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FROM THE EDITOR
Waiting for the Great Leap Forward
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SPECIAL ISSUE: CONNECTED CITIZENSHIP—PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION
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Waiting for the Great Leap Forward: From Democratic Principles to Democratic Reality

E. Wayne Ross
University of Louisville

US students came out near the top of a recent 28-nation study of civics education. The International Civic Education Study tested 90,000 14-year-olds in 24 "democratic" countries. US ninth-graders were ranked sixth overall, indicating that they were among the most knowledgeable in the world about what are accepted as the fundamental principles of democracy. That’s the good news.

The bad news is that the study, conducted by the Netherlands-based International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Attainment (IEA), concludes that despite their grasp of the fundamental principles and processes, US students’ understanding of democracy is superficial and detached from reality.

Judith Torney-Purta, the lead author of the report on US students' performance, told Education Week that "students really have an understanding of the basic principles and narrative of democracy, though they may not have gotten the details, such as the content of specific documents or being able to put wars on a timeline" (Manzo, 2001). The latter has been confirmed by findings of the National Assessment of Educational Progress civic tests. Unlike the IEA assessment, the NAEP tests students’ detailed knowledge of the US government and democratic processes. The 1998 NAEP found that US 4th and 8th graders generally have a weak grasp of the underlying principles of the US Constitution and how US government works (see Ross, 2000).

Despite the good showing of US students on the IEA study, Torney-Purta raises a key issue for social educators, “Whether this [US students’ knowledge of civic education principles] is enough or not is a question we all have to deal with” (Manzo, 2001).

What exactly did the IEA study find? The profile of US ninth-graders concepts of democracy, citizenship, and government based on the findings of the CivEd assessment, as it is known, included the following:

- About 90 percent reported that it is good for democracy when everyone has the right to express opinions freely.
• Approximately 80 percent reported that voting in every
election and showing respect for the government leaders were important factors in being good citizens.

• Eighty-nine percent thought that it was important for a
good citizen to participate in activities in the community.

• Eighty-four percent said that the government should be
responsible for keeping prices under control.

• Fifty-nine percent said that it was the responsibility of
the government to provide an adequate standard of liv-
ing for the unemployed.

• About ninety-percent said that the government should
be responsible for ensuring equal political opportunities
for men and women, providing free basic education and
health care for all, guaranteeing peace and order within
the country and providing an adequate standard of liv-
ing for old people. (Baldi, Perie, Skidmore, Greenberg, &
Hahn, 2001)

CivEd findings also confirmed much of what we already know
about the school and classroom context of civic knowledge.

• Seventy percent of schools with a ninth-grade reported
having ninth-grade civics-related subject requirements.

• Sixty-five percent of students reported studying social
studies in school almost every day.

• US students were more likely to report reading a text-
book or filling out worksheets when studying social stud-
ies (88%) than engaging in activities such as debating and
discussing issues in class (45%) or writing letters to give
their opinions (27%). (Baldi, Perie, Skidmore, Greenberg,
& Hahn, 2001)

Confirming findings from the 1998 NAEP, the IEA study found that
students who participated in hands-on learning experiences, like mock
trials and student government or who took part in democratic class-
room activities, had greater civic knowledge and engagement outside
the classroom than other students.

Demographic, socioeconomic and out-of-school contexts, unsurprisingly, are also linked to civic knowledge. For example:
• Students in low-poverty schools outperformed students in high-poverty schools.

• White and multiracial students scored higher, on average, than African American and Hispanic students.

• Asian and African American students were significantly more likely than their white peers to report that the government should be responsible for economy-related issues.

• Hispanic, Asian, and multiracial students reported having more positive attitudes toward rights for immigrants than did their white peers.

• Students who participated in meetings or activities sponsored by any type of organization, even if they participated only a few times a month, had higher civic knowledge than students who did not participate at all. (Baldi, Perie, Skidmore, Greenberg, & Hahn, 2001)

Perhaps most importantly, however, while student volunteerism is at an all time high, CivEd results show that students are disenchanted with traditional political involvement and distrust political parties. Media observers have responded to this irony by arguing that civic education needs to expand beyond the classroom (Rothstein, 2001). Steven Cuthbertson, the president of Youth Service America, says he is "embarrassed that young people sense that [service learning and volunteerism] is an alternative to civic participation" (Manzo, 2001). While there is certainly a link between service learning, volunteerism, and civic participation, Cuthbertson believes that most students fail to see the connection between such issues and their public-policy implications. This, in my view, is symptomatic of a key failure of civic education.

As social educators we should not be content to merely teach the principles of democracy and then wait for our students to translate those principles into action. This great leap forward, from understanding democratic principles to active engagement as a democratic citizen (and ultimately to the creation of truly democratic society) requires all of us (students, educators, and others) to start making connections that are generally not made.
In his new book, Bertell Ollman recounts the problems we face when we fail to make connections and perceive patterns. Ollman recounts the work of Oliver Sacks and the infamous case of the man who mistook his wife for a hat. The brain-injured patient that Sacks describes lost his ability to perceive patterns. He could see aspects of things, but could not put them together. As a result he couldn’t tell what anything was (e.g., he could not recognize faces).

As Ollman points out, this is a malady that is far more widespread when it comes to things sociological and historical. He argues that the social sciences reinforce this tendency in two ways. First, social sciences break up the totality of human knowledge into the specialized learning of competing disciplines. This is a condition that, at least theoretically, the construct of a multidisciplinary social studies should be able to overcome, although the trends toward disciplinary curriculums and high-stakes discipline-oriented exams threaten the unique social studies perspective. Secondly, the dominance of quantitative techniques in the social sciences leads students to focus almost exclusively on “the bits and pieces of our experiences that permit statistical manipulation” (p. 108).

When it comes to social issues, Ollman argues, people can see the parts well enough, but not the connections and not the overall pattern. Not unlike the failure of young folks to link issues like homelessness and hunger, which they may be volunteering to counter, and the larger contexts that spawn these conditions, or the ways in which students grasp principles of democracy but lack civic engagement.

This separation—repeated on a hundred fronts—of what cannot be separated without distortion is the key feature of what is called “un-dialectical” thought. “Dialectical” thinking, on the other hand, is the ongoing effort to grasp things in terms of their interconnections and this includes their ties with their own preconditions and future possibilities as well as with whatever is affecting them (and whatever they are affecting) right now. (p. 109)

While not the sole culprit, social studies education is too often a contributor to the “trivia, paradoxes, half-truths and outright nonsense that constitutes a large part of most people’s understanding of society.” In order to make more and better sense of the world Ollman prescribes not only the uncovering of facts generally hidden from view, but more importantly a dialectical grasp of the facts we already know.

We have been repeatedly subjected to various surveys and studies that highlight the ignorance of US students on issues of social studies content (the NAEP, in particular, comes to mind). But as political
scientist Michael Parenti asks, “what is so desirable about knowing most of these facts in the first place, especially if they remain unconnected to any meaningful socio-historic explanation and often mask more than they reveal?” (p. 7) The facts are important, but we need more than a few bare ones and we must find ways of making sense of them. For example,

Instead of just wishing more students knew that the Monroe Doctrine was issued in 1823 and that it attempted to discourage European colonization in the Western Hemisphere, we might want to ask why US leaders felt compelled to introduce this “doctrine.” Was it an altruistic gesture to protect Latin countries from European despotism, as some claimed at the time and many textbooks have maintained ever since? Was it to assure the peace and safety of the United States, as the doctrine itself declares? Or could a major consideration have been to guarantee a free hand for US investors in the Western Hemisphere? Secretary of State John Quincy Adams (a principal shaper of the Monroe Doctrine) understood that even the British were aware that “the new Spanish-American markets simply had to be kept open” for US commercial interests, and free from colonization by the continental powers. (Parenti, p. 8)

From this point we might raise questions about whose interests are served by US foreign policy. Or we might consider the parallels of the Monroe Doctrine and the Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, and Carter Doctrines and other assertions of US supremacy in the Western Hemisphere and/or the world.

But just making connections is not enough. As Ollman (2001) points out many people have “noted the connection between the growing wealth of the few and the increasing misery of the many, between the interests of the capitalist class and the actions of the Government, between having money and being free, between being poor and being powerless” (p. 107). Despite making these connections many people don’t take these observations very seriously. Ollman says lacking a theory to make sense of what they are seeing people stop seeing it or forget what they have seen or “ennoble their confusion by calling it a ‘paradox.’” 1

One of the major obstacles we face in overcoming the disconnections and distortions characteristic of “un-dialectical” thought is invisible. Parenti (1999) says that the distortion within mainstream history is neither willful nor conscious because it is merely an outgrowth of the overall political ideology and culture.
If there is no conscious intent to miseducate, it is because many historians who claim to be disciples of impartial scholarship have little sense of how they are wedded to ideological respectability and inhospitable to counterhegemonic views. This synchronicity between their individual beliefs and the dominant belief system is treated as "objectivity." Departures from this ideological orthodoxy are themselves dismissed as ideological. (p. 4)

Parenti's assessment applies equally well to "mainstream" teaching of history and social studies as well as teacher education and research in education. Capitalism is virtually invisible in the social sciences, however, by attaining a dialectical grasp of what we already know we can resolve the "paradoxes" of massive poverty in times of incredible wealth; the existence of chattel slavery in a democracy; government that serves the interests of the few over the interests of the many. And perhaps we can resolve the most important paradox of all for social studies educators, that is, how our students can be rated among the best in the world when it comes to knowing the principles of democracy, but hold an understanding that is detached from reality.

Note

1 A good example of this kind of response can be found in the disbelief, indifference, and/or confusion of many people when confronted with the facts of the "economic boom" in the US over the past number of years, which illustrate quite clearly that, among other things, the poverty of full-time, year round workers has actually increased in the past 25 years even though GDP has increased (see Ross, 2001).

References


The idea for this special issue developed initially from a College and University Faculty Assembly-sponsored paper session presented at the 1999 National Council for the Social Studies Annual Meeting in Orlando, FL, a session for which I served as discussant and Chara Bohan, of the University of Texas at Austin, served as chairperson.

I remember clearly that as I prepared for my role as discussant, as I read and reread each paper and began organizing my remarks, several understandings subtly yet unmistakably emerged, and indeed stood out, relative to all of the presenters’ thoughtful and thought-provoking works. First, they were obviously on the leading edge of social studies scholarship and, in my estimation, certainly publishable in any of a number of distinguished pedagogical journals. Second, and perhaps more relevant and important here, they were exceedingly well matched to one another, connected, thematically linked around various ideas and unique and generally underrepresented orientations, especially toward democratic citizenship and citizenship education—arguably, the two principal and most historically dominant concepts in the entire field of social education. (Here, of course, thanks go to CUFA’s 1999 Program Chair Elizabeth Anne Yeager.)

In the original CUFA session, the participants’ each pursued the general issue of “Democracy and Democratic Citizenship Education.” In their own ways, however, they addressed and tackled a number of more specific themes and topics, ideas critical not only to any understanding of democracy and democratic citizenship education per se, but also to the very meanings, statuses, and even boundaries of contemporary social studies education itself. Drawing on a range of diverse traditions, viewpoints, commitments, and frameworks, each spoke powerfully to such longstanding and significant concerns as: (1) the “nature” and “place” of social studies education (e.g., What is social studies? What are its purposes? What does or should it mean?); (2) the necessity of viewing citizenship education within both its historical, social, cultural, political, and economic contexts and its current, shifting, and dynamic situational multiplicities; (3) the need for a democratic/citizenship/social education that is “connected” (i.e., a/inter/multidisciplinary, global, cross-cultural, anti-oppressive,
community-based, etc.); and (4) the meaning of the collective and common goods and their relationships to authentic democracy, citizenship, and citizenship education. In essence, each presenter located the complexities of democratic citizenship according to the developing and evolving conditions of contemporary US and international society (including those growing and troubling conditions of state-corporate economic globalization, inequality and injustice, environmental degradation, and post-Soviet Union Eastern European democracy movements—all traditionally within the purview of social studies) and argued, in effect, that at the very least democratic citizenship education necessitates (1) the focused study of issues such as the various and interconnected relationships among the individual, the community, and manifold larger environments, and (2) a serious and challenging, shifting and critical pedagogy of multiple perspectives and multiple positionalities. In short, what the presenters sought to establish was that connection—among peoples, individuals, communities, environments, disciplines, worldviews, and so forth—was and is more meaningful, authentic, and imperative than disconnection, especially as disconnection generally means (and has meant) a social education that separates purpose, method, content, and assessment; process from product; interpretation from data; subjectivity from objectivity; fact from value; public from private; civic knowledge from civic action; student life from citizen life; and context from information.

In this special issue of TRSE the contributing authors continue their engagement with these difficult and profound ideas. In "The Refusals of Citizenship: Normalizing Practices in Social Educational Discourses," Lisa J. Cary brings to the table a series of perspectives grounded in poststructural theory in an effort to "highlight the dangers of uninterrogated normalizing practices in social education" that work to "exclude [italics added] through gendered and raced discourses." Here, she fundamentally problematizes and challenges the dominant constructions of certain traditionally key pedagogical subject positions, including those of the "good" teacher, the "good" citizen, and the "good" student, and argues for a social education "that complicates our assumptions of citizenship" by taking seriously (and not simply for granted) both citizenship and its refusals.

In "Ethical Citizenship in a Postmodern World: Toward a More Connected Approach to Social Education For the Twenty-First Century," authors Neil O. Houser and Jeffrey J. Kuzmic begin by recognizing the significant and historical strengths of social studies, including its historic commitments to "the needs of the community at large rather than just the well-being of the individual," and its acceptance of the crucial and far-reaching "importance of connectedness." And yet, they continue, certain "conditions and developments" (e.g., economic exploitation, hyperindividualism, resource depletion, and so
on) have made necessary the re-examination of social studies work within the contexts of ideas and understandings that have evolved since the field's inception and early existence. By drawing upon a number of sophisticated and critical academic and intellectual viewpoints, Houser and Kuzmic aim "to construct a base from which to theorize about a more connected approach to social education," one founded upon an authentically ethical citizenship and aimed toward promoting the connected and "common good of humankind" as well as the ultimate and essential vitality and "health of the planet" (arguably, the highest and most consequential of citizenship ideals).

J. Joe Bishop and Gregory E. Hamot, in "Democracy as a Cross-Cultural Concept: Promises and Problems," examine the extent to which democracy is, in fact, a "cross-cultural concept adaptable from a developed democracy to a developing democracy." Drawing on their work with both US and Czech educators, they (1) describe a "citizenship education reform project" in which participants "mutually shaped a common ground for understanding the concept of democracy," and (2) present and analyze the results of a survey of Czech social studies teachers on their "conceptions of democracy" as an effort to "test the viability" of this common ground approach. They interpret their findings vis-à-vis areas of commonality and difference and consider their implications relative to curriculum reform and democratic citizenship education.

Drawing on "feminist and other alternative interpretations of citizenship in democratic societies," Dawn M. Shinew, in "'Disrupt, Transgress, and Invent Possibilities': Feminists' Interpretations of Educating for Democratic Citizenship," explores not only the notion of citizenship but also its meanings relative to social studies education within the contexts of postmodern society. Building on the work of postmodern/feminist theorists such as Fine and Lather, as well as upon her own focus group-based research, Shinew takes up Eisner's (1997) challenge to interrogate "how we perform the magical feat of transforming the contents of our consciousness into a public form that others can understand" (p. 4).

Chara Bohan and Tyrone Howard serve as respondents to the four feature articles. Both provide insightful, balanced, and critical discussions of the authors' ideas, interpretations, and frameworks. They bring to their work their creativity and their caring, and their fundamental commitments to an authentic and relevant social/citizenship education. Though a difficult task, their efforts represent a sophisticated blending of fairness, scholarly rigor, complexity, and expertise (not to mention a praiseworthy degree of both patience toward me and a willingness to meet my generally impossible deadlines).
As with all issues of TRSE, this one includes several book reviews (my gratitude here to Book Review Editor Perry Marker). For this issue there are four: Andra Makler’s on Michael Schudson’s The Good Citizen, A History of American Civic Life; E. Wayne Ross’s on Richard Rorty’s Achieving Our Country; Valerie Ooka Pang’s on Walter G. Stephan’s Reducing Prejudice and Stereotyping in Schools and Howard D. Mehlinger’s on Dieter Schmidt-Sirns’s Political Learning in the Historical Context. As leading social studies scholars, each of these reviewers addresses democracy and citizenship according to not only his or her own unique and critical interpretations of the individual books, but also against their own individual understandings of contemporary social, cultural, political, and pedagogical life.

Lastly, I feel fortunate to be able to include a “Viewpoint” selection written by noted scholar John Marciano, author of Civic Illiteracy and Education: The Battle for the Hearts and Minds of American Youth (Marciano, 1997)—a work widely read and much admired by many social studies educators. As is the case with Civic Illiteracy, here Marciano explores “The central concerns of [his] work,” which “are the distortions and lies that youth learn about war and patriotism in their schools and textbooks.” In this article he builds critically on “The thesis of the book”—tragically, “that among the fundamental purposes of education perhaps the most fundamental is to foster uncritical allegiance to the militaristic and violent policies of the national security state against Third World nations, and the political and economic war against the poor here at home.”

In addition to the authors, each of whom responded admirably to a range of guest editor-induced demands and pressures, there are, of course, a number of other individuals who have in some way contributed to the publication of this special issue. These include most especially TRSE Editor E. Wayne Ross (who made this undertaking possible) and Book Review Editor Perry Marker, both of whose patience, experience, and editorial expertise were no doubt severely tested, if not in fact taken to their very limits, by my efforts in this endeavor. I wish also, however, to thank Walter C. Parker of the University of Washington, Elizabeth Anne Yeager of the University of Florida, the perceptive though ultimately unacknowledgeable reviewers for both TRSE and the 1999 CUFA Program, the audience members for the original presentation session, and the many encouraging members of the TRSE Editorial Board.

I hope and believe that TRSE readers will agree with me and find the various works included in this issue interesting, challenging, and important. Although I anticipate that they will generate a great deal of critical discussion and debate within the field, a possibility that I and the authors would both welcome and invite, I do hope and believe also that readers will view these contributions as representa-
tive of the best in contemporary social studies scholarship and as indicative of the dynamic vibrancy and continuing relevance of our field to the entirety of educational and cultural work. It has been my pleasure to work with each of these authors and to participate in the evolution of their submissions throughout the editorial process. For each of us it has been a truly insightful, unique, and exciting experience, one we hope the readers of TRSE will share, and one for which I, as guest editor, am sincerely and especially grateful.

Notes

Walter C. Parker also participated in the original CUFA session. His paper, "Alternative approaches to citizenship education: Connecting the dots" (Parker, 1999), influenced greatly my understanding of many of the concepts and themes explored in this specific issue. Although it was unavailable for TRSE because of prior publication commitments, readers are encouraged to see the excellent revised versions of the paper that appear in Theory Into Practice (Parker, 2000) and in William B. Stanley's Critical Issues for Social Studies Research in the 21st Century (Parker, 2001), in addition, of course, to the original work.

References


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The Refusals of Citizenship: Normalizing Practices in Social Educational Discourses

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Abstract
The foundational assumptions of the framing discourses in social education have often been assumed to be neutral and natural. Utilizing a poststructural perspective in the analysis of the foundations of teacher education reform and multicultural education discourses this paper highlights the dangers of uninterrogated normalizing practices in social education. These discursive practices are illustrative of reductionist tendencies and governing mentalities that exclude through gendered and raced discourses. This reduction includes the legitimized (dominant) construction of the subject position of “good” teacher, citizen, and student. Talking differently about the challenges of critical and transformative efforts in social education suggests spaces for a more adequate knowing that complicates our assumptions of citizenship within social education by theorizing about the refusals of citizenship.

Defining social education in its broadest sense, this article presents the cases of discourses in teacher education reform and multicultural education as illustrative normalizing practices that maintain the status quo despite their best intentions for social change. I suggest that these discursive practices, if uninterrogated/uninterrupted, result in reductionist and prescriptive notions of “citizen.” Here I discuss the dangers of assimilationism, the reinscription of whiteness, and the reductionist and gendered technical rationalist nature of teacher education reform rhetoric. From positions of privilege in multicultural education to the constructed notions of “good teaching” and “the professional” in teacher education, I argue that it is time to study the foundational assumptions that frame the way we talk (and act and think) about these areas as a way to highlight and disrupt the dominant knowledge project in social education (Lincoln, 1998). These seemingly disparate fields intersect at the level of social educational discourses (Popkewitz, 1998a; Fairclough, 1995).
Questioning the usefulness of Popkewitz’s (1998a) conception of the redemptive culture of the educational and social sciences as a framework for understanding has provided a provocative positionality for this discussion. Using critical discourse (Fairclough, 1995) and poststructural analyses (Foucault, 1980; Popkewitz, 1998a; Ong, 1999; Britzman, 1998), I have wondered and wandered through the multiply-layered discourses in these two seemingly distinct areas and conclude that they are suggestive of a particular conception of citizen and that practices situated as transformational and liberatory are not necessarily so. In conclusion, I have immersed myself in the refusals of citizenship as a socially constructed subject position that might limit democratic participation and play out in the way we know/talk/act in social education.

A suspension of belief and an interrogation of the center is called for in the social sciences (Marcus & Fisher, 1986), yet it would seem as if these questions have thus far not been addressed at this level in social education, nor institutionally in teacher education reform and multicultural education. While efforts have been made to disrupt the gendered, raced, and classed nature of the field and to create useful spaces from which to begin a different discussion, I continue to question—How do these resistant positionalities exist within and against the totalizing tendencies of the dominant culture that attempt to govern and essentialize such discourses? Consider, for example, multicultural education as one effort to disrupt assumptions of homogeneity in education:

If we examine the reasoning about “the successful” teacher and child in the multicultural curriculum reforms, we can recognize that the ideas of “success” embody a normativity about childhood, learning, and achievement that are not necessarily progressive but are the effects of power. These effects inscribe particular sets of norms and values about ‘reason’ and the “reasonable person” who is then seen as successful. The norms are not those of the public rhetoric about inclusion but relate to rules of reasoning about “the educated subject” to changes in culture and economy. These images of the subject are the effects of power rather than abstract principles of citizenship or social inclusion. (Popkewitz, 1998a, p. 91)

Marcus and Fisher (1986) call for a more sophisticated epistemology in research endeavors and suggest an important question for social education. How can this “crisis” of representation move the field into the 21st century? Can we create spaces from which to disrupt essentialist notions of cultural diversity, citizen, gender, and class? How
might we interrupt the institutionalization and normalization of individuals in academic discourses to enable work towards a more effective, socially just teacher education? Although this paper asks more questions than it answers, it is the beginning of a time for rethinking and questioning unarticulated assumptions about how we come to "know" social education.

A Postmodern Moment

Stanley (1985, 1992), Lincoln (1998), and Popkewitz (1998a) have discussed ways to rethink social education reform and research in this postmodern moment. However, embedded within these dominant discourses are untroubled realist ontologies that aim to authenticate the "good citizen" through populist and humanist constructions. "Thus, there may be a de facto consensus on a rationale for social education, as conservative cultural transmission to reify and reproduce the status quo of society and institutional arrangements" (Stanley, 1985, p. 348).

Stanley (1992) presents a radical positionality which provides a space for discussion of the possibilities for postmodernism and poststructuralism. Thus this constant call for the salvation of the "good citizen" (in multicultural education and teacher education, for example) may be interrogated using counterhegemonic discourses which, according to Stanley, poststructuralism makes possible by highlighting the tensions of critical efforts in social education:

What remains unclear in the debate within critical pedagogy is the relationship (or tension) between utopian thought, values, and pragmatic theory. In other words, while the postmodern and poststructuralist critique has led many radical educators to accept the problematic and contingent nature of all values—including those of radical democracy—there remains an inclination on the part of critical educators to employ such contingent values (e.g., emancipation, freedom, empowerment, democracy, justice, solidarity, etc.) as the basis of a utopian view to orient sociocultural formation. (Stanley, 1992, p. 172)

Stanley (1992) concludes with the caveat that poststructuralism is anti-foundational and thus helps to illuminate and radicalize the emancipatory potential of social education as a way to "understand the 'textuality' of the social world in which we live and to act to change that world. In this sense, poststructuralism is not merely a method at the disposal of any political movement (a nihilistic position) but a way
The social sciences developed in a manner parallel to the state bureaucracy. The social sciences provided the disciplinary knowledge that linked new civil institutions with the liberal democratic political rationalities of the state. The construction of freedom became a problem of the social administration of the autonomous, self-motivated citizen. (Popkewitz, 1998a, p. 3)

**Social Education Discourses**

Technologies of power and the embodiment of the redemptive culture of social scientific research are discussed by Popkewitz (1998a) as in danger of reinscribing historical exclusions and obscuring power relations in research. These institutional processes normalized and regulated individuals to produce docile bodies while concealing the relations of power that shaped the democratic project (Foucault, 1977; Popkewitz, 1998a). “My argument is that the particular ideas of progress and redemption inscribed in the social sciences are the effects of power which, when they go unnoticed in contemporary research and policy, may inter and enclose the possibility of change by reinscribing the very rules of reason and practice that need to be struggled against” (Popkewitz, 1998a, pp. 2-3). In this way the modernist knowledge project as well as the pragmatism of John Dewey

...
can be seen in a new light as contributors to the un-interrogated populist ideals of progress and individual perfectibility:

In contemporary school reforms, these foundational assumptions are deeply embedded as doxa. Dominant and liberal educational reform discourses tend to instrumentally organize change as logical and sequential, although there has been some recognition of the pragmatic qualities of social life (see, e.g., Fullan with Stiegelbauer, 1991). Although the specific focus may change, the agents of redemption are the State and educational researchers, and the agents of change are teachers as ‘self’-motivated professionals. (Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998, p. 7)

Popkewitz (1998a) draws from a Foucauldian analysis of the social and educational sciences. This work encourages us to be suspicious of the “naturalness” of social education discourses.

The notion of discourse is ambiguous in Foucault. A thinking of discourse as both what is said and what is done, which breaks down the distinction between language (discourse in the narrow sense) and practice, is much closer to what I think he intends than just language, but this is not always how he uses the term himself. Unfortunately, most people who use the word discourse think he is talking about what people say. For me, the only function of discourse is to end the action/language distinction (Stuart Hall as quoted in Osborne & Segal, 1999, p. 398).

Foucault was a French poststructuralist who worked to reveal the régimes of truth that legitimize dominant ways of knowing and to highlight how technologies of power shape and are shaped by the subject/object relationships in “discourse” (Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998). Foucault (1977) directly challenged the notion that social institutions can naturally or neutrally “create” empowered and emancipated citizens. According to Foucault, régimes of truth produce legitimate knowledge that (a) serves to regulate and reinscribe the power relations of the institutions, (b) function as dominant discourses (“Truth”), and thus (c) regulate the behavior and ideological assumptions of the institution:

Each society has its régime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements,
the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault, 1980, p. 131)

Truth and power circulate throughout the system. The populist goals of social studies education, for example, are immersed within this system. Dominant conceptions of citizenship prescribed by particularist notions of democratic participation have created a totalizing and exclusivist ideology that serves to silence cultural differences. "While the redemptive theme is rhetorically positioned in the name of democratic principles, the concrete strategies are concerned with the governing of the soul. This reconstitutes the historical relation of the register of social administration and the register of freedom that tied the state and social sciences at the turn of the century" (Popkewitz, 1998a, p. 15).

Foucault (1991) interrogated the "governmentality" of the modern state and the administering of such dichotomies as freedom-civic competence and public-private and the self-regulation of modern institutions as "transformative institutions." Governmentality is a useful concept when deconstructing the conditions by which the practices of collaboration and Professional Development Schools in social education, for example, are constructed as technologies of the modernist project.

This may suggest some reasons why education, both schooling and university sectors, has become so central in the development of new forms of governmentality, exemplifying new strategies, tactics, and techniques of power to furnish what had become the major form of power relations defining institutions and individuals in Western societies. The institutions of formal education, schools and universities, have become central to the 'disciplining' in most if not all other fields. (Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998, p. 22)

One way to sustain rigorous questioning of the "truth" embodied in educational work and research is to articulate and disrupt the "natural" (thus neutral) foundations of the dominant discourses (Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998). Truth, according to Foucault, is played out in the three dimensional space of knowledge, subjectivity, and power (Simola, Heikkinen, & Silvonen, 1998). This is an important point to consider when studying the dominant discourses in teacher education and multicultural education, as the "truth" of the field/area can be deconstructed—as can the ways in which the "subject"/
the "good" citizen/the "good" student is constituted and constitutes him/herself. An investigation of the production of "truth" and the "subject" reveals the ways in which the field has excluded and silenced marginal discourses (Apple, 1996; Stanley, 1992; Lincoln, 1998; Popkewitz, 1998a).

The Redemptive Culture of the Social and Educational Sciences

Popkewitz (1998a) addressed the historical foundations of the social and educational sciences and described the redemptive culture that arose from populist goals which inscribed democratic ideals within the study of the social sciences. Autonomy, empowerment, and emancipation were promised—yet the institutional processes normalized and regulated individuals to produce docile bodies instead. This occurred through self-regulation and surveillance that were concealed in relations of power shaped with/in the democratic project (Popkewitz, 1998a; Foucault, 1977). The development of the social sciences, according to Popkewitz (1998a), paralleled state bureaucracy. "The social sciences provided the disciplinary knowledge that linked new civil institutions with the liberal democratic political rationalities of the state. The construction of freedom became a problem of the social administration of the autonomous, self-motivated citizen" (Popkewitz, 1998a, p. 3).

By highlighting the culture of redemption that emerged within the social sciences, Popkewitz (1998a) suggests that it is possible to work within and against the governing practices that disqualify certain groups from participation, thus interrupting the normalizing tendencies of the total institution of education.

The idea that the state could administer human freedom involved social planning. The new citizen—or "new man," a term that circulated into the early 20th century—connected the scope and aspirations of public powers with the personal and subjective capacities of individuals. New institutions of health, employment, and education tied the new social welfare goals of the state with a particular form of scientific expertise that was to organize subjectivities. That is, the way in which individuals personally experienced and understood the self and the world related to social practices and power relations which constituted the order through which meaning was structured (see, e.g., Scott, 1991). A complex apparatus of institutions, for example, targeted the child, the family, the worker, and the new citizen. Policy and science were to produce a mentality by which the new citizen or individual acted and par-
ticipated in what Michel Foucault (1979b) called “governmentality.” (Popkewitz, 1998a, p. 4)

Even the progressive pragmatism of John Dewey when seen in this light is indicative of the universal modernist project to create productive and worthwhile citizens through populist rhetoric that inscribed specific “dominant” rules of participation (Lincoln, 1998; Popkewitz, 1991, 1998b). Thus, the redemptive culture of populist rhetoric in teacher education governed the souls of individual students and teachers to work for the “greater good” within certain boundaries:

While the current rhetoric is about giving voice to excluded groups and therefore being democratic and emancipatory, this frequent call to reconstitute principles of participation and responsibility occurs through redemptive discourses that are to discipline parents and the community in saving the child. That call for salvation entails discourses that construct particular sets of norms about the child, parent, and community that emerge from political rationalities about populations of targeted groups. It is not some ‘natural’ parent or community that participates, but groups defined through the ordering, normalizing, and dividing practices inscribed in the discourses of participation. (Popkewitz, 1998a, p. 11)

Below I present multicultural education and teacher education reform as illustrative of the discourses that may continue to work from unidimensional, raced, and gendered notions of citizenship if we do not interrogate the assumptions that frame them. There is a need for increased interrogation of the foundational assumptions of the field as this makes possible the demonstration/illustration of the tensions that exist between social administration and freedom in liberal democracies (Popkewitz, 1998b). A Foucauldian analysis of the practices that govern the souls of teachers and students is one way of highlighting the ways universalist assumptions reify an exclusive notion of a “good citizen” or “good teacher” (Foucault, 1977; Popkewitz, 1998b). It also allows us to move beyond critical perspectives by encouraging an increasing awareness of the technologies of power (the way power circulates) in the creation and production of official (legitimate) knowledges and subjects (citizens).

Social education discourses, as discussed here, provide a space for rethinking the ways in which knowledge and power intersect in higher education. It is vital to create a place from which to interrogate the exclusivity of hegemonic discourses (Popkewitz, 1998a; Lincoln,
"Higher education is the only organization we have which is dedicated first and foremost to the generation of new knowledge, and the re-consideration, reconstruction, revision, and reshaping of received knowledge" (Lincoln, 1998, p. 12). Both teacher education and multicultural education may be seen as redemptive projects that attempt to provide opportunities for the development of more egalitarian schools and social transformation in general (Goodman, 1995). I continue to question this conceptualization as a lens through which to study the discourses framing teacher education and multicultural education, and thus I wonder about the masculinist conceptualization of "teacher" in the reform talk and the dangers of "race/ing" assimilationist tendencies in multicultural education.

**Legitimizing Discourses in Teacher Education Reform Rhetoric**

Recently I completed a study that attempted to historicize the discourse practices that constructed the notion of "good teacher" in the Professional Development School (PDS) model as manifested at a large mid-west research institution (Cary, 1999). This study highlighted the need for a more situated and complicated knowing of the assumptions framing concepts such as professional/expert knowledge, legitimate knowledge, and authentic/practical knowledge.

If we think historically about the professional knowledge in teaching, there are three dimensions of historical interest here. They are (a) a view of progress in which change in society and the individual can be brought about through rational planning and social engineering; (b) a notion of the expert knowledge to provide that guidance; and (c) a populism, that is, a view that the expert is in service of the democratic ideal. (Popkewitz & Simola, 1996, p. 122)

The study focused on the PDS model that arose from the reform agenda of the Holmes Group (1986-1995). It triggered a plethora of unique cultures that highlight the limits of universalist assumptions and representations within colleges of education across the country. However, although successes and failures of the model have been well documented, critical research approaching the manifestation of the effects of power, the epistemological assumptions that frame the model, and the textual discourses surrounding it have been lacking. Fullan, et al. (1998) highlight the stalling of the reform effort as mired in the institutionalization of education and the resistance to change at this level. Yet, there is little analysis of the foundations of the reform effort and the assumptions that mire it in these very institutions. In this study
I pursue the “stalling” of the PDS model as a call for an investigation of the foundational assumptions that frame it.

The study focused on the “center” of the PDS model manifested in a large mid-western research institution as socially constituted and historically produced through a critical analysis of the surrounding discourses, from societal to institutional and local (Cary, 1999). If we consider the ways in which total institutions produce regulated docile bodies of their inmates to create an efficient machine, how may this challenge the notion that schools (or universities) can “create” empowered and emancipated citizens?

**Foundational Humanist Assumptions**

In studying discourses of the PDS model the foundational humanist assumptions of educational and social scientific research emerged as a skeletal organizational framework. The grounded discourse analysis of interviews, official documents, educational reform literature, and critical research texts repeatedly referred to terms such as perfectibility, progress, professionalism, good teaching, realist ontologies of authenticity and practice, humanist and populist rhetoric, democratic ideals of citizenship (e.g., autonomy, empowerment, and emancipation), and agency. These terms were then used as a framework for the data analysis to both highlight the foundational assumptions of PDS and also investigate the utility of Popkewitz’s (1998a) conceptualization of the culture of redemption in the professional development school.

Lincoln (1998) describes the “modernist knowledge project” (p. 14) of social scientific research and educational reform as driven by John Stuart Mill’s beliefs that humans were perfectible and that knowledge should be used to achieve useful and productive ends. However, foundational assumptions in the modernist knowledge project in the social and educational sciences discussed by Lincoln (1998) must be taken one step further to reveal the inscription of progress as a neutral central tenet (Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998). By instituting a Foucauldian analysis of the social and educational sciences we can work to reveal the régimes of truth and power within institutions and the ways in which the subject (citizen/teacher) is constituted in power relations (Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998). Using a genealogical approach that historicized how discourses legitimate knowledge, Foucault (1977) highlighted the ways individuals are regulated, and also self-regulate, through state apparatuses and outlined the economies of power inherent in the total institutions of education, the military, and hospitals. His work moves this discussion beyond the scope of Lincoln’s (1998) social constructivism and toward questions of power. For example, school disciplines may be seen as a technology of power which
“succeeded in making children’s bodies the object of highly complex systems of manipulation and conditioning” (Foucault, 1980, p. 125).

The efforts of the 1980s to reform schooling and professionalize teachers, however, were framed by a number of foundational organizational assumptions that further “governed” the teacher’s soul (or “subjectivity”). These assumptions included: issues of fragmentation of knowledge; further specialization and the sequential organization of knowledge; and the construction of possessive individualism and utilitarian thought that increased self-regulation as it deskilled teachers by decreasing teacher responsibility for curriculum decision-making. Moreover,

The anomalies inherent in these reports [of the 1980s] are further exacerbated in that the reform efforts overlook the political and historical background of public schooling...The Holmes Group and Carnegie reports support their arguments by drawing on an idealized version of law and medicine. Altruistic ideals of professionals working for social betterment are portrayed, an approach that ignores the complex political, economic, and structural issues that underlie the cultural, social authority of professions. Whatever important social services are associated with professions, the publicly defined characteristics are myths that legitimate existing authority rather than illuminate the workings and contributions of the professions. (Popkewitz, 1991, p.161)

It has been suggested that these teacher education reforms reflect a nationalistic, masculinist vision assuming possessive individualism and efficiency of the market (a form of social efficiency revisited; see Labaree, 1995; Popkewitz, 1998a). Social administration was the foundational concept of schooling at the turn-of-the-century that aimed to rescue the child so that he or she might become a self-disciplined productive citizen (Popkewitz, 1998a). According to Popkewitz, in his analysis of constructivist pedagogy, educational reform efforts are still founded on the modernist theories of people like Dewey and Vygotsky linking the belief in scientific rationality with the potential of reason to produce social progress (Popkewitz, 1998b). Ultimately this was a form of governmentality, and the contemporary conceptualizations of pedagogy and teacher education reforms are still attempting to govern/rescue the souls of children and teachers at a time when individuality is less stable. “The professional teacher is self-governing and has greater local responsibility in implementing the curriculum decisions—a normativity also found in the structuring of the new constructivist teacher that, as discussed earlier, cites
Dewey and Vygotsky as sources of its vision" (Popkewitz, 1998b, p. 553). This is neither inherently good nor bad, of course, just not to be taken as natural or unproblematic in any discussion about the social construction of knowledge.

**Scientific Rationalism and Technical Competence**

David Labaree (1992, 1995, 1996) has outlined a number of issues in this area by focusing on the discourse of the Holmes Group reforms. He suggests that the way the discourse practices of the Holmes Group work to codify, develop, and implement professional knowledge and the desire for the masculinization of the profession through the development of an objective, common body of knowledge based on the "superiority" of scientific claims, is a move away from the historically feminized profession (Labaree, 1992). This "expert knowledge," according to Labaree, is a framework that positions technical knowledge as superior to political knowledge and validates this through the "science" of teaching. However, he concludes that this is an intellectually reduced notion of practice. His work is useful in suggesting/creating spaces from which to historicize the rhetoric of the professionalization reform movement from which the PDS model emerged. Throughout this work he has emphasized the scientific rationalist foundations for the reform movement that began with the Carnegie Task Force Report, *A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the 21st Century*, and the first Holmes Group Report, *Tomorrow's Teachers*. The desire (or object of desire) for the validation of the profession through the development of the "science of teaching," according to Labaree, was central to the move. The adapted medical school model, however, was mired in epistemological assumptions that increased the normalization of the profession and were based on the humanist foundations of public schooling in this country:

> According to this view, the creation of a professional teaching force will enable us to pursue more effectively all of the major social goals that Americans have traditionally assigned to public schools: social efficiency (raising the standard of living via enhanced skill training); social mobility (increasing social opportunity for the underclass); and political equality (enhancing students' ability to function in a democracy). (Labaree, 1992, p. 127)

Also embedded in this move towards professionalism was an emphasis on technical competence highlighted through the development of PDSs. The gendered nature of the goals of the reform movements, according to Labaree (1992), highlight the desire for increased status as a move away from the stereotypical "female" teacher role of
nurturer and caregiver, to the technical competence of a common body of professional knowledge founded on masculinist assumptions of the superiority of scientific claims.

Professionalization offers the teacher a way to escape identification with the unpaid and uncredentialed status of mother. The new professional teacher—especially a board-certified “lead” or “career professional” teacher—would be well paid and formally credentialed, with an education and a status within hailing distance of the high professions. (Labaree, 1992, p. 132)

Call it “physics envy” (Lather, 1994), hard science, or high professions—the move was away from situated knowing to the development of a common scientifically-based professional knowledge and masculinist technical competence. The notion of common professional knowledge and standards paradoxically presented in these reports, and the following Holmes Group Reports, were founded on notions of teacher autonomy, empowerment, and merit. “Apparently, thinking of teaching’s femaleness as unprofessional, the professionalizers seem to be trying to reshape the female schoolteacher in the image of the male physician” (Labaree, 1992, p. 133).

Labaree (1992) also discusses the development of a significant body of knowledge through research as a central goal of the Holmes Group. This development would make possible the validation of the profession through a formal-rationalist-specialized knowledge that is authoritative (scientific) and hierarchical (inaccessible to non-professionals and therefore counter-intuitive) and that could result in cultural legitimacy:

The burgeoning teaching effects (or ‘process-product’) literature provided an ideal expression of the modernist perspective, since it allowed researchers to develop formal principles for effective teaching that could serve as a prescriptive guide for both public policy and classroom practice. Out of this work emerged a scientifically grounded and law-like field of research that gave teacher educators the opportunity to establish professional credibility within the university community and gave teachers a growing body of formal knowledge from which to base a future claim for professional status. (p. 142)

It is vital to note, however, that the paradigmatic assumptions of the scientific rationalist move were founded in an increasingly shaky and outmoded positivist paradigm that was being successfully chal-
lenged in the “hard sciences” (Harding, 1987). “Therefore,” as Labaree (1992) suggested, “teacher educators may well be hitching their hopes to a research structure that is in the process of molting, which poses the possibility that they could be left behind clutching an empty shell” (p. 146). A tension thus exists between the progressivist notions of empowerment and excellence, as the discourses embedded within this reform movement may be seen as enhancing “social inequality and educational hierarchy and thereby undermin[ing] the efforts to achieve progressivist ends” (p. 145), and as it drives for a politics of expert and male-dominated status within a formal rationalist environment.

As a result, teacher educators at research universities have tended to look at schools through the lens of scientific rationality and to propose solutions for school problems that draw on their own technical skills. This approach tends to work to their benefit not because they are manipulative, but because they are caught in a genealogical web of power and knowledge that limits the way they customarily think and act about schooling. The scientistic logic of their own professionalization effort leads them to envision a rationalized structure of reform for teachers and students that plays out familiar themes of professionalism and technical skill. (pp. 145-146)

This subject construction of “good” teacher seems to be informed and shaped by masculinist, scientistic notions relying on the development of an “objective” body of scientific knowledge which promotes criteria that enhance rationalization through the standardization of professional technical proficiency (Labaree, 1992). This move focuses on “practice” and the superiority of technical competence. Conversely, this has subverted the focus from the political side of the profession/activity.

From this perspective, the problem with promoting the rationalization of teaching is that it tends to hide the political content of instruction under the mask of a technical decision about the most effective means to promote unexamined political ends. Yet a good teacher should in fact examine these ends with a critical eye and should be open with students about the fundamentally political way in which these ends are chosen in and for schools. One potential danger of professionalization, therefore, is the way in which it pushes technical questions into the foreground and political questions into the background as either unscientific or unproblematic. (p. 148)
The final Holmes Group Report was dominated by the populist rhetoric that ruled American political discourse in the 1980s and 1990s:

Populism, seen in its own terms, is the language of ordinary people who are excluded from the seats of institutional power. Presenting themselves as the voice of the people, populists rail against elites who have taken control of major institutions (government, business, education) and who have buffered these institutions from public pressures in order to bend them to the service of elite interests. From the populist perspective, university professors are a natural target. (Labaree, 1995, p. 186)

Labaree argues that the rhetoric employed questioned the accumulated research and experience of education schools and took the position of an uninformed outsider in a simplistic approach to the issues at hand.

For all of its ability to rally ordinary citizens against the partisans of privilege, populism brings with it severe limitations, all of which appear in the third Holmes Group Report. By elevating common sense over expert knowledge, populism often promotes anti-intellectualism; by focusing on the power and privileges of elites rather than pursuing close analysis of institutional process, it often breeds paranoia and sweeping conspiracy theories; and by disdaining the need for complex understandings of how things work, it often produces a demand for simple-minded solutions. (p. 187)

The emphasis on practice over theory is also further evidence of the object of desire (practice) and the move toward an intellectually reduced notion of practice. “As the rest of the report makes clear, the defining characteristic of good theory is its closeness to practice, and a key purpose of the effort to redesign the education school around the PDS is to compel researchers to concentrate on such matters” (Labaree, 1995, p.196). This narrow vision of research and practice deprives both university and the schools. As Labaree continues:

Ironically, recent challenges to American education have made the work of education schools even more complex, and yet in the face of this complexity the Holmes Group report proposes simplistic and inflexible solutions: Turn schools of education into schools of teacher education, and change broad-based educational research into school-
based R&D. It does not require a great deal of thought to come to the conclusion that neither of these outcomes is desirable. (p. 210)

Continuing tensions between the social administration of the individual and freedom become manifest, therefore, in such reform efforts as the PDS. The assumed site of this struggle is often the normalized construction of the characteristics and capabilities of the “good” teacher. This is a dangerous assumption, according to Popkewitz (2000), and he calls for increased scrutiny and interpretation of the ways in which the governing principles of reform talk are illustrative of the effects of power.

This site is contested terrain, and historically the social institution of teacher education has become concerned with the production of knowledge submerged within universal and secularized moral values in the modern era (Popkewitz & Simola, 1996). This “modernization” of the governing practices of professionalization also relates to the systems of knowledge that produce the “good” (self-governed and autonomous) citizen:

The taken-for-granted assumptions behind turn-of-the-century discourses about childhood, the state and schooling came from social engineering. It was assumed that proper planning would produce the New Citizen/‘New Man’ [sic] who could perform competently in the new social, economic, political and cultural contexts. The ‘New Man’ would be self-disciplined, self-motivated and ‘reasonable’ as a productive member of the new collective social projects of the day. (Popkewitz & Simola, 1996, p. 14)

From the desire for a “professional,” authentic teacher idealized through discourses reducing expert knowledge to masculinized, scientistic constructions, I suggest we also consider the ways in which construction of the “good” citizen/student in multicultural education is embedded in assimilationist constructions of race.

**Theorizing the Construction of the Subject in Multicultural Education**

Just as the normalizing discourses in teacher education reform efforts may be analyzed using a poststructural perspective, multicultural education may also be informed/interrogated from this viewpoint. I have included this discussion to highlight the usefulness of analyzing discourses that are often assumed to be transformative.
yet are in danger of reinscribing normalizing practices. As demonstrated above, the teacher education reform effort of the PDS model reified conceptions of good teacher and citizen that were masculinist and reductionist in their subject constructions. Highlighting the gendered nature of certain teacher education reform discourses suggests tensions within the modernist project. I suggest also, in this section, that multicultural education discourses are in danger of including uninterrogated raced constructions of “citizen” as illustrated in the talk of “whiteness” that is currently circulating. Therefore, another way of analyzing the assimilationist tendencies of multicultural education is to study the discursive practices that legitimize the dominant perspective and limit the effectiveness of this transformative effort.

Multicultural education is often accused of becoming an assimilated modernist project. It is decried by conservatives and radicals alike. Yet there remains a place within this field to interrupt positions of privilege and provide spaces from which to work against normalizing institutional and pedagogical practices that reinforce the epistemological position of whiteness without question. One of the problems, according to West (1993), is that “Conservative behaviorists talk about attitudes and values as if political and economic structures hardly exist.” Ladson-Billings (1995) also reflects upon this when she talks of the ways in which courses in multicultural education engender resistance and reinforce stereotypes. Such courses, according to Ladson-Billings, are seen as lacking in intellectual rigor and merely supported to mollify those racialized “Others.” Discussing the foundations of the multicultural education movement as arising from the Civil Rights movement, she highlights how race “has moved off the page” as the central construct.

Recent discussion in multicultural education has highlighted the ways in which the social construction of whiteness has been concealed in our educational discourse (McLaren, 1997; Frankenburg, 1993; Sleeter, 1994). Using the lens of a poststructural analysis, this racial construction may be seen as an aspect of the dominant social discourse within the modernist knowledge project (Lincoln, 1998). The modernist knowledge project works (a) to produce socially legitimate knowledge that may essentialize difference and exclude marginalized groups from positions of empowerment through stereotypical representations of culturally different Others, and (b) from within realist ontological assumptions. A poststructural perspective, however, may suggest alternative counterhegemonic subject constructions that could work within and against exclusive notions of “citizen” in this area.

Popkewitz (1998a) suggests that the redemptive culture of the social and human sciences has not only created docile bodies but also inscribed theoretical and pedagogical reforms as for the “good” of
society through the development of a “good” citizen. In this way, the modernist project has constructed socially, historically, politically, and economically what a “good” citizen is and thus excluded marginalized Others from positions of privilege by their race, class, gender, and/or other standpoints of “difference.”

**Cultural Performance and Hegemonic Structures**

Bringing the literature from anthropology and cultural studies to bear on this discussion, we may consider how culture (and cultural subjects/citizens) are socio-historically constructed. Culture is performed through social interactions often involving experiences of domination and subordination within the enlightenment project of colonization and imperialist territorialization. Clifford (1997), Bhabha (1994), Pratt (1992), Kaplan (1996), and Gilroy (1993) have discussed how culture is a performative act that is socially and politically inscribed. According to Clifford (1997), how one knows and engages in social interactions (as evidenced through ethnographic study) is culturally performative. Culture is, accordingly, an embodied act influenced by a variety of forces, including socio-historical, political, and economic influences. Paul Gilroy (1993) discusses the diasporic nature of the construction of the black Atlantic and disrupts the notions of cultural holism or racial essentialism through a discussion of the ways in which cultural performance is influenced by socio-historical conditions and political and economic influences—using music to discuss the multiple origins of the music of the “West.”

A number of other theorists also discuss the socially interactive performative nature of culture as a place from which to disrupt the colonizing mentality and the legitimization of the Western régimes of truth (Pratt, 1992; Kaplan, 1996; Gilroy, 1993; Bhabha, 1994). In *The Location of Culture*, Bhabha (1994) highlights the reinscription of hegemonic discourse through the relativistic discourse of diversity. He suggests that by highlighting the hybridity of cultural performance we may move beyond essentialist discussions of race and culture. For culture, according to Bhabha, is developed performatively through discursive processes. Bhabha aims to disrupt the epistemological assumptions of the hegemonic discourse that silences and erases issues of race from any discussion of culture. He stresses especially the need to focus upon *difference* rather than on *diversity* in that this term has become a culturally relativistic position—a White solution to the Black problem. Sleeter (1994), McLaren (1997), and Frankenberg (1993) call for a study of the underlying epistemological assumptions and normalizing practices of anti-racist and multicultural education to work against the assimilationist tendencies of institutionalized efforts. Whiteness is a culturally constructed epistemological position of dominance effectively Othering all considered non-white and creating the
possibility of excluding them through objectifying and pathologizing their racial constructions. The epistemology of whiteness is a culturally advantaged standpoint from which to maintain positions of privilege and power.

Lord (1984), Franklin (1993), and hooks (1989) talk back to interrupt such dominant perspectives. Lord (1984) sums it up when she states that “the oppressors maintain their position and evade responsibility for their own actions” (p. 115). For by making invisible the ways in which the dominant position has been reinscribed through even well-intentioned pedagogical reforms, whiteness has been uninterrogated as a position of privileged cultural performance. Franklin (1993) believes that the reason we have failed to create a color-blind society is because it is not in “our” (white people’s) best interests to do so. He calls for an investigation of our past, our race, our dominant whiteness. “The final reason a color-blind society eludes us is that we do not wish to find it. A balkanized racial differentiation has been remarkably profitable and even satisfying to many people” (p. 50). hooks (1989) also talks back using “the margins” as a position of power reflecting counterhegemonic discourse and calls for a collective effort involving radical black women and people of color and white people to work to end white supremacy.

Frankenberg (1993) and Sleeter (1994) suggest that studying and troubling whiteness will allow whites involved in anti-racist and multicultural education to reconceptualize their place in the process. “White people have a good deal of knowledge about racism: all of us have been well socialized to be racists, and benefit from racism constantly. I would like Whites to articulate, examine, question, and critique what we know about racism” (Sleeter, 1994, p. 5). Defining whiteness is central in any discussion that attempts to trouble this normative, reductionist subject construction. McLaren (1997) defines it as follows:

Whiteness is a sociohistorical form of consciousness, given at birth at the nexus of capitalism, colonial rule, and the emergent relationships among dominant and subordinate groups....Whiteness is also a refusal to acknowledge how white people are implicated in certain social relations of privilege and relations of domination and subordination. (p. 9)

By utilizing the conception of cultural performance, we can move beyond dominant erasures of difference to interrogate the ways in which we know ourselves in discourses framing multicultural education and in social education in general. According to Sleeter (1994), “By white racism (or white supremacy) I am referring to the system of
rules, procedures, and tacit beliefs that result in Whites collectively maintaining control over the wealth and power of the nation and the world” (p. 6).

**Whiteness and Assimilation as Discursive Practices**

Ladson-Billings (1995) describes the myth of the “Unity of Difference” discourse in the field and talks of the ways in which multicultural education has been co-opted and “race has moved off the page” even though multicultural education developed from the efforts of the Civil Rights movement to address race in educational settings. Race remains untheorized and undertheorized. “Celebratory Multicultural Education provides schools with convenient escapes from the worrisome concerns of race and racism” (Ladson-Billings, 1995, pp. 10-11). There is a call for professional organizations to act now to move within and against the dominant subject constructions in multicultural education to reclaim the possibility of a more adequate knowing/being in transformative discursive practices by articulating the race/ing of citizenship (Ladson-Billings, 1995; Sleeter, 1994).

By defining something previously unarticulated, whiteness may be interrogated as a standpoint of privilege, a structural advantage, and a place from which to Other all those considered non-white. “Whiteness changes over time and space and is in no way a transhistorical essence. Rather, as I have argued, it is a complexly constructed product of local, regional, national, and global relations, past and present” (Frankenberg, 1993, p. 236). This point of entry into a historically Othered and marginalized discursive practice suggests distinct possibilities for interrupting the dominant curative and assimilationist multicultural education project:

There is, however, one racial subject where an upsurge of interest by academics may precede and effectively recast public formulations of race problems: that is the matter of whiteness. Through the efforts of literary and film critics, historians, sociologists, and gradually, anthropologists, whiteness, as an analytical object, is being established as a powerful means of critiquing the reproduction and maintenance of systems of racial inequality, within the United States and around the Globe. (Hartigan, 1999, p. 184)

Further interrupting the conceptualization of race as a natural construct (somehow distorted by racism), Britzman (1998) suggests that the ahistorical educational desire to simplify complex histories of racism denies or refuses the effects of power through the normalization of gender and race.
The normalization of race—like the normalization of gender and sex—as an obvious, visible, and predictive feature of the body is thus a discourse that gestures to the problem of the production by mechanisms of power that incite proper and improper bodies. (p. 105)

By studying the normalizing, uninterrupted discourse practices of social education as illustrative of the refusals/silent exclusions of citizenship, Britzman opens a space for a discussion of the exclusionary practices that support/create/construct the concept of citizen. Delgado (1999) also historicizes exclusionary practices in the social construction of citizenship in his discussion of the raced nature of the citizen as part of a national community:

In the United States, the current community—the institution to which the argument would hand unfettered discretion regarding immigration policy—is deeply affected by racism and exclusionary practices. For much of our history, a national-origin quota system and, before that, anti-Asian and anti-Mexican laws, kept the immigrants of color low....For much of our history, women and blacks were denied the right to vote or hold office. Higher education was virtually closed to both until about 1960, and in Southern states, Black Codes made it a crime to teach a black to read..."The community," then, is deeply shaped by racism, sexism, and xenophobia. This is not only in terms of its demography and makeup but also its preferences and values. (p. 250)

In a similar vein Rosaldo (1999) highlights the universalization of the concept of citizen as founded upon abstract notions of theoretical universality in tension with the substantive level of exclusionary and marginalizing practices. "Even in its late-eighteenth-century Enlightenment origins, citizenship in the republic differentiated men of privilege from the rest, second-class citizens and non-citizens" (p. 253). While it seems as if this historically abstract conceptualization of citizen is easily deconstructed I suggest here that the ways in which power/knowledge construct the "good" citizen in social education discourses are less visible and more dangerously exclusivist. The refusals of citizenship suggest that there is a "normal" or "proper" embodiment of the concept that manifests in discursive practices. This normalization produces and excludes, in the cases presented here, through gendering and scientizing teacher education reform and racing multicultural education discourse as an assimilationist project.

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Ong (1999) outlines citizenship as subject-ification in the Foucauldian sense through "self-making and being-made by power relations that produce consent through schemes of surveillance, discipline, control and administration... (Ong, 1999, p. 263). She goes on to define governmentality as aimed at giving a unifying expression to the multi-faceted and differential experiences of groups within society. "This role of the state in universalizing citizenship is paradoxically attained through a process of individuation whereby people are constructed in definitive and specific ways as citizens—taxpayers, workers, consumers, and welfare dependents" (pp. 263-264). Therefore, Ong (1999) and Popkewitz (1998a) connect social education discourses with the tensions between the social administration of freedom and state "agencies." They suggest that the pragmatic struggle towards understanding citizenship calls for critical analysis of the regulatory regimes in state agencies and civil society. Ong (1999) states:

Indeed, it is precisely in liberal democracies like the United States that the governmentality of state agencies is often discontinuous, even fragmentary, and the work of instilling proper normative behavior and identity in newcomers must also be taken up by institutions in civil society. For instance, hegemonic ideas about belonging and not belonging in racial and cultural terms often converge in state and non-state institutional practices through which subjects are shaped in ways that are at once specific and diffuse. These are the ideological fields within which different criteria of belonging on the basis of civilized conduct by categorically distinguishable (dominant) others become entangled with culture, race and class....(p. 264)

The work of Britzman (1998), Popkewitz (1998b, 2000), and Ong (1999) suggests connections between social constructions of race and gender and the normalizing discourses discussed by Foucault (1977). Britzman (1998) highlights how the "normal" version of anti-racist pedagogy (i.e., multicultural education) relies on humanistic constructs or role models and self-esteem building and seems to forget the problem of group identification and disassociation from the question/possibility of difference. For example, tensions exist within discussions of difference, she suggests, between African Americans and Jews as mainstream debates in this area are often collapsed into the imperatives of whiteness or get stuck in the binary of assimilation or authenticity.

Britzman (1998) suggests that if we accept that efforts at anti-racist pedagogy are inconsolable, that they are embedded within complex social constructions of race, difference, and normalcy, then we
should engage with what it excludes or refuses: "This is not a move
towards a new inclusivity, even though opening the stakes of identifi-
cation and learning from the conflicts within communities should
trouble what is imagined as a normal race or, more pertinently, as a
normal representation of race" (p. 111).

The Refusals of Citizenship

The maps drawn about children are not neutral but are
practices that divide and normalize. That is, the distinc-
tions that order children’s capabilities function to divide
membership and nonmembership along a continuum of
value through which individual capability and compe-
tence are constructed. The categories of learning, for ex-
ample, are inserted as part of ways to ‘reason’ about edu-
cational phenomena and to differentiate between children
through an unspoken normalization about the capabili-
ties of those who ‘learn,’ or are ‘at risk.’ (Popkewitz, 2000,
p. 22)

This article has suggested that the ways in which the effects of
power normalize the subject construction of “citizen” in teacher edu-
cation and multicultural education as gendered and raced is a major
concern for the field of social education. The “good” citizen/“good”
teacher in the reform model analyzed here suggests a scientistic notion of professional “expert” as superior to the more feminized intu-
tive knowing historically constructed within the profession (Labaree,
1995). In multicultural education the assimilationist tendencies of the
institutionalization of the field seem to reflect a normative racialized
construction of the “good” citizen that is framed within a dominant
uninterrogated discourse of whiteness. The resultant discursive prac-
tices suggest that this area is focused on “difference” that actually pro-
duces régimes of truth legitimizing the dominant and (thus) Othering
those students who are visibly “different” or “raced.”

By re-conceptualizing and interrupting the assumed “neutral-
ity” of the field I suggest we may complicate our understanding of
how discourses and governing practices (Foucault’s governmentalities)
are produced within a populist rhetoric of redemption that is not nec-
essarily liberatory:

Curriculum as a governing practice becomes almost self-
evident as we think of the ‘making’ of the proper citizen.
This citizen is one who has the correct dispositions, sens-
itivities and awareness to act as a self-governing indi-
vidual in the new political, cultural and economic con-
texts. Current reforms that focus on ‘constructivist pedagogy’ and teacher education reforms that considered the ‘beliefs’ and dispositions’ of the teacher are the secularization of the confessional systems of self discipline and control. (Popkewitz, 1998a, p.89)

The normalizing practices of discourses embedded within pedagogy and curriculum development can be studied in social education to address the tensions that exist between social administration and freedom in liberal democracies (Popkewitz, 1998a). A Foucauldian analysis of the practices that govern the souls of teachers and students is one way of disrupting the universalist assumptions that reify an exclusive notion of a “good citizen” (Foucault, 1977; Popkewitz, 1998a).

Popkewitz (2000) describes the project of the social sciences in this country as organizing “the thinking, feeling, hoping, and ‘knowing’ capacities of the productive citizen” (p. 19). Historically, schooling aimed to develop a collective social identity and citizenship that embodied notions of the “Americanization” of immigrants and a universalized image of the child through curriculum social efficiency movements (Popkewitz, 2000). It is vital to investigate social practice and subject relations as represented and representing discourse practices. Thus, by linking the ideas of knowledge, institutions, and power in discussions of the field we may interrupt assumptions of reason and rationality and highlight these foundational understandings as socially constructed epistemologies representative of social relations (Popkewitz, 1991). In doing so we may create spaces to provide a more adequate knowing in the field which complicates our desire for an educational cure and moves us beyond related desires for a coherent subject position and a unified way of knowing (Britzman, 1998).

References


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Ethical Citizenship in a Postmodern World:
Toward a More Connected Approach to Social
Education For the Twenty-First Century

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Abstract

Social studies, as an academic discourse, has played a role in at least two significant conversations related to the evolution of education during the last hundred years. First, since its beginnings a century ago, theorists within the social studies field have sought to address the needs of the community at large rather than just the well-being of the individual. Second, many scholars within the field have considered the importance of connectedness, both in terms of the primary unit of analysis (i.e., the “common good” of the community) and in terms of the approach (e.g., the integration of disciplines for the purposes of citizenship education). We believe these traditional aspects of the social studies—a focus on community and connectedness—are among its greatest virtues. However, we argue that these strengths need to be further examined and their applications broadened in view of important social and intellectual developments that have occurred since the inception of the social studies. Significant conditions and developments include dramatic increases in human population, over-consumption and depletion of vital resources, continued domination of large groups of people at the hands of the few, the growth of an increasingly rigid culture of individualism, and the persistence of the centuries-old misconception that organisms exist in isolation from one another. In this paper we draw on work from many traditions (e.g., American pragmatism, social learning theory, feminist philosophy, multicultural education, critical social theory, new science, the philosophy of science) to construct a base from which to theorize about a more connected approach to social education for the common good of humankind and the health of the planet.
address the needs of the community at large rather than just the well-being of the individual. Second, many social studies theorists have considered the importance of connectedness, both in terms of the primary unit of analysis (i.e., the “common good” of the community) and in terms of curriculum and instruction (e.g., the integration of disciplines for citizenship education). In this paper we examine some of the strengths and limitations of dominant traditions in the social studies, and we explore the implications for a more connected approach to citizenship education in our changing world.¹

We argue that the traditional focus on community and connectedness is among the greatest virtues of the field. However, we believe these strengths need to be further examined and their applications broadened in view of important social changes that have occurred since the inception of the social studies. Significant social changes include dramatic increases in human population, depletion of vital resources, continued domination of the many by the few, and the evolution of an increasingly rigid culture of individualism. Intellectual developments based on the contributions of American pragmatists, critical social theorists, feminist philosophers, multicultural theorists, cultural learning theorists, social ecologists and new science theorists, and philosophers of science have challenged the centuries-old misconception that organisms exist in isolation from one another. Collectively, these developments posit a complex, contingent, and revisable nature of reality based on personal perspective and social context, and they emphasize the importance of an ethic of care, connection, and critical reflection within a democratic and egalitarian community.

Specifically, we will argue that a deeper understanding of interconnectedness (between self and society, subject and object, mind and body, and humans and the environment) is needed in order to educate citizens for the twenty-first century and that such an understanding will require a discourse that explores various forms of connection rather than avoiding or denying them. First, we will provide a brief historical review of the social studies, arguing that although much positive development has occurred, our focus has too often become sidetracked by ineffective practices based on a mechanistic and reductionistic world view. Next, we will underscore the need to build on the traditions of community and connectivity in view of recent social and intellectual developments. We will highlight those developments that have contributed to a deeper understanding of community and connectivity, and we will explore the role of discourse as a factor that can either perpetuate or transform current social conditions. Finally, we will propose alternative goals and practices consistent with a more connected approach to citizenship education.

As we discuss alternative goals and approaches for citizenship education, we will cast a wide net. In addition to contemplating the
need for a sense of community within particular populations, we will also explore the importance of community among all humans. And in addition to examining the connectedness that exists among humans, we will explore the importance of developing greater appreciation for the connections that exist between human and non-human organisms and environments. Among other things, we will address the roles of teachers and schools in their capacity to mediate, through experience and discussion, the development of more critical, caring, and connected citizens who are able and willing to improve our communities and the environment in which we live.

The Broader Goals Of The Social Studies: A Brief Review

Since its beginnings nearly a century ago, social studies has been an area of the curriculum that has focused on education for the common good of society at large. One of the primary aims has been the development of citizens who are willing and able to address both the personal challenges of day to day living and the broader problems that face our society and world (e.g., how to create a more just and caring society; how to reconcile personal interests, perspectives, and actions with the needs of others; how to develop and maintain a sustainable relationship with the environment in which we live). Unfortunately, the aims of citizenship education have too often been lost to oversimplified formulas for social improvement (e.g., social change through social reductionism; “pulling oneself up by the bootstraps;” “just saying no”), reductionistic teaching approaches inconsistent with the nature of knowledge and the processes of learning and development (e.g., Dewey & Bentley, 1949; Vygotsky, 1978, 1986; Wertsch, 1985, 1991), an increasing focus on credentials and “competencies” (e.g., McNeil, 1986), and modernist dichotomies and discourses that draw rigid distinctions between mind and body, subject and object, self and society, and humans and the environment.

As an academic field, social studies was first conceived in the early 1900s. The primary goal was to prepare students for citizenship within a society that was becoming increasingly complicated by population growth, changing demographics, increased immigration, growing urbanization and industrialization, and a widening gap between the rich and the poor (Barth, 1984; Hertzberg, 1981; Nelson, 1992). In addition to the general aims shared by other curriculum areas (e.g., preparing students for vocational competence and the ability to learn how to learn), social education was (and is) also explicitly concerned with promoting the greater good of society (Hartoonian, 1991). While many other areas of the curriculum have focused primarily on the development of individual persons (and presumably, through individual development, the growth of society in general), the primary
unit of analysis for social education is society itself. Hence, in two areas of general consensus, most social educators seem to agree that the primary goal of the social studies is, or ought to be, social improvement through citizenship education and that a combination of practical and conceptual tools (e.g., academic disciplines, literacies, instructional approaches, computer technologies) should be used to accomplish this goal.

Although several common themes have persisted throughout the history of the social studies, the field has also experienced significant change. Our perspectives and practices have undergone a continual process of development, definition, and redefinition as social educators have struggled to identify viable goals and approaches in a changing society (Hertzberg, 1981; Stanley, 1985). For example, disciplines such as history and the social sciences that had long been used informally and independently for citizenship education were gradually integrated for explicit use in the preparation of students for responsible citizenship in an increasingly complex society (Hertzberg, 1981; Saxe, 1991). Today, it is not uncommon to observe approaches that draw from a variety of disciplines in an effort to promote the critical understanding needed to interpret and transform the existing social system.

With the increasing social challenges of the mid- and late 1800s, American educators felt as never before the need to prepare “the masses” to become “good citizens.” As declared in the 1916 NEA report on the social studies, “The keynote of education is ‘social efficiency’” and “the conscious and constant purpose [should be the] cultivation of good citizenship” (p. 9). The development of good citizens through social education must have seemed a reasonable way to cultivate the basic values (e.g., unlimited opportunity and prosperity for all) upon which many believed the United States had been founded. The fact that countless immigrants poured into America every year, that many eventually experienced physical comfort and security, and that some even came to enjoy extravagant wealth, reinforced the belief that unlimited personal gain was both possible and desirable. Thus, although the social studies may have been developed to help preserve our society, the society it sought to preserve has often been viewed merely as a means of securing the right to seek personal fortune, thus reinforcing an emphasis on the wants of the individual rather than the needs of the community.

As conceptions about the ideal citizen and the common good evolved, the notion of the good citizen was gradually replaced by that of the responsible citizen. The basic concern was that good citizenship seemed to imply uncritical obedience rather than thoughtful decision-making based on social analysis and critical reflection. While the “good” citizen is invariably obedient, the “responsible” citizen
realizes the need to question and recognizes that under certain circumstances collective action, resistance, opposition, and even civil disobedience may be necessary. Responsibility, a concept that seemed to imply informed judgment and an internal locus of control, was advocated as an ideal orientation for members of a democratic society.

Many of these developments were summarized in Barr, Barth, and Shermis' (1977) analysis of three broad social studies traditions, which included social studies taught as citizenship transmission, social studies taught as a social science, and social studies taught as reflective inquiry. Citizenship transmission, the oldest and most frequently used approach, assumed that adult teachers possess an ideal conception of citizenship that should be transmitted to students in order to help them become “loyal believers” in a particular set of truths necessary to guarantee the survival of society (p. 60). A social sciences approach, on the other hand, focused not on the transmission of particular views and values, but on the processes and tools used by social scientists to observe society and human behavior without “adulterating understanding with ethnocentric biases, local prejudice, or wishful thinking” (p. 62). Finally, social studies taught as reflective inquiry involved decision-making within a sociopolitical context. From this perspective, the most effective citizenship education works through:

a process of inquiry in which knowledge is derived from what citizens need to know to make decisions and solve problems...Analysis of individual citizen’s values yields needs and interests which, in turn, form the basis for student self-selection of problems. Problems, therefore, constitute the content for reflection. (p. 67)

Since the 1970s these three traditions have been reinforced, refined, and challenged in a variety of ways (e.g., Banks, 1987; Cherryholmes, 1980; Palonsky, 1993; Stanley, 1985, 1992). In an important analysis of the then current thinking in citizenship education, Cherryholmes (1980) explored two views of truth and criticism and the implications for the social studies. Based on a general critique of positivist epistemology (grounded in a comparison of the views of Karl Popper and Jurgen Habermas), Cherryholmes challenged several of the basic assumptions underlying the popular conception of “citizenship education as decision making” (e.g., Engle, 1960; Engle & Longstreet, 1972; Barth, 1984; Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977). Among other things, he questioned the distinction between facts and values, the assumption that knowledge is grounded in an objective, given reality, and the belief that theoretical abstractions can be generalized.
from one decision-making situation to another. Based on this general critique of positivist epistemology, Cherryholmes raised pointed questions regarding the viability of the familiar knowledge-skills-values-action decision-making scheme for citizenship education (e.g., Barth, 1984) and the merits of a citizenship education aimed merely at helping students develop greater consistency between their personal beliefs and actions (e.g., without regard for the broader social contexts or consequences of those beliefs and actions).

Drawing heavily on Jurgen Habermas' (e.g., 1970, 1973) "theory of communicative competence" and "consensus theory of truth," Cherryholmes challenged the basic philosophical assumptions upon which the popular decision-making model of citizenship education was based. Following Habermas, he insisted that since language statements are, by definition, abstract representations of particular phenomena (i.e., related to objects, experiences, relationships, thoughts, feelings) the best we can do to establish the validity of a specific claim (beyond assuring that the utterance is understandable and the speaker is sincere) is to seek "rational consensus" through discourse (e.g., Bernstein, 1976, p. 211). From this perspective, truth lies not in the direct correspondence between a particular truth claim and the facts (objects, experiences, relationships) it purports to represent, but in the degree of consensus that can be established through dialogue regarding alternative truth claims related to the facts in question.

Habermas recognized that achieving consensus is difficult even under the best of circumstances. Indeed, he argued that true consensus can only be established in an "ideal speech situation." Rational consensus cannot be realized, he insisted, unless alternative truth claims are contemplated within a context of symmetrical communication. Alternative claims are unlikely to be given equal credence (if they are heard at all) in the absence of social conditions that ensure "a number of symmetrical relations" for all potential participants (Habermas, 1970, p. 371). These conditions must ensure that alternative perspectives are voiced, that all views are afforded serious contemplation, that "no prejudiced opinion cannot be taken up or criticized" (i.e., that dominant perspectives will also be criticized), that there is a "mutuality of unimpaired self-representation," and that "in the case of full complementarity of understandings (which excludes unilaterally constraining norms) the claim of universal understanding exists" (pp. 371-372).

The point of Cherryholmes' analysis is that it is insufficient, within a democratic and pluralistic society, simply to prepare "decision-makers" who can establish correspondence between their personal beliefs and social actions without also contemplating the broader social contexts and consequences of those beliefs and actions or the nature of the communicative processes used to establish claims to truth
(and authority). Thus, rather than preparing citizens to establish and enact public policies based on positivistic claims to an absolute, objective truth, Cherryholmes emphasizes the importance of learning to negotiate truth through discourse. The purpose of discourse, he insists, is to seek rational consensus through the contemplation of alternative truth claims; however, such consensus can only be achieved if social relations among the participants are symmetrical. The task of the citizen, then, is to engage in critical discourse to achieve rational consensus on alternative truth claims and to establish and maintain the necessary social (political, economic, cultural, linguistic) conditions in which such discourse is possible. Such alternatives, based on an ongoing critique of the positivist paradigm, continue to inform scholarly thinking about the nature and purpose of citizenship education.

While countless other factors have also influenced the development of the social studies, this brief discussion indicates some of the prevailing concerns that have existed within the field, significant thoughts and conditions that have informed the evolution of citizenship education, and the extent to which social educators continue to struggle—philosophically, theoretically, and practically—with what citizenship really means. In the following sections we will argue that although these important contributions have provided the groundwork for further exploration, the field has not gone far enough to embrace the opportunities for personal and societal development afforded by our sociocultural diversity or to support a discourse that adequately interrogates the still dominant cultures of individualism, acquisition, and domination that exist both within the United States and abroad. Citizenship transmission remains a dominant mode of social studies instruction (e.g., Lemming, 1989; McNeil, 1986), critical inquiry exacts a heavy price even on willing participants (e.g., Hartoonian, 1991; Houser, 1995), and the symmetrical social conditions required for the development of "communicative competence" remain (ironically) out of reach as a result of the asymmetrical privileging of rational discourse (relative to intuition or caring, for example) and the presumption that universal understanding is a viable possibility in a postmodern world (e.g., Belenky, et. al, 1984; Ellsworth, 1989, 1992; Greene, 1988; Noddings, 1992). In the meantime, in spite of our "illusions of progress" (Sleeter & Grant, 1994), substandard social conditions and significant opportunity gaps continue to plague our schools and society (e.g., Anyon, 1979; Baldwin, 1988; Banks, 1987; Belenky, et. al, 1986; Houser, 1996; Kohl, 1988; Kozol, 1991; Ogbu, 1987), and we continue to destroy the very environment upon which we depend for the survival of the species (e.g., Capra, 1996; Eisler, 1987; Merchant, 1994). In the following sections we will examine a broad base of litera-
ture to better understand the nature of these problems and to explore where we might go from here.

The Need To Extend Our Traditions Of Community and Connection

Although a number of important changes have occurred in the social studies, much work is still needed. Many of the valuable contributions of critical social theorists, feminist philosophers, multicultural educators, and philosophers of science continue to be misinterpreted, neutralized, or dismissed outright. Limited approaches—supported by a mechanistic worldview and reified by narrow discourses—continue to restrict our ability to educate citizens who will thoughtfully critique their world, care for their communities and environments, and act on the basis of their understandings and convictions. While important foundations have been laid in the social studies and elsewhere, neither the practice nor the discourse of citizenship education has adequately come to grips with the tensions created by our changing social conditions or by the steadfastness of the modernist worldview that has dominated Western civilizations for half a millennium. The result has been a persistently narrow focus on structural issues rather than on the epistemological foundations for citizenship, including fundamental questions about what is worth knowing in the first place. Thus, in spite of the gains that have been made, we believe the best contributions in the field (e.g., the traditions of community and connection) need to be further developed for the twenty-first century.

Dualisms, Dichotomies, and Disconnected Discourses

One of the major constraints faced by social educators has been the persistence, both in schools and society, of a mechanistic and reductionistic world view that has conceptually isolated mind and body, self and society, organism and environment, and human and non-human life. Western civilizations have long been dominated by a modernist paradigm based on a combination of reductionistic assumptions ranging from the mind/body split of Rene Descartes and the classical atomistic physics of Isaac Newton to the compartmentalism inherent in the mechanistic efficiency of nineteenth and twentieth century American industrialists like Henry Ford. Although formal academic critique of this modernist paradigm may be a fairly recent phenomenon, the paradigm itself has evolved for centuries (e.g., Capra, 1996). The nature of the modernist paradigm and the task of the philosopher-scientist were articulated centuries ago by Francis Bacon, philosopher, scientist, and Lord Chancellor of England, who was considered by many (e.g., Durant, 1961) the epitome of modernist Renaissance thinkers:
Although nothing exists in nature except individual bodies exhibiting clear individual effects according to particular laws; yet, in each branch of learning, those very laws—their investigation, discovery and development—are the foundation both of theory and of practice. (Novum Organum, pp. ii, 2—cited in Durant, 1961, p. 134)

The foundations of the modernist world view have been examined by numerous late twentieth century thinkers, including Fritjof Capra (1996) in the following historical account:

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the medieval world-view, based on Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology, changed radically. The notion of an organic, living, and spiritual universe was replaced by that of the world as a machine, and the world machine became the dominant metaphor of the modern era. This radical change was brought about by the new discoveries in physics, astronomy, and mathematics known as the Scientific Revolution and associated with the names of Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes, Bacon, and Newton. Galileo banned quality from science, restricting it to the study of phenomena that could be measured and quantified. Rene Descartes created the method of analytic thinking, which consists in breaking up complex phenomena into pieces to understand the behavior of the whole from the properties of its parts. Descartes based his view of nature on the fundamental division between two independent and separate realms—that of mind and that of matter...The conceptual framework created by Galileo and Descartes—the world as a perfect machine governed by exact mathematical laws—was completed triumphantly by Isaac Newton, whose grand synthesis, Newtonian mechanics, was the crowning achievement of seventeenth-century science. (pp. 19-20)

One problem with such a worldview is that it promotes and perpetuates separation and isolation rather than community and connectedness. Some scholars have argued that the prevailing modernist paradigm is responsible—either directly or indirectly, in part or in whole—for the kinds of reductionistic thinking underlying dualistic conceptions of self and society, disconnection between humans, non-human life, and the physical environment, and the almost inexorable quest to acquire, control, dominate, and consume (e.g., Capra, 1996). Building
on the reductionistic conception of nature and the modernist role of the philosopher-scientist, Durant (1961) describes further Francis Bacon's perspective on the relationship between humans and their environment:

When science has sufficiently ferreted out the forms of things, the world will be merely the raw material of whatever utopia man may decide to make. (p. 134)

Other scholars suggest that although the cultures of separation and isolation have certainly been reinforced by atomistic theories formulated during the European Renaissance, the social and historical roots of our present cultures of domination, separation, and isolation probably originated much earlier in the history of humankind (e.g., Eisler, 1987; Merchant, 1994). These theorists argue that various forms of domination (e.g., the domination of humans over the environment, men over women, one cultural group over another cultural group, adults over children) have mutually reinforced one another throughout much of our collective history, extending back at least to the emergence of the earliest human "civilizations." Activities and relationships intended to achieve practical ends (e.g., to develop workable divisions of labor, to establish viable systems of social order) were gradually internalized, eventually becoming commonplace forms of social behavior. Among these institutionalized social norms were the seeds of the cultures of domination, separation, and individualism prevalent today.

However these norms may have evolved, it is clear that by the close of the European Renaissance, whatever sense of connectivity, reciprocity, and mystery that remained from earlier, more organic and spiritually based conceptions of reality had been firmly placed under the microscopic lens of modernist scientific analysis. During subsequent centuries the norms of domination, separation, and individualism were increasingly reflected and reinforced in the dominant discourses and practices of generations of Europeans and Northern Americans. Today the principles of individualism and domination are often viewed (to the extent that they are visible at all) not only as acceptable, but as natural and desirable modes of human behavior. Our grand narratives and our daily activities have supported and reified an increasingly dualistic and mechanistic view of the world while at the same time precluding the development of viable alternatives (e.g., Capra, 1996). By including some discourses and omitting others, members of the dominant culture have too often failed to critique their (our) own perspectives or to imagine alternative possibilities. Although challenged in many corners, the modernist paradigm has remained the dominant perspective within our society. The result has been the
persistence and exacerbation of a culture of individualism, disconnection, and domination at the expense of community, connectedness, and equality (e.g., Bellah, et al., 1985; Capra, 1996; Eisler, 1987; Fraser & Nicholson, 1990; Lasch, 1978; Merchant, 1994).

In place of a disconnected and mechanistic view of the world, Capra (1996) argues that life and society can more accurately be understood as a vast web of interconnected and interdependent relationships, systems, and systems of systems. According to Capra:

The more we study the major problems of our time, the more we come to realize that they cannot be understood in isolation. They are systemic problems, which means that they are interconnected and interdependent. For example, stabilizing world population will be possible only when poverty is reduced worldwide. The extinction of animal and plant species on a massive scale will continue as long as the Southern Hemisphere is burdened by massive debts. Scaricities of resources and environmental degradation combine with rapidly expanding populations to lead to the breakdown of local communities and to the ethnic and tribal violence that has become the main characteristic of the post-cold war era. Ultimately these problems must be seen as just different facets of one single crisis, which is largely a crisis of perception. It derives from the fact that most of us, and especially our large social institutions, subscribe to the concepts of an outdated worldview, a perception of reality inadequate for dealing with our overpopulated, globally interconnected world. (pp. 3-4)

Capra’s alternative to the modernist worldview is an organic, systems-based perspective articulating horizontal (as opposed to hierarchical) interconnections and interdependencies that, he believes, more accurately characterize the nature of our world and the relationships therein. This perspective, supported by leaders in a variety of fields, offers hope for a different kind of relationship within our communities and between people and the environment. In the following sections we will explore theoretical perspectives that simultaneously challenge the modernist worldview while enriching the notions of community and connection. This review will include a sociocultural critique of society, an examination of the epistemological foundations of learning and development, an exploration of alternative ontological assumptions, and an analysis of the mediational functions of language and discourse. The synthesis of this information will help pro-
vide a foundation for a more connected approach to citizenship education.

**Critical Theories and Cultural Studies**

Some of the most significant challenges to the modernist world view can be found in the rich and diverse literature provided by critical theories and cultural studies. The collective work in the areas of multicultural education, feminist philosophy, and critical theory has advocated a shift from cultural uniformity, the privileging of objective analysis, and social and cultural (re)production to cultural pluralism, the affirmation of varied ways of knowing, and social and cultural transformation rooted in a critical social orientation and an ethic of care and community.

Scholars such as James Banks, for example, have worked for years to situate reflective inquiry within the context of a pluralistic society and to conceptualize such inquiry as merely one aspect of the larger process of self development for social transformation (e.g., Banks, 1987, 1989). The larger goal is to equalize the life chances of all members of society (e.g., Banks, 1987; Bullivant, 1986). According to Banks (1989), we must identify perspectives and approaches that are more deeply, critically, and pervasively multicultural in nature. Rather than limiting our focus to isolated contributions, we also need to address the beliefs, concerns, and relative life chances of members of ethnic minority groups in America. From Banks’ perspective, a truly multicultural approach to citizenship education would be good both for members of ethnic minority groups and for “mainstream” Americans:

A curriculum that focuses on the experiences of mainstream Americans and largely ignores the experiences, cultures, and histories of other ethnic, racial, cultural, and religious groups...is one major way in which racism and ethnocentrism are reinforced and perpetuated in the schools and in society at large. A mainstream-centric curriculum has negative consequences for mainstream students because it reinforces a false sense of superiority, gives them a misleading conception of their relationship with other racial and ethnic groups, and denies them the opportunity to benefit from the knowledge, perspectives, and frames of reference that can be gained from studying and experiencing other cultures and groups. (1989, p. 189)

The ultimate goal in Banks’ view is to develop a thoroughly integrated multiethnic curriculum that would help promote the understanding, empathy, critical self-reflection, and social action needed to create a
more just society.

Additional challenges to the modernist paradigm have been issued by Maxine Greene, Nel Noddings, and other feminist philosophers of education. For example, in an article entitled “Social Studies and Feminism,” Noddings (1992) argued convincingly for a social studies curriculum that facilitates an ethic of caring and community while critiquing and expanding traditional gender-based roles and relationships. Challenging the narrow conceptions that have characterized our thinking in education about subjects such as home economics and religion, Noddings noted that many of the most important goals of social education are consonant with the project of promoting gender equity, social opportunity, and an ethic of care and community.

Like Banks, scholars such as Noddings, Greene, and numerous others have argued that substantive social improvement will ultimately require a fundamental restructuring of basic norms and institutions within our society (e.g., Anyon, 1979; Anzaldúa, 1987; Counts, 1932; Freire, 1970; Greene, 1988; Nieto, 1996; Ogbu, 1987; Philips, 1972; Sleeter & Grant, 1994). Recognizing the limited impact isolated individuals are able to make on the broader workings of society, these theorists insist that social reconstruction through self-development and collective action is essential to the realization of our democratic ideals.

Finally, since the social conditions, practices, and relationships that preclude the achievement of our most worthy national ideals (e.g., equal opportunity, liberty and justice for all) must be identified before they can be addressed, still others have advocated the development of a critical social orientation (e.g., Apple, 1982; Finkelstein, 1984; Giroux, 1985; Gutman, 1990; McNeil, 1986; Popkewitz, 1991; Willis, 1977). If unconscious and unreflective participation in an oppressive social structure is part of the problem, they reason, the solution must include critical consciousness-raising (Freire, 1970) through the development of a critical orientation toward society in general.

However, we are reminded that critical self-examination is just as important as the critical analysis of broader social conditions and structures (e.g., Baldwin, 1988; Ellsworth, 1989; Freire, 1970). Practices that objectify and disempower “others” are unacceptable even when performed in the service of promoting critical understanding. Although social critique is certainly important, social transformation requires attention to the relationship between questioning and caring, and it requires painstaking support in the process of creating physical, social, and emotional spaces in which a search for alternatives can realistically occur (e.g., Ellsworth, 1989, 1992; Greene, 1988).

**Social Learning and Human Development**

In addition to the contributions of critical theory and sociocultural studies, the basic premises of the modernist worldview have also
been challenged by contemporary theories of learning and development. A particularly influential challenge to the assumptions of dualism and disconnection was articulated by the Soviet learning theorist Lev S. Vygotsky who questioned the long-held belief that learning proceeds from the part to the whole rather than the other way around. Drawing heavily on the principles of Gestalt psychology, Vygotsky argued that humans naturally think in terms of meaningful units and that human understanding typically proceeds from the whole to the part. Thus, for example, whole words initially make more sense to a child than do isolated syllables or phonemes, just as specific historical figures and events, geographical locations, and political actions and relationships are more meaningful when located within their broader social contexts. Although it may be argued that learning actually proceeds in both directions (to build upon Vygotsky's [1986] often cited example, it is possible for understanding to work not only from the flower to the rose but also from flower to flora), the point is that Vygotsky's work has gone a long way toward challenging the linear, reductionistic assumptions that have guided unidirectional part-to-whole practices in American education.

The work of Jean Piaget (e.g., 1972) also challenges the reductionism of past assumptions about learning and development, especially those involving the relationship between humans and their environment. Rather than passive beings who are shaped and molded by an active environment, Piaget insisted that humans are cognitively active beings who act upon (interpret, intend, construct meaning about and within) the environment. To this important insight, Vygotsky (1978, 1986) adds that since the human environment is essentially social in nature, and since humans are socially active, the human environment must be considered active (intentional, goal-directed) as well.

The notion of active humans interacting within an equally active social environment demands the re-examination of our most basic assumptions about locus of control relative to persons and their environments, and it suggests a very different conception about what it means to learn and to teach. Rather than depositing information into the minds of students (what Freire [1970] called the "banking" model of education and what Barr, Barth, & Shermis [1977] referred to as "citizenship transmission"), learning entails active interpretation of environmental phenomena and dynamic human interaction (in many cases involving the co-construction of knowledge) within an equally active social environment. This position suggests that learning occurs when students use the cultural tools of communication to interact with other human beings to make sense of the social environment of which they are a part.

American pragmatic social psychologist George Herbert Mead (1934) takes the matter in yet another direction, challenging the dual-
istic assumptions that precluded a useful understanding of the nature and development of self. One of the problems, he argued, is that humans have long been perceived as possessing minds and selves prior to engaging the very environment within which those minds and selves emerge. Society is then explained in terms of the collective action of these preexisting minds and selves. Such conceptions, asserted Mead, have no way of logically explaining the prior existence of the psychic individual. On the other hand, a theory that postulates social transaction as developmentally preceding the formation of mind is supported by the cognitive requirements necessitated by such fundamental physiological relations as human reproduction, cooperation for mutual protection, and the acquisition of food.

Thus, according to Mead, mind and self are developed through social interaction. Social interaction is never simply the product of the actions of individuals. Rather, it produces selves as well. Indeed, as Mead (1934) argued, it is only through the eyes of others that a person comes to see him- or herself as a self in the first place. Our understanding of the “other” is gradually elaborated through broader sociocultural experience and dialogue, and our conception of self is enlarged as we begin to identify with a broader cross-section of others (i.e., as we perceive that we, too, are multifaceted persons who are simultaneously members of a variety of sociocultural groups including, for example, student, teacher, son, brother, partner, Irish American, Polish American, artist, scientist, social activist, community leader, community follower, United States citizen, citizen of the world).

As the sociocultural environment is enlarged throughout life, the self also expands and diversifies. Theoretically, we may continue to become broader, more multicultural and more self-conscious persons as long as there is a continuation of the processes (e.g., the having of increasingly diverse sociocultural experiences; symbolically mediated interpretation and reflection upon those experiences) by which a person comes to see him- or herself as a “self” in the first place. Thus, even the development of self is a dynamic process involving connection, reciprocity, and mutual influence rather than isolation and reduction.

The Nature of “Reality”

Another broad area of intellectual thought that challenges the modernist worldview while extending our understanding of community and connectedness involves philosophical inquiry into the nature of truth and reality. A noteworthy example can be found in the work of Dewey and Bentley (1949). Like Capra, Dewey and Bentley challenged conventional explanations of person-environment relationships based on principles of classical (Newtonian) physics in which particles are presumed irredúcible, interdependent yet separable ele-
ments that interact with one another in a mechanical, linear, and reductionistic manner. Their concern, articulated during the middle of the twentieth century, was that once the premise of separation has been accepted at the microbiological level, it is but a short stretch to conceive of human understandings, processes, and relationships as similarly distinct from each other and from the acting organism (in this case the human agent).

According to Dewey and Bentley, the reductionistic approach of classical physics is simply not applicable to the realm of human-environment relationships or to the processes of human understanding. In their critical analysis of the relationships among subject, object, and action, Dewey and Bentley reexamined the connections between that which is known, those who do the knowing, and the processes of coming to know. The result was a compelling argument that recognized what Dewey called the "transactional" relationship between humans and their environments.

The aspects of space and time are central to the transactional conception of the relationship between knowing and the known. Dewey and Bentley insisted that the processes involved in knowing and being are both "durational" and "extentional" in nature. On the surface, a particular instance of change in understanding may be viewed as isolated in space and time. In actuality, however, such an event inevitably both influences and is influenced by conditions that exist beyond the spatial and temporal confines in which conscious apprehension occurs. Even the intuitive flash, the so-called "ah ha!" experience, represents but a single moment in an expansive temporal and durational network of relationships and processes. According to Dewey and Bentley, the process is reciprocal, it is ongoing, and it inevitably extends beyond immediate physical and social surroundings.

Similar challenges to modernist views of reality can be found in the work of Dewey's colleague and friend George Herbert Mead. A basic assumption of Mead and his followers was that social conditions and individual minds and selves fundamentally influence each other (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Blumer, 1969; Hewitt, 1994; Mead, 1934). From this perspective, the vast majority of human interaction is at once both social and psychological, and the relationship between these aspects is mutually defining. Hewitt (1994) describes the relationship as follows:

Only individuals act. Everything else—society, culture, social structure, power, groups, organizations—is ultimately dependent on the acts of individuals. Yet, individuals can act only because they acquire the capacity to do so as members of a society, which is the source of their knowledge, language, skills, orientations, and motives. Individu-
als are born into and (influenced) by a society that already exists and that will persist long after they are dead; yet the same society owes its existence and continuity to the conduct of its members. (p. 4)

Thus, while particular persons inevitably influence the environment they help comprise, those very persons are simultaneously and profoundly influenced by the environment as well.

Mead (1934) went to great lengths to explore the nature of this relationship. To demonstrate the ways in which humans simultaneously define and are defined by their environments, Mead began with the relationship between organisms and environments in general:

When a form develops a capacity, however this takes place, to deal with parts of the environment which its progenitors could not deal with, it has to this degree created a new environment for itself. The ox that has a digestive organ capable of treating grass as a food adds a new food, and in adding this it adds a new object. The substance which was not food before becomes food now. The environment of the form has increased. The organism in a real sense is determinative of its environment. The situation is one in which there is action and reaction, and adaptation that changes the form must also change the environment. (p. 215)

The point, from a postmodern perspective, is that "realities" are contingent, contextualized, historical, and revisable and that relationships between organisms and environments are inevitably reciprocal in nature. As we shall soon argue, this perspective suggests a dramatically different approach to citizenship education for the common social good.

The Role of Discourse and the Problem of Individualism

Finally, before proceeding to a discussion of alternative goals and approaches for the social studies, we must address the vital role of discourse. The development of a more connected approach to citizenship education can either be enhanced or impeded by the privileging of some discourses and the exclusion of others. In spite of our gains, we believe the substance and modes of communication within the field have too often failed to adequately critique our dominant perspectives or to envision viable alternatives for social growth. The prevailing discourse within the social studies continues to be the discourse of modernism, and the discourse of modernism is a discourse of indi-
individualism. Unfortunately, this discourse has seriously restricted the development of a more connected approach to citizenship education.

It is true that some of the most significant developments in the social studies have been mediated by substantive dialogue utilizing the discourse of individualism. This was the case during the latter half of the twentieth century when leaders within the field began to advocate a shift from the inculcation of “good” citizenship to a more critical focus on the development of “responsible” citizens. It was also the case when scholars such as Cherryholmes, Stanley, and others began to challenge many of the positivist assumptions underlying citizenship education as decision-making and to help lay the groundwork for the reconceptualization of citizenship education as education for civic competence. Works such as these provided timely challenges to some of the positivist assumptions and liberal traditions extant within the social studies while underscoring the important relationships between changes in language and changes in perception.

To the extent that these works began to challenge basic positivist assumptions and to introduce a critique of knowledge, power, and discourse, they provided a significant step in the right direction. Yet insofar as the “citizen” within such arguments typically remained an “individual” (acting within and against a particular social context), dialogue remained the privileged mode of interaction, and the dominant perspective remained essentially rationalist and anthrocentric in nature, more work is still needed. In spite of our progress, not enough has been done to address the broader “crisis of perception” of which Capra and others have warned. The shift in thinking from “good” to “responsible” citizen highlighted the need for social criticism and critical reflection, and the shift from civic “responsibility” to civic “competence” emphasized the importance of nurturing a propensity for rational cognitive activity and equitable social discourse for the common good. What remains is the need for an explicit, cogent, and sustained critique of the worldview itself, and a vigorous, ongoing examination of the implications for citizenship education in a postmodern world.

Berger and Luckmann (1966) have demonstrated that our discourses (or lack thereof) can either reify or transform existing realities. In the case of the social studies, they have done both. As Howard Zinn (1995) has noted, the choices we make about what to discuss and what to omit, and the language we select or omit to address those issues, serve to emphasize some “realities” while obscuring others. Thus, regardless of our progress (e.g., moving from one rationalist, individualistic, nationalistic, human-centered conception of citizenship to another—albeit more critical, self-reflective and multifaceted—rationalist, individualistic, nationalistic, human-centered conception of citizenship), other problems remain unresolved, and numerous
possibilities remain unnamed, unarticulated, and unimagined. One of the most pressing of these problems, the persistence of which is firmly embedded in the modernist discourse, is our primary conception of ourselves as individuals.

The general problem of individualism has been addressed by a number of social and political theorists (Bellah, et al., 1985; Elshtain, 1981; Gilligan, 1982; Gutman, 1990; Lasch, 1978; Lukes, 1973; de Tocqueville, 1964) and educators (Dewey, 1916; Goodman, 1992; Greene, 1988; Kuzmic, 1993; Lesko, 1988) who have sought to explore and understand the fundamental relationship between individual and society. One of the most significant problems is that within a democratic society a tension exists between the discourses of individual freedom and social responsibility (Goodman, 1992; Gutman, 1990; Kuzmic, 1993). These analyses focusing on historical, social, and educational practice in the United States suggest that this tension is not only real, but unevenly balanced. This serves to privilege and therefore legitimize the particular discourse of individualism—an ideological perspective that ultimately privileges self over society. As Maxine Greene (1988) has observed, within dominant discourses we seldom hear talk of the common good—of collective goals and collaborative efforts to improve existing social conditions for the benefit of all—in our daily conversations in everyday settings. Rather than focusing on shared concerns and collective action for the good of all, the daily conversations of many US citizens are dominated by talk of personal goals and achievements, individual purchases and acquisitions, personal savings-, investment-, and retirement plans, and the like.

Thus, within the public discourse of individualism, the discourse of personal perspectives and practices, the notion of self-as-individual has been—and continues to be—privileged to the exclusion of meaningful dialogue about self-in-relation-in-community. The problem is that as the dominant ideological discourse, individualism serves both as a basis for social and educational practice and as a way to delegitimize other discourses, particularly the discourses of social responsibility and community. Self-as-individual has become the beginning, the middle, and the endpoint from which our discourses proceed. At what point, we must ask, does the prevalence of a particular discourse—in this case individualism—impede our ability even to imagine an alternative reality?

Fortunately, there has been growing interest in the relationships among language, power, and knowledge as these factors relate to social, cultural, and educational transformation and reform. The emphasis here is on how the social nature of language reflects relations of power and how language serves as a foundation for practice. In other words, if we as a society privilege a discourse of individual freedom over that of social responsibility, this serves as an ideological
foundation which guides social (and educational) practices. McLaren (1988) states this point as follows:

Language stamps the world with a social presence that is never neutral or unproblematic. Language does not reflect an unblemished image of reality “out there”; whatever image or object or event it attempts to describe, it cannot avoid refracting or distorting. Language, therefore, produces particular understandings of the world: i.e., particular meanings. Language as a form of common sense knowledge, which we call ideology, seeks to establish fixed truths or existing facts about the social world as if such facts were immune to particular relations of power or material interests. Language is always located in discourses and the range of discourses is always limited or “selective” since the dominant culture has legitimated certain discourses and discredited others (p. 3).

The dominance of individualism in North American society and culture in general has been explored from a variety of theoretical perspectives (e.g., Bellah et al., 1985; Elshtain, 1981; Lukes, 1973; Varrene, 1977). In addition, a number of educators have explored the relationship between individualism and educational practice, focusing on such aspects as curricular form and the logic of technical control (Apple, 1982), educational policy and reform (Cagen, 1978; Popkewitz et al., 1986), individualized educational programs as a form of bureaucratic control (Carlson, 1982), and the lack of a sense of community in schooling as a public institution (Raywid, 1988) and its impact on the organization and structure of schools (Lesko, 1988).

More specifically, Goodman and Kuzmic (1996) have argued that an ethos of individualism has dominated our conventional notions of schooling throughout much of the twentieth century. They suggest that this ethos is expressed in and through a variety of instructional, curricular, and pedagogical practices, including those which have focused on: individualized rather than collaborative forms of instruction; a competitive and adversarial rather than cooperative learning environment reinforced by forms of evaluation that serve to grade, rank, and track students; the isolation and objectification of curricular knowledge and subjects at the expense of viewing them as subjectively created, integrated, and connected to teachers’ and students’ experiences; a view of learning which is procedural and skills-oriented rather than conceptual or critical in focus; school structures and regimes that promote social conformity at the expense of a valuing of diversity and difference; and an organizational structure which is au-
thoritarian, punitive, and overly bureaucratic at the expense of more liberatory and democratic structures.

Trivializing the tension between the discourses of individual freedom and social responsibility makes it difficult, if not impossible, to address, challenge, and seek to change existing social, economic, and political inequalities that threaten our democratic values and beliefs (Cagen, 1978). The issues and problems facing our society and schools transcend an ideological perspective which privileges individual concerns above those of the collective society and require a discourse which situates the individual within a broader social context. In seeking to make our social, economic, and political institutions more democratic, Gutman (1990) argues that education must be democratized and schools valued as sites to practice the skills needed to assist students, as future citizens, in dealing with rather than dissolving this vital tension.

The role of discourse is important in another way as well. As with the other literature we have reviewed, current thinking on the role of language in learning and development challenges the reductionism of the modernist paradigm and, as such, is essential to the development of a more connected approach to citizenship education. According to many of the theorists already mentioned, learning and development are mediated by the use of symbols (language) to observe, reflect upon, and interpret experience (e.g., Mead, 1934; Vygotsky, 1978, 1986; Wertsch, 1991). As Piaget made abundantly clear, the construction of meaning involves the interpretation of experiences gained through interaction within the environment. And as Mead (1934), Vygotsky (1978, 1986), and others have added, the use of language is central to the interpretation of that experience. In short, learning and development require both the having of experience and the interpretation of experience, and one of the most important tools humans use to interpret their experience is language.

Thus, the role of language in learning and development is essential to the process of citizenship education. On the one hand, discourse provides a means by which students can begin to address rather than avoid vital tensions, including the tension between self-as-individual and self-in-community. On the other hand, the ability of humans to conceptually isolate—or name—environmental phenomena is central to the process of self-development for social education because it enables one not only to have experiences but to be conscious of those experiences, not only to be a person but to reflect upon the nature of one’s personhood. Once an experience, perspective, relationship, or state of existence is named, there is a greater likelihood that it can be consciously and systematically acted upon in other ways as well. After having identified oneself as a self, for example, a person may reflect upon and critique the nature of that self. At this point it may
become more possible to consider consciously the kind of person one wishes to become, the kinds of physical, social, and psychological actions required to become that person, and the means by which those actions might be carried out under existing environmental circumstances.

Of course, it is important to recognize that conscious deliberation on one's own self-development is but a single aspect of a multifaceted process (we may “choose,” for example, to become a member of a particular club, organization, or community, but we seldom choose whether to be a social creature, a member of the society into which we are born, a self-in-community). Nonetheless, even the possibility of conscious involvement in some dimension of this complicated process represents an important means by which humans can indirectly influence the nature of their physical, social, and emotional surroundings and, in so doing, consciously participate in their own self-development.

Alternative Goals and Practices:
A More Connected Approach to Social Education for The Good of Humanity and the Health of the Planet

In spite of the many positive changes that have occurred within our society, destructive perspectives continue to exert considerable influence over Western thinking. These perspectives are rooted in a mechanistic, reductionistic, hierarchical world view that has been prevalent in Western societies for centuries. Thus, among other things, we see the persistence of the kinds of thinking that underlie the advocacy of unidirectional cultural assimilation, the ongoing oppression of women and the poor, and the seemingly inexorable consumption of the planet upon which we depend for our very survival.

At the same time, many prevalent teaching approaches and curriculum decisions, as well as the discourses that dominate teacher-student interactions, are also rooted in the modernist paradigm. In spite of our pedagogical advances, we observe the continuation of excessive lecturing and note-taking, round-robin reading, over-reliance on nonfiction textbooks, the teaching of information that is disconnected from the everyday lives and concerns of the students, and failure to provide adequate opportunities for critical reflection on vital social and environmental issues (e.g., Eisner, 1991; Houser, 1995). We also know that social education is often flattened or trivialized (e.g., Goodlad, 1984), that the curriculum is sanitized in order to avoid political pressure (e.g., Banks, 1987; Hartoonian, 1991; Houser, 1995), and that too many classrooms continue to emphasize passing tests and earning credentials rather than examining, critiquing, and transforming society (e.g., McNeil, 1986).
The persistence of such views and practices indicates the need for a more fundamental revision of our goals and approaches. Indeed, the combined contributions of the theorists we have reviewed suggest that nothing short of a change of worldviews is needed in order to address the deep and complex problems we currently face. Rather than independence, isolation, and domination, we must begin to recognize and embrace the interdependence, reciprocity, and contingency of our postmodern world. Nor must we lose sight of the mutual relationships that exist between self and community or the vital role of discourse in resisting the privileging of a language of individualism over a language of community. As social educators like Banks (1987), Cherryholmes (1980), Stanley (1992), and numerous others have clearly demonstrated, language contributes to our consciousness about our roles and responsibilities in society. If language can also help students recognize that humans are social beings through and through, with fundamental membership in and responsibility for the well-being of communities-of-selves, we believe we can begin to educate for a more just and caring society. As social educators have long suspected, critique without care cannot unify diverse populations, and understanding without action can do little to change the existing social order.

Among other things, a connected, postmodern critique of “reality” would suggest that a decontextualized focus on historical, geographical, political, or economic information makes little sense. Rather, one form of information always needs to be examined in relation to other forms of information. Thus, geographical themes such as place, movement and interaction would need to be related to one another, to historical factors such as the idea of change over time, to the lives and perspectives of our students, and to a diversity of present-day concerns within our society and world. A connected approach to reality also implies that addressing social problems (such as unequal distribution or consumption of resources) without also addressing environmental conditions (e.g., the existence of finite, nonrenewable resources) may ultimately be a waste of time.

But what, specifically, does the development of a systems-based perspective mean for social educators concerned with the challenges of supporting personal growth and social reconstruction through citizenship education? How can teachers and schools—in their capacity as agents and institutions that provide a link between self, society, and the larger environment—mediate self-development for social improvement and ecological responsibility? And how might educators at all levels facilitate dialogue that addresses rather than ignores the tension between the discourses of individual freedom and social and ecological responsibility? Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to enumerate specific strategies or lessons, the literature we have
reviewed offers several important implications for a more connected approach to citizenship education in general.

First, a systems-based approach to citizenship education implies that we must talk, that our dialogue must be substantial, and that our discourses must not be limited to dominant ideologies that privilege parts at the expense of the whole, individuality at the expense of community, citizens of a nation at the expense of citizens of the world, or mankind at the expense of the rest of the planet. The centrality of the role of discourse suggests a need for communication that begins with self-in-community and humankind-in-relation-to-the-rest-of-the-world as the point from which all other inquiry extends. At all levels of planning and preparation, the dualistic tensions that exist between the discourses of personal freedom and social responsibility and between the wants of humankind and the needs of the planet need to be given serious consideration. Community-school coalitions, classroom practitioners, teacher preparation programs, administrators and administrative organizations, and state boards and departments of education all need to address rather than avoid these important tensions.

A more connected approach to citizenship education might provide experiences that explore not only the existing forms of governance within a particular community or nation, but alternative conceptions as well. And we might examine these various governmental forms not in isolation, but in relation to one another, to the good of the community, and to the health of the planet. Similarly, we might explore not only the history of the conquerors but also of the oppressed, not merely the merits of personal freedom but also the virtues of shared responsibility and collaborative struggle for the common good. And, consistent with the goals of community-building through "cooperative learning" and curriculum integration, we might emphasize the use of various modes of communication (e.g., novels as well as textbooks, gesture as well as speech, the arts as well as the sciences) with diverse groups of students to explore varying societal conditions, distinctions between human wants and human needs, likely results of continuing our current patterns of production, distribution, and consumption, and the ethical implications of the perspectives that currently prevail within our society.

Whatever the experiences provided, and whatever the nature of the discussion and reflection upon those experiences, the tension between the discourses of personal freedom and social responsibility can and must be addressed. Not only must these tensions be embraced by educators, but, like other issues that extend beyond the official parameters of the schooling experience, they must in some way become part of the discourse of students, parents, and the community as well. In a world plagued by massive social unrest and ecological turmoil related to extreme domination, isolation, and competition,
students must be encouraged to explore and address the fundamental relationships between our existing cultures (e.g., of individualism) and the exploitation of people and the Earth.

Genuine concern for the development of a more connected approach to citizenship education must also consider the conceptions of "truth" and "reality" in our postmodern world. Many of our most problematic ideas and approaches are grounded in a disconnected view of the nature of reality. Our students will need to critique this view and consider the possible existence of alternative "truths" and "realities" that are more connected, contingent, and evolving in nature. Thus, we might explore the connections between personal freedom and social responsibility, between mainstream domination and the oppression of sociocultural "others," between abundance and dearth, and between the survival of humankind and the health of the planet.

Specifically, we might contemplate the relationships between the history of our species (the population of which is currently doubling approximately every 40 years, according to conservative estimates), our geography (which is far more densely populated in some areas than others), our responsibility for our own physical reproduction (many of us desire larger families than seem ethically justifiable), and our consumption of resources (as North Americans, even those of us who do not physically reproduce typically consume far more resources than we need).

Similar explorations could make use of the tools of political science, economics, anthropology, and various other fields of study to help raise our students’ consciousness about the importance of connectedness and the responsibility that is needed within our postmodern world. Examples might range from exploration of the political exploitation and social and environmental consequences of corporate hog farming (e.g., in the Oklahoma panhandle) to the collective efforts of grocery retailers in a number of states to defeat packaging legislation designed to reduce waste and pollution. In each of these cases, concepts basic to the social studies (e.g., supply and demand, change and stability over time, the themes of place, movement, and interaction, the concepts of power, control, representation, and persuasion) could be taught within the broader context of exploring an interconnected version of "reality" and the implications for a postmodern citizenship education.

Whatever specific points might be addressed, the broader case also needs to be made. We will need to help students consider that, to the extent that reality is indeed socially constructed, alternative "truths" and "realities" do exist and their existence is important. For only through the development of a basic understanding of the limitations of the modernist worldview and of the possibilities implied by an ethic of community and connection will today’s youth be able to
consciously and systematically act upon the pressing issues they will face during the next millennium.¹⁰

Again, we must emphasize the vital role of discussion. Since language is a primary mediator of learning and development, experience alone will not be enough to assure substantive citizenship education. In addition to having substantive experiences, students must also reflect upon the meaning of those experiences. Discussion can help promote such reflection. If the goal is citizenship education for the common good, and if we are to move beyond well-meaning yet individualistic approaches to the improvement of society, the discussion will need to focus, at least in part, on the tensions that exist between individual freedom, social responsibility, and a sustainable world. We must help students recognize that these tensions exist, examine why they exist and how they are perpetuated, explore ways to address these tensions through the evolution of their own attitudes and actions, and appreciate the fact that substantive self-development occurs precisely as a result of struggles such as these. Moreover, because humans can reflect both on the external environment and on personal existence, it is possible to explicitly contemplate the persons we believe we currently are, the persons we wish to become, and the actions required to become those persons. Within a world that has been dominated by a discourse of individualism and disconnection, it seems that student-citizens deserve the opportunity at least to contemplate the possibility that it is natural for humans to exist as persons-in-community-within-an-interconnected-world.

As long as social inequity continues to define the political and economic landscape of the United States and the world, at least some of our efforts must be designed to help “mainstream” Americans recognize their own complicity in the perpetuation of an unjust system and to examine ways they might assume greater personal responsibility for transforming that system. And as long as humankind continues to dominate and destroy the planet, our discourses of community and connection must be extended to encompass all human and non-human organisms within our system of systems. We must begin to recognize that the fate of the human species is deeply affected by human attitudes and actions toward the world in which we live.

A more connected approach to citizenship education suggests that language must play an essential (albeit not exclusive) role in mediating the learning and development that occur in school. Even if we were to address the problems of unequal distribution and consumption of resources among humans, to consider these matters in relation to the needs of non-human life and the health of the planet, and to take the necessary measures to help students draw connections to their own lives and actions, something more would be needed. We would still need to consider the influence of the prevailing societal discourse
on our educational practices, and our students would need to consider its influence upon their own perspectives and actions. For as long as we continue to suppose that *individuals-as-individuals* have created our problems and that *individuals-as-individuals* can therefore provide the solutions (e.g., President Reagan's "Trickle-down economics," President Bush's "thousand points of light," President Clinton and Colin Powell's "volunteerism"), our prospects for success will be slim indeed.

In conclusion, there is perhaps no more politically tenuous enterprise within our society today than to challenge the modernist worldview that has dominated Western thought for the last 500 years. Yet, because this perspective is directly or indirectly responsible for the privileging within our society of individualism over community, of mind over body, of man over woman, and of humankind over other living and non-living organisms, this is precisely the issue that must be addressed if social education is to realize its full potential as an agent for the development of a more just and sustainable world.

Although the modernist worldview is clearly inconsistent with the basic premises of prominent scholars in a variety of fields, this reductionistic perspective remains fiercely entrenched within our educational system and society at large. While social educators have contributed to the ongoing conversation about the role of community and connection in education, we can ill-afford to become complacent in these difficult times. The social developments of the twentieth century compel us to continue what we have begun, and the intellectual developments provide the necessary means. Nowhere should the feeling of urgency be stronger or the sense of possibility greater than in the social studies, an academic field that has proclaimed for itself the mission of providing citizenship education for a better tomorrow.

**Notes**

1. In this paper we use the term social studies to indicate the name of the field and social education to indicate what we do. Disciplines such as history, geography, economics, and political science have typically been associated with the social studies. While we believe these disciplines can be valuable tools for social education, we do not see them as the only—or even necessarily the best—possible resources for promoting social development for the common good of society. Nor do we believe social studies faculty and teachers are necessarily the only or the best qualified educators to promote social development for the common good. Rather, consistent with the thesis of our paper, we seek to cross traditional boundaries of all kinds, and we encourage others to do the same. We seek to pool our various resources for the broader purpose of preparing global citizens to explore new avenues of positive social change.

2. See also Eric Hoffer's (1963) insightful analysis of the relationship between the "true believer" and the nature and dynamics of mass movements.

3. In this paper we define "culture" broadly to include race, class, gender, religious and sexual orientation, and so forth.

4. See Houser (1996) for a detailed discussion of the implications of George Herbert Mead's work for the development of a more multifaceted sense of self, particularly among members of the dominant culture.
Of course, there are also significant limitations related to the concept "citizen," which tends to emphasize the public sphere rather than the private sphere and tends, by definition, to include some members of a given society (e.g., on the basis of officially sanctioned criteria for membership) while excluding others. We recognize that the concept is problematic and that the least exclusionary use of the term may be the "global citizen."

At some point, we also need to examine the assumption that any particular worldview (whether mechanistic, systems-based, or some other alternative) is sufficient to address the complexity, contingency, and variability inherent in a postmodern world. Indeed, even the assumption that a single, universal "common good" is possible and desirable will, at some point, need to undergo critical examination.

The term "discourse" should be understood in the sense described by Lewis and Simon (1986), who state that "Discourse refers to particular ways of organizing meaning-making practices. Discourse as a mode of governance delimits the range of possible practices under its authority and organizes the articulation of these practices within time and space although differently and often unequally for different people. Such governance delimits fields of relevance and definitions of legitimate perspectives and fixes norms for concept elaboration and the expression of experience" (pp. 457-458).

Of course, strictly speaking, experience and interpretation are not isolated acts. As Joan Scott (1991) noted in her thesis on the evidence of experience, "Experience is at once always already interpretation and in need of interpretation" (p. 779).

It should be noted, as one of the reviewers of this paper pointed out, that from a postmodern perspective critique is already caring (otherwise why critique?) and understanding is already a form of action.

Exploring the tension between the discourses of individual freedom and social responsibility may seem too abstract an idea for young children to comprehend; however, the seeds can be planted even in the earliest of grades. See Paley (1992) or Houser (1997) for examples of ways to help young children begin to address the issues that divide our society.

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Democracy as a Cross-Cultural Concept: Promises and Problems

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Abstract
The accelerated democratization of Eastern and Central Europe has set into motion unprecedented efforts in citizenship education curriculum reform involving partner institutions from developed democracies. These efforts assume that democracy is a cross-cultural concept adaptable from a developed democracy to a developing democracy. This paper compares two distinct, but related, studies to address the viability of this assumption. The first study involved US and Czech participants in a citizenship education curriculum reform project as they mutually shaped a common ground for understanding the concept of democracy. The second study extended to the Czech Republic to test the viability of this common ground by surveying a purposeful sample of Czech social studies educators on their conceptions of democracy. The comparison of the findings yielded areas of commonality and difference on the conceptualization of democracy that led to promising and problematic implications for citizenship education curricular reform.

The dissolution of Soviet communism in Eastern and Central Europe accelerated the globalization of democracy to an unprecedented level (Huntington, 1991; Dahl, 1998). Within these former communist countries, the transition to democracy has been problematic, and long-term solutions to these problems are still being formulated and tested. Among the more visible solutions is the socialization of younger generations toward informed participation in a democratic society. In conjunction with this move toward a democratic polity, Eastern and Central European social studies curriculum reform in citizenship education is taking an evolutionary path. However, the sudden paradigmatic shift from communism to democracy magnifies the need for a quickened process.
In searching for a guiding philosophy upon which to build curriculum for democratic citizenship education, educational reformers from post-communist countries have turned to their cultural past, as well as to the efforts of developed democracies. In the latter instance, for better (Patrick, 1996) or worse (Gibson, 1999), Eastern and Central European educators have engaged many US institutions in projects directed at citizenship education reform. Such projects assume the cross-cultural applicability of democratic philosophical preferences and pedagogical traditions. However, this assumption may not apply to all cases of cross-cultural curriculum reform.

In this study, we address the viability of this assumption through the following question: Is democracy a cross-cultural concept readily adaptable from an established democracy to a developing democracy seeking curricular reform? Nested in the context of democratic citizenship education, our research focused on a curriculum reform project between the United States and the Czech Republic. In so doing, we carried out two distinct, but related, studies. The first study involved US and Czech participants in this curriculum reform project as they mutually shaped a common ground for understanding the concept of democracy. The second study extended to the Czech Republic to test the viability of the common ground established during the project by surveying a purposeful sample of Czech social studies educators on their conceptions of democracy. The comparison of the findings in both countries yielded areas of commonality and difference on the conceptualization of democracy that led to promising and problematic implications for citizenship education curricular reform.

**Setting of the Study**

In the United States, democratic citizenship education is a fundamental premise on which the whole school experience functions. However, a 1916 report generated by the National Education Association’s Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education placed this responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the social studies curriculum (Dunn, 1916). With little variation, social studies curriculum theorists, instructional designers, standards writers, and teacher educators have focused on the concept of democracy in some form or another as the basis of their work. Additionally, US social studies teachers and researchers have been able to base their work on a long, evolutionary tradition that can be traced through the intellectual, social, and political history of their country.

In direct contrast, citizenship education reformers in the post-communist societies of Eastern and Central Europe have had to move with lightning speed toward the generally accepted social mandate of democratization. During a 1990 conference held at the James Madri-
son House and focused on the goals, substance, and methods of democratic citizenship education, Jacek Strzemieczny, then Director of Teacher Training in the Polish Ministry of Education, summarized the complete educational catharsis and metamorphosis prompted by the sudden dissolution of communism and the urgent embrace of democracy in these countries: "Teachers of history [and social studies] were either indoctrinated or repressed....We are trying to fill an empty well with an empty bucket in a very great hurry" ("Amendment," 1991, p. 80). Faced with the urgency to reinvent citizenship education, social studies reformers in post-communist Europe have little historical context, democratic pedagogical tradition, or luxury of time to formulate a curriculum development process.

The Czech Republic is a case-in-point. Six years of Nazi occupation and 43 years of totalitarian communism left social studies educational reformers with no existing base from which to launch a program in democratic citizenship education. Nonetheless, the Czechoslovakian rejection of communism in 1989 impelled the Ministry of Education to enact a stop-gap measure that replaced the secondary school citizenship education curriculum taught under the previous regime with one based on five key concepts taken from social studies education as it appeared during Czechoslovakia’s brief existence as a democratic republic (1918 to 1939). These key concepts included (a) state and government policy, (b) constitutional and local law, (c) free market economics, (d) citizenship and human rights, and (e) Czechoslovakia in the global community.

After the 1993 "Velvet Divorce" separated the Czech and Slovak Republics, the Institute for Educational Research and Development at Charles University, Prague, took the lead in the continued revision of citizenship education curricula in the Czech Republic. The objectives of the Institute included the moderation of Marxist-Leninist perspectives in the historical, philosophical, and social science content of the curriculum; the reintroduction of world religions; a renewed study of Czech history, culture, heritage, and geography; and a pedagogical shift from transmitting information to prompting inquiry and active learning (Dostálová, 1995; Hamot, 1997). It was the Institute’s request to the United States for assistance in carrying out this "pedagogical shift" that led the United States Information Agency and the US Embassy in Prague to support a collaborative effort between the Institute and a major mid-western US college of education. Begun in 1995, the project had an 18-month life span.

Citing the need for a secondary social studies curriculum with a democratic orientation, the Czech project co-director determined that the existing third form (17- and 18-year-old students) social studies curriculum would be the target of the project’s reform effort. The goal of the project was to give life to the Ministry’s mandated content ar-
eas through the infusion of "democratic" pedagogical practices. The limited time frame of the project and the lack of an institutionalized curriculum development format in the Czech Republic led the Czech and US project co-directors to develop a plan that combined the technical elements of the Tyler Rationale (Tyler, 1949) with the bottom-up unfolding of a deliberative curriculum design (e.g., Schwab, 1970; Reid, 1994; Westbury, 1999). Developing the goals, behavioral objectives, and lesson plans normally associated with the traditional Tyler model became the charge of a writing team comprised of experienced pre-collegiate teachers, rather than university scholars or Ministry officials, from the Czech Republic.

The resultant "Civic Education for the Czech Republic" Project included a 12-week curriculum development workshop that brought five Czech civic educators to the US campus. The Czech project co-director chose these educators based on their successful use of democratic classroom practices since the fall of communism. Weekly seminar meetings focused on curriculum design, lesson plan development, and key components of democratic citizenship.

Another aspect of the workshop was a partnership program that paired the Czechs with social studies teachers from the local consolidated school district. As the Czechs rewrote their secondary school citizenship education curriculum, they met on a regular basis with their US counterparts to discuss ideas for the revised Czech curriculum. Over time, the Czech curriculum writers and US teachers met outside the workshop schedule to observe local social and cultural events, attend plays and concerts, and participate in family gatherings. On a professional level, the US teachers arranged for their Czech partners to make frequent visits to local social studies classrooms, thus providing the Czechs an opportunity to observe the theory they discussed in the university-based seminars as it was applied in classroom settings.

By the end of their residency on the US campus, the Czech curriculum writers completed 61 lessons on 20 topics related to the Institute for Educational Research and Development's citizenship education reform objectives and to the Ministry of Education's mandated key concepts for the third form social studies curriculum. These lessons introduced teaching strategies heretofore practiced rarely in the Czech Republic. Included in these lesson plans were teaching strategies such as role-playing, simulations, educational games, decision trees, civic writing, and cooperative learning. Additionally, some lessons highlighted specific areas of content new to the third form social studies course, such as AIDS awareness, industrial pollution, and civic activism.
Dewey (1929) noted that a guiding philosophy in educational endeavors "provides working hypotheses of comprehensive application" (p. 54). Within the framework of citizenship education in the Czech Republic and the United States, the prevailing philosophy is liberal democracy. However, unlike totalitarian visions of utopia, democracy can take on various meanings based on different settings and at different points in time (Dewey, 1939/1989; Griffin, 1942/1992). Consequently, liberal democracy is as recent as its emergence in Central and Eastern Europe after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Given the fluid nature of truth and reality in a liberal democracy, it is not surprising to find social studies theorists in the United States who advocate different interpretations of the concept. For example, Bahmuller (1997) gathered an international consensus on the elements of liberal democracy that should be the core of any curriculum dedicated to democratic citizenship, and he developed a framework based on the "liberal-constitutional" view of democracy. This framework, heavily dependent on democratic institutions, included equality before the law, limited constitutional government, a civil and open society, "as well as such elements of 'democracy,' narrowly conceived, as the conduct of free, fair, and regular elections; the secret ballot; and universal suffrage" (Bahmuller, 1997, p. 103). With a focus on the reflective process, Hunt and Metcalf (1955) anchored the concept of democracy in the examination of society's "closed areas" (e.g., economics, social class, race, sex, religion). Oliver and Shaver (1966) narrowed the vision a bit by basing democracy on the unquestionably fixed moral principle of individual human dignity as a baseline for decision making through reflective inquiry. Engle and Ochoa (1988) viewed the essence of democracy as the understanding of societal norms (socialization) and the open-minded reconsideration of these norms through individual constructions of reality (countersocialization). Others (e.g., Newmann, Bertocci, & Landness, 1977; Remy, 1980; Hartoonian, 1985) have defined the concept of democracy through the basic competencies required to act as an effective citizen in a democracy. Most recently, proposals for citizenship education reform based on a conception of liberal democracy range from feminist perspectives (Foster, 1997; Bloom, 1998) to postmodern interpretations (Gilbert, 1997).

In light of these varying interpretations of liberal democracy, the need to form a universal conceptualization appears not only fruitless, but manifestly unnecessary (Parker, 1996). Such a proposition would seemingly be based on "illiberal" democratic thinking. When projected onto an international scale, the search for cross-cultural unity is even more problematic. As noted by philosopher Jacques Barzun (1987), if
the concept of democracy cannot be defined precisely, then it cannot be adapted by one society from another due to the great historical variances found between different cultural groups. This notion resonates with Rousseau’s extension of the *Social Contract*, titled *Considerations on the Government of Poland* (1772). When asked to draw up a constitution for Poland’s short-lived democracy (it was tri-partitioned out of existence in 1795), Rousseau, in true liberal democratic style, declined the task by noting that no precepts apply cross-culturally; the individual social, cultural, and historical context of a nation drives the conceptualization and subsequent application of democracy.

Nonetheless, there is a concept known as “liberal democracy,” and many post-communist nations of Eastern and Central Europe have embraced this concept as their preferred form of social existence. The seeming lack of universal agreement on the concept of liberal democracy does not preclude its cross-cultural adaptability on certain, specific points of agreement. Ultimately, potential definitional comparisons-contrasts and cultural compatibilities-incompatibilities between conceptions of democracy—not only as a basis for educational reform, but also as an agreed upon social arrangement—form the context of the question at hand: Is democracy a cross-cultural concept readily adaptable from an established democracy to a developing democracy seeking curricular reform?

Both philosophically and constitutionally, the Czech Republic and the United States consider themselves liberal democracies. The philosophical and political writings of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk form the foundation of Czech conceptions of democracy as embodied in their constitutions both before and after the period of Nazi occupation and Sovietization. Masaryk found himself as the leading proponent for Czechoslovak independence immediately before and during World War I. Many of his philosophical writings from this period concerned an understanding of democracy that was liberal in its broad conception. Drawing from the works of Czech scholars throughout history (e.g., Comenius, Palacký, and Havlíček), Masaryk defined democracy through “humanistic ideals” that related to an idea of progress based on positive human potentials and their contribution to the group (Neudorfl, 1989). This notion of a civil society contributing through both individual potential and group alignment resonated with the “naturalistic humanism” of Masaryk’s contemporary John Dewey (Hoy, 1998). In a similar expression, Dewey (1916) viewed the concept of democracy as “more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience” (p. 87).
Analytical Framework

Given the closeness of Masaryk and Dewey on the conceptualization of democracy, intuition led us to the working hypothesis that the Czech curriculum writers, their US counterparts, and a representative sample of Czech teachers would share some key elements of democracy as a concept. Additionally, Dewey’s educational philosophy influenced virtually all of the differing notions of liberal democracy found in the aforementioned ideas of US social studies scholars. This reality led us to the second hypothesis that culturally bound manifestations of liberal democracy as experienced in a developed and a developing democracy would lead to somewhat different conceptualizations. These two working hypotheses, as well as the cultural contingencies evident in defining a concept, led us to develop an analytical framework that referenced both the positions of the respondents as well as their conceptualizations of democracy. As such, we sought similarities and differences in the conceptions of democracy formulated by the study’s participants without the use of a priori categories as the basis for gathering data. Our quest for emergent conceptualizations, coupled with the need for a general referential system, led us to the social context of cultural production as an analytical framework (Wieting & Thorlindsson, 1990).

With a goal to describe the stance toward democracy held by the Czech curriculum writers, their US partners, and a sample of Czech teachers, we focused on subject-object relations displayed in the class of objects acknowledged and singled out for attention, as well as the manner in which the object was defined (Wieting & Thorlindsson, 1990). Because subject-object relations signify membership in particular groups, this framework was particularly useful for analyzing conceptions of democracy mutually shaped through cross-cultural contact (the Czech and US partners), as well as the subject-object relations offered by teachers experiencing a paradigmatic shift in social and political arrangements (the Czech teachers). Thus, our two studies follow chronologically with the intention of looking first to the concepts of democracy mutually shaped during a curriculum reform project on democratic citizenship education and then exploring the conceptualization of democracy exhibited by the audience for which the new curriculum was intended.

Study 1: The Project Participants

This study sought to describe the mutually shaped subject-object relationship of democracy as a concept among the Czech and US partners in the “Civic Education for the Czech Republic Project.” The cross-cultural contact between the Czech and US partners took place Summer 2001.
over a 12-week period. The US project co-directors chose the US teachers based on observations of their classroom practice, on recommendations from their peers and administrators, and on input from their former professors. The criteria considered most when inviting US teachers to participate in the project were their knowledge of democratic citizenship, their innovative application of this knowledge in their classroom practice, and their participation in the school district’s curriculum development projects. As noted earlier, the Czech project co-director chose the curriculum writers on the basis of their democratic classroom practices since the fall of communism.

In this study, we attended to the Czech and US partners’ reflections on their cross-cultural engagements with each other. The key element for moving a cross-cultural experience from a casual event to a learning experience is reflection—"the mulling over, wondering about, and confirming or changing one’s previously held beliefs" (Wilson, 1982, p. 185). Through the reflective process, individuals can reconstruct their thoughts and move beyond the surface of a cross-cultural experience to a look at the significance the experience holds for their self-development (Kelly, 1955; Vall & Tennison 1991-1992; Wilson, 1993). In keeping with our analytical framework, our goal was to have the partners “reveal their own judgments in their own vocabulary regarding some important set of elements in their own experience” (McCoy, 1983, p. 75).

In seeking the partners’ reflective insights on democracy, we approached the study through a qualitative research process. The primary sources of data were reflective journals the partners kept during the project and bi-weekly interviews we held with them. In addition, we collected data from our observations of the interactions between the partners during scheduled workshop activities, classroom visits, and social events. We asked the partners to check each transcribed interview and observation for accuracy. In all, we analyzed two thousand pages of raw data by coding words, sentences, and strings of sentences that fit together conceptually.

Content analysis of the raw data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) offered initial findings that, when categorized, answered the question “How would you define democracy?” By coding each sentence, or string of sentences when the meaning otherwise would have been lost, with a date, name, and category, the partners’ cross-cultural conceptualizations of democracy were discernible. Additionally, constant comparison of the raw data led to the identification of emerging patterns across the cases that helped to focus our observations and to develop questions for the ongoing interview process (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
We used these findings to elaborate the partners’ definitions of democracy over time. We analyzed initially all references to the concept of democracy with regard to (a) what democratic citizens should know, do, and think; (b) the essential elements of a democratic society; and (c) the forms such a society should take. From these initial analyses, two categorical findings emerged that revealed agreement on the conceptualization of democracy (the object), but from dissimilar positionalities (the subjects).

**Positionality and Socio-Cultural Context**

Positionality, or the standpoint of the subject, is a key element in understanding the subject-object relation portrayed by respondents during discourse. In part, people’s positionality signifies the socio-political context and group association from which they make their claim. In the study of the Czech writers and US teachers, two subject positions emerged. These positions alternated between two affiliations, teachers and citizens, but each group positioned itself in one affiliation more consistently than the other.

*The position of teacher.* Throughout the project, the Czech and US partners saw themselves in the position of teacher by the very nature of their profession (the US teachers) and their backgrounds (the Czech writers as former teachers). However, identification with teachers and teaching was more prevalent with the US teachers than with the Czech curriculum writers.

The US teachers, when reflecting on the concept of democracy, spoke frequently from the standpoint of what their students should know, do, and feel in order to sustain a democratic society. They defined themselves as teachers, and they referred to democracy in the context of how “we” (teachers) should teach and what “they” (students) should learn. In so doing, they reflected on the definition of democracy with such leading phrases as “They need to be able to...” or “They have to be committed to...” On other occasions, they referred to themselves as subjects in the act of teaching democracy by noting “our role” or “we need to develop in students.” Clearly, the positionality of the US teachers stemmed from their affiliation with the teaching profession in a democratic society and the charge held by that group in developing democratic citizens.

The Czech curriculum writers referred to themselves as teachers, but they looked upon that affiliation with much less conviction and only as a minor aspect of how they defined democracy. Their self-references as teachers resulted in “if” statements—statements that projected themselves as subjects of possibility within the teaching ranks: “If we help the students feel equality and, for example, tolerance, it will prevent violence and racism.” In a similar vein, the Czech writers’ positionality regarding the teacher’s object, students, indi-
cated a possible reason for the tentativeness of their affiliation with teachers. Students, in the eyes of the Czech writers, “were not ready yet to accept other cultures and nationalities.” However, if democratic citizenship education were successful in the Czech Republic, then “it will help not only the learner, but the whole society.” These occasional references to their position as teachers indicated a sort of distance—a distance that kept their role as tentative, but filled with possibility—and a perception of students as people unprepared for their role as citizens, but certainly critical to the Czech Republic as a democracy.

The position of citizen. Positioning themselves as citizens with regard to the object (democracy) was a trait much more prevalent in the Czech writers than in the US teachers. As was the case with the positionality of “teacher,” the Czech writers did not hold exclusively the role of citizen. Their US counterparts, on occasion, also referred to democracy from the standpoint of citizen.

When discussing democracy as a concept, the Czech writers placed themselves in the position of citizen by referring to a democratic society in general and the Czech society in particular. The Czechs’ references to the skills inherent in the concept of democracy indicated their positionality as citizens by speaking in terms of “we” require “social skills, inquiry skills, and we should be able to interpret data.” Social skills, for instance, “are very important, especially for Czech society.” At times, the Czechs juxtaposed their citizenship with that of their US counterparts. In these instances, they referred to the mutual shaping that took place during their cross-cultural experience in the United States as “a better understanding of the American concept of democracy. What we appreciate in the lifestyle is a pragmatic and rational attitude in solving problems and American optimism because we are sometimes pessimistic in the Czech Republic. We tend to be pessimistic.” The Czechs’ references to democracy as a mutually accepted social norm based on pragmatism and rationality placed them in the position of citizens of a developing democracy analyzing the aspects of a developed democracy for purposes of comparison and understanding.

Unlike the Czech writers, the US teachers viewed their position as citizens only to the degree that they would see their students in that role as adults. They never totally abandoned their positionality as teachers, although they did at times refer to the common good of the greater society in which they participated. For instance, a US teacher’s commitment “to the long term goals of inclusion and cooperation, working together, and a sense of dialogue so that if we disagree it’s OK to disagree and we don’t kill each other” references the whole of society in the need to be tolerant. The US teachers also reflected on an aspect of democratic citizenship based on decision making skills that were “very important for people to realize because there
is sometimes indirect, but other times direct, relationships between what's happening out there and the need for an ability to synthesize information, to apply it, to discuss it. That process requires a willingness on the part of the students to take the time to become informed." Again, the positionality of teacher never fully escaped the US teachers even when they situated themselves as a citizen.

Socio-political context and positionality. Socio-political context is defined as the conception of democracy that exists within the social and political framework indigenous to a country (Hamot, 1999). In the case of the newly formed Czech Republic, citizens view the approximately 50 years of Communist Party domination as an interruption of their long heritage as an intellectual and social entity in Central Europe and to their desired status as a democratic state established at the end of World War I.

This newness of the Czech Republic as a democracy was not lost on the way the Czech writers and US teachers viewed and conceived of their positionality during their cross-cultural experience. Unique in this observation was the fact that the US teachers pointed to the Czech socio-political context as a possible reason for their positionality as primarily that of citizen, and the Czech writers viewed the US teachers' standpoint as a direct result of their deeply ensconced pragmatic habit of mind as teachers in an established democracy.

The US teachers' views of the Czechs grew from a perception of the Czechs' nascent socio-political democratic context. They formed this perception from the seemingly paradoxical reality that the Czech Republic was both an old and a new country with deep historical roots as a culture, but with new and tender growth toward a democratic society. This paradox in the Czech Republic's socio-political context indicated to the US teachers that the Czechs' positionality stemmed from the need to "change not only their educational system, but their entire culture. It's a lot easier for us to take democracy for granted if you've been living and breathing it for over 200 years." However, the US teachers noted that the Czechs, in spite of their long-standing cultural heritage, were actually trying to "create a change in their culture, not only their citizenship education."

Obversely, the Czech writers framed the positionality of the US teachers as one that looked more microscopically at the notion of democracy, thus the focus on their role as teachers and not necessarily citizens. In the eyes of the Czech writers, pragmatic approaches to the problems of today, without the constant reminder of a heritage with long roots in the intellectual and social history of their continent, defined the positionality of the US teachers. The major difference in positionality, according to the Czechs, was "that we are more historically and locally rooted. We have very strong relationships to place and the past. Americans live more for today and the future."
Democracy as an Object

The cross-cultural contact between the Czech curriculum writers and the US teachers mutually shaped their conceptions of democracy over time. Along with the clarified realization of their positionality, two major areas of agreement on the object of democracy as a concept evolved between the Czech and US partners. These two areas included democracy as "tolerance" and democracy as "decision making."

Democracy as tolerance. Throughout the course of the project, the Czech and US partners moved toward a mutual regard for tolerance as an integral aspect of democracy. Tolerance, defined conjointly, included the elements of open-mindedness, civility in social discourse, and cooperation. In the case of the Czechs, the notion of "minorities-as-equals" was an aspect of their cross-cultural experience that evolved separately from the definition of tolerance held by their US partners, but grew from their cross-cultural setting and from their experiences with their US partners.

The Czech and US partners believed that open-mindedness was an aspect of tolerance on which all other aspects depended. Open-mindedness, as summarized by a US teacher, was an attitude encompassing "the acceptance of different viewpoints" that afforded "an opportunity for a person to want to be involved in the system." The "system" represented in this view "was not a particular ideology, but the process by which a whole society, all people, develop." As such, an open-minded citizenry would maintain the conditions for tolerance requisite to democratic dialogue. As noted by one Czech partner, tolerance based on open-mindedness was "important for sharing different opinions among people and for the development of the whole society." A corollary to open-mindedness was the level of participation required in a democratic society. If full participation is desired, then open-mindedness was a requirement for "surviving as a democratic society." A Czech partner pointed to the situation that develops in less democratic parts of the world, or between less open-minded people in a democracy as "people who are not tolerant, people who are not open-minded, fighting and killing one another when they participate in the same arenas of concern." Without open-mindedness, other aspects of tolerance as a key element of democracy would not survive.

Another key element of tolerance—one that the partners considered as an outgrowth of open-mindedness—was civility in social discourse. This sort of civility requires respect for different viewpoints without the need for vituperative reaction. Variously, both the Czech and US partners referred to civility as a "a character trait," "an attitude needed for tolerance," or the "respect for a citizen's dignity" that would promote "effective, two-way communication." The Czech's viewed their new socio-political context as very volatile with respect
to civility in social discourse because of the embryonic nature of their democratic society. The mere fact that opposing viewpoints now entered into Czech political and social discussions through the media, Parliament, and open elections was a sign of the need for developing civility in social discourse as a measure against stagnation through vitriolic opposition. Such opposition would lead to standoffs in Czech society that would endanger their desire to democratize. The Czechs looked more to the younger generation for hope that civility in discourse would prevail because the "skills of debate and discussion have improved a lot lately in the younger people. We see the skills we didn't have." This point was not lost on the US teachers as they portrayed their position as educators of the citizenry. "Hope" of developing an attitude "that we [US citizens] are respectful toward one another and still can disagree" reflected the fact that younger generations in any sort of democracy need to learn civility in social discourse and that it is not an inherent trait of human character. Essentially, the partners believed that a tolerant democratic society required people to help each other and take an interest in each other so that points of contention on socio-political issues could be negotiated with an attitude of open-mindedness based on civility in social discourse.

The Czech and US partners viewed open-mindedness and civility in social discourse as elements of tolerance requisite for cooperation. As one Czech partner noted, these essential elements of tolerance motivated members of a democratic society "to be active and to collaborate with other people." Another Czech partner noted the agreement by both groups that cooperation could only take place by "respecting other opinions and views." As such, a cooperative attitude has a "sense of compassion" running through it. Cooperation was also a required skill necessary for deliberation and eventual decision making that would preclude people from "killing each other" over differences of opinion. In developing and exercising this skill, people in a democratic society needed to look to the long-term goals of inclusion and rational dialogue as ways to work through the problems confronted in a democracy.

Throughout their experiences in the United States, the Czech writers exhibited great interest in the multicultural nature of US society. Confronted daily with myriad races and nationalities so prevalent in a US university town, the Czechs pondered the need to include the notion of "minorities-as-equals" as they constructed the core element of tolerance. The US teachers, on the other hand, folded tolerance for cultural diversity into open-mindedness, civility in social discourse, and cooperation.

Initially, the Czechs considered their republic as a homogeneous nation in the Western tradition. Their economic relation with the Republic of Slovakia was the driving force behind the Velvet Divorce,
and they no longer included the Slovaks in their political and social equation. Coupled with the historical depth of the Czech nation as a cultural entity, these factors indicated no need to include the equality of minorities in their initial conceptualizations of democracy. However, as their cross-cultural experience unfolded, the Czechs began to identify minorities as significant members of their newly democratizing society who required equal partnership in the future. The significance of human dignity in a democracy was no longer dependent on racial, ethnic, or physical makeup, but on the fact that “everybody has the same rights and duties.” The Czechs attributed this realization directly to their experience in the United States, with particular attention to their classroom visits. In these settings, they believed they “learned the significance of the citizen’s dignity from the American example. In the end, American social studies teaches the feeling of dignity by nourishing [students] through the pragmatic system because you have a lot of minorities and people to educate, which will be the task of the Czech Republic as well.” However, the most prevalent minority issue in the Czech Republic, that of the gypsies or Romas, still remained outside the purview of democracy because “they are not the same as we are, and they are problematic.”

Democracy as decision making. Decision making emerged as a key element of democracy upon which the Czech curriculum writers and US teachers focused during their time together in the United States. Aspects of this key element that held significance for both groups were the role of information, the right to freedom of choice, and the responsibilities involved in carrying out a decision in a liberal democracy.

Throughout the course of the project, the partners agreed that information in a democratic society is supposed to be publicly accessible and unfettered from ideological control. Nonetheless, they agreed that this is not always the case. As such, information may hold a particular ideological perspective that is not readily evident to citizens as they make a decision in any situation, whether public or private. A US partner noted that if democracy is to function, then “the most important thing is the critical and rational attitude toward everything.” “Everything” was considered as not only the information required to make an informed political decision through the voting process, but also the information needed to achieve the individual self-realization that earmarks a liberal democratic society. The same US partner noted that all information, then, becomes the object of critical examination with an open mind because “analyzing the facts as they relate to personal and societal problems is very important. Through this analysis, citizens will be able to find their lifestyles. They will be better able to find themselves.” Similarly, the Czechs believed that open access to information would help the citizen guard against political aggrandizement by government officials, an aspect of their recent past that was very
much an evident part of their collective memory. Their US partners agreed that information, accompanied by critical examination, helped citizens to “tell the difference between ideology and the real situation in elections and the overall situation in society because they will be able to distinguish fact from opinion.” Open access to and critical examination of information were considered prerequisites to decision making in a democracy.

To the Czech curriculum writers and the US teachers, the most important aspect of decision making was the right to make a free choice. Decision making relies on the availability of more than one choice, and the partners agreed that in a democratic society choices are sometimes limitless and their consequences uncertain. Unlike the totalitarian past, however, the Czechs believed that democracy’s emphasis on free will, when coupled with multiple choices, opened the possibilities for full extension of one’s abilities. On the other hand, without governmental assurance of success, failure existed as a distinct possibility when citizens make free choices in a democracy. Nonetheless, as a US partner pointed out, “making a bad choice” could be followed by the “chance to recover from that bad choice if it’s not life threatening.”

Throughout the project, the Czechs visited schools where choice was held in high regard. After the fall of communism, the Czech educational system returned to the “tracked” system of schooling. This system divides students into three types of schools based on predetermined intellectual ability. The social and intellectual disaggregation of students starts with middle school. The more comprehensive nature of schools in the United States led the Czechs to voice agreement with their US partners that the definition of democracy reaches the school level when students have the right to “discover their own abilities because people are stronger in some areas than others.” Although the Czechs experienced academic tracking within US schools, they believed that the social integration of students in some classes and in extracurricular activities expanded their right to make free choices. The Czech system highlighted an undemocratic aspect of society because students are “frozen in what they are doing.” The Czechs realized that their society limited some citizens’ opportunities for “reinventing themselves” after a certain point in one’s preadolescent life.

Although the partners agreed that decision making requires access to information and the right to choose from alternatives, responsibility for the consequences of one’s choice played a major role in their definitions of democracy. On this point, the Czechs were more insistent than their US partners. The Czechs viewed responsibility in decision making as crucial to their democracy’s development. Due to the sudden change from communism, the lack of a democratic tradition has led many Czech citizens to view their new situation as an
opportunity to “do whatever I want to.” Freedom of choice, as part of 
the decision making process, requires certain accompanying abilities 
presently lacking in Czech society. The Czech writers’ notation of this 
reality was not an indictment of their society. The point of such re-
marks referred to the sudden urgency for a citizenship education pro-
gram that moved the younger Czech generation toward the ability to 
make responsible decisions “because it will help not only the learner, 
but our whole society to become responsible and knowledgeable for 
what they do.” 

Although the positionality of the Czech writers and US teachers 
differed, Study 1 revealed two major areas of agreement on the defini-
tion of democracy as a concept: tolerance and decision making. Socio-
political context formed the differing positionalities, while cross-cul-
tural interaction shaped each group in their agreement on democracy 
as a concept.

**Study 2: Teachers in the Czech Republic**

The second study was part of a larger project seeking to estab-
lish a conceptual baseline by articulating the relation between Czech 
teachers’ and students’ conceptions of democracy, citizenship, and civic 
education. Here, we utilized the portion of this study that addressed 
the subject-object relations held by a purposeful sample of Czech teach-
ers who attended an annual civic education conference in Olomouc, 
Moravia, the Czech Republic. The materials produced by the Czech 
curriculum writers in the “Civic Education for the Czech Republic 
Project” were disseminated to Czech civic educators as part of the 
conference workshops. We chose this population of teachers for two 
reasons. First, as the only annual gathering of Czech civic education 
teachers, this conference offered a likely place to meet a nationally 
representative sample of those teachers. Second, with a goal to estab-
lish a baseline for further research on the conceptual change among 
Czech teachers, we sought to administer a survey at an annual confer-
ence to which we might expect future access.

In keeping with the intentions of the first study and of our ana-
lytical stance, we wanted the conference participants to define democ-
archy in their own vocabulary. This intention precluded us from using 
a predetermined set of core elements in our survey (Krippendorf, 1980). 
Ideally, in a research setting analogous to the project described in the 
first study, we would have interviewed the teachers who attended the 
annual conference. Our limited ability in Czech, coupled with their 
corresponding lack of English skills, effectively prohibited an inter-
view strategy in this study. As an alternative, we selected an open-
ended survey approach that asked the teachers to define democracy

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in their native language. Thus, we gained access, as in the first study, to the teachers’ vocabulary.

The Czechs who convened the conference administered the surveys. Once collected, we translated these data into English and then had a native Czech speaker examine our translations for accuracy. As we lacked the time and ability to ask the Czech teachers probative questions, we did not gather the depth of data found in the first study. The data, however, were provided in “local language.” For comparative purposes, this format allowed us to conduct a content analysis similar to that of the first study.

In all, we collected survey data from 41 teachers at the conference, and we used these data to develop our findings on the core elements comprising the sample of Czech teachers’ conceptualizations of democracy. Following Glaser and Strauss (1967), we conducted a content analysis of each response to the question “How would you define democracy?” As new elements became apparent in successive definitions, the previous definitions were re-examined to determine whether or not they, too, included that element. The process of reanalyzing the data in this manner continued until we developed an exhaustive list of elements. In the end, we re-read the responses to determine the frequency of each element’s occurrence within the pool of definitions we obtained.

Findings

By far, the dominant relation (32/41 responses) between the Czech teachers (the subject) and their conceptions of democracy (the object) was a reference to themselves as citizens and democracy as a form of government. These references occurred in both institutional (25/41) and conditional (7/41) versions.

In the institutional version, the stance adopted by these Czech teachers cast the object as some structural variant of democracy. In many cases, such as the following examples, these teachers constituted democracy in its representative form:

- Government of the people through the aid of democratically elected representatives of the people (all inhabitants of the state).

- Democracy is a form of government where a citizen shares power through the mediation of free elections.

As in the following cases, several teachers defined democracy as a political form, but there was no specific reference to representative government:
• From the history of language, DEMOS + KRATOS =
government of the people, today freedom, a freedom
which is however a limited application of freedom
(when considering) the freedom of another; (in a pure
form, it does not exist).

• Government of the people.

In the conditional version of this subject-object relation, teachers
cited elements of the various forms of democracy generally consid-
ered as essential. For example, one teacher referred, without specific-
ity, to democracy as a process.

• A process toward better living, but very difficult.

In other instances of what we describe as the conditional ver-
sion of the “democracy as form” relation, teachers referred to features
such as struggle or political space:

• The social temperament of equality of people before
the law and the struggle about constituting and keep-
ing of the laws of state.

• Providing space for the opinions of all

The second most frequent type of subject-object relations in the
definitions we collected (17/41 responses) included references to free-
doms (10/41) and rights (7/41). These responses referred to actions
granted and upheld by the government. For instance, in one case, a
teacher referred to form and constrained freedom:

• A definite limit of freedom; government of the majority.

In a similar fashion, other teachers adopted the same stance to-
ward the object:

• Government of the people, freedom of demonstration
and conduct, responsibility to self and others.

The latter case also illustrates the third element within the definitions.
In these cases, approximately 10% of the teachers (4/41 responses) re-
ferred to duty or responsibility.

Although a major finding in the first study, tolerance ranked
fourth in the survey findings. Only two Czech teachers referred to
this element. In the following case, the teacher was explicit about the
need for tolerance in the office of citizen as both an elected representative and a member of the electorate:

- Government of the people; government of the capable, who are tolerant people; openness and the likelihood of freedom to exert (oneself) and growth for all.

The other teacher defined the core element of tolerance as the prohibition of inequality brought about through social and legal differentiation:

- A society that can ensure its citizens as many rights and freedoms as possible. Citizens are absolutely with equal rights. No discrimination.

The common elements of the subject-object relations in the definitions of democracy offered by the Czech teachers at the civic education conference fell into four categories (see Table 1). However, two elements dominated their conceptualizations.

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Percentage distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form</td>
<td>80% (33/41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>41% (17/41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty</td>
<td>10% (4/41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>5% (2/41)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, characterizing the concept of democracy by its form, either institutionally or conditionally, is generalizable across the group of Czech teachers. This finding is understandable in light of the sudden shift to democracy as the preferred political form created in the aftermath of the "Velvet Revolution." The most distinguishable aspects of this shift may be found in the new governmental and non-governmental organizations visible to the Czech population on a daily basis. Second, it is clear that the only other element that dominates these definitions is the reference to rights and freedoms. While there are references to duty and tolerance, their infrequency made them essen-
Promises and Problems

Table 2 is a comparative illustration of the two studies. When compared, these studies offer four implications for the cross-cultural adaptability of democracy for purposes of curricular reform. These implications reveal that democracy is simultaneously promising and problematic as a cross-cultural concept readily adaptable from an established democracy to a developing democracy undergoing citizenship education curriculum reform.

First, these studies indicated that common ground on the definition of democracy does exist between developing and developed democracies. However, the rights of citizens within a democratic social framework delimited this commonality. The Czech curriculum writers and their US counterparts, within their agreement on decision making as an essential component of democracy, emphasized the right of citizens to freedom of choice when determining the paths their lives will take and in determining the common good. In the survey of Czech teachers, the conceptualization of democracy as freedom, and its accompanying rights, supported the right to a free choice as a cross-culturally agreed upon element of democracy. To these Czech teachers, however, the rights of the polity extended beyond freedom of choice to a broader area of rights that included such elements as free speech and public demonstration. Between the two studies, the accompanying concept of responsibility for one's actions also emerged, but to a much lesser extent in the Czech teachers than in the Czech curriculum writers and US teachers.

Second, the preponderance of survey responses in Study 2 indicated democracy as a form of government. The absence of specific references to democracy as a governmental form in the thoughts of the Czech curriculum writers and US teachers would indicate superficially a serious problem in developing a curriculum for use by the Czech teachers. However, as the Czech curriculum writers and US teachers established common conceptual ground in the form of tolerance and decision making, they referred frequently to the form of government in which these two key elements exist. Without highlighting governmental form as an element within their definitions of democracy, they couched their thoughts within a socio-political context that included a representative form of government. References to tolerance toward other people and their ideas, as well as to informed and unfettered decision making, indicated not only a need for these elements to support democratically oriented day-to-day social actions,
Table 2
Positionality and Elements of Democracy Across the Two Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELEMENTS</th>
<th>AMERICAN PARTNERS</th>
<th>CZECH PARTNERS IN USA</th>
<th>CZECH TEACHERS IN CZECH REPUBLIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positionality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Implied</td>
<td>0% (1/41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>Implied</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>100% (41/41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open-mindedness</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Tolerance in general 5% (2/41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civility in social discourse</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of information</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>0% (1/41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to freedom of choice</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Rights in general 41% (17/41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility for decisions</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Responsibilities &amp; duties in general 10% (4/41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Implied</td>
<td>Implied</td>
<td>61% (25/41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional</td>
<td>Implied</td>
<td>Implied</td>
<td>17% (7/41)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: "X" indicates data found in Study 1.
but also the need for these elements in maintaining the democratic governmental structures of their respective republics.

Third, although the Czech curriculum writers emphasized the need to consider minorities-as-equals, multicultural understanding was not prevalent in the US or the Czech teachers' conceptualizations of democracy. The US teachers underscored only mildly the need to address this reality, and the Czech teachers did not refer to minority rights within their survey responses. Furthermore, the Czech teachers conceptualized democracy with little reference to tolerance as a key element. Variously, the Czech Republic and the United States are multicultural countries. Although the issues embedded in religious, ethnic, and racial differences exist in both countries, the US and Czech teachers conceptualized the key elements of democracy without much concern over the realities of multicultural difference. Nonetheless, the recognition of this need by the Czech curriculum writers did imply the promise of multicultural understanding as a topic in the new curriculum.

Fourth, the cross-cultural adaptability of democracy as a basis for curricular reform found both problems and promises in the vastly different positionalities of these educators. The Czech curriculum writers and teachers referenced themselves as citizens when they contemplated the key elements of democracy as a concept. Their vision of democracy for the Czech Republic took them out of their roles as teachers and curriculum writers and placed them into their broader role as citizens. This finding is not surprising because the Czech Republic, barely a decade into democratization, is at the very early stages of defining its new socio-political context. All of the Czech curriculum writers and teachers lived part of their lives in a completely different socio-political context than did the US teachers, and many basic issues need to be resolved before a common understanding within the Czech polity emerges as a stable base for curriculum development in citizenship education. In contrast, the US teachers referenced the key elements of democracy from their position as teachers with the underlying assumption of their role as citizens. They acknowledged their long-established socio-political context “as something we take for granted,” thus centering themselves as teachers when they contemplated the concept of democracy.

This difference in positionality between the Czech and US respondents implies both a problem and a promise in cross-culturally conceptualizing democracy as a foundation for curriculum development. The evidence from both studies indicates that the Czechs are beginning their quest for a curriculum on democratic citizenship education with little historically established common ground from which to build. Cross-cultural projects designed to combine citizenship education in a developed democracy with the socio-political context of a
developing democracy take the risk, but also afford the promise, of offering "what is" as an example of "what ought to be." Risking the inapplicability of imported aspects of democracy highlight the problem. Broadening the definition of democracy through cross-cultural experiences offers the promise.

Conclusion and Summary

We began our inquiry into the cross-cultural adaptability of democracy as a basis for curricular reform in citizenship education with two working hypotheses. First, with liberal democracy as the preferred form of associated living in the Czech Republic and the United States, we believed that the respondents in our studies would share key elements in their definitions of democracy as a concept. Second, given the fluid nature of democracy as defined in US social studies literature and its culturally bound manifestations, we also believed that somewhat different conceptualizations of democracy would exist between educators in developing and developed democracies.

Each of these hypotheses found credence in our study. Two areas of common ground (tolerance and decision making) and one key sub-area of difference (minorities-as-equals) emerged during the cross-cultural experiences of a group of Czech curriculum writers and US teachers who acted as partners during a curriculum development project held in the United States. When compared to a sample of Czech teachers, the commonalities and differences, although similar, surfaced in different degrees. Given our findings, we formulated four implications that offered both promises and problems in assuming the cross-cultural adaptability of democracy as a concept in curricular reform for citizenship education. Foundational to these implications was the need to grasp the positionality of educators from developed and developing democracies as they formulate their thoughts on the concept of democracy. The socio-political contexts found in each of these democracies carried important implications for the design and development of curriculum for democratic citizenship.

As the globalization of democracy continues, educators throughout the world will have the opportunity to exchange ideas on the concept of democracy as the foundation for citizenship education reform. These exchanges hold the promise of learning how to address shared beliefs through innovative curricula. They also pose the problems inherent in the assumption that democracy, whatever the socio-political context, is a universal concept.
Note

Within this framework of reform, Patrick (1996) notes that "educators of Central and Eastern Europe have looked to the West, especially to the United States of America, for inspiration, material aid, and, above all else, ideas for civic education in support of constitutional democracy" (p. 3). Obversely, Gibson (1999) notes that today's global movement toward democracy "has changed little or nothing of essence" (p. 135). He further comments that the "bellweather" of modern democracy, the United States, which "jails one in 250 of its citizens, does not work especially well" as a model for democratic reform (p. 135).

References


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“Disrupt, Transgress, and Invent Possibilities”
Feminists’ Interpretations of Educating for
Democratic Citizenship

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Abstract
This paper explores the possibilities created by feminist and other alternative interpretations of citizenship in democratic societies — particularly as these concepts relate to secondary social studies education. The study involved five women — four secondary social studies teachers and one university-based researcher — in a series of focus group discussions. Each of the study’s participants identified individual goals she hoped to obtain through her participation. As the university-based researcher, my goal was to create stories, grounded in our discussions, which would encourage readers to “disrupt, transgress, and invent possibilities” (Fine, 1992, p. xii) about the meaning of citizenship in a postmodern world. In addition, I wanted to explore “how we perform the magical feat of transforming the contents of our consciousness into a public form that others can understand” (Eisner, 1997, p. 4).

Almost since its inception, public education in the United States has been associated with preparing citizens. As early as the 1779 preamble of his bill for free schools in Virginia, Thomas Jefferson asserted that public schools could — and should — be considered a means for educating students for democratic citizenship. In large part, it was this assumption about the ability of public schools to prepare citizens that led to the creation of the area of study known as “social studies.” A closer examination of the concept of “citizen” and the historical development of the role of the citizen in democratic society, particularly as these have been presented in social studies education, illustrates the extent to which these conceptions have been limited by the hegemony of traditional interpretations.

The intent of this study was to challenge the dominant discourse related to educating for democratic citizenship through feminist perspectives that illustrate the partiality of these traditions. Hahn (1996) observes that the “knowledge explosion in feminist scholarship” (p. 8) in the social sciences over the past twenty years is not reflected in social studies research. A few notable exceptions exist, including
Hahn’s work. To a large extent, these rarities are feminists working within a postmodern framework; I found examples of this work thought provoking and catalytic. I wanted to create new spaces for women’s voices that interrogate traditional approaches to social studies education. Specifically, I sought to challenge what has long been considered the fundamental goal of social studies educators: preparing citizens for active roles in democratic societies. Further, while I acknowledge the fundamental role citizenship education plays in social studies education, I also support Grant’s (1996) position that this should not be exclusive to social studies. Instead, schools should develop a cohesive program through which citizenship education is supported in all academic areas and school-wide activities reflect a sense of civic involvement in the school and/or local community.

**Background and Related Research**

Until recently, discussion of women’s issues in social studies education has been limited primarily to criticisms of textbooks and curriculum, specifically the ways in which gender stereotypes are perpetuated and women’s roles in history and government omitted (Noddings, 1995). Such issues are significant and I support reform efforts in these areas. However, Bernard-Powers (1996), in her guest-edited issue of *Theory and Research in Social Education*, reminds us that “the project is far more complex” (p. 2). While textbook and curricular reform efforts address the way in which what we say we know is presented, questions about how we know and how our knowing is affected by our identities have been left unposed. Recently, however, notable (though limited in number) exceptions to this trend have emerged. To a large extent, this work originates with feminists working within a postmodern framework. Stone (1996a) notes, “the most vital theoretical work comes from postmodernist/poststructuralist feminists who promote women’s posthumanist difference as the basis for equality” (p. 39). Stone’s observations are not unbiased; she writes as a postmodernist feminist. However, I suggest these theories are more than passing trends. If social studies educators are to benefit from current epistemological debates, we must be willing to engage in the discourse. The following examples of research and theory from social studies education represent current attempts to enter the conversation.

Several articles in social studies journals indicate an important shift toward including feminist postmodernist perspectives in social studies education. Ten Dam and Rijkschroeff (1996), for example, explore the ways in which changing the social construction of gender influences male and female students’ perceptions of women’s history
in the Netherlands. Ten Dam and Rijkschroeff note, "The meaning of gender varies according to context. Femininity, masculinity, and the unequal relationship between men and women are social manifestations that can assume a different form again and again" (Malson, O'Barr, Westphal-Eihl, & Wyer, 1989, p. 75, as cited in Ten Dam & Rijkschroeff). Ten Dam and Rijkschroeff’s position parallels the feminist postmodernist notion of situated knowledges. "Situated knowledges" are "marked knowledges" that produce "maps of consciousness" which reflect the ways in which race, class, gender, and nationality affect how knowledge is constructed (Haraway, 1991, p. 111). As Wolf (1996) clarifies Haraway’s conception of situated knowledges, "They reflect our locationality (historical, national, generational) and positionality (race, gender, class, nationality, sexuality), acknowledging how the dynamics of where we are always affects our viewpoint and the production of knowledge without privileging one particular position over another..." (p. 14). Ten Dam and Rijkschroeff’s conclusions indicate that, to a large extent, boys’ and girls’ interpretations of equality and difference, as well as the value they place on women’s history, reflect the ways in which they shape and are shaped by their positions and locations in life.

In an attempt to understand the implications of gender in political learning, Hahn (1996) employs both quantitative and qualitative methods in developing a case study of two civics classes. Hahn’s use of both qualitative and quantitative methods is a good example of some feminists’ rejection of the dichotomy often associated between these techniques (Campbell & Schram, 1995). Hahn’s work also challenges earlier research in political socialization that often identified gender as a factor in determining one’s political beliefs and opinions but left unchallenged the way in which gender is constructed in society. Although she found no significant differences between males and females in these two civics classes, Hahn suggests that additional research needs to explore minor distinctions in areas of political difference and takes a previously established area of research in a new direction.

Another interesting trend in recent social studies literature is the blurring of lines between public and personal. Feminists often critique the ways in which women’s issues are portrayed as “private” while the “public domain” belongs to men (Stone, 1996b, p. 43). Most notably, Noddings (1994a, 1994b, 1995) challenges the public/private binary. She encourages teachers to use autobiographical, biographical, and fictional stories to illuminate the ways in which textbook knowledge is often fragmented and incomplete (1994a). In addition, she advocates the use of conversations on a philosophical, metaphysical (including issues often associated with religion), and personal level (between adults and children) as a means for promoting more effec-
tive moral education. Noddings argues that the dichotomy between
the personal and public creates a void in which students are left with-
out the care and encouragement necessary for success. In a similar
attempt to demonstrate the interactive nature of social and public
domains, Hart (1997) suggests the social studies curriculum include
not only the names and faces of women, but also their contributions
to social life. Hart argues that by limiting social studies to the "politi-
cal," educators lose a valuable opportunity to demonstrate ways in
which students, like many women in history, can yield political power
by promoting a social agenda.

Bickmore (1996), Stone (1996b), and Bloom (1998) address issues
of citizenship and democracy. Stone offers an insightful analysis of
the feminist contribution to the concept of citizen. She mobilizes the
writings of feminist philosophers in challenging the ways in which
political philosophies have been presented in the past. Bickmore as-
sumes a more pragmatic approach. She explores ways in which con-
flicting perspectives in social studies education (such as those identi-
fied by Stone) prepare young women for claiming a voice in social
change toward equity. In addition, Bickmore suggests teachers engage
in practices of feminist pedagogy which "decenter authority in the
classroom" and remediate the "antidemocratic practices" which have
often characterized citizenship education in the past (p. 235). Bloom
attempts to bring together the theoretical and pedagogical: "As a femi-
nist theorist concerned with equity, I write to participate in the cri-
tiques of universality because this is essential to the ongoing project
of reshaping women's places in society...As a feminist educator, I write
to contribute to ongoing efforts to radically challenge the standard
curriculum of democratic education" (p. 31).

Social studies researchers and theorists are only beginning to
explore the extent to which "gender dynamics, gender identities, and
gendered knowledges affect social studies education" (Bernard-Pow-
ers, 1996, p. 2). I posit that such questions are imperative to the future
of social studies education. However, creating spaces for these ques-
tions is problematic, particularly given the extent to which such is-
issues have traditionally been omitted from social studies discourse.
Fine (1992) suggests feminists challenge the androcentric hegemony
by using "disruptive voices." She invites those of us concerned with
women's issues "collectively and collaboratively, to disrupt, transgress,
and invent possibilities...displaying all our contradictions and differ-
ences" (p. xii). Fine posits feminists promote change by interrupting
what have traditionally been unchallenged discourses. Stone (1996a)
suggests a similar strategy in describing the possibilities of "disrup-
tive teaching." Stone advocates that reading about individuals who
have been influential in promoting change through their disruptions
to the status quo may provide inspiration for others. She challenges
educators to acknowledge teaching, schooling, and education as ethical endeavors and to accept their "obligation" to engage in disruptive teaching. Stone concludes that nothing short of displacing the status quo can address the needs of those who have been marginalized.

As noted earlier, Stone (1996b), Bickmore (1996), and Bloom (1998) present three perspectives on the issues of citizenship and democracy. Bloom's attempt to integrate the theoretical and pedagogical dimensions of this issue reflects some of my own questions: What does it mean to be a "feminist" social studies educator? How do feminist social studies educators perceive the concept of "citizen"? What are their responses to the theoretical frameworks presented by feminists and others challenging the status quo in "civic education"? How do they relate these ideas to their practice? This study represents a response to these questions. Building on Miller's (1990) work in "creating spaces and finding voices," this study represents an attempt to claim spaces for feminist voices in social studies education. In collaboration with a group of classroom teachers, I mobilized Fine and Stone's notion of "disruption" as a tool for demonstrating what may be considered "situated knowledges" but which are often presented as complete and unchallenged. Collectively, the group addressed what is considered to be one of the most fundamental principles in social studies: citizenship education. The connection between education and citizenship has been at the very core of the social studies tradition and, therefore, offered a particularly interesting opportunity for disrupting our thinking and practice related to educating citizens in a democratic society.

**Research Design and Procedures**

The overarching goal of this study was to generate new ways of thinking about what it means to educate citizens for a democratic society. This objective applied to me as the "researcher," to the other participants in the study, and to those who will read our stories. Needless to say, this was not consistent with the traditional "reports of findings" contained in many studies. Instead, this study resided in a space between a research report common to the social sciences and a well-established tradition in the humanities, the personal essay. Since the intention of the study did not fit into rigid categories, the methodology was also eclectic; the methods were, however, firmly grounded in well-established research strategies. The research process involved a group of five women engaging in a series of focus group discussions. Throughout our interactions, we worked toward self-defined goals related to our personal and professional lives. The record of our discussions served as the framework for creating a "story," a type of vi-
sual reader's theater, which intentionally blurred the boundaries between "personal" and "professional" as well as between "facts" and "fictions." I agree, however, with Gough (1998) that "fact and fiction are much closer, both culturally and linguistically, than...narrative strategies imply" (p. 186).

**Identifying Participants**

Based on the following three assumptions, I invited four women to participate in the study. First, I believe that educational research ought to be collaborative and, whenever possible, involve classroom teachers. I was committed to creating spaces in which teachers claimed the right to participate in the educational discourse that is often limited to academe, just as I was interested in creating opportunities for myself, a university-based educator, to become engaged in the discourse of classroom teachers. Second, I support Goodson's (1998) claim that "probably progressively more important for the future, will be the site of everyday life and identity" (p. 3). I, therefore, identified participants who were willing to examine and share our lived experiences and our identities, including the ways in which these locations and positions affected our construction of the concepts of "feminist" and "citizen" and the ways in which we mobilized these constructions in our teaching. In order to achieve this level of trust and intimacy, I concluded that participants should have some preexisting relationship – a foundation upon which our discourse could build. Finally, I decided the most effective method to engage a group in this type of inquiry process was through a form of focus group interviews, making it necessary to keep the group small enough for discussions (Morgan, 1997).

The group decided using our real names made the study "more authentic" and provided an opportunity for me to acknowledge their intellectual contributions, as well as their time and commitment. In addition to myself, Leanne Gabriel, Nancy Mallory, Shannon Tuzzi-Paletti, and Doreen Uhas-Sauer participated in the study. As a group, we represented a variety of levels of teaching experience (from 1 to 31 years) with positions in urban and suburban schools. In addition, the group ranged in age from 27 to 54 years. We knew each other well and worked together in the Social Studies and Global Education Professional Development School Network at The Ohio State University, as well as on projects involving collaboration with civic educators in Poland. We focused on the collaborative processing of ideas, and each established goals for our participation. My objective was to produce a written representation of our activities. In addition to the objectives we established individually, the group committed to a larger goal: we strove to claim new spaces for women in social studies education.
Data Collection and Analysis

Our group conducted a series of eight focus group discussions, which provided the primary source for "data" and ideas to be included in the study. The discussions were similar in structure to seminars in which ideas emerge from shared readings, individual experiences, and group interaction. The focus group discussions took place in my kitchen, usually on Sunday evening. The context was intended to be informal, intimate, and safe. In preparation, the group read or listened to materials regarding various perspectives on educating for democratic citizenship. (Many of these materials are included in the reference section and noted with an "*" at the beginning of the citation.) While many of these materials centered primarily on feminist issues, the scope of the readings was emergent and other theoretical orientations were included as issues arose.

The sessions also provided opportunities for exploring participants' life histories in order that we might better understand our positionalities and localities. Kvale (1996) describes a "semistructured life world interview...as an interview whose purpose is to obtain descriptions of the life world of the interviewee with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomenon" (p. 5, original italics). The group's constructions of ourselves as feminists and our interpretations of "democratic citizenship" were intricately connected to the experiences we identified as most significant in shaping these perceptions.

Building on Richardson's (1990, 1994, 1997) model for writing as inquiry, the process of collecting, analyzing, and writing occurred simultaneously. Once the transcribing process was complete, I went back through the document and changed the fonts, so a participant's words were represented in a particular font that could be easily distinguished from the others, providing a visual representation of our voices. This strategy supports Richardson's (1994) rejection of one dimension: "Rather, the central image is the crystal, which combines symmetry and substance with an infinite variety of shapes, substances, transformations, multi-dimensionalities, and angles of approach" (p. 522).

As a framework for all of the discussions developed, I initiated a process I refer to as a "postmodern constant comparative method." Unlike the constant comparative method of analysis posited by Glaser and Strauss (1967), in which data are broken down into discrete parts and then compared with other "units" of data to create categories (see also Strauss & Corbin, 1990), this process involved keeping the conversation intact and juxtaposing pieces of theoretical literature against the discussion to add other layers to the discourse. The inclusion of the literature in this manner responded to a concern expressed by Goodson (1998) regarding the use of narrative: "[A] primary reliance on narratives or life stories is likely to limit our capacity to understand social context and relationship as well as social and political..."
purposes. Sole reliance on narrative becomes a convenient form of political quietism – we can continue telling our stories (whether as life ‘stories’ or research ‘stories’) and our searchlight never shines on the social and political construction of lives and life circumstances” (p. 10). Once all of the focus group discussions had been completed, I returned to these frameworks and the recurring threads that we identified in the group.

Finally, I organized the data, including the pieces from the theoretical literature, according to the themes we had revisited numerous times in our discussions and developed a “story” (Donmoyer & Yennie-Donmoyer, 1995; Goodson, 1998; Polkinghorne, 1988) that was grounded in the data, but also included fictional elements and additional information from the literature. The excerpts from the literature were included in text boxes, to distinguish them from part of our original discussions. This strategy met Eisner’s (1997) challenge to represent data in ways that provide what might be called “productive ambiguity”…so that it “generates insight and invites attention to complexity” (p. 8). Like most “interviews,” the construction of knowledge did not begin or end with the discussion itself; instead, our discussions were the products of multiple layers of socially constructed meanings.

The quotations represented in the scenes were excerpts from the original data, with the exception of very short passages included to make the scene richer for the reader. These statements were intended to be consistent with the life and experiences of the participant. The final result of this process was a story in which our conversations and ideas were represented in the context of our daily lives. Thus, the story moved between the lines of the research and our personal spaces, as well as challenged the distinctions between what would traditionally be considered “data” and the fiction in which I embedded the data. The different fonts acknowledge that voices of the post-paradigmatic diaspora speak from many perspectives. I intended to visually interrupt my readers as the partiality or situatedness of a particular idea was addressed. In addition, I added my reflections about the process in a series of footnotes, much like the strategy used by Lather and Smithers (1997) in which the researchers’ comments, excerpts from field notes, and subjectivities were included in the bottom of a split text. If, as Foucault (1991) suggests, knowledge and power are generated through discourse, the discursive elements of this process needed to be clearly illustrated. This approach to data representation also provided an opportunity to include our subjectivities in a manner that not only recognized our positions, but embraced them as part of the discourse.

While constructing stories from the data is not yet conventional in educational research, Eisner (1993) suggests, “The battle that once
ensued to secure a place for qualitative research in education has largely been won.... Now the question turns to just what it is that different forms of representation employed within the context of educational research might help us grasp” (cited in Kvale, 1996, p. 270). Eisner’s statement is not about the “mental representation” of cognitive science, but “the process of transforming the contents of consciousness into a public form so that they can be stabilized, inspected, edited, and shared with others” (cited in Kvale, 1996, p. 271). Using the data and literature to create a story and illustrating the multiplicity of voices through the use of different fonts, point sizes, and margins offered possibilities for a public form which would invite teachers, theorists, and students to “disrupt, transgress, and create possibilities” for (re)considering citizenship from feminists’ perspectives.

In its entirety, the story includes numerous scenes in which the themes that emerged from our work together are re-presented. For the purpose of this article, I have included a “scene” in which Shannon, one of the participants, works through her identity as a feminist social studies educator, particularly as it relates to her role in educating for democratic citizenship. As indicated in the title of the tale, what it means to be a “feminist” played an integral, and recurring, role in our discussions.

The Telling of a Tale: “My God, I Ought to Think of Myself as a Post-Feminist”

Shannon Tuzzi-Paletti wore the fatigued look of a first year teacher. In January, her already slight frame was even thinner than it had been in September, when she had started her position in a rapidly growing suburban school district. This year, she had five different “preps” each day – an almost inhumane schedule for an experienced teacher and the kiss of death for someone just entering the profession. Fortunately, her previous experiences working with the Girl Scouts and in a shelter for battered women had prepared her for a wide variety of situations. Shannon was the only woman in the school’s social studies department.1 In fact, she was the first woman to be hired in the department in more than twenty years. She didn’t talk much with her colleagues at school. Nice though they were, she felt pretty sure that her philosophy of teaching and political orientations did not mesh with the rest of them. She did not know this for sure; she’d felt it best not to test the waters for fear of drowning. Shannon spent most of her energies on her relationship with her students, which was why her eighth period Current Issues class had been such a thorn in her side.

During the first semester, Shannon spent much of her time thinking, “If only these kids would talk and express their opinions.” She had planned for the Current Issues course to be a forum for debating controversial issues. The reticence of her first semester class had driven
her crazy. She was about five weeks into a new semester, and a new set of issues. "Be careful what you wish for," she thought as she recovered from the bedlam of that day's class. "Now I have a combination of pot smokers and conservative right-wing Republicans... one of whom sits on top of his desk and points his finger at other students when he’s trying to make a point. I have a few people who do all the talking and it’s lively and we’ve got a diversity of opinions — except when one of the pot smokers can’t remember his point."

While grateful for the participation, she was concerned about the comments students frequently made during class; they often seemed unconcerned about the fate of others and uninterested in the world beyond their immediate lives. While located less than fifteen miles from a metropolitan area, her students seemed unaware of issues related to diversity, poverty, or social justice.

Shannon had also noted an interesting trend in her classes. "Between two Current Issues classes, an elective class with juniors and seniors, I have 2 girls out of 20 in one class and 4 in the other class. That's who signed up for Current Issues." She wondered if high school girls just weren't interested in what was happening in the world or if there was something in the system that funneled mostly boys into her classes. She caught herself before she jumped to too many conclusions. After all, she had already had one experience that day in which her assumptions had led her astray. She smiled a little as she recalled the exchange in her last period class.²

Opinions are going around and I'm worried about people who aren't speaking... There's one girl who's very vocal and a few others who are very quiet. And so I said something. I said, "I'm concerned about those of you who aren't speaking." I realized I was kind of uncomfortable that they weren't speaking — that maybe they weren't getting much out of it, or they weren't comfortable themselves. And it was really me, I think it was more me that was uncomfortable about them not speaking.

And I said something to one of the girls afterwards, to the effect of "Marissa,³ is there something that you wanted to say that you didn't get to say? I'm kind of concerned about everyone being able to express their opinion."

And she said something to the effect of "Why would you think that if I had something to say I wouldn't say it?"

I was like, "Wow, that's a big assumption on my part."

But it was kind of neat. That wasn't an issue for her. If
she wanted to say something she was going to say it. Basically she was saying, “I don’t need you to create that space for me, I’ll jump in.”

Shannon thought about the irony of imposing her expectations on her female students. As a feminist, this presented an interesting conundrum. Shannon had experienced a type of feminist awakening in college. As a student at the University of Cincinnati (UC), she had proudly displayed a button on her backpack that read “Don’t Call Me ‘Girl!’” in bold letters. However, her experiences working with women in a variety of settings heightened her awareness of the complexities surrounding a discourse on “women’s issues.”

The seeds for these realizations had been planted, in part, by one of her professors at UC, Patricia Hill Collins. Collins’ critique of feminist theorists who wrote about women’s issues as some type of unified set of concerns, while speaking from their identities as White, upper-middle class, academics, still resided in Shannon’s mind. She recalled the conversation from one of the focus group discussions in which Doreen had challenged some of the assumptions being made by several of the feminist theorists the group had been reading and who had been part of the panel discussion at AERA.

...I consider myself a feminist but I would say that, compared to where I heard the voices on the tape, and some of the comments being made...I thought by contrast, my God...I ought to think of myself as a post-feminist. I...hope that I have moved on from the point at which they were sort of stuck in...how they were defining the world.

Shannon thought about her own definition of feminism and realized, “My self-definition has changed a lot. ... I came into college not thinking about it too much. And then, kind of getting involved in women’s programs and services and then blaring it...And now, not feeling so much of a need to say, ‘I’m Shannon Tuzzi-Paletti and I’m a feminist; nice to meet you.’” A small part of her wondered if she had lost some of her passion. “But it’s still very important to me.”

Shannon recalled part of a reading the group had discussed a couple of weeks earlier. They had talked about how each of them defined feminism in their lives. She identified with the words of Nancy Wolf, as they appeared in an article by Lynda Stone. Shannon agreed with the definition of feminism Wolf presented:
The rights to vote, to drive a car, get an education, have a job, plan a family, get decent health care, have a say: You weren’t born with them. All of these were brought to you by the American Feminist Movement. Feminism is real democracy. If you value these things, pass them on. Call yourself a feminist, speak up when you are put down, vote for rights for women, and give to women’s organizations. (Wolf, as cited in Stone, 1996a, p. 37)

Shannon also recognized that there was another element to her feminism, and it was this part of her identity that led to her exchange with Marissa. “As a social studies teacher, just historically in terms of civics and citizenship, the contributions, the abilities of women, the absence of women in certain discussions, all of that is very important to me and I try to bring it out, discuss it.” There were many contradictions embedded in feminism. While Shannon bristled at the Rush Limbaugh “femiNazi” stereotype, she did not necessarily want to embrace the brand of feminism that cast all men into the same category because of a penis.

That feminism needs theory goes without saying (perhaps because it has been said so often). We need a theory that can analyze the workings of patriarchy in all its manifestations – ideological, institutional, organizational, subjective – accounting for not only the continuities but also for change over time. We need theory that will let us think in terms of pluralities and diversities rather than of unities and universals...We need a theory that will enable us to articulate alternative ways of thinking about (and thus acting upon) gender without either simply reversing the old hierarchies or confirming them. And we need a theory that will be useful and relevant for political practice. It seems to me that the body of theory referred to as poststructuralism best meets all these requirements. (Scott, 1994, p. 282)

Shannon smiled as she remembered the group’s attempt to define their own conceptions of feminist. Leanne, her hair neatly coiffed and clad in a jumper, had concluded:

. . . When I think of myself as a feminist, I don’t think I’m a radical by any stretch of the imagination...I just think of a femi-
nist as someone who believes in equality regardless of sex—that your gender should not determine what you may or may not be allowed to do.

The definition fit Leanne: it was straightforward, to the point, and yet steeped in complexity.

Nancy's articulation of what feminism meant to her had been longer and reflected some of the internal conflicts she felt about who she had been, who she was, and who she wanted to be:

I'm not real clear about my definition. I call myself a feminist, partly because I think that word has been so misused and abused that I'm willing for people to get nervous about it.

But the thing that I think about when I think about feminism is power. It has to do with the whole issue of power and redistributing power. And that, for me, is part of the reason it would align itself with...classist struggles or racial struggles or ethnic struggles...because they have sort of the same agenda. So the redistribution of power and the access to power seem like the biggest thing... And in the classroom, I see it as a chance to role model being a strong woman and not being nasty about it, and not being defensive, and not being chicken.

Nancy's comment had taken the group into a rather lengthy discussion of how they introduced this dimension of their identities to students.

Like many first year teachers, Shannon sometimes struggled with where the lines should be drawn with her students. She tended to be rather careful about what she shared regarding her personal beliefs, particularly given that the community in which she was teaching leaned toward the conservative end of the continuum. Her affiliation with the Democratic Party, on the other hand, had started at the tender age of five, when her parents awakened her in the middle of the night with tears in their eyes to tell her George McGovern had lost his bid for the presidency.

"Do you define yourself as feminist to your students?" she had asked Nancy.

"Yeah, I do. They ask me every once in a while."

"When my kids ask me," Leanne chimed in, "and I can't even remember an exact example, but I know when my kids have asked me or I have said 'I'm a feminist' it's one of those looks like, 'You are?'" Leanne's voice had taken on the tone of an incredulous teenager. "And then I go ahead and tell them what I think being a feminist means. And it's not at all what they thought."

"Well," Nancy offered, "you're not a lesbian. For some reason, my students always think only lesbians are feminists."

"What do your students think it means?" Dawn asked.
Leanne explained: "...I have asked, 'What did you expect me to act like?' Well, first of all, they think because I'm married, that I don't need to be a feminist. I guess they assume that my husband will take care of me so I don't need to be concerned about women's issues any more." The group laughed. A frequent topic of conversation among the group was the pleasure they took, whether in a relationship or not, from their independence. Leanne continued:

They just...think of a feminist as someone who is a bra burner, you know like back in the 60s, when the whole movement was new. And you were saying, Nancy, you thought your feminism was just there, ready to evolve, and I feel like mine is maybe the opposite. I feel like my activist years are probably over and that might have a lot to do with our ages but I can remember being a, not a radical, but sort of – for the time, a radical – and I can't see myself doing that now. I'm more willing to sit back and maybe with some finesse get my point across rather than with being aggressive. Maybe I've gone from aggressive to assertive as far as feminism is concerned.

Leanne had paused for a moment, lost in thought – perhaps of those younger, more radical years. Her hesitation lasted only a moment, but when she started again, her tone had changed and her voice sounded more forceful, more determined.

But sometimes I really am concerned about the feminist movement when I hear my high school kids talk. It really bothers me and I just want to say, "Damn you, kids! You need to go back and see what it was like." Well, you probably can't remember a lot of it (turning to Doreen), but you can. I graduated from high school with my father saying, "Why do you want to go to college? Even if you do finish, you'll just get married."...I have raised my daughter to believe that, regardless of her gender, she needs an education, she needs to be articulate, she should never hold herself back because she is a female and my high school kids that I have taught for maybe the last ten years just don't see it that way. You know, the girls are quite willing to step back and let the boys be the BMOC [Big Men On Campus]. That bothers me, because I don't know what it's going to be like in 50 years. Of course, I won't be around to see it, but for my grandchildren, I have a concern.
Griffin (1997), in describing teaching as a "gendered experience" explains that "limited economic resources, spontaneous career decisions, and inadequate educational backgrounds are major female issues" that lead many women to teaching. Using Marie, a participant from Cortina's (1986) study as an example, she explains that she was "encouraged by her parents to teach because it was a good job for a woman, it fit in best with having children and a family life" (p. 9).

Shannon thought for a moment about her parents. They had always encouraged her to go to school; in retrospect it seems that the possibility of ending her education after high school had never occurred to her. She realized how quickly society had changed and wondered if Leanne might be right about old habits returning if, as a society, we weren't careful. She thought, again, about Marissa, and with Leanne's admonition in mind, wondered why the girls in the class seemed content to sit back and let the boys dominate the discussion. "Is it right for me to impose my expectations on them?" If she didn't push them to speak, however, would they fall back into the traditionally passive role assigned to women? To a large extent, this was about values and how we determine what is important in society.

Shannon's eyes wandered across her desk. It was littered with piles of papers, most of them still ungraded. She felt her heart sink a bit as she realized she had promised her students that they would have their papers back by the end of the week. She wondered if Steve, her husband, remembered to pick up more coffee; they seemed to be going through a lot of it these days. One of the stacks belonged to her Civics class. Shannon recalled the group's discussion about civic education in schools. Dawn had asked, "Where is civic education? It's not usually taught as a separate course. Is it embedded in Government classes or other social studies classes? Or is the assumption that all teachers are civic education teachers?"

Leanne had responded, "I don't think in my school we have civic education. I don't think we actually," she paused, turning to Shannon. "You teach it."

"I'm the only civics teacher and it's an elective...I will have taught less than 40 kids over the course of the year who signed up for that as an elective," Shannon had explained.

The group discussed the various configurations of their courses of study. Most high schools required seniors complete a government course, though in Nancy's school it was a combination of government and economics, while at Leanne's school it was one semester of "fed-
eral” government and one semester of “state and local” government. While each of these provided some dimensions of what she considered “civic education,” Leanne felt somewhat dissatisfied.

“I don’t know. I guess the more I think about civic education just as I sit here, I think of what I saw in Poland. Was that 6th grade we saw?” she asked Doreen, who had been on the same trip. Leanne continued by describing a lesson on citizen involvement in which students were creating a children’s bill of rights that was a reaction to the United Nations Bill of Rights for Children. “The teacher was encouraging them to get involved. And I’m not sure that a lot of civic education in the United States, well, what I know of it — I shouldn’t make a blanket statement about the United States at all — but the civic education that I know of involvement is just a small part of that.”8

“Why do you think that happens?” Dawn asked, sounding like the psychoanalyst again.9 Shannon sighed as she remembered Doreen’s conclusion regarding citizenship in schools:

[O]ne of the reasons it is not taught...[is] the introduction of the citizenship proficiency test. And so, thereafter, civic education is defined as what is on that stupid test. And I always love [to] tell students, “If they ask you anything about finances, the answer is always taxes and if they ask you anything about being a good citizen, the answer is always volunteerism.” So, in other words, as long as you check the appropriate box, you don’t have to actually do these things...We’ve avoided the question, “What do you do?” You don’t have to do what say, you only have to check the right box about what you would do.”

Shannon shifted a little uncomfortably in her seat, in part because her chair was hard and in part because she felt dissatisfied with the prospect of her students defining citizenship based on a proficiency test. She thought, for a moment longer, of the students she would face the next day and wondered if they would understand the complexities of citizenship. Had they thought about what citizenship meant for women? For those living in poverty? For African Americans? Had it occurred to any of them that citizenship could mean something more than the definitions they would find in the back of a textbook? She doubted it. After all, after several weeks of discussion, she was still struggling to explain what it meant to educate for democratic citizenship from a feminist perspective. “Am I stuck in the same definition that is driving the proficiency test?”

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citizenship (sitɪˈʃəp), n. membership in a state or nation, with all the duties, rights, privileges, and responsibilities that go with being a member (Patrick & Remy, 1980, p. 547).

According to the National Standards for Civics and Government, "citizenship means that a person is recognized as a legal member of the nation; gives each person certain rights and privileges, e.g., the right to vote and hold public office; [and] means each person has certain responsibilities, e.g., respecting the law, voting, paying taxes, serving on juries. [Students should be able] to explain that citizens owe allegiance or loyalty to the United States; in turn they receive protection and other services from the government" (Center for Civic Education, 1994, p. 35).

Shannon thought about their discussion of the role feminism might play in re-defining citizenship. "What if care really did become a political concept?" she wondered. How would her privileged, White, predominantly male students feel about that? How would such a revisioning change her role as a teacher in a democratic society? What would citizenship mean in a world that embraced its complexities and recognized multiple identities?

The postmodern era, at the last, necessitates a new conception of citizenship, in which diversity and difference are valued and the modernist power hierarchy continues to devolve...The past, the present, and continuing lessons learned amongst feminist scholars contribute much to a new citizenship: difference over sameness, multiplicity over singularity, fluidity over stasis. If indeed postmodernism heralds a new age, then a new conception of citizenship is not only logically but also ethically appropriate. We need not deny the successes of modernism, but we must respond to its failures. (Stone, 1996b, p. 51)

Suddenly, Shannon was aware of the ticking sound of the clock over the door in her classroom. Her heart sunk, it was already close to five and she had promised Steve she would be home early tonight. She wrestled the piles of papers into her black bag and scurried towards the parking lot. Shannon, small and thin, was perched atop a pair of clunky black shoes with high platform heels that had been
purchased on a shopping spree with Doreen and Leanne. She loved the shoes, in part because they reminded her of her friends and colleagues, and in part because of the additional inches they added to her height.

Several hours later, Shannon leaned back from the task at hand. The clunky shoes and “teacher” clothes had been strewn across the bed in her hurry to put on appropriate attire for her other work, her job as carpenter, painter, designer, and general fixer-upper. She and Steve had purchased a house in the fall and spent most of their spare time tearing out cupboards, putting in flooring, and spreading fresh coats of paint on the walls. “Now, let’s talk about resisting gender stereotyping,” thought Shannon, as she examined the calluses that had developed on her hands. While Steve clearly had more knowledge, and perhaps higher standards, regarding the renovations on the house, Shannon tried hard to do her fair share of the work. Steve, a perfectionist by nature, noted details about the craftsmanship that she felt sure would escape most people.

Shannon could hear Steve still hard at work in the next room. Her shoulders ached a little and she was thinking of the ungraded papers shoved into her bag. She quickly calculated how much time she needed to finish reading her students’ essays and turned most of her attention back to the sander. “If I start grading at ten,” she thought, “I think I can be finished by midnight.” While her hands and back muscles focused on the vibrations of the sander on the floor, Shannon’s mind wandered back to the members of the group and their definitions of feminism.

Responding to Leanne’s concern about the lack of concern for feminist issues among her young, female students, Nancy had emphasized the importance of providing strong role models. Sometimes, she suggested, students found such mentors in their parents. “When I think of my most outspoken and assertive female students, I realize most of them have mothers who are active in the community, who are successful in their positions at work or in the home, who exude confidence and demand respect.”

“But what happens to the young women who don’t have those types of mothers?” Shannon wondered as she moved the sander to a new spot on the floor. “Is it then the responsibility of teachers to be these models?” She thought about the typical social studies curriculum and thought, not for the first time, of the extent to which women are excluded or marginalized, particularly in textbooks. “People think it’s better because now some women are included in the books, but they are almost always reduced to the ‘Highlights’ sections which read more like ‘Footnotes to History.’”
I would not recommend that curriculum makers dig around in dusty archives to see if there was some female participant in an important political conference whose name can now be included in texts – even though most of the male participants will still be unnamed. The gaps that interest me cannot be closed by raising the count of female names and faces. Women have done things of great importance that go unrecognized because they were done by women and because the focus of their efforts has not been the focus of political history. (Noddings, 1995, p. 231)

"OK," thought Shannon. "Maybe Marissa would talk if she had something to say, but I'm still left wondering why she doesn't feel as if she has something to say!" She considered how the curriculum needed to change to make it a more accurate reflection of women's contributions. It wasn't that Shannon denied that progress had been made, she just acknowledged that a lot of work remained.

Indeed, contestation is central to the feminist enterprise, and many feminists agree with Julia Kristeva that feminism's main responsibility, as well as its most effective and powerful strategy, is to engage in perpetual contestation, critique, and deconstruction: 'If women have a role to play...it is only in assuming a negative function: reject everything finite, definite, structural loaded with meaning, in the existing state of society'...‘A feminist practice can only be...at odds with what already exists so that we may say that's not it, and that's still not it. (Kristeva, as cited in Hirschmann & DiStefano, 1996, p. 1-2)

She pictured Doreen, seated at Dawn's kitchen table with a coffee cup in her right hand and her glasses sitting slightly askew on the top of her head.

When we were talking before about the way women are portrayed in history...the only consistent...frame of reference for women's history that we continue to find (but now, now we've marginalized to the left) is labor history. It's the only consistent source of women's history that seems to be. . . emerging and always good quality scholarship, always many voices, cuts across classism, and yet, where do we teach that in schools?
The rest of the group had agreed with Doreen.

"It's not just part of history, though," Dawn contributed. "I think of my mom and the activities in which she's involved that could be considered part of a democratic society: her work with Wheeled Meals, the Hospital Guild, the Church, and other organizations — all of which are dominated by women. But we don't talk about those things as part of citizenship with our students."

"Right," added Nancy, "because they're not rewarded like male activities."

I noticed that with my parents. My dad is in Civitan and he does all this stuff and gets all these awards. And he does wonderful things. He raises lots of money and he gets all these foundation people to donate money to worthy causes. But that is something they will fly someplace to take care of and my mother's stuff never got that kind of recognition — within the family or outside of it. And when you teach about associations, kids look at you...like you've lost your mind. We started to talk about Jane Addams and Hull House and that whole social movement and they don't have a context for it, which shows that it's been skipped over and over again.

Shannon turned off the sander and surveyed her work. Of course, it was nearly eleven; once again she had underestimated the time a task would take. She knew she hadn't done the job the way Steve would have done it but it didn't really matter as long as things on the house progressed. Perhaps feminism was a little like that. There was a lot of work to be done and everyone would approach it in different ways — identifying their own priorities. And if people quit working on it all together, it wouldn't just stay where it was; it would be like leaving the house halfway renovated — eventually the gains would be lost because no one was there to pay attention to the finishing touches.

Before beginning the trek up the stairs to get her papers, Shannon's eyes passed over the house. The kitchen floor needed to be tiled; an empty space waited where the cupboard was supposed to hang; the shadow of the moldy deck that needed to be stripped reflected in the window; and a floor covering lay in the living room for when the walls would eventually be painted.

"Yes," Shannon muttered under her breath. "There's a lot of work to be done." She wasn't quite sure whether she was thinking about the house, the grading that waited upstairs, or the role of feminism in educating for democratic citizenship.
As Paul Gilroy has recently argued, cultural workers need a discourse of ruptures, shifts, flows, and unsettlements, one that functions...as a part of a concerted effort to construct a broader vision of political commitment and democratic struggle (Giroux with Shannon, 1997, p. 8).

Disruptions and Transgressions

Part of the story presented above includes examples of the group’s ongoing discussion about what it means to be a feminist – especially as that part of our identities relates to and/or conflicts with our roles as educators. Doreen’s comment, “I ought to consider myself as a post-feminist,” characterized the essence of most of this discursive process. (And, thus, serves as part of the title.) One thing was clear in our conversations: while we each identified ourself as a feminist, we were uncertain about what that meant in our current contexts. The shifting boundaries between sexism, classism, racism, and homophobia – as well as a resistance to an essentialized notion of feminism (see Bar-On, 1993; Mohanty, 1988; Said, 1989; Trinh, 1989) – led the group to agree with Stanley’s (1991) claim that it may be more accurate to refer to “feminismS” in a manner that emphasizes the pluralistic nature of feminist theory.

The story also portrays Shannon’s and the other participants’ agreement with numerous scholars in social studies education who are calling for increased attention to substantive women’s issues (Bernard-Powers, 1996, 1997; Bloom, 1998; Crocco, 1995; Hahn, 1996; Noddings, 1995; Stone, 1996a). There seems to be almost unanimous agreement among this group regarding the importance of moving beyond an additive approach to women in social studies curriculum in order to integrate women’s thinking, lived experiences, and genuine contributions to the history and ongoing development of democracy in the United States. However, as Shannon explains, meaningful change needs to move well beyond presenting women’s experiences as “Footnotes to History.”

In addition to discussing the content of what was presented in social studies curriculum and democratic citizenship, the group concluded that teaching from feminist perspectives also included pedagogy. While none of the teachers in this group were familiar with the term “feminist pedagogy,” the concept quickly became an integral part of our discussions (Luke & Gore, 1992). Shannon’s exchange with Marissa, the female student who chose not to participate in the class discussions, provides just one example of the angst group members experienced as we recognized the ways in which our positions and values influenced even our well-intentioned, deliberate interactions.
with students. Our discussions raised many of the same concerns regarding issues of “empowerment” often addressed in the literature (Ellsworth, 1997; Gore, 1993).

The group also joined a chorus of other feminist voices in suggesting that challenges from postmodernism cannot be ignored (Ellsworth, 1997; Fine, 1992, 1994; Flax, 1990; Hekman, 1996; Lather, 1991a, 1991b, 1992, 1994; Usher & Edwards, 1994). The recognition of the connections between feminism and postmodernism comes at a crucial time for social studies education in general and citizenship education specifically. David Broder (1998), in an article published in the Washington Post, explains that “two recent reports show why reviving civic spirit in America is probably the only cure for rampant public cynicism – and why that is going to be devilishly difficult” (p. 12). He goes on to describe two analyses on the condition of civic involvement, one from the National Commission on Civic Renewal (developed by Sam Nunn and William Bennett) and the second from a series of National Issues Forum reports entitled, “Governing America: Our Choices, Our Challenge.” Both reports, one from political leaders and the other from grass-roots organizations, concluded that the need for community involvement was on the rise, and the extent to which both adults and children were participating in such activities was on the decline.

While these findings may seem disheartening, that the issue is being discussed in a public forum can be considered promising. Increased attention in public schools to service-learning projects reflects a similar interest in creating opportunities for young people to assume a more active role in their communities (Battistoni, 1997; Carver, 1997; Kraft, 1996). Without vision, however, these efforts may result in superficial actions that fail to create the very sense of commitment and connection proponents hope to generate.

Inventing Possibilities

A recurring question arose in our discussions, “So what does this mean?” As we considered our roles as feminists and teachers in democratic societies, we wanted to move beyond the “navel-gazing” stage and generate ideas regarding the implications of our discussions on social studies education. In the end, most of our ideas related to a revisioning of citizenship and a reconceptualization of the role citizenship plays in teacher education.

Revisioning “Citizenship”

One of the most powerful and recurring themes in the literature and our discussions was the need for a new conceptualization, and perhaps even a new definition, of citizenship. If we accept Bloom’s
(1998) premise that democracy, and the citizenship upon which it relies, is a constantly evolving entity, we can no longer confine our discussions to neatly proscribed categories. As Stone (1996) suggests, citizenship in the postmodern era must be multidimensional, reflecting "difference over sameness, multiplicity over singularity, fluidity over stasis" (p. 51). Challenges to definitions of citizenship which are limited to membership in nation-states (Patrick & Remy, 1980) or rights to voting and public office (Center for Civic Education, 1994), call for a fluid conception of a "citizen" as one who dwells in the chasms which exist between the ideals of democracy and the realities of their lives. As Giroux (1988) explains, “For educators the modernist concern with enlightened subjects coupled with postmodernist emphasis on diversity, contingency, and cultural pluralism, points to educating students for a type of citizenship that does not separate abstract rights from the realm of the everyday, and does not define community as the legitimating and unifying practice of a one-dimensional history and cultural narrative” (p. 26).

Giroux’s call for a citizenship that challenges the binary between “abstract rights” and the “realm of the everyday” echoes the call from feminists to challenge the binary of public and private. Ackelsberg and Shanley (1996) explain: “Privacy is not something natural, prepolitical, or extrapoltical, but a politically constructed and contested good” (p. 213). Feminist reconstructions of democracy also challenge “the tendency in any democracy for members to assume away the needs and perceptions of subordinates” (Mansbridge, 1996, p. 117). Moving away from unidimensional conceptions of identity which prioritize gender, feminists working within postmodernism recognize multiple identities and advocate for a democratic society which provides spaces for negotiation among these identities (Mansbridge) and the power of care as a political concept (Noddings, 1994b, 1995; Tronto, 1996).

Reconceptualizing the Role of Citizenship in Teacher Education

In addition to revisioning citizenship, the group’s discussion often focused on the importance of integrating discussions about the meaning of citizenship and democracy into teacher education programs. The new visions of citizenship discussed above are not cultivated through specific content related to the forms and functions of the government. While it is often assumed that civic involvement and civic awareness is embedded in Government and Civics classes in secondary schools, this can only be the case to the extent that such classes also model democratic pedagogy. If educators wish to prepare students for democratic citizenship, a call echoed by many in the “democratic schools” movement (Apple & Beane, 1995; Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991; Goodman, 1992; Sehr, 1997; Shor, 1992), it is essential that those
associated with schools initiate a discourse about the meanings of democracy, citizenship, and the place of schools. Teachers need to be prepared to take a leading role in facilitating and promoting this ongoing dialogue.

Usher and Edwards (1996) explain that in carrying out this role, educators become cultural workers and education a form of cultural politics. They cite Giroux’s concept of “border pedagogy” to support this revisioning of the role of the teacher: “Border pedagogy is attentive to developing a democratic public philosophy that respects the notion of difference as part of a common struggle to extend the quality of public life. It presupposes not merely an acknowledgement of the shifting borders that both undermine and reterritorize different configurations of culture, power and knowledge. It also links the notions of schooling and the broader category of education to a more substantive struggle for radical democracy” (as cited in Usher & Edwards, 1996, p. 215).

In fact, the participants in this study concluded that this role is not limited to social studies teachers; all teachers have the potential to be “cultural workers” in the project of democracy. In order to achieve this, however, inservice and preservice teachers must have opportunities to engage in a discourse similar to the one initiated in this study.

Inservice programs, often devoted to technocratic skills related to specific ideas (cooperative learning, assertive discipline, multiple intelligences) should not occur in a vacuum. Instead, the faculty and staff in each school should define its democratic mission through a process of public discourse that involves students, parents, and community members. This process may not result in a neatly packaged statement of a “Democratic Ideal” to which all participants feel committed. Once the dialogue is initiated, however, all aspects of school life should be considered in the context of that conversation.

Preservice teacher education programs need to be reconsidered. While virtually all students enrolled in a teacher education program in the United States are required to complete coursework in multicultural education, the role of the school and teacher in a democratic society is rarely discussed. This statement is not intended to diminish the importance of multicultural education; in fact, I would argue these courses are essential. However, beginning teachers may reduce the multicultural course to lists of characteristics that result in reinforced stereotypes when information about difference is presented in isolation from the impact of difference on our democratic society. Without an appreciation for the extent to which a “secure cultural context” (Gutmann, 1994) can also be considered a right within a democratic society, multicultural education may be perceived as “political correctness” and the mantra of “left-wing liberals.”
Carr and Hartnett (1996) concur:

The need for an approach to educational studies which reinstates the notion of teaching as a theoretically based and morally informed profession has been made all the more urgent because of...reforms [that] have reduced the professional autonomy of teachers to a limited technical discretion with a restrictive framework of bureaucratic inspection and technical control....This has been achieved by eradicating from teacher education any reference to those shared traditions of educational thought which, by helping to expose the taken-for-granted political assumptions and educational values governing contemporary practice, served to animate a critical debate within the educational professions about what the values informing their work should be. (p. 196)

To a large extent, these possibilities may be most effectively initiated at the university level. While the participants in this study agreed that individual teachers could, and do, attempt to integrate democratic ideals into their classrooms, without the support of school and district administrators such efforts were limited in their success. Consequently, in addition to teacher education programs, the preparation of future educational administrators provides a powerful venue for raising these issues.

Conclusions

Lather (1992) suggests certain studies are appropriately assessed on the basis of whether or not the study has “rhizomatic validity”—whether or not it “destabilizes authority from within through connectivity” (p. 32). One of the assumptions of this study was that definitions of citizenship in the United States have been limited to the political domain and have been dictated by White men holding positions of power and authority. By making connections among voices from historically disenfranchised and marginalized groups, the study attempted to challenge this hegemony. The representation of data challenges the hegemonic discourse surrounding the concept of citizen and citizenship education by juxtaposing these ideas with a cacophony of voices, including but not limited to those of the participants. My intent was for educators, those who participated in the study and those who will read about it in the future, to consider the possibilities that exist if we interrogate the authority of existing curricula and programs and move beyond narrow interpretations of citizenship.
Eisner (1997) posits that “productive ambiguity” means “the material presented is more evocative than denotive, and in its evocation, it generates insight and invites attention to complexity. Unlike the traditional ideal of conventional research, some alternative forms of data representation result in less closure and more plausible interpretations of the meaning of the situation” (p. 8). My goal for the study was not to develop a definitive, feminist interpretation of what it means to educate citizens in a democracy. In fact, it was just the opposite. Instead of a narrow definition, I hoped to generate interest in a public discourse on what this means as we face a new millennium. That this was accomplished among the participants in the study is a small measure of success. If I am able to use these initial conversations as a genesis for additional dialogues with people representing multiple identities and localities, an even greater level of “productive ambiguity” will be achieved.

Notes

1 Being the only woman in the department had been characteristic of many of our experiences. At the time of the study, three of the participants were working in situations in which they were the only women.

2 When Shannon recounted this story to the group we had been discussing the role of silence among various groups and our perhaps White, middle-class assumption that it was important to “speak up” and have one’s voice be heard.

3 Not the student’s real name.

4 While Shannon did not use the language of critical feminists and talk about her role in “emancipating” the young women in her classes, this was an underlying theme. In recounting this situation, she identifies the contradictions in her own thinking – can we, as feminists, impose our concerns on others and still be true to what we claim feminism means?

5 The AERA panel discussion generated considerable debate regarding the definitions that were used both by panelists and by those in the audience, as well as the assumptions about what was happening in public schools that were conveyed.

6 The process of defining feminism in our lives provided an opportunity to identify some of our connections, as well as the diversity within the group. Of all the members, Doreen seemed least comfortable with the term feminist. This was, in part, due to her general reluctance to embrace a label that is so broad it may be meaningless, or so wrought with stereotype that it is damaging to those who are labeled.

7 In their fifties now, Leanne and Doreen were just beginning their teaching careers in the late 1960s and 70s. This historical perspective on the women’s movement played an important role in our discussions.

8 One of the strongest connections among the members of this group was our involvement in the Poland project. Each member of the group had been to Poland at least twice (some as many as five or six times) and had worked closely with Polish educators who visited the United States. Their extensive involvement in the project had been an important part of my decision to invite them to participate in the study. The focus of the Poland project had been, since its inception in 1991, assisting Polish colleagues as they developed curriculum materials and teaching methods for civic education in a democratic society. In the process of working with our Polish colleagues, we had each found ourselves wondering exactly what this meant to educators in the United States as well.

9 In the first two discussions, I often found myself slipping into the old “interviewer” role and felt somewhat reluctant to contribute to the conversation as a participant. Consequently,
the first two discussions included numerous comments that sounded like a poor imitation of Carl Jung.

The State of Ohio's Proficiency Test in Citizenship is a topic that arose numerous times during our conversations. Without exception, the group was dissatisfied with the prospect of using an objective, multiple-choice test to assess citizenship and was concerned about the ways in which the results were being used to influence curriculum. Of particular concern were the public's reaction to the test scores and the tendency to use these scores as a basis for comparing schools in the area.

Referring to Tronto's (1996) discussion in which she posits that politicizing feminist issues serves as a vehicle for transforming democracy.

References


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The authors in this special issue of *Theory and Research in Social Education* present questions about the meaning of democratic citizenship for the 21st century. Given the ever-changing nature of modern life, these researchers suggest that current definitions of citizenship need to be reexamined and indeed broadened. Despite their common recommendations, the authors employ different research paradigms, advance divergent claims about the nature of citizenship, and propose varied possibilities for social studies education in the future. A well-informed response, however, demands investigation of certain differences and similarities, particularly the assertion that educators need to incorporate an expanded notion of citizenship in the social studies curriculum for the new century.

**Perspectives on Citizenship**

Each of the articles contains notable and thoughtfully researched perspectives on citizenship and democratic education. The three articles by Houser and Kuzmic, Cary, and Shinew constitute theoretical pieces in which the authors explore and manipulate a variety of interpretations of the concept of citizenship. The article by Bishop and Hamot examines theoretical constructs in actual practice. Bishop and Hamot research the adaptability of democracy as a cross-cultural concept by comparing it, with respect to education and teaching, in the United States and the newly established Czech Republic. Following the collapse of Communism in the late 1980s, the recently accelerated democratization of Eastern and Central Europe provided the setting to compare citizenship education efforts with approaches already developed and practiced in the US. In a related second study, Bishop and Hamot surveyed Czech social studies educators on their conceptions of democracy. Indeed, this work by Bishop and Hamot provides a practical portrayal and an analysis of ideas similar to those explored in the other three articles.

In “Ethical Citizenship in a Postmodern World: Toward a More Connected Approach to Social Education For the Twenty-first Century” Houser and Kuzmic investigate ethical dimensions of citizen-
ship. They draw from diverse research traditions, such as pragmatism, social learning theory, critical learning theory, and multicultural education, to develop what they call a caring and “connected approach to citizenship education.” They advocate methods of teaching social education that they contend would benefit the communities that schools serve. Houser and Kuzmic’s concern for the responsibility of democratic citizens’ relationships to one another echoes Ross’s (1998) plea for the pursuit of social justice in social studies education. Ross reminds TRSE readers that, “the primary responsibility of democratic citizens is concern with the development of shared interests that lead to sensitivity about repercussions of their actions on others” (1998, p. 458).

Shinew, on the other hand, in her article focuses her examination on feminist interpretations of educating for democratic citizenship. She employs a novel methodology in which she encourages readers to “disrupt, transgress and invent possibilities” (citing Fine, 1992, p. xii) as she suggests new and different theoretical understandings of citizenship. The most striking aspect of Shinew’s contribution is the manner in which she blurs the boundaries between research and fiction. In doing so, she creates a “visual readers theater” where the distinct voices of the participants in her study emerge from an invented story. Shinew deliberately pushes and prods at traditional concepts of educational research.

Drawing upon postmodern and poststructuralist theory, Cary, in her article “The Refusals of Citizenship: Normalizing Practices in Social Education Discourses,” deconstructs common notions of citizenship. She theorizes about normalizing practices in social education discourses and suggests the possibility of refusals of citizenship. To her, classic notions of “good citizens” and even “multicultural education” confine, oppress, and damage students as they inevitably lead to the “danger of reinscribing normalizing practices.” Despite the overall merit of the article, Cary’s extensive use of postmodern jargon tends to obfuscate her central message and provides few alternatives for social studies educators to employ when they make decisions. Specific and substantive proposals that inform practitioners would have proved more insightful.

Common Ideas about Citizenship

Each author expresses a common desire to expand traditional notions of citizenship. With feminist interpretations to consider, Shinew explores numerous definitions of citizenship. Members of her focus group appear dissatisfied with the traditional dictionary definition because of its emphasis on political membership in a nation state and the corresponding importance that this definition has placed upon duties, rights, and privileges. Yet, Shinew’s group does not completely
accept other definitions either. Clearly, these women believe that the boundaries between the personal and public sphere are more blurred than classic definitions of citizenship imply. Perhaps a more inclusive understanding of citizenship would not neglect the traditionally private roles of women as wives, mothers, daughters, and homemakers. Pressing feminist explorations even further, Cary claims that the classic notion of “good citizen/good teacher” implies a superiority of professional knowledge to a “more feminized intuitive knowing.” She claims space for women’s ways of knowing. Feminist authors Nel Noddings (1992), Jane Roland Martin (1992), and Andra Makler (1999) remind readers that accentuation on the political sphere precludes attention to personal and familial relations. They suggest that the curriculum should be redesigned to be more inclusive of the possibilities and values of women and of other traditionally underrepresented members of society. Of course, many educators would support attempts to establish a more inclusive and equitable society.

As noted by Shinew, definitions that broaden the meaning of citizenship unsettle the common understandings as they call for a new conception of citizenship in which American citizens value diversity and difference (citing Stone, 1996a, p. 51). According to Cary, dominant conceptions of citizenship silence cultural differences. Interestingly, Bishop and Hamot also conclude that commonly held definitions of democracy are problematic in that their meanings vary according to setting, place in time, and individual interpretation. Their research uncovers the problematic nature of adopting novel and complex understandings of democracy in Czech Republic schools. Yet, they also detect possibilities for improved conceptions of democracy in these schools. Two areas of agreement between Czech curriculum writers and US educators on the concept of democracy is a regard for “democracy as tolerance” and “democracy as decision making.” These findings, with respect to concepts of democracy, correspond with Shinew’s, Cary’s, and Houser and Kuzmic’s theoretical examinations which place value on diversity and shared responsibility. Nonetheless, Bishop and Hamot also find that Czech teachers typically characterize the concept of democracy primarily as a form of government with only secondary importance placed upon rights and freedoms. To these teachers, explanations of democracy that mention tolerance and duty are almost non-existent.

The possibilities of a broadened understanding of concepts of citizenship and democracy include questions about agency and methods for teaching social studies education. Cary calls attention to Freire’s (1970) work, which discusses issues of power, liberation, and education. In developing an expanded understanding of citizenship important questions need to be deliberated, such as: Who will be included in the dialogue about citizenship? How will an educational program,
which includes such dialogue, be developed and implemented? Cary poses numerous questions, but few ideas for action and decision. Houser and Kuzmic, however, detail several alternatives. They note that the ideal of the "good citizen" which implied uncritical obedience has been replaced by that of the "responsible citizen" who recognizes the need for analysis and action. They propose that citizenship education should include a discussion of caring and the virtues of shared responsibility, a narrative of conquerors and oppressed, and a focus on community, connectedness, and the common good. Nonetheless, any proposed suggestions would need to include proposals for a move toward genuine dialogue among educators rather than imposed and enforced liberal cultural transmission.

**Divergent Themes**

Notably absent from the several authors' discussions of citizenship and democratic education was an examination of the rich literature of classic political theory upon which such ideas are based.

Several articles briefly mention political theorists such as Rousseau, de Tocqueville, Jefferson, and Mill; and Bishop and Hamot provide a short discussion on Czech philosopher Masaryk. However, the ideas of these classical political theorists are largely ignored or rejected as part of an outmoded, reductionist, and positivist paradigm that contributes to fundamental negative aspects of Western thinking. Does the status of Rousseau, de Tocqueville, Jefferson, and Mill and other dead "White men" mean these thinkers only represent the oppressive nature of Western cultural heritage?

Developing a truly broadened conception of citizenship, however, is impossible without knowledge of the foundation upon which such ideas rest. In *The Rights of Man*, Thomas Paine (1790), who was ostracized by his contemporaries as a radical freethinker, reminds readers, "There was a time when kings disposed of their crowns by will upon their death-beds, and consigned the people, like beasts of the field, to whatever successor they appointed" (p. 278).

Furthermore, these classical political theorists must be viewed in the context of their times. Their beliefs about citizenship, democracy, liberty, and man's rights were literally revolutionary *in their times*, and opposed by many leading authorities. Consider Edmund Burke's objections in *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790). Many modern political theorists have questioned the breadth of these 18th and 19th century theorists' conception of citizenship and democracy. For example, Richard Matthews (1986) discusses the problematic nature of Thomas Jefferson's commitment to the principle that "all men are created equal" because he owned slaves and he viewed blacks as equal but "in reason much inferior" (Jefferson, 1787, *Notes on the State of Virginia*, Query XIV, p. 266; Jefferson to Benjamin Banneker, August
Yet, even Matthews claims that Jefferson’s “...unwavering faith in democracy and the ability of humanity to govern itself places him in the radical progressive tradition” (p. 119). Of course, John Stuart Mill (1859) in On Liberty explored the tension between a citizen’s liberty and the proper sphere of state action and in The Subjection of Women (1869) asserted the diversity of human nature and criticized sexual discrimination.

Present day notions of citizenship rest on the foundations established by these theorists and revolutionaries. Their ideas, however, are not stagnant, but open to reinterpretation by succeeding generations. Indeed, the passage of the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 and its enactment as law (PL 106-395) demonstrates the US Congress’ recent ability to expand its notion of citizenship. The Child Citizenship Act granted foreign-born children adopted by US citizens the same freedoms and rights of citizenship enjoyed by other Americans. On a personal level, the law ensured that my adopted Chinese daughter was entitled to the same rights of citizenship as my biological, white son of German and Irish heritage. In my household, citizenship is not only a theoretical construct, but is also a practical activity, as it is for the estimated 75,000 children affected by this law.

Clearly, as Leming and Nelson (1995) discovered, the field of social studies research continues to focus narrowly on its own scholarship placing little emphasis on a broader base of social science research for its foundation of knowledge. In Cary’s article, there are more than 50 references to Popkewitz and more than 20 to Larabee, while only one reference to Mill. Houser and Kuzmic mention contemporary political theorists whose writings explore the relationships between individuals and society, as well as prominent educational philosophers, such as John Dewey and Maxine Greene. But these authors omit more recent classic political theorists, such as Peter Woll, Richard Neustadt, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. After reading these articles the reader is left with the impression that modern political theory is generally extinct. The curricular implications of neglecting the foundation of classical conceptions of citizenship and democracy are significant. How can researchers broaden an understanding of citizenship and democracy if they neglect traditional conceptions? Not only did these researchers uncover the challenges that inevitably accompany the teaching of concepts such as democracy and citizenship in a place where a democratic form of government is relatively recent, but they also highlight the complexities that teachers face as they struggle to teach these ideas in established democracies such as the United States.

Critiquing problems of the modern world, such as overpopulation, depletion of vital resources, and a culture of individualism, calls needed attention to societal concerns. Analysis and scrutiny of posi-

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tivist paradigms, of limited perspectives in educational research, and of hidden normalizing practices in educational discourses, also focuses attention on flaws in methodologies, assumptions, and findings. Importantly, Reid (1999, 1994) and Schwab (1970) persistently point researchers toward practice, to the contextual situations in which particular teachers in specific schools must inevitably make curriculum decisions about the teaching of concepts such as citizenship and democracy.

Reid (1999) suggests that curriculum theory demands knowledge of "specific kinds of contexts, data and understandings, but which, at the same time, can be seen as part of a wider group of uncertain practical problems with social and moral significance" (p. 35). Contrary to Cary's claim that "the emphasis on practice over theory is also further evidence of...the move toward an intellectually reduced notion of practice" (p. 419), Reid argues that the method by which practical problems and curriculum decisions get solved, "variously called deliberation or practical reasoning...is an intricate and skilled intellectual and social process" (1999, p. 18).

Teachers and administrators throughout the country who strive to provide solid democratic education for their students do not have the luxury of theorizing or creating knowledge that may or may not involve the making of difficult decisions. Will educators be better prepared to teach about citizenship and democracy if they were to encounter and debate the ideas presented in this issue of TRSE? Leanne, the teacher in Shinew's research, wonders: "I don't know if we ever really did teach citizenship, now that I think about it. But perhaps we've gotten to the point where we're so afraid to step on somebody's toes that we don't dare tell anybody that this is the way a good citizen does things..." (pp. Shinew draft, pp. 26-27).

### Meanings of Citizenship

Questions about the meaning of democratic citizenship form the core of all four of these research studies. Each of the authors asks fundamental questions about the nature of citizenship, such as: What is the meaning of citizenship? What is the role of citizenship in a democracy? How should understandings of citizenship change in modern times given the increased diversity of society? Each of the authors addresses these important questions in very different manners. Yet, after reading and reviewing each of the articles, significant questions remain about citizenship education. Throughout the authors' analyses, readers might ponder how real teachers in real classrooms could employ the ideas, explorations, or suggestions. That a level of "productive ambiguity" remains after reading the articles should not be disturbing. Rather, each author acknowledges the complexities of understanding citizenship. Cary claims to ask more questions than she
answers. In addition, Shinew repeats Eisner's (1997) idea that if material presented is more evocative than denotative "...in its evocation, it generates insight and invites attention to complexity" (p. 510). If such complexity leads to more enlightened citizenship, perhaps such research eventually will result in an improved American society. Such improvement, however, ultimately includes the making of decisions by practitioners who engage in the process of deliberation. If theories about a broadened understanding of democracy intend to influence or inform this process of deliberation, they should retain a close relationship to the practical reality of teachers, students, and curriculum decisions.

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The ideas of connection and democracy suggest the forging of a nation-state wherein all citizens see their fates tied to the well-being and prosperity of their fellow citizens. A connection wherein common destinies are sought and the exclusion and oppression of citizens are greeted with outrage and protest. The notion of connection is a critical feature of democracy because it seeks to establish a common link and lasting bond between individuals within a certain cultural and national context. The principles of democracy offer US citizens an excellent blueprint for how to actualize a harmonious, just, and connected society. However, for myriad reasons the lofty aims and goals of a connected US democracy have never been fully realized. The authors whose work appears in this special issue have cogently raised issues, examined problems, and offered critical insights into various facets of social studies education that offer implications for the creation of a more connected democracy.

The task of creating a more connected and community-centered democracy is filled with multiple challenges. Houser and Kuzmic problematize a concept that has been one of the most complex and enduring facets of this country’s history—how to develop a more democratic, principally connected, and caring society. Their argument contends that the need for a more democratic discourse is even greater now in a postmodern world that has become increasingly diverse across racial, cultural, and economic lines. Houser and Kuzmic’s claim that social studies as “ethical citizenship” can play a role in the processes of creating a more connected social education provides a valid claim. Yet their argument provides us with more of the “whats” of potential solutions than the clear-cut “hows” to achieve such ends. The authors do, though, a commendable job of outlining the “culture of individualism” and the “self-as-individual” discourse that has enveloped Western culture over the past three centuries. Moreover, they put forward a strong claim that one of the goals of the social studies is to promote a brand of citizenship that promotes the well being of the common good. However, they neglect to mention the fact that a capitalistic society possesses characteristics that frequently disrupt the importance of the collective well being.

Consider that a capitalistic society regularly promotes competition over collaboration, domination over compassion, and separation in lieu of unification. Social studies educators face the arduous task of confronting an ethos that often diametrically opposes the community.
and connectedness the authors obviously advocate. Thus we must ponder whether there is deeply embedded hypocrisy within the theoretical tenants of democracy and its day-to-day manifestations that requires a more thorough examination. Over a half a century ago Myrdal (1944) referred to the democratic ideals and antidemocratic behaviors and practices in the United States, such as racial discrimination, as an “American dilemma.” He suggested that while many Americans believed strongly in what he called “American Creed values” (e.g., justice, equality, and liberty), the full internalization and implementation of these values were not fully actualized. Houser and Kuzmic’s argument evokes the spirit of Myrdal’s work and offers a plea to revisit how far we have come over the past half-century.

Central to the idea of using the social studies as a discipline to create a more democratic discourse is for social studies teachers to forge a space for teachers and students to talk openly and honestly about issues such as oppression, racism, and sexism. However, what educational advocates of community and connection-centered education must recognize are the positions of privilege that many educators enjoy. With an overwhelming number of teachers enjoying the benefits of middle-class (if not “higher”) status, the willingness to discuss critically what is in the best interests of the common good can become troubling, particularly when an authentic discussion of inequitable wealth distribution, race- and social class-based opportunities, and systemic advantages for some requires individuals to examine their own situated privileges. If the social studies are to serve as the conduit that helps us establish a more ethical citizenship and democratic society educators must develop culturally and politically responsive curriculum that has meaning via students’ lives and poses possibilities for better tomorrows. Moreover, teachers and students alike must try to understand the life experiences of the “other” and, according to Delpit (1996),

give up [their] sense of who [they] are, and be[] willing to see [themselves] in the unflattering light of another’s angry gaze. It is not easy, but it is the only way to learn what it might feel like to be someone else and the only way to start the dialogue. (pp. 46-47)

Houser and Kuzmic make the argument that the task of citizen is to engage in a critical discourse. It is also equally important to note that the critical discourse must include the use of multiple perspectives as a means to help all citizens recognize how each of our fates are tied to one another. Houser and Kuzmic also make a strong call for what Willie (2000) refers to as “community education,” wherein teachers and pupils share insights into different population groups’
patterns of participation in an attempt to promote both the individual and community advancement.

Examples of the types of self-reflection needed to improve social studies teaching are apparent in Shinew’s “Disrupt, Transgress, and Invent Possibilities: Feminists’ Interpretations of Educating for Democratic Citizenship.” Shinew uses a much needed approach of critical discourse within the social studies by placing her work within a feminist paradigm in an attempt to reconstruct the dominant, male-based constructions of discourse and citizenship. She echoes the work of other social educators who have called for the alteration of traditional forms of discourse that have often excluded marginalized voices. Crocco (2000) calls for addressing the “missing discourse” wherein social studies educators critique the “sometimes self-destructive gendered scripts our society provides for both young men and women” (p. 66).

Shinew offers a sound rationale for why a reconceptualization of citizenship is needed. Her contention that “questions about how we know and how our knowing is affected by our identities have been left unposed” hold significant validity. She builds upon the work of a number of scholars who posit that there needs to be greater attention to women’s issues in the social studies. Shinew’s argument is a central one to democratic citizenship. For as Bernard-Powers (1996) states:

Engendering democratic education requires an understanding of the delicately balanced bridge between the need to acknowledge qualities that are distinctive to a group (e.g., women), and the need for equity based on universal rights and principles. (p. 289)

In a society where largely mainstream groups that serve their ways of viewing and understanding the world have designed citizenship education, there is a need for transformation, or what Banks (1997) refers to as “citizenship education for a changing America.” The increasing ethnic, cultural, gender, and social class make-up of our society merits a form of cultural democracy that recognizes and respects multiple perspectives and viewpoints. Shinew’s framework for the social studies attempts to do just that, define, examine, and interpret the social studies through the cultural lens of women. While her efforts to problematize citizenship in a democratic society are noteworthy they are not without their shortcomings. The type of critical examination that is essential to helping to create and sustain a more gender-sensitive construction of social studies and citizenship did not appear to be apparent in the discussion with the classroom teachers she studied. Do the disruptive or alternative forms of citizenship education call for content change or is theirs a set of practices, principles,
and ideologies that embody the transformation? Shinew’s research is intriguing and important, although the responses garnered from her participants seem to do little with respect to conceptualizing or clarifying the concept of citizen within a feminist framework. Though the educators were queried about their perceptions of the concept of citizen, many of the responses focused on whether the concept was even taught in their classrooms. Shinew’s objective was to generate interest in a public discourse on what it means to be a citizen in a new millennium; to that end her goal seems to be achieved. Yet Shinew’s results appear to suggest that her participants had not given much critical thought to the concept of citizen, much less to the reconceptualization of citizen within a feminist framework. Thus, Shinew’s work leaves us with more questions than answers. In summary, her work informs us about the necessity for further examinations of the “citizen” and how social studies educators’ practices remain influenced by them.

Bishop and Hamot’s analysis of democracy as a cross-cultural concept offers promise for educators seeking to establish collaborative ties across borders in an attempt at curriculum reform. However, what their work may suggest is that attempts to establish democracy must have a complete understanding of the cultural context in which it occurs. They do an admirable job of providing a multitude of definitions of how democracy has been constructed in the professional literature. Using Dewey’s (1916/1980) work as an analytical framework that reminds us that democracy is “more than a form of government but instead a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experiences,” they encourage readers to rethink ways in which to improve the notion of democratic citizen.

The type of examination that Bishop and Hamot analyze is insightful regarding the different conceptions of democracy across the world. Their cross-cultural analysis of democracy is useful because US social studies educators may be able to broaden their understandings and practices of democracy based on how other nations conceptualize the concept in theory and in practice. A reconceptualization of democracy is in order within the confines of our own nation because democracy is still an elusive concept for many. The attention given to new and emerging democracies across our borders are grossly misplaced if we cannot find ways for US citizens who have had essential rights and privileges denied to revel in all the benefits democracy has to offer. Bishop and Hamot speak to how Czech and US partners refer to democracy as having essential elements such as “open-mindedness” and a “sense of compassion.” Yet within the US many people or color, women, and the poor do not have access to equal rights, full protection under the law, and sensitivity to differences displayed toward them in what is considered the ideal democracy in the world. What
becomes even more ironic is that Bishop and Hamot highlight the Czech writers’ interest in the multicultural nature of the US and the need to include “minorities as equals” when many in the US continue to struggle with how this nation deals with the “other.” Do the Czech writers have an idealistic perception of race relations in this country? More troubling is the fact that the Czech writers speak of a more humane approach to the treatment of the Gypsies and Romas in their country yet they contradict some of these grand principles. It appears as though they characterize the Gypsies and Romas in a manner similar to how persons of color in this country are treated by stating “they are not the same as we are, and they are problematic.” Bishop and Hamot fail to provide a stinging critique of how such attitudes continue to prevail in light of rhetoric that speaks of lofty goals of inclusion and democratic citizenship that are, for some, rarely actualized. Moreover, Bishop and Hamot do not offer an analysis as to what the implications are for educators who speak of admirable characteristics for a democracy even while their actions appear to be otherwise.

The inquiry into democracy as a cross-cultural concept for curricular reform in citizenship education is one that is desperately needed in US schools. Banks (1997) has argued that given the nation’s increasing diversity, there is a pressing demand to reconceptualize citizenship education. He contends that in order for students to become reflective citizens in a pluralistic democratic nation-state there is a need for what he refers to as “multicultural citizenship.” Here, students can maintain essential components of their racial and ethnic cultures while simultaneously playing a cogent role in the construction of a nation-state wherein diversity is recognized and respected. This is where I applaud Bishop and Hamot’s efforts to have the Czech teachers articulate their definitions of democracy in their own words. However, absent from those discussions were clear descriptions of how they thought these aims could be achieved. Although the insights offered by both the Czech and US writers are not heavy on best practices that could be used by social studies teachers, they do provide promising ideological considerations for defining and actualizing democracy. The Czech writers offer a number of plausible critiques of US descriptions and interpretations of democracy that can inform new conceptualizations and understandings of democracy. Bishop and Hamot quote the following:

In the eyes of the Czech writers, pragmatic approaches to the problems of today, without the constant reminder of a heritage with long roots in the intellectual and social history of their continent, defined the positionality of the US teachers. The major difference in positionality, according
to the Czechs was "that we are more historically and locally rooted. We have very strong relationships to place and the past. Americans live more for today and the future." (p.18)

The Czechs' assessment of the differences between the two interpretations of democracy can serve as an important design principle for social studies educators in the teaching of democracy. One of the prevailing reasons for the multitude of definitions and interpretations of democracy in the US lies in the history of racial discrimination, gender exclusion, and social class disenfranchisement that many Americans have endured. Thus, as the Czech writers seem to suggest, until wrongdoings of the past are recognized and atoned for the concept of democracy will remain an elusive concept for many, and will have different meanings for large numbers of US citizens.

Cary's work, "The Refusals of Citizenship," is an important one because it challenges social discourse in higher education. More specifically, Cary calls for "rethinking the ways in which knowledge and power intersect in higher education." Her interrogation is a critical one because she uses teacher education programs as the unit of analysis in her work. Furthermore, she calls for the dismantling of hegemonic principles and practices as an impetus to create a more "effective, socially just teacher education." I concur with Cary's notion that much of the discussion in teacher education around issues of multicultural education and social change are long on theory and short on practice, thus the need to interrogate and interrupt the prescriptive notions of "citizen" is long overdue. Social education, as a discipline concerned with issues pertaining to the development of democratic citizens, should represent the leading discipline-producing research, theory, and best practices describing a multiplicity of constructions of the "good citizen." However, as Cary cogently articulates, the voices of marginalized groups remain on the fringes of the discussion surrounding school reform, even in the midst of multicultural and diversity courses common among teacher education programs.

Cary makes the important claim that the disruption of the traditional or "natural" ways of defining truth is essential for a more responsive and democratic citizenship. Her inclusion of a Foucauldian approach to dismantling the traditional canon is quite timely. This view is consistent with earlier claims around the myth of the objectivity of knowledge. Kuhn (1970) was among the first contemporary scholars to challenge the objectivity of knowledge when he re-examined the history of science. Kuhn's account of historical science, in fact, revealed the fallacy of such claims. He suggested that "paradigms" were established based on accepted truths among scientists at the time,
and that paradigm shifts occur when "revolutionary" scientists detect flaws in the existing, dominant paradigm and create new knowledge for the establishment of a new canon. Cary's work represents a call for "revolutionary scientists" in social education not to succumb to claims of such paradigm shifts as merely "revisionist history" but to challenge seriously the authenticity of existing bodies of knowledge.

The redemptive culture that Cary references must include a critical approach to social education within the context of teacher education. Thus, an issue such as race, which Cary maintains is undertheorized, must be examined within the revised definition of "citizen." Other complex issues such as oppression, inequality, and sexism, which also have been undertheorized, merit thorough analysis as they relate to the positionality of social studies educators. Moreover, social studies educators must be willing to engage in a dialogue dealing with complex topics such as sexism, racism, and classism to understand the effects of the political struggles involved in the social and economic exploitation, economic disempowerment, and cultural and ideological repression various groups have endured under the guise of "democratic citizen." In short, Cary reminds us that further attempts to conduct the dialogue on democratic citizenship without disrupting hegemonic ideologies and constructions of what it means to be a "good citizen" lends themselves to a fractured citizenry that inhibits scores of Americans from participating equitably in "their" democratic society. Her work serves as a wake-up call for some and an unpalatable reminder for many others, of the difficult work that lies ahead, to recognize the lofty aims and principles of democracy.

In closing, the words of Cornel West (1990) should serve as a continual reminder of the goals we should seek as a democratic nation. West states that in a nation as diverse as ours the democratic process must concern itself with:

the abilities and capacities of ordinary people to participate in decision making procedures of institutions that regulate their lives...keeps track of social misery, solicits and channels moral outrage to alleviate it, and projects a future in which the potentialities of ordinary people flourish and flower. (pp. 1747-1748)

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Civic Illiteracy and Education: 
The Battle for the Hearts and Minds of American Youth

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*Civic Illiteracy* (Marciano, 1997) makes a series of assertions about the nation, war, patriotism, and education. The central concerns of my work are the distortions and lies that youth learn about war and patriotism in their schools and textbooks.

The thesis of the book is that among the fundamental purposes of education perhaps the most fundamental is to foster uncritical allegiance to the militaristic and violent policies of the national security state against Third World nations, and the political and economic war against the poor here at home.

In SUNY-Cortland’s student newspaper (Fall, 1997), a question asked of six undergraduates in its “On Our Minds” column highlighted the issue of civic illiteracy. “If you were Bill Clinton, what would you do about the Iraq situation?” Three female and three male students responded. The females were more cautious, reflecting recognized gender differences on such matters; the comments from the males, however, reflected the concerns that mark the book. They were: “Nuke them,” “Bomb Them,” and “Do Better Than Last Time. We Need to Make Iraq Comply.”

These responses merely repeated the sound-bite illiteracy that they have learned at home, in school, and from the mass media. Their utterly predictable mindset on Iraq has been repeated *ad nauseam* for other conflicts involving the violent US national security state: in Angola, El Salvador, Grenada, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and, earlier in history, at Sand Creek, Wounded Knee, and on the Trail of Tears. These students are the victims of a civic, historical, and moral blindness; they embrace the illusions of their age and nation state, and are carbon copies of their peers who in 1990-91 rehearsed the US government’s propaganda on Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi threat.

Donaldo Macedo (1994) points out that these students and millions like them—and their teachers at all levels—have fallen victim to “the pedagogy of big lies.” The biggest are the illusions we harbor about the nature and actions of our government and its leaders. He points out, for example, that the “great mass of voters” rallied behind
Bush and supported his "high-minded call to apply international laws against Saddam Hussein's tyranny and his invasion of Kuwait." These same voters, however, "failed to realize that these same international laws had been broken by Bush a year or so before in Panama and by his predecessor [Reagan] in Grenada, Libya, and Nicaragua." Macedo points out that this civic illiteracy also extends to the Pledge of Allegiance, in which millions of us put our hands on our hearts and swear to uphold "one nation, under God, with liberty and justice for all." Have educators examined his assertion that "the United States has systematically violated the Pledge of Allegiance, from the legalization of slavery, the denial of women's rights, and the near-genocide of Native Americans to the contemporary discriminatory practices against people who, by virtue of their race, ethnicity, class, or gender, are not treated with the dignity and respect called for in the pledge" (pp. 10-11)? Despite the evident answer to the question above and to questions like it, we continue the pretense that civic literacy is a basic purpose of our educational system.

Noam Chomsky is America's leading dissident intellectual/activist. More than 30 years ago, during the massive escalation of the US-Vietnam War, Chomsky (1996) articulated the connection between what happens in schools and what happens in the country and abroad—a civic lesson on the real world that has rarely if ever been investigated in our educational institutions: "At this moment of national disgrace, as American technology is running amuck in Southeast Asia, a discussion of American schools can hardly avoid noting...that these schools are the first training ground for the troops that will enforce the muted, unending terror of the status quo in the coming years of a projected American century" (p. 485). Chomsky's concern about the role of schools as the first basic training in civic illiteracy that will then allow millions of students to blithely go along and follow orders was seconded by educator and writer Jonathan Kozol. What he stated then remains true today: "The first and primary function of the U.S. public school is not to educate good people, but good citizens. It is the function which we call—in enemy nations—'state indoctrination'" (Kozol, 1972, p. 1).

The benign tale that we have learned throughout our education is one of a gentle and loving government seeking goodness wherever it goes; it makes mistakes in the pursuit of noble polices but never commits crimes. This goodness is captured brilliantly in the prayer that former President George Bush offered to the country that fateful evening of January 16, 1991 as the mightiest armada assembled since World War II rained death down upon Iraqi soldiers and civilians. This official Presidential Proclamation captured the dominant US view on the war and our noble intentions. Bush's (1991) proclamation was
the yellow-ribbon view that mesmerized our youth and nation and was repeated in every public school in the country:

At this moment, America, the finest, most loving nation on Earth, is at war, at war against the oldest enemy of the human spirit, evil that threatens world peace...the triumph of the moral order is the vision that compels us....We pray for God’s protection in all we undertake, for God’s love to fill all hearts, and for God’s peace to be the moral North Star that guides us. 

So I have proclaimed Sunday, February 3rd, a National Day of Prayer. In this time of crisis, may Americans of every creed turn to our greatest power and [become] united together in prayer...

Let us pray for our nation. We ask God to bless us, to help us, and to guide us through whatever dark nights may still lie ahead. And, above all, let us pray for peace, peace which passeth all understanding. On this National Day of Prayer, and always, may God bless the United States of America.

We should recall that escaping slaves on the Underground Railroad looked for the North Star at night to mark their way to freedom. Comparing their struggle for freedom to the Gulf War slaughter dishonors that struggle and those who risked their lives for it.

Contrast Bush’s glowing view of the government’s violence with the perspective of the late Andrew Kopkind, writer and journalist for The Nation magazine. What Kopkind (1991) stated at the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War bears repeating: “America has been in a state of war—cold, hot and lukewarm—for as long as most citizens now living can remember”; this state of war has “been used effectively to manufacture support for the nation’s rulers and to eliminate or contain dissent among the ruled.” This “warrior state is so ingrained in American institutions...that government is practically unthinkable without it.” But this war mentality is a good cure for “democratic dis-temper” (i.e., the critical civic literacy that is essential to a thriving and passionate democratic politics and education) because it “implies command rather than participation, obedience over agreement, hierarchy instead of equality, repression not liberty, uniformity not diversity, secrecy not candor, [and] propaganda not information” (p. 433).

This war system permeates every institution in our society, including our schools. Opposed to the “kinder gentler” rhetoric that we hear in commencement and political addresses, it glorifies patriotism and war and profoundly fuels the crisis in civic literacy. Do your own research and ask: To what extent has Kopkind’s perspective ever been the sub-
ject of a serious civic investigation in your school, as a student or educator?

This warrior system built upon the premise of patriarchal patriotism has been challenged by many feminists—whose critique has been totally ignored by educators and the mass media. Perhaps the classic anti-war feminist statement was put forth by the English writer Virginia Woolf (1938). In her *Three Guineas*, published a year before the outbreak of World War II, Woolf argued persuasively that although “many instincts are held more or less in common by both sexes, to fight has always been the man’s habit, not the woman’s. Law and practice have developed that difference, whether innate or accidental. Scarcely a human being in the course of history has fallen to a woman’s rifle...” (p. 6).

Woolf argued fervently that people “must educate the young to hate war. [We] must teach them to feel the inhumanity, the beastliness, the insupportability of war. But what kind of education shall we bargain for? What sort of education will teach the young to hate war” (p. 22)? This challenge to war and patriotism has not been the basis of civic education in American schools and colleges.

Her insight into English higher education also bears repeating, for it speaks to the role of American schools at all levels in supporting the dominant-elite and the national security state: “Need we collect more facts from history and biography to prove our statement that all attempts to influence the young against war through the education they receive at the universities must be abandoned? For do they not prove that education, the finest education in the world, does not teach people to hate force, but to use it?” (p. 29). Lest we think that her point is extreme, merely read David Halberstam’s (1969) study of the dominant-elite white men who planned and executed the US-Vietnam War during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, *The Best and the Brightest*.

Woolf then asked profound questions about education that should be the core of any civic and democratic endeavor if we are to think seriously and truthfully about the conditions that produce war and patriotism. “What is the aim of education, what kind of society, what kind of human being should it seek to produce....what should be taught...? Not the arts of dominating other people; not the arts of ruling, of killing, of acquiring land and capital” (pp. 33-4). Have such questions ever been raised in one of your department meetings or education courses?

She concludes: “The question we put to you, lives of the dead, is how we can enter the professions and yet remain civil human beings; human beings, that is, who wish to prevent war?” (p. 75). Youth may do this if they “rid [themselves] of pride of nationality in the first place; also of religious pride....” (p. 80). The starting point is developing a
“mind of your own and a will of your own [she was writing to the
daughters of educated men]. And you can use that mind and will to
abolish the inhumanity, the beastliness, the horror, and the folly of
war” (p. 83). Despite all the rhetoric about critical thinking and civic
literacy, this is the last thing that the American dominant-elite wants
from schools. Tragically, most teachers at all levels have complied with
this wish.

More recent feminist critiques of war and patriotism have
complemented Woolf’s eloquent attack on patriarchal warmaking.
Writing in The Nation after the Persian Gulf War, psychologist and
writer Naomi Weisstein (1991) argued that “we can no longer ignore
the connections between macho and murder, between a triumphal jingoism
and the victimization of the weak, between adoration of power
and the sanctification of world leaders who would rather kill hun-
dreds of thousands than risk the unmanly ignominy of backing down.”
She concludes that the patriotism we find in the US today is “the pa-
triarchal justification for legally sanctioned murder” (p. 132). Weisstein
links nationalist and male violence in a way that has been placed out
of bounds in education; thus, youth cannot think critically because
they don’t get to explore the tough questions in a civically-literate
manner that would allow them to examine the nationalistic, violent
values they have absorbed without reflection.

Another feminist critique of the warrior state has been offered
by the anarchist Emma Goldman who asserted that

conceit, arrogance and egotism are the essence of
patriotism...patriotism assumes that our globe is divided
into little spots, each one surrounded by an iron gate.
Those who had the fortune of being born on some par-
ticular spot consider themselves better, nobler, grander,
more intelligent than the living beings inhabiting any other
spot. It is, therefore, the duty of everyone living on that
chosen spot to fight, kill, and die in the attempt to impose
his superiority upon all others. (Quoted in Zinn, 1990, p.
118)

The illusion of a beneficent national security state spreading de-
mocracy at home and abroad has also been challenged by historian
Howard Zinn (1999), author of A People’s History of the United States
and other important works. Contrary to the belief taught to students
that the US has followed decent and democratic principles and poli-
cies, Zinn (1997) argues that “aggressiveness, violence, and deception”
(p. 311) have been rooted in our history from the founding of the na-
tion in 1776. “Aggressive expansion was a constant of national ideol-
ogy and policy, whether the administration was ‘liberal’ or ‘conserva-
tive'—that is, Federalist or Republican, Whig or Democrat, Democrat or Republican" (p. 313).

Underneath the ideals of democracy and world peace passed on to students in our schools are the real economic and political reasons for patriotism and war that are rarely the subject of a systemic civic investigation in education. These reasons were articulated with amazing honesty in 1933 by former Marine Corps General Smedley D. Butler about his role in pacifying the Caribbean. I see no reason to change them.

I helped make Mexico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenue in....I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras "right" for American fruit companies in 1903. Looking back on it, I might have given Al Capone a few hints (Quoted in Loewen, 1995, p. 213).

In what schools and colleges do students debate the ethical and historical premises embedded in Butler's appraisal of the dominant-elite view of war and patriotism? In what schools do we engage students in the possibility that civic ignorance on such issues is an essential purpose of their education? Critical democratic debate should be at the heart of a liberal arts education: the education of a free people. Yet such a debate and an education remain the exception and not the rule in our schools and universities.

I wish to conclude with a few specific comments about the book. The essential argument is that a critical view of our history, patriotism, and war rarely makes it into schools and the mass media despite mountains of historical evidence. This view must be presented if youth are to think about and challenge the distortions, omissions, and lies that shape history lessons about the country and its wars. Influential educators faithfully support a dominant-elite view that has fostered an uncritical patriotism and militarism, undermining thoughtful and active citizenship in a democracy. Allan Bloom's (1987) Closing of the American Mind has actually been fostered by those who influence educational policy. Despite the claims that civic literacy is crucial to education and democracy, patriotic and militaristic propaganda have dominated history lessons in our schools. Such education leaves students unable to make reasoned judgments on American wars and other public policies.

The dominant-elite fear that civically-literate youth will become informed and involved citizens; civic instruction, therefore, is organized to prevent such a danger. Civic illiteracy is perfectly reasonable
once we understand the purpose and nature of "citizenship training" in the schools: to undermine the critical and liberating potential of education. The elite fear what Harvard professor and former Pentagon official Samuel Huntington (1975) called "the democratic distemper" (p. 102) in the people, especially youth. If youth question and challenge issues and policies, the elite will face an "excess of democracy" of the kind that emerged in the 1960s when social movements challenged respected authorities and established policies. Such movements threaten the power and stability of established institutions and leaders. The history lessons about patriotism, war, and these movements, therefore, are simply one educational tool in the struggle to vaccinate the hearts and minds of youth against this "distemper."

The book begins by examining the "crisis in civic literacy" as presented by influential educational reports and theorists who have defined the debate. This review serves as the basis for the challenge in later chapters to the nature of American society and civic literacy. It then examines the dominant-elite view about the United States, including its history and stated ideals, as expressed through its professed commitment to human rights and its role in the world. This view shapes the debate on civic literacy, country, and war, and those presenting it define the issues to which citizens and youth then respond.

The dominant-elite view of national reports and leading educators are then contrasted with the views of dissenters such as Chomsky, W. E. B. DuBois, and Annette Jaimes, voices rarely heard in contemporary political discussions in the media and virtually excluded from our classrooms. Their dissenting critique gives us a much more truthful understanding of American history and contemporary events.

The US-Vietnam War serves as a case study to illustrate the general principles of civic illiteracy. The dominant-elite view is challenged by a concrete analysis of how the US-Vietnam War is presented in American history textbooks which remain a key source of civic learning for high school students, especially about past wars; these texts equate US policy with honorable intentions and justice while acknowledging errors of judgment and horrible casualties. Distortions and inaccuracies in the texts are examined using dissenting sources that are rarely part of schools' curricula.

Education, war, and civic illiteracy are then discussed in the context of a detailed history of the Gulf War—from the "yellow-ribbon" or dominant-elite perspective as well as from a dissenting viewpoint only infrequently encountered in the mass media or schools.

The book concludes by examining civic literacy efforts undertaken in schools during the Persian Gulf War through the use of three case studies of teachers who fostered the critical dialogue ideally envisioned as essential to civic knowledge. This happened because they
practiced the essential virtue of civic literacy in a democracy: engaging students and citizens in an informed and critical dialogue on an important historical event. These educators embrace the highest ideals of the nation and their vocation; they are the heroes in the struggle for civic literacy.

My scholarship is not merely an academic or careerist exercise. Powerful personal and political experiences have moved me to address the subject and controversy that are the heart of this work: my involvement in the anti-Vietnam War movement of the 1960s and 1970s; my work with Vietnam veterans on the war and related issues; my brother's combat service in Vietnam, and the death of his best friend with whom he went through basic and advanced infantry training; my personal contacts with Noam Chomsky, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Benjamin Spock, and Howard Zinn, all of whom have spoken and written eloquently about issues of war and peace; co-authoring Teaching the Vietnam War (with William L. Griffen, 1979); teaching students at the State University of New York, College at Cortland for 31 years; and my efforts as an activist on issues of education, peace, and social justice for the past 35 years.

Regardless of the judgment we make on the questions under discussion in this book, becoming civically literate about patriotism and war is not merely a minor debating point in another educational report or publication. What youth learn about the US-Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War can literally mean devastation or peace, especially for the poor in the "Third World." As the historian Howard Zinn (1990) argues, "we can reasonably conclude that how we think is not just mildly interesting, not just a subject for intellectual debate, but a matter of life and death" (pp. 1-2).

References


What's Left?


Review by E. WAYNE ROSS, Department of Teaching and Learning, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292.

“I think the left should get back into the business of piece-meal reform within the framework of a market economy.”
Richard Rorty (1998)

“Laws grind the poor, and rich men make the laws.”
Oliver Goldsmith (1765)

Richard Rorty, regarded by many as America’s leading philosopher, is one of the most widely read scholars in the world. Perhaps more than anyone else, Rorty is responsible for the revival of the tradition of American pragmatism in philosophy in general and the philosophy of John Dewey in particular. Achieving Our Country collects his three 1997 William E. Massey, Sr. Lectures in the History of Western Civilization along with two earlier lectures: “Movements and Campaigns,” a homage to Rorty’s self-described “hero,” Irving Howe, to whom the book is dedicated (along with A. Phillip Randolf), and “The Inspirational Value of Great Works of Literature,” a talk given to the Modern Language Association. These lectures, included as Appendixes, were previously published in 1995, the former in Dissent, the latter in Raritan.

Presented as both a history of leftist thought in twentieth-century America as well as the blueprint of a program for a new Reformist Left based on patriotic nationalism and the market economy, Achieving Our Country is a deeply contradictory book that offers pseudo-history in support of a political agenda that has already proven a failure, even by Rorty’s own assessment.

Nobody seems to like Rorty’s politics. From the Right he is assailed as an “irresponsible liberal relativist” who is pro-labor, pro-feminist, and pro-gay rights and on the Left as “a complacent Cold War
liberal reformist.” Rorty is a self-described “bourgeois liberal,” and *Achieving Our Country* has even proven problematic for others of that ilk.

In the first lecture, “American National Pride: Whitman and Dewey,” Rorty lays out his basic argument. “National pride is to countries what self-respect is to individuals: a necessary condition for self-improvement.” And, at the turn of the millennium, there are few inspiring images or stories of America and “most descriptions of what America will be like in the twenty-first century are written in tones either of self-mockery or self-disgust” (p. 4).

The problem is that many people “find pride in American citizenship impossible” and/or “vigorou participation in electoral politics pointless.”

They associate American patriotism with an endorsement of atrocities: the importation of African slaves, the slaughter of Native Americans, the rape of ancient forests, and the Vietnam War. Many of them think of national pride as appropriate only for chauvinists: for the sort of American who rejoices that America can still orchestrate something like the Gulf War, can still bring deadly force to bear whenever and wherever it chooses. (p. 7)

The root of this problem, according to Rorty, is that when “young intellectuals watch John Wayne war movies after reading Heidegger, Foucault, [or the novels of] Stephenson or Silko, they often become convinced that they live in a violent, inhuman, corrupt country,” but their insights into the “ghastly reality of contemporary America” fail to move them to “formulate a legislative program, to join a political movement, or to share in a national hope” (pp. 7-8). “Insufficient national pride,” Rorty argues, “makes energetic and effective debate about national policy unlikely” because “deliberation will probably not occur unless pride outweighs shame” (p. 1).

In other words, the difference between early twentieth-century leftist intellectuals (like Dewey and Whitman) and “the majority of their contemporary counterparts is the difference between agents and spectators” (p. 9). Rorty argues that the pragmatic patriotism of Dewey and Whitman needs to be reclaimed because “the government of our national-state will be, for the foreseeable future, the only agent capable of making any real difference in the amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted on Americans” (p. 98). The academic Left, says Rorty, has “no vision of a country to be achieved by building consensus on the need for specific reforms” (p. 15). The “leftists in the academy have permitted cultural politics to supplant real politics, and have collaborated with the Right in making cultural issues central to public de-
bate. They are spending energy which should be directed at proposing new laws" on discussing topics that are remote from the country’s needs.2

In his second lecture, "The Eclipse of the Reformist Left," Rorty seeks to bolster his left credentials by telling his family story from the 1930s-1950s, revealing that his maternal grandfather was the social gospel theologian Walter Rauschenbusch, and that he was raised a loyal Trotskyist. And he identifies himself with the anti-Stalinist Sidney Hook, Lionel Trilling, Norman Thomas and the social democracy they advocated. Then Rorty argues that we should abandon the “leftist-versus-liberal distinction,” which he sees as residue from Marxism, that “catastrophe” that clutters our vocabulary.

For Rorty, anyone who struggled for social justice within the framework of constitutional democracy should count as a Leftist. He invokes Dewey and Whitman as the anchors for his new “Reformist Left.” In his sense of the term, the racist Woodrow Wilson, who kept Eugene Debs in jail, “counts as a part time leftist.” Rorty wants American Leftists to stop asking questions like “whether or not Walter Reuther’s attempt to bourgeoisify the auto workers was objectively reactionary. It would also help if they emphasized the similarities between Malcolm X and Bayard Rustin, between Susan B. Anthony and Emma Goldman” (p. 51).

In this lecture he offers a “history,” of sorts, of the two Lefts (the old Reformist Left and the New Left of the sixties) to serve as a basis for a new Reformist Left, one that eschews cultural issues and takes up economic and political reform—a legislative agenda. Rorty says that “insofar as a Left becomes spectatorial and retrospective, it ceases to be a Left” (p. 14). He claims that once the old alliance between the intellectuals and the unions broke down (according to him in the 1960s) the American Left adopted Henry Adams’ attitude of political abstinence. Rorty’s new Reformist Left would be an optimistic, participatory left, with national pride, not mocking and spectatorial as he depicts the Cultural Left, which has been captivated by Heidegger and Foucault and paralyzed politically.

In Rorty’s history of the American Left, bottom-up struggles of people with little power, money, or security, who heroically rebelled against unfair treatment—Rorty’s examples are: “the Pullman Strike, Marcus Garvey’s black nationalist movement, the General Motors sit down strike of 1936, the Montgomery bus boycott, the creation of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, the creation of Cesar Chavez’s United Farm Workers, and the Stonewall ‘riot’”—would likely have been “fruitless if leisured, educated, relatively risk-free people had not joined the struggle. Those beaten to death by the goon squads and the lynch mobs might have died in vain if the safe and the secure had not lent a hand” (p. 54).
Rorty ends his "history" of the American Left arguing, ironically, that we should forget much of the history of the American Left.

As I see it, the honors should be divided between the older, reformist left and the New Left of the Sixties. The heirs of that older Left should stop reminding themselves of the stupid and self-destructive things the New Left did and said toward the end of that decade. Those who are nostalgic for the Sixties should stop reminding themselves that Schlesinger lied about the Bay of Pigs and that Hook voted for Nixon. All of us should take pride in a country whose historians will someday honor the achievements of both these Lefts. (p. 71)

In the third lecture Rorty takes on the "Cultural Left." Rorty says the "New Left" (mainly students) gave up on the system around 1964 and abandoned any effort at genuine political and economic reform; despaired of America; refused to work with the labor movement; and opposed the anticomunist agenda of the Cold War liberals. Rorty does applaud the protests of the student movement and the anti-Vietnam War movement. Rorty argues that the New Left's program of cultural reform—feminism, African American studies, gay rights and multiculturalism, the politics of identity—is concerned more with removing stigma than greed or inequality. While he agrees with the accomplishments, Rorty deplores what he sees as the Cultural Left's split with the reformist-liberal Left.

Rorty believes we must reestablish the American dream for the 75% of the people who are squeezed out of the system—restore vision and hope by embarking upon economic and political reform within the framework of the market economy—via redistributive economic policies, progressive taxation, and governmental regulation of corporations. Rorty wants to reinvigorate the democratic system and restore social equality. In the end, Achieving Our Country is an argument for the return to what Rorty calls the business of the American Left in the first two-thirds of the twentieth-century: "I think the left should get back in the business of piecemeal reform within the framework of a market economy" (p. 105).

Achieving Our Country is maddeningly contradictory. Take for example Rorty's critical assessment of the effects of neoliberal global capitalism and his proposed solution. Rorty clearly describes (and condemns) the segregation and oppression of contemporary capitalism:

If the formation of hereditary castes continues unimpeded, and if the pressures of globalization create such castes not
only in the United States but in all the old democracies, we shall end up in an Orwellian world...there will be an analogue to the Inner Party—namely, the international, cosmopolitan super-rich. They will make all the important decisions. The analogue of Orwell’s Outer Party will be educated, comfortably off, cosmopolitan professionals. (p. 87)

Rorty even believes that the United States may be approaching a time when “a scenario like that of Sinclair Lewis’ novel It Can’t Happen Here may be played out” (p. 90). Rorty takes seriously Edward Luttwak’s argument in The Endangered American Dream that fascism may be in America’s future as workers “realize that their government is not even trying to prevent wages from sinking or to prevent jobs from being exported.”

This same Rorty, however, believes the market is “indispensable”; he is an apologist for capitalism, with no small streak of anti-Marxist sentiment. As he says in Philosophy and Social Hope,

The Marxists hoped that once those on the bottom seized control, once the revolution turned things upside down, everything would automatically get better. Here again, alas, the Marxists were wrong. So now Marxism is no longer of much interest, we are back with the question of what top-down initiatives we gentlefolk might best pursue. (Rorty, 1999, p. 250)

What we need to do, Rorty advises, is confront the new economy together in the name of our common citizenship, the “we” being the super-rich—whom Rorty elsewhere informs us operates without any interests save its own—and the working class.

Rorty also clearly grasps the extent to which neoliberal “democracy” is a corrupt process:

The view that the visible government is just a false front is a plausible extrapolation from the fact that we are living in a Second Gilded Age: even Mark Twain might have been startled by the shamelessness with which our politicians now sell themselves. (p. 6)

But this does not deter him from offering a reformist political program for the American Left aimed at getting the government to pass laws that will redistribute the wealth produced by (the exploitive practices of) capitalism.
What seems to have escaped Rorty’s historical viewfinder is that over the past three decades reformist social democracies have employed such neoliberal economic schemes and they have been miserable failures at achieving the redistributive outcomes he claims to advocate; in fact, these policies continue to have the opposite effect.  

Rorty’s political and economic strategy is a reformulation of Irving Howe and Michael Harrington’s proposal to American Leftists in the 1960s, what Hal Draper called “permeationism”—the process of adapting to the ruling powers and infiltrating their centers of influence with the aim of some day becoming part of the Establishment in order to manipulate the reins to the Left (Johnson, 2000). As Draper pointed out in 1965, independent rebellious forces (e.g., the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party [MFDP]) threaten the permeationist strategy. And that explains why one part of Rorty’s reformist Left (e.g., Hubert Humphrey and Lyndon Johnson) attacked the MFDP at the 1964 Democratic convention, and why Rustin, Reuther, and Harrington supported them (Johnson, 2000). This same political strategy is the source of the “lesser evilism” that leftists in the Democratic Party are subjected to every four years.

Alan Johnson (2000) details how Rorty’s history of the reformist Left is “not so much rose-tinted as false” (p. 107). In fact, Johnson stands Rorty’s history of the New Left on its head.

In 1966 Harrington attacked the nihilism of the New Left and called for the construction of a “new political majority” around the “liberal wing” of the consensus which built the welfare state. And Howe argued that “the necessary social and economic reforms can be achieved through a reactivated coalition of liberal-left-labor forces. Few listened while the Movement was on the rise and the “Liberals” were bombing Vietnam but as the New Left plunged into crisis Howe-Harrington found an audience. Thousands of ex-New Leftists entered the reform wing of the Democratic party after 1972 with Howe and Harrington playing an important co-ordinating role...Howe and Harrington had brought the new Left “home” to the Democrats just as the Democrats were packing up and moving to the right, ditching labor and civil rights... (p. 108)

Rorty would have us believe that the New Left of the sixties merely became cynical and retreated into theory. More likely, as Johnson (2000) argues, Rorty cannot face up to the transformation of American liberalism, its abandonment of the Left, and the fact that
the New Left learned hard lessons about the racist, capitalist, imperialist system and the Democratic Party's relationship with that system.

In Rorty's history there is a place for the Martin Luther King, Jr. who felt national pride and admonished his country to live up to its ideals, but not for the King who said in 1967 that America is

"the greatest purveyor of violence in the world" and [who] called racism, economic exploitation and militarism "triple threats" which were "incapable of being conquered" as long as "profit motives and property rights are considered more important than people." (Johnson, p. 111)

Even more confounding is how Rorty's history ignores Dewey's increasingly radical democratic socialism and his critique of liberalism, so thoroughly detailed by Westbrook (1991). Rorty's embrace of neoliberal markets and his disdain for any form of socialist planning as Stalinist gives him more in common with Walter Lippman than Dewey. As Westbrook points out, Dewey warned against "piecemeal policies taken ad hoc." Dewey argued that reforms were of limited utility and that private power undermined freedom and democracy. In the 1920s, Dewey argued, "power today resides in control of the means of production, exchange, publicity, transportation and communication. Whoever owns them rule the life of the country...Business for private profit through private control of banking, land, industry reinforced by command of the press, press agents and other means of publicity and propaganda" is the system that must be unraveled if we are to talk seriously about democracy and freedom.

In Achieving Our Country and his other recent political writings, Rorty shares with us his dreams of a global human brotherhood and a classless society. He remains, however, an elitist—in the liberal-democratic tradition of Lippman—believing the only route to this utopia is top-down and achieved through sentimental manipulation of the powerful (e.g., lawmakers and capitalists). Rorty believes we should

...hand our hopes for moral progress over to sentiment...in effect...to condescension. For we shall be relying on those who have the power to change things...rather than relying on something which has power over them. (Rorty, quoted in Johnson, p. 114)

Rorty is clear about who he believes controls the future, it is the "people on top...everything depends on them...there is nothing more powerful to which we can appeal against them."

For Rorty, rational and nonrational methods of changing peoples' minds are equivalent (see Geras, 1995)—"stories about what a nation
has been and should try to be are not attempts at accurate representation, but rather attempts to forge a moral identity” (p. 13). Achieving Our Country is best understood as one of the sad sentimental stories Rorty believes will soften the hearts of the people in power. This kind of reading explains, at least partially, his warm embrace of markets, his continued fervent anti-communism, and his belief that there is hope for a legislative program that puts into place redistributive economic policies.

Rorty’s faith in sentimental stories as the best weapon we have for social and economic justice in our society belies two important premises that underlie (and undermine) Rorty’s political thought as represented here. First, his appeal to the super-rich, the politically powerful people, as the only hope of achieving our country is consistent with prevailing democratic theory that the people must submit in the political arena. In neoliberal democracy the governed have the right to consent, nothing more. In the terminology of modern progressive thought, as Chomsky (1999) points out, his population may be “spectators” but not “participants,” apart from choosing among leaders representing authentic power. (And as we saw in the 2000 elections, even that is not guaranteed.) In the economic arena, which largely decides what happens in society, the general population is excluded entirely. Rorty’s second premise is that capital should not, indeed cannot, be challenged.

Rorty describes the culminating achievement of Dewey’s philosophy as treating evaluative terms such as “true” and “right” not as signifying a relation to some antecedently existing thing...but as expressions of satisfaction at having found a solution to the problem: a problem that may someday seem obsolete, and a satisfaction which may someday seem misplaced...Instead of seeing progress as a matter of getting closer to something specifiable in advance, we see it as a matter of solving more problems. (p. 28)

In Achieving Our Country, however, Rorty seems to have misapplied Dewey’s most important lesson. It’s not that he fails to understand the economic problems of poor and working folks created by global capitalism, he clearly details these. Nor is he unsympathetic to the social, cultural, and political problems of historically disenfranchised groups in neoliberal democracies. He cannot, however, envision progress except in relation to two closely related antecedents: market economies and neoliberal “democracy.” The former being the source of the economic inequalities Rorty laments and the latter the means used by the wealthy few to limit the political rights and civic powers of the many,
making all but a tiny minority of Americans spectator citizens.

**Notes**

1 Rorty is referring to Neal Stephenson's best selling novel *Snow Crash* and Leslie Marmon Silko's *Almanac of the Dead*.

2 The *National Review* describes Rorty's advice to the left as "stop following Foucault, stop being sentimental about the Bolshevik Revolution, stop hating your country, and stop sneering at reformist liberals" (Ellis, 1998).


5 Here Johnson is quoting from Rorty's 1993 lectures for Amnesty International.

**References**


Reducing Prejudice


Reviewed by VALERIE OOKA PANG, School of Teacher Education, San Diego State University, San Diego, CA 92182

Because a vision softly creeping, left its seeds while I was sleeping. And the vision that was planted in my brain still remains within the sound of silence.

"Fools!" said I, "you do not know silence like a cancer grows."

"Hear my words that I might teach you, Take my arms that I might reach you."

But my words like silent rain-drops fell, and echoed in the wells of silence.

Paul Simon, *The Sound of Silence* (1964)

Visions that stem from prejudice have been taught to us from a young age, and prejudice like a cancer grows. Prejudice grows into discrimination and exclusion of those who are perceived as "others." We are fools if we think prejudice has been eliminated from schools. We bask in the atmosphere of silence where we cover our eyes and ears not seeing what is happening to children or teachers. Stephan, in his book *Reducing Prejudice and Stereotyping in Schools*, carefully and clearly explains how prejudice and discrimination permeate our schools as institutions that transfer our social mores and beliefs.

In fact, some educators believe that diversity is a dirty word and must be eliminated from school policies and textbooks. It is called the "d" word. These educators see diversity as unpatriotic rather than part of our rich heritage as a country that prides itself on equality and social justice. Prejudice and discrimination arise in many forms.

Many educators in schools do not believe that prejudice is a major problem. However, there are many indications that under the surface, prejudice and discrimination are still alive and hurtful. Let me share a recent experience of prejudice that is still present in schools today.
How Does Prejudice Look in The Stage Play Grease?

This July I was invited to a performance of the Youth Summerstock Theater. The Summerstock is housed at a local high school and the organization's goal is to teach theater and performance skills to high school students. My friend invited me to join her at the opening night of the play Grease. Her granddaughter had a major part in the play and wanted to share this wonderful evening.

We arrived early to the theater. People were enjoying the beautiful summer evening sitting out on the lawn before the doors opened. We went in. My friend had bought our tickets early so we had great seats in the second row. People in the audience were excited. Most had a relative or friend in the play. Two young girls, about 5 and 7, sat in front of us.

The curtains opened and several young people came out and began singing the opening and most identifiable song from Grease. The audience cheered. The story has somewhat of a coming of age theme. The main characters are learning how to deal with their feelings toward others, whether it is to gain approval from their peers or learn about romantic attachments.

In the first scenes, the audience gets to know the main characters and sees them in various situations, for instance in the cafeteria. As the characters tell their story, one young woman sings about a young fellow whom she likes who is in the army and had sent her a beautiful silk bathrobe. In this scene two of her friends say something like, “Don’t tell us you have a Jap boyfriend?” This comment is repeated a second time.

My husband and I, the only Asians in the entire theater, were sitting in the second row in the middle of the audience. We were concerned, offended, and disappointed with not only those comments but the use of terms like “bastard,” “horney guys,” and “knocked-up” [girls]. My husband and I did not clap after this scene though most of the audience did.

At the intermission, my friend apologized for the racial slur. In fact she said, “I kept looking forward because I was too embarrassed to look at you. I didn’t know what to say. I thought you might walk out of the play.”

I did think about walking out, but felt that it would have embarrassed the students and they would not have understood why. It would be better to have the members of the Summerstock use the situation as a learning experience and discuss the issue. Later, at the end of the play, we saw that a new notice had been Xeroxed and stapled to the bulletin board outside the theater. It said that the play presented by the students was the original from Broadway and so to remain true to the integrity of the original work the sexual and other strongly worded terms were left in the performance.
My friend’s daughter did talk with her daughter who was a performer in the play. She brought it up to her peers. I wrote a letter to the director asking him to consider that through the play he might be teaching or reinforcing racial slurs and stereotypes. This theater is known county-wide for quality performances for families. In addition, since Summerstock is part of the local high school district, it is under the supervision of the superintendent and his staff.

The example clearly shows that racial prejudice has not been erased. This was a real incident involving teachers and students. The play also involved community sponsors. Did they know what was being presented? The local Kiwanis Club, a large credit union, and many other local businesses had donated to the youth theater.

**What are Some Theories of Prejudice?**

Why don’t people see overt prejudice? Or even if they see it, why do they ignore it and do nothing? Prejudice is a negative, rigid, and overgeneralized attitude toward a social group (Stephan, 1999). As Stephan has carefully described, prejudice is learned and involves both affective and cognitive processes. Prejudice evolves over time; this makes prejudice and discrimination hard to change or eliminate. Stereotypes develop in a person’s mind and and are seen as permanent traits in others. Members of outgroups are seen as less desirable or in a negative light. And people are more likely to remember or consider information that confirms their stereotypical beliefs. When a person receives knowledge that contradicts the stereotype she or he holds, a subcategory is created so that the stereotype remains in tact. Therefore, the processes of learning prejudice are individual and social. Children learn prejudicial attitudes from people and materials that they come into contact with. The comments in the play described above could reinforce the prejudicial beliefs that some hold. In addition, as part of the information processing that occurs, the two young children in the front row may believe that since the comments were given without anyone questioning them, those beliefs are acceptable.

Why do people hold onto their prejudicial attitudes? Stephan discusses several reasons. One of the most powerful is called the “aversive racism theory.” Stephan believes White Americans hold a contradiction between what they value and what they feel. Whites may believe in the abstract values of equality and equal status, yet they may hold negative feelings about people from underrepresented groups. They may perceive themselves as not being racist, but may act in patronizing ways. There is a dilemma in that people hold the national belief that though all people are equal, discrimination is allowed in order to maintain a dominant position in society.

Connected to this perspective is the “social dominance theory.” In the United States there is a structured hierarchy where the domi-
nant group is at the top. Stereotypes and social myths like innate inferiority serve to justify discrimination. There is also the underlying message that members of the outgroup are less human. So racial, class, and gender prejudice support continued stratification. These beliefs serve to legitimize discriminatory behavior.

Another theory that Stephan explains is the "compunction theory." Children grow up in a racially divided society and they learn stereotypes about people from communities of nonmainstream groups. When people who are less prejudiced hear racial slurs or discrimination, they feel guilt or shame. These feelings assist them in moving away from prejudicial behaviors. Some of the members of the audience may have felt this when the racial slurs were presented on stage. This feeling of guilt could help move people toward holding nonprejudiced standards and attitudes.

What Can Be Done to Fight Prejudice and Discrimination?

What strategies does Stephan suggest? He provides two guiding principles. First, Stephan points out how important it is for educators to tailor strategies to local situations. Each school has a unique set of circumstances and problems. This must be carefully considered when creating programs to address the prejudices they find. Second, in order to make lasting changes, school personnel must develop collaborative long term goals. Prejudice and discrimination will not go away after one workshop or one discussion. People usually have learned prejudicial attitudes over many years, and so they must be involved in many instances where they reflect upon and move away from bias.

How can teachers begin to develop long term plans for prejudice reduction? There are four domains in which teachers can address prejudice. First, with respect to information processing, teachers can help students understand how they categorize and stereotype people who are seen as others. Educators can point out the importance of judging individuals on their own merit rather than group stereotypes. Second, teachers can facilitate youth in accepting themselves and others. When youth accept themselves, they are more open-minded towards others. Third, students can be taught effective intergroup relation skills so that conflicts can be worked through in collaborative situations. Collaboration is one of the most powerful strategies that Stephan suggests. And fourth, school policies and practices must be implemented to support changes.

Stephan emphasizes the importance of educators in equipping students with knowledge and social skills that provide the means for young people to work with those whom they perceive as being different. Stephan believes that underlying social prejudice is the threat (and fear) of losing power; this may also include the possibility that their way of life will erode. Our society has been built upon a system of
power based on financial status, racial membership, and social prestige. Students need the opportunity to examine how many of our social practices serve to maintain social hierarchies.

Stephan has written an excellent research-based text describing not only how prejudice evolves and is reinforced, but also how prejudice and discrimination are social elements that continue to preserve a hierarchical system of privilege and bias. He provides clear examples of how prejudice is reinforced in multiple ways in everyday life. Stephan also suggests numerous ways that teachers can fight the development of prejudice in individuals. One of the few criticisms of the book is its lack of suggestions about how to deal with institutional prejudice and discrimination. Because in order to eliminate prejudice, it is critical to abolish prejudice not only in individuals, but also in our social institutions. If we do nothing to develop long term plans to eliminate prejudice on both levels, as Paul Simon wrote many years ago, "Silence like a cancer grows..." It can destroy the opportunity we have to create a truly just and compassionate nation and world.
Participating at Acceptable Levels of Risk


Reviewed by ANDRA MAKLER, Graduate School of Education, Lewis & Clark College, Portland, OR 97219

...in the long run, a desirable civic life is one where people can participate at acceptable levels of risk. When, without jeopardizing life, liberty, or conscience, and without subjugating or demeaning private life, people can speak freely, deliberate collectively, and work together in hope, political democracy will have achieved its aspirations. (Schudson, 1998, p. 313)

In the post-modern era, post Vietnam, Watergate, and the birth of a new e-technocracy, pundits in academe and the media have proclaimed the end of history and the demise of civic-mindedness. Nightly newscasts tell us that people don't vote, political leaders are more interested in poll ratings than devising policies to promote the general welfare, and baby boomers are more interested in the health of the social security system than in funding public education. Today we hear, "The good citizen is dead!"

A Politics of Mythology and Historical Reality

Political sociologist Michael Schudson disagrees. In *The Good Citizen*, he presents a well-argued, historically-grounded case that as the U.S. grew as a nation, the meaning of good citizenship and of core civic activities such as voting changed. Implicit in his argument is a sense of mild castigation: if we Americans knew our political history, we would be able to differentiate between mythology and historical reality. Our longing for the Norman Rockwell image of small town community, complete with baseball games, Fourth of July picnics, and town meetings, is nostalgia for a myth propounded by "communitarian philosophers" (including de Tocqueville, John Dewey, and Robert Bellah and colleagues), school books, and our a-historicity. An astute student of the influence of the mass media on our public life and our attitudes about democracy, Schudson urges us to revisit the 1920s debate between Walter Lippman and John Dewey over the place of expertise in a democracy. The heart of his analysis is a plea that in debating the virtues of the common good we not forget that a good society
provides “access to a satisfying private life for all.” His preoccupation is to understand “how individuals come to participate in political life, how they arrive at an understanding of political questions, and how they think about what obligations their citizenship entails” (p. 315, footnote 2). These are excellent questions for social studies educators to address with prospective or experienced teachers, but I wonder how many of us do.

This book takes a sweeping look at the changes in our political norms and values that have accompanied the shift from “a politics of assent” in the colonial period to our contemporary rights-based politics of “legally legitimated claims,” and the associated shifts in our expectations for the good citizen’s participation in public life. While Schudson recognizes that this framework is problematic because women, Black people (whether slave or free), and Native Americans were excluded from the category of citizen and/or expected not to be seen or heard in the political arena, he seems unaware of those Americans of Asian descent who were legally prohibited from becoming citizens until after World War II. Furthermore, as Mary Frances Berry (1999) eloquently points out in The Pig Farmer’s Daughter, we have yet to find a way to acknowledge the historical and current simultaneous coexistence of alternative narratives for understanding civic life and legal processes. With this caveat in mind, Schudson’s account, and the model he presents for understanding the norms of citizenship, are worthy of serious discussion.

**A Politics of Deference to Elites**

Schudson divides American political history into three distinct eras and four distinct phases of citizenship: the colonial period, lasting from about 1690-1830s; the era of mass democracy from Jackson to the late 19th century; and the era of the informed citizen, which today is morphing into the era of the monitorial citizen. The first era was characterized by a politics of assent and deference to the elite classes, who were looked to for moral and political leadership. What counted was how well you knew the man running for office, and what you knew of his character. Those known to be of “good character” were considered trustworthy; their word and judgments carried weight.

From the Pilgrim fathers through the generation who wrote the Constitution, residents of the colonies accepted the existence of social hierarchy as part of the order of the universe; the purpose of elections was to “[reaffirm] leading gentlemen’s right to govern” (p. 22). Despite this shared world view, by the middle of the 18th century, growing acceptance of the idea that governments derived their authority from the consent of the governed made “American political culture...unique for its time” (p. 15). Schudson’s discussion of how important symbolic gestures “earn their social keep...by their capac-
ity to combine in persuasive ways apparently...contradictory social features" is a significant contribution to our understanding of politics and history. The public vote—and votes were public, called out in the town square and rewarded immediately by the gentlemen earning them with tankards of ale—was a ritual that reaffirmed social hierarchy while simultaneously reminding the leaders that they were “themselves subject to common understandings of what kinds of power governmental officers should restrain themselves from exercising” (p. 22).

Representative government as practiced in England was virtual representation; the member of Parliament rarely lived in the borough that elected him, nor was he expected to be of the same background (or class) as the mass of those who lived in his district. Gradually, the American system of government came to challenge that notion, as qualifications for voting shifted from church membership and ownership of property to verification of one’s status as a tax-paying white male. Historically speaking, institution of a poll tax as the selective mechanism for electors was a democratic advance, as was “real” representation.

Job Distribution and A Politics of the Masses

The administrations of Jackson, Van Buren, Chester A. Arthur, and Lincoln saw a shift to a politics of affiliation. During these years of mass democracy the American political party became the primary institution of political education and political life. Schudson describes a time of boisterous politicking, conducted in taverns and other male social spaces—including union and ethnic association halls—when political rallies, speeches, and elections were among the few forms of entertainment available to the masses. Asserting that job distribution was the heart of 19th century politics, the book presents rather surprising statistics on the number of positions and total salary dispensed through political positions in state and federal customs houses: all jobs from scrub woman to customs agent, and all positions in the postal service. All who received positions through political patronage were expected to make a “voluntary assessment” to party coffers, a kind of political tithing that provided the funds to mount and conduct elections. The post office was a highly political institution because it controlled distribution of mail, including political tracts and notices of public meetings. A postmaster could expedite or retard delivery of key information to voters.

Educated elites of the middle and upper classes often disdained the tactics of soliciting votes and providing employment as pandering to the masses; but they saw nothing wrong with buying their candidacy. Not special interests in our sense of the word, but the candidates themselves provided the money to run an election. To be on the
party ticket in New York City, for example, a candidate for alderman put up $5 for each of the 812 districts, a total of $12,180. Those running for judgeships kicked in $10,000 for the privilege (p. 152). Among "mugwump" and progressive reforms was the Australian printed ballot, a mechanism which transferred the running of elections from the political parties to state control and not incidentally depressed the leverage of political parties.

A Politics "Bleached of Color"

In the last quarter of the 19th century, international reform efforts removed government positions from the taint of party politics by creating a civil service. The consequence in the United States was an increasing number of bureaucrats "committed more to the federal service than to the party." In Schudson's judgment, this eventually "left the public sphere cleansed but bleached of the color that had made people care about it" (p. 155). The story of the Progressive reform coalition of middle class urban WASPs has familiar chapters, but the story of the consequences of these reforms (direct election of Senators, state laws giving voters the power of initiative, referendum, and recall) is just now emerging.

Progressive reforms limited the influence of American political parties, but was this beneficial? American political parties, a unique form of voluntary association, charged no membership fees and were limited to exerting their influence through associations outside the parties themselves, through the Grange, the Farmer's Alliance, the Knights of Labor, the Grand Army of the Republic (the primary veterans' association), women's suffrage organizations, the WCTU, and the federation of women's clubs. Limiting party influence produced a third shift in American political culture, away from the mass democracy of a politics of affiliation to a politics that privileged the control and possession of information.

Because Schudson focuses solely on the political exercise of citizenship, his narrative does not accommodate the ways those excluded from the political process understood their role as citizens. Despite his assertion that we need to pay attention to the meaning of casting a vote in the historical period in which the vote was cast, he does not sufficiently address the consequences of defining voting as the primary expression of citizenship. Unlike the history of Sara Evans and Harry Boyte (1992), whose book Free Spaces explores the way the activity of citizens in voluntary association becomes politicized, Schudson's story has little room for the activism of ordinary citizens. It ignores the processes immigrant and Black men and women developed for participating in the civic life of their communities—including the organization of civic associations (such as the Federation of Negro Women's Clubs) which used parliamentary processes to con-
duct their meetings—and those, such as sewing clubs, the settlement houses, ladies’ church societies, and meetings of elders within Black churches, which did not. Schudson’s story takes no notice of Native Americans or those of Asian lineage.

**A Politics of Legitimated Claims**

Though 20th century feminists and other theorists have sharpened our awarenesses of the links between the personal and the political, Schudson says our politics used to be personal but became impersonal, as the nation expanded geographically and population increased. The Progressive ideal of the good citizen as an informed citizen shifted the locus of authority from “shared, generally religious, values located in the community to the formal polity and elections, to individual rights guaranteed by administrative fairness and the courts” (p. 8) and put a premium on literacy and information distributed through media, usually newspapers. Impersonal sources of authority overwhelmed the authority exercised by a colonial gentleman of good character. Was this a beneficial shift?

Schudson problematizes ideals that we have come to accept uncritically as cornerstones of the social studies curriculum. For this service alone the book is worth reading. He notes:

...today’s most honored notion of citizenship, the ideal of the “informed citizen” arose in the Progressive Era as part of a broad-gauge attack on the power of political parties. The nation’s framers would not have recognized it. The institutional practices that were legislated to make it realizable were made deeply inadequate by the emergence of a complex, national industrial society. Moreover, the informed citizen model has had less influence on progress toward a society of free and equal citizens than the model of the “rights-bearing citizen” that began to displace it in recent decades. (p. 9)

Today the model citizen is one who knows how to catalog his or her entitlements, along with the kinds of victimization he or she may have knowingly or unknowingly experienced. Perhaps the most significant features of the post-World War II rights-based model of citizenship have been a decrease in state power and alignment of individuals with the federal government to protect our much vaunted rights.

**Contradictions of Self-Government**

This book tackles several contradictions of American political life: the elitism of the founders who established a Constitutional sys-
tem that quickly bred a lively mass democracy; the importance of voting as an act of self-government and the myriad opportunities for persons wielding and seeking power to corrupt that vote; the tension between spectacle and substance at the heart of electoral politics; the contradictions inherent in defining the vote as central to citizenship and then excluding all women and minority males from the franchise; the importance of a free press and the need to limit the power of the press; and the importance of the right of citizens to form voluntary associations as a brake on government and the need for government to have the power to restrain both majorities and minorities from tyrannizing individuals. These contradictions provide a richer conceptual framework for a U. S. history or government class than the typical chronological or topical march.

Did Extending the Franchise “Widen the Web” of Self-Government?

I read this book on a train tunneling through the Gotthard Pass and on a plane flying from East Coast to West. That journey became a metaphor for my experience as a reader. This book is big in scope; it twists and turns as Schudson tries to account for peculiarities of the American political landscape essential to understanding American political culture. I kept coming back to the title: the book is less about The Good Citizen than it is about how the organization of the American political system has structured ordinary Americans’ efforts to actualize the abstraction of citizenship in the exercise of self-government. That is what citizenship is supposed to mean in this republic: the exercise of self-government. However, “self-government” is examined here only in the context of the leverage party politics afforded newly enfranchised poor farmers, industrial workers, and immigrants.

A story-telling political sociologist with a historical bent, Schudson has a kind of Hollywood director’s vision of partisan politics coupled with genuine nostalgia for the color of political parades and electioneering. This makes the book interesting to read but hard to discuss. I found myself wishing for some kind of graphic organizer to the themes; instead each chapter begins with a “prospectus” and jumps from topic to topic, typically without any effort to draw them together. That synthesis is reserved for the last chapter, which proposes that rights-based citizenship has “widened the web of citizenship” to include more citizens in the process of political participation than our previous models. Despite an earlier claim that we should pay more attention to the cultural meaning of voting, Schudson fails to examine the meaning that middle class white women and Negro and Black citizens, who believed that access to the voting booth was key to their participation in full citizenship, ascribed to voting. After the spectacle of Election 2000, I wonder what voting means now—to those who cast “uncountable” ballots or who were prevented from
voting because their names were not on the eligibility list, or to those who chose to forego the exercise of their constitutional right?

Perhaps extension of the franchise devalues the act of voting? Schudson wants us to examine the consequences that flow from defining voting as the quintessential expression of citizenship. Citing Schlesinger and McKinley (1924), he says voter turnout was lower in the 1920s than during the 1830s, despite increases in eligible voters (p. 190, footnote 9). Schudson’s critique of the validity of the decline in voter turnout as the main measure of civic participation has two parts. Yes, those who came of voting age in 1968 or later have had voter “turnout rates sharply lower than those who came to voting age between the 1930s and 1964” (p. 297). But, participation in school board meetings, financial contributions to charities, and self-reported volunteer activities in local communities has risen during this period of voting decline. For Schudson, women and minorities are “doing politics” when they hold jobs formerly barred to them, lesbian and gay couples when they file for a marriage certificate, ordinary people when they listen to talk show hosts and guests discuss politics. Because “civic participation now takes place everywhere” (p. 198), citizens have less need to focus on the ballot box as the place to exercise their citizenship. While high voter turnout alone is not necessarily an indicator of civic health, the Supreme Court’s active role in Florida’s presidential ballot is surely not the antidote for voter malaise.

Schudson raises good questions and proposes other measures of civic health worth considering. First, the questions: Who owns politics? Easy to answer, he says: in the 18th century—elites; and in the 19th—political parties. But today? Today, several groups contend for this power: big business, political parties, experts, pollsters, television news. These interests compete for the attention of citizens, who no longer participate in a culture of respect for traditional elites or show strong affiliation with partisan political parties, or who may be strongly committed to a national, rather than a regional or local, political culture.

Schudson is a historian of the media and communication. He knows that the founding fathers sought to limit the power of the press in order to preserve the people’s good opinion of their government. He wants to correct the popular image of the Lincoln-Douglas debates as the high point of citizens’ political participation and a model of informative, rather than vituperative, politics. He reminds the reader that very few of the thousands who stood for hours in the hot sun to listen to those debates could hear a word that was said. Most people were there for entertainment and to socialize with their neighbors. Reporters colluded with speech givers after the fact, to clean up the text of the speech, which was rarely published in its entirety. Newspapers were partisan; people knew which papers supported which can-
didates and purchased those which supported their own views. The most accurate reports of Lincoln’s speeches were published in newspapers that supported Douglas, and vice versa.

With this background as context, Schudson examines the role of television as purveyor of information and finds the current treatment of politics as news partly responsible for contemporary disdain of partisanship politics. He locates the networks’ decision to tell the story of protests in Chicago’s streets as the news about the 1968 Democratic Convention, rather than covering the formal political meetings inside the convention hall, as the moment of truth—or untruth—that shifted our attitudes about the importance of politics. The networks now decide what issues and decisions are important, not the voters or the politicians. The book asks if this, too, is necessarily a good thing.

**Rights-Based Citizenship and the Monitorial Citizen**

Schudson rejects the “strong” communitarian critique of rights-based citizenship. Although certain costs come with this model, he believes that rights-based citizenship has been and is more inclusive and more democratic than earlier models. Echoing Walter Lippman’s words of 70 years ago, Schudson argues that “if democracy requires omnicompetence and omniscience from its citizens, it is a lost cause. There must be some distribution across people and across issues of the cognitive demands of self government” (p. 310). We need too much information of too technical a nature to be fully informed these days; to cope we need to be monitoring citizens. Our obligation is to know enough to participate intelligently in government affairs. Like a good parent we should be watchful. The public sphere should be permitted a limited claim upon our time and attention because our private lives are worth living, and living fully.

I agree that we should not give short shrift to the historical and contemporary importance of access to the elements of a satisfying private life. It is hard to imagine any serf, peasant, indentured servant, slave, ladies’ maid, or 19th century factory worker claiming to lead a satisfying private life. Many Americans today, who work dead-end jobs or several part-time jobs, who cannot find good affordable health care, day care, or elder care, or who cannot find safe and secure employment or neighborhoods, do not have access to satisfying private lives. I also agree that we should remember that within our lifetimes many Americans have risked injury, intimidation, and death threats to exercise constitutionally protected rights—such as voting, or demonstrating in the streets against organizations and practices with which they disagree. However, Schudson’s monitorial citizen is an individual version of Ralph Nader’s Consumer Union, without its tax exempt status. I find it passive, limited, and passionless. No private individual, alone or in loose voluntary association with others, can be an
effective watchdog against the power and predation of multinational corporations, bands of zealots who believe they alone possess God’s truth, or the backroom deals of ordinary citizens seeking to perpetuate their individual private gain at the expense of the rest of us. That requires more than monitoring. It requires a willingness to forego private satisfaction and make a commitment to act, even when the timing is inconvenient, the place of assembly is far away, and the powerful decision-makers are organizing to stop you.

As I write this review, I am struggling to decide whether to use this book as a required text for my course, “Teaching Social Studies to Adolescents.” I like to use a mix of education and “subject matter” texts, to fill in the gaps in my students’ academic backgrounds. This book assumes that readers have familiarity with classic texts (The Federalist Papers and de Tocqueville for example), current—dare I say trendy?—scholarship in sociology (e.g., Habits of the Heart), and some broad knowledge of labor history, political administrations, civil rights, cold war issues, even recent political history. I cannot assume most students will have such knowledge. This is a function of their age, general skepticism about expert knowledge, and the variation we accept in our efforts to enroll students from different academic disciplines. The real culprit is our unwillingness to recognize that social studies teachers must learn on the job if they are to teach all 10 of the NCSS theme areas well.

The questions the book raises are an excellent framework for a government class, a U.S. or comparative history class, even global studies. They encourage discussion. Schudson’s model could be tested by students, who could be encouraged to suggest their own version of the 21st century good citizen. Even as I suggest this, however, I remember how adamant a young bi-racial woman in one of my student teacher’s classrooms was as she insisted: “I am not an American. I live here—but this stuff, it isn’t about me.”

In most urban public schools, and many suburban ones, diversity is linguistic, cultural, religious, and racial. Many students, whether born in this country or from immigrant families, do not identify with the key players in school textbook narratives, and Schudson’s tale focuses on the same key players. Although the book acknowledges the barriers to the exercise of citizenship faced by minority citizens and women, there is little discussion of the consequences for the nation as a whole, or of the creativity those forced to the margins exercised as they expressed care, concern, and responsibility for their own communities despite limited access to the mainstream institutions of political life. There is no suggestion that bicultural citizens could infuse vibrancy and new life into the American political system, that young people should challenge vested interests and consider roles as change agents.
Schudson’s model citizen is a watchful, parental type monitor—not a picture that includes young adolescents or even young people in the early stages of their careers. Schudson chooses the monitorial image because he wishes to protect our ability to have private (family) lives, relatively free from the pressures of the outside community. This desire and norm is deeply embedded in American culture, but especially during adolescence, many students value membership in groups meaningful to them at least as much as their individual privacy. Increasing numbers of students come from family and cultural backgrounds that teach reliance upon cultural and religious groups for help in negotiating the system, rather than writing letters to the editor or an elected representative, as “the way to get things done.” Given the increasing power of big money in today’s politics, to elevate monitoring of the political arena as the epitome of good citizenship is unlikely to encourage more involvement of disaffected voters and young people in electoral politics or civic life. The strength of this book lies in its historical description of the trajectory of American political life. Sadly, Schudson’s contemporary Good Citizen seems more likely to cry “not in my backyard” than to take action of any kind.

References
Political Learning in the Historical Context is a recently published book by Dieter Schmidt-Sinns. It is volume 9 in a series of books on the topic of “international studies in political socialization and political education” edited by Bernhard Claussen. Schmidt-Sinns’ book consists of an introductory essay, “Ways to Political Literacy in the Society”, and eight articles on the general topic of political education that were written over a period of two decades while Schmidt-Sinns worked at the Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (Federal Center for Political Education) in Bonn.

The book is structured around three chapters: Specific Issues in the Various Periods of Political Education in Germany, Political Learning through Political Socialization, and Historical Topics for Political Literacy. Chapter One has three articles. The first treats the post-war effort by the allied powers to impose a democratic culture on Germany, a defeated nation with authoritarian traditions. The second deals with the topic of national identity within a divided Germany. And the third describes the effort to create a new political culture following the reunification of the two Germanys. Chapter Two provides two approaches for understanding how society and socialization inevitably shape political learning. Chapter Three employs three topics from historical studies and indicates how they contribute to political literacy. The three chapters provide coherence to articles that were written at various times and for diverse purposes.

Citizenship Education in Germany

The book provides scholars who do not read German with access to some of Schmidt-Sinns’ best work from the period when he was providing intellectual and political leadership for programs aimed at helping German youth and adults understand democracy and acquire competence in the skills necessary to support a democratic society. The book may be especially valuable to those who are curious about the problems that confront “citizenship education” in other societies. Germany provides an interesting, special case because it had an effective, political education program before World War II; how-
ever, when the allied powers occupied Germany after the war, they insisted that the Nazi program be dismantled and replaced with new programs that fit allied beliefs about a proper civic education. Because the allies could not agree on one best approach, the program that emerged in the German Democratic Republic differed substantially from programs created for the Federal Republic of Germany. The recent reunification of the two Germanys provides new challenges to citizenship education in Germany.

The Impact of American Social Studies

American social studies educators played an active role during the occupation of West Germany immediately following World War II. They planted the seeds of American social studies in German schools and encouraged American approaches to citizenship education. Schmidt-Sinns discusses some of these efforts and the struggle of German educators to make sense of American ideas while incorporating them into the German political culture. Evidence of success can be found in the institutions and political practices that exist in Germany today.

Given the proud and distinguished tradition of German education, it was inevitable that ideas imported from the United States would acquire new attributes when practiced in German schools. By the mid-1970's, German social studies specialists were ready to share their practices with educators from other countries. Through conferences and publications, many organized by Schmidt-Sinns through the Federal Center for Political Education, German political educators became a source of fresh ideas concerning citizenship education. One example from the 1970's was "kritische theorie", an approach unfamiliar to American social studies educators at that time but one which later served as the foundation for the development of "critical" approaches to social studies in the United States. Soon, some American social specialists were attempting to adapt German ideas to fit American pedagogy.

This book may be useful also to those social studies educators who have little interest in social studies in Germany but who are seeking fresh perspectives on American social studies. Schmidt-Sinns knows American social studies, but he sees it through German eyes. The result may be new insights on American social studies for the American reader.
Information for Authors

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Theory and Research in Social Education is designed to stimulate and communicate systematic research and thinking in social education. Its purpose is to foster the creation and exchange of ideas and research findings that will expand knowledge and understanding of the purposes, conditions, and effects of schooling and education about society and social relations. Manuscripts reporting conceptual or empirical studies of social education are welcomed.

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