Theory and research in social education 11/04

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Introduction

For at least two decades, social educators have attempted to develop strategies and programs to make concept instruction a central focus of social education. Some consensus exists regarding these efforts, and one might assume that modern social studies methods texts should reflect this concern for concept learning. Most do, but the degree and quality of the attention varies widely.

This article discusses the results of a study of how thirty-seven social studies methods texts deal with concept instruction. It is assumed that the methods text is one of a number of significant sources of information for undergraduate and inservice social studies methods students. Although other factors might have an equal or greater effect, e.g., the professor, field experiences, peer influence, etc., it seems logical to assume that the methods text can have a significant influence on students. Certainly they are designed for that purpose. Consequently, it is relevant to examine how these texts deal with concept instruction in an effort to determine how they might affect instructional practices and student learning.
Method of Study

The books analyzed in this study include nine general or secondary texts, twenty-seven elementary/middle school texts, and one early childhood/primary text. All were published since 1970, and the group includes most of the most recent and popular examples in the field. Thus they constitute a representative sample of what most elementary or secondary social studies methods students might be exposed to in an undergraduate or graduate course.

Each text was examined in terms of the following questions:
1. How and in what detail does the text define concepts?
2. To what extent does the text discuss research findings regarding concept learning and instruction?
3. Which specific strategies for concept instruction are recommended, and how well is each explained?
4. To what extent are the recommended strategies consistent with the text's definition of concepts and current research regarding concept instruction?
5. How adequate is the text's general coverage of concept instruction? This is assessed on the basis of a summation of the answers to questions one through four.

Two types of ratings are used in this article to help describe and evaluate the texts. The first is an objective item analysis, i.e., a numerical count of various things such as how many different strategies are proposed in each text or how many texts use a specific strategy. The second is a subjective rating of the quality or adequacy of various aspects of concept instruction covered in the texts, e.g., the definition of concepts or the discussion of research related to concept instruction. These subjective ratings are on a scale of 0 to 4 as follows:

0 indicates no coverage of the topic
1 indicates very poor coverage of little or no value
2 indicates an attempt to cover the topic but the analysis and explanation is still weak
3 indicates generally good coverage of the topic but with some major omissions
4 indicates superior coverage although no text was without some problems in each area. Note that those texts with the best general coverage are indicated with an asterisk in the bibliography.

Although subjective, the qualitative ratings are based on a careful reading of each text in terms of specific criteria, e.g., length and depth of discussion, number of teaching strategies covered, critical analysis of the strategies presented, major research cited, and so forth. These findings could have been reported without the use of numbers, i.e., in terms of generalizations about the texts in each area. However, it is hoped that the number ratings help to clarify the range and quality of coverage.
Under ideal circumstances, it would be better to have a team of judges rate each text according to the criteria used here. This was not possible given the resources available for this research. Still, it is felt that these findings do give a valuable and generally accurate assessment of the quality of social studies methods texts in the area of concept learning. There are at least two important reasons for saying this. First, a great deal of what is reported and evaluated is based on an item analysis of coverage. A large number of texts simply do not cover certain areas of concept instruction. In addition one can specify the number of strategies presented and if they relate to the text’s definition of concepts. Second, the tradition of qualitative critical analysis is well established in the social sciences and is often the only available methodology. Such an analysis has frequently been applied to texts in the social studies (Gibson, 1969; Fitzgerald, 1979; and Nelson, 1981).

Summary of Findings

Of the thirty-seven texts examined in this study, seven made no significant reference to concept instruction. All of the other texts dealt with concept instruction, but the quality of the coverage varied widely from text to text. We will look specifically at how the texts define concepts, their discussion of research regarding concept instruction, and the instructional strategies they propose.

Defining Concepts. The way we define concepts can have a significant impact on the process of instruction. Almost all the texts used some variation of the following definition, i.e., a concept is “... a class or category all the members of which share a particular combination of critical properties not shared by any other class” (Markle and Tiemann, 1970, p. 54). There is also a great deal of consensus regarding this definition in the literature of educational psychology (p. 54). Still, there are several problems apparent in terms of how the texts define concepts.

First, even if one accepts the basic definition given above, the issue is far more complex than this limited definition suggests (Martorella, 1977, ch.6). There are many different kinds of concepts, and some are more difficult to teach than others. This is certainly true of social education where many of the major concepts are abstract, complex, and connotative. However, only sixteen of the methods texts elaborate on the basic definition of concepts.

The more comprehensive definitions include discussions of various dimensions of concepts such as level of abstraction, complexity, number of attributes, etc. In addition, several authors describe ways of categorizing types of concepts, e.g., conjunctive, disjunctive, connotative, and relational (Fraenkel, 1980; Martorella, 1976). Conjunctive concepts are those which have two or more essential attributes which are always present. Disjunctive concepts, on the other hand, are those which have alternative sets of attributes, each of which might define the concept.

Among the most complex concepts are those considered connotative or
relational. Connotative concepts have other abstract concepts as their defining attributes, and relational concepts have no special attributes but are defined in terms of a fixed relationship between or among attributes (Martorella, 1976; Fraenkel, 1980).

Each of these different concepts can present significantly different problems for instruction. Thus one might assume that their special characteristics and strategies for dealing with them would be explained in the methods texts. Unfortunately, this is not the case. As noted, only sixteen texts present an expanded definition of concepts, and of those, only a few authors attempt to relate different kinds of concepts to specific strategies for instruction (Ehman, 1974; Martorella, 1976). In fact, only Martorella offers a specific strategy for teaching relational concepts.

A second, and potentially more serious problem, concerns the basic definition of concepts used in all the texts. In the first place, disjunctive and rational concepts do not fit the basic definition which requires that a single set of defining features be possessed by each member of a class. This apparent contradiction receives little or no attention in the texts. At the very least, it would seem to require a broader definition of concepts.

In addition, there have been serious challenges to the basic definition of concepts for at least several decades. One could go back to Cassirer’s (1923) criticisms, but a more recent challenge was posed by Wittgenstein (1953) some 30 years ago. Specifically he rejected the assumptions underlying the definition of concepts as a class or category sharing a particular set of attributes. A recent critic of concept instruction in social education has attempted to illustrate how Wittgenstein’s ideas could apply to social concepts (Aumaugher, 1981).

Wittgenstein defined concepts as “a terms use in the language” (p. 7). He acknowledged that some concepts, such as triangle “... where all instances have three sides the sum of whose interior angles equals 180 degrees”, might fit the standard definition, all (probably most) will not. Wittgenstein used the concept game to illustrate his point. Many things are called games and yet there is no single attribute (much less a set of attributes) which all games hold in common. “Thus the concept game is not what is common to all games; but instead—at least, in part—is the network of similarities and differences among the various things called games” (p. 7). As a result, concept instruction should consist of teaching this network and much more.

Students should also understand “... the network of similarities and differences between the concept game and that array of concepts which are naturally involved in the areas of discourse with which the concept of game has to do. For example ... the concepts of player, play; sport, leisure, activity, rule, opponent, etc.” (p. 7). In addition, instruction should include consideration of game as it relates to contrasting concepts such as war or battle. Therefore, even in those cases where one is teaching concepts like triangle which have an essential set of characteristics, students should be
taught the "... similarities and differences between it and its family of concepts..." (p. 7). Consequently, the standard definition of concepts is, in Aumaugher's view, misleading and of only limited value for teaching concepts in social education.

Although few social educators might be familiar with Aumaugher's views, a good deal of research has developed over the last two decades which directly supports Wittgenstein's ideas, or at least raises other questions concerning the traditional definitions of concepts (Simpson, 1961; Rosch, 1973; 1974; Rosh and Mervis, 1975; Rosch, McClosley and Glucksberg, 1978; Sokol, 1974; Gibson, 1977; Bengston and Cohen, 1979; Hampton, 1979 among others). A full explanation of these views is beyond the scope of this article. They are noted because they cast doubt on the traditional definition of concepts and some of the related strategies used to teach them in social education. Certainly we need to explore this issue more fully. Yet to date, only a few methods text authors seem concerned with a broader analysis of concepts (Martorella, 1976; Mehlinger, 1980; and Fraenkel, 1980).

Table-1 below presents a general rating of the texts in the area of concept definition.

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<th>Table-1 Concept Definition Ratings</th>
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**Discussion**

Concept learning and instruction has been the source of a great deal of research (Bruner et al., 1977; Gagné, 1970; DeCecco, 1968; Markle and Tiedemann, 1976; Klausmeir and Hooper, 1974; Tennyson et al., 1973; Tennyson, 1975 and Tennyson et al., 1975 among others). Social educators are aware of this research and there have been recent efforts to replicate some of it in social education (McKinney et al., 1981 & 1982). In spite of obvious relevance of such research, nineteen of the thirty-seven texts studied do not cite or discuss research on concept instruction.

Much of the research is based on the developmental theory of Piaget, and it suggests a number of guidelines and conditions for concept attainment. However, only fourteen of the thirty-seven texts discuss the relationship of child development theory to concept learning, eleven of the elementary texts and three of the nine secondary texts.
An understanding of child development theory is of obvious importance at the elementary level, as most students pass through at least two and possibly three stages from grade K to 6. Yet less than half of the elementary texts discuss this topic as it relates to the critical cognitive process of concept learning. Perhaps the authors assume that the students will have a sufficient background in educational psychology to make the connection between cognitive development and concept learning. If so, this is a questionable assumption, and most students probably need specific guidelines to apply cognitive theory to teaching social studies concepts.

The lack of attention to developmental theory in the secondary texts might be excused as most students are assumed to be at the formal level of thought. But some research suggests that most students remain at the concrete level of thought until age sixteen (Hallam, 1969, pp. 3–12). Thus secondary teachers might also benefit from some guidelines for concept instruction as related to developmental theory.

In addition to research based on developmental theory, many other studies have been conducted to examine the relationship of instructional design, learning conditions, cognitive style, and other factors to the process of concept instruction (Klausmeier et al., 1974; Witkin et al., 1971; Ramirez and Castaneda, 1974; Ramirez and Price-Williams, 1974; and Tennyson and Park, 1981). This body of research suggests that certain specific strategies and instructional techniques might be more effective than others for teaching social studies concepts. This is especially true when related to student background and/or learning style. Yet only fourteen of the thirty-seven texts discuss some of this research, and many of those which do fail to relate the discussion to the teaching strategies they recommend. But most disturbing is the fact that twenty-one texts make no significant reference to the implications of educational research as it relates to concept instruction. A rating of each text's discussion of research is summarized in Table-2 below.

**Instructional Strategies.** Three basic strategies for concept instruction are advocated by most of the texts: 1) Taba’s (1971) inductive concept develop-

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ment strategy; 2) an inductive-discovery strategy based on or similar to one developed by Gagné (1970); and a deductive-expository strategy derived from the work of DeCecco (1968) and others (Tennyson and Park, 1981). A brief description of each strategy follows.

Taba's Strategy:
1. After students have been exposed to some experience, e.g., a field trip, resource person, etc., they are asked to describe and list what they have observed.
2. Once a sufficient list (of items, events, persons, etc.) has been compiled, students are asked to find some basis for grouping them and to identify and explain the basis for forming the specific groups.
3. Finally, students are asked to label or name the groups they have formed and to consider if new items could be subsumed under these labels or if the groups could be recombined or relabeled.

The Inductive-Discovery Strategy
1. Give students the name or label of the concept and present them with some examples which illustrate the critical attributes of the concept.
2. Alternately present examples and nonexamples to the students; in each case indicate if it is or is not an example of the concept.
3. Ask students to infer or discover the critical (or defining) attributes of the concept based on the examples or nonexamples presented.
4. Have students apply the concept to new examples and nonexamples to test understanding and to extend learning. Immediately reinforce correct answers and correct wrong answers.

The Deductive-Expository Strategy
1. Present the student with a label for the concept and a definition which includes all the essential defining attributes.
2. Alternately present examples and nonexamples of the concept and explain why each is or is not an example.
3. Present new examples and nonexamples to test the students' understanding and to expand learning. Immediately reinforce correct answers and correct wrong answers. Ask students why each was or was not an example of the concept.

Note that the descriptions of the three basic strategies given above indicate the main features of each. The specific way these strategies are presented in the texts varies considerably. For example, in one text a strategy might be presented in three steps, while in another, nine steps are used. Still, most of the texts use some form of at least one of the basic strategies. Tables 3 and 4, below, illustrate how frequently each strategy is used and how they are distributed among the texts.

As the tables indicate, five texts did not present any strategies for teaching concepts. Another five texts did not use any of the three basic strategies, and four of these texts were among those which did a very poor job of covering concept instruction in general.
Taba's strategy is clearly the most popular and is included in one form or another in twenty-one texts. Despite the popularity of this strategy, little or no research is cited to support its efficacy. Indeed one social educator has suggested that Taba "... was not satisfied with her strategy because it was so inefficient and unreliable in teaching content and would have corrected it if she had lived longer. Unfortunately the strategy is illogical, inefficient and inadequate for teaching concepts" (McKenzie, 1979, p. 46). Yet the strategy is still widely recommended as a good way to teach concepts.

Regardless of the strategies they recommend, most of the texts fail to explicitly link the strategies they advocate to their definition of concepts or research related to concept instruction. This failure to relate theory, research, and practice could have unfortunate consequences such as teachers spending a great deal of time using ineffective strategies or not matching effective strategies to the appropriate tasks. For example, some research indicates that presenting examples and nonexamples of a concept in random order during an expository strategy is not the most effective way to proceed. One should instead present "rational sets" of examples and nonexamples, each of which focuses on similar variable attributes (Tennyson and Park, 1981, p. 65).

The presentation order of rational sets should be arranged according to the divergency and difficulty level among examples of the concept, and the presentation order of the examples within rational sets should be decided according to updated information about the learner's knowledge state. (pp. 65–66)

Other researchers have suggested that an expository strategy for concept instruction is more effective than an indirect or discovery strategy (McKenzie, 1979; Markel and Tiemann, 1976; Merrill and Tennyson, 1977; and Tennyson et al., 1973 & 1975). Unfortunately little of any of this research is mentioned or related to instructional practice in the methods texts. For instance, only Welton and Mallan (1981) mention any criticism of the Taba

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<th>Combination of Strategies</th>
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<td>1. Strategy 1 only</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>2. Inductive-Discovery</td>
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<td>3. Strategy 3 only</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4. Strategy 1 &amp; 2</td>
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<td>5. None</td>
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<td>5. Strategy 1 &amp; 3</td>
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<td>7. Strategy 1, 2 &amp; 3</td>
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<td>8. More than three</td>
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strategy. Yet they too present it as if teachers should use it for concept instruction (pp. 224-225). Thus almost all the texts fail to give explicit guidelines for how to employ the strategies they advocate, and they also neglect to mention the possible limitations of the strategies as indicated in the research.

Table-5, above, gives an overall rating of the texts in terms of how they cover concept instruction, i.e., their discussion of definitions, research, and strategies for instruction.

### Conclusions

The results of this study indicate that most social studies methods texts do not provide sufficient information and guidelines for concept instruction. Among the most serious deficiencies in the texts are a failure to: 1) adequately define concepts; 2) discuss research regarding concept instruction; 3) relate concept definitions and research findings to the process of instruction; 4) discuss the limitations of the instructional strategies they support; and 5) offer specific guidelines for applying instructional strategies in the classroom. Given the significance of concept instruction in social education, these are serious shortcomings.

The potential importance of concept learning is illustrated by the fact that via our concepts, "...we perceive, understand, and order our world. The concepts an individual has affects the kinds of beliefs and values held, the kinds of actions taken and thus the kind of life led. As such concept learning and formation is critical in everyone's education" (Aumaugher, 1981, p. ii). Put another way, "...concepts not only organize our experience, but also affect how we attend to or reflect upon that experience" (Martorella, 1977, p. 198).

There is no doubt that the authors of social studies methods texts face many practical problems which limit their ability to write texts as they would like. Still, it should be clear that it is time to improve the way methods texts deal with concept instruction. This could begin with a reexamination of our present definitions and paradigms related to teaching concepts. As noted in this article, there has been a significant amount of theoretical work and research concerning the structure and formation of

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concepts, and much of this work has specific implications for teaching social education concepts. Thus social educators should attempt to relate these ideas to current practice and conduct investigations of their own. One important facet of this process is to revise social studies methods texts to reflect developments and to offer more consistency and guidance in terms of those definitions already in use.

Educators and teacher training programs have been the target of much recent criticism, and specific questions have been raised regarding the quality and effectiveness of social studies methods courses (Switzer et al., 1981). Although one would be foolish to rely solely on the social studies methods text as a source of information for concept instruction, it is certainly perceived as an important instructional tool in that process. Furthermore, anyone involved in teacher training programs realizes that there is normally too little time for all topics of significance. Given these circumstances, the social studies methods text can function as a valuable resource or an obstacle to effective instruction. Too often they seem to fall into the latter category with regard to concept learning.

References

Texts Evaluated


**Other Sources**


Tennyson, R. D., Wolley, F. R., and Merrill, M. D. "Exemplary and Non-exemplary Variables Which Produce Correct Concept Classification Behavior and Specified Classification Errors." *Journal of Educational Psychology.* (1973) 63, 144–152.


Introduction

Teacher enthusiasm has long been believed to be an important teacher behavior (Barr, 1929; Rosenshine, 1970). Based on a review of the literature on teacher behavior and student achievement, Rosenshine and Furst (1971) stated that teacher enthusiasm ranked third among teacher variables associated with student achievement. They were careful to point out, however, that this conclusion was based primarily on correlational studies. Later, Rosenshine (1979) restricted the claim regarding the efficacy of teacher enthusiasm to older subjects. He claimed that teacher enthusiasm had very little effect on the achievement of students in the primary grades (see also, Brophy & Evertson, 1974).

Since the publications by Rosenshine (1970) and Rosenshine and Furst
(1971), research on teacher enthusiasm has developed along three lines. First, several researchers have attempted to explicate the construct of overt teacher enthusiasm (see Note 1); that is, these researchers have attempted to identify teacher behaviors that convey the impression of enthusiasm (Caruso, 1980; Collins, 1976; Ochs, 1973; Oldham & Larkins, 1977). The second area of investigation has examined whether teachers could be trained to increase their overt enthusiasm (Bettencourt, 1970; Collins, 1976). Finally, the third area of research has attempted to establish a cause and effect relationship between overt teacher enthusiasm and student achievement (Bettencourt, 1970; Larkins & McKinney, 1982; Malcolm, 1977; Mastin, 1963; McKinney & Larkins, 1982; Sneed, 1977).

**Behaviors That Convey Enthusiasm.** Several investigators, proceeding independently and apparently unaware of each others’ efforts, have attempted to identify behaviors that convey enthusiasm and to develop instruments to measure overt teacher enthusiasm. These researchers consistently identified the following behaviors: eye contact, vocal delivery, gesturing, body movement, facial expression, and overall energy level. In addition, Collins (1976) included word selection and acceptance of students’ ideas and feelings; Oldham and Larkins (1977) included commitment to the content being taught. Teachers who appear to be enthusiastic were described as varying their voices in speed, tone, pitch, and loudness; maintaining eye contact, dancing and shining eyes, and raising their eyebrows; gesturing vigorously with hands, arms, and face; moving energetically about the classroom; and generally having a high degree of energy. Teachers who appeared lethargic, or appeared to have low enthusiasm, were described as being dull, speaking in a monotone, and exhibiting few gestures or movements.

**Can Teachers Be Trained to Increase Their Levels of Overt Enthusiasm?** If there is a positive relationship between the appearance of teacher enthusiasm and student achievement, it is important to know if teachers can be trained to increase their levels of apparent enthusiasm. Four studies have examined this question (Bettencourt, 1970; Collins, 1976; Gillett, 1980; Rolidor, 1979). In all cases teachers who received training were able to substantially increase their levels of apparent enthusiasm.

**Experimental Studies.** Several experimental studies have examined the relationship among levels of overt teacher enthusiasm and student achievement. Mastin (1963) had 20 teachers teach two social studies lessons to sixth- and seventh-grade students using two levels of enthusiasm—one with enthusiasm and one with indifference. A significant difference was reported between scores obtained from the two approaches for 15 of the 20 classrooms; all differences were reported in favor of the enthusiastically taught classes.

Sneed (1977) also examined the effects of two levels of overt enthusiasm on student achievement. Two ninth-grade social studies teachers taught two
lessons over a two-day period. Two of the lessons were taught with enthusiasm, two were taught lethargically. On the first day of the experiment no difference was reported. On the second day, however, the group mean for the enthusiastically taught group was significantly larger than the mean for the lethargically taught group.

Two other studies examined the relationship between two levels (high and low) of enthusiasm and student achievement (Bettencourt, 1979; Land, 1980). Bettencourt (1979) used 17 teachers, eight experimental and nine control to teach fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-grade students an eight day unit on graphing and probability. Results of analysis of covariance indicated that there were no significant differences between the two groups on achievement or on an attitude measure.

Land (1980) examined the joint effects of teacher structure and enthusiasm on student achievement. Eighty-six undergraduates were randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups and viewed a videotape on the legal rights and responsibilities of teachers. The main effect of enthusiasm (high vs. low) and the interaction effect of enthusiasm and structure were nonsignificant. However, he did report a sex by enthusiasm interaction.

Not only did the findings reported in the above studies differ concerning the effects of teacher enthusiasm, other questions remain unresolved. In those studies reporting significantly better performance for students of teachers who appeared enthusiastic, only two levels of enthusiasm—high and low—were presented. Hence, it was unclear whether high overt enthusiasm might increase student achievement or whether low overt enthusiasm simply decreased achievement. Four studies (Larkins & McKinney, 1982; Malcolm, 1977; McKinney & Larkins, 1982) have examined this question. Malcolm (1977) included a medium or normal level of overt enthusiasm. Seventh-grade students were taught three social studies lessons over a three day period. Significant differences were reported with the high enthusiasm group having the largest group mean followed by the normally and lethargically taught groups.

Larkins and McKinney (1982) reported findings from two studies which examined the effects of three levels of overt teacher enthusiasm on seventh-grade students' achievement. Treatments were rotated across teachers so that each teacher taught each level of the treatment. The first study lasted four days. The results indicated that there were no significant differences between the low and normally taught groups; however, the means for both of these groups were significantly larger than the means for the group taught with high overt enthusiasm. Using the same population, Larkins and McKinney attempted to replicate these findings with different lessons and tighter controls. Students were randomly assigned to treatment groups, teachers received additional training, and observers were present in all of the classes during the administration of the treatment. In addition, tests were administered on each day of the experiment rather than at the end of
the experiment. Findings from the original Larkins and McKinney study did not replicate. No significant differences were reported on the first day; however, the means for the high and normal groups were significantly larger than the low enthusiasm means on the second and third days.

McKinney and Larkins (1982) used seventh-grade social studies students in a third attempt to replicate Malcolm's findings. Again three levels of teacher enthusiasm were used. Five teachers and 15 classes (unit of analysis) were used in a quasi-experimental design. Treatments were rotated in the same manner as reported in the Larkins and McKinney (1982) study cited above. Tests were also administered following each lesson. One observer randomly observed a subsample of the treatments. On Day 1 of the experiment the high enthusiasm group mean differed significantly from the low group mean. However, no differences were reported on Day 2 and Day 3.

Several conclusions can be drawn from these studies. It is clear that teachers can be trained to increase their levels of overt enthusiasm; they can be trained to appear more or less enthusiastic regardless of their genuine or felt level of enthusiasm. Also, several studies reported differences in treatment groups in only a short period of time. In fact, significant differences were reported after only one day (Mastin, 1963; McKinney & Larkins, 1982). However, the central question concerning the effects of teacher enthusiasm on student achievement remained unanswered. In addition, although there appeared to be a positive correlation between teacher enthusiasm and achievement at the middle and senior high school levels, less is known about the relationship between teacher enthusiasm and elementary students' achievement. In fact, limited evidence suggests that there is no relationship at this level (Brophy & Evertson, 1974). The study reported here was an attempt to examine this relationship at the first-grade level.

Procedures

Sample. The sample consisted of 52 first-grade students randomly assigned to one of three treatment groups (high, medium, and low overt teacher enthusiasm). Since it was believed that the effects of overt teacher enthusiasm were cumulative, subjects who were absent from the study were excluded from the analysis on succeeding days. Therefore, the sample size varied daily (Day 1 = 47, Day 2 = 45, Day 3 = 42, Composite = 42). Subjects attended a primary school in a suburb of a medium-sized city in a southern state. Most subjects could be categorized as upper-lower to lower-middle class.

The teacher, a graduate student at a nearby university, held a Master of Science in Education degree and had over 10 years teaching experience. Prior to the study the teacher received approximately 10 hours training in the treatment. The training procedure included reading studies concerning teacher enthusiasm, taping sessions with feedback, and practice sessions with feedback. Training continued until the teacher was able to clearly dif-
Differentiate the three levels of the treatment. As a further check, an observer was present during each presentation to verify that each level of the treatment was followed.

**Treatment.** The treatment consisted of three levels of teacher enthusiasm—high, medium, and low. Collins' (1976) descriptors were used to define each level. High enthusiasm was defined as rapid, excited speech; many changes in voice tone and pitch; shining eyes; raised eyebrows; quick and demonstrative movements of the body, head, arms, hands, and face; many vibrant facial expressions; and a high overall energy level. Two of Collins' descriptors, acceptance of students' ideas and feelings and word selection, were not included because each lesson was scripted to maintain consistency of lesson content. Low enthusiasm was defined as speaking in a monotone voice; exhibiting dull or bored eyes; utilizing few gestures; showing little or no movement, no facial expression; and generally characterized as lethargic. The medium treatment level was defined as being approximately half way between the high and low levels. Some descriptors that were used to describe this level were as follows: pleasant variation in voice, interested eyes; steady body, arms, head, hands, and facial gesturing; free movement about the room; smiled—looked happy; and generally characterized as maintaining an even energy level.

**Lessons.** The topics of the three lessons were land, air, and water pollution. Lessons followed the Merrill and Tennyson instructional design for teaching concepts (Merrill & Tennyson, 1977). Each lesson was begun with a definition of the concept and was followed by a presentation of examples and nonexamples with a teacher explanation. Students were then presented with new examples and nonexamples and asked to explain whether each was or was not an example. The lessons were scripted so that the content of each presentation was identical. Each lesson lasted about 20 minutes.

**Instrument.** Following each lesson, 20 items of a 60-item yes-no test were administered. Items were either photographs or drawings. The items were written at the classificatory level (Klausmeier & Hooper, 1974); that is, subjects were asked to apply what they had learned to newly encountered examples and nonexamples.

**Analysis.** One way analysis of variance was performed on each of the 20-item subtests and on a composite score of the entire 60 items. Data were analyzed this way because several studies reported that the effects of overt teacher enthusiasm were cumulative (Larkins & McKinney, 1982; Sneed, 1977). An analysis of a composite score may indicate no significant differences when significant differences are present on some of the previous days. If the subtests are administered on each day of the experiment, this cumulative effect can be examined. This effect would show up, even if nonsignificant differences are reported on the composite score. When signifi-
significant differences were reported, Tukey’s HSD test was used to determine which means differed significantly.

Results

The means and standard deviations for Day 1, Day 2, Day 3, and the composite score are reported in Table 1. No significant differences were found on Day 1, $F (2,44) = 1.79$, and Day 2, $F (2,42) = 1.14$. Significant differences were reported on Day 3, $F (2,39) = 4.99$, $p < .01$, and on the composite score, $F (2,39) = 4.43$, $p < .02$. On Day 3 the mean for medium level (19.38) differed significantly from the means for the low (18.75) and high (18.41) levels. This pattern was repeated on the composite score (Medium = 55.54, Low = 54.00, and High = 52.88).

Discussion

The primary purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of teacher enthusiasm on first-grade students’ achievement. A previous study (Brophy & Evertson, 1974) reported that teacher enthusiasm had no effect on second-grade students’ achievement. Their findings were replicated in this study. Our findings indicate a small, but statistically significant relationship. On Day 3 and on the composite score the students who were taught with a medium level of teacher enthusiasm performed significantly better than those taught with low and high levels. Although these findings were statistically significant, they are certainly not practically significant. Sur-
prisingly, the students taught with the high level of enthusiasm had the smallest means on two of the three days.

A second question that this study examined was whether high enthusiasm increases student achievement or whether low enthusiasm decreases achievement. Results of this study provided only a partial answer. However, if there is no difference in the effects of levels of teacher enthusiasm at the primary level, as the findings in this study indicate, then this question may be unimportant.

There are several possible rival explanations for these findings. The reliability of the test was low (.43). Examination of the means reported in Table 1 indicates that all of the groups performed quite well on the test. Therefore, the test could have been too easy. However, this conclusion is unlikely. The authors had used the same materials and tests in another study that utilized a similar sample (McKinney, Larkins, Burts, & Davis, 1982). In the earlier study students in a control group scored only at the chance level. Furthermore, the low reliability did not prevent significant differences from occurring on Day 3 and on the composite score.

A second explanation may be that the instructional design was more efficacious than levels of teacher enthusiasm. The McKinney et al. study cited above demonstrated that the Merrill and Tennyson design of teaching concepts is quite effective in teaching concepts to first-grade students (see Note 2). This could explain the high group means and the low test reliability. This issue can be resolved by using different teaching methods in future studies.

The informal observations of the teacher and observer may also help to explain these findings. They reported a marked difference in the behavior of the three groups. The group taught with high teacher enthusiasm was extremely active and noisy. On the other hand, the group taught with low teacher enthusiasm was very lethargic and attentive, and no disruptive behavior was reported. The group taught with a medium level of enthusiasm displayed more interest and emotion than the low level but remained attentive and were not disruptive. Further research needs to examine the relationship between student's attending on-task behaviors and levels of teacher enthusiasm.

Other possible explanations include the short duration of the treatment and the use of only one teacher. Previous research allows us to rule out short duration. Several studies cited in the review reported statistically significant differences after only one day with junior high school, high school, and college students. On the other hand, one correlation study that lasted for one school year reported no relationship between first-grade students' achievement and overt teacher enthusiasm.

The use of only one teacher that was new to the students could explain these findings. It is possible that students will attend more closely to a new teacher, and that this attention will wear off over an extended period of time. Research findings on this point are not clear. Several of the studies
cited in the review reported significant differences with "new" teachers who taught with high levels of overt enthusiasm. Why did that not happen in this study? In all of these studies subjects were of junior high school age or older.

What about the use of only one teacher? It is possible that different teachers exhibit enthusiasm differently. Including more teachers would eliminate this problem. However, two similar studies conducted since this one reported no significant differences.

Evidence is rapidly being built to support Rosenshine's (1979) claim that teacher enthusiasm is much less important with young children than was once believed. The important point here is that consistent patterns are being reported by different researchers in different settings and in different subject areas. Replication of findings in several different settings makes each individual study more powerful.

Endnotes

1. In everyday language, enthusiasm refers to certain kinds of positive feelings residing within a person. In such language, an enthusiastic teacher is one who feels positive about the subject he is teaching, or about the particular students in her class, or perhaps, about teaching in general. We call that sort of enthusiasm "felt enthusiasm" or "genuine enthusiasm." Educational researchers have not generally attempted to study the effects of genuine or felt enthusiasm, but have focused on overt enthusiasm. We define overt enthusiasm as those teacher behaviors which communicate the appearance of enthusiasm. We have emphasized overt enthusiasm in our research because we assume, and have evidence to support that assumption, that teachers can be trained to manipulate their levels of overt enthusiasm, and that overt teacher enthusiasm is related to pupil achievement. We believe that the effects of felt enthusiasm are also worth studying, but have chosen to focus on the more easily manipulative behaviors which we label overt enthusiasm.

2. Professor Meredith Gall believes that this is a plausible explanation. During personal correspondence with the authors, he states he believes that some instructional designs are simply more powerful than teacher behavior. In a sense the design is "teacher proof."

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A Response to Romanish: Ideological Bias in Secondary Economics Textbooks*

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Introduction

Ideology was once an honorable field of study—specifically, and literally, the study of ideas. Today, to accuse an academic of harboring ideological bias or of promulgating bias represents a serious charge. Consequently, such an accusation, made in a respectable public outlet, should be carefully and convincingly supported with evidence. Perhaps because of this high burden of proof, it is rare to see charges of bias addressed at specific works of authors in journals where the accused are likely to respond, or where other disinterested parties have an opportunity to refute the accusations.

Bruce Romanish's recent article (1983), "Modern Secondary Economics Textbooks and Ideological Bias," is strikingly bold in describing areas of alleged ideological bias in ten economics textbooks for secondary students, chosen on the basis of a recent copyright date and coverage of "most major

*We wish to thank Steven Miller and James Dick for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Any errors or omissions, of course, are the responsibility of the authors.
publishers and several smaller ones. . . .” (p. 4). The purpose of this response is to show that:

1) Romanish does not establish that the textbooks he cites are flawed by ideological bias;

2) The selection and interpretation of categories and evidence in the paper is arbitrary and inconsistent;

3) The article is marred by several factual mistakes and misleading statements; and,

4) Romanish’s charge of ideological bias seems directed at the academic discipline of economics, as it is currently practiced by mainstream American economists, rather than the secondary textbooks selected for review.

Bias in Economics and Economic Education

The foundation for Romanish’s charge of bias rests on two general claims: “Consensus does not exist concerning the nature of what economic education ought to be. . . .” (p. 5); “Providing the young with an education in ‘free enterprise economics,’ complete with all acceptable conclusions students are to reach, is to deprive them of the balanced experience they need to acquire economic literacy and the knowledge needed to participate in a democracy.” (p. 2). Unfortunately, the first statement is basically incorrect and the second statement is misleading.

The alleged lack of consensus on what economic education ought to be is not convincingly supported by the evidence. In fact, the two quotations cited by Romanish (from M. L. Frankel and William Rader) show a high degree of consensus. More damaging in our view, however, is what Romanish does not cite. The Joint Council on Economic Education (JCEE) in cooperation with the standing Committee on Economic Education of the American Economic Association (AEA), has published curriculum guidelines, instructional materials, and standardized tests that describe what content economic education ought to include in the nation’s schools. To cite just two major references on this point, which should be familiar to scholars with even a casual interest in economic education, see the AEA’s National Task Force report on Economic Education in the Schools (Committee on Economic Development, 1961) and the JCEE’s Master Curriculum Guide in Economics for the Nation’s Schools, Part I—A Framework for Teaching Economics: Basic Concepts (Hanson, et al., 1977).1

Surprisingly, there is no reference to either of these benchmark publications in Romanish’s paper, and no evidence that he is aware that the largest, most prestigious professional association of economists has explicitly and repeatedly addressed the issue of what economic education ought to be. Romanish’s premise might well have been tested, at least on one level, by evaluating how many of the positive concepts identified in either of these manuals (most explicitly on p. 9 of the 1977 volume) were accurately
presented. In addition, he might also have considered in what areas the texts extended beyond presentation of basic concepts and whether these normative areas were treated in a one-sided or biased manner.

The second charge made by Romanish, of providing youth with “conclusions” about “free enterprise economics” instead of economic literacy, can be interpreted sympathetically as a warning to avoid bias. While the warning is similar to John Maynard Keynes’ famous description of economics as a way of thinking and not a settled body of conclusions immediately applicable to policy, it also misses the mark: any academic discipline that is even partly positive in approach offers a body of conclusions in terms of analytical knowledge. For example, in a perfectly competitive system, not characterized by market failure and given some distribution of income and an equilibrium position for consumers and producers, it is impossible to make anyone better off in an economic sense without making someone else worse off. This positive economic conclusion, together with the “invisible hand” idea that competitive markets will channel self-interested behavior into socially desirable outcomes and the concept that using any scarce resource entails an opportunity cost, represents the “bottom line” of micro-economic analysis.

Note that the whole conclusion, including the provisos on market failure and income distribution, is the bottom line. Omitting the provisos would represent a distinct bias, but Romanish does not really address those points since he is not interested in developing student understanding of positive economics. Instead, he prefers to focus instruction on the should be, could be, ought to be world of normative economics without a positive foundation. From our view this strictly normative approach leads to continuing economic illiteracy among students.  

**A Framework for Evaluating Bias**

The author alludes to an undefined “fairness doctrine” (p. 6) in laying the groundwork for his review of the textbooks. Beyond that doctrine, there is no real framework identified to direct his study, and this omission leads to major problems in interpreting his results.

Several social studies interest groups (e.g., the Middle East and African-American Institutes and the Asia Society) that review texts for bias have established guidelines for reviews. One important feature in these reviews is the use of panels of readers, so that personal opinions in reviewing materials can be identified and minimized. When only one reader is used to review textbooks, it is not necessary to obtain agreement on what content issues will be used to check for bias and to describe what kinds of statements will be considered biased before the review begins. This *ad hoc* procedure results in personal selection and reporting on categories which allegedly show bias in the textbooks, but instead may reveal more about the biases of the single reviewer. The problem is readily apparent in Romanish’s paper and
underlies our criticism, since what he is presenting is his personal count of instances of bias.

To illustrate this point one need only examine the patterns in the “evidence” on bias offered by Romanish. Thirty-four separate offenses of bias are cited from the 10 textbooks he reviews—9 cases of omission and 25 of commission in the presentation of material. Five of the nine “errors” of omission relate to claims that not enough coverage is devoted to “right-to-work” laws. Of the 25 allegations of biased presentation, 6 are for “evading the contradiction between growth and environmental preservation.” Subtracting these 11 issue items (5 + 6) from the total leaves only 23 other charges of bias to allocate among the 10 texts. Eighteen items, however, relate to just three texts reviewed. The five remaining items are distributed among three texts with two cited disapprovingly on two points, and one on only one point. Four texts receive no criticism from among the 23 charges.

In short, the calculations indicate that Romanish is very concerned with the issues of “environment and growth” and “right-to-work” laws in his overall review of texts. The patterns in his citations of bias hardly support the general message of his paper that there is widespread or near-uniform bias among the leading economics textbooks at the secondary level. Textbook space is severely limited for most subjects at the secondary level and authors may choose to limit their coverage of pollution and right-to-work laws to cover other topics in more detail. The issues Romanish chooses to review for bias do not seem inherently more important than alternative issues such as poverty, income distribution, health care, energy, transportation, housing, unemployment, inflation, or other pressing economic issues. Nor, for that matter, do the pollution or labor issues seem more useful in revealing bias.

The problem with reviewing issues as opposed to concepts for presentation bias is that, pragmatically, textbook authors and publishers will not be able to cover each major issue in a one-semester book. Space constraints are also especially acute in texts that are written for courses required of all students in a school system, not just those texts written for college preparatory courses. For both types of textbooks, however, whether issues are covered extensively may legitimately reflect hard editorial choices and not ideological bias.

Any of the above economic issues which are included in an economics textbook are likely to be covered using a conceptual approach that Romanish apparently does not appreciate or understand. To make general charges of bias based so heavily on the coverage of two current issues, chosen arbitrarily and reviewed for bias using criteria that are at best dubious, seems unwarranted. It would also seem incumbent on Romanish, in the spirit of “fairness” doctrine he invokes, to have noted how many of the texts he reviews are, by his own count, entirely or nearly free from specific charges of bias apart from these two issues.
Finally, his review is flawed by several mistakes in the selection of "secondary" texts. For example, he states that only one of the texts he reviews has a copyright date "earlier than 1978," but in fact two texts do (#4 and #5, to use his notation in his list of references). He also believes that the text by Kalman Goldberg, published by Little, Brown and Company, is a secondary text, but it is a one-semester college text. Little, Brown and Company does not operate a secondary division, and this text has been out of print since November of 1981. Furthermore, text #6 by Robert Heilbroner and Aaron Singer is not a standard textbook at all, as Romanish recognizes when he calls it "a history of American economic development" (p. 17), but apparently this distinction is not important to his analysis. In other words, we find that the author has not been as careful in the selection of secondary texts as the paper title, the general remarks, the specific charges, or the list of references would indicate.

Content Questions and the "Evidence" on Ideological Bias

Romanish reviews the treatment of economic systems, labor, the role of government, and the environment in the ten textbooks. While the selection of these categories seems arbitrary, we will respond to the major points expressed in each category to demonstrate the problems with his arguments.

Category I: Treatment of Economic Systems. Romanish admits that some well-meaning academics may choose to instruct students only on the American economy, albeit from a "warts and all" stance (p. 6). He devotes, however, much text to arguing that other economic systems should be covered extensively in a secondary economics course. He does not mention the fact that most of the textbooks he reviews do cover other types of systems, and some include full chapters on the Soviet, British, Japanese, and traditional systems (c.f., #’s 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 in Romanish’s list). This concern for coverage of other economic systems suggests that perhaps he would like to see equal numbers of pages devoted to all, or at least to a "significant array" of systems. In support of this approach, he cites Bonnie Mezaros’ conclusion that, since the United States is the world’s largest trader, a "basic knowledge of international economics" (p. 6) is required to understand the American economy. Although it is easy to support Mezaros’ statement, the author does not appear to understand how little support that statement offers for his position.

The United States is the world’s largest trader, but it is also well known that United States exports (or imports) equal only about ten percent of United States national income, or GNP. In pre-OPEC years this figure was considerably lower, and the figure for net exports, which is what economics students use in calculating national income through the total expenditure approach, is even smaller (less then one percent of GNP in 1982). Considering this small percentage, a case can be made that is far more important that
students, in their current or future roles as workers, consumers, or citizens, spend more time learning about the United States economic system than they do other systems. In other words, there is empirical support for the textbooks' stress on how the United States economy works. Of course in the best of all worlds, students and citizens would have the time and resources available to receive substantial instruction on both the United States economy and other types of economic systems, but given instructional constraints and the size of the domestic economy, a focus on the United States economy seems justified.

On a related point, Romanish mistakenly interprets a call for greater understanding of international economics as a statement on the need for instruction on comparative economic systems. College students who enroll in international economics courses offered by an economics department receive instruction on such topics as comparative advantage, the balance of payments, and exchange rates, developed through standard tools of economic analysis (i.e., supply and demand factors). Those students who want to study institutional arrangements and the strengths and weaknesses of different economic systems should enroll in a comparative economic systems class, not an international economics class. Students may find some material on ideology in an institutionally-oriented comparative economic systems course or a history of economic thought class, but most economics departments will offer little instruction on that topic in any course.

One specific complaint lodged by Romanish in this category is that six of the ten texts offer the Soviet Union as the primary example of a planned or command economy. The author does not offer a better example; nor does he recognize that many, perhaps most, introductory textbooks at the secondary and university level point out that while all economies are, to some degree, mixed economies, it is possible to place different systems on a continuum ranging from "pure planned" to "pure market" (or free enterprise, though that term apparently offends many for conceptual, pragmatic, or ideological reasons), depending on the degree of central ownership and direction of productive resources. Assigning only the more developed economies of the world to this kind of continuum, as is customary if not appropriate, is there a better example of a command economy than the Soviet Union? And even if there is a better example, does it really represent ideological bias to refer to the Soviet system in this way?

Category II: Labor. Romanish actually means by this category "organized labor or unions" (p. 11). The author does not claim that any of the texts omit this topic, although he finds fault with a number of texts for their limited coverage of specific unions. Whether referring to specific unions makes a text less biased is an open question. Indeed, to focus on organized labor rather than labor markets might well be said to reflect more of an interest in political power than in economics, since about 80 percent of the United States labor force does not belong to a union. While we still think
that unions are an important topic to cover in a secondary economics text, the general topic of labor (both union and nonunion) might offer a better test area for determining ideological bias.

Romanish chastizes several texts for ignoring the "exploitation" of labor (p. 11). He does not explain whether he is referring to monopolistic exploitation, monopsonistic exploitation, or the Marxian idea of exploitation. Whatever the type of exploitation the texts are supposed to cover, the topic is probably one that most secondary educators would consider too abstract and difficult to introduce formally to most secondary students.

Romanish also considers including material on "right-to-work" laws and "yellow dog" contracts as evidence that texts are unbiased. It is not clear from his argument that including both topics should exempt a textbook from some charges of bias since "yellow dog" contracts are generally illegal, while 20 states have passed "right-to-work" laws. Given the controversy surrounding the "right to work" issue, it would seem sufficiently balanced to present the issue from a pro and con approach as most texts do.

Finally, Romanish reports he has found a "hidden message" when one text "suggests, as do many economic books, that labor (sic.) is done by either people or machines, whichever is less expensive" (p. 12). He claims that since students should learn in economics that making choices must be based on personal values, it is improper to suggest that the only factor distinguishing between people and machines is their cost. Again, Romanish has missed the point of the strictly positive statement that a profit maximizing firm will produce in the least-cost method. Or, put differently, he does not recognize that if inefficient production does somehow continue it will be at the expense of human living standards and, quite possibly, employment levels. In any event, it is important for students to learn that if the price of labor increases relative to capital, private firms will have strong incentives to hire fewer workers. Does such a positive understanding imply ideological bias? If so, virtually all economics texts and economists are guilty, not merely the books cited in the Romanish study.

Category III: Role of Government. This section is a particularly strange part of Romanish's paper. He opens with the claim that authors who refer to the free enterprise system "also feel obliged to warn about the concern of 'many' that the role of government has become too obtrusive" (p. 13). Yet, we know of no lengthy economic study on regulation in the United States economy that does not seriously address the same point and offer examples of regulatory failures—even studies which make a case for new regulations. Indeed, economists today expect balanced texts to address issues of "government failure" and market failure, in recognition of the substantial public choice literature that has developed in economics during the past 20 years.

The points on regulation that economists since Adam Smith have been trying to make include:
1) Well-intentioned regulations very often lead to inefficient and inhumane results, simply because it is so difficult to anticipate all of the ways a fixed and enforcable regulation will affect (and be responded to by) thousands of producers and millions of consumers facing varied and unique circumstances;

2) Regulations are at least as likely to be sponsored by special interest groups, which will benefit from the regulation, as by groups which are truly representative of “the” social or public interest;

3) Regulators are no more likely to be saintly or efficient than any others, so regulatory agencies themselves are open to corruption, sloth, and “regulatory capture” by the groups they were originally set up to regulate; and,

4) There are specific areas in which government regulation will be needed in a fully competitive market economy, including provision of a social and legal environment, public goods, income redistribution, stabilization policies, maintaining competition and adjusting for externalities. In these areas, policies must be established and enforced in a cost/benefit framework if they are to be effective.

There is no evidence that Romanish's review of the textbooks acknowledges these points, and without offering any conceptual framework he devotes over a page to examples that show powerful private interests manipulating government grants and policies. Then, and only then, without relating these horror stories to the textbooks in any way, Romanish begins his specific review of the texts.

Romanish might have pointed out that many of the secondary textbooks do offer a standard list of the economic functions of government, especially identical to what is offered in college-level texts. Instead, in less than a page of text, he notes the books that he believes: consider taxes and tax policy in great detail; discuss the government's role in cleaning the environment; recognize that government growth is usually in response to demands of “the people”; describe the infrastructure provided by government; point out that government interference can restrict economic freedom; and, explain how government services are financed. Three paragraphs, asserting that the textbooks do not provide a format that is fair to evaluate the role of government, conclude this section of Romanish's paper.

Whatever the assertions about the role of government in the economy in this unconnected section, the points presented do not demonstrate systematic bias in the texts. While the “conspiracy theory” view of government-business relations may convince those already converted, it does not pass for an academically sound argument on bias in the presentation of economics material. The discussion also indicates an ignorance of the substantial positive economic literature on regulation in the economy.

Category IV: The Environment. Romanish devotes one page to arguments that environmentalism is a key topic in the modern economy and cites one
authority, Jeremy Rifkin, who is best known as the author of a popular book on entropy. Then, in one-half page, Romanish asserts that over half of the texts fail to point out the trade-off between economic growth and environmental protection, that several discuss environmentalism very briefly, that four texts are more comprehensive and two are fair, but that one text assumes the topic is "not germane" to economics (p. 17). Three concluding paragraphs then pose the question, "How (is it) possible that many modern economics textbooks designed for a broad range of high school students could have overlooked such a significant topic?, especially since "a recent Harris Poll revealed that' 80% oppose any relaxation of the Clean Air Act" (p. 17).

Romanish would apparently be surprised to learn that many (most?) one-semester texts in economics for college students eschew chapters on environmental concerns, as do some two-semester texts. Many of the two-semester texts also include suggested outlines on coverage for one-semester courses, and even in these texts which do offer environmental chapters that material is often excluded in their outlines for a one-semester text. Since the high school economics course is almost always a one semester course, the high school texts again largely reflect a "bias" of the economics discipline on this point, if any bias really exists.

More important, most economists treat pollution and environmental deterioration as an example of an externality. Pollution is the classic example of an external or spillover cost, and the classic example of how resources held in common, like the environment, are often abused. Many of the texts not cited approvingly in the Romanish survey often discuss pollution in precisely these terms, but do not choose to devote full chapters to environmentalism in an already crowded one-semester course (c.f., #’s 2, 6, 7, 8, on Romanish’s list). Once again, failure to include such chapters hardly constitutes ideological bias, especially when pollution and other environmental concerns are treated in the development of such basic economic concepts as externalities and social cost.

Errors and Ideological Bias in the Review

A number of statements made by Romanish contain factual errors, show ideological bias, or present unsubstantiated conclusions. As examples, consider the following quotes and our brief response after the dash:

1) "...(A) command economy is one where society dictates to the market and a market economy is one in which the market dictates resource allocation to society" (p. 10)—A correct statement would be: in a command economy the decisions of the central planners exert the major influence over the allocation of resources; in a market economy, people specialize in productive activities and satisfy most of their wants through voluntary exchange, thereby determining resource allocation. Society and markets do not dictate to each other!
2) "Textbooks that parade 'free enterprise' in the titles on their jackets are not books designed to promote economic literacy but are intended to foster beliefs in an appreciation of that system" (p. 2) — You cannot judge a book by its cover. When nearly half of the states mandate instruction on economics or free enterprise for all students it is not surprising, or per se biased, to find free enterprise on the title of books written by academics interested in promoting economic literacy.

3) "There is practically no agreement on what the subject matter of economics ought to be among the texts, save a basic core presentation of classical economic thought" (p. 18) — To economists' way of thinking, consensus on what positive concepts to present in an economics course is the necessary area of consensus — what particular topics or issues are used to present the economic way of thinking is a matter of much less significance and concern;

4) "It is safe to assert . . . that the textbooks present an explanation of economic constructs that is harmonious with the existing economic order in America. In a broad sense the texts display a bias in favor of neo-classical macro-economics (sic.). Such widely used approaches as the Keynesian are relegated to a position of non-status" (p. 18) — There is no such thing as "neo-classical macro-economics," and most of the textbooks do discuss total spending, Keynes, and the macroeconomic theories (such as monetarism), which have been developed since Keynes' time; and,

5) "... (T)hey (the texts) proffer an essentially classical model and imply that this is the American model" (p. 18) — The texts generally do offer a "mixed economy" view of this American economy, as discussed earlier.

Taken together, these problems and those cited earlier should make one very leery of accepting Romanish's "evidence," or accepting his conclusions. We believe these types of statements mar the quality of the article and raise questions about the author's understanding of economics.

Conclusions

There are well known reasons for expressing concern about bias in free enterprise and economic education programs because of such factors as politically mandated courses on free enterprise, special interest pressure on textbook publishers, and corporate contributions to economic education programs at the local, state, and national level. Given such an environment, it behooves academic observers from the fields of economics and education to keep a weather eye on all materials widely used in the nation's schools, especially the ever present textbook.

The existence, however, of possible conditions on influencing textbooks and other materials is not an excuse for crying "wolf," or for confusing bias with instruction in basic economics. If Romanish wants to reform the cur-
rent practices of economics discipline, or more reasonably, to argue that economic education practices are somehow biased and in need of restructuring to include more material on other economic systems, he is free to do so. But those arguments do not prove, or even depend on, claims of ideological bias in a cross-section of current textbooks.

To charge academic authors of bias is a serious matter, deserving near-legal proof and at least a solid and well explained framework for evaluating whether bias does exist. Romanish offers strong assertions, no proof, little evidence, and a flawed and inconsistent framework for analysis. We must all do better than that when we examine textbooks and other educational materials for ideological bias.

Endnotes


2For a further explanation of the distinction between positive and normative economics, see Fisher and Dornbusch, 1983, pp. 16-17, or most any introductory college economics text.

References


Book Review Section

We are seeking critical reviews of scholarly works related to the concerns of social educators. This includes books on education, the social sciences, history, philosophy, research and any other works which might make a contribution to the field.

Normally, textbooks will not be reviewed with the exception of those which appear to advance theory and research. Essay reviews of two or more works on the same topic will be considered if they conform to manuscript guidelines for reviews. Reviews which exceed the guidelines for length must be handled on a case by case basis as space permits. Reviewers who have suggestions for reviews which might exceed the guidelines are urged to contact the book editor prior to submitting the review.

Reviewers should provide sufficient detail regarding the book's substance and approach, including positive and negative evaluations where relevant. Finally, the review should include the specific importance of the book for social educators.

Manuscript Form

The length may vary from 1,000 to 2,000 words; the manuscript must be typed, double-spaced (including quotes) on 8½" × 11" paper. The format is as follows for the top of the first page of the review, left side:

Book Author's Name (Last Name first),
Title, City of publication: Publisher, Date;
Total pages; list price (if known).
Reviewer's Name (Last Name Last)
Institution

Submit review manuscripts to:
Professor William B. Stanley, Book Editor
Department of Curriculum and Instruction
64 Long Field House
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, LA 70803

Reviewed by Don Kauchak, Professor of Secondary Education, University of Utah

The outstanding success of scientific measurement of individual differences has been that of the general mental test. Despite occasional overenthusiasm and misconceptions, and the fact that the established tests are rendered obsolescent by recent conceptual advances, the general mental test stands today as the most important technical contribution psychology has made to the practical guidance of human affairs. (Cronbach, 1970, p. 120)

This book, then is about the abstraction of intelligence as a single entity, its location within the brain, its quantification as one number for each individual and the use of these numbers to rank people in a single series of worthiness, invariably to find the oppressed and disadvantaged groups—races, classes, or sexes are innately inferior and deserve their status. In short, this book is about the Mismeasure of Man. (Gould, 1981, pp. 24-25)

Probably no concept in the psychological literature is as pervasive and as controversial as the concept of intelligence. Everyone knows intuitively what intelligence is and most professionals are familiar with testing procedures, but few people are aware of the historical developments that led to the creation of the modern day intelligence test. In exploring this development Gould's book takes us on a tour of craniometry, criminal atavism, the first I.Q. tests and the impact of secular racism on the scientific development of modern day intelligence tests. The roles of giants in the field like Agassiz, Broca, Binet, Terman, Yerkes, Spearman, Sir Cyril Burt, Thurstone, and Jensen are explained and put in historical perspective. But the book is more than just an historical account; it is an investigation into the nature of scientific inquiry and the various ways that experimenter bias and distortion enter into the process, from presumably unconscious bias to falsification of data.

In his description of the historical development of the modern I.Q. test, Gould raises serious questions not only about its uses, but more fundamentally the validity of I.Q. as a psychological concept. Central to Gould's criticism of modern day intelligence testing procedures is the notion of biological determinism and the reification of intelligence as a single, quantifiable entity. The connection between the two becomes evident as the
author describes the cultural context in which the I.Q. testing movement grew. This occurred in an environment saturated with biological determinism i.e., the belief that social and economic differences between races, classes or sexes come from biologically inherited differences and that societal differences reflect these biological differences. In an environment of biological determinism, attempts to define and measure intelligence became more polemical than empirical; data became weapons to prove racist ideas rather than tools to investigate the nature of human intelligence. Created in this environment, the intelligence test quantified intelligence as a single score or number, and because the number existed as a singular entity intelligence was conceptualized in the same way.

The search for the psychologist's stone, to measure and quantify intelligence began with craniometry, the study of skull shapes and sizes, the argument being advanced that the bigger the skull the greater the intelligence. To understand the role of craniometry in scientific thinking Gould takes us back to pre-Darwinian styles of racism: monogenism and polygenism, the former holding that non-Caucasian races degenerated from a single source, Adam and Eve, and the latter claiming human races were separate biological species. The role of craniometry became one of justifying social and political differences between whites and blacks with physiological and psychological differences. Agassiz, one of the founders of modern anthropology, argued vehemently for the separation of races and a natural division of labor in which whites use their mind and blacks their hands. Morton, a contemporary of Agassiz, empirically gathered information from hundreds of skulls to prove the relationship between race and skull size (intelligence). Whites did indeed have larger skulls and the skulls of white males consistently proved to be larger than those of white females. Through re-analysis of this data, Gould shows that Morton finagled his data in a number of ways, combining groups when it was convenient, and treating them separately when it wasn't. In addition, he completely disregarded sex and body size differences, comparing the skulls of smaller women and small statured minorities with large statured whites.

The latter half of the Nineteenth Century showed a similar fascination with skull and brain size and a similar biasing of data; the purpose of the measurement was not to investigate the relationship between brain size and intelligence but to demonstrate that white brains were larger. A most disturbing part of this story is Gould's discovery of a chapter in a 1978 educational yearbook suggesting the lower I.Q.'s of laborers could be accounted for by the fact that their heads were 9.2mm smaller than professionals (569.9 vs 560.7). Craniometery lives.

Binet's work at the beginning of the Twentieth Century brought the development of intelligence testing as we know it today. Using memory and simple arithmetic and logic tasks, Binet attempted to screen children needing assistance in special classrooms. Binet himself was vocally cautious
about the uses of his tests; they were pragmatic attempts to identify learning problems and were not measures of fixed, innate intelligence nor were they to be used as the cornerstone for a theory of intellect. Unfortunately subsequent workers in the field were not this cautious.

Goddard brought the Binet tests to America but transformed their meaning and uses. Intelligence became a single innate entity described by a unilinear scale; races differed on the scale and the opportunity for procreation should be determined by a person's position on the scale. Eugenics now had an instrument to sort people. Terman, developer and popularizer of the Stanford-Binet continued in this direction, treating I.Q. as a single inherited entity within the individual and finding distinct differences between classes and races. The Army Mental Tests, developed by Robert Yerkes provided even more evidence of inherited white superiority; the darker immigrants from southern Europe and the Slavs of Eastern Europe scored lower than whites, with Blacks at the bottom of the continuum. Unfortunately the developers and interpreters of the test took items like "Crisco is a patent medicine, disinfectant, toothpaste, food product?" and "Christy Mathewson is famous as a: writer, artist, baseball player, comedian?" to be measures of innate intelligence rather than culturally acquired knowledge.

A chapter on factor analysis serves as a prelude to the final section dealing with the work of Charles Spearman, Cyril Burt, and Arthur Jensen. The discussion of factor analysis and its role in the conceptualization of Spearman's g factor is clear and understandable (even to a numberphile such as myself). If g, or general intelligence, can be factor analyzed out of intelligence tests, then it must exist, and if patterns of g can be found within females, then the vehicle of transmission must be heredity. Cyril Burt extended Spearman's work to the study of I.Q. in twins; what better test of hereditary intelligence than monozygotic offspring? Burt's data showed intelligence to be strongly related to heredity, but later researchers discovered that he had falsified his data. The chapter then proceeds to a discussion of Arthur Jensen, the most out-spoken hereditarian in the area today. The techniques are more complex (perhaps this is why they are harder to fault) but the assumptions and conclusions are the same. Blacks score lower on these tests and the reason can be found in the blood, blue, black, or otherwise.

If the book has a short-coming it is the absence of discussion of alternative conceptions of intelligence and ways of measuring it. After finishing the book the reader understands how intelligence shouldn't be defined but it is left without alternate procedures for thinking about, or measuring intelligence. But in fairness to the author, this was not the book's primary purpose.

An interesting and disturbing feature of the book is Gould's almost cavalier handling of the extensive scientific bias and faking uncovered. Dismissing the fraud of Sir Cyril Burt and Goddard (who allegedly altered
photographs of the Kallikaks to suggest mental retardation) as historically uninteresting "... except as gossip because the perpetrators know what they are doing . . ." (p. 27) the author also treats unconscious bias as a given dimension of the scientific perspective.

These latter two comments should not be considered as major criticisms of the work as a whole. Though written for the lay public, it has definite value to educators. It provides an understandable and readable account of the development of intelligence testing from a perspective not seen in most psychological or psychometric texts. The book should be read by educators not only for the historical insight it provides into the present day intelligence testing controversy but also for the view it provides into the relationship between the working of science and the society in which it exists.

References

What should the purposes of schooling be in our society? Nyberg and Egan address this important question in *Erosion of Education*. Their discussion is framed within two perspectives—socialization and education. The authors argue that schools should be simultaneously involved in the dual process of educating and socialization. It is suggested that at the present time education is increasingly being eroded at the expense of socialization. The central focus of the book is to clarify the distinction between these two functions of schooling. The authors argue that it is necessary to make this difference clear in order to insure that education does not become absorbed by socialization. The approach of the book, therefore, is philosophical in that its purpose is to clarify and distinguish between two conceptions of the purpose of schooling.

Socialization is defined by the authors as "...preparation for a life of gainful employment and participation in everyday social, economic and political activities (p. ix)." Education "... refers to a somewhat different and less practical set of dispositions and capabilities to appreciate and enjoy those aspects of one's culture that include a historical perspective and the life of the mind (p. ix)."

While the book's primary purpose is to rescue education from the dead hand of socialization, the authors do not advocate that schools ignore socialization. It is acknowledged that socialization is an essential function of schools and that in many cases it can not be separated from education. Socialization, it is stated, is essential; education is merely desirable. While the authors ostensibly accept the notion that the schools should be involved with both processes, it is their conclusion that due to a variety of forces within society and the educational community schools are failing to educate.

If one accepts the position that education has been eroded and should be restored to a significant position among the purposes of schooling, then what is required? In order to move schooling beyond its overemphasis on socialization, the authors suggest that the starting point be an educational theory applied to educational decision making and planning. An educational theory, it is argued, is not based on social utility, but rather on a theory of human nature. A four stage theory of human development is presented as a guide to the educational process. These stages are seen as critical periods for the development of the capacities characteristic of each stage: the mythic stage in which learning involves making sense of the unknown world (without) in terms of human world (within); the romantic
stage in which students respond to the alien world by associating with those elements that one powerful, noble, heroic, etc.; the philosophic stage which following reflection of the romantic world view focuses on abstract general schemes as sources of truth; and the ironic stage which arrives with the realization that no general scheme can adequately reflect the richness and complexity of reality. Following the presentation of their educational theory, the authors conclude the book with an analysis of presuppositions which influence curriculum, some reservations regarding behavioral objectives, and observations on the usefulness of teaching effectiveness research.

While this book achieves modest success within the parameters set, it is disappointing on a number of accounts. First, for the authors to achieve their goal of distinguishing between the terms "education" and "socialization", there is a need for precise definition, yet we are repeatedly told that such definitions are not possible: "educating... is rather vague and difficult to specify in any detail, but it refers to a range of cultural attainments that do not serve any social end while enriching in some way the life of the person who acquires them (p. 2)"; the capacities of educated people "... do not lend itself to precise specification — this doesn't mean it isn't a precise capacity — it means it is complex and varied and may take different forms in each education person (p. 39)"; "... education is ultimately a personal experience whose nature is a part of the person experiencing and which ultimately is inaccessible to anyone else — like pain, love can't be set up in neat sets of skills, knowledge and attitudes (p. 120)."

As the authors' definition of the term education is left casually ill-defined, so too is the term socialization left in lexical limbo. While one can be sympathetic with the authors' inability to present a precise definition for the term education, their lack of clarity and consistency with regard to the use of the term socialization is less understandable. There exists a rich and varied literature on the study of socialization which is present in such works as the *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research* (Goslin, 1969) and the third edition of *Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology* (Mussen, 1970). This literature suggests at least three interpretations of the term socialization: 1) as enculturation-transmission of culture from generation to generation; 2) as acquisition of impulse control-channeling potentially disruptive drives into socially acceptable forms; and 3) as role training-training the child for social participation. The authors' stipulated definition of the term appears to be similar to the role training interpretation, yet their own use of the term frequently strays to other meanings. For example, when talking about an approach to the teaching of history which emphasizes socialization, it is interpreted as knowing "... the main events leading to the formation of the society and culture (p. 39)". This traditional view of the teaching of history appears to be more compatible with the ideal of socialization as enculturation than role training.

The confusion created by the authors' failure to pin down the meanings
of the key concepts is also apparent in their discussion of values clarification. The author's claim that values clarification is a vehicle of "... socialization in the ways one can learn to express beliefs in values and suppress conflict over values (p. 77)." This is yet another meaning of the term socialization as used by the authors. Among the major criticisms of values clarification has been that it espouses ethical relativism based on a personal subjective epistemology (e.g., see Lockwood, 1975 and Stewart, 1975). Values clarification advocates no specific substantive values that people should hold, but rather it simply espouses a method of looking at value questions. The end result of the values clarification process according to its proponents is that each person hold his/her own self-chosen and carefully examined set of personal values. This sounds surprisingly like what Nyberg and Egan would call the goal of the educative process. The claim that values clarification is socialization into a way of inquiry raises the question of whether the label socialization, as used by the authors, cannot be applied to what the authors themselves advocate as essential to the educative process: the method of philosophic dialogue. One can raise the question of whether teaching children to think within the framework of any intellectual tradition isn't itself a form of socialization/enculturation in that it forces men to be alike in their worldviews with regard to the nature of acceptable modes of inquiry?

A second major weakness of the book is that it takes an exclusively philosophic approach to a topic which in my judgement requires psychological explication and analysis. In order to fully understand the relationship between education and socialization one must inevitably consider questions of a psychological and/or developmental nature. The following are some of the questions which appear central to an understanding of the relationship between these concepts: What evidence does one accept in order to support or reject the claims that socialization stifles education or that education transforms socialization?; is it possible to develop in students a critical historical consciousness and at the same time socialize one into a commitment to general cultural norms?; should how one practically approaches the socialization/education issue vary from elementary to adult education?; developmentally, are there propitious times for socialization or education to receive the major emphasis in schools?; in what way are the two complementary—that is, how does one at the same time make men more like each other and more different?; what would be the effect of placing the major emphasis in elementary schools on education—how would this be different in assumptions, practice and effects from child-centered approaches? My disappointment with this book is not that these sorts of questions weren't answered, for they are exceedingly difficult, but rather that they weren't seriously addressed.

A third major area in which the book is disappointing is in its discussion of socialization in schools as a phenomenena best viewed from a curricular
perspective. The learning of social roles and norms, if it is to be adequately understood, must involve an analysis of the various contributions of family, peers, media, school and classroom atmosphere, significant adult role models, and the like. The perspective of this book, that schooling and more specifically curriculum (through the quantification of outcomes) is the primary agent for understanding the socialization of youth, is needlessly restrictive.

Another interesting position adopted by the authors is their view on the need for societal transformation and the essential role that education plays in this process. In this regard the authors state that "what one owes society discussions are okay but education requires anti-societal urges" (p. 78); "if our concern is the transformation of society, we must go beyond socialization and into education" (p. 34), and "an educational theory may well prescribe an educational process whose products could transform present society" (p. 40). On the other hand, the authors also state that education involves an “appreciation of and pleasure in participation in society” (p. 1) and “school will change only when society takes for itself new values” (p. 31). The authors’ exact position on education and its relationship to existing society is unclear. They appear to hold that education and societal change are related. On the other hand, education is seen as developing an appreciation and enjoyment of the existing society. In my judgement, a more satisfactory analysis of the proper relationship between schooling and society, is presented by Postman (1979) in his thermostatic view of education. According to this view, the major role of schooling, in the years immediately ahead, is to help conserve that which is both necessary to a humane survival and threatened by a furious and exhausting culture. Postman acknowledges that there are times in cultural history where stasis sets in and the proper role of education is to produce perspectives which will contribute to social change. The authors appear to feel this is such a time, however, it is Postman’s position, and I concur, that at this time in history this is not required, nor is it desirable. The authors of Erosion do not address the question of the relationship between education and the society into which “educated” students will enter. They make a strong argument for elevating idiosyncrasy and individualism in an age suffering from uncertainty over core values, social fragmentation and rampant narcissism.

Another point which is intriguing, yet not developed enough to be satisfactory, is the authors’ interpretation of the role of scientific inquiry in educational planning. The authors separate educational theory from empirical inquiry. They argue that we shouldn’t be able to empirically test the theory—the major test of educational theory must be conceptual involving consistency, coherence, and plausibility. The theory itself is seen as created to begin (re) building defenses against the modern incursion of socialization and its agent, educational psychology. The authors carry this line of thought regarding the relevance of empirical analysis to educational issues
further when they make the related point which will be surprising to many, that teaching effectiveness studies have failed to yield secure generalizations (p. 106). Granted there are very few assertions in the realm of human affairs which are "secure"; however, in my judgment, it seems presumptuous of the authors to claim, without careful analysis and argument, that the teaching effectiveness research of the past decade has not contributed to our understanding of the conditions of schooling which foster—or hinder—student learning. The authors' skeptical view of educational psychology is perplexing in that, if their analysis is correct, we are left with the problem of devising new methods of resolving conflicting interpretations of the results of schooling. For example, what is the impact on children of those forces in school which represent what the authors would call socialization? Obviously they feel the cost of socialization is high, namely the loss of the attributes and character associated with the educated person. It is a frequent jeremiad of school critics that schools have a significant and deleterious impact on many of the characteristics schools should be committed to enhancing, e.g., creativity, sensitivity, capacity for critical inquiry, sense of self worth, human potential, etc. Defenders of schools, on the other hand, are fond of pointing to the social and economic benefits of the values emphasized in schools and to the adult happiness which schooled individuals experience as a result of those values. How can one resolve such conflicting interpretations adequately from a purely philosophical framework. Philosophic inquiry may help one to clarify the nature of educational language and relationships between concepts, but I fail to see how it can help in determining the results of the schooling experience. It is the results of contemporary schooling which lie at the heart of the authors' argument yet they fail to offer a method for resolving disputes concerning differences of perception. For all its shortcomings, the empirical study of schooling, as one means of collecting knowledge, at least commits us to a dialogue based on standards of evidence and an attempt to achieve a degree of objectivity.

In my judgment the proper focus of the issues provocatively posed by Nyberg and Egan lies not in the domains of the apparently conflicting enterprises of socialization and education but in a more unitary developmental perspective which offers greater potential for understanding and designing schooling experiences. An alternative construction of the socialization/education issue centers around the process by which youth develop a commitment to social norms, how that commitment is adapted and modified until it becomes critically and autonomously held, and how this process can be mediated in schools in such a way as not to needlessly crush the dignity and creative intelligence of individuals. When the issue is posted in these terms the insights of Durkheim (1925/1973) and Piaget (1965) offer fruitful insights into the dynamics of socialization and the development of mature social understanding. Durkheim with his emphasis on the behavioral dimension of social development and Piaget with his focus on the development of
social understanding offer perspectives which do not view socialization and individual autonomy as concepts at war with each other in which one is accomplished at the expense of the other. Durkheim insightfully shows that authority, discipline, and social conformity are not necessarily growth stunting experiences insensitively imposed on vulnerable youth by unreflective and brutish teachers, but rather are rational and necessary contexts of developmental stages leading to the development of socially responsible and rationally autonomous adults. In an extension of Durkheim's thesis Piaget suggests that the development of an autonomous perspective on personal and social responsibility inevitably involves a morality of constraint followed by a morality of cooperation. Nyberg and Egan's position on the socialization/education issue appears to take little cognizance of the developmentally intertwined nature of these elusive concepts. To "educate" young children without an emphasis on authority and discipline may well result in miseducation due to its developmentally inappropriate nature. The failure of Nyberg and Egan to place their prescriptions for schooling within a psychologically sound developmental context leaves one with the possibility of the practice of schooling without attention to the necessary developmental experiences essential to the development of those basic understandings and commitments necessary for successful social life.

References


Lockwood, Alan L. A critical view of values clarification. Teachers College Record, 1975, 77, 35-50.


Editorial Comment: Academic Freedom and Government Restraints

Jack L. Nelson

The following statement on an issue of great importance to higher education, and to freedom in the larger society, is based upon a continuing series of papers developed by the American Association of University Professors. The papers are (and will be) published in *Academe* (September 1982; January, 1983), the AAUP Journal, and provide detail and analysis of the problem. Another informative and alarming publication on this matter appeared in the *New York Times Magazine*, September 25, 1983: "The New Effort to Control Information", by Floyd Abrams. The statement below is an official AAUP view; one that deserves attention by CUFA members.

**AAUP Statement on Academic Freedom and Government Restraint**

In the last few years the American academic community has witnessed increased restrictions by the federal government on scholarly and scientific pursuits which—by their nature, their sweep, and their intimidating character—cause grave harm to academic freedom.

The current administration, acting in the name of national security, has directly blocked the open presentation of unclassified research results at academic conferences. It has continued to deny visas to foreign academics invited to attend scholarly meetings in this country, and has done so on a more expansive basis than did previous administrations. It has promulgated an executive order which extends the reach of the government’s system for classifying information by relaxing the standard according to which the determination of classification is made.

Most recently, it has issued a directive which places more than 100,000 government employees and some 15,000 federal contractors indefinitely under the constraints of government censorship. These persons, who currently have access to highly classified intelligence information, are required to submit to a government agency for prior review virtually everything they
may write, even after they leave government service, before discussing what they have written with or showing it to any other person not authorized to have access to the classified information. The same directive provides that government employees may be required to submit to random polygraph examinations as a condition of employment, although the polygraph itself is of doubtful validity, its use is widely feared, and submission to the examination may be required without regard to a stated probable cause and without any clear limits respecting the questions to be answered.

These actions are at war with the principles of free expression in a free society. They inevitably inhibit that robust search for truth which is the genuine source of our scientific and technological achievements. They impair informed discussion of public issues. They foment antagonism between government officials and academic researchers. They isolate researchers from each other while erecting ineffective barriers to the transmission of knowledge abroad. They take their toll on the willingness to serve government of those of us in the academic community who believe that the diminution of freedom is too great a price to pay for the opportunity to carry out government responsibilities. They invite cynicism about the government's assertions concerning threats to the national security. They lead us in the direction of emulating those societies with which we have traditionally contrasted ourselves.

Government officials have not demonstrated that their imposed restrictions are essential to our welfare. Indeed, each recent additional government restraint has added to restrictions that were already excessive, already compromising of academic freedom, and susceptible to executive manipulation.

AAUP's Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, which has issued three formal reports in the last year and a half on the ramifications for academic freedom of the government's restrictive practices, is mindful of the risks which the exercise of academic freedom may entail. We reiterate our longstanding position, however, that these risks are well worth taking in order to avoid the greater hazard of impeding the free search for knowledge. It is not only that useful research may be frustrated. The repressive nature of the administration's actions undermines the foundation of free government, the common confidence that those exercising political authority are responsive to the will of the people.
Search for Editor of TRSE

The College and University Faculty Assembly (CUFA) of the National Council for the Social Studies welcomes nominations or applications for the position of editor of its quarterly journal, Theory and Research in Social Education. The candidate shall have demonstrated a record of scholarly work and a commitment to high quality research and theory in the field. In addition, candidates must have institutional commitment and support for the editorship.

Editorial duties will begin August 1, 1984 and will extend through December, 1987. The deadline for submission of nominations is April 20, 1984. Send nominations or applications to:

Lee Ehman, Chairperson
Search Committee for TRSE
School of Education 227
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47405
812-335-9076
Abstracts

Effects of Overt Teacher Enthusiasm on First-Grade Student's Acquisition of Three Concepts
McKinney, Larkins and Burts

This study examined the effects of high, medium, and low levels of overt teacher enthusiasm on first-grade students' (N = 47) acquisition of three social studies concepts. Results of analysis of variance indicated that students taught with a medium level of overt enthusiasm performed significantly better than students taught with either low or high levels. Informal observation indicated that the students taught with a high level of overt enthusiasm were more disruptive than students taught with a medium or a low level.

Approaches to Teaching Concepts and Conceptualizing: An Analysis of Social Studies Methods Textbooks
William B. Stanley

Thirty-nine social studies teaching methods textbooks were examined to determine the nature of their treatment of the teaching of concepts. These texts were published since 1970, represented the most popular texts, and included texts for teaching different grade levels. Quantitative data were obtained in regard to the extent of coverage of concept teaching, and a subjective analysis of the quality of coverage, as compared with research work on concept development, was undertaken. A rating scale was used for overall evaluation. The study concluded that most methods texts for social studies teaching do not provide sufficient information, definition, discussion of research, expression of the limitations of strategies, or specific guidelines for applying strategies.
Call for Nominations

1984 Exemplary Dissertation Award in Social Studies Education

The National Council for the Social Studies is sponsoring an Exemplary Dissertation Award competition in order to recognize excellence in research conducted by doctoral candidates in areas related to social studies education. The author of the selected dissertation will receive a certificate of merit and $150.

The award will be conferred on the basis of dissertation research in the pursuit of the doctoral degree. Research is broadly defined to include experimental, conceptual, historical, philosophical, and other modes appropriate to the problem investigated. For a dissertation to be selected for the award, it must make a significant contribution to the field of social education. The dissertation must also be outstanding in the areas of problem statement, analysis of related literature, methods and procedures, analysis of data, and discussion of results.

For the 1984 award, the dissertation must have been completed between June 16, 1983 and June 15, 1984. Nominations should include four copies of an abstract, not more than three 8½ × 11" pages, typed, double-spaced, submitted by June 15, 1984. The heading of the abstract must include the author's name, address, telephone number, name of institution where degree was completed, name of major advisor, and date of degree completion. Include a self-addressed, stamped envelope for acknowledgement. The Subcommittee may ask for the submission of the completed dissertation by August 1, 1984.

Send materials to:

Dr. Stanley E. Easton
Department of Secondary Education
Montana State University
Bozeman, MT 59717

1983 Research Award in Social Studies Education

The Research Advisory Committee of the National Council for the Social Studies is sponsoring an annual Research Award to acknowledge and encourage scholarly inquiry into significant issues for social education. Awards will be made for published research studies. Ideally, such research would:

1. offer an explicit conceptual framework and rationale, sensitive to the interconnections of theory, inquiry, and practice;
2. evidence scholarly integrity, methodology appropriate to the questions raised, credible procedures and analysis; and

3. attend to social, political, and ethical implications.

Studies bearing 1982 and 1983 publication dates will be considered for the 1984 Award to be presented at the Annual Meeting. Applicants should submit five copies of the published article, chapter, book, or monograph; five copies of a one-page abstract; and their agreement to present the research, if selected for the Award, in a special session at the NCSS meeting in Washington, D.C. Send materials, by June 15, 1984, and address inquiries to:

Dennie L. Smith
Department of Curriculum & Instruction
Memphis State University
Memphis, Tennessee 38152
Journal Information

Theory and Research in Social Education is designed to stimulate and communicate systematic research and thinking in social education. The purpose is to foster the creation and exchange of ideas and research findings that will expand knowledge about purposes, conditions, and effects of schooling and education about society and social relations.

We welcome manuscripts on a variety of topics including:

- Purposes of social education;
- Models, theories, and related frameworks concerning the development, diffusion, and adoption of curricular materials;
- Instructional strategies;
- The relation of the social sciences, philosophy, history and/or the arts to social education;
- The politics, economics, sociology, social psychology, psychology, anthropology, philosophy, and/or the history of social education;
- Alternative social organizations and utilizations of the school for social education;
- Comparative studies of alternative models of social education;
- Models of and research on alternative schemas for student participation and social action;
- Relationship of different pre- and in-service patterns of teacher training to social education;
- Models of the utilization of objectives in social education and related research findings;
- Implications of learning theory, child development research, socialization and political socialization research for the purposes and practice of social education;
- The relationship of different independent, explanatory variables to educational achievements in the area of learning about society and social relations;
- The social climate and cohesion of schools and other school characteristics as independent, explanatory variables predicting general achievement.
Submission of Manuscripts

In order to facilitate the processing and review of manuscripts, authors are asked to follow these procedures:

1. Manuscripts should be typed with a dark ribbon or clearly mimeographed, multilithed, or photocopied. Some corrections in dark ink will be accepted.
2. Four copies of each manuscript should be submitted.
3. The author's name and affiliation should appear on a separate cover page, along with an abstract of approximately 100 words.
4. Only the title of the article should appear on the first page of the manuscript.
5. All text, references, abstracts and endnotes should be double-spaced.

Manuscript Style

1. When citations are made, the name of the author, publication date, and any necessary page number should be enclosed in parentheses and located directly in the text. The complete reference should be included in section labeled “References.”

   For example, “Teachers commonly assume that students must acquire background information before they can be expected to think or to test their insights.” (Hunt and Metcalf, 1968, p. 54)

2. Endnotes should not be used to cite references. Substantive endnotes should be numbered sequentially and inserted in text.

3. References should be alphabetized and located at the end of the manuscript. The reference list should contain only those sources which are cited in the text. Examples of references to a chapter in an edited work, a book, and a journal article follow.


4. Each table and/or figure should be placed on a separate page and placed in a separate section at the end of the manuscript. Arabic numerals should be used for numbering both figures and tables, and their location in the text should be indicated by the following note:

   Table/Figure ____________ about here.

5. Send manuscripts to: Jack L. Nelson Editor, TRSE

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Rutgers University
New Brunswick, NJ 08903
Subscription Information

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