence.

For those rescuers who were inspired by their faith tradition, their moral education came from the Christian Bible. One rescuer recalled that her family was basically uneducated and illiterate, except for the fact that her mother was able to read the Bible. This rescuer received most of her moral lessons from her mother’s repetition of biblical themes. Another rescuer recalled his father’s relationship to the Bible:

My father modeled himself on the Holy Bible, and he taught us how to live using God’s word. My father was a person who liked to pray all the time, and he would even gather our neighbors together in our home to pray. I remember that he liked to teach people around his community, sharing God’s word through the Bible. Many people trusted him because of his commitment to God. We still try to live according to his example and the lessons he taught us.

Second, the rescuers’ moral education drew upon stories of their role models’ responses to incidences of anti-Tutsi behavior in the years prior to the 1994 genocide. These stories focused on the suffering that Tutsis experienced in the past, such as having their homes burned and their property seized, facing systematic exclusion from education and employment opportunities, and being directly targeted for acts of violence. For many rescuers, the first salient memory of witnessing discrimination against the Tutsis or even hearing about distinctions between Hutus and Tutsis occurred during the first years of school. After seeing Hutu and Tutsi children being separated in school, they returned home confused and asked their parents about this. Their parents would respond by telling them that these ethnic distinctions did not matter and that they (the rescuers) should never participate in that kind of discrimination. In response to witnessing a violent raid

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71 Participant #15.
72 Participant #3.
73 Participant #21.
that initiated the fleeing of the Tutsis in his community in 1959, one rescuer recalls the impact of his father’s words:

Our father was saying and pointing out how the people in the raid were not good. He believed it was the government that put these bad ideas in their heads, and he told us that there would be a time when we would be asked to join them. He told us not to be changed by these people, not to allow them to overturn us, and that we need to stand on our own position, as well as learn to be disciplined and maintain the culture of no division.74

The experience of seeing firsthand the injustices committed against people with whom the rescuer was quite familiar was reinforced by the prior lessons from his father, imploring him not to accept the government propaganda.

One interviewee told of how her husband—a rescuer—hid people in the earlier wars of 1959, 1962 and 1973. He would “tell [their] children about how people came to [their] house to kill the Tutsis, and he said to the people, ‘Are these Tutsis not human like us? Were we not all created equally?’… He had no separations between people. He was very compassionate and people really appreciated him.”75 Another rescuer’s father exhibited generosity during a previous era of bloodshed by saving people who faced moral dangers from predators.

[My father] used to tell me stories as to how he helped people who were being hunted in 1959, 1960 and 1962. As conflicts were prevalent during those times, there was a family who was on a list of Tutsis to be targeted. When my dad saw this person’s name on this list, he decided to go and tell his friend not to stay in his house anymore because he was on the list.76

Another rescuer found inspiration from his father’s outspoken rebuke of killers during past conflicts. “When my father was still alive, he would always tell the killers that what they are doing is not good. ‘It is not good to shed someone’s blood,’ he would say.”77

The third component of the rescuers’ moral education centered on witnessing the ethical behavior of their role models. Such behavior included acts of kindness by offering shelter to strangers, feeding the hungry, or caring for the sick. Most rescuers interviewed conveyed stories of inspiring rescue efforts by their role models: a mother offering shelter to the homeless, a father providing food to the hungry, an uncle giving clothes to the poor.78 The rescuers emulated these influential people for their compassion, inspiring them—the rescuers—to care for those in need around them—the homeless, hungry, impoverished, and destitute. The rescuers internalized such stories, which had a strong influence on their relations with others. When asked why he risked his life, one rescuer responded:

It was the heart I inherited from my parents. What I am, I learned from them. My parents loved their neighbors and were living well with them. They had no conflicts or problems with anyone. They would tell me to forgive mistakes, to never seek revenge, and to never create enemies. I tried to follow their steps by adapting their behaviors. The education I received from them, this is what helped me. I have no division in me and I never will.79

He made it very clear that his own behavior is the result of the way that his parents lived, illustrating a direct connection between this rescuer’s sense of self and his parents’ behavior. He internalized

74 Participant #22.
75 Participant #16.
76 Participant #9.
77 Participant #8.
78 Participant #1, #2, #4, #6, #9, #10, #14, #15, #16, #19, and #20.
79 Participant #16.
their conscientious approach to social relationships and attributed his own acts of rescuing to this internalization.

The neighbor of one rescuer taught her how to care for others and to live as a family: “All people [in the neighborhood] were considered as family members, they are not just close friends.” In another case the friends of the interviewee’s parents were kind and loving, creating a culture of generosity and sharing with each other. These friends “would... give crops to those that didn’t have crops. They would also advise us to give to others.”80 Another rescuer praised a Tutsi woman for exhibiting a good heart in offering sanctuary for the homeless and providing resources to meet their tangible needs. This woman even showed kindness to aggressive individuals, which included her own husband. “All people loved her family,” said one rescuer.81 Tragically, she was killed by a grown child that she had raised, who claimed that as a Tutsi, she was conspiring with other Tutsis to enslave Hutus.

One interviewee recalled how his parents taught him compassion for others in need. “The charity I got from my parents gave me the heart of growing up and loving others and wanting to take care of others who are in need.”82 Another rescuer—a successful businessman—credits his father with showing him the immorality of his earlier, materialistic lifestyle. Because of this admonition from his father, the son later found true happiness in acts of selfless generosity, transcending regard for his own life.

One rescuer’s mother demonstrated selfless love to others: “I followed the way that she loved people. I learned from her to have love and to love people because I would see how she would talk to people, even welcoming strangers and giving them shelter.”83 Another rescuer recalled how her mother taught her to promote peace with others and avoid division since “all Rwandans are the same, brothers and sisters... She would tell us to love each other, help each other.”84 Another interviewee tried to emulate her grandmother, who “taught us to never to eat all of our food, but to always leave some for a visitor that may come. If a visitor comes when they are hungry, you want to have food for them. So we were always seeing her keeping extra sorghum flour and milk and porridge for potential visitors.”85 In another case, the rescuer’s grandfather “taught us how to live well with others... he was a person of peace and he wished that others would also be at peace.”86 Another rescuer identified the impact her neighbor’s example had on her:

[My neighbor] and I were very close, and I could share all my secrets with her. She lived a good life and she had a good heart. Her family was rich but they were not arrogant. My family was very poor, but we were still welcome in their home. She taught me many important lessons. Cecilia would advise me that no one could live without saving money or food. Whenever I would go into the market to buy things, and there was some balance left over, she would tell me to join my money with the people that needed help. She taught us to pool our extra money together so that there would be money available when one of us was going through a hard time.

I learned a lot from her. She was always advising me to be familiar with farming. Even though she was rich, [my neighbor] still loved to farm. This motivated me to love working as well. She was willing to do the work of the poor. When there were no seeds to cultivate, [she] would give us seeds. And she always taught us to give to others and to be human. [She] was a good lady with no separation and everyone could go to her house whether they were Hutu or Tutsi. Everybody in my community loved her family.87

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80 Participant #3.
81 Participant #1.
82 Participant #19.
83 Participant #6.
84 Participant #2.
85 Participant #4.
86 Participant #20.
87 Participant #1.
This rescuer was inspired by her neighbor’s virtues of generosity, tolerance and compassion, all of which exemplified her good heart. Another rescuer proclaimed his intention to adopt his mother’s social practices as his own:

I saw that my mother loved people very much. I followed the way that she loved people. I learned from the ways that she would talk to and act with people. She would welcome strangers and give them shelter. She was not very religious, and she was not involved in political issues. She would always tell me to live well with people and to love others. If someone would come by our home and ask for something, she always gave to them and she expected that we helped them as well. She would tell us to always help people even when she wasn’t around. She was advising us to be human.88

Not only did his mother exhibit helping behavior, she was also explicit about her expectation that her children follow her example. This is a clear expression of both the role model’s deliberate efforts to instill her values on her children, and the rescuer’s personal reflections about his mother’s normative social practices. Through this rescuer’s testimony, we see another repetition of two familiar themes. The first is the association between division and politics. Highlighting the fact that his mother was not involved in political issues reflects the belief held by several rescuers that politics were an instrument of division—and therefore to be mistrusted. The second is the idea of being human, of having a good heart. The social practices performed and encouraged by this role model were interpreted by the rescuer simply as the normative behaviors of a human: “she was advising us to be human.” From this example, we see how role model ideology and behavior were internalized into the rescuers’ personal meaning matrix.

One rescuer, whose grandmother agreed to look after several cows belonging to Tutsi neighbors who were forced to flee to Burundi, described the elaborate means by which the grandmother altered the cows’ appearance in order to pass them off as her own.

When the Tutsi families were fleeing to Burundi, they would bring some of their things to my grandmother, and she would keep their stuff for them. It was hard for them to flee with cows, so my grandmother would keep the cows for her, but my grandparents could be targeted if anyone recognized the cows they were hiding. So my grandparents would get the dry banana leaves and they would burn the hair of the cows to make them a different color. After two weeks of doing this every day, a white cow would become brown, and then they could let that cow roam freely with the other cows without there being suspicion. They would also use a hot iron to change the direction of the cow’s horns. They would keep the cow inside their one room house for a short period and then they would just mix them in with the rest of their cows.89

This story illustrates how the willingness to endure inconvenience, hardship and suffering for the sake of other community members was cast as an expected quality of a good person. Neither the role model nor the rescuer considered this kind of behavior extraordinary. Such endurance was seen simply as the logical application of ethical norms.

Lessons Learned
Most of the interviewees embraced the moralistic principle that each person attains full authenticity in right relations with others. Some rescuers invoked this principle by declaring that “my” life is connected to “yours,” that “I” am enriched by close bonds with “you,” and that “I” become fully realized in right relations with “you.” One sees oneself—one’s humanity—reflected in the character of others. This principle includes the exhortation to live as one, as a family, “as friends and brothers and sisters.” One rescuer said, “A human being is a human being and a child is a child. You have to get together and never separate or segregate people.”

88 Participant #6.
89 Participant #4.
Many rescuers invoked the metaphor of a family to characterized Rwandans, often referring to everyone as brothers and sisters. Traditionally, families stick together, help each other, live together, and defend each other. Rescuers often used the phrase “living together” to refer to their way of being in general—whether in a literal sense, as in an actual home environment where all were welcome, or in a more theoretical sense, in that they avoided conflict, respected others, or lived in peace with their neighbors. Because they viewed the Tutsis as family members, the rescuers’ sense of obligation toward them became personal and immediate. From the rescuers’ point of view, when family members are threatened or in danger, one instinctively and unquestionably acts to protect them. One rescuer took in a Tutsi child and hid her among his own children. He recounted an episode during which a massacre was taking place in front of his house:

Many killers would come to my house to try and kill her. So when I heard them coming, I would lock the house with my family inside, and I'd stand outside. I would tell them, “If you are going to kill her, then go ahead and burn the entire house, throw a grenade and kill all of them! They are all my children! If you are going to kill her, then kill me too!”

For this rescuer, his love for the human family prompted him to rescue. He proudly recalled how the girl whom he saved was still registered as his own child—he had taken her in as his own regardless of the fact that she was a complete stranger. For the rescuers who saved the lives of children, adopting them as their own was not uncommon.

Another rescuer considered the very idea of racial distinction a moral perversion. As he explained it,

The genuine “brotherhood of man” supersedes the fabricated notions of racial division. [The Interahamwe] kept saying, “If we found out you are hiding someone, you will die with him.” But I had the conviction in my heart. No one chooses where he [comes] from. Others were also born like that in another group they didn’t choose. So my purpose was whoever came to me I would welcome him. I think every human is like any other human, and I think when a human suffers I suffer too. I think God created every man in his own image. He never created races... My purpose in life was to live with everyone like a brother.

Since God did not make ethnicities, the categories of Hutu and Tutsi are invalid, as illustrated in the following statements: “I didn’t give things related to ethnicity much importance, I saw everyone as God’s creation,” “We are all God’s children,” and “God created us as one.”

Charles Kabwete Mulinda reports that some Tutsis credit their survival to the work of God rather than to their own efforts or even the efforts of the helpers. When analyzing the rescuer interviews, we see that their identities orbit around the character of the good human, the good Christian, or both. For the rescuers, being a good human or a good Christian is qualified through what it means to have a “good heart.” With a good heart, one is driven—as if by an inner voice—to speak kindly of others, eschewing expressions of hatred based on race, nationality or tribal affiliation. A person with a good heart would intentionally share resources with neighbors, would live in peace with everyone, and would avoid divisive things, such as politics and ethnic distinctions. A person’s good heart provides the wisdom to discern between the righteous path and the road to hell, to distinguish between good and evil. Guided by this wisdom, the rescuers found it impossible to tolerate the racist propaganda of Hutu extremists, finding these ideologies utterly abhorrent. In conversation with others, one speaks directly from the heart and is compelled to do

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90 Participant #6.
91 Participant #2.
92 Participant #2.
good deeds. A man who loses his heart is susceptible to evil, and so is inclined to say and do evil. “It is from the fullness of the heart that the mouth speaks.” 94

While a substantial number of rescuers ascribed their actions to their Christian faith, the notion of a good heart was also invoked by non-Christian rescuers. One non-Christian rescuer explained his actions to save Tutsis as simply being human. Notice the articulation of the qualities of generosity and universal love, and then the consummation of this self-description with the familiar reference to having a good heart:

I have love in me, and I’d like to see people living peacefully whether I know them or not. Another thing is that I always help people who need to be helped. For example, for the people who are sick or in prison, if I see that they need something, I feel that I should share with them what I have. This is why I saved that girl—I was just being human and having a good heart. 95

But most interviewees who invoked the notion of a good heart as a basis for the rescue efforts understood this notion from a Christian perspective. Most of the rescuers interviewed repeatedly referenced this concept as a basis for their obligations to Tutsis. One Christian rescuer expressed how the possession of a good heart is the most important ingredient for producing moral behavior:

To me, I love people equally. I am this way because I am Christian. All people are the same and created the same by God. I rescued because of having a good heart. I never had a problem with people. I decide to live in peace with everyone. I don’t refuse anyone who asks for my help. Those who are really serving God, they have love. There are some Christians who are hypocrites, maybe seeking food or better life conditions. We don’t see things the same, we don’t necessarily believe the same way, and we don’t all have the same heart. 96

Not only does this statement express the first two qualities of a person with a good heart, that is, generosity and unconditional love for all people, but it also demonstrates how the Christian identity alone was no guarantee of moral behavior and that having a good heart was the critical determinant of ethical conduct. The rescuers also believed that the killers themselves could be transformed if given proper instruction. The same kind of moral education could be used as a potential catalyst to reform the killers. The killers could be saved if introduced to a morally infused linguistic environment that the rescuers themselves acquired.

Before the genocide of 1994, about 80% of Rwandans adopted Catholicism in combination with the traditional religious practices of Nyabingi. As Catholics, they would attend church in the morning and then worship in the afternoon, relying on the New Testament for guidance to live a virtuous life. 97 According to the sacred text, one’s good deeds come directly from the heart. “Good people produce good from the store of good within themselves: and evil people produce evil from the evil within them. For the words that the mouth utters come from the overflowing of the heart.” 98

In the same way that the rescuers’ secular positioning of “shared humanity” and the “one family” focused on oneness and equality, the Christian positioning also emphasized commonalities over differences. Often this religious positioning qualified oneness through shared bodily features, particularly with statements that highlighted that we all bleed the same blood. This emphasis echoes throughout a number of rescuer statements:

People are the same; no one has different blood. There is no difference between the Hutu and the Tutsi—we all have the same blood. No one has milk in his or her veins. Some people

95 Participant #6.
96 Participant #23.
97 I thank Gedeon Patrick Hakiziman for providing this information during a personal conversation.
betray others saying that they have tails, or that the Tutsis come from a different place, but I say God created one humanity, and all people bleed blood. No one bleeds milk. I have to love humans as I love myself.

Facilitated by their unequivocal faith in the righteousness of their positions, proper servants of God respond to genocide by rescuing. One rescuer recounted how one of his parents expressed doubt about God’s mercy and justice. The parent said, “If the killers come here and kill someone, then I will know that the God I am serving is not the real God.” While the rescuer’s parents questioned God’s moral authority, the rescuer himself never did. After the genocide, the rescuer became a pastor.

Most rescuers interviewed were motivated by a kind of fear that superseded any fear they had at the hands of fellow humans—that of God’s wrath on Judgment Day. The fear of losing oneself, of losing one’s good heart, became a source of energy for their rescuing efforts. Another rescuer found comfort in the promise of a better life in Heaven: “If you die while trying to save another’s life, then you are on the right path of the life to come. That’s what motivated me. Whether I died or not, God would be happy with what I was doing.”

Some rescuers expressed their gratitude to God for answering their prayers, proclaiming that he intervened directly to save Tutsis. For example, God is credited with “pushing the killers away” from the house where Tutsis were hiding, or causing rescuers to leave an area where Tutsis were vulnerable to fatal attacks. One rescuer reports, “I saw one attack coming from behind my house. I prayed to God, ‘Look—they have attacked me. I need you to do some miracle.’” She credits her survival to God, who somehow enticed the attackers to suddenly depart from the area where the Tutsis were hiding. The prayers of some rescuers were answered in what they described as a miracle from God. Other rescuers cited specific directives from God about the most effective tactics for confronting the Interahamwe.

The rescuers claimed that, because of their good heart, they could not turn away those seeking safety in the face of mortal danger, risking the same fate as those they sought to save. This expectation established an existential bond between them and the Tutsis they harbored in their homes, a bond sealed by the knowledge that the rescuers would live or die alongside those seeking sanctuary. For some rescuers this bond was actually a source of comfort; as one rescuer explained, “Even if I die, I’ll die happy because I have seen people who I secured that are still alive.” And to the rescuers, this bond reflected their good heart and their covenant with God. On this view, the eyes of one’s good heart are opened to the suffering and needs of others.

Most rescuers acknowledged the intense fear they experienced at the outset of the extermination campaign. The anti-Tutsi propaganda was an existential threat to peace-loving Hutus.

What happened to others can happen to us as well, and we were not happy with what was happening to them... We couldn’t sleep. We stayed up with fear filling us, thinking that the [Interahamwe] are coming and they will kill us. But we could see that there was nothing to do since God is the one who knows if we are meant to die.

But the rescuers were not paralyzed by their fears. Some rescuers recounted how their faith only strengthened their resolve to take the right path no matter the consequences. One rescuer claimed that his faith gave him the strength to endure frequent beatings and threats to his life—and even on one occasion being ordered to dig his own grave. Yet even as he and the other rescuers described their experiences and actions, they refused to characterize themselves as heroes, preferring instead to depict their rescuing efforts as ordinary—even obligatory—for anyone with a sense of moral integrity.

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99 Participant #5.
100 Participant #2.
101 Participant #32.
Conclusion

The rescuers interviewed for this research resisted the propaganda disseminated by Hutu extremists that Tutsis are a separate race, committed to conquering Rwanda and enslaving all Hutus. Instead, these rescuers held fast to their humanitarian values, recognizing everyone’s inherent moral worth and potential vulnerability to suffering. A majority of the interviewees found inspiration in their Christian faith, which they claim gave them strength during the darkest days of the slaughter. These interviewees repeatedly invoked their bond with God, driven by their good heart to follow his law. For all the rescuers interviewed, the moral education they received from role models took the form of direct verbal instruction on the proper treatment of others, stories the role models recounted about past deeds, and accounts of general ethical practices. The rescuers’ moral education took place within a localized narrative environment that operated simultaneously within the context of the larger, societal narrative, and contributed to their sense of moral bond with Tutsis—one they could not in good conscience ignore. Undergirded by their sense of a common humanity and motivated by their Christian faith, the rescuers clung to their conviction all Rwandans were part of the same “family,” and they heralded the amalgam of these two positions, rooted in a Christian perspective: that all people are created equally in God’s image and that we are all God’s children. These alternative positions intertwined the rescuers’ self-image with compassion for those in need, spurring them to act with courage on behalf of the Tutsis.

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Appendix
Interview Questions

Pre-Genocide
• Childhood
  • Where and when were you born?
  • What was the economic status of your family?
  • What was the religious status of your family?
  • What was your family’s relationship to the community and neighbors?
  • Did you attend school? If so, how much schooling did you attend?
• Adulthood
  • Did you marry? When?
  • Did you have children? How many?
  • What did you do for work?
  • What was your religious status?
  • What was your financial status?
  • What was your relationship with the community like?
  • Did you have Tutsi friends or relatives?
  • Where you involved in politics?
• Right before the genocide
  • Where you aware of what was going on?
  • Did you listen to the radio? If so, what was your impression of what was being broadcasted?
  • Did anyone try to recruit you into joining the killings?

During the Genocide
• Where were you when you first heard that the genocide started?
• What was your experience during the genocide?
• When did you start to help people?
• Where they friends, strangers, neighbors, etc?
• How many people did you help?
• How did you help them?
• Was anyone harmed? Property damaged?
• What were your interactions with the people participating in the killings?
• Why did you do this?
• What is your understanding of your actions?

Post Genocide
• Has your life changed since the genocide? If yes, how so?
• How have others responded to your actions? Have you received any praise or hardship because of rescuing?
• Are you still in contact with any of the survivors you helped?
Forgotten and Concealed: The Emblematic Cases of the Assyrian and Romani Genocides

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Abstract: By exploring how the Assyrian and Romani genocides came to be forgotten in official history and collective memory, this paper takes a step towards redress for years of inadvertent neglect and deliberate concealment. In addressing the roles played by scholars and nations, and the effect of international law and government policy, it notes the inaccessibility of evidence, combined with a narrow application of definitions of victim groups, and a focus on written proof of perpetrator intent. Continuing persecution of survivors in the aftermath of the genocides, and government actions to erase the genocides from history, are common to both cases. The dimension of a comparative analysis between two emblematic “hidden” genocides shows that there are many similarities in the process of forgetting that occurred in their respective aftermaths. Developing an understanding of how these genocides came to be ignored and forgotten may provide a foundation for genuine acknowledgment and redress.

Keywords: Romani/Roma, Assyrians/Assyria, genocide, hiddenness, concealment, forgotten

Introduction
Seventy years after the liberation of Auschwitz, Romani peoples are still struggling to have their tragic experiences during the Second World War acknowledged. Only a few survivors are still alive. Hermann Höllenreiner is one such survivor, and remains deeply troubled by the unlearned lessons of what he calls the “forgotten genocide”—the systematic liquidation of Europe’s Romani population. Likewise, descendants of victims of the Assyrian Genocide experience the hidden nature of their history as an added insult; as compounding the trauma of the genocide itself. This experience is encapsulated in the words of Joseph Zaya, born in the Hakkari region of south-east Anatolia, who shortly before he passed away at the age of one hundred stated that this genocide “is something that we Assyrians should never forget, and the world should not forget it, either.”

The factors contributing to the hiddenness of a particular genocide are often made up of an interrelated web of political, economic, religious and geostrategic interests; and are the result of a combination of actions by various parties. This paper will examine why some genocides are ignored or fade into oblivion, by looking at the cases of the Assyrian Genocide, which occurred alongside the Armenian Genocide during the First World War, and the Romani Genocide during the Nazi-Fascist era in Europe. These emblematic examples illustrate how and why some genocides are studied, reported, and officially commemorated, while others are ignored and their victims forgotten. As René Lemarchand writes in his edited volume, Forgotten Genocides, “the systematic eradication of tens if not hundreds of thousands of Assyrians receives little or no attention. Again, consider the marginal attention paid to the martyrdom of the Gypsy victims of the Holocaust.”

The phenomenon of hidden or forgotten genocides has received some attention in recent years, and two texts in particular have informed the analysis in this paper—Lemarchand’s abovementioned Forgotten Genocides; and Hidden Genocides: Power, Knowledge, Memory, edited by

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http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.2.1404
Alexander Laban Hinton, Thomas LaPointe and Douglas Irvin-Erickson. Both collections present a range of case studies and analyses, and the latter identifies a canon of genocide cases which “remain exemplary, first and foremost the Holocaust.”\footnote{Alexander Laban Hinton, Thomas LaPointe, and Douglas Irvin-Erickson, eds., *Hidden Genocides: Power, Knowledge, Memory* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2013), 5.} The core of recognized genocides includes those in Rwanda, Bosnia, Cambodia and Darfur, those of Indigenous peoples broadly, and the Armenian Genocide, which has gained attention in recent years and which is now also included in the triad of core genocides along with the Holocaust and Rwandan genocide. Those genocides which have engendered less recognition, constitute what has been referred to as the “second circle”, “periphery”, and finally “forgotten” genocides,\footnote{Ibid, 6.} encompassing cases ranging from Bangladesh, Kosovo and the Ukrainian famine, to East Timor, Burundi and the Assyrian and Greek genocides. It is unclear where in this structure sit the many non-Jewish victims of the Nazis and their Axis allies, primarily Romani peoples but also Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals and other categories of people considered asocial.

This paper presents a comparative analysis of the Romani and Assyrian experiences, addressing the roles played by scholars and nations, and the effect of international law and government policy, in either blocking out or including particular events in collective memories and official history. A comparative analysis between the Romani and Assyrian cases can help to highlight the interplay between causes, and identify patterns that can lead to both unintentional forgetting and deliberate concealment.

This paper also notes the influence of issues internal to the victim communities, such as a cultural disinclination to record events in writing, resulting in a lack of survivor testimony, and in both cases, internal divisions which have prevented a unified voice to advocate the cause of recognition. Indeed, in consultations with Assyrian community representatives, the absence of a self-governed, autonomous nation-state is sometimes cited as a reason for the lack of power to drive recognition efforts, and this factor in itself would be worthy of a more detailed study.\footnote{Ian Hancock, “Responses to the Porrajmos: The Romani Holocaust,” in *Is the Holocaust Unique?*, ed. Alan Rosenbaum (Boulder: The Westview Press, 2009), 138; Andrea Boscoboinik, “Challenging Borders and Constructing Boundaries: An Analysis of Roma Political Processes,” in *Identity Politics: Histories, Regions and Borderlands*, eds. Vytis Ciubrinskas and Rimanta Shuzuńskas (Klaipeda: Klaipeda University Press, 2009), 187; Panayiotis Diamadis, “Controversies Around Governmental and Parliamentary Recognition of the Armenian, Hellenic, and Assyrian Genocides,” *The AHIF Policy Journal* 7 (Spring 2016), accessed August 3, 2016, http://ahiworld.org/AHIFPolicyJournal/pdfs/Volumes7Spring/03diamadis.pdf; Hannibal Travis, “The Assyrian Genocide: A Tale of Oblivion and Denial” in *Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, and Memory*, ed. René Lemarchand (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).} The most significant factors have been located outside the control of the communities themselves. Political motivations and the desire to consolidate national identities lie behind how history is written and how genocides are remembered. It may be a cliché that history is written by the victors, however the collective memory of a population is very often intentionally built by removing certain aspects and emphasizing others, creating a narrative that benefits that particular group.\footnote{Many Assyrians advocate the establishment of a national homeland in the Nineveh region of Iraq, to which they are indigenous. In the Romani case, the idea of a nation-state is complicated by the fact that Romanies are not a land-based group, and opinions differ within Romani communities as to how their rights should be acknowledged and enshrined in policy or legislation; see Mirga, Andrzej, and Nicolae Gheorghe, “The Roma in the Twenty-First Century: A Policy,” *Project on Ethnic Relations*, 1997, accessed August 3, 2016, http://www.per-usa.org/1997-2007/21st_c.htm.} In the construction of historical narratives after both world wars, nations strove to create clear dichotomies between perpetrators and rescuers, or perpetrators and victims, with no room for complex analysis or acknowledgement of those countries which may have played simultaneous and often paradoxical roles (for instance, simplistic postwar narratives allowed especially non-Axis countries to conceal their own persecution of Romanies before, during and indeed after the war.)
The inaccessibility of documentation—records officially withheld by authorities or information presenting in wide range of languages—has also hindered academic research. Other issues relate to methods of implementation of the genocides, exacerbated by narrow academic and legal interpretations of the concept of genocide. For example, an intentionalist view of genocide in early historiography (that is, a view that genocide is the result of a central policy or decision by government, and recorded in writing) excluded the massacres of Romani peoples, which were often haphazard and locally-initiated, from mainstream definitions of genocide. Much official Ottoman documentation refers explicitly to the Armenian community, and although Assyrians were often directly targeted, or swept up in massacres of Armenians, clear proof is sometimes concealed behind the wording of Turkish documents.

Further, continuing prejudice against the victims in the immediate and longer-term post-genocide environment, suppression of information and national mythmaking, and conscious government efforts to muddy the identity of victims, can have profound effects on how genocides are written into, or omitted from, official histories. For example, as modern nation-states were created in the aftermath of the First World War, their new governments embedded the denial of Assyrian history by denying even the identity of Assyrans as a group. Forced to officially identify as members of other communities, the very existence of a group known as Assyrians was officially extinguished. Finally, ongoing discrimination meant that the survivors of genocide were not only deprived of acknowledgement of their suffering, but even blamed for bringing it on themselves. Since Romani peoples were imprisoned in camps based on their categorization as a social group with “criminal tendencies,” their treatment during the war was considered to have been justified, and they were subsequently excluded from commemorations, memorialization and reparations processes. In fact, because they were believed to have been targeted as a social group, they have been excluded from legal recognition under the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which specifies that genocide can be committed solely against national, ethnic, racial or religious groups. For these and other reasons to be explored further in this paper, certain genocides of the twentieth century have been relegated to the footnotes of history.

Germany’s wholehearted admission of guilt for the Jewish Holocaust has contributed to widespread memorialization and compensation, but this admission has only recently extended to other groups of victims. The Nazi genocide of Europe’s Jews during the Second World War remains the most studied and publicly known genocide; in contrast, the attacks on Romani communities, and the ideologies that triggered them, remain relatively forgotten in academic literature and public consciousness. Today, the Assyrian and Armenian communities recognize and commemorate each other’s history of genocide by the Ottoman and Republican Turkish authorities, but broader awareness of the Assyrian experience pales in comparison. Official Turkish denial of both genocides continues to this day, though global recognition of the Armenian experience has increased over recent years. For the Assyrian community, however, the hiddenness of its history represents an additional layer of denial.

The analysis in this paper is based on existing research by leading scholars of the Romani and Assyrian genocides, including Racho Donef, Hannibal Travis, David Gaunt, Nicholas Al-Jeloo, Ian Hancock and Michael Stewart, while also referring to the authors’ own research.

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9 Hannibal Travis, “‘Native Christians Massacred’: The Ottoman Genocide of the Assyrians during World War I,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, no. 3 (2006), 135.
10 Official documentation often refers to the “Ermeni miliyet”, which has been mistranslated as referring only to the Armenian community. It also referred to the non-Canonical Orthodox Christian community.
14 Particularly, see e.g. Racho Donef, Massacres and Deportation of Assyrians in Northern Mesopotamia: Ethnic Cleansing by Turkey 1924-1925 (Stockholm: Nsibin, 2009); Travis, “The Assyrian Genocide”; Hannibal Travis, “Constructing the
The authors carried out fieldwork in Italy and Australia on the history of the Romanies, and the views of both Romani and Assyrian representatives were taken into account. While examining the case studies, this paper provides some background on the two communities, their history and culture, and experiences of persecution in the lead up to the two respective genocides. A section on the genocides themselves describes the ideological motivations and outlines how each community was targeted for elimination. It argues that in the aftermath of the genocides, deliberate efforts were made by governments to prevent any recognition of the genocides, and to blur the identity of the victim groups so as to avoid acknowledgement of their losses. Minimal scholarly attention, a lack of public commemoration, and limitations of the legal definition of genocide, represent some of the obstacles that the Romani and Assyrian communities continue to face as they seek recognition of their communities’ respective historical and contemporary experiences of genocide and prejudice.

This article presents a new dimension of comparative analysis between the Romani and Assyrian genocides. The process of highlighting factors that are common to both has identified patterns in the development of the hiddenness of certain genocides. An awareness of these factors may help in the pursuit of recognition and redress.

Theoretical Issues and Debates Concerning ‘Hidden Genocides’

Both the Assyrian and Romani genocides have been primarily viewed, to the extent that they have been studied at all, through the lens of other genocides, partly the result of each having occurred concurrently to another genocide. Ian Hancock argues that recognition of each case should be pursued “in its own context, and not as a corollary to that of another people.”15 While Hancock points out the value of exploring the history of each genocide as a singular event, comparative analyses can also be beneficial. Comparative analyses can become problematic however, when one genocide is always used as the lens for another, to the extent that one is subsumed or obscured by the other.

In genocide historiography, the Nazi Holocaust of European Jewry is recognized as the paradigmatic genocide, where “other genocides are often seen and interpreted through the lens of our understanding about the Holocaust”.16 Indeed, there are important ways that the Holocaust can form a useful foundation, not least because of the enormous evidence base it provides to the study of genocide. Holocaust scholarship has developed theoretical frameworks for critical examination of all other cases of genocide, and the wealth of evidence and analysis in relation to the Holocaust provides a strong basis for studying other genocidal atrocities.

One of the unforeseen effects of the extensive attention on the genocide of the Jews, however, is that the Romani Genocide has been viewed exclusively in relation to the Holocaust. In practice, this has led to the creation of a neat distinction between a sort of “Upper-Case Holocaust” and a “lower-case holocaust.”17 The experience of the Romanies has remained on the periphery of genocide scholarship and is hardly ever analyzed as a case of genocide in its own right, despite research suggesting that “together with Jews, the Romani victims were the only ethnic/racial population selected for total annihilation.”18
Likewise, the Armenian Genocide is the ultimate early model of a modern, bureaucratic, systematic genocide of a minority group viewed as a national, ethnic and religious threat. The atrocities against Assyrians that began just prior, in 1914, tend to be viewed, only and always, comparatively through the lens of the Armenian Genocide. There are important distinctions however, between the Assyrian and Armenian examples. The national, ethnic, cultural and linguistic, demographic and religious motivators that influenced the Armenian Genocide should not be neglected in the process of recognizing the Assyrian tragedy. However, it is fair to say that the Assyrian Genocide has been largely overshadowed by study of the Armenian experience.

Debate remains as to whether the Holocaust’s status as paradigmatic example nurtures or hinders scholarship and memorialization of other genocides. In recent years, some genocide scholars have claimed that particular victim communities have highlighted their own suffering while deliberately shutting out attention and empathy for other communities. Yair Auron has criticized the repression of experiences of non-Jewish victims of the Nazis, while Dirk Moses has written on the phenomenon of competitiveness within genocide memorialization and historiography, arguing that groups seek to assert the uniqueness of their own experience while diminishing the suffering of others. Moses’ article about the development of the Canadian Museum of Human Rights claims that some communities view the memorialization of the genocide of another group as a direct threat to the memory of their own experience, and his application of Emile Durkheim’s theory of the sacred versus the profane has shown how one’s own history of genocide may be felt as somehow special (“events that are loved, venerated, or dreaded, and that are superior in dignity to the ordinary world of the profane”), relative to others’ experiences of genocide. Hannibal Travis has alleged that some scholars of the Armenian Genocide intentionally omitted information about the Assyrian Genocide in the construction of Armenian Genocide historical narratives. All of these theories are highly contested. For instance, in his book review, Uğur Ümit Üngör rejects Travis’ claim about Armenian Genocide scholars, while Dina Porat at Yad Vashem, the World Holocaust Remembrance Center, “vehemently rejects” Auron’s allegations.

The authors of this paper do not believe it is helpful to blame one victim community for eclipsing the experiences of another; but rather seek to focus on the interplay of various factors in the development of each genocide. Shedding light on less well-known genocides is not intended to equate these with their better-known counterparts. In fact, the process of comparative analysis actually emphasizes distinguishing features as well as parallels, allowing a deeper understanding of the manifold ways that genocides are devised and implemented. It follows that exploring the ways in which the Assyrian and Romani histories have been ignored or forgotten, and bringing their genocides to light, in no way diminishes the experiences of the Ottoman Armenians or the Jewish communities of Europe.

Background

The Assyrian Community

As the indigenous people of Bet-Nahrain (“the Land Between the Rivers”), the Assyrians have inhabited the upper reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates River valley systems since the beginning of recorded history. Perhaps as early as the 2400s BCE, Assyrians had formed states in Mesopotamia, with their last great state falling in 612 BCE. King Abgar of Edessa was the first ruler to convert to

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22 Travis, “Constructing the ‘Armenian Genocide’,” 172.
Christianity, taking his subjects with him. The geostrategic importance of the Assyrian homeland astride key trade and travel routes made the community susceptible to repeated invasions and conquests by foreign forces including the Eastern Romans (erroneously named Byzantines),26 Iranian Persians, and Mongols.

The development of a modern, national identity amongst the Assyrians of the Ottoman Empire inevitably clashed with the Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms emerging in the early twentieth century. They came to be viewed, like the Armenians, as a threat to the longed-for ethnic and religious homogeneity of the Turkish state. By January 1914, six years after the coup d’etat that brought the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) to power, the long-standing enmity between Muslim Turks and indigenous Christian populations was at the point of exploding.

The Ottoman Empire’s milliyet system classified personal identity by the house of worship an individual attended.27 The development of Assyrian Christianity28 led to a split from the Orthodox Patriarch in Constantinople, and Assyrians were subsequently classified as being part of the Ermeni milliyet,29 with the Armenian Patriarchs of Constantinople and Cilicia being responsible for their good behavior. It is clear that the CUP (also known as the Young Turks), despite expressing a secular agenda, was in no hurry to abolish the existing religiously-based social system, reflected in the resolutions adopted by the 1910 CUP Congress in Thessalonike (Salonika):

Musulmans generally should retain their arms, and where they are in a minority arms should be distributed to them by the authorities. ... Emigration from the Caucasus and Turkestan must be encouraged, land provided for the immigrants, and the Christians prevented from purchasing property. ... Turkey was essentially a Moslem country, and Moslem ideas and influence must preponderate. All other religious propaganda must be suppressed, as no reliance could be placed on Christians, who were always working for the downfall of the new regime. ... Sooner or later the complete Ottomanization of all Turkish subjects must be effected, but it was becoming clear that this could never be achieved by persuasion, and recourse must be had to force of arms.30

Moreover, genocidal language became increasingly common, laying the groundwork for the broader acceptance of massacre and deportation, with one of CUP’s chief ideologues, Dr. Behaeddin Sakir, stating in 1911, “The nations that remain from the old times in our empire are akin to foreign and harmful weeds that must be uprooted.”31

Romani Peoples

The Romani32 population, likely originating from the north-west of India somewhere between the fifth and the tenth centuries33 comprises a multitude of sub-groups, scattered across all continents.34 The community first appeared in Europe under the Byzantine Empire, around the tenth century AD and were regarded as “outcasts, intruders, and threats, probably because of their dark skin,
their association with [the] invading Muslim Ottoman Empire, and their foreign ways.” Over the following centuries, the communities developed unique languages and cultural traditions, and a way of life that set them apart from the dominant European population. Often referred to using pejorative terms such as Gypsies, Zingari, Zigeuner, Gitano, or Cigani, their marginalized position can partly be attributed to a negative view of nomadism:

...in the superior man, nomadism enlarges the spirit, educates him to wider intuitions ... in the inferior man, like the gypsy ... it creates an instability of character, ... it distances him from permanent work and facilitates greed for other peoples’ possessions and other peoples’ women ... In the inferior man, nomadism destroys every notion of homeland.

The idea that nomadism was an element of asociality became deeply rooted, and consequently, European countries adopted policies for the “sedentarization” (and forced assimilation) of Romani peoples. For example, Italy introduced a series of institutional measures, with Romani communities “treated as a public danger and subjected to bans throughout the Italian peninsula.” As in the Assyrian case, by the 19th century, nationalist ideologies informed the view that Romani peoples represented a problem of national security. The resistance displayed by itinerant people to the “re-educational” policies enacted within different national contexts was subsequently linked to pseudo-scientific race theories, whereby a tendency towards crime and asociality was seen as a genetic feature of the group. As early as 1876, Cesare Lombroso, an Italian criminal anthropologist, described the Zingari (Gypsies) as a “criminal race.”

Influenced by Darwinist theory, Lombroso argued that not only was it possible to identify criminals through the use of anthropometric techniques, but that certain attributes, considered responsible for creating inferior populations among the species, were hereditary. For this reason, Lombroso “believed that deliberate selection was appropriate, to complement and fortify natural selection.” These perceptions created a context in which genocide, later carried out by the Nazi regime in Germany and its counterparts across Europe, would be considered an acceptable measure against Romani peoples. With the introduction of the Nuremberg laws in 1935, the Jewish and Romani peoples were both identified as “enemies of the race-based state.”

Forgotten Genocides

Seyfo (The Sword): The Assyrian Genocide

Massacres of Assyrians began in earnest in 1914, as part of preparations for the invasion of Russia and Persia at the year’s end. Starting with the conscription of Christian men of military age, the Ottoman authorities ordered massacres beyond the borders of the Turkish state, consolidating an established pattern of systematic massacre aimed at eliminating the indigenous non-Muslim presence in desired territories. Eyewitnesses recorded the treatment of Assyrian victims; Australian members of the Dunsterforce for instance, recorded that of the approximately 80,000 Assyrians and Armenians they had encountered in the Urmiah Valley in August 1918, barely

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40 Giulia Baldini et al., Alla periferia del Mondo: Il Popolo dei rom e dei Sinti Escluso dalla Storia (Milan: Insml & Fondazione Franceschi, 2003), 57.
42 Bársony and Daróczci, Pharrajimos: The Fate of the Roma, 1.
half reached safety in British-held Mesopotamia.\textsuperscript{44} Across the decade of genocidal destruction (1914-1924), an estimated half of the indigenous Assyrian population of the Middle East was killed.\textsuperscript{45}

The Turkish authorities of the Ottoman Empire, although motivated particularly by a fervent nationalism which ideologically fed the drive for ethnic and cultural homogeneity, did not hesitate to use religion as a political tool. The Young Turks declared \textit{Jihad}\textsuperscript{46} in August 1914 and transformed the already existing practice of forced conversion of women and children into official government policy. Assyrian and Armenian communities were the targets of a host of genocidal strategies which escalated over time. In addition to mass murder, these included sexual violence, forced marriage and assimilation, in conjunction with forced deportation under conditions producing large numbers of deaths. Cultural destruction was also widespread.

However, there is a great deal of complexity around the targeting of Armenians and Assyrians, including geographical variance as well as differing interpretations and orders by CUP officials and lower level bureaucrats. In addition, atrocities were committed by a wide range of perpetrators, sometimes centrally ordered, sometimes acted on by local populations within a broader context of religious and ethnic hatred. In some geographical areas, the Armenian community was specifically targeted, with Assyrians and other minorities afforded a greater level of protection, at least in theory. In other areas, Assyrians were swept up in massacres of Armenians and both communities suffered huge losses.\textsuperscript{47} For example, telegrams between the governor of Diyarbekir, Dr. Resid Pasha and Interior Minister Talaat Pasha in July 1915 indicate divergence in the orders from the most senior CUP officials and the actions on the ground, with Talaat aware from German reports “that in recent days massacres have been planned of the Armenians in the province, as well as of the other Christians without any differentiation according to sect or confession” and instructing the governor not to apply the “disciplinary and political measures adopted vis-à-vis the Armenians … to the other Christians.”\textsuperscript{48} Taner Akçam, who has analyzed a wealth of Ottoman documentation, has explained that although Talaat demanded the killings apply only to Armenians, the massacres of all Christians in Diyarbekir continued.

Eastern parts of the Empire, astride the corridor linking Anatolia with the Caucasus and Central Asia contained large Armenian and Assyrian populations, and because these communities presented a physical obstacle to the unification of the Turks in Anatolia with the Turkic-speaking peoples in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, this geographic area became a priority target for elimination. The records of the ruling political party illustrate their perception of Christian citizens as a hostile collective.\textsuperscript{49} Üngör notes that “Many historical sources including interviews with Assyrian survivors suggest that genocidal intent among the CUP elite was strongest towards the Armenians.”\textsuperscript{50} Yet, even though on paper the distinction between Armenian and Assyrian people was recognized, it appears that in the minds of the bureaucracy and the Muslim Turkish population, they were often seen as one enemy.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{45} Gaunt, \textit{Massacres, Resistance, Protectors}, 433-436.
\textsuperscript{46} This was widely reported in the media at the time. See e.g. “The Sultan’s Jihad,” \textit{The West Australian} (Perth, Western Australia), December 2, 1914, 7.
\textsuperscript{47} See e.g. Edward William Charles Noel, \textit{Diary of Major Noel on Special Duty in Kurdistan} (Basra: Government Press, 1919). Noel observed that “In Diarbekir itself the Syrian Jacobites were scarcely molested. Of all the Christian communities they know how best to get on with the Turks, and when the massacres were ordered they were officially excluded. In the districts, however, the Government very soon lost control of the passions they had loose (if they ever wanted to keep them in control), with the result that the Jacobites suffered there as much as anybody else.” 28.
\textsuperscript{50} Üngör, “Book review: Hidden Genocides’,” 102.
Baro Porrajmos (The Great Devouring): The Romani Genocide

The history of the Romani diaspora across Europe has been characterized by centuries of persecution, which reached its climax under the Nazi Fascist regimes. The vision of creating a pure nation, free from ethnic or other minority influences was embedded in Nazi doctrine, with 500,000 German Jews the earliest victims.

The Romani population in Germany numbered between 20,000 and 26,000 at the start of the Second World War, and this small number, as well as their marginality in social and economic affairs meant they were not a high priority for the Nazis. But the goal of creating a “pure” nation was deeply embedded in the Nazi regime and in July 1933, a new law introduced the compulsory sterilization of those labeled as hereditary ill, applying predominantly to Romanies.

This law triggered a massive hunt for asocials (such as homeless and beggars), leading to the intensification of measures directed at destroying “organizations and subcultures considered to be breeding-grounds of immorality and deviance.” Policies against Romanies, in particular, escalated over the course of the war, and many thousands were imprisoned in concentration camps, or murdered by bullets and in gas chambers. Countless more were forcibly sterilized in order to rip apart the biological and social fabric of the community. Although there are no precise figures regarding the number of victims, between 500,000 and 1.5 million Romanies lost their lives during the Second World War.

To note that the Romani Genocide has been neglected in historical study is not to suggest it is equivalent to the Holocaust of the Jews. As Michael Stewart has noted, “The Gypsy problem’ occupied a totally different place in Nazi ideology that than of ‘the Jewish problem.” Jews were undoubtedly considered the ultimate enemy of the Nazis, to be totally wiped out wherever they dared live. According to the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research, this totality of ideology and implementation distinguishes the treatment of Jews from other examples of mass murder committed by the Nazis. So called “community aliens” were not all treated the same way, and “different policies hit different groups at different times.” By the mid-1930s, Romanies had come to be viewed as “a racial, rather than social threat” and the intention to eliminate them from German society became manifest.

Since the end of the war, academic and public attention has been primarily focused on the Holocaust of the Jews, with the fate of Romanies considered a marginal issue. According to Kenrick, “in the many books written describing the Nazi period and the persecution of the Jews, Gypsies usually appear as a footnote or small section.” When reference is made to Romanies, they are usually grouped together under the category “other non-Jewish victims.” Because of this lack of recognition, and to emphasize the specific character of their own tragedy, Romani...
scholars introduced the concept *Baro Porrajmos*, or the “great devouring” of human life, to refer to the Romani Genocide.⁶⁴

**Aftermath of the Genocides**

**Assyrian Aftermath**

The 1920 Treaty of Sevres gave hope to the surviving Assyrians scattered across British Iraq, Persia and French Syria⁶⁵ by offering “a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas … [with] full safeguards for the protection of the Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or religious minorities within these areas.”⁶⁶ However, often conflicting political interests of London, Paris, Rome and Moscow combined with the 1919 revolution led by Mustafa Kemal,⁶⁷ ensured the Assyrian claim for autonomy, guaranteed by the League of Nations and the Great Powers, never materialized. In addition, the small size of the Assyrian population, itself a direct result of the genocide, was used as justification for the denial of an autonomous homeland for Assyrians on their ancient territory. The major consequence of the failure of Sevres was that systematic killing of the region’s Christian minorities went on for years, culminating in the destruction of Smyrne (Izmir) in September 1922. Despite the fact that persecution and indeed mass killings continued after the end of the First World War and well into the republican era, in terms of mobilizing Western engagement with Turkey in the decades after the war, there may have been a broad political benefit in relegating the Armenian Genocide to the Ottoman era and creating a distinction between that time and the new Turkish state. This may partly explain why Western countries allowed the genocides of Assyrians and other Christian minorities to fade from collective memory.

Cultural destruction and denial continued also, as the new national governments under whose jurisdiction many Assyrian communities fell, claimed Assyrian land and cultural material as state property, and changed the names of Assyrian villages and even the names of Assyrian citizens.⁶⁸ These concrete actions were presented as proof that no indigenous Assyrian population had lived in the lands which were now part of these newly established nation-states.

While Assyrians had been subsumed within the category of the *Ermeni milliyet* before the genocide, the hiddenness of Assyrian identity continued in its aftermath. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne did not include special protections for Assyrians, nor did it even record the Assyrians as an official minority group. When the governments of Iraq and Turkey replaced the Assyrian category in the census with broader categories of “Christian Kurds, Turks and Arabs,”⁶⁹ the result was that Assyrians would never be recognized as a distinct group with unique religious, ethnic and national characteristics. These developments set the stage for decades of inaccurate descriptions of Assyrians as “Turco-Semites”, “Christian Kurds”, and “Semitic” or “Mountain Turks.”⁷⁰ Not only had enormous physical losses been suffered, but the Assyrian right to its indigenous homeland, even to its very identity and presence was intentionally disappeared. As Travis has written: “So thorough has been the cultural and physical annihilation of the Assyrian people that even the memory of their distinctiveness is at risk.”⁷¹

In addition, the pre-genocide Ottoman practice of categorizing people by their religious affiliation (for example, Nestorian or Church of the East, Chaldean, Eastern Catholic, or Syrian)...

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⁶⁴ Ibid., 53.
⁶⁸ Travis, “The Assyrian Genocide,” 133.
⁶⁹ Ibid., 133.
⁷¹ Travis, “The Assyrian Genocide,” 123.
continued in a deliberate attempt to blur Assyrian identity and deny the genocide. The long-term impact of this has been a lack of academic scholarship on, and public or official recognition of, the Assyrian Genocide.\textsuperscript{72}

\textit{Romani Aftermath}

There are several parallels in elements of the aftermath of the Romani Genocide with those identified in the Assyrian case. Firstly, and crucially, is the issue of group identity. The Romanies were viewed as a social group, although their treatment under the Nazi regime comprised elements of racial ideologies that attributed to them a genetic tendency towards criminality.\textsuperscript{73} The actions taken against Romani communities were either dismissed or excused in a postwar environment that continued to persecute Romanies based on the very same stereotypes that fueled the genocide in the first place. The Third Reich policies against the Romanies were commonly regarded as control over criminals, a form of genocide denial that not only diminished the experiences of the group and misconstrued the motivations behind their persecution, but then blamed the victims for their own suffering.

Any attempts to seek recognition placed Romani survivors in a position where the same prejudices were unleashed. In a continuation of the discrimination they had faced for decades, many Romani survivors were excluded from official compensation processes, by requiring applicants to prove a fixed address and employment.\textsuperscript{74} Romani survivors who claimed compensation for incarceration in concentration camps or for forced sterilization were often told they had deserved the treatment they received. Some claiming compensation for physical and psychological effects were even examined by doctors who had been involved in the Nazi machinery.\textsuperscript{75} With Germany determining that actions taken against Romanies before 1943 were “legitimate official measures against persons committing criminal acts, not the result of policy driven by racial prejudice,”\textsuperscript{76} the notion that the treatment of Romanies had been justified set the precedent for ongoing denial of their right to recognition.

This attitude was further exacerbated by the nature of the surviving Romani populations, who were, like the Assyrians, scattered across national borders, diverse, and without a central authority or national government to advocate on behalf of the community. While a process for reparations for Jewish victims was established in the decades following the end of the war, and a small number of perpetrators brought to justice via the Nuremburg Trials, Romanies were excluded from any justice-seeking processes. In addition, and in contrast with the many Jews who migrated to America, Israel, Australia and elsewhere, Romanies generally remained in the countries they had been persecuted in during the war, and subjected to the same kinds of discrimination as before. Now though, they faced the additional trauma of “a concerted effort across Europe to deny the Porrajmos.”\textsuperscript{77} Alternatively, where it was acknowledged, Romani experiences were subsumed within the category of “non-Jewish victims”, which obscured the genocide simply by not naming its victims. If it was considered at all, the fate of the Romanies was viewed as a marginal issue. As Stewart has written “…the mass murder and sterilization of the Roma, Sinte, and Gypsies provides, perhaps, the locus classicus in the modern world of a genocidal catastrophe denied and cast into public oblivion.”\textsuperscript{78}


\textsuperscript{73} Clough Marinaro, “Between Surveillance and Exile”, 272.

\textsuperscript{74} Stewart, “The Gypsy Problem,” 144.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 143.


\textsuperscript{78} Stewart, “The Gypsy Problem,” 140.
Academic Research and International Law

Assyrian Genocide

While the Armenian Genocide has been recognized by an overwhelming proportion of genocide scholars and is now situated within the standard canon of twentieth century genocides, very little scholarly literature has been produced on the Assyrian Genocide. In part this is the result of the complexity of the religious, cultural, ethnic and national make-up of Assyrian identity which comprises a range of sub-groups and religious denominations, as well as the application of various exonyms (identities and definitions imposed on the community by others), spreading confusion. Partly the lack of scholarly attention paid to the Assyrian genocide is an inadvertent side-effect of the inaccessibility of much of the evidence. In addition to Turkish authorities deliberately withholding evidence, documents that are available often appear in a range of languages, most of them not widely understood. Another important reason that the Assyrian Genocide has remained in the shadows is the previous emphasis on proof of perpetrator intent. Relative to evidence of the Armenian Genocide, proof of intent to eradicate the Assyrian population took longer to discover and decipher. As already mentioned, much official perpetrator documentation names the Armenian community as the primary group for elimination, though in practice Assyrians were frequently targeted.

Racho Donef pioneered research into official documents indicating genocidal intent against Assyrians by analyzing telegrams sent in 1914 and 1915 by the Ministry of the Interior, mostly to the governors of the southern and eastern Ottoman provinces of Van, Mosul, Diyarbakir, Mamuretul Aziz, Halep (Aleppo) and Bitlis. These demonstrate that all Assyrians, regardless of denomination, were to be “deported” and “resettled”, terms usually used as euphemisms for genocide.

Like Armenians, thousands of Assyrians died of starvation, thirst, exposure, disease and local violence, in desert camps and along the deportation routes, aligning with articles (b) “causing bodily or mental harm”; (c) “deliberately inflicting on the [victim] group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction”; and (d) “imposing measures intended to prevent births” of the Genocide Convention.

The emphasis on mass murder in early genocide historiography tended to overshadow other components of genocide such as deportation and forced removal and assimilation of women and children. As a result of academic research as well as efforts by respected legal scholars, cultural and biological strategies have been proven to have represented government policy, and to have constituted genocide in the Armenian case. There is extensive evidence to demonstrate government intent to eliminate the Armenian identity via forced assimilation in addition to massacres and deportation. While there was some divergence between the treatment of Armenians and Assyrians, the recognition of forced assimilation in the Armenian case provides a basis for acknowledging its effects on Assyrians also.

Over the last two decades, the Assyrian experience has begun to be included in academic conferences and works specifically examining the Assyrian Genocide have been published. Assyrian diaspora organizations have also increased their research output and advocacy campaigns. In addition, genocide scholars have begun to incorporate the Assyrian Genocide into journal articles and book chapters, with summaries of the Ottoman era now

82 Akçam, The Young Turks’ Crime, 290.
83 See e.g., Panayiotis Diamadis, “To Deny or to Gloat: That is the Question”, Paper Presentation, Portraits of Christian Asia Minor International Conference in Sydney, Australia, Published in ITNetwork, Volume 14, Issue 2 Volume 15, Issue 2 Centre for Comparative Genocide Studies, Division of Humanities, Department of Politics, Macquarie University, 1999, 29-30.
often noting Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks as victims of displacement and genocide. Adam Jones’ *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction*, for instance, states that “while the events of the 1914-22 period have long been depicted in terms of the Armenian Genocide and its aftermath, one is justified in portraying it instead as a unified campaign against all the empire’s Christian minorities.”

This view is reflected in an Assyrian saying that refers to the attitudes of the perpetrators: “An onion is an onion, red or white. All must be chopped.” However, this grouping of victims comes with its own issues, such as the risk that the nuances of each case can be overlooked. Combining all Christian minorities together as victims of the Young Turks can overstate the role of religion in the genocides, and dilute the ethnic, cultural and national aspects of ideologies that informed the treatment of the Armenian community in particular. It can also obscure other specifics, such as the numbers of victims and survivors. It is recorded that two million indigenous Christian Armenians, Assyrians and Hellenes were massacred, deported or forcibly converted to Islam by 1918, but these sorts of collective statistics fail to differentiate between the communities’ respective losses.

The other consequence is that those Assyrians who are experiencing persecution today in Iraq and Syria, are consistently subsumed within the category of “Christian minorities”, which, while recognizing the religious character of the community, overlooks their unique cultural, national and ethnic characteristics.

**Romani Genocide**

As in the Assyrian case, a lack of documentary evidence has contributed to the hiddenness of the Romani Genocide. While the Nazis meticulously documented the murder of Jews, their accounting of Romani deaths was deficient. The Romani population was considered to be so marginal, in fact, that their elimination did not require any written authorization. Once again, the emphasis on written government intent placed Romani experiences on the fringes of early academic research on genocide.

Survivor testimonies are also rare. In Romani cultures, history itself is an alien concept, especially when it is related to the commemoration of death, both individual and collective. Therefore, Romani survivors were “traditionally not disposed to keeping alive the terrible memories from their history.” The orally-based nature of Romani culture and a disinclination to record events in writing meant that Romani survivor experiences have not been recorded or studied in depth. As stated by Zoltan Barany, “unlike the Jews and other victims of the Holocaust, many of whom were highly educated, Gypsy survivors did not leave behind diaries, did not write memoirs, and did not do subsequent research into this subject.” In addition to cultural influences, those survivors reintegrating into their countries of origin, such as Germany and Italy, were faced...
with enormous pressure to remain silent about their experiences, or, as already noted, blamed for their own imprisonment and oppression.

Yet another parallel with the hiddenness of the Assyrian Genocide is the impact of narrow definitions of victim groups and unrealistic expectations concerning the explicitness of evidence of perpetrator intent. The definition of victim groups under the Genocide Convention may be read as excluding Romanies, since they were assumed to have been targeted not as a racial, ethnic, national or religious group, but rather as a result of their ‘asociality.’ This stereotype however was founded on pseudo-biological racial theories, which attributed supposed criminal tendencies to hereditary characteristics, thought to be innate to Romanies as a group. Despite the fact that Romanies were targeted based on racial ideologies, early genocide scholars tended to accept the exclusion of Romanies from the definition of genocide victims, effectively sideling their experiences. As Robbie McVeigh has explained, “if they are not an ethnic group ipso facto they cannot have experienced genocide.”

Although Raphael Lemkin’s original conception of genocide included biological and cultural methods of genocide, when the Genocide Convention was ratified after the Second World War, attention was focused, understandably, on mass murder, gas chambers, ghettos and concentration camps. Genocidal tools that veered from these very overt and visible measures were discounted, and the unprecedented and industrial-scale methods used during the Holocaust became the benchmark for genocide. Although many Romanies were murdered by the Nazi regime, forced sterilization was a primary genocidal strategy against the Romani population, sometimes carried out in local “hereditary health clinics” and often unrecorded. Much like forced assimilation of Assyrian women and children, forced sterilization was a tactic that remained largely unacknowledged as a genocidal tool, despite technically qualifying as a strategy of genocide under the Genocide Convention.

Mirroring another of the reasons for the lack of attention on the Assyrian Genocide was a heavy emphasis on clear proof of central and premeditated intent to eradicate a group. The treatment of Romani communities was not conducted in a particularly strategic way and although documents were produced indicating intent, sometimes decisions were made for pragmatic rather than ideological reasons, such as in the case of establishing and liquidating the “Gypsy camp” at Auschwitz. The lack of evidence of a single decision by authorities to eradicate the Romani population has been misinterpreted to mean there was no genocidal policy in place at the time.

A contemporary understanding of genocide allows for some divergence in implementation, recognizing that genocide rarely stems from one decision made and documented by authorities, but more often progresses over time, and frequently in response to other wartime developments. Legally, genocidal intent can be inferred from a coordinated set of actions, a fact that sheds new

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92 For more on this, see Hancock, “Downplaying the Porrajmos”.
96 For example, Himmler’s April 1942 directive to “treat gypsies as the Jews;” Gilad Margalit, Germany and its Gypsies: A Post-Auschwitz ordeal (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002), 47.
98 For example, in the context of the Armenian case, Geoffrey Robertson QC explains that “...the court must look to see whether there has been ‘a pattern of purposeful action’ from which a genocidal intent may be deduced – and it is precisely that pattern of CUP action... from which the CUP’s guilty intention may be deduced,” An Inconvenient Genocide: Who Now Remembers the Armenians? (Sydney: Vintage, 2014), 108.
light on the Romani Genocide, during which persecution and massacres were carried out at a grassroots level by a range of perpetrators and across national borders, from Serbia and Croatia, to Italy and Romania, as well as, of course, Germany. But these were not always explicitly directed by the Nazis. The Romani Genocide was a prime example of structuralism, where local governments, low-level bureaucrats, schools and other local institutions all worked to implement a system of discrimination, persecution and eventually genocide. In some places, “municipal camps” were set up in order to concentrate Romani communities, where they were examined by scientists searching for the gene of asocial behavior. Local perpetrators operated in a culture where social and racial hatred was condoned and encouraged, and they were well aware that they could act with impunity. Yet in the aftermath of the Holocaust, this method of implementation did not align with the notion of genocide requiring state-sponsorship or official directions from a central authority.

**Public Memory**

*Assyrian Monuments and Commemoration*

Commemoration ceremonies dedicated to the Assyrian Genocide have largely been restricted to Assyrian diaspora communities. In recent years, commemoration of the Armenian Genocide has attracted increased attention, particularly around advocacy for recognition from the Turkish state. High profile speakers such as the eminent Geoffrey Robertson QC, who has become an ambassador for Armenian Genocide recognition, and events including the one hundred-year anniversary of the commencement of the genocide (April 24, 2015) have resulted in mainstream media coverage. Meanwhile, official acknowledgments by the Vatican, the European Union and various nations including the Ottoman Empire’s then-ally, Germany, have created a sense of credibility and urgency around the Armenian Genocide, as well as broader public knowledge of its occurrence. In Australia, the connections between the Armenian Genocide and the experiences of the Anzacs in Turkey have begun to enter the collective consciousness. The Assyrian Genocide, however, remains beyond the awareness of the general public and attracts little coverage outside of the Assyrian press.

A host of monuments exists to officially memorialize the Armenian Genocide and some of these also recognize the Assyrian and Hellenic experiences. The establishment of such memorials has not, however, been simple to achieve or free from controversy. For instance, much debate surrounded the erection of a monument in Sydney specifically dedicated to Assyrian victims, with some local Turkish groups attempting to prevent the memorial. The plaque has been subjected to several attacks and acts of vandalism since being erected.

In addition, sometimes the positive impact of public memorials is diminished by continuing confusion concerning Assyrian identity, and debate over how to recognize the religious diversity within the community. It is arguable that ongoing theological, political and jurisdictional disputes amongst the adherents of the different Assyrian churches are hampering the cause of public and political recognition of the genocide. The Church of the East (“Nestorian”) and sections of the Syriac Orthodox (“Jacobite”) churches commemorate the “Assyrian Genocide.” Some recent monuments have, in response to the assertion by the Vatican-aligned Chaldean Catholic Church of the existence of a “Chaldean Genocide”, begun to distinguish between religious denominations in public memorials, such as one located in Belgium. A memorial unveiled in Sweden in May

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112 Ibid.


2015 complicates efforts to bring the Assyrian experience out of its current state of hiddeness, by referring to the “Centenary of the Genocides of the Armenians, Assyrians, Syriacs, Chaldeans and Hellenes.” Similarly, the “Oecumenical Memorial” in Berlin, Germany, identifies the victim populations as “Armenians, Hellenes of Asia Minor, Pontus and eastern Thrace, and Arameans (Syriacs, Assyrians, Chaldeans).” It comprises a set of four elaborate memorials along a wall, creating three separate spaces for each group as well as one, common space.

While these memorials are undoubtedly well intentioned, they serve to maintain historical factions and divisions that were established under the Ottoman Empire and even earlier, and to ensure the Assyrian Genocide remains misunderstood or simply ignored by the general public.

**Romani Monuments and Commemoration**

It was not until the 1970s that an important shift occurred in the acknowledgement and memorialization of Romani experiences during the Nazi era. Alongside civil rights movements and a growing body of scholarly literature, Romanies began to push for greater attention to be paid to their experience of genocide. A small, albeit increasing, body of literature now focuses on the genocide of the Romanies in Germany and other European states that were part of the Axis during the Second World War. Still today though, Romanies “seldom appear in official statistics and Holocaust victim commemoration events.” And as Hancock maintains, there is still “a long way to go both with our understanding of the Porrajmos and with achieving its proper acknowledgement in the classroom.”

The task of recognition is complicated by the fact that, like the Assyrians, the Romanies constitute an internally diverse group, characterized by cultural fragmentation as well as factional rivalries, which has prevented the possibility of empowerment around common social, cultural and political goals.

In Italy, the Porrajmos remains highly under-studied and the memory of the Romanies’ past is still not officially recognized. Indeed, its very reality continues to be questioned. Historical investigation of the persecution and internment of Italian Romanies has been carried out only by independent researchers and only since around 1999. An increase in national patriotism is now playing a key role in the emergence of an historical amnesia and revisionism which is allowing racism to re-emerge, together with the myth of Italian kindness and moral superiority.

In Germany, on the contrary, Italy’s principal partner in the Axis alliance, this recognition arrived in 1982 under then chancellor Helmut Kohl. More recently, on Holocaust Memorial Day in 2011, Zoni Weisz became the first Romani survivor to address the German Parliament, and the following year, Chancellor Angela Merkel inaugurated a monument dedicated to Sinti and Roma victims. In those countries where local populations collaborated with the Nazis and perpetrated
their own massacres of Jews and Romanies, there has been little motivation to commemorate the victims for fear of highlighting their own complicity. In Romania, despite the unveiling of a $7.4 million Holocaust memorial to commemorate over 280,000 Jews and 11,000 Romanies who died as victims of the Ion Antonescu regime, the murder of the Romani community remains a taboo subject (as explored in the 2015 documentary film Valley of Sighs).\(^{114}\) Although Romanies are recognized among the victims, the context of their suffering has not been well illuminated, nor perpetrators held accountable. As Kelso and Eglitis write, “Roma are simultaneously represented, unrepresented and misrepresented in the historical story and memorial of the Holocaust in Romania.”\(^{115}\)

In Hungary, Roma and Sinti Genocide Remembrance Day is commemorated in a number of memorial events held throughout the country. In 2014, former President János Áder delivered a speech at the inauguration of a new center dedicated to Romani history, culture, education and Holocaust remembrance. Despite these steps, Romani survivors and their descendants “are not only struggling against attempts to disavow and erase the memory of what happened to them, but also against new persecutions.”\(^{116}\) The rise of right-wing ultra-nationalism does not bode well for Porrajmos or Holocaust remembrance in Hungary.

In Bulgaria, March 10 was designated by the Council of Ministers as the “Day of the Salvation of the Bulgarian Jews and of the Victims of the Holocaust and of the Crimes against Humanity.”\(^{117}\) However, there is no specific statement by the Council as to whether Romanies are included as victims. In 2014, Croatia’s parliament adopted August 2 as “International Roma Holocaust (Porrajmos) Remembrance Day.”\(^{118}\) Yet, still many Croatian Romanies continue to suffer segregation and discrimination that pervades every aspect of their lives, from education to health and employment.\(^{119}\) As for the Slovak Republic, terms that express the Romani Genocide, such as Porrajmos or Samudaripen (mass killing) are still “not recognized and not acceptable.”\(^{120}\)

Conclusion

The parallels between Assyrian and Romani genocides having been treated as an afterthought of history, or ignored completely, are significant. What does this tell us about why some genocides are omitted from collective memory and official writing of history?

There is rarely one reason for a genocide having been forgotten. Exclusive attention on better-known genocides that occurred simultaneously cannot be said, in and of itself, to have obscured the Assyrian and Romani cases. There is an interplay between various factors, some inadvertent and others deliberate that has resulted in the two genocides remaining on the periphery of academic and public attention. Many of these factors began even before the genocides occurred, continued throughout, and were consolidated in the aftermath of the events.

In both cases, issues such as a complex group identity that extends beyond neat ethnic, national and/or religious lines, as well as definitions imposed by others and intentional muddying of the


group’s identity, have contributed to an ongoing lack of clarity about what constitutes Assyrian and Romani identity, let alone the history of their genocides. Calculated strategies to hide the history of the communities and annul their identification as a group may even be said to constitute genocidal tactics in themselves. In both examples, internal divisions and the absence of a unified authority to advocate the cause of recognition continue to exacerbate this situation.

Moreover, the relative lack of official documentation, corroborating evidence and survivor testimony, compared with that available for the Holocaust and Armenian Genocide, relegated the two genocides to virtual oblivion within academia until recently. In the Assyrian case, in addition to the Turkish authorities’ denial and refusal to release documentation, that evidence which is available is less accessible, requiring knowledge of many cultures, geographical areas, aspects of history, and languages. The tactics used after the war to erase Assyrian identity in official records meant that the history has not been easy to reconstruct and analyze.

The Assyrian and Romani genocides were also forgotten due to aspects of early academic study of genocide, including the focus on written evidence of perpetrator intent and on direct methods of mass murder at the expense of other genocidal strategies. Both the Assyrian and Romani genocides were committed by a range of perpetrators; varied from region to region; relied on massacre as well as cultural and biological elimination strategies; and involved large-scale deportations causing huge numbers of deaths.

Meanwhile, the narrow scope of the Genocide Convention, which provides the legal framework for genocide to this day, combined with an ongoing misperception of Romanies as a social, rather than ethnic group, effectively excluded the genocide of the Romanies from legal recognition.

Acknowledgement remains a crucial issue for today’s Romanies and Assyrians. This acknowledgement does not, however, rest on equating their experiences with their better-known counterparts or blaming other communities for eclipsing their experiences and history. What is a critical progression on the path to achieving full recognition of the Assyrian and Romani genocides is a better understanding of how the process of forgetting and concealing the two genocides developed. Only once these processes are more fully understood can redress occur in academia, the law and public commemoration spaces.

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Working with the Remains in Cambodia: Skeletal Analysis and Human Rights after Atrocity

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Abstract: This essay will discuss the research being conducted on Khmer Rouge-era human skeletal remains in Cambodia, and the implications of this work. First, the Cambodian project to conserve and analyze the remains at the Choeung Ek Genocidal Center (Choeung Ek) will be briefly discussed. This exceptional undertaking was the first complete scientific analysis of human remains from a Cambodian mass gravesite. Second, the author’s independent research at Choeung Ek and a collaborative project at another mass gravesite will be reviewed. The author’s research focuses on the traumatic injuries and demographics of the remains at Choeung Ek, while also incorporating cultural understandings of these memorials. Finally, the importance of this work within Cambodia and the international community will be examined; this essay will attempt to situate the research being undertaken in Cambodia within the broader framework of human rights after atrocity.

Keywords: Cambodia, Khmer Rouge, human skeletal remains, forensic anthropology, genocide, human rights, traumatic injuries

Introduction

After a deadly civil war in the early 1970s, the Khmer Rouge Communist regime came to power in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in April 1975, subsequently establishing the government of Democratic Kampuchea (DK). The DK leadership, led by the infamous Pol Pot, abolished money, education, religion and private property, and almost all Cambodians were forcibly relocated from cities to collective farms in the countryside. The conditions were severe, and historical estimates state that between 1975 and 1979, approximately one quarter of the Cambodian population of nearly eight million died from mistreatment, overwork, malnutrition, and violence. On January 7, 1979 Vietnamese troops entered Phnom Penh ending the three years, eight months, and twenty days of Democratic Kampuchea.

In April 1994, the United States Congress passed the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act to investigate the Khmer Rouge era atrocities. The following year the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) was founded as a research and documentation institute to provide information about the Khmer Rouge period to scholars and the public. In 1994, DC-Cam launched a ten-year project to locate and map sites of Khmer Rouge atrocities including mass graves, former prisons and security centers, and memorials. At the completion of the project, DC-Cam had identified 19,733 mass graves, 196 former prisons, and eighty-one memorials.

One of the most well-known mass gravesites, and the one that is used for national commemorations, is Choeung Ek. Located approximately 15 km southwest of the center of Phnom Penh, today it is called The Choeung Ek Genocidal Center, although colloquially it is known as the “Killing Fields.” After 1977, the former Chinese cemetery at Choeung Ek was used by the Khmer Rouge as an execution and burial location for thousands of men, women, and children. The majority of the victims came from S-21 (Tuol Sleng), the highest level security and torture center in use during the Khmer Rouge period. When Choeung Ek was discovered shortly after the Khmer Rouge era, the Khmer Rouge regime responded by arresting, torturing, and executing those who had knowledge of Choeung Ek and arranged for the mass graves to be covered and abandoned.

1 “Khmer Rouge” is the French derivative of “Khmer Kroham” or “Red Khmer.” This term was first used by Cambodia’s King Norodom Sihanouk in the 1960s to describe Cambodian members of the Communist party. Khmer Rouge can refer to the regime, as well as individuals who worked for the regime, also known as cadre. Meng-Try Ea, The Chain of Terror: The Khmer Rouge Southwest Zone Security System (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2005), xii.


5 Dacil Q. Keo and Nean Yin, Fact Sheet: Pol Pot and His Prisoners at Secret Prison S-21 (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2011).
Rouge were driven from Phnom Penh in January 1979, 129 mass graves were found. Eighty-six of these graves were subsequently exhumed, and the remains of nearly 9,000 individuals were disinterred. In 1988, the Cambodian government built a memorial *stupa* (shrine) to commemorate and protect the physical remains of the Khmer Rouge victims, and it is within this *stupa* that the human bones have stayed—virtually untouched—until recently.

Analysis and Preservation of Human Remains in Cambodia

**Conservation at the Choeung Ek Genocidal Center**

In 2012, with the official consent of Cambodia’s Prime Minister, Hun Sen, a conservation project was launched. Under the direction of a Ministerial and Municipal committee, the project sought to preserve and curate the human bones, tools/weapons, and textiles at the Choeung Ek Genocidal Center. This was the start of the first comprehensive scientific analysis and preservation of human remains from mass gravesites throughout Cambodia, and the scientific team was exclusively Cambodian.

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6 Author’s discussion with Choeung Ek managerial staff, December 2015.


The human remains within the *stupa* comprise crania, mandibles, long bones, and other skeletal elements (i.e., sacra, os coxae, scapulae, etc.), which were systematically removed, cleaned, analyzed, and preserved. Analysis and inventory of the remains were also incorporated to properly record the available information for posterity. In particular, the team was interested in demographics (i.e., age-at-death and sex) and skeletal traumatic injuries.

The project was completed in December 2015. In less than three years the team analyzed and preserved tens of thousands of human bones. This is an extraordinary achievement that has yet to be replicated in Cambodia. To date, data derived from the human remains at Choeung Ek have not been analyzed and there are no forthcoming publications about this work in either Khmer or English. Perhaps this will occur in the future. The analytical/inventory forms for each individual have been published in Khmer in a 32-volume set that is retained by the Choeung Ek Genocidal Center, the Cambodian Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts, and other Cambodian organizations as scientific documentation of the work that was completed.

**Current Research and Projects**

The author was fortunate to be able to join this team at their laboratory for the first time in 2014. She returned in late 2015 to begin anthropological doctoral research employing a biocultural (biological and socio-cultural) approach to address questions concerning the individuals executed by the Khmer Rouge regime and the agency (the effect on living individuals) of the resulting skeletal remains. The author scientifically assessed the demographics (i.e., age-at-death, sex, ancestry) and evidence of traumatic injuries (e.g., blunt force, sharp force, and gunshot trauma) of more than 500 crania at Choeung Ek.

The author’s research is complimentary to the exclusively Cambodian research conducted at Choeung Ek and employs different methods and technology to answer additional questions. By systematically analyzing the human skeletal remains at Choeung Ek, which directly retain evidence of violent actions, the author will integrate previously undocumented data into a more holistic narrative of these Khmer Rouge atrocities. The author hopes that her research will greatly contribute to the literature on Khmer Rouge violence, as well as the current focus within forensic anthropology on crimes against humanity and genocide.

The socio-cultural component of the author’s research will evaluate the incorporation of skeletal remains into Cambodian memorials. While these memorials are well-documented, research has not specifically addressed the role of the physical skeletal remains within; since these structures were built to shelter the remains, studying their primary component (the bones) will be an important contribution to the memorial literature. The author directly observed more than a
dozen memorials and conducted interviews with the site’s caretaker(s) to address the role that the memorials and/or remains play in modern Cambodia.

A bio-cultural approach for the author’s research is an anthropological imperative. A biological analysis of the skeletal remains provides demographic data and permits quantification of the traumatic injuries; but without integrating the socio-cultural context, these remains persist as isolated specimens of scientific evidence on the periphery of modern Cambodian life. By evaluating the agency, or social impact of these remains—via their presence within memorial structures—the author will address the conceptions of bones as both active materials (objects) and as embodied memories (subjects). Rather than focusing exclusively on what has been done to/with the bones since they were exhumed in the 1980s, this research will also evaluate what effect the remains have on living people.

After the analysis and conservation of the remains at Choeung Ek finished, the author and the Choeung Ek laboratory director wanted to collaborate to continue this important work throughout the country. A project proposal was developed to analyze, document, and preserve human remains at another mass gravesite in Cambodia called Krang Ta Chan. Krang Ta Chan is a former Khmer Rouge prison and gravesite located in Takeo Province. At this site, it is estimated that more than 10,000 people were executed and at least 3,000 bodies were exhumed.

With funding granted by the American Academy of Forensic Sciences and additional international donations, the Krang Ta Chan project became the fourth effort to systematically analyze human remains from the Khmer Rouge era. This new project had three primary goals: 1) to scientifically analyze the previously exhumed human skeletal remains located at Krang Ta Chan, 2) to renovate the memorial stupa currently at the site, and 3) to provide documentation about the human remains for historical and future research. It is hoped that this project and the associated research will contribute evidence of Khmer Rouge violence that has hitherto been undocumented in the historical literature.

Employing the same techniques used for the remains at Choeung Ek, this project began in April 2016. All of the remains were removed from the stupa and transported to the laboratory at Choeung Ek where they were assigned identification numbers, cleaned, analyzed, photographed, and preserved. The team documented more than 1,900 crania and thousands of other bones belonging to both adults and children. The remains were returned to the renovated (i.e., cleaned, painted, and with new glass) stupa in Krang Ta Chan and a solemn Khmer Buddhist ceremony was held for the local community to call the spirits back to the mortal remains and wish them well in their next lives.

It is the author’s hope that this type of analysis and preservation of human remains from the Khmer Rouge era will continue in Cambodia, as much information can be gleaned from studying human remains. However, as discussed below, perspectives on this work vary.

Implications for Analyzing and Preserving Human Remains from Human Rights Atrocities and Genocides

While it is informative to describe the aforementioned analytical research, more pertinent is the significance of these analyses and research in Cambodia—as well as how this research contributes to the international study of human rights and genocide. The following discussion will attempt to situate the skeletal research being undertaken in Cambodia within the broader framework of human rights after atrocity.

The analysis of modern human remains from violent conflicts is primarily conducted by forensic anthropologists. Forensic anthropologists and archaeologists have been involved in

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11 The team at Choeung Ek conducted two smaller analytical and preservation projects while completing the Choeung Ek work.

12 A simplified distinction between forensic anthropologists and archaeologists is as follows: archaeologists are primarily trained to locate graves and buried bodies and remove them from the ground, while anthropologists are skeletal...
the investigation of political violence and human rights violations for many decades. The first inclusion of forensic experts—particularly anthropologists—in a human rights investigation was in 1984 when professionals were asked to investigate the “disappeared” from Argentina’s military dictatorship (Dirty War) in the late 1970s and early 1980s.13

As the discipline of forensic anthropology becomes more widely recognized internationally, it is now common for these professionals to be involved in the identification of disaster victims and victims of human rights violence.14 Presumably this trend will continue in the near future as anthropologists and archaeologists are able to provide information that is otherwise inaccessible.

The responsibilities of forensic anthropologists and archaeologists often include (mass) grave exhumation, skeletal and material culture analysis (primarily analyses and documentation of biological characteristics and traumatic injuries), assisting with identification of the decedents, providing legal testimony, and collecting ante-mortem (before death) data on decedents.15 Therefore, in the context of human rights violence or genocide, the work of forensic anthropologists can demonstrate that multiple individuals residing within a common grave was purposeful rather than coincidental; it can provide evidence suggesting the cause of death; and the work can offer specialists trained to analyze the recovered remains. In some areas of the world, forensic anthropology and archaeology are distinct fields, while in others they are combined. In some cases a professional can have training and expertise in both specialties.


biological information which has the potential to lead to personal identifications. Additionally, forensic anthropological contributions to the analysis of traumatic injuries and violence at the population-level (i.e., taking the injuries of entire groups of victims into account rather than simply analyzing one victim individually) allows for geographic and temporal comparisons of such atrocities,\textsuperscript{16} which directly contributes to the global nature of genocide and human rights studies.

Returning to Cambodia, after the Khmer Rouge regime officially ended in January 1979, citizens and local governmental authorities throughout the country proceeded to collect human remains and artifacts from mass graves and place them in memorials for preservation. In the subsequent decades, however, the memorials and the remains began to deteriorate. After noting this degradation, the Cambodian government issued directives in 2001 to preserve the remains of the victims of the Khmer Rouge. “In order to preserve the remains as evidence of these historic crimes and as the basis for remembrance and education by the Cambodian people as a whole, especially future generations,” as the government circular states, “all local authorities at province and municipal level shall cooperate with relevant expert institutions in their areas to examine, restore and maintain existing memorials, and to examine and research other remaining grave sites, so that all such places may be transformed into memorials…for both citizens and tourists.”\textsuperscript{17}

The preservation of remains and memorials in Cambodia, was therefore, officially sanctioned and encouraged.

The projects at Choeung Ek and Krang Ta Chan are fulfilling the aforementioned goals established in 2001 for the preservation and examination of both the human remains and the memorials. Despite a fifteen-year delay, the work is now being conducted in order to document the violence inflicted by the Khmer Rouge, preserve the human remains for future generations of Cambodians and international visitors, and maintain the memorials to protect the remains and provide a location for visitors to pay their respects to the deceased. However, it must be noted that the work with the human remains in Cambodia is not currently forensic as these data and results are not directly contributing to legal cases. This status may change in the future, but currently the term for the work is more correctly classified as applied skeletal biology or osteology (the study of human bones) rather than forensic anthropology.

Additionally, both projects as well as the author’s research are providing information that has not been available until now. While there are historical and eyewitness accounts of the violence that transpired during the Khmer Rouge era, the physical remains were not analyzed until three years ago. Human remains, in contrast to historical records, provide direct evidence of traumatic events—in the form of distinct skeletal injury patterns—that can be assessed to discern one of the key tenets of anthropology: human behavior.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, this research is vital for a comprehensive understanding of this time period and for international awareness.

\textit{Controversies}

However, in Cambodia as well as other countries, the exhumation of mass graves, the analysis of the human remains within, and the subsequent disposition of these disinterred remains are not without controversy. It must be noted that human remains resulting from genocide or crimes against humanity are rarely accessible for research primarily because they are politically, culturally, ethically, and religiously sensitive. If the unidentified remains are not buried or cremated, and therefore potentially available for study, it is generally not possible to ask for family permission to work with the remains, which is problematic. As mentioned above, only recently has the Cambodian government granted permission for large-scale analysis of skeletal remains from the Khmer Rouge era; however, as all of the remains are unidentified, families cannot be consulted to provide permission. Given the varying socio-cultural and religious contexts of post-atrocity


\textsuperscript{17} Royal Government of Cambodia, “Circular on Preservation of Remains of the Victims of the Genocide Committed During the Regime of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1978), and Preparation of Anlong Veng to Become a Region for Historical Tourism,” \url{http://d.dccam.org/Projects/Maps/Victim_Memorials.htm}.

regions, the ramifications of working with human remains must be addressed on a case-by-case basis and should include governmental, cultural, and familial/community parties.

Prior to the graves being exhumed and the remains disinterred, many scholars have recently begun to discuss the conflicting ideologies and desires of forensic science/anthropology and other groups. As Rosenblatt and Crossland note, for example, justice, evidence, and truth mean different things to different political, social, and religious stakeholders. In many post-atrocity nations, religious leaders citing various beliefs and doctrines, have objected “to exhumation, autopsy, and other forensic practices, even when the mass graves in question contained crucial evidence of atrocities committed against their own members.” Rosenblatt continues by stating that the division between religious groups and forensic investigators is not that the forensic teams are disrespectful of the dead or are mistreating them; rather, it is about disturbing the bodies and the graves (or sacred spaces) that they occupy. Religious or cultural groups may believe that forensic teams profane the spaces and the individuals within if the grave is disturbed.

Crossland provides another example of contested forensic work: although the exhumations of the mass graves in Argentina in the 1980s and 1990s were politically sanctioned, mothers and other surviving relatives of the victims were opposed to the exhumations stating that rather than resulting in a reappearance of their family members, the forensic disinterment was a definitive indication that their children and relatives were deceased. Until those who committed the crimes were held accountable, the mothers wanted to remember their children as alive rather than dead; as long as their children were “disappeared,” the mothers could protest for accountability. These are two examples of contested spaces and ideologies in which forensic anthropologists and archaeologists find themselves and which must be considered before any forensic investigations or analysis of human remains are begun.

Finally, the disposition of disinterred remains can be fraught with controversy. In post-atrocity nations such as Guatemala, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and many others, the disinterred remains have been buried, often as a means to counter the disorder of the mass violence and mass graves. In Rwanda and Cambodia, however, human remains are publicly displayed. In Cambodia, the display of the human remains at the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum (the former Tuol Sleng/S-21 detention center in Phnom Penh mentioned above) came under scrutiny by the late Cambodian King Norodom Sihanouk in the 1990s and early 2000s.

When Tuol Sleng was converted into a museum in 1980, a map of Cambodia was created from 300 disinterred human crania and other bones and hung on the wall within the museum. In opposition to the governmental rhetoric of “human remains as ‘evidence,’” the late King Sihanouk employed religious discourse in 2001 requesting that the remains of the Khmer Rouge victims be

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22 Ibid., 132-33.
25 Sarah E. Wagner, To Know Where He Lies: DNA Technology and the Search for Srebrenica’s Missing (Berkeley: University of California Pre, 2008), 204.
cremated in Khmer Buddhist tradition to honor the spirits and allow them to be re-incarnated. However, Sihanouk later retracted his request for cremation possibly because of political and public opposition to his proposal. The map of skulls was later dismantled in 2002 citing the deteriorating condition of the bones.

In response to the late King’s request, Prime Minister Hun Sen did offer to hold a referendum on the issue of cremating the human remains throughout the country, but not until after the trials of the Khmer Rouge leaders at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC, also commonly known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal) conclude, “in case remains were needed as evidence before the court.” As the ECCC cases are still ongoing, it is likely that the discussion regarding disposition of the human remains from the Khmer Rouge era will be renewed in the future.

Although forensic anthropologists and archaeologists have long been involved in the assessments of genocide and crimes against humanity, the amalgamation of forensic science and human rights is still in its infancy. Discrepancies between various stakeholders, political narratives, religious ideologies, and local and international communities will continue to pose challenges to the exhumation of mass graves, the analysis of the human remains, and the disposition of these remains. The questions and issues arising from working with atrocity-derived human remains are valuable and must continue to be discussed within the forensic science and human rights communities. Cambodia is merely one example of the work being done with human remains from an era of mass violence; while certainly not representative of past or future endeavors, perhaps this research and preservation serves as an illustration of what is possible.

Conclusion
While forensic anthropologists and archaeologists are not generally positioned to prevent mass atrocities such as genocide, they can contribute pertinent information about atrocities after they occur so that the victims are not forgotten. Although more than thirty years passed between the end of the Khmer Rouge regime and the beginning of skeletal analysis in Cambodia, the information derived from the human remains—as well as the preservation of the remains—is important for current and future generations of Cambodians and foreigners. While the display of human remains in Cambodia may be religiously and culturally contentious, for the time being, the display of remains throughout the country serves as a reminder of the past, and a lesson for the future.

30 Ibid., 188.
31 Ibid.
The analytical and preservation project at Choeung Ek was the first systematic assessment of the human remains from the Khmer Rouge period, and as the author’s research and the project at Krang Ta Chan demonstrate, there is much more work to be done. The Choeung Ek team and the author sincerely hope that the information gathered from the remains will contribute to a more accurate and holistic understanding of the violence that transpired under the Khmer Rouge regime. There is also the potential that the Cambodian skeletal and cultural data will be useful for international comparisons of such atrocities thereby furthering the global comprehension of mass violence. While much research still needs to be completed in Cambodia, the author hopes that this brief introduction has shed some light on the work being done and how this research may contribute to the larger fields of forensic anthropology and genocide studies.

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This is an important book about a deadly conflict that has been overshadowed by higher-profile violence in neighboring Darfur and South Sudan. Although somewhat biased in favor of the rebels who claim to represent the main victims in the conflict, the book includes several more balanced chapters that allow a careful reader to gain a better understanding. The only thing missing, regrettably, is the government’s side of the story, which would have facilitated a holistic perspective.

The book’s underlying thesis—conveyed most clearly in two chapters, one by Rebecca Tinsley and the other by the book’s co-editor, Samuel Totten—is that impunity perpetuates atrocity. In the early 1990s, according to the book, Sudan’s emerging Islamist regime perpetrated genocide against the Nuba people of South Kordofan. When the regime suffered no punishment, it was emboldened to replicate that violence in Darfur a decade later. When that crime too went unpunished, the regime was emboldened to resume genocide against the Nuba the following decade. It is a clear thesis. Less clear is whether the facts support it, especially with regard to the most recent violence in the Nuba Mountains, as elaborated below.

What is indisputable and amply documented in the book’s opening chapters is that the Nuba people—a catch-all name for the Black Africans who live in the Nuba Mountains and share some cultural attributes but speak dozens of different languages—have suffered terribly for a long time. In centuries past they were captured and enslaved. Under British rule, they were isolated from modernization. After independence, their fertile land was seized by well-connected Sudanese elite for large agricultural projects, forcing them to retreat into the mountains. Seasonally, the sedentary Nuba farmers also faced competition for land with migratory Arab pastoralists seeking to graze their herds.

Violence reached new heights in the context of Sudan’s second north-south civil war that started in 1983. The Nuba lived just north of the historical internal border but shared grievances with the southerners regarding neglect and discrimination by the Khartoum elite. In 1987, some of these Nuba welcomed a commander from the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to launch a northern front in the rebellion against Khartoum. The Nuba thereby became a Fifth Column in the southern rebels’ war against the north, and accordingly soon suffered the punishment that often falls upon suspected domestic accomplices of the enemy during wartime.

The book makes a strong case that the Sudanese government’s retaliatory violence against the Nuba escalated to genocidal levels in the early 1990s due to the ethnoreligious fervor of the Islamist regime that seized power in Khartoum in 1989. As J. Millard Burr, Guma Kunda Komey, and Alex de Waal explain in their respective chapters, Jihad was declared against the Nuba people, including its Muslim majority that was characterized as apostate. The regime also attempted to modify the region’s demographics by forcibly relocating tens of thousands of Nuba to “peace villages,” a process that involved segregating the women and subjecting them to sexual violence by Arab forces. The resulting death toll is disputed in several of the book’s chapters, but may have been in the range of 100,000, about ten percent of the Nuba population at the time.

That round of violence in the Nuba Mountains ended in the context of negotiations over the north-south war, culminating in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, which offered the south a secession referendum in 2011. Several of the book’s contributors—
Mudawi Ibrahim Adam, Alex de Waal, and Jok Madut Jok—contend that the SPLM effectively double-crossed its Nuba allies, initially using them as a stalking horse for leverage against Khartoum, and then signing a peace deal that abandoned them to the north. SPLM leader John Garang personally supported staying in a reformed Sudan, but after he died in a helicopter crash in 2005, the south increasingly embraced secession, leaving the Nuba with little to show for their years of fighting and suffering. Under the CPA, South Kordofan would not hold a referendum but only a “popular consultation” within four years so that its legislature could assess the CPA, but even this modest procedure was never implemented.

The CPA also called for democratic elections in South Kordofan, which eventually were held a year late in May 2011. The book’s most fascinating details—in chapters by John Young and Siddig Kafi—reveal the local politics behind this vote and thereby shed light on its consequences too. The gubernatorial battle pitted two notorious military commanders. The regime’s candidate was Ahmed Haroun, who had led government troops against the Nuba in the 1990s and then oversaw the brutal counterinsurgency in Darfur in the 2000s. The candidate of the SPLM-North (SPLM-N)—as the party was renamed in Sudan following the south’s secession—was Abdelaziz al-Hilu. He had helped launch an ill-fated rebellion in Darfur 1991 and then, as deputy commander of the Nuba rebels, was accused of targeting civilians.

As Young documents, the regime candidate won the election narrowly, according to all three relevant authorities: the national election commission, the domestic observation mission, and the international observation mission of The Carter Center. The SPLM-N’s al-Hilu, however, rejected that outcome and resumed a war footing. The regime then issued an ultimatum for his forces to disarm or depart for South Sudan, as envisioned under the CPA. When al-Hilu refused, the government forcibly attempted to disarm his troops in June 2011, triggering a new war in South Kordofan, which soon spread to Blue Nile state. Fighting in these “Two Areas” has continued until the time of this writing in July 2016. According to Young, it was the SPLM-N’s original refusal to accept its electoral loss that “set the Nuba Mountains on a course of war.”

Western critics of Sudan’s regime, by contrast, claim that it stole the election and thus is to blame for the resumption of fighting. However, several of the book’s chapters explain how and why the SPLM-N actually did lose, thus casting a very different light on the party’s refusal to accept that outcome, and on the resulting violence. As Mudawi Ibrahim Adam reports in his chapter, “The Dilemma of the Nuba,” the SPLM-N in South Kordofan often acted as an exclusively Nuba party, which alienated other ethnic groups that otherwise disliked the regime and might have supported the SPLM-N. Another factor undercutting SPLM-N support, as detailed by both Siddig T. Kafi and John Young, is that the Nuba themselves were divided, and many of them resented the domination of the SPLM-N and al-Hilu, whose roots lay outside South Kordofan. One Nuba commander, Gen. Talafon Kuku, actually ran against al-Hilu—and upon which the SPLM imprisoned him in South Sudan—while another northern Nuba commander (Gen. Ismail Khamis Jallab) dissociated himself from the SPLM-N.

As a longstanding senior commander of the SPLA, al-Hilu favored the secession of both South Sudan and Abyei from Sudan, but these stances proved unpopular in the western part of South Kordofan and even among many Nuba who stood to become more isolated and vulnerable in a rump Sudan, as detailed by Young in his chapter on “South Kordofan State Elections, May 2011.” Many Nuba also distrusted al-Hilu for having cooperated with the regime as deputy governor under the CPA from 2009-2011, even though living conditions improved during that time. Finally, the regime deftly engaged in coalition politics, courting traditional Sudanese parties in South Kordofan, while the SPLA alienated them by refusing to pledge a coalition government. All these missteps help explain how and why al-Hilu managed to lose an election to Haroun, a candidate who had been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes in Darfur.

Several of the book’s chapters regrettably stretch the truth by not only blaming the regime for the resumption of war but also accusing it of an extermination campaign. Jok Madut Jok, for example, asserts that the “genocidal actions of the 1990s have been unleashed once again, and the survival of the Nuba people hangs in the balance” (160). Gillian Lusk similarly contends that the regime is driven by an annihilationist agenda akin to that of al Qaeda or ISIS. Thankfully, Young’s
chapter exposes such hyperbole, criticizing Lusk’s analysis as marred by “a visceral hatred of the [regime] and failure to acknowledge SPLM failings” (174).

There is enough blame to go around. The SPLM-N is guilty of refusing to accept its loss in the 2011 democratic elections, which sparked the renewal of war. But the regime might well have done the same if it had lost. During the campaign, Sudan’s President Omar Bashir declared that the regime would win “either by ballot boxes or bullet boxes” (217). This mirrored the SPLM-N’s threatening campaign rhetoric that announced voters had a choice between “the star [its party’s flag] or the gun” (171). In light of such signaling by both sides of unwillingness to accept possible electoral loss, the resumption of war may have been inevitable.

Regrettably several contributors—especially Jok, Lusk, Tinsley, and Totten—blame the regime alone for the ongoing humanitarian deprivation in the Nuba Mountains. The Khartoum government does bear some responsibility, as it has blocked international NGOs from entering rebel-held territory via Sudan, on grounds that such organizations in the past have aided Sudanese rebels and assisted international prosecution of regime officials. At the same time, however, the SPLM-N has rejected repeated regime offers of a temporary cease-fire to enable neutral international actors to deliver humanitarian aid and administer vaccines in rebel-controlled areas. Apparently, the rebels fear that an informal humanitarian cease-fire could reflect well on the regime and undermine their negotiating leverage. The SPLM-N thus also bears some responsibility for perpetuating the suffering of its own Nuba civilians.

In several places, the book exaggerates the suffering of Nuba civilians by denying the existence of an aid pipeline. For example, Totten writes that as of April 2014, “no such humanitarian corridor has been established” (129). To the contrary, in spring 2012, the United States initiated regular shipments of humanitarian aid by an international NGO via South Sudan to hundreds of thousands in South Kordofan, as U.S. and SPLM-N officials have confirmed in published accounts.

Several of the book’s contributors also mischaracterize the regime’s aerial bombing as targeting civilians. Totten, for example, cites “almost daily bombings by Antonovs of civilian targets (suqs, churches, villages, farms, and other places where relatively sizeable groups of people congregated)” 129). In reality, most of the government’s bombing has targeted rebels or sparsely populated areas. As Wendy James notes in her chapter on the parallel war in Blue Nile state, such targeting of rebels has succeeded in forcing them to retreat to the border region near South Sudan. When the government has targeted supposedly “civilian” areas, she writes, those are “where the SPLA-N was indeed holding out” (205).

During the first three years of renewed war in South Kordofan—according to data compiled by the anti-government Sudan Consortium that is not cited in the book—aerial bombing killed approximately one non-combatant per week, a relatively modest rate that is not indicative of targeting congregated civilians. Indeed, the combined military and civilian death toll from war in the Two Areas since 2011 is estimated at only hundreds per year (see, for example, the U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports for Sudan in 2012 and 2013). While any war death is tragic, such statistics suggest that the nature of violence is quite different from the allegedly genocidal campaigns of the early 1990s.

Cogently, a few of the book’s contributors interrogate the actual aim of the rebellion. The people of the Nuba Mountains clearly have legitimate grievances. For example, as Komey delineates in his chapter on “The Nuba Plight,” none of the CPA’s promises regarding the Two Areas—sharing of power and wealth, integration of the civil service and military, return of displaced persons, resolution of land disputes—has been fully implemented. Indeed, many of the Nuba’s longstanding demands—self-determination, compensation for past abuses, cultural autonomy, and transitional justice—remain unfulfilled. In addition, as Tinsley points out in her chapter, “Who Will Remember the Nubans?” when South Sudan seceded and took with it much of Sudan’s non-Muslim population, the Khartoum regime declared Sharia to be national law, further alienating the substantial minority of Nuba who are not Muslim.

However, rebellion has made life worse, not better, for the Nuba. Despite this reality, the SPLM-N steadfastly refuses to accept the regime’s offer of negotiations on a political and security settlement for the Two Areas. Instead, the rebels demand to negotiate on nationwide political change, which the regime has made clear it will not do with them while the war continues. (In Jok’s
biased chapter, he mischaracterizes this as the rebels continuously offering negotiations, while the regime responds only with military threats.) Meanwhile, the suffering of the Nuba people continues as the SPLM-N instead pursues its national political agenda. As Kafi notes in his chapter on “The Nuba Mountains Crisis,” this dynamic was further highlighted when the SPLA-N formed a military alliance with Darfur’s rebels and invited them to South Kordofan, where they promptly abused the local population.

Adam’s analysis of the rebels’ ill-fated strategy is worth quoting at length: “The Nuba are now fighting against Khartoum, but it is not clear for what they are fighting. Certainly they are not fighting to join the south, which has betrayed them. Are they fighting for a New Sudan in the north? For an autonomous region? If the antagonism with the local pastoralist tribes continues apace, such an autonomous region would certainly be a dismal failure” (41). Adam thus implies that the Nuba might be better off negotiating with the regime on a local political settlement, which the SPLM-N refuses to do.

According to James, this realization is dawning on local populations. As she frames it, the aggrieved people of the Two Areas have two choices: embrace a nationwide military struggle to overthrow the regime in Khartoum (which could have high costs and low prospects), or “pursue local peace agreements with the government” (206). As she observes, “The government’s preference is clear, and it is dividing opinion among the people of the Two Areas” (206).

If the international community really wanted to help the Nuba people, it would promote a negotiated agreement for the Two Areas, rather than acquiescing to the SPLM-N’s pursuit of regime change in Khartoum, which only perpetuates suffering in the Nuba Mountains. Fostering such a soft landing, however, would require applying pressure on the SPLM-N. Regrettably, the West has done just the opposite so far, giving a pass to the rebels while exclusively pressuring the regime. As Kafi succinctly observes “The international community has ignored the abuses of the rebels and concentrated only on the abuses of the government. This encouraged the rebels to go on committing atrocities against the citizens, without any regard for innocent lives” (190).

To ensure that future intervention is more effective, it is vital to assess accurately the impact of past international responses to conflict in Sudan. Totten is likely correct that the failure to punish crimes of the 1990s in the Nuba Mountains emboldened the regime to repeat such tactics in Darfur in 2003-2004. However, the international reaction to Darfur in the mid-2000s was far more robust and did impose costs on the regime, which Tinsley fails to acknowledge and which may explain why conflict in the Two Areas since 2011 has followed a different course. In response to Darfur’s atrocities, the United States declared “genocide,” refused to lift sanctions as it had pledged to do, and coerced Khartoum to sign a peace deal including substantial concessions. Meanwhile the African Union and United Nations deployed tens of thousands of peacekeepers, and the ICC indicted Sudan’s president and three of his subordinates. Tinsley and Totten may view such international response as inadequate, but it had a major impact on the regime’s calculations.

Indeed, when I conducted interviews in Khartoum in 2013 with current and former regime officials, virtually all of them said that the government’s scorched earth response to rebellion in Darfur had been a mistake, and that their president knew it, precisely because it had turned the world against the government. Since 2011, the regime again has used deadly force in the Two Areas, but it has not repeated the genocidal tactics previously employed in Darfur or the Nuba Mountains. This represents significant progress that the book fails to acknowledge. Admittedly, the current situation in the Nuba Mountains remains wretched, which is why the international community should promote both enhanced humanitarian access and a negotiated settlement. But, as those of us who study genocide know all too well, it could be a lot worse.
We underestimate corruption. These three words sum up the driving thesis of Sarah Chayes’ 
*Thieves of State*. In fact, we—including scholars, commentators and especially Western political 
and military leaders and advisers—underestimate almost every facet of corruption. We misread 
its pervasive extent and its networked, systemic nature. We fail to appreciate its crushing impact 
on those who suffer under its yoke. We downplay the sinister social, political, cultural, and even 
religious shifts it drives, and the way such dynamics fuel civil strife and armed conflict. And as 
a result of all of these underestimations, the international community (and the U.S. in particular) 
makes catastrophic strategic miscalculations when engaging with struggling states like Iraq and 
Afghanistan.

With its brave claims, gripping anecdotes and grim insights into the wheels of power from 
Kabul to Washington, *Thieves of State* makes for an engaging read, quite suitable for a lay audience. 
Despite its popular (footnote-less) format, the book boasts more than enough careful argument 
to warrant scholarly attention. Chayes’ work will be of immediate interest to those who work in 
corruption or governance studies: a motley array of disciplines including law and constitutionalism, 
criminology, political science, and economics. But because of the link she draws between endemic 
corruption and widespread civil strife, her work also will be helpful to scholars of international 
relations, global security and governance, human rights, and genocide studies.

Rather than dividing corruption into petty and grand types, *Thieves of State* instead focuses 
on endemic corruption systems or ‘Malign Actor Networks’ (136). In such networks, the entire 
system of government is better understood as a vertically integrated criminal organization: petty 
bribery and extortion by local public officials is made possible by the higher-level ‘grand’ political 
corruption that protects it and profits from it—and vice versa. Money, influence, protection, power 
and resources course through these inter-locking networks in complex ways, giving rise to a 
toxic environment where it is integrity and honesty—rather than corruption and chicanery—that 
become perilous endeavours. “Corrupt and corrupting,” as one figure sums up the atmosphere in 
Nigeria (132).

Chayes leaves her readers in no doubt as to the effect on populations suffering under the 
authority of these malign networks. While scholars may debate the legal minutiae of understanding 
edemic corruption as a violation of human rights, the vignettes sprinkled through the book 
present all-too-perfect expressions of arbitrary interferences with fundamental freedoms, backed 
up by kleptocratic state power.

Yet Chayes’ signature claim lies in what happens next: the population’s response to the 
edemic corruption. She argues that the daily, inescapable indignities of networked corruption 
strip any vestige of legitimacy from the reigning political regime, and from everyone and everything 
associated with it. Hardworking, peaceful citizens withdraw their support for the government: “If 
I see somebody planting an IED,” vows an Afghan, outraged at the impunity for police violence 
when they shook down his brother, “and then I see a police truck coming, I will turn away” (6). But 
for so many others, resistance takes a more violent, proactive form. Chayes’ argument weaves from 
one conflict-zone to the next, covering Iraq, Afghanistan (Chapters 4, 11), Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia (Chapters 6, 8), Egypt (Chapter 7), Uzbekistan (Chapter 9), and Nigeria (Chapter 10). While 
the particular organization of the corruption network may differ (as Chayes helpfully models in
the book’s Appendix), in each case she hammers home to the reader the decisive causal role played by corruption and state-sanctioned theft in triggering civil strife and revolt. As much as Western observers might prefer to conceive the population’s animus lying in familiar concerns with human rights violations, or democratic deficits, or economic inequality, or religious intolerance, Chayes takes dissidents at their word when they rail against their leaders’ corruption and greed. By throwing open the door to all manner of civil strife, corruption threatens global security.

The Arab Spring showed—at least in its beginnings—that such dissident movements may be secular (Chapter 6). Yet Chayes’ perhaps most intriguing claim lies in linking endemic corruption and puritanical religious extremism—a link she stresses is by no means constrained to Islamic extremism, or even to modern history. ‘Corruption’ in every language implies both moral and material depravity—and the purity of religion can often present as the best or only weapon with which to combat it (116). From al Qaeda to Boko Haram, from Protestant rebellions to Nigerian Pentecostal churches, the flagrant corruption of the political elites engenders a puritanical response.

From this basis, Chayes aims to inject concerns with corruption into the thinking and strategizing of all actors in international relations and global security. One key lesson is to avoid seeing civil strife in foreign countries through the short-sighted Western preoccupation with terrorism and religious extremism. Civilians on the ground harbor very different priorities to those of their occupiers or benefactors. Faced with flagrant criminal regimes, populations may well countenance tyrannies or theocracies as the lesser of two evils.

In terms of informing policy, especially in military engagements like Iraq and Afghanistan, Chayes stresses how state corruption works as a force-multiplier for insurgents. In supporting and protecting existing governments, foreign troops become entangled in their extortion, and are viewed by the local population as complicit in the ensuing shake-downs, extortions, land-grabs and theft of national resources. A similar theme holds for diplomatic, development and humanitarian action; shrugging off claims of humanitarian neutrality Chayes avers that in the context of endemic corruption, “economic or even capacity-building support is always political” (198). Ultimately, international actors must be as willing to challenge corruption as they are to call out human rights violations and democratic deficits.

Yet wariness about corruption need not drive a blanket rule to disengage. In her final chapter, Chayes considers a wide array of remedies, including tools in the hands of international leaders, diplomats, business and civil society, that can increase the costs and risks of corruption by developing country governments. While her recommendations here should be required reading for all international actors, Chayes offers less advice about internal efforts to combat domestic state corruption—though her Epilogue rightly reflects on the Global Financial Crisis, showing that systemic corruption networks are not purely a developing world problem.

In terms of evidence and argument, much of the book’s persuasive force comes from stories and experience accrued in Chayes’ life and research on the ground in these geopolitical hotspots, particularly Afghanistan. Since 2001, Chayes worked as a journalist, ran an NGO, and then was called upon in 2009 to serve as special adviser to ISAF commanders. Her thesis dovetails with the grim recent history of the Middle East, and in particular with the failures of the U.S. to grapple with the problems besetting Iraq and Afghanistan, including its all-too-late realization that corruption fueled the strategic threats of insurgency and extremism.

As well as this hands-on experience, the work is shot through with intriguing scholarly argument and historical evidence. In Chapter Two, Chayes scours the ‘mirrors’ for ‘Princes’; guide-books written by hopeful advisers to their monarchs, spanning from the eight century to the sixteenth, written by Islamic and Christian scholars. Chayes draws one persistently recurring admonition out of this trove: the advice that monarchs shun the theft of their subjects’ possessions, lest they drive the population to insurrection. As she observes, even Machiavelli—hardly a political theorist drawn to unnecessary moralizing—upheld this prohibition in The Prince.

Chayes returns to the history twice more. In Chapter Twelve she reflects on the Dutch revolt against absolutist monarchy and its corrupt envoys, which fed into later attempts to create limited government, through John Locke in England and then the founding fathers of the United States. The next chapter moves further back in time, highlighting Luther’s challenge as an indictment of the Catholic Church’s corruption. The history, Chayes stresses, tells a consistent message.
Whatever else they may put up with, the masses chafe under flagrant, corrupt, thieving rule—whether temporal or spiritual.

Like any work that hones in on a single causal factor, Chayes’ focus on corrupt kleptocracy risks under-emphasizing other triggers driving civil strife—a limitation she explicitly notes (187). So too, more empirically-minded social scientists may wish for further, quantitative evidence to demonstrate the correlation and causation existing between endemic corruption and civil strife. But it would take a stern critic not to be persuaded by Chayes’ fundamental thesis that corruption deserves more consideration in conversations about global security.

Several elements of *Thieves of State* carry relevance for scholars of genocide and atrocity crimes. To be sure, concerns with corruption are not unknown in this context. The United Nations OSAPG’s *Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes* lists corruption as a circumstance that impinges on state’s capacity to prevent atrocity crimes. But if Chayes is right about the causative link between kleptocracy and civil strife, then corruption may warrant inclusion as a prime factor placing states under stress and making them vulnerable to social breakdown.

The key question in this context is whether in stripping resistance to insurrections and violent terror, endemic corruption contributes to the wholesale breakdown in social functioning that often characterizes atrocity crimes. While further research on this question beckons, Chayes’ work provides some *prima facie* reasons to think it does.

First, Chayes argues that endemic corruption fuels puritanical religious extremism, with normative ideas about purity seen as an answer to secular government’s moral and material depravity. Such extremism can feed into the type of identity politics, and beliefs about the moral impurity of others—both within and outside one’s sect—that can foment violent solutions.

Second, kleptocracy gives rise not only to rebellions, but ones who have lost faith in all institutions associated with the rampant corruption. All too often, secular government, economic development, democracy, western-style education, and human rights are tarred with the same brush (115). The rejection of these ideas and institutions may strip societies of vital cultural resources capable of stymieing their collapse into ethnic or religious violence. So too, subsequent international interventions, for example through offices of the United Nations, will be viewed as unwelcome and illegitimate. Cosmopolitan, international and secular actors are seen as complicit in the very problem that drove the insurgency.

Finally, peacekeepers and humanitarians can be important actors in genocide prevention efforts. Yet these groups are routinely forced to work alongside existing governments, supporting and protecting their interests. As such, many of the concerns with complicity Chayes canvassed with respect to U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan will be relevant here, giving force to recent work on the challenging questions arising between peacekeeping and corruption.

In all, anyone who deals with the conflict-related harms, human rights violations and atrocities that can follow from the wholesale collapse of civic trust will profit from a careful reading of *Thieves of State*. In conversations and action on works on global security and international affairs, we can no longer afford to underestimate endemic corruption.
The violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia, with its most brutal manifestation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) from 1992 to 1995, has been the subject of sustained scholarly interest for the past two decades. One of the main points of contention and fierce debate has been the issue of genocide: if it has been committed, where, when and by whom. These disagreements are largely the result of scholars applying different understandings of the concept of genocide, where one group of scholars uses the definition from the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, while others consider that definition, which was subsequently adopted by international criminal tribunals, to be too limited. In this personal account, Edina Bećirević argues that Srebrenica was not the only instance of genocide in BiH but a “culmination of a planned and widespread genocidal process begun in the spring of 1992 and meant to exterminate Bosnian Muslims throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (p. xii).

The work focuses on seven municipalities of eastern Bosnia, exploring the patterns of mass violence in Zvornik, Vlasenica, Bratunac, Rogatica, Foča, Višegrad, and Srebrenica. Given that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague has prosecuted dozens of individuals for crimes in BiH since the end of the war, the evidence, testimonies, and judgments have significantly influenced academia, not least because of the incredible amount of documents that are available to researchers in ICTY archives. The author of this book relied extensively on those archives in her research. Another significant case that influenced how the war in BiH is understood by scholars is the ruling of the International Court of Justice, also in The Hague, in 2007. Both courts, one determining individual responsibility and the other those of states, came to the conclusion that the one incident, i.e. set of events, that qualifies as genocide in the case of BiH is Srebrenica, in July of 1995, where Bosnian Serb forces over-ran a protected enclave populated mostly by Bosnian Muslims, resulting in mass executions of around eight thousand men and boys. The detained men were locked up in schools and warehouses, sometimes beaten, then killed in summary executions, their bodies scattered in mass graves only to be dug up again in secret, some months later, in an attempt to hide the evidence. The independent scholarly community has, by and large, accepted the rulings and consider Srebrenica to be the ‘only’ genocide not only in BiH, but in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

In five chapters, Bećirević analyzes the campaign of the violent expulsion of non-Serbs, starting in the spring of 1992, detailing the role of local authorities in putting the campaign in motion. Her analysis provides us with a better understanding of how mass expulsions, dispossession, and detention of thousands and their exposure to torture and inhumane conditions were orchestrated. Significant attention is given to the post-war period, where Bećirević places much attention on the denial of mass atrocities, murder and rape committed by Serb forces during the conflict. The author is a Bosnian native and her book shows an intimate understanding of the communities, which coupled with extensive research of evidence material presented at the ICTY, makes it a valuable contribution to the debate. However, the tone often drifts from scholarly to journalistic and the evidence and analysis do not always sufficiently support her bold claim of genocide in the entire territory of BiH, throughout the war. At times, it seems that the author is more interested in advocacy than a detached scholarly analysis.
The violent campaign aiming to remove non-Serbs from the territories claimed by the Serb leadership in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s is largely accepted in scholarship and was described in many works, from James Gow’s analysis during the early days of the war, to the recent contributions by Robert Donia. The aim of the campaign was the creation of a homogeneous, contiguous territory populated by Serbs. Those contributions stop short of calling what the Bosnian Serb leadership did, with support from the Belgrade regime and Slobodan Milošević, genocide. Mark Mazower states that the goal of the campaign was not the total extermination of Bosnian Muslims but their removal from the territory and that “ethnic cleansing was an integral part of nation-building, or to be more precise nation-enlarging” for the Bosnian Serb and Serbian authorities.¹ That view is shared by Dulić and Hall who make a convincing case when stating that Bosnian Serbs made excessive territorial demands, but “did not seek to control the entire country.” The Bosnian Serb forces “refrained from capturing municipalities where Serbs constituted a small minority of the population, unless these were of extremely high strategic importance.”² They continue by saying that “massacre and expulsion were means by which they ‘cleansed’ territories and thus obtained demographic control over contested space.”³ War crimes were an essential part of the Serbian strategy in the war, claimed Gow.⁴

Bećirević’s contribution seems to suffer from what Christian Axboe Nielsen calls “genocide myopia” in relation to BiH, where any conclusion that a set of crimes committed against non-Serbs was not genocide, be it by a judicial or scholarly authority, is considered flawed.⁵ For Bećirević, crimes against humanity and war crimes are not enough, as if those qualifications are somehow less serious, or less deserving of condemnation. Genocide is a concept that was born out of the advocacy of Raphael Lemkin, and the definition in the 1948 Genocide Convention is a result of negotiations. Much criticism has been leveled at it for not including political groups among those that are considered protected. That definition is limited, and proving that charge in a courtroom has been challenging for prosecutors. Claiming that everyone who subscribes to this definition and thus finds it impossible to accept her argument that genocide has been committed on the entire territory of BiH, from 1992 to 1995, and calling them deniers, as Bećirević does, is wrong and fundamentally unfair. Many of those that accept ICTY and ICJ judgments in calling Srebrenica genocide, but refrain from doing so for other municipalities, have no history of political bias and have spoken out about the violent take-over of municipalities, the mass detentions, the killings and rape committed against non-Serbs.

The approach taken by the author could be more nuanced when she analyzes the relevant actors i.e. those that put the mass violence in motion. Too often, she speaks of ‘Serbs’ as actors, a homogeneous agent with a homogeneous leadership led by the puppet master Milošević and his allies in BiH. This approach is reductionist and is belied by extensive documentation and evidence presented at the ICTY. Catherine Baker makes a good point when she asks authors to be specific and attribute actions to individuals and institutions instead of groups, “even though it lengthens sentences.”⁶

Ideology, or nationalism, is emphasized as the main driving force of the violence, and the book makes ample use of historical events which have allegedly primed the Serb communities to separate themselves from others, in this case Bosnian Muslims, and commit genocide. However, it is not clearly explained how those processes allegedly took place. Historical events become myths that are then used to mobilize nationalist sentiment, but as Siniša Malešević rightly argues,

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² Tomislav Dulić and Jonathan Hall, “The logic(s) of ethnic violence: Control, ideology and the spatial distribution of indiscriminate violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1941-45/1992-95” (Unpublished manuscript, Uppsala University, 2014), 5.
³ Ibid., 5.
nationalism is not inherently violent and more attention should have been given to analyzing how and why that particular nationalism turned violent. It would have also been interesting to discuss the similarities and differences between state-level elite and local leaderships and their motivations. Dulić and Kostić have argued that ideology has dominated the motivations of the elites, while fear and insecurity played a more significant role at the local level.

In sum, this book is thought-provoking and valuable in the micro analysis of the dynamics of violence and the role of local Bosnian Serb authorities in orchestrating the violence that swept the country in the spring of 1992. However, it has made the mistake of arguing more than it can actually prove. A dreadful machinery of violence that left one hundred thousand dead and over a million displaced was set in motion in early 1992 by Bosnian Serb authorities: it included camps, expulsion, dispossession, mass murder, torture and rape. Not labeling all of those events as genocide does not minimize the experiences of those who suffered through them, or perished. The narrower understanding of genocide, as defined by the UN Convention, and its application to BiH simply aims to differentiate between types of mass violence. The mass executions after the fall of Srebrenica, in 1995, were indeed unique in their systematic nature and the consequences they had on those communities. Srebrenica can be understood as a culmination of the policies set in place three years earlier, but it should be categorized as distinct—as genocide.

Bibliography

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Book Review: *The Crime of All Crimes: Towards a Criminology of Genocide*

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*The Crime of All Crimes: Towards a Criminology of Genocide*  
Nicole Rafter  
320 Pages; Price: $35.00 Cloth

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Contending with a subject that has provoked sustained interest across many disciplines within the social sciences, Nicole Rafter’s latest book is an important addition to the ever-expanding field of genocide studies, one which will be appreciated by scholars and students of genocide from, for instance, history, sociology, psychology, law, political science and international relations. That Rafter herself is aware of the attention from diverse audiences that her book might inevitably garner is evident from the skilful way in which she engages with and navigates through the wealth of existing multidisciplinary scholarship and research on genocide throughout her book. This is all the more impressive given that this was Rafter’s very first book on genocide, having only taken an interest in genocide in recent years. For those deeply immersed in genocide studies and its evolving conceptual and empirical concerns, Rafter’s book successfully speaks to, and builds upon, important work that has already been done in the field, particularly concerning colonial genocides, the gendered nature of genocides, and the micro-level variables that enable and sustains genocides. Meanwhile, for those newly acquainted with genocide studies, the book provides an accessible overview of the key debates and studies that have come to define the field.

Rafter is a criminologist and her book, as its title suggests, is an examination of genocide from a criminological perspective. While criminologists have started to contribute to the study of genocide, this body of scholarship is still, as Rafter points out, relatively small. Rafter’s key aim, therefore, is to demonstrate more forcefully how, and to what extent, criminology can contribute towards a better understanding of genocide. Rafter stamps her unique mark in contemporary genocide scholarship by weaving together an overarching framework to wrestle with the phenomenon that is genocide. Capitalizing on criminology’s interdisciplinary character, Rafter draws upon ideas from political science, psychology, sociology, and legal philosophy to construct her analytical building blocks. The result is a comprehensive conceptual vocabulary for genocide, one aimed at simultaneously grappling with the macro, meso and micro elements of genocide. In this regard, a number of Rafter’s novel conceptual ideas have the prospect of guiding future research on genocide. This includes her idea of “genocidal propensity,” which is aimed at predicting which states are more predisposed towards committing genocides, in order to more effectively prevent genocides before they occur; the idea of “hot genocides,” which indicates how the intensification of genocide’s emotional dynamics mark turning points in genocidal violence; and finally, the idea that “genocidal organizations” create “states of exception,” as a tool to mobilize genocidal destruction without fear of consequences.

Rafter’s empirical task is ambitious: a comparative study of eight historical cases of genocides, occurring across the world and covering the period between 1900 and 2000. Following a common position embraced by many genocide scholars, she adopts a definition of genocide that goes beyond the one currently enshrined in international law. The destruction of political groups—notably excluded from the Genocide Convention—is added as a protected group in Rafter’s analysis, alongside national, ethnic, racial and religious groups. This allows the genocide of the Herero by the German colonial army, the Armenians by the Ottoman Turks, Polish nationalists by Stalin, Indonesian anti-communists by Suharto’s regime, political opponents by Pol Pot’s regime, the Mayas by the Guatemalan state, and the Tutsis by the Rwandan Hutus to fall under the scope of her study. This is relatively uncontroversial; what is controversial, however, is her inclusion...
of killing of the disabled (people with mental and physical disorders) by the Nazis. Even under
the broader definition of genocide she adopts, it is unclear under which protected group they fall
under. Do they constitute a political group, construed in the broadest possible terms? Or, do they
amount to a racial group, given that their destruction, as Rafter notes, was aimed at improving the
purity and power of the Aryan stock?

Nonetheless, Rafter executes her empirical task with considerable ease and confidence. Each
historical case-study is stripped down to its bare and essential facts, while historical details are
selectively chosen and strategically employed to further her main arguments about each of these
genocides. This approach clearly aids Rafter’s conceptual mission, namely, to compare genocides
across multiple dimensions, in order to generate generalized conclusions about what genocides
“looks like” as a phenomenon and what they share in common. Some of the important conclusions
she draws, in this regard, are the macro dynamics that enable genocide (war and major political
upheavals, state failure; ethnic and racial persecution; ideology; colonialism; and impunity); the
psychological reasons why individuals are capable of committing genocide (processes of moral
disengagement, empathy shutdown and the objectification of victims); and the factors that enable
the mobilization of genocidal destruction (the formation of genocidal organizations and the
creation of states of exception).

Occasionally, the elegant ideas presented in each chapter are not adequately developed or
illustrated through the book’s historical case studies, even though this is what Rafter sets herself out
to accomplish. For example, Rafter seeks to use the Indonesian genocide to illustrate the emotional
dynamics of genocide, which involves, she argues, the framing and reframing of victims’ identities
by perpetrators, through the creation of social stereotypes or the development of ‘us versus them’
thinking (Chapter 4). Beyond claiming that this in fact occurred in the case of Indonesia, actual
historical evidence for this is missing within Rafter’s analysis. A stronger case could have been
made by tapping into the wealth of historical analysis, debates and sources that this period of
Indonesian history has prompted. To illustrate another example, Rafter suggests the Cambodian
genocide usefully demonstrates the micro-level factors that are at play in genocides, namely,
the social psychology of genocide perpetrators (Chapter 5). Here, Rafter argues perpetrators are
psychologically capable of committing genocide because they undergo a “splitting process,” a
process that centres on “moral disengagement,” “empathy shutdown,” and the “objectification of
victims.” In her historical discussion of the Cambodian genocide, however, she does not concretely
demonstrate how, or to what extent, the perpetrators themselves underwent the process which she
articulates. In certain parts of the book, therefore, there is disjuncture between the chapters’ main
contceptual argument and its empirical substantiation. This, in turn, unfortunately diminishes the
overall strength of Rafter’s main claims, which could have been avoided if the historical analysis
was used more directly to engage with, and to buttress, core conceptual arguments.

All throughout, Rafter rightly insists that genocide needs to be understood, first and foremost,
as a “crime.” Genocide studies, as she writes, is a crowded, multidisciplinary field but it has
seldom dealt with genocide as a crime. This is an insightful point; genocide’s inherent criminality
is easily overlooked, especially when it is subsumed, as it often is, within broader topics such as
political conflict, state (in)stability, external interventions or legal prosecutions for human rights
violations. Given criminology’s core preoccupation with the study of crime, it is particularly well-
placed, Rafter suggests, to interrogate what constitutes the essence of genocide’s criminality.
This important point is not conceptually pushed far enough by Rafter, however, resulting in her
providing a somewhat unsatisfactory answer to the very question she maintains contemporary
genocide scholarship has thus far neglected to assess, and which she seeks to address through her
book: “What kind of crime is genocide?”

Rafter’s answer to this question rests upon unpacking how key concepts in criminology—
specifically, the perpetrators and victims of crimes—figure and feature in the case of genocide.
According to Rafter, genocide is a crime whose perpetrators commit their deeds during wars and
periods of upheaval; they are likely to mobilize genocidal organizations to help with the killing;
they attempt to purify a human group or territory through some sort of “cleansing,” be it ethnic,
genetic, political, racial, religious or social; and finally, they operate with the confidence that no
consequences will follow from their actions. A further aspect of genocide’s criminality lies with its

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victims. They tend to be attacked in their own country, where they live alongside their perpetrators and where, sometimes, no prior conflict existed between them and their perpetrators; the victims are often unsuspecting or helpless, lacking “guardians” who could have protected them; and they are negatively labelled by the perpetrator based on race, ethnicity, political views, or status. It is not entirely convincing, however, why these particular characteristics concerning genocide’s perpetrators and victims make it a distinct crime in its own right or, as the title of the book suggests, the “crime of all crimes.” Arguably, these same characteristics could conceivably apply to other crimes that equally provoke opprobrium for their heinousness, a significant point that Rafter does not herself contemplate. Key examples that immediately come to mind, in this regard, are international terrorism and crimes against humanity.

If Rafter had perhaps engaged a little more with the fact that genocide is not simply any ordinary crime but rather, an “international crime,” the significant point she makes about the need to uncover the essence of genocide’s criminality could have been pushed a step further. What seems missing from Rafter’s take on genocide’s essence as a crime are its unique origins and historical development, which saw it being globally condemned as an act that violates the fundamental norms of the international community. An additional line of enquiry, then, to the question Rafter poses—“What kind of crime is genocide?”—lies in the reasons why the act of genocide was specifically fashioned into, and accorded with the special status of, an altogether unique and distinct category of criminal conduct – that of an international crime. Arguably, this is a matter which criminologists, given their interest in how crimes are constructed, would be well-suited to explore. On balance, however, Rafter’s book takes the study of genocide an important step forward. Having shown crucial ways in which the discipline of criminology can have a meaningful conversation and connection with genocide, she had laid further foundations from which other criminologists interested in genocide and other atrocity crimes can fruitfully build upon.
**Book Review: An Inconvenient Genocide: Who Now Remembers the Armenians?**

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An Inconvenient Genocide: Who Now Remembers the Armenians?
Geoffrey Robertson
300 pages; Price: £20.00

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About the time of the centennial of the mass deportations and murders that constituted the Armenian Genocide of 1915, that deliberately obscured and neglected crime against humanity had finally found a large number of champions. The official Turkish state campaign to deny that a genocide had taken place, and the persistence of diaspora Turks and a few pseudo-scholars defending the government’s claims, were largely seen as groundless obfuscations. A cascade of serious scholarly books and articles appeared; the rich and famous, including a number of Kardashians, visited Armenia; and Pope Francis publicly acknowledged the genocide. With the publication of German, Austrian, Vatican, American, and other archival documents, as well as the work of honest Turkish and Kurdish historians, most people familiar with the facts accepted the record of what had happened to the Ottoman Armenians and Assyrians during World War I as indisputable.

One of the most prominent people to have taken up the project of rectifying public understanding of the tragedies of 1915 is the international lawyer Geoffrey Robertson, the author of at least fifteen books on issues of law, freedom, and justice. Born in Australia and today a barrister and law professor in Great Britain, Robertson has defended numerous people in free speech and expression cases and taken on risky cases, such as those of the novelist Salman Rushdie, the Canadian artist Rick Gibson, Wikileaks founder Julian Assange, and the boxer Mike Tyson. He has had his own television program in Australia and received the honor of an appointment as Queen’s Counsel. In the Genocide’s one hundredth anniversary year he worked with Amal Clooney before the European Court of Human Rights in the notorious case of a Turkish denialist, Doğu Perinçek.

In An Inconvenient Genocide Robertson provides a careful study of the legal issues surrounding crimes that might be considered genocide. While such state-initiated mass killings had occurred earlier in history, and in the twentieth century with the Herero and Nama in German Southwest Africa, the Armenians and Assyrians, and Jews, Roma, and others in the Holocaust, the Polish Jewish jurist Raphael Lemkin did not invent the word “genocide” and conceptualize the crime until mid-way through the Second World War. Not until the 1990s, Robertson writes, did the United Nations “deliver on the Nuremburg legacy, by setting up international courts to punish genocide in Rwanda and the Balkans,” with the first verdict coming down (for Rwanda) in 1998.1

Significantly, the court clarified the language in the Genocide Convention of 1948 “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” to mean “methods of destruction by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group but which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction.” Thus, starvation, systematic expulsion from homes, and inadequate medical services directed against a targeted ethnoreligious people would constitute genocide. All of these practices were carried out on the Armenians.

After a brief history of the events and a discussion of the eyewitness, diplomatic, and archival evidence, Robertson notes that after the German government aided the escape of the Young Turk leaders, the successor government of the late Ottoman Empire held trials of perpetrators. In these

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precursors of the Nuremburg Trials, the accused were found guilty of crimes against humanity. “It is sad,” writes Robertson, “that Turkey can never take pride in this moment of its history, and tends either to portray the liberals as ‘quislings’” (in the words of a principal American denier) “or to see the trials as little more than a cunning attempt to gain an advantage at [the post-war] Versailles [Peace Conference].”

Robertson’s principal contribution to the discussion of the Armenian Genocide is his review of the law and the place of genocide in international jurisprudence. Within the larger rubric of crimes against humanity, genocide is a crime against an ethnic, national, racial, or religious group, distinct from the crimes of extermination or persecution against political or social groups (politicide or classicide). “[I]n effect, all genocides are crimes against humanity, but by no means do all crimes against humanity amount to genocide.” To be considered genocide destruction need not be total, and responsibility falls not only on who directly carried out killings but on those leaders, like the Ottoman government, that ordered deportations knowing “that the marches would kill – and were killing – most of those who marched.” Intention to commit genocide can be inferred from words and deeds, knowledge of consequences, and public statements.

Intention, however, is different from motivation. Whatever the reason behind deportation or killing – greed, fear, a sense of betrayal, religious conviction, race hatred, or as an element of warfare – the intention to destroy a group and prevent its collective reproduction is sufficient to convict someone of the crime of genocide. A government need not have a premeditated policy or a prior plan to commit genocide. “There is no doubt,” Robertson makes clear, “that in 1915 the Ottoman government continued the deportations in the knowledge that many of the deportees would die, and that it passed laws and regulations that enabled it to seize their property on the pretense that it was ‘abandoned’ – that is, that they would not be allowed to return and reclaim it.”

Those who deny that a genocide took place have argued that the Armenians of Ottoman Anatolia were conspiring to rebel against the empire and that they constituted an existential threat to the government, the Turkish nation, and to Ottoman war effort against Russia and Britain. Historians, however, have concluded that no such insurrection was being planned or was even possible in the context of World War I. Most Ottoman Armenians were loyal to the empire, though they desperately and in vain hoped for reforms to improve their lives and protect them from the predations of Kurds. Tens of thousands of Armenian youth were mobilized and fought in the Ottoman Army until they were forcibly demobilized by their superiors, turned into work battalions, and eventually slaughtered. Even if Armenians had been an internal threat, the arguments of both officials and a few denialist scholars that “military necessity” required their removal would not hold up as a viable defense in international tribunals. “‘Necessity’ in war can never justify the deliberate killing of civilians: if they are suspected of treason or loyalty to the enemy they may be detained or interned, or prosecuted, but not sent on marches from which they are expected not to return.”

The stunning achievement of this book is that a sharp legal mind, carefully and systematically laying out irrefutably the argument that 1915 constituted a genocide, manages both to constrain his rage at the obscenity of denialism and allow the reader to feel the author’s passion for justice. As fiercely as he exposes the lies of the deniers, Robertson opposes laws that would prohibit people from freely expressing such reprehensible and malicious views on genocide. Such expression should not be criminalized “unless there is an additionally proved intention to stir up race hatred or else a threat to public order or social cohesion.” In 2005 the right-wing Turkish nationalist Doğu Perinçek deliberately declared in a public meeting in Lausanne that the Armenian Genocide was “an international lie.” Swiss courts found him guilty of breaking a law against genocide denial, but

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2 Ibid., 85.
3 Ibid., 122.
4 Ibid., 101.
5 Ibid., 108.
6 Ibid., 117.
7 Ibid., 208.
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg reversed the verdict and found that Perinçek’s rights to free expression had been violated. Robertson defends Perinçek’s right to speak but is appalled that the court went on to cast doubt on the Genocide itself by claiming the historical facts were difficult to ascertain and that denial was “part of a heated debate.”

The case has been referred to the Chamber for review.

The present-day Republic of Turkey is the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, and because of its continued denial of the Genocide and its near century of appropriation of Armenian property and discrimination against Armenians within Turkey, “it has continued the original wrong.”

Some form of recognition – apology, reparations, restoration of property and cultural monuments to the heirs of the original owners – Robertson argues, must be part of the settlement of claims against Turkey -- and against Germany for complicity in the deportations and massacres. There is right now a museum in Iğdır in eastern Turkey claiming that there were Armenian massacres of Muslims amounting to genocide as well as a permanent exhibition in Istanbul’s military museum making the same argument. Perhaps one form of compensation might be to build a Persecution Museum in Istanbul, one that would acknowledge and illustrate the atrocities not only against Armenians and Assyrians but against Greeks, Aleví, Kurds, and others that continue to the present time.

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8 Ibid., 204.
9 Ibid., 228.

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Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991
Lidwien Kapteijns
308 Pages; Price: $29.95

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At the beginning of Against Forgetting, Carolyn Forche quotes Bertolt Brecht to affirm that “In the dark times, will there also be singing? Yes, there will also be singing, about the dark times” underlining the importance of poetry, even in the midst of atrocity. This continues to be proven important; one cannot help but think of art produced in even the darkest of circumstances as bearing insight into the experiences of people within a society undergoing violence. Since the early 1990s when Against Forgetting was published, the study of poetry of witness has expanded, integrating into the broader body of literature on genocide and mass atrocity, with a general recognition that literature speaks to the intangible horror in a way that more analytical work will never fully grasp. So too do poetry and oral traditions reflect the feelings of diaspora, recording the ways that feelings and identities change over time and the ways that they endure. Rarely, however, does analysis begin with poetry, expanding then to a broader history of mass violence.

Kapteijns’ Clan Cleansing in Somalia the Ruinous Legacy of 1991, whose research rests on a strong analysis of Somali literature, does just that. Examining Somali poetry, songs, publications, as well as interviewing key Somali officials on their time in the 1990s, Kapteijns provides an excellent account of the ethnically—or clan-based—violence that became so prevalent in Somalia in 1990 as the Siyad Barre regime collapsed. This account is significant because it discusses the clan-oriented nature of the violence frankly without subscribing to the fixed categories that leaders used to mobilize violence and provides important discursive links between the way that elites spoke and the changes in the nature of violence at that period. Most importantly, the book seeks a unified narrative for the violence, assigning responsibility to political figures for the discourse and the ensuing “clan cleansing” of 1990-1991.

Kapteijns’s central focus began with a study of Somali discussions of this period, primarily in poetry and song, a focus that builds off of her previous work on Somalia. Looking at “prestigious poetry” that rises above clan audiences to speak to the larger Somali community, clan-oriented poetry that often addresses specific clan groups and pushes forward clan-hate narratives, and unconventional forms of Somali literature including contemporary poetry and novels by Somalis in diaspora, Kapteijns sheds light on ways that Somali artists discussed and failed to discuss violence from this period. Prestigious poetry, Kapteijns notes, is upfront in condemning the violence that occurred and the destruction of the state. Poets such as Mustafa Sheekh Cilmi, Axmad Naaji Sacad, Cabdi Muxumed Amiin, and Cabdulqaadir Cabdi Shube all denounce the violence in no uncertain terms, positioning themselves within a national Somalia that rejects divisions. At the same time, all of these poets shied away from discussing explicitly the nature of the problems in detailed terms, and all were careful to avoid pointing out who was responsible for such problems. While these poets imply that certain groups, such as the United Somali Congress (USC), a rebel group that eventually entered Mogadishu and overthrew Siad Barre’s regime, were responsible, no groups are named explicitly, either in terms of politics or clan. On the other hand, clan-oriented poetry from

this period speaks of the clans themselves, calling on listeners to perpetuate violence and promoting stereotypes regarding other clans. It is only in some unconventional literature, whether novels by Somalis in diaspora or the poetry of Somali-Canadian poet Mohamud Togane, that violence is discussed reflectively with reference to clan, with an acknowledgement of the relationship between the mass violence and clan hatred narratives that became so prominent in the early 1990s.

With these narratives and this polarization in mind, Kapteijns uses the next two sections to provide a historical narrative of the violence and collapse of the state that Somalia experienced from 1989 to 1991. This narrative takes us from the power dynamics at play in the late period of Siyad Barre’s reign as president into the period of rebellion, where various rebel groups, most prominently the USC but including several others, armed themselves and sought to overthrow the regime. Somalia in the late 80s, even before state collapse, was marked by extreme violence, and Barre’s government was the first among many groups to encourage collective punishment against groups where certain members proved resistant to government rule. In addition to the violence seen in Hargeisa and Somaliland, such dynamics were at play in other large cities. At the same time, this violence was not just collective punishment—rather, the discourse changed, both within the Barre regime and later within rebel groups. Systemic inequalities had existed before, but fell along largely regional lines, with those centered in Mogadishu gaining more resources than those living elsewhere. In the late 80s, however, Barre’s regime and rebel groups used collective blame and new hate narratives in order to mobilize mass violence on behalf of particular political causes. Thus, rebels intentionally conflated support of government with Darood identity and Hawiye identity with rebellion against the government, leading to massive, ethnically based violence that ultimately ignored almost entirely who had actually supported the regime and who had not.

The book concludes by discussing the implications of such discourse and the fracturing of Somali society that it prompted. Such changes were the result of what Kapteijns terms “clan hate mythologies,” drawing on genocide literature regarding the ways that violent groups create justifications for violence that have their roots in particular interpretations of history. These histories often have basis in fact—for example, that certain groups might have more access to resources or more power, but require interpretation and the argument that such dynamics have created long-standing animosity in order to create a justification for violence where one had not existed previously. Historically, the Barre regime found its support through patronage networks that went along clan lines at times, although it traversed such divisions to find supporters who could be paid in other clans. Such complexity was obscured entirely by the discourse of clan hatred, and the violence that ensued was not centered around political issues but exclusively on clan. One of the ironies of the state collapse was that those in power did not shift entirely; rather, those who went on to take part in the next transitional government included prominent supporters of Barre, spared simply because they were Hawiye. On the other end, Kapteijns recounts an anecdote in which both a prominent supporter of Barre and an opponent of his regime lived next door to each other in a refugee camp in Kenya, both fearing for their lives because of their clan identity.

Clan Cleansing in Somalia’s stated goal—to name and make explicit the role that clan played during the disintegration of the state in Somalia—is important, and Kapteijns carries it out with the sensitivity and consideration necessary. Concluding that the term genocide is not particularly productive in the context of the Somali state’s collapse, she nonetheless draws on a body of genocide literature regarding hate narratives and othering to create a greater understanding of the process by which armed groups who originally aimed their violence against the authoritarian state could turn to mobilizing mass violence against particular clans. She notes

Few are the scholars who critically examine the construct of clan rather than just accepting it, treating it as an unproblematic, ‘natural’ category, and attributing agency to it as if it were a single body or a machine operating automatically. Those who did refuse to take the concept of clan for granted successfully uncovered other principles of social and political organization and behavior…However, they—including the current author—mostly did not

engage how and under what circumstances clan as a feature of politics and society became a real historical political force.\(^3\)

Kapteijns draws upon this paradox—on one hand, emphasizing the constructed nature of clan identity and the way that such identity change in the 1980s and 90s, while at the same time, showing how identity in 1990–91 was ultimately used as a bedrock for mobilization, proving more salient that previous political affiliations had been. As such, her analysis of 1989–1991 is particularly instructive in that it acknowledges the discourse heavy discussion of identity and its malleability without minimizing the importance of such constructs in the context of conflict.

Part of why this is possible is because of the source material drawn upon. Kapteijns undertook interviews with eye-witnesses to the violence and elites who were involved with resistance to the Barre regime; however, the bulk of her sources are songs and poetry from the period. As a result, the book seeks to draw essential links between the discourses prevalent at the time and the violence which occurred. Discourse analysis is used in many fields of social science and often draws out interesting truths about the nature of power relations and the ways that people conceptualize phenomena in their daily lives. It is far rarer for it to illustrate the mechanisms by which social movements and violence actually occur. In Clan Cleansing in Somalia, we not only see how the concept of clan is discussed, the ways elites and media makers spoke of clan, but also the results; the ways that elites used clan-related discourses to mobilize mass violence, ultimately at the expense of the populations that they claimed to represent, and the ways that this in turn led to alliances and reactions by the communities involved. Kapteijns notes “That the civilians of particular communities of victims initially sided with the USC or even participated in the clan cleansing campaign is an aspect that is often concealed by authors advocating for these groups... Pointing out that this was so does not excuse the injustice that was done to these communities but is a crucial analytical clarification of the different stages and contexts of Somali civil war violence.”\(^4\)

Since the violence has continued in various forms until the present day, the discourses that are at the root of such communal violence take on greater weight. As Togane, a Somali-Canadian poet, concludes in his poem “Afweyne’s Swansong,” “That is why today/ MOGADISHU/ Our erstwhile capital of the Somali nation/Is clannish hell visible/ bearing Dante’s invisible hellish inscription.”\(^5\)

In the process of drawing upon these strains of Somali history, Kapteijns manages to create a unified narrative that remains specific and assigns responsibility to particular political groups and elite figures of state and rebel actions. This sort of narrative, present for most other national histories (with some notable exceptions, all of which also face regular violence), is particularly important in the context of Somalia. Eugene Weber described in Peasants into Frenchmen how nation-building requires both remembering and forgetting, so that in order for collective identities to function, society must be compelled to remember particular, unifying things while underplaying more divisive truths.\(^6\) The violence that ruptured the Somali state in 1990 and the ongoing violence, both clan-based and otherwise, has fundamentally fractured society, leading to remarkably little communication between different communities. Such fragmentation can even be seen online, where diaspora groups divide along clan lines, communicating in different chat forums and assigning responsibility to different figures.\(^7\) In this context, it makes sense that historical accounts, as well as the society at large, would be fractured, and in desperate need of common historic narratives, ones that are inclusive and seek reconciliation through accountability. Kapteijns’s work then participates in the process of rebuilding Somalia, starting at the intellectual underpinnings of society, ones that can be used to reinforce and forge more positive communal identities. Her narrative allows

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3 Kapteijns, Clan Cleansing in Somalia, 73.
4 Kapteijns, Clan Cleansing in Somalia, 203.
5 Kapteijns, Clan Cleansing in Somalia, 68.
Somalis to grapple with a violent past and acknowledge the divisions that have rent society for over twenty years, while also urging readers to lay aside their divisions by recognizing the role that elites on all sides played in fostering such divisions. By “remembering” the violence and the way that it was manufactured, even while “forgetting” the manufactured divisions, society can seek to forge new connections and rebuild itself even as southern-central Somalia pushes towards greater stability in the face of attacks by al-Shabab and other armed groups.

If anything seems to be lacking for this book, it would be only a community of scholarship that can contextualize the history that Kapteijns presents. Indeed, it is shocking how little work exists on the past twenty-five years of Somali history and how difficult it is to this day to gather information on a period so close to the present day. The same scholars repeat again and again in bibliographies about Somali history, not exclusively due to their quality, but also due to the impediments to studying this period and the limited number of people capable of doing so. Too often, the focus of scholarship on Somalia seems to be exclusively oriented towards the present and the most recent elements of the conflict there. Kapteijns states explicitly that her nine oral interviews should not be taken as a comprehensive look at what happened politically or socially during her period of study. Undoubtedly this is true and fair, but the fact that few examinations exist elsewhere today simply underscores how much needs to be discussed further. It seems that in the absence of a national archive, and in the absence of a stable state in which to conduct research, the barriers to careful, comprehensive research grounded in the personal experiences of Somalis became (at least in part) prohibitive, and little was put forward—although that is changing and one hopes this change continues.

It is now then that poetry takes on such great importance in the study of Somalia and Somali history. Yes, Somali poetry has long had great status in Somali society, and yes, its prestige is historical, with a rich oral tradition that only continues with the aid of mass media. And indeed, diasporas tend to value literature that brings them together and forge communities. Yet for Somalia, poetry stands out as a way to bind together a diaspora not without a center, but one with a center whose turbulence has made it difficult to reach, albeit increasingly less so in recent years. Poets and scholars write not really to bind a diaspora to the center, but to surround it, trying to reach a place whose reality was too difficult, too violent and unstable to inhabit directly for a long time. Kapteijns succeeds not only in discussing clan and violence in an innovative way, but also in touching upon this unreachable center, bypassing impediments that stifled so much work on Somalia.
Film Review: 
Son of Saul

Carla Rose Shapiro
Independent Scholar

Son of Saul
Director: László Nemes
Hungary, 2015

Reviewed by Carla Rose Shapiro
Independent Scholar

Auschwitz presents “a multiplicity of realities, a multiplicity of meanings, perspectives and approaches that co-exist simultaneously.”¹ Son of Saul is director László Nemes’ cinematic interpretation of one specific perspective of Auschwitz as envisaged by the film’s protagonist, Saul Ausländer, a prisoner of the camp, who, as a member of the Sonderkommando, was assigned a particularly onerous task—working in the gas chambers and crematoria of Auschwitz-Birkenau. Son of Saul should have provoked debate about the enactment of those events, and the placement of a camera at the threshold of that sacral, albeit mimetic space. If, according to Theodor Adorno, writing poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric,² what about creative endeavours seventy years after Auschwitz? With the passage of time between the realities of Auschwitz and their contemporary re-creation, the boundaries of the limits of representation have become increasingly indistinct. The near universal praise from film critics, and numerous prestigious awards bestowed upon Son of Saul (such as the Grand Prix at the 2015 Cannes Film Festival and the Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film), suggest an almost unquestioned acceptance of the film’s leitmotif, which is no longer considered artistically transgressive in this visually permissive YouTube era. The film’s acclaim, coupled with affirmative nods from French philosopher Georges Didi-Huberman³ and filmmaker Claude Lanzmann⁴ (who has long rejected fictional cinematic representations of the Holocaust) seem to support Son of Saul as both a tour de force and the realization of an effective representational strategy within the challenging genre of Holocaust cinema. Son of Saul is a demanding film that is difficult to watch; it takes the audience on a journey where few artistic endeavours have gone before. By setting the film in the gas chambers and crematoria of Auschwitz-Birkenau, and by expressing that he “wanted to show people how the situation really was”⁵, Nemes sets the moral and representational stakes high; a critique of the film must therefore be considered accordingly.

More than one million victims, mostly Jews, died in Auschwitz-Birkenau, making it the most lethal of the Nazi concentration and death camps. The epicentre of the killing took place in the four crematoria buildings housed in Birkenau, the largest within a network of camps and sub-camps which made up the Auschwitz complex. It is the main setting for Son of Saul, as evidenced by the unequivocal mise-en-scène of the film; the viewer is immediately plunged into the terror of this univers concentrationnaire.⁶ It is the latter half of 1944, the time gleaned from the storyline of the prisoner revolt, which resulted in the sabotage of Crematorium IV. The Sonderkommando, or Special Squads, were comprised of prisoners, predominantly Jewish, forced by the SS to usher

⁶ This term comes from the title of a book written by David Rousset, L’univers concentrationnaire (Paris: Editions de Pavois, 1946).
victims to their deaths in the gas chambers and to dispose of their bodies. Eyewitness accounts written by members of the Sonderkommando, buried in 1944, were unearthed in the grounds of Birkenau after the camp’s liberation and published as *The Scrolls of Auschwitz.* The testimonies contained in this book were the inspiration for Nemes and co-writer Clara Royer’s script for *Son of Saul.*

*Son of Saul* accurately portrays certain mechanics of the Sonderkommando’s grim undertakings. The film begins with the arrival of a new transport of Jews. Saul and his fellow Sonderkommando instruct the unsuspecting victims to undress and await a shower and hot soup. “Remember your hook number” a voice instructs the new arrivals. *Son of Saul* captures the deception perfectly—the undressing room is the antechamber to death. Moments after the gas chamber doors are slammed shut, the screams begin, getting louder and louder—then silence. The naked bodies of the dead are removed and the floor is scrubbed clean in preparation for the next victims. During one of the so-called operations, Saul witnesses a young boy survive the gas chamber. The child’s resuscitation is but a momentary reprieve, as the boy is soon smothered to death by a Nazi camp doctor. Saul insists the dead boy is his own son, although we are never sure of the truth of this assertion, or whether the boy reminds him of his son or is a projection of a son he will never have. Saul searches frantically for a rabbi to perform the proper Jewish prayers and to somehow find a way in this incendiary hell to bury the child according to Jewish tradition. This quest appears obsessive and irrational, and one film critic even goes so far as to summarize *Son of Saul* as “a movie set in Auschwitz that concerns a member of the Sonderkommando who goes mad.” Concurrent to this mission of ritual, Saul is recruited into Birkenau’s resistance movement. Saul’s role in the Sonderkommando revolt and his attempt to bury the boy are the two intertwined narratives that structure the film.

While cinematic representations of concentration camp privation and death are prone to aestheticization, Nemes does nothing to placate the harshness and ugliness of the events portrayed. He rejects decontextualized memory cues of the Holocaust, the clichés such as barbed-wire fences, smoke rising from crematoria chimneys, and victims passing through the “Arbeit macht frei” gate—and forgoes a sentimental music soundtrack for only screams of terror. Nemes’ script also avoids using conventional Hollywood narrative structures such as a hero-rescuer, successful escapes, or survival against the odds, which all offer up a positive narrative resolution. Through avoiding these tropes he denies the audience a happy ending or emotional catharsis à la *Schindler’s List* (Steven Spielberg, 1993). He even shuns character identification and empathy. There is nothing particularly special or even likeable about Saul. We learn very little about him as a person or as a prisoner, and we know even less about the supposed son. Nemes here rightly acknowledges that within this massive loss of life, the stories and memories of individual lives forever remain unrecoverable. *Son of Saul* remains a film about people who were killed rather than a film about survivors, reflecting the reality of the Holocaust, that the vast majority of European Jewry did not survive. As Stanley Kubrick noted about *Schindler’s List,* “The Holocaust is about six million people who get killed. *Schindler’s List* is about 600 who don’t.” Nemes’ directorial choices, however, do not suggest that *Son of Saul* entirely eschews stylization or fully transcends cinematic conventions, or the dangers of the aesthetic seduction of violence.

Nemes implicitly explores what Primo Levi describes in his book *The Drowned and the Saved* as “the grey zone,” in his depiction of the work assigned to the Sonderkommando. The grey zone was the ambiguous ethical space inhabited by the Sonderkommando—an area outside the boundaries of usual human morality where the categories of guilt or innocence, perpetrator or

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7 Ber Mark, ed. *The Scrolls of Auschwitz,* trans. Sharon Neemani (Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishers Ltd., 1985). Books by surviving members of the Sonderkommando were also likely used as resources, such as Shlomo Venezia’s *Inside the Gas Chambers: Eight Months in the Sonderkommando of Auschwitz* and Filip Müller’s *Eyewitness Auschwitz: Three Years in the Gas Chambers.*


victim are not easily applied. Levi considers the formation of the Sonderkommando to be one of the most insidious crimes of the Nazi regime; that is, forcing Jewish prisoners to participate in the destruction of their own community. Were the Sonderkommando collaborators who betrayed their fellow Jews in return for a momentary reprieve from their own demise? Or were they as much the victims of Nazi oppression as other prisoners in the concentration camps? The Sonderkommando, the “bearer of secrets” as the film’s only intertitle states, held additional burdens not experienced by other camp prisoners in both the secrecy of their actions and the guilt at having participated in the process of murder. Even though the Sonderkommando hold a highly contested place in Holocaust history, the film’s articulation of the predicament of the Sonderkommando within this grey zone is inadequate. While an exploration of the grey zone as a central theme in the film may not have been the intention of the filmmaker, the necessary, (but unanswerable) questions which should be provoked by the tragic moral quandary of the Sonderkommando, are difficult to form within the paucity of the film’s frames of reference.

In crafting a film with abstract messages, each viewer journeys through this nightmarish nether world responsible for their own interpretive work. *Son of Saul* seems to explore the necessity of meaning in life even within a state of suffering—perhaps a cinematic reading of Viktor Frankl’s *Man’s Search for Meaning.* The film never makes clear why Saul is so determined to bury the boy. Regardless of whether the boy is, in fact, the son of Saul, Saul’s quest to give the child a proper burial infuses his life with a sense of purpose. It is through the performance of a universally-held ritual that Saul sees one last tenuous link to life as it was lived “before.” Saul’s final meaningful act connects him to ethical humanity and enables him to feel again; it is a transformational act. In *Son of Saul*, the necessity of meaning is given precedence over the cause of the resistance and even over survival itself. A fellow Sonderkommando, Abraham, reprimands Saul: “You failed the living for the dead.” The film purports to explore the material and spiritual facets of resistance and the nature of survival, but in pushing Saul’s obsession to the brink of madness, the credibility of Saul’s character as a conduit for such questions becomes suspect.

*Son of Saul* engages with the issue of the radical de-subjectification of the victims of the Holocaust by giving agency to a seemingly powerless Auschwitz prisoner. In the film de-subjectification is starkly expressed when Nazi officers refer to the murdered Jews as “pieces”—they yell orders to the Sonderkommando, “move the pieces, burn the pieces.” The victims have become mere physical objects to be processed and then disposed of. Saul’s quest for a ritual burial for the child is a kind of refutation of this ultimate loss of subjectivity. No matter how futile, Saul’s actions are perhaps meant to serve as a corrective to the perception of Jews through the lens of Nazi history, as weak, passive, and lacking in any sense of agency; abject images from liberator’s and movie director’s cameras further perpetuate Jews as representational victims. However, with the exception of the boy, victims in the film are still denied their individuality and subjectivity by being shown as anonymous heaps in burn pits or blurred corpses being dragged out of the gas chambers. The victims remain objectified and dehumanized. The film reiterates the perpetrator’s perspective, that the dead are just a mass of corpses, nothing more. With poor character development of Saul’s Sonderkommando comrades, and other minor dramatis personae, neither the living nor the dead victims in *Son of Saul* are recovered from the impersonal machinery of destruction.

Nemes appears to take an ethical position on the representation of atrocity through his particular use of technique. *Son of Saul* focuses on the experience of one individual, Saul Ausländer; the film is from the visual and experiential viewpoint of that single witness. In all but a handful of shots, the viewer sees Birkenau through the eyes of Saul. The square visual format (a 4:3 aspect ratio), and use of medium and extreme close-up shots of Saul (who is typically placed in the centre of the frame), combined with the camera’s shallow depth of field, provides a severely limited visual perspective, creating a feeling of confinement and claustrophobia. Echoing the fear and confusion of the victims upon entry into the camp, the camera intentionally throws spectators off balance. Long, unbroken hand-held shots add to the film’s rawness. On top of providing no orienting shots

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10. A similar failure to describe the essence of Levi’s conception can be seen in Tim Blake Nelson’s 2001 film *The Grey Zone*, which also focuses on the Sonderkommando.

that grant a wider view of the camp, Nemes provides nominal visual references with few narrative clues to situate the characters or the action. What little space is left in the visual field is usually out of focus and/or in partial view. In this oblique approach to representation, the brutality of the murder process occurs just beyond our line of sight, or is shown at the edges of the filmic space. The violence and its aftermath is suggested rather than clearly visible. While these techniques are both effective and affective, they are not original, as some film critics have noted. One also questions whether a blurred representation of systematic murder set in the periphery of the frame resolves the representational challenges of depicting atrocity.

Nemes deviates from his own methodology, oscillating between mostly oblique visuals, graphic glimpses, and explicit sounds. From being indistinct and hazy, bits and pieces of the bodies come into focus. In this way, Nemes forwards a representational double standard, with the horrors of Birkenau situated on the periphery, but the referent is unmistakable; we see quick flashes of naked, dead bodies being dragged away over concrete floors stained with excreta and corpses being fed into ovens. In one memorable scene, a column of recently arrived victims is pushed to the edges of a pit where they are shot to death at close range. The brutality is excessive, not only in its aestheticization of violence but in the fact that such shootings in pits, while typical of the mass-murder operations of the Einsatzgruppen in the occupied Soviet Union, did not occur in Auschwitz. A death camp seems like the last place where violence would need to be embellished.

It is the close-up detail of the corpses of dead women that appears in the aftermath of a gas chamber sequence that is among the most problematic visuals in the movie. In the scenes set in the crematoria, both naked male and female bodies are evident. However, in one sequence the camera lingerers, in focus, on a voluminous breast. The positioning of the corpse in a sexualized manner and the cropping of the image leaves the victim disembodied. One could argue that the expression of the perpetrator’s sheer power over the victim, and the brutality of the murder is correctly correlated to images of the dismemberment of the female body. But Son of Saul more consistently neglects the consideration of gender in the Nazi’s process of dehumanizing their victims, and in the manner in which the Final Solution was carried out. While there was an ultimate common fate for all Jews during the Holocaust, Jewish women were victimized as Jews, and as women. Upon arrival at Auschwitz, men and women had an unequal chance of surviving the initial selection process. And, visibly pregnant women, and women with infants and young children were immediately consigned to the gas chambers. The film could have succinctly conveyed these realities without disrupting the two principal storylines, but did not, and thus the placement of the cadaver in the aftermath of the gassings was likely not intended as a comment on the vulnerabilities and exploitation faced by women in the concentration camp system; rather Nemes’ inclusion of the violated female body elicits possible scopophilic responses.

Son of Saul is mostly a wordless film, but it is by no means silent. The technically impressive sound design by Tamás Zányi serves not only to augment the visuals but acts as a representational proxy for the un-visualized. For example, it is through the marrying of images and sound that the chaos and fear experienced by people being unloaded from the transports and prodded into the unknown is vividly captured. These scenes in particular ring true to survivor accounts of arriving at Auschwitz, and they reflect the fact that there were “no smoothly functioning killing machines, immediately consigned to the gas chambers. The film could have succinctly conveyed these realities without disrupting the two principal storylines, but did not, and thus the placement of the cadaver in the aftermath of the gassings was likely not intended as a comment on the vulnerabilities and exploitation faced by women in the concentration camp system; rather Nemes’ inclusion of the violated female body elicits possible scopophilic responses.

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quick deaths, or German efficiency when it came to mass murder.”14 While the film visualizes the “before” and the “after,” the actual moment of murder through gassing is conveyed through a horrific collection of sounds. Nemes’ camera, by focusing on Saul, does not enter the gas chamber before or during the gassing. Sounds are used as part of the imagining of the horrific events occurring in the interior of the gas chamber—the thud of the gas chamber door, the pounding of hands from the inside, the screams and moans of the victims. The not seen, or the barely seen but heard, leaves the rest to the viewer’s imagination (although very little is left to the imagination). If the point had not already made, the Sonderkommando enter the chamber after the murder by Zyklon B to take away the bodies and clean the space in preparation for the next group. While Nemes has crafted a sensory and visceral film experience that transports the audience to the right “there” of constant fear and dread this scene serves as an admonition: we understand cinema’s inadequacy as a medium for recovering the fact and memory of Birkenau’s industrial-scale mass murder. Within this mimesis there is also an obscenity—that some inchoate representational limit may have been breached. If, as cultural theorist Andreas Huyssen believes, the question of Holocaust representation will always return to the problem of unspeakability, then the gas chambers of Birkenau should be that place of silence. Just because one can depict, does not mean one should. Does hearing rather than seeing the murder process, make it any less representationally problematic? But beyond theoretical issues related to representation, a simpler and more general question should be posed—what does cinema at this abyss advance?

Nemes’ representational approach, that of an experiential and immersive cinematic encounter, does not facilitate an understanding of the history of the Holocaust. While Son of Saul does not purport to be a historical film, it employs a specific historical setting and quotes actual historical events that took place in Auschwitz-Birkenau. History, however, seems more of a backdrop to Saul’s story, and just as the composition of the film gives us a limited view of the actions taking place, the larger history is also kept outside the frame. The focus on the character of Saul comes at the expense of the broader context. Too little information is provided as guidance to viewers unfamiliar with the Holocaust, which leads one to wonder what audiences Nemes had in mind while crafting his film? In order to properly follow its storylines, Son of Saul demands a certain level of knowledge from its viewers. It seems surprising that Nemes assumed such knowledge, even for a Hungarian audience. One could leave this film not actually knowing something about the Holocaust as it unfolded at Auschwitz. Do we understand the scale of the crimes committed at Auschwitz and during the Holocaust in general? Why did Nemes open the film with an intertitle about the Sonderkommando but choose to provide absolutely no information about the Holocaust and Auschwitz-Birkenau – something akin to an exhibition didactic panel, in film intertitle form, containing brief and concise orienting text? No film can offer a comprehensive or totalizing understanding of Auschwitz, or the Holocaust. However, Nemes’ technique of contextual minimalism, and the privileging of immersive and impressionistic memory, risks at least the partial erasure of the specific historical events referred to in the film. How does such an approach promote Holocaust remembrance and education, which surely must have been one of the motivating factors behind the creation of this film?

Son of Saul can be said to offer an artistic response to the catastrophe of the Holocaust, situated between the demands of historical veracity and the more malleable needs of artistic interpretation. All art involves some rearranging of the facts in its imaginative reworking of reality. The artifices of stylization, and narrativization, for example, have the potential to impose unreliable and untruthful structures that occlude the historical memory of the Holocaust, but not necessarily so. Popular culture representations such as films have been delegitimized by being unfairly juxtaposed with some absolute standard of historical truth. By evaluating film as history, and only on history’s terms, the ability of film to provide both historical awareness and entertainment is not fully contemplated. Son of Saul makes us consider the very fine balance necessary where both these demands converge in a film set in Auschwitz. The film is unsteady in negotiating both these interests, as fact and fiction intermingle freely, and the viewer left uncertain where they are within this dynamic. For

those watching without in-depth knowledge of the history of the camp, it is difficult to know what events in the film are pure drama, what accounts are based on events which took place in the camp, and which scenes are a hybrid of fact and fiction. One example of this hybridization is the storyline that forms the basis for Saul’s mission throughout the film. That a child was pulled from the gas chambers alive and then quickly put to death by a camp doctor was based on an account by Miklós Nyiszl, who had worked in Birkenau as a physician for the Sonderkommando and as a pathologist assisting Josef Mengele. He survived Auschwitz and wrote a chronicle of his life and work at the camp: *Auschwitz: A Doctor’s Eyewitness Account*. Nemes takes Nyiszl’s account and modifies it to suit the needs of the film, thereby fictionalizing a significant event in the historical record of Auschwitz.

Questionable are not the necessities of filmic abbreviations or the creative license taken to achieve an immersive spectatorial experience, but, rather, the overall abstraction of the film. *Son of Saul* alludes to specific events that took place in the camp but without describing them in enough detail to discern what is actually taking place. Who were the victims of Auschwitz that the film shows arriving in trains and leaving as ashes? The events depicted are likely the destruction of Hungary’s Jewish community or the remnant of the Jews of the Lodz ghetto, but the film provides few clues as to the nationality or identity of these victims. Nor is there a clear chronology. The film opens in a time period just prior to the Sonderkommando revolt, which took place on October 7, 1944. From May until early July 1944, under the direction of Adolf Eichmann, in just eight weeks 437,000 Hungarian Jews were deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau; the camp reached its peak killing capacity during this time. It was during this brief period that one third of the total number of victims of Auschwitz were killed. More than 75 percent of those who were deported were murdered in the gas chambers of Auschwitz-Birkenau. In August, 67,000 Jews from the Lodz ghetto were transported to Auschwitz-Birkenau where 67 percent of them perished in the gas chambers. *Son of Saul* depicts a frantic rush to kill larger numbers of Jews even more rapidly. There is a specific historical reason for this. The impending defeat of the Third Reich, in the military sense, did not deter the other arm of the Nazi’s total war—the genocidal campaign against the Jews, (the Final Solution) was not abandoned, but rather its pace accelerated. Early in the film the disposal of the murdered corpses takes place in the crematorium, but a later scene shows piles of bodies being burned in an area outside of the crematoria complex. During this last phase of murder in Auschwitz, the incoming volume was so great that the crematoria could not handle the volume, and corpses were incinerated in open-air pits. The incineration of the bodies of the victims was a part of the concealment of evidence of the mass murder that had taken place there. *Son of Saul* does not make these facts known and therefore misses an opportunity to inform its audience about this last critical phase in the destruction of European Jewry and thus diminishes the film’s value for Holocaust and genocide education.

Saul’s participation in the underground resistance is the other main narrative thread of the film. The storyline is punctuated by vague references to a planned rebellion among the Sonderkommando (snippets of conversation, items to be gathered), but Saul’s assignments within the resistance are difficult to follow. There is a scene that takes place in a Birkenau warehouse where goods plundered from the victims are being sorted. A mysterious meeting between Saul and a female prisoner is arranged. Who is she and what is the nature of their relationship? She passes him a bundle. This visit is clearly linked to the revolt in the making, but like many other scenes in the film, the action is confusing. Was Saul facilitating the transfer of smuggled gunpowder to members of the camp’s resistance movement? Toward the end of the film, a revolt does takes place, but it is difficult to understand the scope of this revolt; it appears that amid the chaos of the rebellion a few prisoners managed to escape, soon to be captured and killed by camp guards in quick pursuit.

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15 Nyiszl recalls in this book that a teenage girl had survived the gas chambers. She was found alive at the bottom of a pile of corpses. Nyiszl revived the girl, but soon after Erich Mussfeld, a supervising SS officer, perceived her to be a risk to the order of the camp, as a witness to the gas chambers, and ordered her to be killed.


It is curious that the film does not convey that the smuggled gunpowder was fashioned into the crudely-made grenades and explosives, which were used by the Sonderkommando to launch the uprising. Crematorium IV was destroyed in the revolt and never used again, but Son of Saul fails to describe the scale and “success” of the October 7, 1944, rebellion and the story of one of the most significant acts of resistance in the history of the Holocaust. The film omits the story of the important role that women played in the Sonderkommando rebellion. It was a group of Jewish women who smuggled small amounts of gunpowder from a munitions factory, located within the Auschwitz complex where they worked, to men and women in the camp’s resistance movement and then eventually to the Sonderkommando. One of the key figures in the underground group responsible for smuggling the gunpowder was Róza Robota, who, like the mysterious woman in the film, worked at a clothing depot in Birkenau; one wonders why Nemes left the female figure in the depot so undeveloped as a character and the culmination of her courageous actions so vague.

Son of Saul touches upon another form of resistance—resistance through acts of documentation. The Nazis planned the total erasure of European Jewry, all the physical and evidentiary traces. Photographs taken by a Sonderkommando from inside Birkenau represent another significant act of resistance during the Holocaust - an act which, in the film, is inexplicably de-emphasized. Although none of the four photographs show the murder itself, the images, which capture the preparations for murder (a group of undressed women being readied for the gas chambers) and the aftermath (the Sonderkommando burning bodies in open-air incineration pits), are the only extant visual documents that depict the process of mass killing perpetrated at the gas chambers in Auschwitz-Birkenau. The Sonderkommando photographs are both an important expression of witnessing, documenting the lives of victims soon to be obliterated, and evidentiary documents whose purpose was to inform the outside world about the murderous events taking place at Auschwitz. These photographs represent a collective act of resistance by the organized underground movement: those who smuggled the camera into the camp, the photographer who captured the images, the people covering for the photographer, and those who smuggled the images out of the camp and handed them over to the Polish resistance. Saul is recruited by the resistance to provide cover for the Sonderkommando assigned to take the clandestine photographs by fixing a lock on a crematorium door. Saul’s rescue of the entire mission—by sensing the approach of SS officers and quickly hiding the camera in a duct—appears as an incidental moment in the film and the gravity of this act is lost. The Sonderkommando photographs are exceptional visual documents of immense historical importance, yet in Son of Saul the viewer would not know that the events depicted are part of the recorded history of the camp. Nor would they learn about the fate of these photographs. Son of Saul passes over yet another opportunity to educate audiences about a pivotal event in the history of the Holocaust.

With its cache of high-profile awards and large audiences (by Holocaust film standards), Son of Saul is one of the texts now shaping the memory of the Holocaust and, by extension, impacting our culture’s social awareness of the event. But what kind of memory and awareness is this film advancing? Nemes’s filmmaking seems to acknowledge a shift in the representation of human suffering in an age of media saturation; the privileging of the evidentiary, the factual and the graphic in the interest of preventing atrocities, having not yielded positive results, has given rise to alternative approaches to memory-work. But Nemes’s filmic memory-work presents audiences with too little and too much concurrently: there is a lack of explanation and reflection and an excess of sensorial disturbance. The problematic consistent throughout the film is that the complex and almost incomprehensible reality it refers to calls for more historical context than is provided. Perhaps Nemes purposefully rejects such attempts at elucidation, and in doing so suggests that there are neither simple meanings or lessons to take from the Holocaust. The Holocaust compels us to think deeply, and the disorientations and dislocations that Nemes places in the viewer’s path may be those irritants that provoke individual contemplation, in contrast to the prescribed interpretations generally advanced in Holocaust-themed films. In refusing to offer explanations for one of the most complex historical events in human history, the film’s equivocality may seem appropriate. However, rejecting the narratives of convention does not allow for the near complete rejection of the narrative of history.
Title of the Film: *Saul fia (Son of Saul)*; Director: László Nemes; Producers: Gábor Rajna, Gábor Sipos, Judit Stalter, Robert Vamos; Screenplay: László Nemes, Clara Royer; Cinematography: Mátyás Erdély; Film Editor: Matthieu Taponier; Sound Designer: Tamás Zányi; Country: Hungary; Year of Release: 2015; Production Company: Laokoon Filmgroup. Duration: 107 minutes.

**Bibliography**


