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Readers familiar with Praeger’s 2007 gathering of essays in five-volumes entitled *Strategic Intelligence* will welcome this updated and more compact collection of key articles from that original anthology. Capably edited by Loch K. Johnson, who also introduces readers to the current state of the literature on intelligence in the book’s opening piece, the work consists of twenty-one articles written by a combination of academics, practitioners, and other experts. It is divided into five topical parts: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government, The Intelligence Cycle, Covert Action, Counterintelligence, and Intelligence and Accountability.

The three articles that comprise the section on “Understanding the Hidden Side of Government” start with the aforementioned bibliographic essay written by the editor. Another article examines the methodologies used to conduct research in the intelligence field, but the most interesting piece is Amy B. Zegart’s look at why scholars have not yet fully accepted the study of intelligence as an academic discipline. She decries the neglect of scholars as antithetical to the historical role played by academics in “developing new organizations and new ideas for U.S. national security” (p. 44). Citing as examples of scholarly assistance to the Intelligence Community (IC) the use of academics as early CIA analysts and the contributions of game theory to providing insights into nuclear deterrence, she then concludes that the combined factors of secrecy and the restraints of current theories and methodologies are what are responsible for keeping professors at bay. It is a conundrum that does not appear to bode well for the future of the discipline nor the IC.

Since the intelligence failures of 9/11 and the flawed application of various forms of intelligence data that was used to justify the Iraq War, there has been an increasing sense of tension between politicians and intelligence professionals. Jack Davis’s essay in the second part of the book addressing “The Intelligence Cycle,” examines some of the existing ground rules governing the relationship between intelligence analysts and policymakers. He suggests some guidelines to support analysts’ independence and to avoid a “deliberate and unintentional politicization of analysis” (p. 131) while at the same time cautioning policy makers on possible subversion of analysis for political purposes. In regard to the former, he posits that the President’s
Intelligence Advisory Board is well positioned to oversee analyst compliance, while the role of the Ombudsman for Politicization should be strengthened to provide oversight of both the IC and policymakers. It is a suggestion well worth consideration.

The National Security Act of 1947 is generally considered to have vaguely provided the rationale for the conduct of covert action in support of U.S. foreign policy goals. Lying somewhere along a continuum of responses ranging from diplomatic to military force, the so-called ‘third option’ has been used to pursue a variety of operational goals from political, economic, or propaganda, to direct paramilitary actions. Since 9/11, covert action has been a burgeoning business. In the book’s third section that addresses that topic, Jennifer Kibbe’s essay on “Covert Action and the Pentagon” raises some interesting questions about the rapidly expanding capabilities and missions of military special operations forces (SOF). Though it was traditionally the realm of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Kibbe asserts that SOF has increasingly engaged in operational activities that fall within the realm of covert action, which is designed to conceal the identity of the sponsor, as opposed to merely clandestine activities, which are designed only to maintain tactical secrecy. Kibbe explores the implications of liberal legal interpretations of the boundaries of the Intelligence Authorization Act and questions whether there is sufficiently robust congressional oversight. She concludes with a brief look at the struggles to transition the drone mission from CIA hands to those of the military’s Joint Special Operations Command, citing it as a case study of the various oversight issues that accompany the involvement of the Department of Defense in covert operations. Kibbe calls for clearly needed updates to address the unforeseen changes that have occurred since the creation of laws and policies governing the roles of various agencies in covert activities.

The fourth section of the book is entitled “Counterintelligence,” (CI) but it necessarily addresses the issue of counterterrorism (CT) as well. Though counterespionage (CE) is acknowledged by the editor as an offensive means of CI, it is a subject that is inadequately treated in any of the essays in this section in other than an historical sense. It is an element of CI worth looking at more closely. Our intelligence capabilities must be directed at more than just the efforts to fight terrorism and preserve the safety of the homeland. The vulnerabilities of our information technology to cyber attack is illustrative of the hazards of failing to devote sufficient effort to countering those new cyber threats as well as addressing more traditional espionage threats. The Great Game goes on whether scholars find it relevant or not, but the topic of intelligence and terrorism is admittedly a pressing issue.
In “The Intelligence War against Global Terrorism,” Richard Russell explores how the CIA has fared in its role of conducting Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations, performing analysis that informs decision makers, and carrying out covert actions. Sadly, this is one article that could have benefitted greatly from an updated evaluation of that performance since 2007, yet the notes reveal only two newer sources, both of which refer readers directly to the sources for more information on waterboarding or paramilitary activities. Russell cites evidence that is critical of the CIA’s efforts in all the areas he discusses, and his findings were clearly valid when the article was written, but we are left to wonder whether the analysis of more current evidence would alter the conclusions.

The final segment of the book entitled “Intelligence and Accountability,” begins with Davit Barrett’s study tracing the history of congressional oversight through 1963. It follows with Glenn Hastedt’s discussion of four different but interrelated political patterns that influence intelligence policymaking and which must be acknowledged if we are to gain a full understanding of the policy process. Hastedt’s piece, along with the subsequent work by Matthew Aid on the National Security Agency, both delve into post-Snowden concerns at that agency. Hastedt discusses the results of the inquiry into the agency’s electronic surveillance activities and President Obama’s reform agenda, but he is critical of what was left unsaid in that agenda, noting the President’s promise only to end the activity “as it currently exists” (p. 412). Matthew Aid provides a broader consideration of the future of the agency, citing a number of factors that could potentially influence its mission.

Mark Phythian’s article on “The British Experience with Intelligence Accountability” rounds out the book. He traces the historical rise of accountability starting in the 1970s and focuses largely on the Intelligence Security Committee (ISC) in Britain, including an interesting discussion of the role of British intelligence in the period leading up the Iraq War and how the results of the ISC’s investigation damaged its credibility. He ends by touching on the impact of the Snowden case and cites it as a potential “catalyst in speeding up the next stage in what history will record as a slow march toward an appropriately powerful system of legislative oversight of intelligence” (p. 468).

A glossary of terms used in the book and an appendix showing the 2014 structure of the IC in the United States round out the work. As with most collections of essays, readers will find something of interest in the book.
few of them have stood the test of time well, others have been substantially updated to incorporate new research or information, and a few would have been made even more relevant and current with the addition of more new material. As a textbook it would be a useful primer on strategic intelligence issues and, if not always the most current material, it would at least open the door for discussion of the major topics and perhaps steer students to avenues of research on their own.

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