Representing the Unrepresentable: The Traumatic Affect

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Representing the Unrepresentable:

The Traumatic Affect

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I. Introduction

Notions of the representation of trauma have been plaguing philosophers, historians, psychologists and others, each in their respective fields, as they attempted to solve problems on the subject. The questions range in complexity from, “Does the representation of trauma reinforce trauma beyond our abilities to do justice to trauma itself?” “Can traumatic experiences be represented by any direct means?” While the list of topics goes on for quite some length, I try to will make a contribution toward disentangling a small aspect of these related issues, namely how we can represent a traumatic experience, something that by definition is not conscious to another generation.

Representation is an aesthetic quality in which one can attempt to manifest the intangible into the tangible, and if represented properly, into another person’s perhaps intangible characteristics, such as their emotions. The purpose of representation is replication of a thought and emotion into another person’s mind. As humans we attempt to represent thoughts and emotions constantly in order to try to reach mutual understanding with one another. These representations are commonplace and completely conscious to our minds.

However, a traumatic affect, the mind and body’s response to an extreme event, cannot be represented directly in the same manner as common thoughts and emotions. The complexity of traumatic damage on the brain separates the traumatic event to the unconscious mind, thus the commonplace first-person narrative that conveys both the historical and emotional context of an experience becomes unusable.
I will first define the traumatic affect and the nature of its causes, so as to identify the problems that allow the circumvention of direct representation. I will then argue that representation can be achieved through two distinct indirect approaches that allow for representation with distinct limitations. While the two approaches contrast in methodology and medium, each allows various aspects of trauma to be represented, while not simultaneously, in near-totality. The two approaches that shall be discussed are Daniel Libeskind’s “spaces of encounter” and Marianne Hirsch’s concept of “postmemory.” These theories will also attempt to show that the representations yielded by these means will not cause identification for the subject attempting to understand the traumatic event and further suffering in him or her.

In another approach to the problems posed by representation, if one is to analyze the work of Plato, one has reason to suspect that Plato also realized the same problem of direct representation in his dialogues. Through his character Socrates, Plato describes many philosophical notions of truth, justice, and other concepts, through metaphor. The Republic does not give a philosophical treatise about Forms and the Form of the Good; instead it provides its audience the allegory of the cave, a narrative that describes an experience in order to convey its meaning. Plato seemed to understand that an attempt to explain his philosophy directly would be futile. Socrates is often referred as a stinging gadfly, somebody who, in a way, stings people out of complacency. He leaves them almost in shock and awe, best described in Greek as thauta, which is much like a traumatic experience.
In application, one can find that this study of the traumatic affect and its representation can pose radical problems for the history of the philosophy of science. The nature of the traumatic affect and the theory of postmemory are quintessential parts to understanding the problems of representation of the trauma, but, also help identify a crucial problem in a commonly argued notion of philosophy of science: first-person historical perspective. The nature of traumatic affect will show that unreliability of first-person narrative poses major problems for the theories of Larry Laudan, a widely known philosopher of science.

Seeing that our direct proper methods of representation are invalid in the case of trauma, can trauma be represented at all? If it can be represented, are there limits of the representation? Wouldn’t a proper representation lead to empathetic identification and thus only exceed the suffering caused by original event? These are some of the questions I wish to grapple with in this honors thesis.
II. The Traumatic Affect

For many scholars traumatic affect cannot be given a simplistic, firm definition. Over history, trauma has appeared in various descriptions at many times with many names. The notion of trauma can be described in many ways due to the variance of the situations that cause it (Caruth, 181). Seeing as the argument at hand refers to aesthetic representations of trauma, the definition pertains to the norm representations changed by the extreme traumatic event. Trauma is a psychological response brought upon by a clear violation of one’s own mental representations of the world due to an extreme horrible event. Given this excessive event; one cannot possibly perceive the event in its normal representation due to one’s normal expectations of the world. The event is naturally is outside the scope of the possible for the traumatized victim whose worldly representations vary due to personal background such as cultural, ethnic, racial and social distinctions (Ginsburg, 29).

The common phrase that comes to mind in this sense of ideas of mental violation is, “such and such happens in the world, but it will never happen to me.” Enforced by the rarity of an event, it seems that, before it has taken place it, could not possibly happen. Because of this event, the mind then goes into shock and does not have the ability to transmit the impression of the event onto the conscious mind. Yet, the actual experience does remains in the mind unassimilated in its entirety (Ginsburg).

The trauma itself transcends the literal reference to the experience and lies dormant within the subconscious mind, instead of allowing the mind to be plagued by it constantly. Upon recall, the victim seems to only remember being in the
encounter very vividly, but understands entirely the events from an objective standpoint. The mind’s reaction to the apparent change of world representations is to become dehumanized and to delete the human perspective in preference for the observing eye (Ginsburg, 29).

Even aside from a traumatized victim, the mind will commonly dehumanize an observation to allow its mental capacities to move on. Such example an example of this is one of my own experiences. While walking on the streets of Paris, I observed a motorcyclist clip the leg of a pedestrian, causing him to fly up in the air like a ragdoll. Let me emphasize, upon leaving the ground the pedestrian seemed to lose his status as a human, and became an object, “like a ragdoll.” My mind’s quick dehumanization of the pedestrian was a defensive tactic similar to that of a trauma victim; the difference lies in mind’s far stronger response to an extreme situation happening to itself, rather than to another human. As I attempt to imagine what the “ragdoll” went through, my mind refuses and does not want to inflict trauma upon itself.
III. Freud and Moses

One can see the difficulty that arises in representation due to the nature of the mind’s response. Without the mind’s conscious effort to provide even itself with a narrative form of the extreme event, there cannot be any direct approach to the information. The recounting of the event from the victim will be purely objective, and may be primarily correct factually, thus a representation of the event and its details may be given, but no recollection of the emotional construct that is the representation of trauma may be left (Caruth, 181).

Even though by nature this flaw in traumatic recollection has always existed, it was not until the 1980s and the following decades in which the problem became a serious debate within the community of clinical psychologists. Within that time, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) finally approved Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, or PTSD, as an official disorder, and many institutes began to pop up to help trauma victims—either veterans or disaster survivors. After a decade of actions in regards to trauma, PTSD had become a household word.

After the mental healthcare industry had finally stabilized, the discussions turned to question about the representation of the experiences, and question of proper memory transfer through their representation to a younger generation (Tal, 1).

As the studies and literature began to climb, the discussion shifted quickly to the concept of memory in regards to trauma and interpretation. The body of literature involving trauma and memory has had a clear acceptance by Sigmund Freud as the “illuminator of the human psyche” (Tal, 2), given that Freud wrote extensively on traumatic experiences, processes and events.
Freud attempts to identify a process, which a traumatized individual undergoes after an extreme event. As Freud describes it, when someone has survived a shocking accident, even though the person is not injured, over a time period after the accident he or she will develop a large amount of psychological and motor symptoms, which he calls “traumatic neurosis.” Freud refers to this time period through an allusion to an infection disease: an incubation period for which the victim has no apparent effects once their show subsides. This concept of latency in trauma creates an enigma that only reinforces the fact that the victim was never entirely conscious for the duration of the accident (Caruth, 186).

Cathy Caruth is one of the Freudians who expanded her thoughts not just to representation, but who also realizes the difficulty behind any direct method. Her claim about this aspect of Freud’s thoughts is: “The experience of trauma, the fact of latency, would thus seem to consist, not in the forgetting of a reality that can hence never be fully known; but in a inherent latency within the experience itself” (Caruth, 187). Given this, one must realize that the true representation of a trauma cannot be in the experience that is repeated, but in the amnesia of the experience itself. The indirect reference point to the experience remains the only option left to access the information lost within the forgotten memories (Caruth, 187).

Caruth proposes that due to occurrences of trauma and the various attempts to understand it, a representation of a traumatic history is not directly referential. Caruth develops this notion that approaching a historical standpoint of trauma fails to allow one to grasp the experience. She then analyzes one of Freud’s works, *Moses and Monotheism*, to describe this indirect reference point to access the forgotten.
Within his work, Freud rewrites the history of the liberation of the Jews from Egypt. The story that is created, while entirely fabricated, would not affect history at all, yet the convoluted nature of the tale reconstitutes a history of the Jewish repression, and gives way for different implications. The false story, indirect to the history, allows the reader to experience the traumatic experience, but receives no historical value whatsoever (Caruth, 187).

Freud’s tale gives the reader a fictional, emotional account of something that is historically “objective.” By understanding the mind’s response to direct the factual history and its different response to the fictional story, one will realize that the mind is far more able to allow empathetic response from the fictional story. In the same sense the mind can dehumanize a graphically unsettling event, it can identify with a fictional account. Freud has written a fictional story of not his own trauma, but a trauma that is historical of a culture. And although a representation of the repression has existed, Freud created the representation of the trauma (Caruth, 183).
IV. Postmemory and The Space of Encounter

Cathy Caruth’s careful analysis suggests that Freud put into practice what Marianne Hirsch calls “postmemory.” Along with Daniel Libeskind’s spaces of memory, the theory of postmemory is one of the two major breakthroughs in Holocaust memory. Each of these theories tackles a specific problem in order to desensitize various audiences and the future generations after the Holocaust. Without postmemory, the traumatic experience would be lost within the minds of the survivors and never expand to the future generations.

Hirsch and Libeskind suggest a generation-specific way to redefine the secondary witnessing of the Holocaust, or in other words, the ability to pass a proper representation of the Holocaust through the generations. To understand how this can be done, one must better understand the theories at hand.

Libeskind, the designer of the Jewish Museum in Berlin, describes his work on Jewish History and memory as the architecture of trauma. He believes that his use of architecture is a medium to allow viewers to understand the materiality of trauma that could not be accessed from the literal approach. Libeskind attempts to capture a spatial and physical experience of trauma rather than the prior attempts at representation that seem to only try to attract the intellect. Understanding with only intellect, while being able to comprehend many mechanical aspects of trauma, lacks the ability to understand the actual experience through the body, like a traumatized individual has experienced (Heckner, 63).

These encounters of space that Libeskind creates are meant to confuse spatial orientation and to unsettle the viewers by placing them in a situation in
which they cannot remain simply spectators. This experience is taking the viewer outside of their mental representations of the world, and by the definition of trauma they are forced into a traumatic experience (Heckner, 63).

Libeskind is not a philosopher, psychologist or historian, but an artist and an architect. His artistic approach to trauma allows for a substantial representation of the trauma for a wide audience. Although Libeskind has structured a physical dimension to the concept of trauma, issues still arise in multiplicity. How does one translate this experience of discontinuity and disorientation to the Holocaust memories? This question also plagues Marianne Hirsch, who gives an answer that she refers to by the concept of postmemory. This notion also calls upon a reliving of a traumatic affect through an artistic means. Hirsch argues in detail that the belated reliving of the affect is far different from the experience itself, and yet that a representation of the traumatic experience is an understanding that can translate the memory for a new generation (Heckner, 64).

The idea of secondary witnessing, an attempt to transfer the affect of trauma into a third observer lies in closing the gap between viewer and subject—in many ways this is the purpose of museums. The difficulty in this task comes from the fact that the majority of the public has next to nothing in the sense of connection with the subject. While a Holocaust survivor may be brought to tears from images of the Holocaust, a member of the digital age may have near to no emotional response comparable to the traumatic affect, because of the severed connection (Heckner, 66).
In contrast to Libeskind’s, Hirsch’s theory of postmemory focuses on the internal aspects of trauma, not the externalized effect. Hirsch attempts to take the complex inner psychic dynamics of receiving the Holocaust traumatic damage and to turn it into an ethical relationship of empathy and identification. The question is asked, what does it mean to adopt another’s trauma, and how can one do so? Even further, if one properly identifies with the other’s trauma, will it only cause more suffering and pain to the receiver? Any attempt to represent the Holocaust memory in totality obviously runs the risk of causing further damage to the audience than the traumatic experience originally achieved. Hirsch’s theory of postmemory runs this risk because of the empathy that she is attempting to invoke, while Libeskind’s architecture manages to only give a generalized experience rather than a lasting impression of grandeur (Heckner, 68).
V. Postmemory Through Art and Expression

The strength of Hirsch’s argument lies in its connections with the second-generation interpretations of the Holocaust memories. Hirsch proves that postmemorial representations, such as art, allow for a repetition of the traumatic experience. Art, in contrast to actual realistic photographs, needs to be produced or understood, rather than just viewed; thus the effect of trauma is relieved more directly. Photography can show a historical representation of the events, but the second generation cannot relate to the situation in the same way that the first generation survivors can.

In the case of second-generation postmemorial art, such as Art Spiegelman’s *Maus*, while the major historical events remain true, the fictional story connects the second generation to the events of the first generation's lifetime. Heckner claims, “It not only establishes a lineage between the second and the survivor generation but also reconfigures traditional modes of reception by reintroducing the visceral” (63). This postmemorial artistic medium is a very similar medium to the one about which Caruth made her observations concerning Freud’s *Moses and Monotheism*. Through this type of art there is a transmission of memories from the first to the second generation that causes a traumatic repetition to continue through a culture.

The significance of this transfer is quite important in the theory of postmemory; as Hirsch claims, “Postmemory describes the relationship between children of survivors of collective trauma, experiences of their parents, experiences that they “remember” only as narratives and images...so powerful, so monumental, as to constitute memories in their own right” (Heckner, 65). Postmemory is the all-
encompassing form of this transmission, thus it becomes generation-specific in regards to any trauma. Hirsch claims that the postmemory experiences refer back to the actual survivors experiences, yet it is not a requirement, seeing as the new expression allows for the same memory to be preserved and conveyed to the newer generation in an entirely different way.

As one can now understand the postmemorial link of memory transfer between the two generations, the questions posed earlier of memory transfer become simple to answer. The suffering that can be caused by identification and empathy that could be risked through postmemory is unlikely due to the nature of the memories themselves. The children of the survivors have the purpose of using these memories given to them by their background, and due to the nature of the creation of the artistic representation of trauma, it seems that the idea of narrative is gained back with the second-generation that was lost by the extreme event of the first-generation. Given the ability of narrative to the transferred memory, identifying empathetically to cause pain and suffering from this memory is unlikely, seeing as the brain has not gone into shock after the years of acquired memories by acquiring the collective experiences of their parents. Furthermore, identification is not possible to the secondary and tertiary observers and does not further the spread of suffering (Heckner, 65).  In a response to the work of Caruth, Tal Kali attempts in his book *World of Hurt* to refute Caruth’s work of an indirect reference point to history by discussing the idea of flashbacks. Kali’s understanding of Caruth is quite misplaced, seeing as he believes her reference to Caruth’s indirect method is implying a literal truth of flashback memory. His claim about the issue is that
Caruth overlooks the concepts of precision and accuracy in regards to her claims about the experience of trauma. What he fails to see is that her methodology is not assuming an encapsulated memory as a perfect truth once represented, but a means to understand the feeling of trauma. It seems as though Kali must eat his own words in due to the notion that our attempts to solidify an interpretation of trauma is an attempt to see different light on a history that has already been verified, but lacks emotional perspective (Tal, 3).

Given two images from the Holocaust, figure one and figure two, one can see the contrast between accuracy and precision that Kali does not realize the indirect methods of Caruth and Hirsch lead into. Given figure one, the photograph of many bodies stacked, one can easily grasp the historical accuracy of such a photograph. The emotional response one might have to this memory is that disgust, but the level of connection on the emotional level is lacking substantially. To observers of this photograph who have no place of reference to it, the representation of trauma that this photograph could attempt to convey is
lost in historical context the mind establishes.

Figure two, a painting by David Olère entitled *Gassing*; one can feel the emotional pain and anguish of a traumatic experience due to the medium of paint. Olère claims he sketched the testimony to all those who never could due to the Holocaust. One must realize that there is no real history in the same way of the photograph. The notion of the gassing victims in the Holocaust is historical, but this representation is nameless and fictional, and thus can elicit the proper representation from the audience.
VI. The Nature of the Philosophy of Science and HOS$_1$

In the words of Irme Lakatos, a philosopher of mathematics and science, “Philosophy of Science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind” (Lakatos, 91). This quote claims that neither philosophy of science nor history of science can be done exclusively, which is a staple of the arguments of Larry Laudan. Laudan’s arguments about the history of philosophy of science is detailed in his book, *Progress and Its Problems*, which outline the ways upon which he claims history must be written, and how it is to be understood.

Like the Lakatos quote implies, philosophy of science and history of science have been in question for many years by scholars, asking whether they should be considered two separate domains or one interconnected field, which may not be able to be separated at all without taking meaning or substance away from one of the two fields. While this issue seems purely semantic, the separations of (or lack there of) the two fields create questions of legitimacy in both historical and philosophical contexts. Laudan seeks to answer the question of whether the two can be considered autonomous (Laudan 155).

Most people seem to think that philosophy of science and history of science are extremely different ways of studying science, though they are considered occasionally complementary to one another. The historian will follow a timeline of sorts, arranging events to form an idea of how science “evolves”. The philosopher on the other hand, will look at a normative, *a priori* investigation on how the proceedings of science are meant to continue. The philosopher is looking for an
overarching theory such that he or she is able to see a continual pattern of historical science and thus predict future events because his or her theory (Laudan 156).

Laudan claims that these distinctions between historians and philosophers are similar to the divide between matters of fact and matters of value. The historians do not consider philosophy useful to them, because they do not believe it is their job to make normative judgments about what he or she studies, and the philosophers believe that historical account is useless for they do not care what has already happened, but about how it ought to be (Laudan 156).

The standard account has been slowly debunked over many years on this issue. One can see that in many works by historians, their writing is filled with philosophical assumptions, used in the historians’ work in order to distinctly define the character of the history that is being written. When cornered, historians will often find themselves convinced that experimentation is the only method available for evaluating a theory and furthermore, they will use this experimentation to test or abandon their theories (Laudan 156). Not only have the historians used philosophical assumptions in their work, they saw no way to avoid using philosophy. History has no neutral data; it is only manifestations of what those who study it philosophically deem important.

The critics of the standard view pose many problems of their own. Given their views, any philosophical theory, which does not deal with history of science, now is unacceptable. Furthermore, if the two fields were considered one, any argument that does not appease both sides would be considered reduction ad absurdum. The difficulties are numerous with an integrated view of history and
philosophy of science, beginning with a circular reasoning. If historians presuppose a theory in philosophy of science and if this theory is then to be verified by rationality in history of science, the theory is then self-authenticating.

Even if self-authentication were avoided, other questions of the difficulties of research collaboration are also involved. For example, if historians were to organize their historical data with a specific philosophical model in mind, then clearly any philosopher who is in opposition to that philosophical model would find the data invalid. The philosophical model that organized that data provides a structure to the data, filled with assumptions and premises that the philosopher may not prescribe to. Laudan sets out to answer these questions by analyzing first the role of history in the philosophy of science, and then vice versa. He attempts to create a structure upon which one can understand the tentative relationship between philosophy and history of science.

Philosophy of science cannot deny that it must rely on some specific empirical input from the sciences. Philosophy of biology must draw upon biological observations and understanding; without it there is no field whatsoever. Yet, in that portion of philosophy of science, which embarks upon attempts at theories concerning general methodology of science there is a looming question of how much empirical data can be relevant or decisive.

To begin to solve this, Laudan defines two forms of history of science. There must be a distinction between the histories of science themselves, which we define as a chronologically ordered class of beliefs of former scientists, and writing about the history of science. Laudan refers to the former, writings of science, as HOS₁ and
the latter, writings of historians about science, as HOS₂. This distinction seems merely a statement of syntax, yet one must realize that each of these will interact with philosophy in a different way.

HOS₁ could be conceptually construed to define science as normative, under the logic that if one cannot create norms from scientific facts, then under this philosophy there can be no link between history of philosophy and philosophy of science. Ronald Giere recently published this view and insists that philosophers cannot become a slave to this HOS₁; if they do, they will fail to criticize previous theories from the past. Giere contends that this view is commonly associated to a large majority of philosophers of science, however Laudan claims that while it seems largely plausible, it fails to pass detailed scrutiny (Laudan, 159).

Under Giere’s theory, there is a possibility that a philosophy of science could entail that all past scientific judgments were irrational. Laudan pontificates that such a thing is not possible. Philosophy of science is understood to be a meta-study of science as a whole. Definitionally speaking, a theory of philosophy science cannot be entirely a priori. Yet, it does contain some sort of a priori understanding, a hunch per say, which gives philosophers a way of identifying rational theses from the irrational ones. According to Giere’s theory, these hunches do not come from HOS₁, but from contemporary science for legitimacy.

Moreover, the Gierean understanding of philosophy of science seems claim that a majority of HOS₂ has a focus on the distant past. However, the recent science covered by HOS₁ does not have historical counterparts in HOS₂. If that were the case, philosophy of science could merely do away with HOS₁. Regardless, this would still
do nothing against what Laudan refers to as a “parasitic dependence of philosophy of science upon HOS₁” (Laudan, 159). Furthermore, Laudan seeks to solve this problem between these two distinctions of philosophy of science, which essentially is a problem caused by the competing accounts of the normative claims of HOS₁ and descriptive claims of HOS₂.

Laudan finally returns from his assault on the commoner’s opinion of philosophy of science, to pave a way out of his problem. Laudan’s two cases exist within HOS₁, the theory-acceptance and the theory-rejection. By using an understanding of historical accounts, Laudan recounts that under the division into these subcategories, one can theorize points in history when it became rational to accept one theory and reject a prior theory. For example, if one were to continue to accept Aristotelian mechanics rather than Newtonian mechanics after 1800, it would be entirely irrational (Laudan, 160). Examples such as this one are widely held beliefs in the context of the scientific world. Normative judgments like these are pre-analytic views about scientific rationale that are deeply embedded into our society that any person to conclude that these theories lack proof would be considered insane.

Although these claims seem to be rather presumptive, Laudan finds that the normative judgments of rationality are a positive feature, not a bug. The importance of the pre-analytic judgments is not about the theories they are about, but rather to use them as a model to hypothesize and evaluate about contemporary models of rationality. One uses the normative judgments about the past to create a standard
for the developing rationality of the day. Given that science was rational under similar situations to the contemporary rationality (Laudan, 161).

However, suppose you were to consider two cases, which equally conform to many of our normative judgments on rational choice that one used to test them. Thus, HOS₁ alone becomes too small to test competing theories – more data is required to make the “true” rational choice than the rational choices of the past. Laudan’s answer is indubitably HOS₂. The philosopher of HOS₂ studies the work of historians of science; this philosopher uses the normative judgments and their philosophical models of rationality to create a superseding judgment (Laudan, 161).
VII. HOS$_2$ and The Historical Account

Laudan establishes that philosophers of science use HOS$_1$ to construct their philosophical models of rationality; the philosopher needs HOS$_1$ for this reason alone. Yet, the relationship of HOS$_2$ remains far more complicated for it remains contingent on historical narrative and the value of historical explanation. Laudan does not deny that HOS$_2$ carries a few limitations on how much the philosopher can acquire from it (Laudan, 164). Clearly, when a historian chronicles the story of a scientific event, the historian does not want to overburden his reader with unnecessary information. In consequence, only the author deems what is considered necessary information. According to Laudan, the ideological differences between two historians of science does not necessarily be a problem, yet Laudan continues on to argue that it is the duty of the historian of science to apply a standardized norm to his accounts of science (Laudan, 165).

Finally, Laudan is able to bridge the gap between HOS$_1$ and HOS$_2$, through the historian of science. He claims, “The task of the historian of science is to write an account (HOS$_2$) of episodes in the history of science (HOS$_1$)” (Laudan, 165). A historian of science should have the philosopher of science in their mind, which should influence his work to indicate what factors he should include in his historical account.

Historical understanding and historical explanation, to Laudan, is as a deeper level of normative judgments within HOS$_2$. Historical explanation comes into play when one is posed a question that cannot be evaluated by mere rationale for it. It is not uncommon for a historical account to raise questions of rationality. Yet, if a
situation does not conform to the norms of science, and the theory does not follow the evidence posed for it, Laudan proposes we must look the historical account to reconstruct the factual information that caused the irrationality (Laudan, 167). He relies on a first-person narrative to fill the holes in his framework of $\text{HOS}_1$ and $\text{HOS}_2$. 
VIII. The Traumatic Fall of the Historical Account.

In the previous section, we analyzed a partition of the philosophy of science, which Laudan introduced to create distinctions between actual science, HOS₁ and the historical record of science, HOS₂. As our work on trauma can indicate, such divisions cannot be made of philosophy of science because of the very nature of the historical record. There cannot be an HOS₁ apart from HOS₂, given the possibility that first-person narratives are unreliable.

Although trauma is a marginal phenomenon, the traumatic affect creates a clear-cut alteration to the mind’s perception of an event upon recall. While one isn’t to go as far as to claim that science is like a traumatic experience, which cannot be represented in first-person narrative, one can at least emphasize the necessity that, first-person accounts must be interpreted, analyzed, double-checked against other narratives pertaining to the same topic. Historical accounts, even if they do not involve traumatic experience, will still remain stilted and biased. Laudan even addressed the fact that historians of science have their own conceptual ideologies on what is vital to the historical record that they are creating, thus leaving those records even further skewed from the original happenings.

Not unlike Freud’s reimagined story of the *Moses and Monotheism*, HOS₂ and its historical records could very much be a representation of that which is lost by conveying the event through the eyes of the historian. If one can recall, the historical facts of Freud’s story were entirely fabricated, yet if the story were true, Freud includes many subtexts which would align itself to contemporary time. However, in the case of history of science, Laudan attempts to justify the stilted first-person
claims with the historical resources within HOS$_2$, which are also unreliable. Without a doubt, we have made full circle through both HOS$_1$ and HOS$_2$, which together remain one with the philosophy of science. There is no Archimedean point from which any of us can stand.

To relate back to the central theme of representation, we must again look to Marianne Hirsh’s theory of postmemory. The theory of postmemory implies that the first-person narratives of trauma victims are surely unreliable, so any attempt to reach a representation of the traumatic affect and emotion is not obtainable directly through the victim. If one compares this to Laudan’s philosophy, one can see that the first-generation victims of trauma are similar to the scientists who practice in HOS$_1$. While not likely that the scientists giving first-person accounts have a psychological block against conveying a narrative of their work, their accounts will still be skewed. Rather, the scientists and their first-person accounts convey a rather familiar sense of factual regurgitation of the events, but cannot properly represent the extensive processes upon which man has made their greatest discoveries. Isn’t the extensive process leading up to brilliant science that exactly what the philosophers of science are searching so diligently for?

Continuing on with the postmemory comparison, the historians of science of HOS$_2$ produce work similar to that of the second generation. Both take the attempted first-person historical records of the event, and mean to produce a viable representation while explaining aspects that the first person account could not. The difference between them lies in the notion of being a member of the second generation. Rather than attempting to work from the defective facts of a first person
narrative, the second generation begins to work on their representation far before they, themselves, know what they will create. Even the work of the most apt historian of science fails to compare to the many years of experience that the second generation acquires when they live with their traumatized first generation member.

In conclusion, while Laudan’s attempt at finding a methodology that illustrates the structural relationships within the philosophy of science between scientists, historians and philosophers, he fails to see that his division of philosophy of science is not really a division at all. First-person accounts cannot rationally be considered as reliable, not unlike the mind of a trauma survivor.
IX. Conclusion

To properly represent trauma, to allow others to receive these events from an emotional standpoint, one must sacrifice the historical information at hand. To truly feel traumatic experience, one needs narrative and humanization to relate to something the primary observer cannot recount directly to his or her audience.

As you can see, the generational practice of postmemory and Daniel Libeskind’s spaces of encounters allow for the representation of this widely unapproachable notion, and the enigma surrounding such a representation can be emotionally deciphered for explanation of the struggles of extreme events such as the Holocaust. As for the philosophers of science, it is absolutely essentially to be weary of the first-person accounts of historical perspectives, as well as the possible bias of the historians of science.

Through all of this one can see that representing what cannot be represented provides difficulty at all levels of philosophical inquiry. Plato’s account of the allegory provided a narrative form of explanation that was able to relay his philosophy to others without direct speech. Like Plato, we all must realize that many concepts cannot be told to one another, but must be expressed in a more abstract way that the mind can truly experience.
X. Bibliography


