Full Issue 7.2-3

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The present issue of *Genocide Studies and Prevention* is a combined issue. Since the previous two volumes, “60 Years after the Ratification of the Genocide Convention: Critical Reflections on the State and Future of Genocide Studies, Parts 1 and 2” were longer than usual, the editors decided to combine Volume 7, Issues 2 and 3 into a single issue. It is a general issue containing a wide variety of material and should be, we hope, of interest to a broad range of readers.

This issue continues the tradition followed by *Genocide Studies and Prevention* throughout its now seven years of publication as a peer-reviewed, print journal dedicated to publishing a wide variety of high-quality manuscripts devoted to the understanding and prevention of genocide.

The first of the six articles examines a topic of great interest, but one which has seen little in the way of scholarly material: it examines state-induced famine and use of prisons as possible mechanisms of genocide—or, at least, massive human rights violations—in North Korea. Rhoda Howard-Hassmann examines the famine that took place from 1994 to 2000 which, she estimates, killed 3–5% of North Korea’s population. She notes that there appears to be “little recourse under international law to punish the perpetrators of state-induced famine.” Yet, she points out that it might fit some of the criteria of genocide under the United Nations Genocide Convention. Her conclusion looks at how strategic, political “concerns about North Korea’s nuclear weapons outweigh humanitarian concerns about North Korea’s citizens.”

Of course, there is nothing unusual in this state of affairs since political calculations always trump humanitarian concerns in international politics. In the second article, “A System, Society, and Community Perspective on Genocide,” Adrian M. Gallagher points out that genocide scholars often miss the point that the very definition of genocide is open to interpretation. Their perceptions are, he argues, warped by a view of the world which helps to explain the different perspectives. Gallagher then uses the “concepts of an international system, an international society, and an international community to demonstrate how one’s worldview holds implications for how one understands genocide.” These two articles are followed by two case studies: the first addresses the leadership of Roméo Dallaire in the UNAMIR mission to Rwanda and the next, the fourth in the volume, focuses on the 1965–1966 genocide in East Timor.

In “The True Measure of Success: The Leadership of Roméo Dallaire in the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda,” Sarah Devonshire evaluates Lieutenant General Dallaire’s actions prior to the beginning of the genocide. She concludes that his attempts to fulfill UNAMIR’s directives—“despite resistance on all sides”—disproves arguments that his failure of leadership “was a primary contributor to the outbreak of the Rwandan Genocide.” This is followed by an examination of mass murder in Indonesia and East Timor in the 1960s and 1970s. In “Foreshadowing Future Slaughter: From the Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966 to the 1974–1999 Genocide in East Timor,” Kai Thaler argues that the failure to stop the earlier mass killing in Indonesia allowed the “establishment of genocidal regimes that institutionalize genocide as a tactic of repression and power consolidation.” This was exactly what happened with the “New Order government of Indonesia, which committed mass killings of known and alleged Communists throughout Indonesia in 1965–1966 and later carried out a genocidal colonial occupation of East Timor.” He notes parallels between
the actors and tactics, and concludes that the “Indonesian case illustrates the necessity of punishment for genocide to preclude a culture of impunity that encourages both previous and new offenders.”

The fifth contribution to this joint issue shifts gears to examine psychological factors in the possible dissolution of human bonds which contribute to genocidal behaviors. In “Thy Brother’s Keeper? The Relationship between Social Distance and Dehumanization Intensity during Genocides,” Lisa Haagensen and Marnix Croes hypothesize that “the degree of social distance between the perpetrator group and the victim group prior to the outbreak of genocide is inversely related to the degree of dehumanization severity employed by the perpetrator group during the genocide.” Using data from Rwanda and the Holocaust in Eastern and Western Europe, they find that their hypothesis is confirmed by the cases of Rwanda and Eastern Europe, but that the results for Western Europe present “an anomaly within the context of the proposed hypothesis.”

The final contribution, “The Question of an Armenian Revolution and the Radicalization of the Committee of Union and Progress toward the Armenian Genocide” by Wolfgang Gust, raises questions concerning Hilmar Kaiser’s argument and finds that important “facts showing the extent of the Genocide have been overlooked.”


GSP 7.2/3 is a combined issue with a diverse series of articles that examine numerous aspects of genocide and the prevention of genocide. Throughout our seven years of publication we have endeavored to bring to our readers the finest scholarship in these areas. We hope this combined issue continues that tradition.

Herb Hirsch
This article discusses North Korea as a case of state-induced famine, or faminogenesis. A famine from 1994 to 2000 killed 3–5% of North Korea’s population, and mass hunger reappeared in 2010–2012, despite reforms meant to address the shortage of food. In addition, a prison population of about 200,000 people is systematically deprived of food; this might be considered penal starvation. There seems little recourse under international law to punish the perpetrators of state-induced famine and penal starvation. State-induced famine does, however, fit some of the criteria of genocide in the United Nations Convention against Genocide, and could also be considered a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. There would seem, then, to have been a case for referral of North Korea’s recently deceased leader, Kim Jong Il, to the International Criminal Court, and it is still a case for referral of Kim’s successors. However, strategic concerns about North Korea’s nuclear weapons outweigh humanitarian concerns about North Korea’s citizens.

Key words: North Korea, state-induced famine, faminogenesis, penal starvation

Introduction

Scholars of genocide know that it is not unusual for governments to kill their own citizens, but two ways that states do this have remained relatively unstudied. The first method is state-induced famine—that is, state policies that create famine. The second is penal starvation—state policies to starve prisoners to death.

David Marcus coined the term faminogenesis to describe public policies that generate famine, using Amartya Sen’s definition of famine as a “particularly virulent manifestation of [starvation] causing widespread death.” Marcus presents a typology of four levels of faminogenic behavior: intentional famine (deliberately using famine as means of extermination), reckless famine (continuing policies despite evidence of famine), famine by indifference (turning a blind eye to mass hunger), and famine by incompetence. He also recommends that intentional and reckless faminogenesis be specifically prohibited by international law. I add to Marcus’s analysis my own recommendation that penal starvation also be specifically prohibited by international law, perhaps as a subcategory of faminogenesis. I define penal starvation as a state’s deliberate policy to subject prisoners in penal institutions and camps to starvation rations.

I use the term state-induced famine interchangeably with faminogenesis to clarify that faminogenesis is often a state activity. The history of the twentieth century reveals several major cases in which communist states caused citizens to starve. Among those citizens were the approximately 3.3 million ethnic Ukrainians who starved to death in the Soviet Union in 1932–1933; the 45 million people who starved during Mao Tse-Tung’s “Great Leap Forward” from 1958 to 1962; and the hundreds of thousands who starved to death in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979. Similarly, both

community and fascist regimes used penal starvation as a tool of punishment and extermination. Under Nazi rule, Jews in ghettos, Soviet prisoners of war, and all inmates of concentration camps faced starvation. Under communism, prisoners in the Soviet gulag as well as the Chinese laogai (prison camp complex) were also starved to death. One might wish to think that state-induced famine and penal starvation disappeared with the defeat of Nazism and the end of both Soviet and Chinese communism, but there are still countries where these practices exist—for example, North Korea (formally named the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). North Korea is an example of reckless and possibly intentional faminogenesis.

Examination of North Korea raises the question of whether intentional and reckless faminogenesis is or should be considered an aspect of the crime of genocide. Knowledge of the general human rights situation helps to evaluate whether a famine is intentional or reckless. If a regime denies all human rights, it cannot be deemed less than reckless in its creation of a famine. Famines do not occur, contends Sen, in countries with functioning multiparty democracies. This is because when citizens can exercise their democratic rights, they can protest against government policies that undermine their access to food and threaten to vote the government out of office. No such recourse is possible in totalitarian dictatorships such as North Korea.

This article begins with a brief historical background, followed by sections explaining the occurrence of famine in North Korea in the mid-1990s and 2010–2012, and discussing the legal basis for considering North Korea’s food policies to be at minimum reckless, possibly intentional, faminogenesis. Following this is a section describing penal starvation and its victims. The article continues with discussion of what could have been done under international law before the December 2011 death of Kim Jong Il—North Korea’s leader since 1994—to punish the regime for its use of famine and penal starvation. At best, I contend, Kim Jong Il was guilty of reckless faminogenesis and should have been prosecuted accordingly, had a law prohibiting reckless faminogenesis existed. In the absence of such a law, Kim should have been prosecuted for the many crimes against humanity—and possibly crimes of genocide—he had committed. Should the leaders who took over after Kim Jong Il’s death continue his policies, they will also become candidates for such prosecution. However, as the final section explains, the international community’s strategic and security interests in North Korea render it unlikely that the rulers of the country will be tried for any of these crimes.

Before continuing, a note is necessary on sources. This article relies in part on news reports, reports from international human rights non-governmental organizations, and books written by reporters and activists. These sources, in turn, rely heavily on interviews with North Korean refugees in South Korea and northern China; interviews in China are clandestine. It is almost impossible for foreigners to enter North Korea and those who do enter are very carefully watched. Nevertheless, the testimony that the various researchers have accrued over the years, especially since large numbers of people started to enter China illegally during the famine of the mid-1990s, is remarkably consistent and can be considered reliable. As of 2001, 2,300 refugee accounts existed; by 2011, there were many more. These are not sensationalist accounts; researchers are very careful to cross-check them when they can and, if possible, to conduct methodologically sound surveys of refugees. Taken as a whole and checked against other sources, refugees’ accounts can be considered reasonably reliable.
Historical Background

North Korea, a state severely isolated and cut off from the international community, is a creation of the Cold War. From 1910 to 1945, the Korean Peninsula was colonized by the Japanese. At the end of World War II, the Americans and Soviets agreed that Korea would be split at the 38th parallel, a line arbitrarily chosen as it roughly divided this ancient kingdom into two equal parts. Kim Il Sung, allegedly a heroic guerilla leader against the Japanese in Manchuria,11 was chosen by the Soviet Union to lead the North. In 1950, anticipating an easy victory, he attacked the South. The United Nations and the United States came to the defense of the South, leading newly Communist China to enter the war on the side of the North. An extremely brutal, three-year war ensued in which hundreds of thousands died, many from American bombs and napalm.12 North Korea is estimated to have suffered 300,000 military and 400,000 civilian deaths.13 In 1953, the two parties signed a truce and retreated to their respective sides of the 38th parallel. There is no peace treaty, and the two Koreas are still technically at war, leaving a heavily defended demilitarized zone between the two states.

North Korea’s official ideology, introduced in 1970, is called Juche, comprising “self-control, independence, and self-sufficiency”—in a word, self-reliance. The regime also perpetuates a mythology that its hereditary rulers represent “the will of both heaven and earth.”15 Kim Il Sung died in 1994 and was succeeded by his son Kim Jong Il, who ruled North Korea until his death; he, in turn, was succeeded by his own son, Kim Jong Un. While Kim Jong Il lived a life of luxury, enjoying Western movies, Western food cooked by imported chefs, and “entertainment women,”16 the overwhelming majority of the population lived on the edge of starvation. The official organ controlling the state is the Korean Workers’ Party,17 supplemented by an extremely large military of approximately 1.1 million people out of an estimated population of 24.5 million.18

In the 1950s and 1960s, North Korea was more prosperous than its southern neighbor.19 In part, this was because it had inherited most of the industrial capacity and infrastructure created under Japanese rule;20 in part it was because the Soviet Union heavily subsidized its economy.21 When the Soviet Union de-Stalinized in the 1950s, North Korea turned to China for infrastructure, energy, and food support. Food shortages occurred in 1945–1946 (just after WWII), 1954–1955 (just after the Korean War), and 1969–1974,22 and food rations began to decline steadily from about 1970.23 Moreover, industry and infrastructure quickly declined as a result of inadequate maintenance, poor management, lack of spare parts, and lack of an external market for the shoddy goods that the factories produced.24

Problems in food production were caused in large part by highly inefficient, collectivized agriculture. Immediately after World War II, the government seized all land belonging to Japanese colonialists and Korean landlords and redistributed it to peasants. The initial redistribution was unsuccessful and food production fell. The government then collectivized all land in the 1950s,25 first in cooperative farms and then in state farms. Above a certain minimum left for farmers’ own consumption, the entire harvest had to be turned over to the state, which distributed it to citizens through the Public Distribution System (PDS) adopted in 1950. Outside the collectivized farms, only very tiny “micro-farms” on which citizens could cultivate fruits and vegetables and keep small animals, poultry, and bees for their personal consumption or for periodic, legal farmers’ markets were allowed.26
About 62% of the people, mainly urban, were dependent on the PDS for all their food. The PDS distributed food according to a scale that privileged some categories—especially members of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party and the military, and heavy industry workers.27 Even with the PDS system in place, however, the country relied on food aid from its Communist allies—the Soviet Union and China—as early as the 1980s, as its own production of food substantially declined.28 Thus, North Korea’s collectivized system of food production, its refusal to allow almost any private production of food, its prohibition of food markets, and its reliance on food rationing all set the stage for the famines of the 1990s and 2000s.

Famine

In the early 1990s, the World Food Programme (WFP) described the food situation in North Korea as a “famine in slow motion.”29 By the mid-1990s, it was experiencing a major famine. While many refugee, newspaper, and other reports cited figures of up to 3 million out of a then population of 23 million as having died between 1994 and 2000,30 scholarly accounts present a lower figure of about 600,000 to 1 million dead.31 A South Korean scholar using several types of demographic and statistical data concluded that between 580,000 and 1.1 million people lost their lives during the famine of 1994–2000, or 3–5% of the population.32

North Korea attributed the famine to natural disasters, citing poor harvests and flooding in 1995. But these “natural” disasters were in large part a consequence of poor decisions by the central government in the 1980s about agricultural policies, which exacerbated the earlier food shortages caused by collectivized food production and distribution. During the 1980s, the government ordered continuous cropping and overuse of chemical fertilizers, which eroded soil quality; there was also much soil erosion and deforestation as hills were denuded of trees to provide more land for cultivation.33 When the floods came, terraced hillsides simply collapsed. By this point there was very little agricultural machinery or fuel; much cultivation was by hand.

This extremely poor agricultural policy was exacerbated when, in the early 1990s, both Russia and China cut their food and fuel aid to North Korea.34 Russia, the successor state to the Soviet Union, had no interest in subsidizing Communist states abroad. Chinese exports of maize to North Korea declined by 80% from 1993 to 1994, in part because of a poor harvest in China itself and in part as punishment to North Korea for having opened up diplomatic relations with Taiwan.35 Both Russia and China informed North Korea that it would have to start paying market prices in hard currency for their exports.36

The regime responded by describing the famine as an “Arduous March.”37 Adopting a disingenuous approach to the famine’s causes, Kim Jong Il first urged upon his subjects the virtues of eating only two meals a day,38 then one, while in the meantime attributing the famine to an imperialist blockade against North Korea.39 At the same time, the regime reduced farm families’ grain rations by 35%, far below subsistence level.40 Rations under the PDS also appeared to have been completely cut off to the northeast in 1994.41 Nevertheless, privileged groups—especially members of the government, the military, and the Korean Worker’s Party—continued to receive rations.42

Reports on the famine, many by refugees, are heartbreaking. A refugee doctor described wasted (emaciated) children whose desperate mothers had fed them weeds and wild grasses. Unable to digest this food, children appeared in the doctor’s under-equipped North Korean hospital with severe medical complications, or simply with a
vague malaise that preceded their deaths; babies died from lack of mother’s milk. Often parents and grandparents denied themselves food so that children could eat; sometimes entire families killed themselves. Married women prostituted themselves in order to obtain money to buy food for their children. Homeless children were reputed to be cannibalized; one refugee reported witnessing the public execution of a 28-year-old man accused of eating a four-year-old child; and the WFP requested the right to inspect farmers’ markets where it was reported that “special meat” on offer was actually human flesh. Ironically, in this devastated land, the very children dying of starvation were taught a song about how they had “nothing to envy” from the rest of the world.

In 1998, a survey by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), WFP, and the European Union (EU) found that 60% of North Korean children were stunted and 50% malnourished. A survey conducted by the UN and EU in 2002 found that the average North Korean, 7-year-old boy was 20 centimeters shorter and 10 kilograms lighter than his counterpart in South Korea. Indeed, the height requirement for entry into the North Korean military was reduced because so many military-age men were stunted. Once the actual famine ended around 2000 as a result of better weather, international food aid, and some policy reforms, a “chronic food emergency” nevertheless ensued well into the first decade of the twenty-first century.

After the worst of the famine in the 1990s, the government introduced some reforms in food production and distribution. As early as 1987, it had decided to permit industrial workers to cultivate small plots of land at their under-producing factories and to permit farmers to expand their personal plots and trade in illegal—though tolerated—farmers’ markets. The factories were given some autonomy from state control and were granted permission to trade manufactured products among themselves and in international markets. The state deregulated cooperative farms and permitted farmers to keep a larger proportion of the food they produced. Men were sometimes obliged to spend time at factories even if there was neither work nor wages for them, while women, who were less likely to be obliged to spend time at factories, began to engage in “sideline” production, selling home-cooked food or handicrafts. The state turned a blind eye to private markets that sprang up in urban areas, indeed legalizing them in 2002. Economic reforms that introduced the basic elements of a market economy were absolutely necessary to put North Korea on the path to real self-sufficiency in food, in contrast to the official ideology of Juche that claimed to be a prescription for self-sufficiency. However, the reforms also had their own detrimental consequences. Although wages were increased, prices rose as well. Moreover, the reforms did not appear to cause a substantial increase in production, as farms and factories still lacked necessary inputs and fuel. As a result, North Korea faced the classic inflationary scenario of too much money facing too few goods—especially too little food.

By 2005, a new system of stratification between rich and poor had developed; those who had access to hard currency either through remittances (mostly from Japan or China), smuggling across the border with China, or crime (such as exporting arms or narcotics) could buy what little food was in the market, while those dependent on meager state wages could not buy what they needed. Thus, this incomplete, regulated, “socialist” marketization resulted in high rates of post-famine malnutrition for those who could not find ways to earn hard currency. Moreover, in its attempt to marketize
the economy, the government abolished the PDS in 2002 except for the top 1 or 2 million people in the country. Those many other North Koreans who had relied on the PDS were suddenly forced to either cultivate their own food or buy food in markets; many lacked the resources to do either. About 50% of formerly PDS-dependent households were unable to meet their caloric requirements. Complicating matters even further, in 2005, the state overturned some of its reforms. It once again banned the private buying and selling of grain and reintroduced the PDS. As of 2008, markets were again closed and women under 40 were no longer allowed to trade, even though women were the mainstays of their families.

Finally, a currency reform in late 2009 effectively wiped out the savings of those North Koreans who were managing to make money in private markets, which they had been using to purchase food. Citizens were obliged to turn in their banknotes, which were replaced at a rate of 1 per 100 won. This was one of the few times that some parts of the population showed their displeasure, with demonstrations taking place against the regime. In response, the government executed Pak Nam Gi—the official in charge of the reform—and sent three dozen of his relatives to prison.

Partly as a consequence of these incomplete and erratic reforms, severe food shortages causing malnutrition and death returned by the end of the decade. This food shortage was partly a result of a lack of seeds, fertilizer, fuel, storage capacity, and advanced agricultural technology. By 2008, the country was “once again on the brink of starvation,” with families eating grass, tree bark, and poisonous mushrooms that could cause death by diarrhea in young children. Matters were made worse by periodic campaigns to boost industrial production, which removed farmers from their fields; “We are being led to our deaths,” said one such farmer. These campaigns continued in 2010–2011 as preparations were made to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung in 2012.

Rations in 2010 met less than half the daily food needs of the 68% of the population dependent upon them. In early 2011, North Korea was begging for food aid as a result of a hard winter, floods, and the spread of foot-and-mouth disease among its animals. In March 2011, estimates were that 6.1 million people—about a quarter of the population—were at severe risk of starvation, especially in the northern and eastern provinces. Diplomats reported that food rations had been halved in 2010–2011, while “feral children” ate dead dogs and rotten food in the markets. By November 2011, a visiting UN official found that about a third of the children under five were at risk of long-term effects of malnutrition. Even members of the military, normally favored by the regime, were suffering malnutrition.

This short description of North Korean economic policy cannot explain all the decisions that caused famine in the 1990s and mass hunger, if not famine, again in 2010–2011. In brief, until 2000, North Korea was a dogmatic, highly authoritarian state that refused to make even the mildest reforms. In the twenty-first century, reform was erratic and internally contradictory—in a word, incompetent at best. Thus, food shortages have been severe for two decades, reaching acute stages from 1994 to 2000 and again in 2010–2012.

The Crime of Faminogenesis

To determine how, if at all, Kim Jong Il should have been treated under international law, it is first necessary to assess in which category of faminogenesis his actions fell. Marcus’s four categories are intentional, reckless, indifferent and incompetent.

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faminogenesis; he argues that the first and second categories should be prohibited and punished. To reiterate, famine is intentional if the state deliberately uses it as a means of extermination; it is reckless if the state continues its food policies despite evidence of famine. North Korea’s famines are at minimum reckless; over two decades the state continued policies that resulted in underproduction and maldistribution of food. The regime’s consistent disregard for its citizens’ food needs, its imprisonment of those committing “crimes” such as hoarding, and its suppression of those civil and political rights that might have permitted citizens to communicate their needs to the government also suggest intentional famine, though stronger evidence of mens rea than can be provided in this article may be required in a court of law to prove intentional famine.

Marcus argues that some of the North Korean government’s actions during the 1990s famine constituted the first-degree crime of intentional faminogenesis. He accuses the government of “manipulating the famine to target certain populations that threaten its political survival” by denying them food rations. During the 1990s famine, “it was persistently reported that PDS rations were delayed or temporarily suspended in the northern parts of the country.” However, Haggard and Noland state that they “find no evidence that particular segments of the population were deliberately starved.” They consider evidence demonstrating that the regime cut off four northern provinces to be circumstantial, although they note that there is evidence that the government focused food aid on the western coast, despite evidence that the (north) east coast was facing particularly severe food shortages.

Haggard and Noland’s view is that “informational failures and the lack of accountability characteristic of authoritarian regimes played a crucial role” in the famine. This suggests that the government was guilty of the second-degree crime of reckless faminogenesis, continuing policies that caused famine even when their consequences were known. Not permitting citizens to farm small plots of land was reckless; as such farms could have produced food to supplement official rations. Prohibition of trade and foraging was also reckless. In Marcus’s view, “North Korea’s behavior in refusing to admit that its policies are flawed . . . constitutes a second-degree famine crime.” The same might be said of the famine of 2010–2012, which was caused in part by the regime’s continuation of these extremely flawed policies. Recklessness is implied, for example, by the 2005 decision to rescind the reforms that had been implemented to assist in creating a market economy.

Incompetence, Marcus’s fourth degree of faminogenesis, is the most generous description of a regime that followed policy prescriptions from the Soviet Union and China that had been abandoned by both countries by 1990. On the other hand, the fact that North Korea sought food aid during the 1990s famine, and again in 2010–2012, suggests that the regime was not indifferent to the famine, thus not guilty of the third degree of faminogenesis. The regime did seek international help during the 1990s, asking South Korea, the UN, and the US for food aid. However, there was some suspicion that the food was not disbursed to the neediest citizens; rather, it seemed that the military was well fed while others starved. The regime may simply have treated food aid as balance-of-payments assistance: the less it spent on food, the more it had to pay off debts.

Feffer claims the famine was not deliberate, but rather was a result of “atrocious policy.” Haggard and Noland also argue that “the famine was a classic case of state failure,” rather than having been deliberately constructed. However, these arguments
seem to inadvertently imply that the policies were made by honest bureaucrats who accidentally made poor decisions; they run contrary to Marcus’s view that the government recklessly continued these policies even when their consequences became known. An alternate view is that the regime made decisions according to its own interests, regardless of the effects on some sectors of the population. As long as members of the Korean Workers’ Party and the military—along with the relatively privileged inhabitants of the capital, Pyongyang—were fed, the regime could ignore its other citizens.

The regime also denied all human rights, so that citizens could not make their concerns known. Systematic denial of human rights during severe food shortages suggests at minimum reckless faminogenesis. The state deliberately denies itself a key resource—the voices of its own people—that could help rectify its faminogenic policies. North Koreans enjoy no freedom of speech, assembly, or press; no political right to vote; and no civil rights to protection from torture or arbitrary execution. Citizens cannot protest the policies causing them to starve, nor can they vote their leaders out of office; if they do protest, they risk imprisonment, torture, and death. They cannot fulfill their need for food when they are not permitted freedom of movement to leave the country or even within it.

Moreover, North Koreans, enjoy no right to privacy whatsoever: neighbors are encouraged to spy on neighbors and all citizens must attend self-criticism sessions where they must confess and repent for even the tiniest acts that might be considered disloyal. Thus, independent thought and conversation are completely blocked by a system in which neighbors can and do report each other for “crimes” against the state such as foraging for, producing, and selling food, or even complaining about food shortages. Radios and televisions are wired so that they can receive only state channels which broadcast propaganda into every household, thus prohibiting the spread of information about food shortages that might cause unrest.

Another major policy “error” in North Korea is prohibition of private property. The right to own property is protected by Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). This right helps individuals be self-sufficient rather than rely on the state to provide for all their needs. Aside from the micro-farms described above, no personal cultivation of land was permitted in North Korea until the 1990s and there is still no private ownership of land. Even in the brief period of flowering markets during the early 2000s, no reforms were introduced to enable individuals to own the land they were farming. Yet individual land rights have been shown to result in “higher productivity, cultivation and yields, as well as the retention of surpluses against the risk of climatic disaster.”

All these denials of citizens’ human rights are consequences of deliberate policy decisions. A government concerned with the welfare of its citizens would not continue policies that cause its citizens to starve. Thus, the regime is recklessly faminogenic, prohibiting human rights that could avert or alleviate famine. It is not quite as easy to make a case for intentional faminogenesis, especially given the inconsistent and erratic “reforms” the state introduced after the mid-1990s. In either case, though, denial of citizens’ civil and political rights is a key cause of the starvation. Not enjoying any of these rights, North Koreans resort to occasional protests, strikes, uprisings, sabotage, and even murders of local officials. There have also been reports of attempted assassinations and coups d’état, suggesting dissension within the ruling clique and/or the military.
The Crime of Penal Starvation

The North Korean regime is responsible not only for famine, but also for a deliberate policy of subjecting its prisoners to starvation rations. The government maintains a large system of repressive slave labor camps—in effect, a gulag—in which prisoners are even more likely to starve than the general population. Rations are far below what is needed to maintain health and were so even before the food shortages and famine of the 1990s: “Prisoners are provided only enough food to be kept perpetually on the verge of starvation.”¹⁰⁰ Food is allocated on the basis of productivity: the less a prisoner produces, the less he eats, resulting in a spiral downward as those deprived of even more food produce less and less. Many in the camps die from lack of food, while some are executed for foraging; in one case a prisoner was executed for eating ripe chestnuts that had fallen at the entrance of a slave labor mine.¹⁰¹

I use the term penal starvation to describe this phenomenon. Penal starvation does not cause death in the manner to which Sen refers, in which malnutrition spreads over wide populations. Rather, it attacks a significant percentage of prisoners who cannot live on rations constantly below subsistence level, or whose food rations are even lower than the prescribed below-subsistence level because they do not work hard enough or have angered the authorities in some other way. Estimates of how many people are in the prison camps at any time vary, but most sources agree on about 200,000 every year.¹⁰² Pierre Rigoulot, publishing originally in 1997, estimated that 1.5 million people had died in the camps since the creation of North Korea.¹⁰³ Becker’s lower estimate suggested that as of 2005, 1 million people had died, assuming an annual death rate of 10% of prisoners.¹⁰⁴

Inmates in these camps fall into two major groups. The first is people who have been imprisoned for political reasons or because they belong to population categories that the regime considers disloyal or dangerous. Over the course of North Korea’s history, tens of thousands of people have been imprisoned in various political purges.¹⁰⁵ The state also classifies every individual citizen on the basis of perceived loyalty, or lack thereof, to the regime: the three classes are the core, or loyal, class; the wavering class; and the hostile class. South Korea estimates that these categories constitute 30, 50, and 20% of the population respectively.¹⁰⁶ Membership in the three core classes is hereditary; for example, an individual might be deemed a member of the hostile class if his great-grandfather was a landlord. Members of the hostile class are most likely to be sent to the gulag; they were also the first to have their rations cut during the 1990s famine.¹⁰⁷

Some other categories of people are so despised that they are frequently sent to prison camps where they suffer a high risk of starvation. In the past, North Korea imprisoned Japanese-Koreans; that is, Koreans who had lived in Japan when Korea was under Japanese colonial rule, but had been badly treated there. Some of the estimated 93,000 returnees from Japan were incarcerated.¹⁰⁸ Christians are also imprisoned or executed;¹⁰⁹ the earliest massacre of Christians appears to have taken place in November 1945,¹¹⁰ and it is believed that the government executed about 400,000 religious practitioners (not all Christians) during the 1970s.¹¹¹ In the past, moreover, disabled people were sent to special concentration camps in accordance with the Kims’ (father and son) belief that North Koreans ought to be physically perfect.¹¹² The Kims had a particular aversion to dwarfs, who along with other disabled people were exiled from the capital.¹¹³ Dwarfs were put in special prison camps and subjected to forced sterilization. It appears, however, that in the last two decades disabled people have been somewhat better treated and are less likely to be imprisoned.¹¹⁴
Not only those convicted of crimes, but also their families, including parents, spouses, siblings, and children, are imprisoned. This is in accordance with Kim Il Sung’s 1958 directive that “[prison] inmates are class enemies and must be actively exterminated to three generations,” which was apparently repeated in 1972: “Factionalists or enemies of class, whoever they are: their seed must be eliminated through three generations.” Thus, for example, Kang Chol-Hwan, author of a rare memoir of the camps, was incarcerated at the age of nine because his grandfather was suspected of a crime; Kang survived partly by eating rats. This form of collective punishment is one reason why the gulag contains so many prisoners.

The second group of prisoners is made up of people whose actions in search of food are considered illegal. Their crimes consist of engaging in petty trade, cultivating small plots of land, hoarding food, foraging, traveling within the country in search of food, stealing food, smuggling and other black market activities, and cannibalism. It is estimated that about 200–300,000 people fled to China during the 1990s famine: China returns refugees to North Korea, where most are then imprisoned and “re-starved.” Having committed what the state considers to be crimes in order to survive the famine, they are incarcerated and deliberately subjected to starvation rations. It is not yet known, however, whether North Korea engaged in the same policy of incarcerating people who were trying to find food in 2010–2012 as it did during the 1990s.

Applying Marcus’s four categories of intentional, reckless, indifferent, and incompetent famine to penal starvation, it appears clear that penal starvation is intentional. The state decides whom to imprison, it decides on food rations for prisoners, and it decides that prisoners can be deprived of food for various further transgressions while in prison, such as not working hard enough. Thus, as a subset of faminogenesis, penal starvation should be punished as a first-degree famine crime, although again, a court of law might require stronger proof of mens rea that I can supply here.

International Law: The Question of Genocide

If famine in North Korea is at minimum reckless and possibly intentional, and if penal starvation is clearly intentional, then how, if at all, can international law stop these two practices? One possibility is to pressure North Korea to live up to its formal commitments to uphold those human rights covenants to which it is party. North Korea became party to both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on 14 September 1981. The ICESCR includes the right to adequate food (article 11[1]) and freedom from hunger (article 11[2]). But as discussed above, this right cannot stand alone: in order to have access to enough food, citizens must also enjoy their civil and political rights.

It is unlikely, however, that the North Korean regime will be susceptible to pressure to protect human rights. In a facade of legality, the regime has introduced constitutional changes that are supposed to—but do not—protect human rights on several occasions. In 1998, a constitutional revision introduced habeas corpus and revisions in 2004 prohibited arrests and detention not in accordance with the law, required warrants for arrests, and introduced other such procedural guarantees. In 2009, the constitution was revised ostensibly to protect human rights. For example, articles 65–68 protected equal rights; the right to vote; freedom of speech, press, assembly, demonstration, and association; and freedom of religion. At the same time, however, the principle of “military first” was included, allocating resources to the military before any other sector
of society. There is no indication that North Korea now respects the rights written into the 2009 constitution.

Since the regime is unlikely to protect human rights, the possibility of punishing its leaders must be considered. It is possible that Kim Jong Il could have been referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the crime of genocide before his death in December 2011. In 1996, Kim apparently said that North Korea only needed 30% of its populace to survive in order to reconstruct a “victorious” North Korean society, suggesting a very high tolerance for mass deaths among those for whom he was supposed to be responsible.

The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) is meant to protect groups at risk of genocide because of their race, religion, ethnicity, or nationality. Certain groups that fit these categories have been targeted for extermination in North Korea. North Korean Christians are one such group, as adherence to Christianity is viewed as treason against the Juche philosophy and the Kim dynasty. A second group is Japanese-Koreans, whose situation has been described above. A third is Korean-Chinese infants, who are considered to be “polluting” the pure Korean race. These infants are the children of North Korean mothers who fled or were trafficked to China, where they sometimes voluntarily married and sometimes were forcibly married or prostituted to Chinese men. In violation of its obligations under the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (CRSR), as discussed below, China returns refugees to North Korea. Eyewitnesses have recounted that if these women are pregnant when they return, they are made to undergo forced abortions. If they are in the late stages of pregnancy, delivery is induced and the infants are then murdered or tossed alive into garbage cans before their mothers’ eyes. This can be considered “ethnic infanticide,” which constitutes “killing of members of a group.”

While the particular cases of Christians, Japanese-Koreans, and Chinese-Korean infants may fit the UNCG definition of victim groups, the majority of people subjected to state-induced famine or penal starvation do not fit this definition. Rather, the North Korean regime commits politicide, defining “victim groups . . . in terms of their political status or opposition to the state.” The famine of the 1990s and the continuing risk of starvation in the twenty-first century affects all North Koreans except the core, inner elite; even members of the military and of the Korean Workers’ Party are at risk. Moreover, disproportionate incarceration of members of the hostile class might be considered a form of politicide; certain categories of people deemed to be politically unreliable are at substantially increased risk of penal starvation. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn’s definition of genocide applies to North Korea: “Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing [for example, by state-induced famine and penal starvation] in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.” The perpetrator—the North Korean regime—defines some citizens as hostile and starves them accordingly.

Even if some of North Korea’s famine victims fit the UNCG’s definition of victim groups, however, the crime of faminogenesis is not specified in the UNCG. Yet both the intentional and the reckless varieties of state-induced famine cause serious bodily harm to members of a group and also inflict “conditions of life calculated to bring about [a group’s] physical destruction in whole or in part,” thus fulfilling aspects of genocide as defined in article 2 (b) and (c) of the UNCG. State-induced famine also prevents...
births within a group, a practice prohibited by Article 2 (d), as starving women are not capable of conception. The group, in this case, is made up of all North Korean citizens.

A further difficulty in proving a charge of genocide against Kim Jong Il is the question of intent. Did Kim intend to kill 3–5% of North Korea’s citizens, or was he merely reckless in continuing his economic policies even when it was obvious that they caused starvation? Jasper Becker, a journalist, contends that “the most heinous part of the story is that the leadership, especially Kim Jong Il, resisted adopting every policy that could have brought the misery [of the 1990s] to a quick end. This makes the suffering he inflicted on an entire people an unparalleled and monstrous crime.” Paul French agrees, noting, “At no time did the state admit to any ideological, economic, or systemic problems as causes of the . . . famine.” Indeed, it might seem that resistance to economic reform, combined with complete denial of all civil and political rights; diversion of food aid to support the Korean Workers’ Party, the military, and the elite; and discrimination against some provinces in provision of food, add up to evidence of intent. Nevertheless, none of these elements provides the “smoking gun” proving that Kim wanted to kill his own population, and his frequent appeals for international food aid suggest the contrary.

A further gap in international law is the absence of a specific crime of penal starvation. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has ruled that whenever individuals or groups are unable to enjoy the right to adequate food via their own means, the state has the obligation to directly fulfill that right. The United Nations’ Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners specify that “every prisoner shall be provided . . . with food of nutritional value adequate for health and strength.” These rules can be read to protect not only “normal,” individual prisoners, but also large groups of people deliberately incarcerated and subjected to rations below the subsistence level. This positive obligation to provide food, however, fails to penalize states that deliberately starve large numbers of prisoners as a matter of policy or of common—and encouraged—practice. Nor is penal starvation specified as an act of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment in the Convention against Torture, although it is obviously extremely cruel and degrading to force individuals to beg, scrounge, smuggle, steal, kill, and even become cannibals in their search for food.

Even if referral to the ICC for genocide was not possible, a strong case could have been made that Kim Jong Il was guilty of almost all the crimes against humanity the ICC prohibits, including murder, torture, deportations, enslavement, and persecution. There is no specific mention of state-induced famine or penal starvation in the list of crimes against humanity; rather, it seems these two crimes would qualify merely as “other inhumane act[s] . . . intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” Grace Kang argues that food deprivation in prison camps can be considered acts of murder or extermination, reinforcing the argument that Kim Jong Il should have been referred to the ICC. Similarly, Debra Liang-Fenton argues that “the North Korean government is actively involved in committing crimes against humanity with respect to both its food policy leading to famine and its treatment of political prisoners;” these are crimes against humanity because the government knowingly engages in policies that cause hunger and starvation.

In October 2011, a coalition of human rights groups launched a campaign in Tokyo to have the United Nations establish a commission of inquiry into crimes against humanity in North Korea. As of the time of writing (August 2012), however, North
Korea was not party to the ICC; thus, were he still alive, Kim Jong Il would have to be referred to the court by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Such referral either of him or of his successor, Kim Jong Un, was and is unlikely, as North Korea has been testing nuclear weapons and the geostrategic concern to contain its nuclear ambitions tops the international community’s agenda, as discussed further below. North Korea has, however, been referred to the ICC by South Korea for a possible war crime. In March 2010, a South Korean ship, the Cheonan, sank, resulting in the loss of 46 lives. An international commission determined that a North Korean torpedo had struck it and in December 2010 the ICC opened a preliminary investigation into whether the sinking of the Cheonan was a war crime. This suggests some willingness on the part of the international community to refer North Korea to the ICC while concurrently trying to negotiate with the regime to curb its development of nuclear weapons.

Another aspect of international law that might be useful in protecting North Koreans is refugee law. It is estimated that by 2009, between 100,000 and 300,000 North Koreans were living in China. China has been party to the UN Convention on Refugees since 1982; thus, it is obligated to protect refugees fleeing North Korea because of political or religious persecution. This entails setting up a refugee adjudication process and allowing the UN High Commissioner for Refugees access to North Koreans in China. China also should protect refugees who have had contact with South Koreans, missionaries, or aid workers, as they are likely to be punished more harshly than other returnees should they be sent back to North Korea; people who went to church in China, for example, are sentenced to ten years in prison camps. China is also obligated to protect those many female refugees—both women and girls—who end up working in the sex trade and to make sure that they are not persecuted if they are returned to North Korea.

Yet China signed an agreement with North Korea in 1986 to return refugees, sending back about 10% of them every year. The agreement permits North Korean agents to operate in northern China to intimidate, abduct, and murder refugees. It also imposes arrest quotas on Chinese border police, fines anyone helping refugees a substantial sum, and offers a reward of $500 to any Chinese citizen who turns in a North Korean refugee. In general, China does not consider starving North Koreans to be political refugees, as if they were fleeing a natural, rather than a politically-designed, food disaster; the Chinese government claims they are economic migrants. Yet they are actually political refugees, in the sense that they are fleeing state policies that prevent them from eating. Moreover, the government’s discriminatory distribution of food—for example, by denying food to members of the hostile class—constitutes political persecution. At the moment, refugee activists are limited to the argument that even if North Koreans are not political refugees when they enter China, they become political refugees when threatened with the torture, imprisonment, starvation, and execution that follow refugees’ return to North Korea. In 2008, 13 women and two men were executed merely for planning to go to China. To avoid such repatriations and to incorporate both faminogenesis and penal starvation into refugee law, state-induced famine should be considered a crime against humanity—if not a form of genocide—and people fleeing this crime should be considered refugees.

Despite the laws against genocide and crimes against humanity, and the laws that ostensibly protect refugees, the international community takes relatively tentative

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actions against North Korea. Strategic and security interests trump concern for human rights.

**Conclusion: Strategic vs. Humanitarian Concerns**

Marcus argues that aspects of intentional and reckless faminogenesis are already crimes under various international laws, but that all these laws should be brought together in a single UN convention. Had such a convention existed, it might have been possible to indict Kim Jong Il before the ICC without having to prove that his crimes were directed against a “national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such,” as required by the UNCG. Such a convention might also have prohibited penal starvation as a specific sub-category of the crime of faminogenesis. In the absence of such an agreement, Kim Jong Il should have been prosecuted for the many crimes against humanity and genocidal acts of which he was guilty. Some of Kim’s close associates were still in power in 2012 and remained candidates for prosecution, as will be his son and successor, Kim Jong Un, if he does not change North Korea’s food production and distribution policies and does not immediately ensure that prisoners are properly fed.

But such prosecution is unlikely. The international community’s chief concern regarding North Korea is strategic, not humanitarian. North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons since the 1980s and already possesses illegal chemical and biological weapons. Six-party talks among the two Koreas, the United States, Japan, China, and Russia have been taking place sporadically since 2003 with the objective of controlling North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Food aid, along with other types of aid, is sometimes used as an incentive to persuade North Korea to take part in these talks, and conversely is sometimes withdrawn or cut if North Korea refuses to cooperate.

The US is particularly concerned by North Korea’s nuclear aspirations and has had sanctions against North Korea for some years, partly for the purpose of choking off the flow of luxury goods into elites’ hands. North Korea finances its purchases of these goods by exporting drugs such as opium and heroin and by counterfeiting US currency. China, on the other hand, has an ambiguous relationship with North Korea. Like the US, it fears nuclear weapons, but it has also been investing in North Korea and is interested in more bilateral trade. Moreover, China also fears a much larger outflow of refugees from North Korea into its northern region than currently exists, should the North Korean regime collapse.

South Korea is interested in preserving a stable North Korea. Its official ideology is that the two Koreas will someday unite, but, in fact, it also fears a refugee overflow and is wary of the very severe costs of reunification, were it ever to occur: one estimate has put the amount at $900 billion over four decades. Finally, South Korea has a very real fear of attack by North Korea, which already possesses conventional weapons that could wipe out its capital, Seoul. It must therefore balance its concern for its starving co-ethnics with the need to avert attacks and to protect its own economy.

Thus, it appears that the international community, the US, China, and South Korea all agree that their first strategic priority is a stable North Korea that does not develop or use nuclear weapons. It is extremely doubtful that either China or Russia would support referral of North Korea’s leaders to the ICC by the UNSC; even the US might argue that such an indictment would stand in the way of the six-party negotiations. No state or international organization has invoked the evolving principle of the responsibility to protect with regard to North Korea. The preferred option appears to be to simply wait for change. News of the prosperity of China and South Korea filters into...
North Korea via returned refugees and via traders who smuggled videos and DVDs in from China. The more North Koreans encounter goods from the global marketplace and visitors from the rest of the world, the harder it is for the regime to trumpet its nonsensical propaganda about being the best country in the world.

However, since Kim Jong Il’s death the principal concern of the international community has been to preserve North Korea’s internal stability and avert further nuclear development. Factional infighting among members of the military or civilian elites could result in a collapsed or failed state, causing massive refugee outflows into China and South Korea, civil war, and the need for United Nations peacekeeping or peace-making troops. Such infighting might also trigger actual use of nuclear weapons by one faction. As long as nuclear threat and internal stability are the international community’s chief concerns, the crimes of faminogenesis and penal starvation will likely remain overlooked.

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49. French, Paranoid Peninsula, 130.
50. Demick, Nothing to Envy, 195.
52. Kim, Escaping North Korea, 51.
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96. Demick, Nothing to Envy, 33.
97. French, Paranoid Peninsula, 136.
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108. Ibid., 208.
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112. Myers, Cleanest Race.


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147. For a description of what happened to two such women, see Tim O’Neill, “Escape from North Korea,” *National Geographic* 215 (2009).

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A System, Society, and Community Perspective on Genocide

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The question of why the international community continually fails to prevent genocide remains an ever-present concern. Genocide scholars question how the political will of the politically unwilling remains unaltered by the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur. However, it appears that little consideration has been given to the fact that genocide is open to interpretation. By this I mean that all scholars and policy makers have a view of the world which shapes their understanding of genocide within it. This is important because it helps explain why actors at the international level perceive genocide prevention in a radically different light from one another. With this in mind, the article uses the concepts of an international system, an international society, and an international community to demonstrate how one’s worldview has implications on how one understands genocide. These three perspectives help underline the complexities involved as genocide prevention remains dependent on a consensus being forged among actors who do not share a common worldview.

Key words: genocide prevention, international system, realism, international society, the English School, international community, cosmopolitanism

This article incorporates the concept of genocide into Martin Wight’s “three traditions” framework in order to put forward a realist–international system, a rationalist–international society, and a cosmopolitan–international community perspective on genocide in international relations (IR). The value of this approach is that it enables a three-way dialogue to be forged between competing worldviews that highlights how the assumptions embodied within one’s view of international relations shapes one’s understanding of issues such as justice, power, and, in this context, genocide. The utility of Wight’s approach has seen an upsurge in the three traditions literature over the past two decades as scholars have sought to analyze issues such as humanitarian intervention, globalization, and the security dilemma within this tripartite framework. To date, there has not been a single article published which analyzes genocide within the context of the three traditions. Accordingly, this article addresses this lacuna and, in so doing, demonstrates how alternative worldviews shape perceptions, interpretations, and understandings of genocide. This is not to suggest that other factors—from the psychological mindset of a leader to the grand strategy of a state—do not also play a role in shaping perceptions, but that at present the discourse tends to overlook the implications of competing worldviews for the issue of genocide prevention.

To put the issue of rival worldviews into context, let us consider a recent debate in the Journal of Genocide Research between Linda Melvern and Stephen Wertheim over whether the Rwandan Genocide could have been prevented. While many issues were raised, of specific interest here is Melvern’s claim that the 2,500 UN peacekeepers in Kenya, 250 US Rangers in Burundi, 800 French troops in the region, and “80 Italians everywhere!” (to use Wertheim’s phrase) among others, could and therefore should have been brought together in order to prevent the Rwandan Genocide or at least

minimize its destruction.\(^5\) Opposing this view, Wertheim claims that while possible, this was not plausible.\(^6\) The point here is not to judge whether Melvern or Wertheim is right as that would take an entire article in itself. Rather, the aim is to simply highlight that each perspective embodies a different worldview regarding the potential for cooperation between states.\(^7\) From an IR perspective, Melvern seemingly upholds a normative approach which posits that since states could have cooperated, they should have, and thus by “pooling” their resources, states could have prevented the Rwandan Genocide.\(^8\) On the other hand, Wertheim’s focus on what is plausible rather than possible reveals a realist approach which stresses the inherent difficulties of cooperation in an anarchical realm (though Wertheim is sympathetic to the idea that the US could have supported the Rwandan Patriotic Front).\(^9\) Notably, this example illustrates that the debates that emerge between genocide scholars do not necessarily stem from alternative views of genocide (both Melvern and Wertheim wanted the Rwandan Genocide to be prevented) but instead stem from different worldviews.

Problematically, these worldviews are rarely acknowledged within the discourse. Until this is taken into account, my fear is that scholars and policy makers will continue to talk past one another rather than to each other. By this I mean that because a dialogue is created on a single subject matter—in this case, genocide—the actors involved assume they are talking about the same thing, whereas in fact, they have a fundamentally different understanding of genocide prevention that stems from their worldview. While such thinking is increasingly accepted in political science,\(^10\) this remains an unexplored theme in genocide studies.\(^11\) Addressing this lacuna, this article incorporates genocide into the three traditions framework in order to illustrate how one’s worldview shapes one’s understanding of genocide within it. The hope is that through deconstructing alternative worldviews on genocide we can generate valuable insight into how a more fruitful dialogue that aids the prevention of genocide can be constructed.

To do this, the article is structured in a fourfold format. The first section presents a brief overview of the three traditions in order to explain what is meant by an international system, an international society, and an international community perspective. This provides the groundwork for the following three sections, which put forward more in-depth analyses of each outlook to reveal how the assumptions embodied in each worldview have implications on genocide prevention. This is something that needs to be considered carefully within the discipline of genocide studies.

The Three Traditions

It was in the 1950s that Martin Wight first identified the three traditions of realism, rationalism, and revolutionism as a teaching tool to help students navigate the realist–idealist dichotomy that dominated the discipline of IR in the interwar period.\(^12\) As Andrew Linklater explains, “In his lectures, Wight lamented the way in which debates between realism and utopianism in the interwar years had neglected the via media with its distinct focus on international society.”\(^13\) For Wight, there was middle ground to be found between the overt pessimism embodied in realism and the overt optimism embodied in what he labeled revolutionism. Responding to this neglected middle ground, Wight brought the rationalist tradition (which he associated with Hugo Grotius), back into his analysis of international theory. In so doing, Wight developed a threefold analytical framework that, as I have stated, has undergone a revival since it was published posthumously in 1991. Accordingly, this article incorporates the concept of genocide
into this threefold framework to help shed insight into understanding genocide in international relations.

As stated, Linklater uses Martin Wight’s three traditions to equate the tradition of realism with the more pessimistic idea of an international system, the tradition of rationalism with the idea of an international society, and the tradition of revolutionism with the more optimistic idea of an international community. Understandably, for those not familiar with IR theory, this overview may seem somewhat alien. Thus, in Figure 1 I attempt to bring the Linklater–Wight juxtaposition to life in order to help illustrate the three alternative worldviews prior to integrating the concept of genocide.

It is important to take note of three caveats prior to continuing. First, the spectrum falls foul of failing to recognize “discontinuities of thought” and exclusions of thought, such as gender. Second, Wight himself feared that reification would only further simplify and distort the three concepts which he himself never published. While both these points are valid, it seems that the discipline of IR has always been plagued by the problem of classification. Scholars use frames, labels, figures, and models as ways of illustrating the complexities involved. The reality is that if we did not categorize the history of ideas, we would be left bewildered. What is important, then, is that scholars remain aware of the limitations involved while continuing to explain their position as clearly as they can. A third and final caveat is that Wight stressed that “the three traditions are not like three railroad tracks running parallel into infinity. . . . The three traditions are streams, with eddies and crosscurrents, sometimes interlacing and never for long confined to their own riverbed.” This statement neatly captures the idea of blurred boundaries and underlines the notion that realism, rationalism, and revolutionism should not be viewed as three separate pillars.

Figure 1 simply aims to illustrate that the three traditions of realism, rationalism, and revolutionism represent different and competing worldviews. This is important because one can see that one’s position on this spectrum consequently holds implications for how one understands genocide prevention in international relations just as it would with any other concept, such as war, sovereignty, diplomacy, or justice. Each tradition embodies assumptions, and understanding these helps reveal how one’s view of
the world shapes one’s view of genocide prevention within it. To consider this further, let us first address the tradition of realism and the idea of an international system.

**International System: Realism**

Critics often portray realism in an overly simplistic and crude manner, which in turn allows them to dismiss realism, or at least their representation of realism, with ease. This is not to suggest that realism does not have its problems, but to acknowledge at the outset that realism does offer insight into understanding international relations. Perhaps Barry Buzan summarized this position best in “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?,” where he essentially concludes that realism offers us wisdom, but not timeless wisdom. From this perspective, realism offers insight into the complexities of international relations, but it fails in its attempt to provide objective knowledge claims that are applicable across both time and space. However, the dominance of realism in policy making remains unavoidable: “From 1939 to the present, leading theorists and policy makers have continued to view the world through realist lenses.” It is therefore important to engage with realism for it helps explain why policy makers give low political priority to the issue of genocide prevention.

To return to Linklater’s analysis, he equates the tradition of realism with the idea of an international system: “The Hobbesian or Machiavellian perspective represents the anti-progressivist approach to international relations which contends that states belong to an international *system* in which there is seldom relief from competition and conflict.” The statement encapsulates the skepticism embodied in the realist view of international relations. Unlike English School scholars—who champion the idea of an international society—realists tend to see a world of international instability rather than international order. The origins of this instability are traced back to the anarchical structure (neorealism) or human nature (classical realism). With no world government to constrain the conditions of anarchy or human nature, states remain embroiled in a never-ending competition for power, security, and survival. Essentially, states are locked into this *international system* of competition and conflict which prevents any potential for progress toward an international society or international community.

To put this logic into the context of genocide studies let us consider Alex Alvarez’s work *Governments, Citizens and Genocide*, in which the author explains that diplomats “are often held hostage to *Realpolitik* strategies that place a higher value on protecting national security than protecting an oppressed group.” The prioritization of national security dictates that the prevention of genocide and mass violence is given little political priority. For instance, in 1975, prior to the Indonesian oppression in East Timor, the Australian ambassador to Indonesia wrote that Australia should assume a “pragmatic rather than a principled stand,” because “that is what national interest and foreign policy is all about.” Echoing such sentiment, James Wood, a US deputy assistant secretary of defense, placed Rwanda–Burundi on a list of potential trouble spots only to be informed by a superior: “Take it off the list. . . US national interest is not involved . . . we can’t put all these silly humanitarian issues on lists like important problems like the Middle East and North Korea and so on.” Similarly, as Slobodan Milošević engineered a process of destruction and dispossession in the former Yugoslavia, George Bush’s secretary of state James Baker repeatedly stated, “We don’t have a dog in this fight.” The attitude expressed through these statements underlines the central point that genocide prevention is not considered to be in a state’s national interest. Because of this, policy makers view genocide prevention as somewhat altruistic and part of an unrealistic
foreign policy agenda. It is important to consider, however, that this does not necessarily represent an amoral or immoral position, even though it is obviously a highly contentious issue.30

Although realists would like to live in a world without problems such as genocide, they do not see how such problems can be resolved without the establishment of a world government. To go back to the aforementioned debate over the potential for cooperation between states, realists argue that international institutions such as the United Nations do not have the power to “mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects on interstate cooperation.”31 In other words, because there is no world government, states operate within a climate of mistrust and fear (the security dilemma32). This zero-sum environment dictates that state $x$ will only cooperate with state $y$ if state $x$ perceives that it will gain more out of the agreement than state $y$ (and vice versa); for realists, this explains why there is so little cooperation at the international level. This represents a relative gains approach as opposed to an absolute gains approach which is upheld by those that favor the idea of an international society. Such understanding helps explain why realists view genocide as just another insoluble problem as they reject the so-called idealistic belief that “no problems—however hopeless they may appear to be—are really insoluble, given well-meaning, well-financed, and competent efforts.”33 In other words, genocide prevention is a classic example of moral overreach, for as Morgenthau succinctly stated, while the individual has the right to say, “Let justice be done, even if the world perish,” the state does not have the right to say this on its citizens’ behalf.35 Since realists reject the idea that states have a moral obligation to anyone other than their own citizens, they have tended to view international normative developments such as the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) as humanitarian concerns that are of little real concern to a state’s national interests. From this perspective states should not send—or let the UN send—their “sons and daughters” to die “saving strangers.”36 In addition to this, realists claim that so-called humanitarian intervention is nothing more than a “Trojan horse.”37 Political elites may speak with a moral tongue when intervening in a certain state but they pursue ulterior motives. Thus, a secondary moral argument arises as realists claim that state sovereignty and nonintervention help protect weaker countries from the imperialistic agendas of more powerful ones. Accordingly, this realist framework embodies a moral rationale.

For realists, whether right or wrong, humankind has divided itself up into states. It is therefore unrealistic to ignore the reality that policy makers create policy on behalf of states rather than on behalf of humankind. Yet as shall be discussed below, this is precisely what cosmopolitans advocate. Realists claim that when states do cooperate, they do so only to further the national interest. For example, long-term collective security strategies are adopted when attempting to prevent crimes such as nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, drug trafficking, and piracy at the international level.38 Using
realist logic, it would seem that policy makers perceive that such crimes outstrip the individual security capacity of states who then work collectively to address this security deficit. Accordingly, the collective interest furthers the national interest within such specific contexts. The fact that there is no long-term collective security strategy regarding genocide reflects that policy makers do not perceive genocide as posing an international threat. Such understanding only goes to restate the point that when it comes to genocide prevention, policy makers do not perceive that they have a “dog in the fight” and in turn do not treat the prevention of genocide as a matter of national interest.

Prior to highlighting the counter-perspectives put forward by English School scholars (international society) and cosmopolitans (international community) it is important to stress that further interdisciplinary research needs to be done. For example, realists have to consider whether their view of genocide stems from their understanding of human nature, cooperation, national interest, anarchical structure—a mix of these—or, more importantly, genocide itself. By this I mean that despite their having a pessimistic view of human nature, a narrow understanding of national interest, a relative gains approach toward cooperation, and/or a neorealism belief that the anarchical system can push states to behave in certain ways, realists do accept that on certain issues states do cooperate within the anarchical realm. This acceptance of cooperation is important because it highlights that the realist view—that genocide prevention is not within the national interest of states—stems from their view of cooperation, human nature, and so forth, but their view of genocide. In other words, realists do not believe that genocide poses a security threat to states. It is this perception of genocide, therefore, that drives realists to claim that states should not engage in genocide prevention unless there are matters of national interest at stake. However, a problem arises as realists have not spent any significant amount of time questioning whether genocide does in fact have an impact on international order. Simply speaking, they have a view of genocide but have not actually studied genocide in any great detail. This brings us back to the article’s opening claim that more interdisciplinary research on the relationship between one’s worldview and one’s understanding of genocide within it is needed.

At present, it appears that the realist view of genocide is built on a set of undertheorized assumptions. This was put into perfect context in the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide as hard-line realist Henry Kissinger stated,

At least in Bosnia we did something—maybe too late—but in Rwanda hundreds of thousands were killed. [Rwanda] is not a country of strategic importance for the United States; you cannot define a national interest that would take us there. And yet, there, I tend to think I personally would have supported an intervention. It would have been a violation of what ordinarily is my principle. Ordinarily I feel that you should not risk American lives for objectives where you cannot explain to the mothers why you did it. . . . [Yet] my instinct tells me we should have done it in Rwanda.

The statement neatly captures much of the rationale set out above as Kissinger highlights that states should only engage in complex foreign policy matters when there are national interests at stake. From a moral perspective, the prioritization of the national interest is justified on the grounds that the lives of citizens should not be risked for anything other than national security. While one could raise the point that many grieving mothers may accept genocide prevention as a “just cause,” the interesting point
is that Kissinger favors intervention even though it violates his ordinary principle (by which he means the assumptions set out above). Kissinger’s omission is very interesting for the following concluding point: if realists accept that they may be willing to violate their ordinary principles when it comes to genocide prevention, then is it not time that realists reformulate their ordinary principles so that they did not have to violate them in the first place? Otherwise, realism provides us with a theory of international relations except at those times when genocide is occurring, which notably undermines the entire premise of so-called realism. Therefore, it is worth considering that realists do not hold a monopoly over interpreting reality, which naturally leads us to the two alternative perspectives discussed below.

In sum, realists ask us to consider the tragedy that lies at the heart of international relations. This tragedy stems from the fact that there is no world government to constrain human nature (classical realism) or mitigate the impact of the anarchical structure (neorealism). Because of these factors, genocide represents an insoluble problem; furthermore, genocide prevention represents an altruistic and dangerous foreign policy agenda that states should not pursue unless there are vital national interests at stake. Until a world government is formed, to think otherwise is simply unrealistic or utopian. Yet of course, counterclaims can be made, which leads us to the international society perspective as English School scholars claim that even without a world government states can and do uphold legal, moral, and political agreements.

**International Society: Rationalism**

As stated, the English School approach to international relations—which Wight associated with Hugo Grotius—is also known as the international society approach or the rationalist approach. All three terms, therefore, are used interchangeably to refer to the English School view that international society represents a *via media* between the international system advocated by realists and the international community advocated by cosmopolitans (to be discussed below). While the English School’s focus on the state and the role of power within international relations has sometimes seen critics label it “realism in drag,” as will be discussed, the idea that states have formed a society rather than a system demonstrates a fundamentally different interpretation of international relations, which holds significant implications for how English School scholars view genocide.

To flesh out this idea of an international society let us return to Linklater, who summarizes the meaning of this society approach:

> The Grotian tradition occupies the intermediate position since it believes there has been qualified progress in world politics exemplified by the existence of a *society of states* which places constraints on the state’s power to hurt and facilitates international cooperation. States in this condition are orientated towards communicative action—to participation in diplomatic dialogues in which they advance claims and counterclaims with a view of establishing global standards of legitimacy which distinguish between permissible and proscribed behavior.

The statement encapsulates the spirit of the international society approach as English School scholars believe that although societal relations have developed beyond that of an international system, they have not progressed, and indeed are unlikely to progress, to the point of an international community. As a result, international society represents the middle-ground position: there is more to international relations than the
realist suggests but less than the cosmopolitan desires. The idea of an international society, therefore, stems from the belief that just as individuals at the domestic level create societies based on the establishment of collective understandings, states create international societies by establishing what Linklater refers to as “global standards of legitimacy.” These standards of legitimacy are expressed via the norms, values, principles, and institutions of international relations. It is claimed that these collective understandings enable and/or constrain the behavior of states, thereby increasing the likelihood of order at the international level.

From this perspective, the UNCG represents a normative reaction to the Nazi atrocity which was later labeled genocide. By this I mean that the Nazi genocide acted as a catalyst which altered international legal, moral, and political expectations, thus changing international society’s understanding of “rightful conduct.” For instance, Gareth Evans explains that for 300 years the Westphalian principles that underpinned international relations acted to “institutionalize indifference” in that political leaders were both immune to external accountability and largely indifferent toward the suffering of others within states. This is not to say that political elites never voiced concern over human rights violations within other states. Events such as those in Armenia acted as notable precursors for the changes made in the post-World War II era. The point is that the pattern of institutionalized indifference was deemed to be morally and legally unacceptable in the aftermath of the Nazi genocide. From this perspective, international society’s willingness to accept the term genocide and codify it into international law reflected a new global standard of legitimacy. Furthermore, the Nazi genocide had broader implications as it helped shape the discourse on universal human rights. Such developments reinforce the English School belief that states form a society at the international level by creating collective institutions, rules, norms, values, and principles. These reflect that international relations have progressed to the point that the international system has become an international society.

At this point the genocide scholar may rightly point out that while the UNCG may represent a global standard of legitimacy, so far, political elites have systematically failed to meet the goals of the convention. Of course, English School scholars would not reject this position for it is evident that states have failed to fulfill their legal and moral duties to prevent genocide. Yet at the same time, one has to consider that since genocide prevention may lead states to complex and dangerous foreign policies, fundamental problems arise from legal, moral, and political perspectives. Although English School scholars want genocide prevention and favor the idea of collective preventative strategies being forged, they also share some realist fears regarding humanitarian intervention which they believe “exposes the conflict between order and justice at its starkest.” The reason for their apprehension is that the debate over humanitarian intervention creates tension between the fundamental principles that are seen to underpin both order (state sovereignty) and justice (universal human rights) in international society. As is well documented, the Charter of the United Nations embodies a dual commitment to both state sovereignty and human rights. Although the latter took on a subordinate role in 1945, developments since have seen contemporary interpretations of the Charter claim that both state sovereignty and human rights should be understood as ordering principles within international society and that the former should be understood in the conditional rather than the absolute sense as implied by the UNCG and the 2005 formalization of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
Notably, this has seen a division arise within the English School between pluralists and solidarists. On the one hand, English School pluralists reject the idea that states can legitimately intervene in other states’ internal affairs and uphold the rules of absolute sovereignty and nonintervention on the grounds that these rules help serve international order. From this perspective, humanitarian intervention acts as a crime against humanity (in a non-legal manner) as it violates the very rules that serve humanity best. On the other hand, English School solidarists claim that sovereignty should be understood as conditional, human rights as universal, and humanitarian intervention as legitimate if they bring an end to mass atrocity crimes such as genocide. Critically, both sets of scholars appeal to different empirical developments in their attempts to legitimize their own set of rules. For example, pluralists invoke the UN Charter—especially Article 2 (7)—to claim that sovereignty should be interpreted as absolute. Solidarists advocate subsequent developments such as the adoption of the UNCG and R2P in order to demonstrate that sovereignty should be interpreted as conditional. While an assessment of these claims cannot be put forward here, the division within this one school of thought succinctly illustrates the magnitude of the task at hand, as international society has been constructed upon fundamentally opposing principles. Genocide prevention will remain entrenched in a legal and political quagmire until what Ian Clark refers to as a “tolerable consensus” has been forged between relevant actors at the international level.

A final point worth considering within this analysis of international society is the faith that English School scholars place in the idea of an international society. Indeed it may seem somewhat paradoxical to highlight the moral deficiencies of international society on the one hand but also uphold a commitment to international society on the other. This brings us naturally to the criticism that the English School is state-centric in nature. How can it stress the moral imperfections of the state system yet remain committed to a state-centric approach? This is perhaps best illustrated in Paul Keal’s accomplished study, in which he highlights that the laws and ideas embodied within the expansion of international society led it to be constructed on the dispossession of indigenous lands, the dehumanization of indigenous peoples, and ultimately genocide. From this perspective, the historical evolution of international society should be understood as “morally backward.” However, despite Keal accepting this, he upholds an English School approach for he claims that international society remains the most appropriate vehicle for moral progress within contemporary international relations. In other words, English School scholars accept that states have committed atrocities in the past and will no doubt commit them in the future, but to suggest that an alternative non-state framework can be constructed is a fallacy. Again, it may be possible, but not plausible. As Andrew Hurrell succinctly explains, “The state can certainly be a major part of the problem but remains an unavoidable part of the solution.”

So where does this leave genocide, the UNCG, and genocide prevention from an English School perspective? English School scholars would illustrate that although the UNCG and R2P have laid some groundwork, much more has to be done to entrench and institutionalize universal moral standards and implement exiting legal commitments. International law will never cause states to act in a certain way, but it does shape the behavior of states and most of the time states do uphold international legal developments. The problem is that genocide prevention, as discussed, remains highly problematic from a legal, moral, and political perspective. Therefore, English School
scholars accept that normative developments will not come about quickly as an international consensus needs to be forged in order to implement—not just agree upon—global standards of legitimacy such as the UNCG. The fear is that just as international relations can progress, they can also regress, and the survival of international society requires a consensus being forged over the basic principles of international order. In essence, English School scholars uphold an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary ethic as they seek to gradually improve international society rather than radically redesign it. It is this latter aspect that this article now turns its attention toward.

**International Community: Revolutionism**

The tradition of revolutionism remains the most undertheorized tradition identified by Martin Wight—at least from an English School perspective. For Wight, revolutionism was a hybrid category which captured the “soft” revolutionaries from Kant to Nehru, as well as the “hard” revolutionaries of Jacobins and Marxists. While the complexities involved in this broad spectrum cannot be addressed here, it is evident that these revolutionary perspectives share common ground in that they act to remind both realism (international system) and rationalism (international society) of the moral imperfections to be found in the present state-centric model.

It is important then to stress that Figure 1 reflects Linklater’s focus on Kant’s softer revolutionary position and the idea of an international community. As Linklater explains, “The Kantian tradition represents the progressivist tendency in international thought since its members believe in the existence of a latent community of humankind, and are confident that all political actors have the capacity to replace strategic orientations with cosmopolitan political arrangements governed by dialogue and consent rather than power and force.” Perhaps the best way of viewing this Kantian perspective is in terms of what humanity should move away from, rather than exactly what humanity should move toward. For example, a Kantian commitment to humanity implies that we should move away from the present Westphalian, state-centric model as this serves the interests of states rather than the interests of humanity. Yet at the same time there remains significant debate among Kantians as to how societal relations should be ordered instead. The point of relevance is that this perspective prioritizes the value of humanity over the realist focus on power or the English School focus on order.

To relate this cosmopolitan focus back to the study of genocide, it seems clear that cosmopolitans could use the occurrence of genocide to illustrate how the present state system is failing humanity. In so doing, cosmopolitanism poses a direct challenge to the realist and English School dependency on states and policy makers, which further strengthens the cosmopolitan normative claim that international relations should progress to the point that the security of the individual is given priority over that of the state—while acknowledging that the state has a role to play. By starting with the individual rather than the state, cosmopolitans break away from the state-centric, top-down focus embodied in both the aforementioned international system and international society perspectives. Martin Shaw’s work on global society provides great insight here as he explains that state-centric approaches are limited precisely because they neglect “complex social relations which bind individuals and states.” Thus, Shaw invokes a more complex formulation of international relations which seeks to understand both relations between and within states, and in so doing invokes the idea of human society.
While not a cosmopolitan as such, Shaw’s work could be placed within the international community framework as he claims that a new politics of global responsibility needs to be forged that goes beyond the narrow, state-centric focus embodied in the international system and society perspectives.79

Furthermore, it is important to stress that cosmopolitanism is not some utopian dream; in sharp contrast, many cosmopolitan principles already exist in international relations. For example, scholars such as Linklater and Richard Shapcott have used the idea of harm to highlight that a “global harm narrative” has already emerged in international relations.80 The reality is that states have managed to forge a common understanding on a “range of matters which belong to a lower moral register than visions of some supposedly universal conception of the good.”81 In other words, although there is still a debate regarding what constitutes a universal good, states have come to an understanding over what constitutes a universal bad. It is here that the crime of genocide is of relevance. Although different societies have different views on what constitutes harm, there is a universal consensus regarding the crime of genocide. As Shapcott explains,

It follows that the more serious or fundamental the nature of the harm, the more likely it is to be identified as such by people in diverse situations. Starvation is a clearly harmful condition that is close to being both objectively identifiable (the point at which life can no longer continue) and commanding of a near universal consensus as to its harmful status. Likewise, having one’s identity, or community of belonging, removed or destroyed (harmed), is also something that might well command such a consensus. Genocide is perhaps one value that states have agreed (in principle) overrides national sovereignty, thus recognising a universal crime (or harm) against communities as well as individuals.82

Both Shapcott and Linklater recognize genocide as a paradigm example of harm and claim that the UNCG represents a cosmopolitan harm convention.83 Moreover, they make the case that the principle of harm can be used to promote a global civilizing process that benefits not just states but humankind itself.84 Furthermore, as the statement suggests, this process has already begun and should not be seen as some abstract dream. Yes, we may live in an international society rather than an international community, but this does not mean that cosmopolitan principles do not exist within this society and that they cannot be further institutionalized in order to help bring about an international community.

It is the concept of humanity, therefore, that seems to represent a point of fracture between the international society approach outlined above and the international community approach upheld by cosmopolitans. For example, leading English School scholar Nicholas J. Wheeler has put forward a seminal text in which he claims that humanitarian intervention could be legitimate if it were to prevent crimes such as genocide.85 In contrast, William Bain claims, “It seems as though Wheeler merely invokes humanity as a self-evident moral truth—the authority of which requires no further explanation—which in the end cannot tell us the reasons why we should act to save strangers.”86 The statement is significant for it explains that in failing to justify the existence of humanity, English School scholars such as Wheeler fail to explain why we should act to save those targeted by crimes like genocide. In sharp contrast, cosmopolitans ask us to consider
the Kantian understanding of humanity, which is built on the claim that human beings are inextricably connected: “a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.” Again, one can see such thinking evident in the discourse; for example, Fergal Keane’s analysis on the Rwandan Genocide led him to claim that “genocide killing in Africa diminishes us all.” In so doing, Keane invokes the idea that an international community of humankind actually exists which reflects his worldview. This would be categorically rejected by realists.

To return briefly to the debate set out between Melvern and Wertheim at the start of this article, the cosmopolitan framework discussed here would ask policy makers not to calculate the cost–benefit analysis of genocide prevention based on the interests of the state but on the interest of humanity itself. Thus, while Wertheim is correct to highlight the difference between what is possible and what is plausible, one should not let the focus on the latter obscure the potential for the former. From a cosmopolitan perspective, Wertheim’s approach places too much emphasis on the state-centric reality of how the world is, rather than how it should be. After all, when faced with the horror of genocide it seems perfectly acceptable to make the normative case that since states can cooperate, they should cooperate in order to stop genocide. But again, these perspectives stem from alternative worldviews, and it is impossible to prove (in the scientific sense) that one is right and the other wrong as this is a matter of judgment, not science.

As with the system and society perspectives discussed above, there are, of course, limitations and problems that need to be considered. The central concern with the international community perspective is the value it places on the concepts of humanity, human nature, and human essence to condemn acts such as genocide as inhuman. The problem with this worldview is that it is built on the assumption that humanity and human essence exist. One could, for example, claim that the widespread participation of “ordinary people” in the genocidal process highlights the tragic reality that such acts are, in fact, human. This somewhat profound philosophical argument was put into context in the aftermath of the Nazi atrocities as news and images of events began to filter through mainstream British society. After viewing a Daily Express exhibition on the horrors that took place in Belsen, one 30-year-old woman stated,

I’m afraid it didn’t make me feel anti-German; it made me feel anti-humanity. Would the same have happened here, I wonder, if we’d had the same government? I’ve heard some violent anti-Semitic talk which makes me think it would. I feel it’s the fault of humanity at large, not the Germans in particular.

The statement highlights that just as one can appeal to the idea of humanity to condemn the crime of genocide, one can also appeal to the crime of genocide to refute the existence of a common humanity. Furthermore, even if realists and English School scholars were to accept that humanity does in fact exist, they would then question how we can realistically transform the present international system or international society into an international community. While cosmopolitan scholars offer normative claims, these problems demonstrate how this is an ongoing debate and that further research needs to be done.

In sum, cosmopolitans would tend to accept that we do not live in an international community; yet they uphold a commitment to cosmopolitan principles in the hope that a community of humankind can be established. While English School scholars would
advocate the prevention of genocide on the grounds that this is a legal duty that has to be fulfilled, cosmopolitans would tend to claim that there is something bigger at stake: humanity. Yet at the same time, the concept of humanity is problematic. Whereas scholars such as Keane make the claim that genocide “diminishes us all,” realists would simply question if this is true. If it is not, what does this tell us about the concept of humanity? If it is, how are we meant to transform the present international system into an international community? Thus, further dialogue on this issue is essential for it may be the case that even if humanity does not exist, this does not mean that we should not construct it, cherish it, and protect it.94

Conclusion
This article has examined three perspectives on genocide to illustrate how one’s view of international relations shapes one’s perception, interpretation, and understanding of genocide within it. This is a simple yet important point. For example, genocide scholars continually refer to the international community’s failure to prevent genocide; yet it is clear that most IR scholars do not actually believe that an international community exists. Therefore, when genocide scholars use the term international community they seem to be simply repeating a political mantra which is often put forward by politicians for political purposes.95 Through an examination of the ideas of an international system, international society, and international community, this article revealed how alternative worldviews embody fundamentally different understandings of cooperation, power, justice, order, human nature, and so forth, which in turn shape perceptions of genocide. In other words, genocide is open for interpretation. This may seem somewhat shocking as some genocide scholars might claim that all scholars, policy makers, and laypeople should see genocide as a problem of the greatest magnitude. Yet the truth is that there is not one interpretation of genocide. Thus, the three perspectives outlined in this article help underline the magnitude of the task at hand as genocide prevention remains dependent on a consensus being forged among actors who do not share a common worldview.

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Notes


7. It should be stressed here that the debate between Melvern and Wertheim raises an array of issues which cannot be addressed here. I am not claiming that Melvern is a normative theorist and that Wertheim is a realist; rather, I am simply highlighting how one’s view of genocide prevention may reveal more than just one’s understanding of genocide.


10. A large proportion of the political science literature focuses on how alternative ontological and epistemological assumptions shape discourses that have an impact on political decision making. See Colin Hay, *Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction* (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002).


20. This article uses the term *realism* as shorthand to refer to the array of voices found within the realist and neorealist traditions. To avoid confusion, this article will specify which it engages with when addressing each tradition. In essence, any such approach faces an unavoidable double-edged sword, as on the one hand, realism and neorealism are fundamentally different yet share certain commonalities, and on the other hand, neither realism nor neorealism speaks with a unified voice. This was aptly captured in Robert G. Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” *International Organization* 38,2 (1984): 287–304.


Routledge, 2008), chap. 5. Notably, Mearsheimer developed an offensive neorealist theory which stipulates that since states can never know how much power they require to survive, they should simply continue to accumulate power—within reason, of course. John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (London: Norton, 2001).


41. It should be noted here that offensive neorealists such as John J. Mearsheimer would not be so willing to abandon their principles in favor of any such intervention, which again reveals the tragic nature of the system itself. See Mearsheimer, *Tragedy*.

42. For an analysis that goes beyond the simple reference to Thucydides and Machiavelli see Nicholas Rengger, “Realism, Tragedy, and Anti-Pelagian Imagination in International Political Thought,” in *Realism Reconsidered*, ed. Michael Williams (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), 118–36.


61. Jackson, *Global Covenant*, 410. Whilst not using this phrase as such, Jackson puts forward a strong normative argument that uses the idea of humanity to oppose humanitarian intervention.


63. Article 2 (7) states: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”


65. Ian Clark, *International Legitimacy*. The idea of a “tolerable consensus” being forged among relevant actors in this context allows for much-needed flexibility. Essentially, more than a consensus among the permanent five is needed and the rise of “new” powers such as India, Brazil, and Turkey, as well as existing regional organizations and none UN Security Council powers such as Germany and Japan, will be vital in order for a long-term genocide prevention strategy to be implemented. For a contemporary view on the complexities of legal humanitarian intervention see Ian Hurd, “Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World,” *Journal of Ethics and International Affairs* 23,3 (2011): 293–313.


67. Obviously, this is adapted from the title of Keal’s book.
This of course can be questioned and I feel that there is fascinating research to be done on this thesis and how it relates to Mark Levene’s Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, vol. 1, The Meaning of Genocide (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005); also, Mark Levene, “From Past to Future: Prospects for Genocide and its Avoidance in the Twenty-First Century,” in Bloxham and Moses, Oxford Handbook, 638–59.

Hurrell, On Global Order, 27.

This is an ongoing process; see UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect” (A/63/67, 2009).


Wight, International Theory, 267.

The idea that revolutionism acts to remind the other two traditions that the existing state-centric system is morally deficient is taken from Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory in International Relations (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1990), 8.

Linklater and Suganami, The English School, 117.


Shaw, Global Society, 126.

Ibid. This is a theme developed throughout the book.

To go back to Figure 1, there is further work needed to be done on the relationship between concepts such as international society, international community, world society, and human society.


For Linklater’s position, see Linklater and Suganami, The English School, 181; see also chap. 6, “The Sociology of State-Systems.”


Wheeler, Saving Strangers.


For a seminal critique see Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989). For an overview of this debate which notably draws on both Rorty and Geras among others, see The Limits of Ethics in International Relations, Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Human Rights in Transition (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009), chap. 9.

The term and the idea of ordinary people committing such acts are taken from Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (London: Penguin, 2001).


For example, Andrew Linklater’s work, which has been discussed extensively here, led one scholar to claim that ideas regarding the transformation of the international system into a community was nothing more than fantasy theory; see Randall L. Schweller, “Fantasy Theory,” Review of International Studies 25,1 (1999): 147–50.

Ken Booth claims that we should invent humanity; see Booth, Theory of World Security, 379–80.
For example, Condoleezza Rice once referred to the “illusionary international community” in order to substantiate the US objective of furthering the national interest of the United States through unilateral action; see Joseph Nye, “The American National Interest and Global Public Goods,” *International Affairs* 78,2 (2002): 233–44, 236. Then in 2010, the WikiLeaks scandal showed that the US had framed the event as an “attack against the international community” in order to gain the necessary international consensual support; see “Wikileaks Diplomat Cables Release ‘Attack on World,’” BBC News, 29 November 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11868838 (accessed 22 May 2011).
The True Measure of Success: The Leadership of Roméo Dallaire in the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

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Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire, as force commander for the United Nations Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the figure most associated with the infamous mission, has often been accused of providing poor leadership that ultimately failed to prevent the outbreak of genocide in April 1994. To evaluate this claim, it is necessary to analyze Dallaire’s actions prior to the outbreak. By looking at his personal suitability, situational nuances, and moments of opportunity during the UNAMIR mission between October 1993 and April 1994, it is possible to form an accurate assessment of Lieutenant General Dallaire’s leadership in Rwanda and its relation to the development of the catastrophe. This article will demonstrate that prior to the death of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, Dallaire succeeded in fulfilling UNAMIR’s directives despite resistance on all sides. This assessment disproves arguments that his failure in leading UNAMIR was a primary contributing factor to the outbreak of the Rwandan Genocide.

Key words: UNAMIR, Rwanda, genocide, Dallaire, leadership

Introduction

Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire’s United Nations (UN) mission to Rwanda is often interpreted through the prism of the genocide that exploded months after the peacekeeping force arrived. The majority of the literature on the mission, including official UN summary publications, has focused on the colonial and pre-1990s national conflicts, glossing over the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) until the onset of the genocide on 6 April 1994.1 In this context, the plane crash that killed President Juvenal Habyarimana and marked the beginning of the 100-day massacre became just another step toward chaos for the troubled nation. This paper will argue that this view places undue blame on UNAMIR’s military leadership for the genocide’s occurrence and disregards UNAMIR’s successes prior to the crash when Dallaire was able to manage the evolving scenario and the limitations of the UN mandate with skill and resourcefulness. Until the crash, the situation in Rwanda had been volatile but had presented opportunities for Dallaire and UNAMIR to genuinely further the aims of the Arusha Accords. In the face of numerous stumbling blocks, Dallaire’s tenure prior to the crash was a tentative success. Once the plane crashed in Kigali, neither Dallaire nor any other element of the UN had the capability or speed to address and halt the rising tide of genocide. The true measure of his success or failure in Rwanda can only be judged by looking at the days before 6 April 1994.

This argument will establish the criteria by which Dallaire’s leadership of the Rwanda mission can be judged a success or failure. With a realistic evaluation of the
resources available and the nature of the UNAMIR mandate, success will be defined as the keeping of peace, the maintenance of the ceasefire, and the facilitation of political processes toward the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. Conversely, a failing mission would be defined by the resumption of large-scale military aggression and the practical inability to facilitate meetings and unified political gatherings. This corresponds with Paul Diehl’s suggested criteria for evaluating peacekeeping operations by “how well an operation deterred or prevented violent conflict in its area of deployment; and how much it facilitated ‘resolution of the disagreements underlying the conflict.’”\(^2\)

Dallaire’s suitability must be evaluated for the peacekeeping mission, but also for the complicated forces at play in Rwanda. Aside from his own suitability, it must also be determined whether any other potential leader had a chance of success, or whether the mission was already troubled prior to his appointment as force commander (FC). Diehl and Daniel Druckerman have raised concerns over the use of the “lessons learned” approach to analyzing peacekeeping, which promotes methods that have worked well in the past with little investigation into why they were effective and whether they are applicable to different situations.\(^3\) This is very much the attitude that has been used to measure Dallaire’s performance. His evaluation in respect to the UNAMIR mission has been based primarily on its final, violent outcome. This argument will instead attempt to analyze his tenure from his arrival until the airplane crash in an effort to understand leadership in peacekeeping missions as more than a matter of responsibility, but as having a unique set of challenges and requirements which need to be further studied and structured in order to strengthen future missions. By looking at pivotal moments to determine whether Dallaire piloted these events toward the best possible outcome, a more accurate measurement of his proficiency as force leader can be formed, and the argument that his leadership was a contributing element to the genocide can be refuted.

Once Dallaire was made force commander, what mission was he to lead? The mandate of the UNAMIR mission is a key element in this appraisal. The mission he believed he was undertaking and the means he understood to be available gave him an image of the mission that would be violently disrupted by the reality of Rwanda. While the situation on the ground changed under his feet, the necessary adaptations to his formal mandate languished in the bureaucratic paper trays of UN Headquarters (UNHQ) in New York. This situation was both a functional and ideological constraint on Dallaire’s ability to react and reassess as opportunities as challenges arose.

The obstacles and opportunities that arose during the UNAMIR mission were the showcase of Dallaire’s competency as force leader. These scenarios began to shape the progress of the mission before it even touched down in Kigali, and continued to do so until the 6 April 1994 death of President Habyarimana. Beginning with the 21 October 1993 coup in neighboring Burundi and followed by the complications of the Belgian peacekeeping contingent and the deficiencies of the majority of the force, the political concerns surrounding Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh and the informant Jean-Pierre’s report of weapons caches in Kigali, Dallaire was confronted with a number of critical moments. The paths he chose and his reactions to obstructions would reveal the true measure of his leadership.

This investigation will look into whether there was still hope that a controlled—if not entirely peaceful—environment could be maintained by the UN force at each
turning point, and will ask whether the mission was fated to fail before it even began. It will be argued that the possibility of success remained, under the leadership of Dallaire, until the night the presidential jet crashed just outside of the Kigali airport.

**Dallaire’s Suitability for the Situation**

Evaluating Dallaire’s potential for success in the months leading up to 6 April 1994 requires examining his qualities as a leader and, more specifically, his suitability for the role of force commander of the Rwanda mission. Doing so requires firm guidelines for the FC’s role in relation to other leaders involved in the mission.\(^4\) Dallaire’s position made him responsible for the military and security concerns of UNAMIR. His superiors assured him that his first peacekeeping mission was to be a “relatively tranquil affair.”\(^5\) Matters of politics and diplomacy were assigned to SRSG Booh-Booh. Dallaire was to be subordinate to Booh-Booh, who—as the political leader of UNAMIR—was intended to be a “special representative to lead the mission and provide the diplomatic glue that would make sure the Arusha Accords didn’t come unstuck.”\(^6\) In the fulfillment of the Arusha Accords and the establishment of Rwanda’s new government structure, Dallaire’s role was to be one of facilitation, not implementation.

This suited Dallaire, who has been described as a “NATO man,” implying that his military knowledge had been shaped by the needs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the Cold War, rather than a “UN man” experienced in the complex political machinations of peacekeeping operations.\(^7\) Aware of his inexperience with the political and social elements of UN forces, Dallaire selected Major Brent Beardsley—who at the time was involved in the drafting of the Canadian Forces peacekeeping manual—to assist him and supplement his knowledge of UNHQ and peacekeeping.\(^8\) Dallaire was not an experienced UN force leader, but he understood himself to be centered in a support network that would supplement his deficiencies in this respect.

Measuring Roméo Dallaire’s personal suitability for the Rwandan mission reveals that his deficiencies in experience were mitigated by his suitability to the nature of the conflict. Dallaire’s experience with cultural and linguistic plurality in society was ingrained from his youth and the earliest stages of his career. As a young man in Quebec during the era of the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) Crisis, René Lévesque’s Parti Québécois, and as a bilingual soldier in a predominantly Anglo military, Dallaire was well versed in cultural tensions and prejudices.\(^9\) He was also experienced in actively navigating and finding solutions to the barriers created by language and ingrained relations.\(^10\) This was a valuable asset in Rwanda, where the negotiations faltered between the French-speaking Rwandan government forces (RGF) and a largely anglicized Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).\(^11\) Both conceptually and linguistically, Roméo Dallaire was able to comprehend dynamics between the two antagonists that other military figures could not.

These skills were mobilized when SRSG Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh failed to act proactively in his political role. Rather than supplying essential political leadership, Dallaire felt that Booh-Booh was unable to provide any innovation and at times even reasonable aid in response to a volatile situation.\(^12\) In his own memoir of the UNAMIR mission, Booh-Booh would argue that the lack of movement could be blamed on the intransigence of the Rwandan political class.\(^13\) Booh-Booh’s own publication, a clear attempt at a rebuttal to Dallaire’s claims, called this view of his role a “puerile dream” and often chastised Dallaire for his political ventures.\(^14\) Nonetheless, Dallaire frequently attended the often frustrating political meetings between Rwandans, for which his deputy commander, Henry Kwami Anyidoho, acknowledged him.\(^15\) He found that his
language skills led him to act as translator between the English-speaking RPF and French-language representatives of the Rwandan government. He later claimed it was this role as a linguistically neutral figure that gave him greater access and comprehension in Rwanda and motivated communication with all sides. Faced with a mission leader whom he found at best uninterested and at worst negligent, Dallaire proved that he was not only willing, but particularly well suited to bridging the personnel gaps at UNAMIR’s highest levels.

While experience with antagonistic cultural plurality and bilingualism were valuable tools in the Rwandan conflict, they do not single Dallaire out as one uniquely well suited to the mission. Other nations could have provided military leaders with similar characteristics, but what they did not have was the connection to Rwanda found in Canada. Deliberations between the RPF and RGF had identified Canada in particular as a prospective nation from which to draw a peacekeeping commander. While a Western, bilingual nation, it was free of the colonial history of comparable European states. Positive impressions of Canada had been developed in Rwanda during the decades after the 1960s decolonization, when Canadian relations with the African nation were tied strongly to education and philanthropy. These positive bonds made Dallaire a desirable leader for the UN’s military force. It also meant that Dallaire was entering an arena where key players had been influenced by his own cultural heritage and experiences.

Considering his linguistic and cultural suitability to Rwandan society, Dallaire seems to have emerged as the most viable candidate for leadership. His own civilian and military experiences fitted him to the organizational and social characteristics of the Rwandan conflict. His character was said to fit well into the African culture, with less cool reserve than many of his anglophone contemporaries. He was described as energetic, charismatic, patient, principled, and hard-working, sometimes to the irritation of others, but often to the benefit of his leadership position.

As a leader, he was versed in the realities of modern peacekeeping. When troops under his command were sent to join UN forces in Yugoslavia and Cambodia, Dallaire discovered the vulnerability and possibility of casualties among peacekeepers in regions where conflict continued to spark. He recognized this risk in his own mission once on the ground and was subsequently aware of it during his decision-making processes. Dallaire was a man who fit the needs of the situation and culture of Rwanda, had his own knowledge of the dynamics of national conflict, and had a strong career as a military leader.

One of the elements he did lack for an African mission was being from the continent himself. While the UN often tried to give a regional character to African missions, the front-runner for the position, a Nigerian general leading the Organization of African Unity (OAU) observer mission in Rwanda before the UN’s arrival, left much to be desired. This officer’s own men informed Dallaire during his observations of Rwanda prior to UNAMIR’s establishment that the general had abandoned the military observers he had been charged with in the midst of a break in the cease-fire in the de-militarized zone (DMZ), retreating to Kigali and leaving them to fend for themselves. This was not the strong military figure necessary for a mission that depended as much on its control of minds as its control of bodies. Dallaire was a man who could lead and interact with his own men, and decipher the Rwanda that confronted him.

His primary role was to be the military leader of the UNAMIR force; as such, his military background is an important measure of his suitability for the mission. Dallaire
was not an experienced UN peacekeeping soldier, nor were his inclinations to be particularly aggressive. In the post-Cold War era, the nature of peacekeeping was beginning to undergo a drastic change. Without the divisive influence of Western-Soviet conflict, new and more complex dimensions were becoming apparent. Even experienced UN peacekeepers were entering theaters that were unfamiliar and evolving beyond their fields of reference. Criticisms of Dallaire’s foundations as an artillery officer are valid for the technical nature of the mission, which was not combat-based or heavily armed. However, the characteristics of an artillery officer as outlined by the Canadian Forces are highly compatible with the challenges the Rwanda mission produced. The artillery officer was to expect “long hours under stress both by day and night . . . to be out of doors with little shelter in all weather, often in physically demanding conditions.”

In response to this environment, artillery officers were expected to perform as superior leaders, especially among subordinates, and to possess physical and mental strength and stamina, methodical and mature judgment, and the ability to perform steadily and quickly while under great stress. Dallaire’s mobilization of these transferable skills from his artillery leadership role to the Rwandan arena shows his suitability as a new leader in a new kind of peacekeeping. His deputy commander Henry Kwami Anyidoho affirmed in his own work on UNAMIR that Dallaire was “a high calibre officer that one rarely comes across . . . a courageous leader who showed the way and we all followed.”

As a final measure of his suitability to UNAMIR, Dallaire’s resistance to aggressive displays of force was an important feature of his success prior to the outbreak of genocide. While he was not against pre-emptive displays of action or a strong defensive stance, Dallaire’s insistence on control among his men was essential in preventing outbreaks of public violence or internal disruptions for months before the crash. From UN force observations and intelligence on Hutu extremists included in Dallaire’s cables to the UN, it was evident that the forces of the RGF and its paramilitary organizations were actively agitating an already volatile situation. RGF elements participated in mass demonstrations during key events in the peace process—armed, but in plain clothes—hoping to incite the crowds and the UN forces protecting politicians. Their aim was to set off violence that would reignite the Rwandan conflict and to target UNAMIR’s Belgian troops in order to prompt their withdrawal. By promoting calm and measured actions and disciplining those who crossed behavioral and disciplinary lines, Dallaire proved that his even temperament and reservation were an appropriate approach in a volatile situation not only prone to violence, but at times specifically working to incite it.

L.Gen Dallaire’s strengths and weakness reflect the reality of UN peacekeeping processes. In the United Nations, the force commander and the head of peacekeeping missions are both appointed by the secretary-general. This detail is not highlighted in order to redirect blame or responsibility for the outcome of missions onto the secretary-general, but to raise the question of the need for well-reviewed guidelines in the selection of force leaders. This would likely require matching those individuals selected for their suitability to the mission, such as Dallaire, with the necessary training and guidance in the intricacies of modern peacekeeping that he was not provided with. Such an arrangement would also allow for a greater forum for communication that could build future leaders of peace operations. While Dallaire had proven himself to be a strong leader in the Canadian Forces, there is much that could have been done to support him further as leader of a UN mission.
Initial Appraisal of the Situation

In order to understand the character of the UNAMIR mission, it is important to understand Rwanda as it was seen at the time, without the benefits of hindsight, and with a view to Dallaire’s responsibilities as a military leader for the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Determining whether Dallaire’s actions up to 6 April 1994 can be considered successful requires an understanding of what potential for resolution the UN believed existed in Rwanda. If the scenario in Rwanda was massively underestimated prior to commencement, can the standard concept of success as non-violence and the development of democracy still be applied?

In the 1980s, Rwanda found itself in a position of secure—though not ideal—government under the dictatorship of Juvenal Habyarimana. For more than 15 years, Habyarimana had ruled over a country which was pragmatically described as “in general one of the least bad in Africa if one considers only its actions and not its intellectual underpinnings.” However, stability fell and racial tensions rose as economic downturns struck the nation. The coffee and tin industries—highly important for the Rwandan economy—collapsed, and the tiny nation became dependent on foreign aid as its main source of income. Leaning on traditional links between Rwanda and France, Habyarimana loosened his monopoly on public power after French president François Mitterrand advised him that democratization was paramount in maintaining a flow of international aid. While the opening of politics to opposition parties was in keeping with changes being made in many nations following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it stirred up civil conflict in Rwanda. The racialized political tensions between Hutu and Tutsi citizens and exile populations erupted in the early 1990s. Composed largely of exiled Tutsi living as refugees in Uganda after decades of conflict in their homeland, the RPF launched an offensive against the ruling Habyarimana government. The resultant civil war was the catalyst for international intervention in the African state.

UNAMIR’s aim was to monitor the enforcement of the Arusha Accords, the complicated resolution proposed to end the war. Many outside politicians and diplomats believed that these accords presented the best opportunity for establishing a new governance system between the warring factions. One American representative, Herman J. Cohen, embodied the optimistic view of the UN by stating, in April 1993, that “in terms of the Arusha agreement moving forward, [he] did not consider a non-implementation scenario.” Much of the UN saw Rwanda as a chance to revitalize its damaged peacekeeping reputation following recent missions in Somalia and Yugoslavia. In 1993, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali considered Rwanda “the site of a unique experiment in preventative diplomacy—which was supposed to be the first step in averting war . . . and the experiment [was] on the verge of success.” SRSG Booh-Booh was clearly dedicated to the structure of the Arusha agreement and complained that Dallaire did not understand the need to have the confidence of all Arusha signatories, even once the agreement no longer effectively addressed the shifting dynamics of the conflict. This level of optimism toward a successful Rwandan peace was passed on to Dallaire as the truth of the scenario. In an interview, Dallaire himself stated that the atmosphere at the UN during the formation of his mission plan was decidedly optimistic:

The information we received from the international community and from the UN, who were monitoring and assisting the peace agreement, led us to believe that the mission would be a success. There would be some friction and there was a sense of
urgency surrounding our deployment. But both sides had come to UN HQ in New York and said that they wanted the peacekeeping mission to happen. It was perceived as a classic low-budget Chapter 6 mission.41

A “classic” Chapter 6 peacekeeping mission was based on the idea of the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes” and lacked a Chapter 7 mission’s capacity for physical enforcement regarding “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.”42 On the direction of the organization sponsoring his efforts and already investigating the conflict, Dallaire initially perceived that his would be an achievable mission in a willing nation.

In reality, Dallaire was not fully informed of the true nature of the Rwandan conflict. A well-trained and respected soldier, he was admittedly not a political specialist, nor was he adequately equipped with one on his initial investigative technical mission.43 In a complex political situation with multiple players, the mission lacked adequate political analysis and understanding. The Rwandan nation may have desired peace and stability, but its leaders did not.44 Vital information that could have aided Dallaire and altered his mission plan dramatically was withheld or simply not communicated to the DPKO through the often convoluted and competitive structure of UN departments.45 A Human Rights Watch report completed in 1993 outlined the trends of violence and rights violations that were already occurring in Rwanda. Even the Network Zero organization—anti-Tutsi “squads” formed across the nation associated with high-level figures like First Lady Agathe Habyarimana and central to the promotion and preparation for the genocide—was specifically identified by observers in the region before Dallaire’s arrival.46 Despite warnings that any response to the Rwandan situation needed to be properly equipped to address these concerns, Dallaire was not aware of the report until after his return to Canada, after the 100 days of genocide had already consumed the country.47 Even the World Bank failed to pass on vital information about Rwanda’s militarization to the UN, considering it unnecessary to inform the Security Council of its knowledge of arms shipments arriving into the country.48 This lack of information likely influenced Dallaire’s determination that while a mission force of 5,500 would be ideal, a “reasonable viable option” of a 2,500-strong force could still complete the mission while passing the UN’s austere approval standards for mission size and cost.49 It was with this dearth of knowledge and barely adequate force strength that Dallaire would face the challenges of Rwanda. If he was to succeed, he would have to do so with a less-than-ideal force in a scenario more complex than he could have known. This was the challenge Dallaire faced from his arrival on 22 October 1993 to the night of 6 April 1994.50

Crisis Point
To understand why an investigation into Roméo Dallaire’s success must begin before April 6, the plane crash that resulted in the death of President Habyarimana must be clearly understood as the critical fracture point in the Rwandan conflict. The event and its direct repercussions removed Dallaire’s ability to act in any meaningful way toward the establishment of peace. A survivor of the genocide focused the restricted nature of Dallaire’s response on the rising tide of violence after the crash:

We wondered what on earth UNAMIR was doing in Rwanda. . . . [They] could not even lift a finger to intervene and prevent the death of tens of thousands of innocent people who were being killed under their very noses. . . . An institution must have the capacity to be effective. But the UN protects no one.51
While some have stated that UNAMIR’s “greatest challenge” was to stop the killings, in reality this was neither its purpose nor within its ability.\textsuperscript{52} Dallaire had not been sent to Rwanda to fight for peace, only to facilitate it. He would later recall that in the face of the rising violence “UNAMIR’s hands essentially remained tied.”\textsuperscript{53} He posited that if he had been provided with a contingent able to convince Rwandans it was “riskier to go [out] . . . than stay at home, we could have stopped it.”\textsuperscript{54} Unfortunately, the reality of UN dynamics and logistics made the plausibility of this a moot point. If providing a monitoring force during ceasefire was considered impractical by the US or UK, volunteering troops when the element of risk escalated was too foolish to even consider. Unwilling to increase support in the months prior to the crash, the UN certainly would not send in troops after it.\textsuperscript{55}

Habyarimana’s death irreparably destabilized the nation. Ignace, a Hutu interviewed by author Alain Destexhe during his post-genocide research in Rwanda, was one of the many génocidaires who rose from the wreckage of the crash. He recalled the new, collective sentiment that formed following it.\textsuperscript{56} Ignace told of a radical Hutu element that “no longer worried about who had followed the teachings of the presidential party or the teachings of a rival party. We forgot all quarrels, and who had fallen out with whom in the past. We kept only one idea in the pot.”\textsuperscript{57} That idea was genocide.

This was mirrored in the international connections around the Rwandan peace settlements. Habyarimana was the conduit between Rwandan politics and the international community.\textsuperscript{58} The inflammatory Hutu radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) encouraged the public to “stand up, take action . . . without worrying about international opinion.”\textsuperscript{59} Many did just that. A witness to the genocide later revealed that the violence “did not become widespread until extremists saw the world would not get involved and that UNAMIR’s contingents would protect only themselves.”\textsuperscript{60} Hutu radicals were no longer held back by the influence of the international community embodied in an established leader or UNAMIR. Habyarimana’s death released the ties that had kept intent from becoming action.\textsuperscript{61}

Colonel James Allen, who had led peacekeeping missions before retiring from the military to become a journalist, shamed Dallaire. He chastised him for not diving into the conflict in the “best military tradition,” which would have been tantamount to suicide for his troops, yet at the same time criticized him for allowing the deaths of the Belgian soldiers on security detail with Prime Minister Madame Agathe.\textsuperscript{62} Allen argued that Dallaire’s Canadian contemporary, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, chief of staff in the 1992 UN mission in Yugoslavia, would not have failed as he believed Dallaire had.\textsuperscript{63} Yet, in his contradictory disapproval of both action and inaction, it is hard to determine what outcome he would have considered a success. Deputy Commander Anyidoho later reinforced Dallaire’s pragmatic stance, questioning the wisdom of placing UN forces “with basically only personal weapons . . . in the face of belligerents who were armed to the teeth.”\textsuperscript{64} While morality obligated action, it was not a practical or political possibility in Rwanda in 1994. The flood gates had been opened and no one man, whether willing or recalcitrant, masterful or inept, could close them.

**Mandate**

The UN’s approval of Dallaire’s proposal for a force of 2,500 led to the creation of the mission mandate for UNAMIR. However, it was not the only outline that would be created in the early months of the mission. The political and military settlement in Rwanda had been created through the Arusha Peace Accords, the heavily debated peace
The Arusha Accords called for a neutral international force to assist in implementing the new government structure and maintaining the unsteady truce between the sides. However, the creators of the accords recognized to a greater degree that “peacekeeping cannot be an end in itself—it merely buys time.” African politicians and insiders were becoming aware that the possibility of force would be a vital element to any response. However, the response they wanted and the force they received had considerable differences. Arusha outlined a mission which would have secured the country as a whole, taken part in actions such as arms confiscations, and enforced security. Both unwilling and unable to find funding or willing participants, the UN watered down these strong aims, cutting down the geographic reach and the force’s bite, replacing confiscation with mediation, and security with monitoring. The UN mandate consisted of eight roles for the UNAMIR force:

a. to contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, inter alia, within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city
b. to monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement . . .
c. to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government’s mandate, leading up to the elections
d. to assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes
e. to investigate . . . instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties, and to pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report . . . as appropriate to the Secretary-General
f. to monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons . . .
g. to assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities . . . with relief operations
h. to investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police

The primary intent of the mandate was to monitor and assist the Rwandans in their progress toward a peaceful settlement. While the mandate initially appeared to be a sufficient outline for the simple mission the UN believed Rwanda to be, in truth the situation was much more complex than the mandate recognized.

The mandate itself presented numerous problems. It was formed at a time in 1993 when the DPKO’s perception of Rwanda was simplistic and uncomplicated. As such, Dallaire did not consider the exact semantics of the mandate to be of great importance. Without the anticipation of active and widespread violent elements in Rwanda, it was not important that the specific wording could eventually prevent UNAMIR forces from engaging with violent mobs or individuals. Due to these expectations, the mandate was also formulated around traditional perceptions of peacekeeping operations. It presupposed goodwill, respect, and cooperation from both sides of the conflict so that UN forces could remain a neutral force between them. When this was discovered to be untrue, the need to institute flexibility into the mandate to address the shifting situation on the ground was heightened.

Further, the generic quality of the mandate gave Dallaire a wider impression of his options than the UN had conceived. In an interview, Dallaire spoke of
the impasse over philosophy and interpretation of the mandate. I saw my mandate as “6-plus,” which gave me a certain amount of room for manoeuvre. DPKO saw it in a much more restrictive sense, because of the fear of casualties and so on.\(^{72}\)

In the spirit of a “six-plus” mandate that gave room for military actions in the face of threats to human rights, Dallaire produced the guiding document for UNAMIR that elaborated on the outline in the mandate: his rules of engagement (ROE). In UN operations, the ROE are written by the commanding officer after the establishment of the mission. Upon reaching this stage, Dallaire took what he perceived to be the open spirit of the mandate and shaped his Rules to fit his scenario. He saw it as his general role to “create an atmosphere of security,” and to do so, he recycled a portion of the Cambodian peace-enforcement mission’s text, which became paragraph 17 of the ROE.\(^{73}\) Paragraph 17 stated that the occurrence of crimes against humanity “morally and legally [required] UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them.”\(^{74}\) Dallaire believed that this was within the boundaries of his vague mandate, and necessary in light of recent developments in Rwanda. The UN never responded to his ROE, neither positively or negatively, and Dallaire took this as a tacit approval of his direction.\(^{75}\)

Crossroads
Evaluating Roméo Dallaire’s leadership of the UNAMIR mission prior to 6 April 1994 requires a specific area of investigation. For this analysis, the most important evidence is in the decisive moments when conflict in Rwanda and the mission determined in which direction UNAMIR and the nation would go. Dallaire’s ability to lead a successful mission rested less on the stasis of peace, and more on the resolution of conflicts that threatened it. By investigating these moments of conflict and their results, it is possible to evaluate the point at which the mission was or became irredeemable.

Burundi Coup
The first crisis that Dallaire faced during the UNAMIR mission arose as he touched down in Kigali. Arriving on 22 October 1993, Dallaire found that the very fundamentals of Rwanda’s national situation had changed drastically the day before.\(^{76}\) Along the southern border of the country lay Burundi, with its own postcolonial legacy of Hutu and Tutsi conflict. The day before Dallaire’s arrival, leaders in the nation’s Tutsi-led army overthrew and assassinated Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye, who had been recently elected in Burundi’s first free elections after 30 years of Tutsi dictatorship.\(^{77}\) This coup had several repercussions on the Rwandan situation. In the wake of reprisals from Hutu and Tutsi, 300,000 mostly Hutu refugees crossed the border to camps in southern Rwanda.\(^{78}\) For Hutu in Rwanda, fears of Tutsi hegemony were escalated by the coup, providing not only the spark, but also fuel for the fire of charged opposition. Theories of an overarching Tutsi plot were enflamed by radical propaganda that warned against believing that “what happened in Burundi cannot happen here.”\(^{79}\) Large Hutu refugee populations in the south proved to be fertile recruiting ground for the RGF, where “Hutu Power” grew in a climate of the Hutu nation under siege.\(^{80}\) The lack of Western reaction and recognition of the Burundi crisis was also compelling evidence to Rwandans of the limitations of international intervention.\(^{81}\) The upset in Burundi did not only remove the secure southern front Dallaire had depended on, but it also agitated the conflicts and tensions in Rwanda just in time for his arrival.
This was a key moment for Dallaire’s leadership. He recognized immediately that “everything had changed. Not only would the coup in Burundi shake the fragile political situation in Rwanda, but the stable southern flank, which I had relied on in my mission plan, had vanished.” As his first test, it was important to set a precedent while reshaping his understanding of the atmosphere. It was essential that the mission did not run out of hand within its first days. In response, he reorganized according to the increased security requirements. Dallaire immediately requested an increased force from the UN. The DPKO informed Dallaire that the troops were not requested in the initial mission report, filed before the coup had occurred, and as such would not be added on at that point. Establishing an element of stability in southern Rwanda would require the juggling of his already limited personnel to a region he had not intended to staff heavily. Dallaire stretched his force of unarmed military observers into the south to maintain UNAMIR presence throughout the unsettled nation. Determined to make higher powers aware of the heightened tensions, Dallaire continued to report to the UN that the stretching of UNAMIR’s forces in this new environment would require taking more risks. It was not ideal, but it was a reality he was willing to work with. In his reports, Dallaire gave a realistic but positive look at the situation and needs, recognizing his responsibility to protect the Rwandan peace and his own contingent. It was not until after the mission that he found out that SRSG J. R. Booh-Booh had watered down his expressions of concern to a picture of slow and steady progress before allowing them to reach the UN. At the time, Dallaire was painted as a cowboy and Booh-Booh’s reports were considered more balanced and understanding of the situation. In the aftermath, it would appear that these perceptions were not an accurate representation of events.

The situation in Rwanda at this time was not out of hand. Radicals did not take advantage of the chaos in Burundi to mount their own political or military action in Rwanda and Dallaire was able to establish a monitoring force that fulfilled UNAMIR’s needs in the south. While tensions had been raised and racial rhetoric spread, it was not obvious at that point that widespread genocidal chaos would ensue as a direct result.

**Force Dynamics**

Dallaire’s second challenge arose with the arrival of the various national groups that formed the UNAMIR forces. Without the support of large nations such as Great Britain or the United States, the UNAMIR contingent was composed largely of forces from smaller nations in Asia and Africa. The only significant Western elements were the Belgians. While their skills and experience were essential to the success of Dallaire’s mission, they had their own complications. They arrived with limited supplies and equipment, although more than other contingents, and fresh from assignment in the Somalian conflict. When further equipment did arrive, the long distances involved in their transportation to Rwanda left most machinery and vehicles broken and stripped of vital components. Furthermore, the colonial history of Belgium as an oppressive power in Rwanda made their contribution to the force controversial at best. Dallaire was faced with the added complication of dealing with Belgian para-commandos fresh from active conflict in Somalia and used to peace enforcement, not peacekeeping. Their attitude and the environment they were accustomed to encouraged aggressive behavior that did not mesh with UNAMIR’s methods. However, as his only significant Western force, Dallaire needed the Belgians as a controlling and secure influence in a complex environment. Dallaire would become aware in the course of the following months that the Belgian soldiers were specifically targeted for agitation by radicals trying...
to get Belgium to withdraw from the force in the face of casualties. They were a target for disturbances and worsened the situation by actively creating problems for the mission. The best example occurred when the Belgian protective detail supporting the transit of RPF representatives to Kigali abandoned them in the face of attack. Dallaire reported that the “shame this incident brought on UNAMIR forces was never expunged.” The Belgian contingent was both a blessing and a curse to Dallaire and to UNAMIR.

The majority of UNAMIR’s forces were provided by poorly prepared and undersupplied “Third World” nations. These soldiers were promoted as “highly motivated, if less well trained.” In reality, many arrived with broken or outdated equipment, little to no supplies, and without the training or desire to meet UNAMIR’s challenges. For Dallaire, the Bangladeshi contingent was the epitome of this conundrum. Contributing nations were required to supply their troops with sixty days of supplies. The Bangladeshis came without many of the most basic requirements for food and shelter. This was particularly striking when considering that the Bangladeshi contingent made up the majority of logistical support units for the mission, including the engineering and medical services. Dallaire’s deputy commander Henry Kwami Anyidoho of Ghana had warned him against depending on a developing country to serve as a central element of UNAMIR’s logistics, but Dallaire countered that Bangladesh was also the only nation that had offered. When he tried to train them as a quick-response force, they proved unequal to the task, more likely to escalate than improve a high-risk scenario. In periods of tension, Dallaire would discover that they and other contingents would operate according to orders issued by their country, not by UNAMIR. The Bangladeshis and other, similar force contingents created a constant juggling act for Dallaire to monitor, supply, and control in the sparse time available outside the maintenance of the mission’s basic requirements.

In response to these challenges of mission leadership, Dallaire was able to assess both his personnel and his environment in order to juggle the complex force dynamics. When the Belgians lost RPF confidence after Belgian soldiers abandoned their duties, Dallaire modified the placement of his contingents. Instead of the controversial Belgians, the well-trained Tunisian force was positioned at the RPF headquarters in Kigali. Dallaire was also able to use general Belgian presence and participation to the benefit of the mission, calling on Belgian personnel for intelligence information that UNAMIR itself lacked. Such changes revealed some flexibility in UNAMIR that allowed Dallaire to react to challenges. His was a responsive force, not one locked in a downward spiral.

Dallaire also revealed himself to be willing to make difficult decisions for the overall success of the mission. In response to Belgian forces’ fraternization in Rwandan bars and with Rwandan women, their aggressive attitude toward Rwandan politicians and important figures, and general insubordination, Dallaire went to the Belgian command, threatening that control had to be established or the continuation of a Belgian presence would become a greater hindrance than help to UNAMIR. Several Belgian soldiers were removed to Belgium in the face of their actions. It is difficult to believe that Dallaire would have been willing to even consider the removal of the Belgian contingent force if he had thought that large-scale violence was about to break loose across Rwanda.

**Political Deficiencies**

With the establishment of the UN mission in Rwanda, attending to the political requirements of the Arusha agreement became a primary concern. Dallaire was aware of his
position as a military man and hoped that UNAMIR requirements beyond his expertise would be handled by an effective ally. Dallaire wanted this ally, the special representative to the secretary-general, to be a military figure who would lead a French-language mission in Rwanda. In reality, he received a civilian, Cameroonian Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, and a mission with English as the operational language in a primarily French-speaking region of Africa. Booh-Booh was supposed to be the “glue” that kept the Arusha Accords together, but for Dallaire he was often more divisive than effective. Though the SRSG was a confidant to then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, he also refused to use his influence to aid the mission. Seemingly favorably biased toward the former Rwandan government and often damaging to the vital image of UN neutrality with his numerous personal visits with President Habyarimana, Booh-Booh’s fit with the Rwandan mission was awkward at best.

Politically, Dallaire found Booh-Booh’s diplomatic efforts limited and filled with ultimata and threats toward both sides of the civil conflict. His communications with the UN were full of watered-down appraisals and assurances that contributed to a regular pattern of denial to Dallaire’s requests, even when tensions escalated. According to Dallaire, at one fragile point in February 1994 during political discussions between the parties to form the new government, Booh-Booh “suddenly pounded the table . . . and got up, knocking his chair over in his haste. This meeting was going nowhere, he announced emphatically, and he was not going to waste any more of his time. In fact, he refused to chair any more such meetings.” Deputy Commander Anyidoho stated a belief that Booh-Booh’s missteps, including his visits with Habyarimana, were done in innocence of their harm. As the senior political figure for the mission and the supposed diplomatic head of UNAMIR on the ground, it would seem that Booh-Booh should have had the foresight to understand the implications of his actions in a delicate political situation. An interview allowed Dallaire to reflect on Booh-Booh’s position as the figurehead and political leader of UNAMIR:

Booh-Booh was given the task of leading the process, but he was never able to bring forth innovative ideas. Indeed he seemed, at times, to not be particularly helpful in bringing along possible solutions. . . . Looking back, it would have been interesting to have had a political advisor—rather than a political boss—a solid, experienced diplomat-politician . . . with whom we could have built a team.

Booh-Booh would later attempt to contradict this image of himself by arguing that an arrogant Dallaire struggled under the authority of an African. There were no such similar claims from Dallaire’s other African counterparts.

Dallaire’s response to Booh-Booh’s limitations would reveal both his adaptability and his continuing belief in the viability of maintaining the Arusha process. He couldn’t overpower Booh-Booh’s influence at the UN to argue for the primacy of his mission’s needs. Instead, Dallaire attempted to fill the diplomatic gap to the best of his own ability. He held and participated in political meetings in an attempt to break deadlocks on cabinet assignments to the broad-based transitional government (BBTG) proposed by the Arusha Accords:

I attended all the political meetings (as the number two of the mission) as the Force Commander, so not only was I sitting at the table with the SRSG and attempting to
whisper comments, etc., but I also often found myself being the translator between the English-speaking RPF and the French-speaking government representatives. Consequently, a number of people—extremists, Tutsi and Hutu moderates, and so on—would conduct overt and covert meetings with me.110

Dallaire’s dedication evidences his belief that Arusha was not a lost cause in the early months of 1994. His attempts at politics contributed to the continual efforts to resolve those issues involved in installing the BBTG. In his own book on UNAMIR, Deputy Commander Anyidoho recognized the difficulties involved for military leaders unable to avoid political machinations during a civil conflict and the way in which peacekeepers, including Dallaire, had to be ready to “face all these frustrations to the point of being humiliated.”111 He would go on to recommend that in recognition of this emerging challenge, diplomacy become part of the training given to potential peacekeeping soldiers and military leaders.112 Under the auspices of UNAMIR, attempts were made to further the government’s formation on January 1, January 5, February 14, February 23, March 25, March 28, and in early April 1994.113 While it was a frustrating situation for Dallaire, who admitted he was no expert in political machinations, an overt consensus on Rwanda’s descent toward destruction did not dominate UNAMIR.

“Jean-Pierre” and Kigali Weapons Caches

A galvanizing possibility for UNAMIR arose in mid-January when Dallaire was presented with the testimony of an RGF informant code-named “Jean-Pierre.” He claimed to be a military trainer who was preparing elements of a national militia, the Interahamwe, for acts of mass violence.114 He gave specific information on the location of arms caches in Kigali that were intended for distribution. Dallaire saw this information—which was verified by a member of the contingent who was shown the cache by Jean-Pierre—as a golden opportunity.115 He directly informed the DPKO of his plan to conduct a raid on the cache, bypassing the SRSG. Believing that the cache was in direct violation of the Kigali Weapon Secure Area (KWSA), a key element to Arusha and UNAMIR, Dallaire considered this action to be well within his mandate. The message to the DPKO was intended as a notice of action, not a request for approval.116 In likely the fastest response from New York during the mission, a direct notice from DPKO heads Kofi Annan and Iqbal Riza forbade the raid.117 Dallaire was not only told that this would be in violation of his mandate, but he was instructed that for the purposes of transparency, he had to inform President Habyarimana and his advisors of the information.118

The action Dallaire was forbidden to take could have been a key stabilizing element in the Rwandan conflict. In a post-conflict analysis published by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and including input from an OAU report, it was argued that the “power of presence,” the psychological impact of a force beyond their physical strength, should not be underestimated in situations like Rwanda.119 The report of UNAMIR knowledge of the caches turned out to be a shock to the president and his associates.120 The seizure of the weapons could have had a considerable impact, projecting a more powerful image of UNAMIR and international control in Rwanda. Instead, the surprise exhibited by the RGF quickly receded and the distribution of arms from the cache was accelerated as a result. Dallaire was frustrated by the prohibition on conducting arms raids, which he believed satisfied the original mandate’s requirements for the establishment of KWSA and contributions to the security of Kigali. Public knowledge of other caches
and expectations that UNAMIR would address them aggravated this further.\textsuperscript{121} It had been an ideal opportunity to gain a grip on the security situation in Kigali. Dallaire would later learn that his warnings had failed to reach the highest levels of the UN, including Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a move that would come to be considered by some an “incomprehensible” disgrace to the UN structure.\textsuperscript{122} Others considered it a failure by Dallaire for not sending the message directly to the highest levels, even though he was already breaking protocol in bypassing Booh-Booh and sending it directly to the DPKO.\textsuperscript{123} In retrospect, Dallaire’s intentions looked to head off problems that might arise in the future. Yet the disavowal of pre-emptive action was still not a death sentence to the peace process.

In the period that followed Jean-Pierre’s revelation, Rwanda did not appear to be facing a downward spiral into mass violence. Violence in February was followed by a period of calm in March that precipitated the continuation of political discussions.\textsuperscript{124} Dallaire was aware of the threats radical groups posed, yet “despite increased tensions and insecurity engendered by the political impasses, the cease-fire was generally holding. UNAMIR forces . . . continued to play a stabilizing role.”\textsuperscript{125} Even some Rwandan politicians were cautiously optimistic. In March 1994, Moderate Faustin Twagiramungu expressed a belief that the only thing that could possibly stop the Arusha agreements was a decision by President Habyarimana.\textsuperscript{126} The comment would become surprisingly prescient. The day before the crash, UN Resolution 909 of 5 April 1994 “[welcomed] the fact that, despite the difficulties encountered in implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement, the cease-fire has been respected and commends in this respect the essential contribution made by UNAMIR.”\textsuperscript{127} The UN did not yet see that their forces were stuck in a futile situation and in need of withdrawal. Even though the opportunity provided by Jean-Pierre’s information was missed, it did not appear that the extreme violence of the coming days and weeks was a foregone conclusion at this time.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Three dynamics are vital to making any judgment about Dallaire’s performance in Rwanda; the first is his personal and professional suitability to the mission; the second, the evolving structure of UNAMIR; and the third, his response to key crossroads during the development of the mission. However, these three dynamics must be considered within specific parameters. The plane crash that killed President Juvénal Habyarimana and precipitated the eruption of violence and genocide is the cut-off point of this investigation. After this point, it can be seen through an examination of the changes in circumstance, power, and politics in Rwanda, and the guidelines of the UNAMIR mandate, that Dallaire had neither the ability nor the authority to respond to the widespread chaos. This is not to limit the importance or gravity of the genocide that would follow, but to produce an examination of the UNAMIR mission and specifically Dallaire’s leadership that is not biased by the moral responses formed in the aftermath of the genocide. The literal decimation of Rwanda at its own hands was watched by a world which cried out at the failure of international forces to stop the flow of blood, the same world that neglected the efforts to stabilize it, only to then cast it as a catastrophic failure. Upon examination, there is much more to the legacy of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda than the 100 days of genocide in 1994. As a military leader, Roméo Dallaire had six months of operation during which he maintained an uneasy peace with a limited pool of resources to draw from. As other peacekeeping analysts have argued, it may be better to look at the methods and means of Dallaire’s
leadership that worked and why, rather than the destructive conclusion the country ultimately came to.

Dallaire’s suitability to the Rwandan situation provides the basis for examining his effectiveness. A leader, no matter how dedicated or capable, can be hindered by the nature of his approach or lack of environment-specific skills, such as language or cultural knowledge. For Rwanda, Roméo Dallaire would prove himself to be an effective fit for an unusual situation. His background, not only as a military officer, but as a French-Canadian integrated into a largely anglicized environment of the Canadian Forces made him familiar with concepts of minority populations, bilingualism, and cultural prejudices so predominant in Rwanda. Although he was inexperienced with UN missions and his suitability for the position as an artillery officer was questioned, Dallaire gathered others with experience into his team for support and used the transferable skills from his artillery position to adapt to the rigors of Rwanda. In addition, the value of experience in UN peacekeeping missions in the past, which Dallaire did lack, was complicated by the rapidly changing character of peacekeeping in the immediate post-Cold War period. The scenarios UN veterans had faced were often vastly different from the situations they began to find themselves in. His nationality was also a particularly good fit for a mission in Rwanda, as the country’s relations with Canada lacked the specters of colonialism that European nations represented, and charitable and educational works had developed a positive impression of Canada since decolonization. Dallaire, as a French Canadian, arrived to find that many leading figures were directly tied to his own nation, province, and culture in a way few others could have appreciated. These strengths would be vital to Dallaire in an environment with few other suitable candidates and little support from the UN’s political elements in Rwanda and New York.

The structure of the mission reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of the system upon which Dallaire depended. The inflexibility and ambiguity of the mandate in response to a rapidly changing situation on the ground limited the requests Dallaire could make and the actions that he could take. The complications of the UN’s interdepartmental rivalries and disconnects further hampered Dallaire by depriving him of information on Rwanda, including arms movements and human rights violations, that would have been vital elements of the mission’s primary evaluations. Requests for additional forces, supplies, and support were denied, communications unanswered, and Dallaire was left to assume that in his approach to the situation and interpretations of his options, no news could only be good news. This situation reveals a great deal about Dallaire’s determination and the dedication of many members of the UNAMIR mission to keep it operational, while at the same time revealing the betrayal by UN officials who were meant to be supporting them.

Ultimately, the means to judge Dallaire’s leadership and success in Rwanda in the period prior to the crash is the examination of his decisions at key crossroads. These responses reveal whether the mission of maintaining ceasefire and facilitating political development was still viable. The first challenge arose with the coup in Burundi, which negated the calm southern front Dallaire had depended on in his mission plan. Despite the contagion of unrest present in the first days of the mission, Dallaire was able to reallocate his forces and begin the planned initiation of UNAMIR on the ground. In establishing the mission, he would be challenged by complications caused by force dynamics and personnel deficiencies. The complications of poorly provisioned or ill-suited troops marred the military element and required regular adjustments and reassignments to
maintain the security and ceasefire of Kigali and Rwanda. The reticence of the political head of the mission, SRSG Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, forced Dallaire to act as a political liaison at many turns, a role beyond his military position and training, but vital to the overall mission. Dallaire’s greatest test would come with the informant Jean-Pierre. While potential raids on weapons caches within the KWSA were forbidden by the UN DPKO hierarchy and may have ultimately been numerically insignificant, the action that Dallaire aimed to respond with emphasizes a very different perspective. The planned raid could have depicted Dallaire as a potential man of action in Rwanda and made a huge contribution to UNAMIR’s image and control in the region. In a position hindered by the realities of UN supply issues and mission restrictions, this image was one of Dallaire’s strongest tools. The decision of the DPKO to forbid the raid struck a blow to UNAMIR’s perceived effectiveness but did not make it a wholly lost cause.

The UNAMIR mission and the Rwandan genocide are inextricably tied together in memory as part of an incomprehensible tragedy. In the face of this, the simplest way to deal with the aftermath was to find a scapegoat who could be blamed this “failure of humanity.” A closer analysis of the situation and the environment, both in Rwanda and across the international stage, reveals a different story. Investigating the mandate and mindset of the mission, it can be seen that the outbreak of civil war negated the role of the forces that were there as peacekeepers, not peace enforcers. UNAMIR and the genocide were unavoidably separated by the crash of President Habyarimana’s plane, and as such, Roméo Dallaire’s leadership of the UN mission can best be judged in the period from his arrival on 22 October 1993 to the crash at the Kigali airport on 6 April 1994. Not only for Dallaire, but for the study of peacekeeping, it is of greater use to understand these months of stability, rather than the ultimate conflagration. It is during those months, when tensions and strains could have lead to a renewal of violence at any time, that Dallaire’s effectiveness as a peacekeeper can be seen. His actions revealed a suitability, resourcefulness, and resilience that pushed the nation toward the process of peace, or at least barred the way to widespread chaos. When the president’s plane went down, it took many things with it. A storm of unstoppable events swelled within the nation as the mission’s mandate was destroyed. Neither Dallaire, nor the slow-moving UN, nor the unwilling, powerful nations of the world could stop what had begun. The genocide was a current that swept up everyone within the nation, and destroyed any evidence of progress in Rwanda, leaving Dallaire vulnerable in the public eye. That narrative ultimately fails to tell the whole story of the UNAMIR mission. Rwanda may have been a failure of humanity, but it was not Dallaire’s failure alone.

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Notes


5. OECD et al., *Soldiers to the Rescue*, 91.


7. Ibid., 21.


10. Ibid., 34.

11. Ibid., 72.


14. Ibid., 94.


17. Off, *The Lion, the Fox & the Eagle*, 25.


23. Ibid., 86.


27. 34 Canadian Brigade Group, “Officer Trades.”


30. Ibid., xxi.


34. Prunier, *Rwanda Crisis*, 90.


44. Off, *The Lion, the Fox & the Eagle*, 36.


50. Ibid., 96–7.

51. OECD et al., *Soldiers to the Rescue*, 78.

52. Ibid., 89.

53. Ibid., 89.


60. Hamburg, *Preventing Genocide*, 68.


63. Ibid.

64. Anyidoho, *Guns over Kigali*, 93.


69. Off, *The Lion, the Fox & the Eagle*, 33.


73. Ibid., 28.

74. Off, *The Lion, the Fox & the Eagle*, 33.


79. Off, *The Lion, the Fox & the Eagle*, 38.


82. Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands*, 97.

83. Ibid., 131.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.


87. Off, *The Lion, the Fox & the Eagle*, 38


91. Off, *The Lion, the Fox & the Eagle*, 27.

92. Ibid., 41.

93. Anyidoho, *Guns over Kigali*, 40

94. Off, *The Lion, the Fox & the Eagle*, 41.

95. Moore, *Hard Choices*, 79; Anyidoho 48
97. Ibid., 84–5.
99. Ibid., 94.
100. Off, *The Lion, the Fox & the Eagle*, 27.
103. Off, *The Lion, the Fox & the Eagle*, 37; Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 100, 104.
112. Ibid., 125.
114. Off, *The Lion, the Fox & the Eagle*, 41–2.
115. Ibid., 41–2.
117. Off, *The Lion, the Fox & the Eagle*, 43.
118. Ibid.; Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands*, 146.
120. Off, *The Lion, the Fox & the Eagle*, 44; Grünfeld and Huijboom, *Failure to Prevent*, 108.
123. Grünfeld and Huijboom, *Failure to Prevent*, 98.
124. Ibid., 122.
126. Grünfeld and Huijboom, *Failure to Prevent*, 123.
The failure of the international community to act on the legal and moral imperative to stop, punish, and prevent genocide and other mass killings has led to the establishment of genocidal regimes that institutionalize genocide as a tactic of repression and power consolidation. One such repeat offender regime was the New Order government of Indonesia, which committed mass killings of known and alleged communists throughout Indonesia in 1965–1966 and later carried out a genocidal, colonial occupation of East Timor. I demonstrate parallels between the actors, tactics, and discourse of the communist killings and the Timorese Genocide. The failures of domestic resistance and international pressure to punish the New Order after 1966 allowed génocidaires to retain power and reinforced their belief in the acceptability and effectiveness of genocidal tactics. The Indonesian case illustrates the necessity of punishment for genocide to preclude a culture of impunity that encourages both previous and new offenders.

Key words: genocide, Indonesia, East Timor, New Order, communists, impunity

Genocide and Repeat Offenders

After World War II, as the full extent of the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis during the Holocaust came to light, there was a sweeping sentiment of “Never again.” Never again could a state be allowed to attempt such human destruction. The Nuremberg trials brought convictions for crimes against humanity, the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) was adopted in 1948, and memorials were built around the world. Yet, in a sense, the Holocaust itself was an example of “again.” Not only did it come in the wake of the Armenian Genocide, but Germans themselves had already committed genocide in the twentieth century through their slaughter of the Herero and Nama peoples of German South-West Africa. Scholars have identified many parallels in examining these cases, with the German experience in South-West Africa having acted as a testing ground for ideas and methods later “perfected” by the Nazis.

While Isabel Hull has found a common military culture in Germany oriented toward seeking “final solutions,” the genocide in Africa was committed by the regime of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Holocaust by the Nazis, with the Weimar government separating the two. Later in the century, one regime was allowed to commit not one but two mass killings, each of which can be argued to be cases of genocide. Within the span of a decade, the New Order regime of Suharto in Indonesia organized both the killing of hundreds of thousands of Communists and alleged leftists within Indonesia from...
1965 to 1966—hereafter referred to as “the Killings”—and then, in 1975, invaded East Timor, which was subjected to a brutal, 24-year occupation. To my knowledge, there has yet to be a detailed, direct comparison of these two cases. Following the example of the German cases, this article examines the characteristics and methods of the Killings and the occupation campaigns in East Timor to find similarities and to determine what role the Indonesian experience in the Killings played in shaping later actions in East Timor. Based on this case comparison, I also explore the implications of impunity for the organizers of the atrocities, and how this impunity has led to a normalization of genocidal policies in Indonesia, which may be seen today in the ongoing conflict in West Papua.

I first turn to the story of the Killings, how they were committed, and who was responsible. This discussion is followed by the history of the invasion and subsequent occupation of East Timor, in which I make note of the violent practices and discourse that carried over from the 1965–1966 Killings, highlighting the similarities in anti-Communist sentiment, military tactics, targeting of women and ethnic Chinese, biological rhetoric of infection and extermination, and post-violence impunity. I then assess whether or not these cases were or should be considered genocide, and what implications they hold for the prevention and further study of the crime.

The Indonesian Killings

Indonesia’s New Order regime came to power in 1965 in the wake of a complicated and much-debated event. Since independence from the Dutch in 1948, Indonesia was led by Sukarno, whose charismatic leadership enabled him to balance the power of the country’s political parties and the highly influential military. The key tenet of Sukarno’s political program, called Guided Democracy, was Nasakom, which stood for “nationalism, religion, communism.” While this principle served as part of Sukarno’s shrewd political balancing act, he did in fact attempt to move the country to the left, for instance by withdrawing from the United Nations and building closer ties with Communist states in Asia. It is undeniable that the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was a great beneficiary of Sukarno’s policies: the PKI had been excluded from government until 1957, but, with Sukarno’s emphasis on Nasakom, began to hold bureaucratic and political offices and also gained influence in the military, especially in the air force, with which it shared a dislike of the army. The PKI used its newfound influence to promote policies such as land redistribution and the arming of workers and peasants to form a “fifth force” that would counter the power of the army, navy, air force, and police. The issue of land redistribution was particularly contentious, with the PKI and its affiliates sometimes using “direct action” land occupations to dispossess landowners, and both party activists and landowners resorted to violence in the competition for land. The land reforms came in the early 1960s, at a time of economic crisis that was exacerbated by Sukarno’s misguided policies and had “left Indonesia as one of the poorest countries in the world, its name conjuring up much the same connotations of chaos and misery that the names of the Congo and Sierra Leone conjure up today.” The great economic decline and increasing tensions between political parties led to an atmosphere of uncertainty, strained even further by Sukarno’s increasing health problems and six attempts on his life.

The tensions finally boiled over on 1 October 1965. While there is much uncertainty regarding the facts, what is certain is that on the night of September 30, a group of middle-ranking officers—who became known as the 30 September Movement (G-30-S) and were led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung—kidnapped and murdered six generals of
the military high command and one lieutenant and also fatally wounded the six-year-old daughter of General Abdul Haris Nasution, the Minister of Defense. The G-30-S announced that they had undertaken this action to counter a plan by right-wing military leaders to seize power from Sukarno and that they were forming a Revolutionary Council to help govern the country. Major-General Suharto, commander of the Army Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD), quickly mobilized troops to crush the rebel officers. By evening on October 1, Suharto, collaborating with other army officers, was in control of Jakarta.

The true role of the PKI in events surrounding G-30-S might never be known, but most scholars agree that while the PKI might have been peripherally tied to the plotters and some elements of the party expressed support for the group, the party was not responsible for G-30-S. Public perception, however, was that the PKI was behind G-30-S, and Suharto and his clique moved quickly to promote and exploit this viewpoint. As Robert Cribb writes, Suharto “took steps to consolidate the already widespread public presumption that the PKI had masterminded the coup (and was probably planning further actions) and encouraged rumors that the communists had been planning to torture and murder their enemies.” Suharto and Nasution had been pushing the murdered generals to take more action to check the PKI’s growing influence and preserve military autonomy, and, now in power, they seized the opportunity to fulfill this desire. Public sentiment was inflamed by the exhumation of the bodies of the murdered generals and a public funeral for Nasution’s daughter.

Rumors were spread through the press that the generals had been tortured and mutilated, with their eyes gouged out and their genitals cut off by members of Gerwani, a women’s association affiliated with the PKI. The Gerwani members allegedly followed this orgy of violence by participating in a literal orgy. These claims were proven false by the official autopsies conducted on October 4 and 5 after the bodies were exhumed, and Sukarno attempted to speak out against journalists writing “untrue things,” but Suharto and the military had already seized the momentum. The autopsy results were never publicly released, and so anger and fear were cultivated and directed toward the PKI. Marshall Green, the US ambassador to Indonesia at the time, aided these efforts, recommending “increased covert efforts to spread the story of the PKI’s guilt, treachery, and brutality; although he was unsure of the evidence of the PKI’s role,” while the British and Malaysians also worked to inflame anti-Communist sentiment. Many Indonesians were also reminded of the Madiun affair of 1948, when a small Communist group rebelled against the larger Indonesian army during the fight for independence from the Dutch.

Through the media and official statements, the PKI were not only blamed, but systematically dehumanized. G-30-S was dubbed Gestapo by Brigadier General Sugandhi, amalgamating the Indonesian name Gerakan September Tigapuluh with the connotations of the German Gestapo clearly in mind. Especially in light of the false stories about Gerwani actions in the killing of the generals, PKI members and supporters were painted as “bloodthirsty and sexually sadistic monsters” and “scary mongrels [who] put their slimy claws on the innocent souls of our children.” One paper printed a cartoon showing the PKI and associated organizations as lizards lapping up the blood of the murdered generals. The success of this propaganda is exemplified by one killer’s remark, “I did not kill people. I killed wild animals.”

Also of central importance was the view of Communists as atheists, both immoral and exercising a corrupting influence on Indonesian society. In the wake of the coup,
the military newspaper *Angkatan Bersendjata* characterized the campaign against the PKI as a holy war, writing that “the sword cannot be met by the Koran . . . but must be met by the sword.” The equation of Communism with atheism also served to further dehumanize PKI supporters, since “‘belief in the one God’ is the first of the five principles which comprise the Pancasila, the national ideology contained in the Preamble to the Constitution. Thus for its enemies the PKI was automatically disqualified from inclusion in Indonesia.”

Seeking to organize the anger they had built up and lacking the troop strength or intelligence necessary to destroy the PKI using military forces alone, military leaders met with younger leaders of anti-Communist parties and religious organizations, and banded together to form the militant Action Front to Crush the Gestapu (KAP-Gestapu), which began holding protest rallies. Having whipped the non-Communist population into a furor, military leaders decided to begin releasing the anger. At the funeral of Nasution’s daughter, “as if by pre-arrangement, a high naval officer gave Moslem student leaders a one-word signal, *sikat*, which means ‘sweep.’” The next day, on October 8, after a KAP-Gestapu rally filled with anti-PKI speeches, a group of members of Muslim student organizations marched to the PKI headquarters, which they attacked and burned. Harold Crouch argues that while the mob had not sought permission for this action from military or KAP-Gestapu leaders, “it is likely that they had been assured by junior army officers that the senior generals would not be displeased if the PKI building were ‘spontaneously’ attacked by the ‘people.’” Brian May, however, found that the PKI building was destroyed “while soldiers blocked the approaching streets and firemen looked on.”

Rumors were spread that the PKI had been compiling death lists and planning a purge of non-Communists, creating fears that it was a situation of “kill or be killed.”

In the days after the funeral and attacks on PKI headquarters in Jakarta, the first massacres of PKI supporters began in heavily Muslim Aceh, with troops from the regional military command and Muslim youth groups hunting people down and killing them. According to some accounts, the families and household servants of PKI cadres were also among the “several thousand” killed, and Brigadier General Ishak Djurasa, the commander in the area, described Aceh as “the first region to be cleansed of counterrevolutionary G.30.S elements.” By December, Djurasa told the press that “the PKI is no longer a problem for Aceh because the region has been entirely purged in a physical sense of PKI elements.” In the second half of October, mass killings of alleged PKI supporters began in Central and East Java, with military forces arming, training, and supporting youth groups, mainly from Muslim and Christian organizations. In Central Java, according to Sarwo Edhie, the officer in command of the anti-Communist operations there, the massacres were initiated by his troops from the Army Paracommando Regiment (RPKAD), which traveled from village to village, massacring alleged Communists, sometimes killing the entire population of a village (except infants) if it was suspected of being fully in support of the PKI. Edhie’s RPKAD moved out from Jakarta through Central and East Java and finally to Bali, organizing massacres along the way. Sensing that his units were too small to attack all the alleged Communist villages in the province, Edhie began delegating more responsibility to civilian youth, nationalist, and religious groups: “We gave them two or three days’ training, then sent them out to kill the Communists.” The troops also gave some of their prisoners to civilian anti-Communist groups, who killed them with knives and sickles.
This pattern manifested itself across all the regions of the slaughter: civilians, usually part of larger organizations, carried out the majority of the killings, but they had support, weapons, and training from the military, which still directly participated in many of the killings. While there were existing tensions between PKI supporters and anti-Communists across Indonesia, Aceh was an exception: in most regions, as in Central Java, the massacres did not begin until after the arrival of troops. In Bali, it was only after the replacement of the governor, a radicalization among the local military establishment, and the arrival of troops from Java in early December that massacre of PKI supporters began. To polarize the population in Bali, propaganda teams spread the message through rural areas that “there are only two possible alternatives; to be on the side of the G-30-S or to stand behind the government in crushing the G-30-S.” Village authorities in particular were exhorted to promote the purge of the PKI, and some of them used “institutions of communal responsibility and labor” to carry out the killings. One older Muslim leader considered the killings by Ansor, a leading Muslim youth group, as “the will of God; at the same time he said that Ansor had ‘fulfilled the command of the army.’”

It was difficult for PKI members and affiliates to resist the tide of violence, as almost all of them had been completely in the dark about the events of September 30. Instead, there was bewilderment and a scramble for survival. A communist youth organization member recalled, “We were confused. The leaders of the organization didn’t know what to do. There was a curfew, so I didn’t stay at home. I slept in the backyard along with other friends. We didn’t know anything. After a few nights we went our different ways, trying to save ourselves.” Though there is evidence of some villages, especially in Java, organizing for defense against the anti-Communist onslaught, most of those targeted offered little resistance in the face of death.

Killings took place throughout the country, but the worst-affected areas were Aceh, Bali, Central Java, East Java, and Northern Sumatra. The massacres were committed with extreme brutality. While the military tended to shoot those Communists they took prisoner, common methods of killing by civilians were beating, throat cutting, and decapitation. Some particularly enterprising killers in Cirebon in West Java constructed a guillotine to expedite their work. According to one report, victims were given knives and told to kill themselves; if they refused, they were shot in the back. Corpses were often dumped into rivers and, as described by an eyewitness in Central Java, “the departure of corpses from the Kediri region down the Brantas achieved its golden age when bodies were stacked together on rafts over which the PKI banner proudly flew.” There were so many bodies flowing downstream that barriers were put up to keep them out of irrigation channels; in Surabaya, corpses “became a danger to public health when ebbing tides deposited them on river banks.” Where there were no rivers, bodies were dumped into mass graves, sometimes dug by the victims themselves.

And who were these victims? To be certain, many of those killed were, in fact, PKI members, or members of closely aligned organizations; others, however, were only marginally affiliated with the PKI and the permissiveness of the situation led to violence being used to solve more localized disputes as well, which played out along religious, ethnic, economic, and personal lines. Youth organizations in Java traveled from village to village using lists and informants to root out “Communists,” but “teachers and other village intellectuals were especially common on the lists of victims.” In some massacres, children were killed and it was common to kill the families of alleged PKI...
supporters in order to prevent future retribution.\textsuperscript{59} Leslie Dwyer and Degung Santikarma found in Bali that most of those killed as Communists “went to their deaths denying such affiliation” and often “the label ‘communist’ was attached to victims and, by extension, to their family and friends and even casual acquaintances once they were dead, as an after-the-fact explanation of their fate.”\textsuperscript{60} The powerful demonization and dehumanization of “Communists” allowed the misapplication of that label to be used as a justification for killing people “over land, over inheritance, and over more personal problems such as long-remembered insults or sexual jealousy.”\textsuperscript{61} Thus, in a campaign supposedly based on ideology, thousands were killed for “reasons that had little or nothing to do with ideology.”\textsuperscript{62} Killings over land were often rooted in the PKI’s land reform campaigns and the more general conflict between landowners and peasants. In one region of Sumatra, Javanese transmigrants were killed by the local population,\textsuperscript{63} while elsewhere, “on the first day of the mass killings, one army officer in civilian dress cheerfully left Kediri city, carrying a machine-gun, to shoot squatters who had refused to get off his untilled land.”\textsuperscript{64} Ethnic Chinese were also targeted, in some cases due to their mother country’s Communism, and in others for localized, economic reasons. Cribb argues, though, that the murders of and riots against Chinese during the Killings were not out of proportion with prior and later eruptions of violence against Chinese in Indonesia,\textsuperscript{65} and scholarly and media accounts have tended to give highly inflated estimates of Chinese deaths.\textsuperscript{66}

Women were singled out for especially brutal treatment. The myth of Gerwani members mutilating and killing the generals during the G-30-S incident enraged the population. “Communist” women were thus seen as savage monsters who were guilty not only of the alleged crimes against the generals, but, in the words of Suharto, whose “sadistic practices . . . had destroyed the identity of Indonesian women.”\textsuperscript{67} Some of the anti-Communist slogans used were “‘Gerwani Tjabol’ (Gerwani Whores), ‘Gantung Gerwani’ (Hang Gerwani) and ‘Ganjang Gerwani’ (Crush Gerwani).”\textsuperscript{68} In Bali, thousands of women were rounded up and taken to government offices to have their genitals examined for signs of sexual activity, which, it was claimed, could identify them as Gerwani members; these searches were frequently accompanied by rape.\textsuperscript{69} In a gendered analysis of the Killings, Saskia Wieringa finds that in Indonesia’s sexually repressed society, the alleged brazen sexual transgressions of the Gerwani women were both arousing and infuriating to the young, often religious, men who comprised the majority of the killers.\textsuperscript{70} The forms that violence against women took bear out this argument. A document received by the human rights group Tapol is particularly illuminating: a female PKI member was ordered to strip and had her “body and honor” burned before she was hacked to death; a newlywed Gerwani member was raped multiple times by an Ansor group and then was “slit open from her breasts to her vulva”; a woman nine months pregnant was killed, then had her stomach cut open and her child butchered\textsuperscript{71}; another Gerwani leader was impaled through her vagina with a sharpened bamboo pole.\textsuperscript{72} These extremes of violence reflect the dehumanization caused by the Gerwani myth and also a reassertion of male power and control over female sexuality, eliminating those who would challenge it.\textsuperscript{73}

By late December, the fury and pace of the Killings had slowed as the military sought to consolidate violence under its control and restrain anti-Communist vigilante groups in order to prevent anarchy.\textsuperscript{74} Massacres continued regularly into 1966, followed by a period of what the army called “mopping-up operations,” aimed at hunting down
the few remaining Communist cells. These operations peaked with the massacre of hundreds of alleged Communist prisoners at Purwodadi in November and December 1968; Indonesian Institute for Human Rights Vice-Chairman Johannes Princen, who investigated the massacre, concluded that at least 860 prisoners had been beaten to death. Hundreds of thousands of Communists and alleged supporters continued to be imprisoned and in some cases used as slave labor, while being given insufficient food and denied medicine.

It is uncertain how many people were actually killed during the massacres of 1965–1966. Cribb provides a comprehensive list of the varying death toll estimates, which range from 78,000 (from a late 1965 Indonesian government “fact-finding” commission) to 2,000,000. More recently, Cribb has come to believe that the correct figure for those killed between October 1965 and March 1966 is approximately 500,000, while Dwyer and Santikarma argue that this is still an underestimation. What is certain is that the PKI, which in 1965 claimed 3 million members and 20 million people in affiliated organizations, was destroyed as a political force. The New Order government, however, still invoked the threat of Communism and continued to demonize all those associated with it. A “clean environment” policy was instituted, whereby the descendants of those who had been killed or imprisoned were considered “children of the PKI . . . ‘infected’ by ‘political uncleanliness,’” and were discriminated against in employment, education, and social services. These policies held even for children born after 30 September 1965. There is also a sense that even after the physical elimination of the PKI, its pernicious spirit remains. As James Siegel writes,

Since the 1980s at least, Indonesian political leaders have spoken of organizations without form when implying presumed communist resurgence. The state has gone to great lengths to keep track not only of those communists released from years in prison, but also of their descendants. This seems to indicate fear of something they cannot locate, even when they know precisely who is a communist and who is the son or daughter of one.

In the aftermath of the Killings, with the elimination of the Communists from the political scene, the military—most specifically, the army—was free to consolidate its control over the government, deposing Sukarno in 1967 and officially transferring presidential power to Suharto. The army thoroughly penetrated all levels of government across Indonesia, allowing it to quickly snuff out any political challengers and to exercise complete control over policy. Thus, many of the same officers who presided over the Killings were still in positions of power in 1974, at the beginning of Indonesia’s next episode of mass killing.

**East Timor**

Less than a decade after taking power and presiding over the purge of Communists, the New Order regime decided to embark on a mission of territorial expansion. Indonesia had taken control of the Dutch half of the island of Timor at independence, but the other side, East Timor, remained under Portuguese colonial rule. With the collapse of Portugal’s dictatorship in April 1974, the future of East Timor was thrown into question. There were three different visions for the future, each with its supporters in East Timor: independence, autonomous association with Portugal, or integration with Indonesia. There were also three major political parties in East Timor at this time: the
Timorese Democratic Union (UDT); the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT), which in September became the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin); and the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti). The UDT and ASDT/Fretilin supported independence, while Apodeti favored integration with Indonesia.

Indonesia’s foreign minister, Adam Malik, gave assurances of Indonesian non-interference in East Timorese internal politics, but the military officers who were truly in charge of the government had different ideas. They thought an independent East Timor would destabilize their country by sparking desires for independence among discontented ethnic groups on nearby Indonesian islands such as Ambon. The military group, operating under and with the support of Suharto, included Major-General Ali Murtopo, Lieutenant-General Yoga Sugama, and Major-General Benny Murdani, all of whom had served during the Killings. In order to facilitate the integration of East Timor, the group began using special forces troops, propaganda, and small numbers of internal supporters to destabilize East Timor in what was called Operation Komodo. The military group also exploited fears of Communism to push for the annexation of East Timor, with Sugama painting the UDT as socialist and Fretilin as Communist, and the group going so far as to allege that ethnic Chinese Communists who had fled the Killings had relocated to East Timor to use the territory as a launching pad for further destabilization of Indonesia. The Indonesians were able to infiltrate the UDT and used false claims about Fretilin to press the UDT into staging a coup in an attempt to seize control, which led to a short civil war in which Fretilin quickly defeated the UDT. The radio station Indonesia had set up to broadcast propaganda into East Timor falsely reported heavy fighting and atrocities committed by Fretilin, prompting many East Timorese living near the border to flee into Indonesian West Timor. Here they became pawns, used by Indonesia as evidence of the instability of East Timor, the threat it posed to Indonesia itself, and thus the need for intervention. The plans for the destabilization and invasion were drawn up by Generals Murtopo and Murdani, members of the larger Javanese military clique that had risen to power with Suharto from 1965 onwards.

The small remaining Portuguese military force and administration took refuge on the island of Atauro during the civil war, and when they did not return, Fretilin took full control of the government. Disappointed by the UDT’s loss and the failure of Apodeti to gain traction, Indonesia decided to begin more active and direct military actions, attacking East Timorese towns. Fretilin had been biding its time on declaring independence, but after an intense Indonesian attack on the town of Atabae, the group’s leadership decided that a full-scale Indonesian invasion was imminent and that the only possibility for staving it off would be to declare independence and so gain the protection of the United Nations. However, the United States and Australia—the two countries most invested in the situation (for geostrategic and economic reasons, respectively)—had come down in favor of an Indonesian annexation: the US to oppose the left-wing leanings of Fretilin and protect deep-water passages in the Timor Sea for its nuclear submarines and Australia in large part to protect oil exploration agreements and other economic ties. As one Australian official put it, “The plain fact is that there are only 700,000 Timorese; what we are really concerned about is our relationship with 130,000,000 Indonesians.” So outside help was not forthcoming for the East Timorese.

The full-scale Indonesian invasion began on 7 December 1975, spearheaded by an assault on Dili from air, land, and sea. Fretilin prepared defenses in the city and
provided stronger resistance than expected, but the Indonesians almost immediately
turned their full force against the civilian population. Indiscriminate massacres took
place all over the city, with a large number of executions at the waterfront that included
women and children. Indonesian forces had been told prior to the invasion that they
were “fighting Communists in the cause of Jihad (Holy War), just as they had done in
Indonesia in 1965” and the Timorese were presented as “backward, primitive, almost
sub-human.”94 There were many stories, John Taylor writes, “of entire families being
shot for displaying Fretilin flags on their houses, of groups being shot for refusing to
hand over their personal possessions, of grenades being rolled into packed houses, and
of Fretilin sympathizers being singled out for immediate execution.”95 There was no
method to the madness; on one occasion, for example, Indonesian soldiers asked a
group of 30 integration supporters what political party they belonged to, and then
machine gunned them even after they answered “Apodeti.”96 Even those East Timorese
who fled into West Timor as refugees were targeted there, with their houses burned and
perhaps thousands killed.97

At a greater level than during the Killings, ethnic Chinese were targeted in Dili and
elsewhere. During the initial attack on Dili, many of those executed were Chinese; after
the assault on the city, a Catholic priest reported that 2,000 people had been killed in
the first few days after the landing and 700 of them were Chinese.98 Meanwhile, in the
towns of Maubara and Liquiça, the entire Chinese population was killed.99 This came
despite many Chinese having been among the strongest supporters of Indonesian inter-
vention.100

Fretilin was forced to withdraw to the hills, taking thousands of civilians with
them. Indonesian forces countered with brutal counterinsurgency campaigns from 1977
to 1979, using such indiscriminate weapons as rocket batteries and napalm.101 It was
also alleged that Indonesian troops could be promoted for “acts of savagery against the
Timorese population.”102 The goal of these operations was termed the “encirclement
and annihilation” of Fretilin, and the US State Department called it Indonesia’s “final
solution” for East Timor.103 Food supplies in Fretilin-controlled areas were especially
targeted and villages known or suspected of supporting the group were “systematically
wiped out.”104 A priest in Dili described in November 1977 “the barbarities (under-
standable in the Middle Ages, and justifiable in the Stone Age), the cruelties, the pillag-
ing, the unqualified destruction of Timor, the executions without reason” and
expressed his fear that “genocide will come soon, perhaps by next December.”105 Indo-
nesian rhetoric promoted the biological extermination of the Timorese as it had with
the PKI. Following massacres in 1976 in Remexio and Aileu in which all residents
over the age of three were shot, the local people were described as having been “infected
with the seeds of Fretilin.”106

For those who managed to survive the encirclement and annihilation campaign, a
cruel fate awaited: they were rounded up by Indonesian forces and transported to “re-
settlement camps,” where they were not provided with and were prevented from grow-
ing sufficient food to survive, in addition to being used for forced labor. One priest
wrote that “if the Indonesians were to allow Timorese people to move around freely
and live where they like, there would be no shortage of food.”107 Indonesian troops
looted crops and livestock and robbed the pantries of houses.108 Aid groups were sys-
tematically denied access to the population and whatever aid that did arrive was stolen
by Indonesian soldiers and sold at inflated prices,109 while one report found that there
was corn rotting away in warehouses in Dili. As a result, East Timorese starved and died of disease by the thousands.

In May 1981, Indonesia launched a new offensive code-named Operation Security, which the Defense Department also called “the ‘final’ or ‘decisive’ war.” This operation was also one of encirclement, but this time the Indonesians tried a new method. Tens of thousands of men between the ages of 15 and 50—though sometimes as young as 9 and as old as 60—were ordered to march in front of Indonesian troops as they approached suspected Fretilin positions so as to force Fretilin soldiers to choose between shooting their countrymen and surrendering. This method, known as pagar betis, or “the fence of legs,” had previously been used in Indonesia to round up suspected Communists during the Killings. One particular incident of note during this period was the massacre of over 400 people at Lacluta in September 1981, where the targets were mostly women and children, and the young were killed by smashing their heads against rocks. Beyond those who were actually killed during pagar betis sweeps, the operations took men away from their crops, exacerbating the food shortage and starvation. Pagar betis was also part of a plan to “Timorize” the war, in which some Timorese came to the Indonesian side in exchange for pay or the opportunity to loot, in addition to those forced to participate.

Counterinsurgency operations continued throughout the 1980s, with fighting fluctuating at times, but Indonesian forces remaining brutal. For instance, in August 1983, the village of Malim Luro was looted by Indonesian troops who then bound over 60 men, women, and children, forced them to lie on the ground, and crushed them with a bulldozer. Indonesians discussed their intent to destroy Fretilin “to the third or fourth generation,” and food sources were still constantly attacked. It was also during the 1980s that Indonesia began a program of transmigration, bringing Indonesians from other islands and settling them in “the more fertile regions” of East Timor; combined with voluntary migrants, by 1992 there were estimated to be 100,000 Indonesians living in East Timor out of a total population of 750,000. International attention was again focused on Indonesia after the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991, when an estimated 273 peaceful protestors were killed, but international outrage quickly dissipated. Meanwhile, the Indonesians continued attacking and torturing the East Timorese population and continued their practice of choosing ominous military code names including 1997’s Operation Annihilation, in which hundreds were rounded up, tortured, and in some cases killed in response to Fretilin attacks. Torture remained prevalent, with one post-conflict survey finding that approximately half of all East Timorese had suffered some form of physical, sexual, or psychological torture.

The opportunity to break the decades-long cycle of violence finally arrived in 1998 with an economic crisis in Indonesia that led to the forced resignation of Suharto. His successor, B. J. Habibie, made overtures toward peace and eventually decided to allow a referendum to choose independence or autonomy for East Timor, under the auspices of the United Nations. Yet his actions were contradicted by the military establishment, which was sending thousands of new troops into East Timor to sabotage the referendum. Troops worked with pro-Indonesian militias, arming and training them as they had in 1965, to embark on a campaign of destruction, with an Indonesian lieutenant-colonel calling for “the killing of pro-independence movement leaders, their children, and even their grandchildren.” Hundreds of people were killed and tens of thousands fled their homes in response to the increasing violence. As Geoffrey Robinson argues,
the militias “provided a perfect cover for official efforts to disrupt, or affect the outcome of, the vote while simultaneously perpetuating the illusion that the fighting was among East Timorese,” a continuation of the program to Timorize the violence. Yet with an extraordinary turnout estimated at 90%, the East Timorese people voted for independence. This outcome was obviously not the result the Indonesian military or militias had desired, and it was met with a campaign of total destruction—killing, rape, looting, and so forth—during which at least 150,000 people were taken into West Timor against their will. Even after the referendum, the Indonesian military would not let East Timor out of its control and it was only with the intervention of a UN force in late September that the Indonesians finally left and widespread violence ceased.

As in the Killings, women were specifically targeted throughout the Indonesian occupation. In the aftermath of the initial attack on Dili in 1975, Indonesian forces demanded women to use for their pleasure, and women who were related to Fretilin members or were themselves members of associated organizations were singled out, like the targeting of Gerwani during the Killings; the women were then imprisoned, tortured, and raped, a pattern which continued in Dili for months. Rape became used as a method of emphasizing Indonesia’s dominance of East Timor and a way to destroy Timorese communities. Indonesia also embarked on a program of forced population control, using surgical sterilization, injections of Depo Provera contraceptive, and even infanticide.

Indonesia was seeking to control the already degraded population of East Timor. While estimates vary, the general consensus is that about 200,000 East Timorese died from direct killing, starvation, and disease as a result of the Indonesian incursions and occupation during 1974–1999. The UN-mandated Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor found a minimum possible conservative death toll totaling 102,800: 18,600 ±1,000 killings or disappearances and 84,200 ±11,000 deaths due to hunger and illness beyond expected peacetime levels. It also reported that deaths due to hunger and illness could have been as high as 183,000, which would be consistent with an overall death toll of approximately 200,000. Clearly, as in the Killings, hundreds of thousands of people died and the Indonesian military bears the ultimate responsibility. But were these cases of genocide?

**The Genocide Debate**

Genocide, as defined by the Article 2 of the UNCG, is the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

a. Killing members of the group
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group

This definition excludes political and social groups, but many genocide scholars include these in their definitions of genocide. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn’s definition acknowledges victims that belong to “a group, as that group and membership in it
are defined by the perpetrator,” while Israel Charny includes as genocide any mass killing based on a shared characteristic, and Helen Fein argues that genocide is a “sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members.”

PKI members and the party’s alleged supporters would not meet the UN’s definition of victims of genocide since they were part of a political group and were targeted as such; however they could fit into the above definitions that allow for social or political groups. The overall target for extermination was the G-30-S movement, which was defined by the New Order as the PKI or “Communists” in general. The statements and actions of the military and the New Order government in encouraging and organizing the Killings show a clear intent to eliminate the PKI, and the equating of Communism with an infection and something heritable presents it as a problem that can be remedied through physical means—in this case, extermination. While the Killings cannot legally be considered genocide, they have been accepted as genocide under the wider definition that includes politicide. An alternate approach is to view Indonesia at the time of the Killings through Christian Gerlach’s lens—as an “extremely violent society” in which the military, civil society groups, and individuals joined together to destroy the PKI for distinct, self-interested reasons, diffusing the intent required by the UNCG.

The case of East Timor is also nuanced. Ben Saul contends that the East Timorese cannot be considered a national group for the period prior to 1999, since their sovereignty had not been recognized. I would argue, though, concurring with David Lisson, that the support Fretilin enjoyed from the majority of the population and its declaration of independence in 1975 would constitute an exercise of the right to self-determination; thus, the East Timorese can be considered a national group. Saul further argues that much of the killing was done by East Timorese against one another, so this might be considered a case of “auto-genocide”; however, the Indonesian policy of Timorizing the conflict demonstrates Indonesian intent behind this intranational violence. Indonesia’s systematic destruction of food sources and its failure to provide adequate subsistence alternatives would meet Article 2 (c)’s condition of “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction.” It was for this reason that the truth commission accused Indonesia of committing genocide by starvation. The coercive sterilization and birth control programs were clearly aimed at preventing births within the group. In the words of one Timorese,

after at least 200,000 people have been killed off . . . any talk of over-population is . . . ludicrous. There’s absolutely no need for family planning, but it’s quite clear that the reason why the Indonesians are resorting to this kind of thing is because they want to kill off the Timorese and re-populate our country with their own people.

The targeting of Chinese in East Timor that reduced their population from about 20,000 at the time of the invasion to only a few thousand within a decade also qualifies as a genocidal action as they were singled out due to their ethnicity. Overall, human rights violations by the Indonesian military and their auxiliaries in East Timor “were of a systemic nature, indicating a purpose beyond the destruction of individual victims.” Thus, I find that East Timor, too, was a case of genocide and one that could be prosecuted based on the UNCG.
Conclusion

There were many parallels between the two mass killings committed by the New Order: the involvement of the same clique of generals; allegations of Communism; targeting of Chinese; gender and sexual violence; tactics like pagar betis and the delegation of violence to non-state actors; and a violent rhetoric of extermination, often couched in biological and genetic terms. Another common factor is that there has been no prosecution of the perpetrators in either case. The Indonesian military’s firm control over the government ensured prosecution would not take place after the Killings, and of the few officers brought to trial in Indonesia for atrocities committed in East Timor, most have been acquitted, and the few sentences handed out have been light.

The cases of the Indonesian Killings and the occupation of East Timor bear out Fein and Barbara Harff’s findings that perpetrators of genocide are likely to commit it again as elites and the military become habituated to it. The failure of the international community to sanction the New Order regime after the Killings emboldened it and gave it a sense of free rein in East Timor, bolstered by the material and political support of powerful Western allies. While the Killings served as an example that was emulated in East Timor, the impunity with which the New Order acted serves as an example to the world. Since the invasion of East Timor in 1974, the regimes of both Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milošević, for example, likely felt secure in committing multiple ethnic mass killings.

The Indonesian military’s continued influence in the government and the country’s continued policies of internal colonization and suppression of ethnic resistance mean that similar tactics and outcomes may be seen today in West Papua, where violence, transmigration, and cultural suppression have led many to conclude that genocide is ongoing. The “secession” of East Timor has been used by the Indonesian military as a justification for harsh measures in West Papua, where Kopassus special forces units—the successors of Sarwo Edhie’s Killings-era RPKAD and themselves responsible for many atrocities in Timor—are among the most active and have similar operational codenames, such as Clean Sweep and Annihilation.

There is continuity among Indonesian military and political leaders through the conflicts. Kopassus is currently led by Pramono Edhie Wibowo, son of Sarwo Edhie. In 1999, he led an anti-terrorism sub-unit of Kopassus that was accused of facilitating a deadly attack on the Catholic diocese office in Dili. Kopassus forces under Pramono were subsequently accused of committing human rights violations against Papuans. The current president of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is the son-in-law of Sarwo Edhie and in fact served three tours of duty in the military during “pacification” operations in East Timor. Further, General Timbul Silaen, previously police chief in East Timor in 1999, was appointed to the same post in West Papua in 2003. Scholars who speak Indonesian would likely be able to uncover many more officers with involvement in both the Killings and East Timor or East Timor and West Papua.

In the cases of both the Killings and the invasion and occupation of East Timor, Indonesia’s neighbors and allies—in particular the United States, and Australia in the case of East Timor—had ample opportunity to oppose the violence and bring pressure to bear on the Indonesian government and military to halt their genocidal actions. Evidence even suggests that US opposition to the invasion of East Timor through a cutoff of military funding to Indonesia would have resulted in minimal damage to bilateral relations. However, realpolitik, self-interest, and disinterest won out among the
Western powers, allowing the genocidal campaigns to proceed. While it is possible for individuals and civil society to intervene early in the process of genocide to try to halt it,\textsuperscript{156} this private intervention is especially difficult in the authoritarian settings of most genocidal regimes, where information and opposition are tightly controlled. Thus, international intervention was needed to stop the Indonesian campaigns, and though it is those countries with the closest relations with the perpetrator government that have the most leverage, they also have the strongest disincentives to act.\textsuperscript{157} In the cases discussed in this article, these close allies aided and abetted the ongoing genocides. Impunity and international inaction allowed the Indonesian government and military to view genocide as an acceptable tactic in the pursuit of power consolidation, territorial gain, and economic expansion.

Without international condemnation and punishment or domestic outcry, genocide becomes part of a repertoire of repression and control for regimes. Patterns of rape and massacre learned and used during the Killings were embedded in the institutional repertoire of the Indonesian military and state, then applied to East Timor. If genocide truly is “our era’s most heinous crime,”\textsuperscript{158} the international community must act accordingly to ensure that genocidal regimes are punished for the atrocities they commit and that any steps toward reoffending are cut short.

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\textbf{Notes}


6. Instead of having both a first and last name, many Javanese have only one name.


scholars see Sukarno as working closely with and promoting the PKI and its programs, Wertheim argues that, through Nasakom, Sukarno forced the PKI to moderate: “In order to be acceptable as partners, the communists had to water down much of their social and political radicalism. By making them share governmental responsibility, he had maneuvered the communists into a somewhat precarious position if they wanted to criticize official policy.” W.F. Wertheim, “Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup,” Pacific Affairs 39,1/2 (1966): 115–27, 118.


13. Peter Dale Scott (“The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967,” Pacific Affairs 58, 2 [1985]: 239–64) argues that Untung was a dupe and that both G-30-S and the reaction were designed to serve Suharto and the United States, a position which receives some support from Roger K. Paget (“The Military in Indonesian Politics: The Burden of Power,” Pacific Affairs 40,3/4 [1967]: 294–314). Paget finds that “most of the insurrectionary units and their leaders had been under [Suharto’s] former command” (298).

14. There are many accounts of the events of this “coup”; for a clear and succinct recounting of the known facts, see May, Indonesian Tragedy, 94–7.

15. See especially Crouch, Army and Politics, 94–125; May, Indonesian Tragedy, 103–20.


24. Crouch, Army and Politics, 140. Michael Van Langenberg (“Gestapu and State Power in Indonesia” in Cribb, Indonesian Killings, 45–61, 48) notes the necessary intent behind the construction of the name Gestapu, since “Indonesian citation of dates normally follows the day/month/year format.”


32. May, Indonesian Tragedy, 121.

33. Crouch, Army and Politics, 141.

34. May, Indonesian Tragedy, 121.

38. The PKI had previously been very strong in West Java, so anti-Communist violence there was relatively “mild.” Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 142.
42. May, *Indonesian Tragedy*, 122.
43. Ibid.; Young, “Local and National Influences,” 83.
45. Breman, *Indonesian Tragedy*.
46. Robinson, *Dark Side*, 293.
47. Ibid., 299.
51. For detailed information on the gruesomeness of the Killings in Central Java, see Anonymous, “Additional Data on Counter-Revolutionary Cruelty in Indonesia, Especially in East Java,” in Cribb, *Indonesian Killings*, 169–76; an Indonesian report on the violence that was discovered by Tapol in the 1970s. See also the firsthand accounts provided in Cribb, “Indonesian Massacres,” 289–326.
52. May, *Indonesian Tragedy*, 123.
56. See Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’: Action and Identity in Civil Wars,” *Perspectives on Politics* 1.3 (2003): 475–94. Kalyvas succinctly describes the variance across regions in many people’s motivations for killing: “in the southern Sumatra province of Lampung, the violence was caused by a conflict between local Muslims and Javanese transmigrant settlers. In some areas of Timor, the victims were Protestants, while in others they were followers of local cults; in Lombok they were Balinese and Chinese. The killings in Central and East Java were caused by hostility between local Muslim cultural-religious groups known as abangan; in Bali they were associated with long-standing rivalries between patronage groups” (478).
57. There are substantial allegations that United States officials provided lists of Communist sympathizers to Indonesian authorities so they could be killed. See especially Cribb, “Introduction,” 7n11; Kim, “U.S. Covert Action,” 78.
61. Ibid.
On sexual violence against women in genocides more generally, see Allison Ruby Reid-Cunningham, “Rape as a Weapon of Genocide,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 3,3 (2008): 279–96, http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/gsp.3.3.279. In some Indonesian cases, violence against men also took a sexual form, as victims had their penises amputated presumably to avenge the alleged mutilation of the generals. They also became symbols of the repression of open sexuality as the severed penises of Communists were displayed outside one brothel. Rochijat, “Am I PKI,” 44.


Rochijat, “Am I PKI,” 45.

On sexual violence against women in genocides more generally, see Allison Ruby Reid-Cunningham, “Rape as a Weapon of Genocide,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 3,3 (2008): 279–96, http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/gsp.3.3.279. In some Indonesian cases, violence against men also took a sexual form, as victims had their penises amputated presumably to avenge the alleged mutilation of the generals. They also became symbols of the repression of open sexuality as the severed penises of Communists were displayed outside one brothel. Rochijat, “Am I PKI,” 44.


May, *Indonesian Tragedy*, 203.

Ibid., 205–6.


Cribb, “Indonesian Massacres,” 233; Dwyer and Santikarma, “‘When the World Turned to Chaos,’” 290–1n2.


Dwyer and Santikarma, “‘When the World Turned to Chaos,’” 297, 299. See also Cribb, “Genocide in Indonesia,” 236.


According to a member, “ASDT was formed to defend the idea of the right to independence; Fretilin was formed to fight for independence.” John G. Taylor, *East Timor: The Price of Freedom* (New York: Zed, 1999), 33.


Dunn, *Timor*, 169; Robinson, “People’s War,” 295.


Dunn, *Timor*, 183. Meanwhile, the refugees were held captive by the Indonesians, given little food, and committed to forced labor.


Dunn, *Timor*, 141. Brad Simpson argues that anti-Communism was not so much a concern of the U.S. and Australia, as they were disinterested in East Timor’s fate as a territory too small and economically insignificant to risk relations with the Suharto government. Brad Simpson, “Illegally and Beautifully: The United States, the Indonesian Invasion of East Timor and the International Community, 1974–76,” *Cold War History* 5,3 (2005): 281–315.

Taylor, *East Timor*, 70.

Ibid., 69.


Ibid., 286; Taylor, *East Timor*, 70.


Dunn, *Timor*, 211.

Budiardjo and Liong, *War against East Timor*, 27.

Taylor, *East Timor*, 84.

Ibid., 28.

Dunn, *Timor*, 313.

107. Taylor, East Timor, 93.

108. Dunn, Timor, 324.


110. Dunn, East Timor, 335.

111. Budiardjo and Liong, War against East Timor, 41.

112. Robinson, “People’s War,” 291. According to Robinson, pagar betis had been used before the Killings in the Indonesian military’s counterinsurgency campaign against the Darul Islam rebel group in the 1950s.


114. For example, Robinson, “People’s War.”


117. Taylor, East Timor, 150.


120. For example, Geoff Simons, Indonesia: The Long Oppression (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 66.

121. Ibid., 88.


126. Dunn, “Genocide,” 278; Taylor, East Timor, xxvii–xxviii. Dunn gives a higher figure of 250,000 East Timorese deported.


130. See Taylor, “Encirclement and Annihilation,” 163n1, for a discussion.


135. Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies.


145. The use of biological and genetic terms in arguing for a group’s elimination is common across genocides, with Dutton, Boyanowsky, and Bond stating that “a common perception of genocidaires is that their target group is virus- or cancer-like. The notion of the threat spreading is common to these views, justifying extermination of the currently innocent.” Donald G. Dutton, Ehor O. Boyanovsky, and Michael Harris Bond, “Extreme Mass Homicide: From Military Massacre to Genocide,” Aggression and Violent Behavior 10,4 (2005): 437–73, 458.
148. In fact, Pol Pot took the Killings as a lesson that anti-Communists had to be dealt with sharply, lest the Cambodian Communist Party suffer the same fate as the PKI. This was one of the motivating factors behind the mass murder conducted by his regime. Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 36–7.
155. Simpson, “‘Illegally and Beautifully’,” 305.
This paper puts forth the hypothesis that the degree of social distance between perpetrator and victim groups prior to the outbreak of genocide is inversely related to the degree of severity of dehumanization employed by the perpetrator group during genocide. Derived from psychological theory, this hypothesis is illustrated by using a primarily literature-based method of analysis combined with a vignette-designed severity of dehumanization scale. Three genocides are compared: the Rwandan Genocide, the Holocaust as it occurred in Western Europe, and the Holocaust as it occurred in Eastern Europe. The findings for Rwanda and the Holocaust in Eastern Europe show a negative correlation between the two variables, confirming the hypothesis. The results for Western Europe, however, present somewhat of an anomaly; variations in the extermination policies of the German perpetrators in Eastern and Western Europe correspond to this difference and can, in this case, provide a possible explanation for the incongruity.

Key words: psychology, social distance, perpetrators, victims, barbarity, genocide, Rwanda, Holocaust, dehumanization

Introduction

In her seminal work on genocide, Helen Fein defines the phenomenon as the “sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collective directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim.” Genocide and other forms of mass killing have recurred frequently over the past 50 years. Events in Rwanda and Darfur, for instance, are just two examples of recent genocidal events that have left the international community in shock. Surprisingly perhaps, the perpetrators of this barbarity are neither extraordinary nor particularly prone to pathology and/or insanity. Rather, perpetrators typically reflect an ordinary distribution of humanity: some are wealthy while others are impoverished; some are religious and others agnostic; some are relatively young and others relatively old. Most of them are not psychologically impaired nor are they typically the products of abusive childhoods. In short, the majority of perpetrators of genocide are ordinary people.

This is particularly apparent when examining the Rwandan Genocide, a case where the killers were, to a large extent, not only ordinary civilians but also often personally acquainted with their victims. Even so, they displayed an extraordinary inclination toward brutality. Innocent Rwililiza, a survivor of the Rwandan Genocide, reflects that the cruelty of the slaughter was not executed by “demons or drug-crazed interahamwe”
(Hutu militias), but rather by “neighbors with whom we used to chat while walking to the market.” During his interview, Rwililiza poses two important questions: “Why did they chop people up instead of killing them straightaway? . . . If there was killing to be done, all that had to be done was kill, but why chop arms and legs?” As illustrated by the survivor and perpetrator interviews conducted by Jean Hatzfeld, many otherwise ordinary Rwandan did not simply kill their victims. Rather, they inflicted a maximum amount of pain and suffering, often wounding and leaving their Tutsi neighbors to die slow and agonizing deaths. Considering that the vast majority of perpetrators were neither insane nor drugged, how can one explain the unwarranted mutilation, torture, and suffering they inflicted on their victims? According to Rwililiza, it was their personal acquaintanceships with their victims that became the driving force behind the malice. In his view, mutilation and torture represented the means through which the humanity of the victims was removed and the task of killing made easier.

In this paper we seek to develop the hypothesis that social proximity prior to genocides enhances severity of dehumanization during genocide. In other words, the smaller the social distance between the perpetrator group and the victim group the more severe the dehumanizing behaviors of the perpetrators. To do this we compare the cruelty of the killing methods employed by Rwandan perpetrators during the Rwandan Genocide and German perpetrators during the Holocaust in Eastern and Western Europe. To simplify the task of comparison, Germany is used as a model for Western Europe, while the Baltic states and Poland are used as models for Eastern Europe. Although the perpetrators of the Holocaust were in no way limited to those of German nationality, we have to limit our analysis of the behavior of the perpetrators to German nationals for reasons of conciseness. For the same reason, the victim group is limited to people who were deemed Jewish according to the Nazi definition. As such, in the case of Western Europe, the perpetrators are Germans while the victims are German Jews. In the case of Eastern Europe, the perpetrators are again limited to Germans while the victims are Polish and Baltic Jews. Finally, in the case of Rwanda, the perpetrator group refers to Hutu perpetrators while the victim group refers to Tutsi victims.

The reasons for which these two cases have been selected are twofold: First, the Rwandan Genocide and the Holocaust represent two of the most widely researched and examined cases of genocide today. Consequently, in each case there exists a wealth of information that can be drawn upon for this study. Second, in order to assess the effects of social distance on dehumanization one requires contexts that are characterized by different degrees of social distance. The Rwandan Genocide and the Holocaust—given that we distinguish between the Holocaust in Eastern Europe and the Holocaust in Western Europe—represent three such cases. The Rwandan Genocide was a “neighborhood genocide” where individuals from the victim and perpetrator groups were personally acquainted with one another. In contrast, the Holocaust in Eastern Europe was a predominantly bureaucratic and military-driven undertaking targeting a diffuse population with whom the German perpetrators were not previously acquainted. With regard to the Holocaust in Germany, acquaintanceship between the German perpetrators and the Jewish victim group did exist, albeit to a lesser extent than in Rwanda.

**Theory**

At first glance, our hypothesis may appear counterintuitive from the perspective that acquaintanceship overcomes social barriers and bridges social gaps—a viewpoint, for instance, that underlies Dutch public policy for preventing segregation in public
primary schools. However, psychological theory supports our hypothesis. The argument put forth in this paper begins with the assessment that for most people, hurting another human being is unpleasant. Indeed, “most people find it deeply upsetting to inflict harm, pain or death on another person.” Consequently, no matter the extent of prejudice and hate one group may feel for another, reservations against killing fellow human beings are deeply entrenched. If systemic killing involving mass participation is to transpire, the target group’s status as human beings—as being part of the same moral universe as the perpetrators—must first be removed. Through dehumanization, the target group is rendered sub- or non-human in the eyes of the perpetrator group, clearly distinguishing “us” from “them.” Ultimately, this is a process of facilitation because killing individuals who have been devalued and excluded from the realm of humanity is easier than killing those who have not. Restraints against persecution and violence are eliminated and mass killings can then unfold within this context of moral exclusion. “Anything that is done to someone who is morally excluded is permissible no matter how heinous the action.” This makes dehumanization a vital cog in the wheel of mass killing campaigns.

Dehumanization can be viewed from the perpetrator’s perspective as well as a victim’s, and encompasses both the process whereby others’ humanity is denied and the cruelty and suffering that embody that process. The majority of psychological research tends to focus on dehumanization as a process in which negative imagery campaigns and propaganda are employed to reduce the target group’s humanity before genocide. An extensive vocabulary is frequently employed to assign demeaning and animalistic— or non-human—qualities to those comprising the target group. Cockroach, vermin, and parasite are some of the epithets associated with past cases of genocide. This type of systematic labeling represents a primary way of stripping the humanity of the target group while simultaneously inciting the perpetrator group against them.

Dehumanization, however, does not only play a role in preparing the ground for genocide; it also drives genocidal campaigns forward, sustaining killing operations over lengths of time. The very dynamic of mass killing necessitates and intensifies dehumanization, for no matter the extent to which one is labeled cockroach or parasite, exterminating people perceived as vermin is simply not the same as exterminating real vermin. As a result, those who participate in genocidal massacres will infuse their acts with dehumanizing vocabulary in a further and final attempt to break the bonds that tie human beings together. Dehumanization is as much a part of the killing operations of genocidal campaigns as it is their preparation.

The actual killing that occurs during genocide is always imbued with a degree of dehumanization; however, the degree of severity of dehumanization can vary. It is our hypothesis that such a variation is somewhat determined by prior social distance. Importantly, it must be acknowledged that degrees of social distance do not translate into degrees of amicability. For instance, small social distance does not necessarily imply fondness for the other group. Dislike can also be a function of small social distance; as Roy Baumeister has so aptly put it, “most people reserve their greatest animosities for people they know well.” Nevertheless, it goes without saying that smaller social distances often engender liking, which can be borne from similarity, sexual attraction, or relationships of dependence; all of these categories presuppose social proximity. Assuming that human bonds need more dehumanization to break when social nearness is characterized by fondness, a more precise phrasing of our hypothesis would state that
where social relations are more affable prior to genocide, more cruelty during genocide is likely to ensue. However, given that we are not able to measure how friendly social relations are or were—only how close—we have to limit ourselves to the inverse relation between social distance and severity of dehumanization. Furthermore, it is important to stress that our hypothesis is solely concerned with differences in perpetrator behavior during genocide and is not concerned with either why the genocides in question occurred, or with the events leading up to their commencement.

**Methods**

*Measuring social distance*

To measure the social distance between the perpetrator and victim groups in Rwanda, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe, we employed an adaptation of the Bogardus Social Distance Scale. This scale, named after sociologist Emory S. Bogardus, includes a sequence of between five and seven items or statements that convey greater or lesser intimacy toward members of a particular group. The scale is both one-dimensional and cumulative. Consequently, an individual or group that asserts a certain degree of intimacy toward another will accept items denoting less intimacy. As a result, accepting members from a group on the scale of marriage will automatically signify acceptance with regards to the previous scales of friends, work colleagues, and neighbors. Table 1 illustrates the intimacy items or statements that make up the Bogardus Social Distance Scale.

For this study, we have utilized a modified version of the Bogardus Scale. The cumulative nature of the original scale enabled us to limit ourselves to the first four items. This made the task at hand decidedly simpler, as data regarding the first four categories is much easier to come by. Furthermore, the first four items on the limited scale were modified from their original survey question format into four socio-demographic categories of social distance: intermarriage, social interaction, workforce integration, and community integration. Table 2 presents the limited version of the social distance scale and the associated socio-demographic conditions.

Using the modified scale, we analyzed the literature to determine the social distance between the perpetrator and victim groups in each of the genocides studied.

*Measuring Severity of Dehumanization*

Measuring severity of dehumanization entails an in-depth analysis of published personal accounts and testimonies of survivors, bystanders, and perpetrators of the three case studies. There are two justifications for the selection of this literature: First and foremost, in order to obtain accurate depictions of the dehumanization behavior

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**Table 1 – Bogardus Social Distance Scale**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Would marry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Would have as regular friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Would work beside in an office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Would have several families in my neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Would have merely as speaking acquaintances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Would live outside my neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Would live outside my country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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employed, first-hand accounts from those who witnessed and even experienced such events are vital. However, the nature of the topic is particularly sensitive due to its focuses on episodes of extreme trauma and distress. Analyzing published personal accounts and testimonies have represented an unobtrusive means of accessing eyewitness accounts. Simply put, published personal accounts and testimonies have allowed us to capture incidents of dehumanization without having to put those who witnessed these traumatic events through renewed pain or distress during interviews. Furthermore, assessing testimonies from perpetrators, victims, and bystanders has allowed us to gather a variety of depictions stemming from all vantage points; this in itself has limited bias. Second, the wealth of published personal accounts and testimonies of survivors, bystanders, and perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide and the Holocaust render the conducting of fresh, first-hand interviews unnecessary.

Consequently, in order to determine the degree of dehumanization, we have carefully examined the literature from which we compiled a list of all the dehumanizing behaviors represented in each case study. Any perpetrator behavior that encompassed some degree of humiliation, dehumanization, or the inflicting of some level of pain—physical and/or psychological—during the killing operations of genocide was considered to be dehumanizing behavior. Within each of the three lists, the behaviors were subsequently grouped according to five behavior categories: dehumanizing living conditions; psychological dehumanization; physical dehumanization without physical pain; and physical dehumanization with physical pain. The latter was further separated into abuse with the use of instruments and abuse without instruments.

**Dehumanizing living conditions** concerns living conditions that are unfit for human dwelling and threaten survival. The victim is forced, either directly or indirectly, to endure these conditions for extended periods of time.

**Psychological dehumanization** concerns perpetrator behaviors that inflict psychological torment, humiliation, and/or dehumanization upon the victim. Behaviors within this category range from derogatory labeling and name-calling, through to threats, taunts, degrading insults, defamation, and slander.

**Physical dehumanization without physical pain** concerns any humiliating and dehumanizing behavior or action that is either inflicted upon a victim by a perpetrator, or that the victim is forced to perform him- or herself. These actions are devoid of physical pain.

**Physical dehumanization with physical pain** concerns any behavior that not only diminishes the humanity of the victim but also inflicts a degree of physical pain upon that person. This group of behaviors was divided into two subgroups: abuse with instruments and without instruments. **Instrument** refers to any tool or weapon used by a

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**Table 2 – Modified Bogardus Social Distance Scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Social Distance Category</strong></th>
<th><strong>Corresponding socio-demographic condition</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would marry</td>
<td>Intermarriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would have as regular friends</td>
<td>Social Interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would work beside in an office</td>
<td>Workforce Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would have several families in my neighborhood</td>
<td>Community Integration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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perpetrator to inflict torture, pain, and humiliation. Such instruments range from guns, clubs, and machetes, through to fire, water, and attack dogs. Conversely, behaviors categorized as abuse without instruments refer to all actions in which pain and humiliation are inflicted without the explicit use of a tool. Beatings with hands and feet are examples of this type of physical dehumanization. Table 3 presents the dehumanizing behavior categories that we distinguished.

Once all the dehumanizing behaviors were divided among these five categories, a smaller list containing the cruelest behaviors was compiled. To ensure that our analysis was not only based on a compilation of cruel exceptions, the behaviors had to have been regularly inflicted. However, it must be acknowledged that since our analysis is based on the available second-hand literature, the precise frequency with which these behaviors occurred is unknown. Consequently, the behaviors chosen were those that were most common in the literature consulted. To compile this smaller list, behaviors were ranked according to the physical and psychological pain they inflicted on the victims. The categories included no pain, least pain, pain, most pain, and death. Death was further divided into “immediate death” and “prolonged death.” Based on this categorization, the two most painful and most commonly employed behaviors for each genocide were chosen per dehumanizing behavior category. As a result, 10 behaviors representing the most common and most severe dehumanization were identified for each case. Consequently, a final list of 30 dehumanizing behaviors was compiled. To determine which genocide had the most severe dehumanization, this final list of 30 had to be ranked on a scale from one to 30, with a score of 30 constituting the cruelest behavior and a score of one representing the least cruel behavior. We chose not to do the ranking ourselves to preclude any potential teleological result. Instead, we asked eight members of a working group who did not know the aim of our research to do the ranking for us. Although subjectivity was not completely defeated in this way, the opinions upon which the ranking was based were diversified and as a result, the extremes were averaged out and therefore play a smaller role.

### Social distance measured

**Rwanda**

Rwanda’s ethnic characteristics and tumultuous political history—during which first the Tutsi minority, supported by the colonizing Germans and Belgians, but since the 1960s the Hutu majority dominated—often leads to the misconception that the Hutu and the Tutsi were mutually exclusive tribes with little interaction.

In reality, however, they had much in common. They shared important customs, routines, and societal arrangements, spoke the same language, attended the same schools, shared the same religion (Christianity), frequented the same bars and shops, intermarried, and lived side by side. On a personal level, the Hutu and Tutsi shared
amicable relations. They were neighbors, friends, and even members of the same family. This was also true of the génocidaires. Scott Straus conducted interviews with 210 convicted genocide perpetrators detained in 15 prisons across Rwanda where he asked the respondents four questions regarding interethnic proximity and intermarriage prior to the genocide. The answers are presented in Table 4. Almost all génocidaires claimed to have had Tutsi neighbors and would have allowed their child to marry a Tutsi, or would have married a Tutsi themselves. More than two thirds had Tutsi family members.

In addition, Straus enquired about the nature of Hutu-Tutsi interaction after 1990 but before 1994 when civil war broke out between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—a Tutsi rebel group operating from Uganda—and the Hutu regime. These questions were designed to reveal the sentiments, either positive or negative, that characterized Hutu-Tutsi relations. Table 5 shows that the greater majority claimed that relations were “positive” before 1994, while Table 6 shows that they remained “positive” even after the war began in 1990.

### Table 4 – Tutsi-Hutu Interaction in Percentages (weighted results)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before 1994, did you have any Tutsi neighbors? (N=210)</th>
<th>Before 1994, did you have any Tutsi family members? (N=205)</th>
<th>Before 1994, would you have allowed your child to marry a Tutsi, or would you have married a Tutsi yourself? (N=195)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>98.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not know</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Only one respondent was not Hutu. Although he carried a Hutu identity card, he claimed his entire family was considered Tutsi.

* Any blood relation or relation by marriage is considered a family member.

* Married men and fathers were asked if their child would be permitted to marry a Tutsi, while unmarried men were asked if they themselves would marry a Tutsi woman.

In addition, Straus enquired about the nature of Hutu-Tutsi interaction after 1990 but before 1994 when civil war broke out between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—a Tutsi rebel group operating from Uganda—and the Hutu regime. These questions were designed to reveal the sentiments, either positive or negative, that characterized Hutu-Tutsi relations. Table 5 shows that the greater majority claimed that relations were “positive” before 1994, while Table 6 shows that they remained “positive” even after the war began in 1990.

### Table 5 – Relations between Hutu and Tutsi neighbors before 1994 in percentages (weighted results)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before 1994, how were your relations with your Tutsi neighbor? (N=200)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positivea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'No problem’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negativeb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Responses that have been labelled as positive include: good, very good; truly good; more than 100%; we were friends; we shared and we intermarried.

* Responses labelled as negative include: not good; we were friends before 1990; not good after 1990 and; they were accomplices.
It must, of course, be acknowledged that the reliability of the results could be called into question due to the limited number of respondents on the one hand, and the fact that the respondents were exclusively perpetrators on the other. Straus’s findings, however, mirror those from other sources.39

Intermarriage
Rwanda has a well-documented history of intermarriage.40 As generally described by the literature, mixed marriages were a common occurrence and can be traced back to pre- and early-colonial times.41 Callixte, a genocide survivor from the Ntarama locality, recalls that “about two thirds of Tutsi daughters would be married to a Hutu. But Hutu daughters married to Tutsi men were only 1 percent. Prospects were better for Tutsi daughters marrying Hutu men. They would get better opportunities.”42 Although this distribution is unlikely, we take Callixte’s statement as further evidence that intermarriage was widespread. The high degree of intermarriage is also mentioned in other survivor testimonies and in witness and perpetrator accounts, albeit often in the context of inter-marital killing.43 According to one such a survivor, “Tutsi women married to Hutu were killed. I know only one who survived. The administration forced Hutu men to kill their Tutsi wives before they go to kill anyone else—to prove they were true interahamwe.”44 This high rate of intermarriage is indicative of a society with little social distance between victim and perpetrator groups.

Social Interaction
Numerous personal accounts from both Hutu and Tutsi reveal close social relationships and personal friendships between the two groups.45 Hutu and Tutsi children and teenagers were relatively well integrated. Not only did they engage in shared leisure activities, but they were also part of the same sports teams. The Nyamata soccer team was one such group of players that encompassed both Hutu and Tutsi.46 Tite Rushita, interviewed by Hatzfeld, paints a picture of affable, cheerful relations in which the love of the game overrode any hint of ethnic tension. Although the civil war of the early 1990s marked the beginning of a swift decline in these once agreeable affiliations and the 1994 genocide pitted previous teammates against one another, their pre-1994 interactions were generally social and harmonious in nature.47 Rushita’s description is reinforced by numerous testimonies from those who lived through the genocide. Angélique Mukanmanzi conveys in her interview with Hatzfeld that her pre-1994 social circle was an ethnically mixed group of both Tutsi and Hutu.48 In Charles Mironko’s interviews with a group of perpetrators residing in six Rwandan prisons, the majority alluded to a historical friendship between the two ethnic groups.49 While one respondent discusses regular

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did your relations with your Tutsi neighbor change after the war began in 1990? (N=185)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did your relations with your Tutsi neighbor change after the war began in 1990? (N=185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 – Relations between Hutu and Tutsi neighbors after 1990 in percentages (weighted results)
social visits and blood brotherhood pacts, another talks of regular gift exchanges in the form of cows and other items. The common premise connecting these testimonies is a high rate of amicable social interaction. Social distance can therefore be considered minimal within this category.

Workforce Integration
To some extent, the workforce that characterized post-colonial, pre-genocide Rwanda did show an ethnic division of labor. This was especially the case in the state sector. For instance, in the army and the intermediate to upper strata of government, transparent, anti-Tutsi policies were actively employed. Other areas of the public sector, although absent of official discriminatory measures, also exhibited a Hutu-dominant workforce. Consequently, this sector of Rwanda’s pre-genocide workforce did not exhibit comprehensive ethnic integration.

However, the vast majority of Rwandans (both Hutu and Tutsi) did not participate in the public sector labor force, but rather found employment in peasant farming. Statistics taken from Rwanda’s 1990 Human Development Report show that 92.8% of the Rwandan labor force at the time worked in agriculture. The 1991 Rwandan census puts this number at only a slightly lower 90.9% (91.9% for Hutu, 85.5% for Tutsi). It further underlines the importance of agriculture by showing that only 5.5% of the population lived in cities.

Land and cattle have traditionally represented the two sides of Rwanda’s agrarian and pastoral economy. Hutu tended to manage more of the food production in Rwandan society. Armed with farming implements such as the hoe and the machete, these farmers employed intensive labor to ensure the harvesting of crops. Generally uncomfortable in the company of livestock, Hutu planters considered cattle breeding to be an extravagance not befitting the typically arid landscapes of Rwanda. Animal husbandry was the historical pastime of the Tutsi pastoralists, who contributed to Rwanda’s economy through cattle breeding and milk production. Consequently, while the vast majority of the Rwandan population was united in its agricultural occupations, differing specializations within the agrarian economy resulted in an agricultural workforce that was not comprehensively integrated. However, given that this agricultural specialization was not associated with differences in socioeconomic status—those who worked in agriculture were generally poor—the social distance between the two groups can, from this perspective, still be considered small.

Community Integration
Pre-genocide Rwanda was initially divided into 11 prefectures. Table 7 depicts the ethnic distribution in these prefectures in 1991.

As the table shows, not a single one of these zones was restricted to just one ethnic group. In spite of the clear numerical dominance of the Hutu, the two groups lived side by side and generally without segregation. In fact, Straus’s analysis of five communes from five prefectures shows that the Tutsi population was actually in excess of 10%. Communes such as Giti, Musambira, and Kanzenze boasted quite large numbers of Tutsi. As a result, ethnic segregation along provincial, regional, or community lines does not appear to have been a feature of pre-genocide Rwanda.

Numerous survivor testimonies corroborate this portrait of community integration. Christine Nyiransabimana, a Tutsi, for instance, stated, “In my area, and in Nyamata town, I saw many Hutu relations and neighbors killing Tutsis every day of the
In describing the death of her father, Angélique Mukamanzi stated, “He was run through by a Hutu neighbor.”

When talking about their neighbors and relatives who took part in the killings, many survivors and witnesses referred to it as “turning Interahamwe.” In other words, these individuals had displayed no previous alignment with Hutu extremism or radical militia groups. This expression not only implies a level of familiarity but also that those who were not expected to join the slaughter did. Essentially, the Hutu and Tutsi lived side by side in the same villages and in the same towns; there was little social distance with regard to their localities.

To conclude, in all categories of social distance studied, the Hutu and Tutsi displayed high levels of interaction. Social distance between these two groups prior to the 1994 genocide can therefore be considered to be small.

**Germany**

Assessing the social distance between the German perpetrators and the German-Jewish target group within Germany is not a straightforward task as the Nazis implemented widespread anti-Jewish legislation after their rise to power in 1933. As a result of these discriminatory laws, the social distance between the Jewish victim group and the German perpetrator group was deliberately manipulated in the years leading up to the extermination carried out by the Nazi regime.

In the years prior to Nazi rule and following the fall of Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic was characterized by the widespread integration of Jews in all spheres of German life. The 1925 census calculated the Jewish population at 564,379 Israelites or 0.9% of the total German population. The demographic distribution of the population at that time showed that 66.8% of the Jewish populace lived in cities with over 100,000 inhabitants. Six of Germany’s largest cities—Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Breslau,

Table 7 – Distribution (%) of the Population of Rwanda by Prefecture and Ethnic Group in 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Hutu</th>
<th>Tutsi</th>
<th>Twa</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total Population (numerical)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Butare</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>753,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byumba</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>775,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyangugu</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>551,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gikongoro</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>465,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gisenyi</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>731,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gitarama</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>848,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibungo</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>648,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibuye</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>469,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kigali</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>905,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kigali-ville</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>221,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruhengeri</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>766,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td><strong>7,099,844</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leipzig, and Cologne—were home to 49% of all Jews in the country. 16% of the Jewish population resided in smaller cities with between 10,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, while the remaining 17% lived in towns and villages with less than 10,000 inhabitants. The assimilation of the Jewish community into the greater German society was especially evident in the high rate of intermarriage before the genocide. Among all Jewish marriages between 1926 and 1930, 21.5% constituted mixed marriages. This trend proceeded into the early days of Nazi rule, with 44% of German Jews choosing to marry non-Jews in 1933. In fact, roughly 35,000 Jews lived in mixed marriages in 1933. The Jews and gentiles enjoyed peaceful and indeed intimate relations during the pre-genocide era.

However, the final years of the Weimar Republic were decidedly tumultuous and witnessed an escalation of anti-Semitism, especially within the manifestos and propaganda tactics of political parties like the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP, “Nazi” Party). The 1933 Nazi takeover represented a turning point in German-Jewish integration. The years immediately preceding the genocide of European Jewry were characterized by widespread efforts on the part of the Nazi regime to set up barriers between German Jews and gentiles. The anti-Jewish policies and legislation outlined below not only depicts the ways in which the Nazis attempted to curtail their interactions, but also the extent to which these policies were actively pursued.

**Interrmarriage**

The 1935 *Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor* marked the first phase in the Nazi-led venture to curtail all interactions between Jews and gentiles. This law not only prevented German women under the age of 45 from working in Jewish households, hotels, and health resorts, but also prohibited mixed marriages and extramarital intercourse. Any mixed marriage occurring after the decree was not only automatically invalidated, but also considered to be an affirmation of guilt of extramarital intercourse. This decree was immediately supplemented with laws concerning the marriage practices of *Mischlinge* (crossbreeds) of the first and second degree—that is, with two or one Jewish grandparents, respectively. More specifically, marriages between a *Mischling* of the second degree and a Jew were prohibited, as were marriages between a *Mischling* of the second degree and another *Mischling* of the second degree. Furthermore, *Mischlinge* of the first degree could only marry other *Mischlinge* of the first degree or Jews. Through such policies, German-Jewish intermarriage was strictly curtailed.

**Social Interaction**

The 1930s were characterized by a number of laws that sought to reduce social interaction between Jews and gentiles. In April 1933, the *Law against Overcrowding of German Schools* was passed. It declared that the admission of non-Aryans into schools and colleges had to reflect the proportion of non-Aryans in the total German population. This law had far-reaching repercussions for Jewish students. By 1936, more than half of all Jewish students were forced to attend Jewish schools established by the Jewish community. By 1938, all Jewish students had been denied access to German schools and were as such enrolled in Jewish schools. Other restrictive measures included the introduction of travel regulations whereby Jews were forbidden access to dining and sleeping cars on all trains within Germany; the introduction of separate Jewish shopping hours by the Food and Agricultural Ministry; the introduction of separate Jewish hospitals; and denial of access to beaches. From September 1939 onwards, Jews were further
constrained and isolated by the installation of an 8:00 p.m. curfew. Such limitations were exacerbated by the imposition of further restrictions on Jewish movements. For instance, the installation of private telephones in Jewish homes was outlawed. All communication and interaction with the gentile world was steadily reduced. The gap between the perpetrator group and the target group was steadily widened.

**Workforce Integration**

As 1933 unfolded and Hitler embarked on his first year of power, the position of Jews in Germany’s economy was still strong and their role active. The majority of employed Jews found themselves in commerce. Such specialization stems from a historically low rate of Jewish employment in the civil service, the army, or agriculture. Therefore, while this sphere of German economic activity witnessed relatively little Jewish-German integration—only 1.2% of the total population in these professions were Jewish—other spheres such as commerce and enterprise exhibited higher Jewish representation. For example, in 1930, 48% of all private bankers and 40% of all textile businesses were Jewish. The Jewish representation in liberal professions however, was nowhere near these high levels. In 1933, only 2% of all professional positions in Germany were held by Jews.

The position of Jews in all spheres of economic life was the first area targeted for segregation by the Nazi regime. In 1933, all non-Aryan officials were barred from positions in public office in the state railway company, the civil service, and the Reichsbank. The ramifications of this law were not limited, however, to civil servants. Professionals such as Jewish doctors were suddenly deprived of their affiliation with state-sponsored health insurance programs, and Jewish notaries and lawyers were denied admission to the bar. Within a year of Nazi rule, Jewish representation in Germany’s economic and public arenas had been severely curtailed. With the ensuing Aryanization and liquidation of Jewish enterprises and business establishments, the Jewish working sector was progressively and deliberately isolated from the greater German work force.

**Community Integration**

By 1939, forced emigration had reduced Germany’s Jewish population to 330,892. According to the 1925 census, the Jewish community was considerably urbanized, a trend that increased rapidly after the Nazi takeover in 1933. In a bid to escape impoverishment, Jews abandoned the isolation of small towns and villages for the promise of Germany’s big cities. The 1939 census shows that there were 82,788 Jews in Berlin and 14,461 in Frankfurt. Jewish migration within Germany was not, however, accompanied by integration into their new urban neighborhoods. The Nazi government greeted Jewish urbanization with renewed segregation efforts: namely residential separation. The Nazi administrative machine set about confining German Jews to separate housing blocs designated solely for Jewish inhabitants. Such a formidable task required widespread evictions and accompanying legislation. For instance, in 1938, a decree was passed in which German landlords were authorized to cancel the apartment leases of Jewish doctors. In 1939, this decree was compounded by another that allowed all German landlords to evict Jews if that landlord could provide a certificate declaring that the tenant could find alternative accommodation.

Jewish emigration rose dramatically throughout this period. During the first 10 years of Hitler’s reign, several hundreds of thousands left the country. By November
1941, it was estimated that just 160,000 out of the 499,682 counted in the 1933 census remained in Germany. With such deteriorating numbers, Jewish-German interaction and integration in all areas, particularly living arrangements, would have been reduced.

**Establishing an Overall Social Distance Estimate**

From their inception into power through to the start of the genocide in 1941, the Nazi regime set about the systematic separation of the German Jews from the gentiles. The fact that these efforts were believed to be necessary indicates that social distance between gentiles and Jews was relatively small. Furthermore, successfully isolating German Jews from their non-Jewish counterparts was not guaranteed. Indeed, despite rigorous efforts, three events demonstrate the regime’s failure in entrenching considerable social distance between Jews and gentiles.

The first such event was the 1933 boycott. Two months after Hitler’s ascension to power, the Nazi party organized several mass meetings led by an established boycott committee. On the agenda was the implementation of a widespread national boycott on Jewish goods, shops, lawyers, businesses, and doctors. Predominantly driven by radical Sturmabteilung (SA) members, the events of the boycott included the placement of anti-Jewish placards and SA and Schutzstaffel (SS) guards outside such businesses. The guards were responsible for deterring shoppers by “informing” them of the Jewish ownership of such establishments. However, in spite of these efforts, the boycott was ultimately a failure. In truth, the German public largely ignored it and continued to go about their daily affairs, which included shopping at Jewish-owned stores. The significance of this evident failure is explicit in its illustration of the overall German sentiment and implicit in its illustration of the degree of community integration of the Jews. Combined with the two events below, this illustrates the failure of the Nazi regime to create the social distance it so desired.

The second event was the *Kristallnacht*. The night of 9 November 1938 was characterized by the destruction of 171 synagogues and 7,500 Jewish businesses, as well as the arrest and subsequent deportation of 20,000 Jews to concentration camps within the Reich, such as Dachau and Buchenwald. The brutality of this evening must not, however, mislead one into thinking that it represents anti-Jewish sentiment among the collective German population. The events of the *Kristallnacht* were no more than a cleverly orchestrated invention through which the destruction of Jewish synagogues and businesses were made to appear to be the work of the populace as a whole, when in fact it was solely the work of Nazi militias. The Nazis had to concoct a popular revolt because German civilians were simply not interested in an anti-Jewish pogrom. This provides evidence of a smaller social distance than that sought by the Nazis.

The third event is known as the 1943 Rosenstrasse incident or protest. Recall that German-Jewish intermarriage in 1933 and prior was relatively high. Essentially, it would have been those Germans in mixed marriages who had close personal contact with Jews who were most resistant to anti-Jewish policies and propaganda. It was within this context that the 1943 Rosenstrasse incident occurred. At the start of that year, it was estimated that there were still 16,760 mixed marriages within Germany proper. It was primarily the Jewish husbands of these marriages who were incarcerated by the Gestapo in early 1943 and held in a former welfare office of the Jewish community at Rosenstrasse 2–4 (Rose Street) in Berlin. In response to these arrests, non-Jewish spouses and relatives openly resisted Nazi rule and gathered themselves in significant numbers outside the building. The SS, however, did not arrest or shoot the women.
standing in defiance. Instead, the Nazis negotiated with the protesters and finally released the detainees. The fact that the imprisoned men were released indicates a small social distance between some Germans and Jews. The Nazis were aware that the popularity of the persecution of the Jews was limited and were anxious not to lose support for their regime. In an effort to prevent social unrest, the regime ignored its ideological principles and let the Jewish men go free.

The final conclusion to be drawn from this section on social distance is less straightforward than the one drawn in the case of Rwanda. The years preceding the 1933 Nazi takeover consisted of peaceful relations and increasing integration. However, the ascension of the Nazi party to power brought with it a number of anti-Jewish policies and laws. Through the administrative apparatus of Hitler’s machine, anti-Jewish decrees sought to isolate the Jews and corrode German-Jewish interaction. However, in spite of such extensive legislation, there were several incidents which point to the maintenance of small social distances. Consequently, although legislation made strides toward widening the social distance between the two groups, interaction continued to occur. The bonds that connected the two were therefore still present, though admittedly weakened.

Eastern Europe

Following the model of the previous sections, this paragraph addresses the degree of social distance between the Polish and Baltic victim groups and the German perpetrator group prior to the outbreak of the Jewish genocide in Eastern Europe (Poland and the Baltic States). At this point, however, we depart from the previous composition. Specifically, the perpetrator group in this case refers to the German army that invaded Poland in 1939 and the Einsatzgruppen—small, mobile killing units of the Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo) and Sicherheitsdienst (SD)—that invaded the USSR in 1941. The geographic distance separating the victim and perpetrator groups limits the likelihood of social contact, therefore rendering the social distance categories obsolete. Simple logistics imply that intermarriage, social interaction, workforce integration, and community integration on anything other than a minimal level were absent. It can therefore be assumed that the overall rate of victim and perpetrator group interaction prior to the outbreak of genocide was so minimal that the social distance between them can be classified as large.

Summing Up

The social distance in each pre-genocide context is summarized in Table 8.

Rwanda constituted the case with the smallest social distance. The Hutu perpetrator group and the Tutsi victim group were not only characterized by high rates of intermarriage and social integration, but were also part of the same general workforce, social circles, and neighborhoods. As a result, they had the greatest rate of interaction prior to the outbreak of genocide in 1994. In the context of Eastern Europe, social distance between the German perpetrator group and the Polish and Baltic victim groups was, for all intents and purposes, nonexistent. Due to the geographic distance separating the two, any meaningful interaction was unlikely. Ergo, it can be stated that the social distance between the perpetrator group and the victim group prior to the outbreak of the Jewish genocide in Eastern Europe was large.

Comparatively speaking, the social distance prevalent in Western Europe (i.e., Germany) falls somewhere between that of the other two genocides. This conclusion rests
on the bisection of German-Jewish interactions before the outbreak of genocide. The interaction between these two groups resembled two competing forces: high rates of German-Jewish interaction before 1933 on the one hand, and institutionalized attempts by the Nazi government to separate them on the other. Although not entirely successful, the Nazis did manage to widen the social distance between these two groups. Consequently, this case lies somewhere between Rwanda and Eastern Europe.

### Dehumanization Measured

Table 9 below contains the 30 selected dehumanizing behaviors that the perpetrator groups inflicted on victim groups. The table also illustrates which behavior belonged to which genocide, as well as the method of categorization. It is important to keep in mind that the table given to the participants only contained the behaviors. Following the procedure outlined under “Measuring Severity of Dehumanization,” these behaviors were ranked based on their severity/cruelty.

The respondents’ answers enabled us to formulate several rankings of dehumanizing behaviors. They will be presented below.

Table 10 gives an overview of the different types of dehumanizing behavior per case study and the average dehumanization score that our respondents attributed to them.

In terms of total severity of dehumanization, Rwanda received the highest total average score of 19.6. Eastern Europe was placed second with a total score of 15.0, while Western Europe received the lowest score at 11.9. When we look at the subtotals of the dehumanizing behavior categories, Rwanda’s position as the genocide manifesting the most severe behavior is further cemented. As Table 10 shows, Rwanda received the highest score in three of the five categories. The Holocaust in Western Europe, on the other hand, clearly exhibits the least severe dehumanizing behavior, despite having received the highest score for psychological dehumanization (10.2). The Holocaust in Eastern Europe is placed between Rwanda and Western Europe with several middle-ranking scores.

Finally, we looked at the specific types of behavior with the five highest scores. The figure below displays the results in the form of a column chart. The values represent the data presented in Table 9.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dehumanizing Behavior</th>
<th>Genocide Case</th>
<th>Category of Dehumanization Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Members of the victim group were forced into slave labor for 12 hours a day.</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Dehumanizing living conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Members of the victim group were forced to march huge distances with no food or rest.</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Dehumanizing living conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Members of the victim group were forced to attend daily roll call.</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Psychological dehumanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Skin of dead victims would be tanned and stored for later use.</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Psychological dehumanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Members of the victim group were made to stand naked waiting to be shot.</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Physical dehumanization without physical pain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Members of the victim group were herded like sheep by members of the perpetrator group.</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Physical dehumanization without physical pain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Men from the victim group were kicked and dealt heavy blows.</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Physical dehumanization with physical pain (abuse without instruments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Members of the victim group were forced to stand for a night outside in the rain.</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Physical dehumanization with physical pain (abuse without instruments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 The following medical experiments were inflicted on members of the victim group:</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Physical dehumanization with physical pain (abuse with instruments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothermia where victims were placed in freezing water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infectious diseases were injected into victims</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High altitude experiments using low-pressure chambers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pharmacological where victims were subjected to poisons or gas to test possible antidotes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sterilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surgery such as bone-grafting experiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traumatic Injuries to simulate battle wounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Members of the victim group experienced beatings with rifle butts, clubs, and whips.</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Physical dehumanization with physical pain (abuse with instruments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Up to 200 members of the victim group were forced into closed cattle wagons with no fresh air.</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Dehumanizing living conditions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dehumanizing Behavior</th>
<th>Genocide Case</th>
<th>Category of Dehumanization Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 Members of the victim group were forced to live in fenced-off ghettos in unsanitary conditions that resulted in the repeated outbreak of epidemics and high mortality rates.</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Dehumanizing living conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Members of the victim group were assigned numbers to replace their names.</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Psychological dehumanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Laughing and jeering accompanied beatings by the perpetrators.</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Psychological dehumanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Members of the victim group were made to march naked to pits and forced to lie on top of corpses.</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Physical dehumanization without physical pain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Women from the victim group were forced to throw their children into graves alive where they would be shot</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Physical dehumanization without physical pain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Members of the victim group were forced to stand for hours in the freezing cold, rain and snow and often froze to death.</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Physical dehumanization with physical pain (abuse without instruments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Female members of the victim group were raped.</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Physical dehumanization with physical pain (abuse without instruments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Members of the victim group were beaten to death with clubs and iron rods.</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Physical dehumanization with physical pain (abuse with instruments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Attack dogs would be set on members of the victim group.</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Physical dehumanization with physical pain (abuse with instruments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Members of the victim group were deprived of methods to collect water, which led to dehydration and death.</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Dehumanizing living conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Members of the victim group were forced to live in mud and swamps in the company of snakes, mosquitoes and corpses.</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Dehumanizing living conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Members of the victim group were called worms, cockroaches and snakes.</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Psychological dehumanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 The killers would laugh, sing and dance while they went about the task of killing.</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Psychological dehumanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Women from the victim group were forced to march naked while being forced to sing songs.</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Physical dehumanization without physical pain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table continued on next page)
As one can see from this figure, four out of five of the highest-scoring behaviors originated in Rwanda, thereby solidifying Rwanda’s position as the genocide with the most severe dehumanization.

Severity of Dehumanization Scores and Social Distance Findings

Combining Results

When one combines the above findings for severity of dehumanization with those for social distance, the relationship between the two variables becomes visible. While Rwanda exhibited the least social distance but the greatest severity of dehumanization, Eastern Europe, with its much greater social distance, displayed less severe dehumanization.

These findings imply that a high degree of social proximity dictates a high degree of severity of dehumanization during the killing operations of genocide. Conversely, the
less social interaction there is prior to the outbreak of genocide, the less severe the dehumanization behaviors appear to be during the genocide.

These results corroborate our hypothesis, which had postulated that dehumanization reduces the moral and cognitive obstacles that stand in the way of killing fellow human beings. As explained by Bandura, empathetic emotions are elicited when one perceives another as human. The elicitation of these feelings stems from perceived similarity and identification. Yet, if perceived similarity is replaced with perceived difference, the victim is removed from the moral, human realm and thus becomes destructible. In this way, dehumanization can break the bonds that tie human beings to one another. Consequently, no matter the surrounding contexts, circumstances, cultures, or environments, killing human beings is easier when those targeted are no longer bound to the killers by their shared humanity. In support of this reasoning, one Nazi commandant maintained that the degradation inflicted on concentration camp prisoners destined to die was administered not with the aim of inflicting cruelty for cruelty’s sake, but rather to severely diminish the humanity of the prisoner. In this way, those operating the gas chambers could carry out their duties with minimal distress. When questioned about a mass of bodies, another Nazi camp guard said, “It had nothing to do with humanity, it couldn’t have; it was a mass—a mass of rotting flesh.”

In light of the results of this research, it can be stated that if dehumanization is necessary in the mass murder of strangers (the Eastern Europe case), it appears absolutely imperative in the mass murder of acquaintances (the Rwanda case). Breaking the ties that bind human beings is difficult in itself, so breaking ties that have been solidified by social closeness is even harder and requires more effort. As noted by Albert Bandura, “the joys and suffering of similar persons are more vicariously arousing than are those of strangers”. Therefore, the termination of empathetic feelings and subsequent
destruction of shared human bonds will require greater dehumanization if the targeted individual is known to the perpetrator than if they were unknown. It is therefore unsurprising that out of all three cases the perpetrators in Rwanda infused their killing operations with the most severe dehumanization. As stated by Rwililiza, a survivor of that genocide, “They cut and mutilated Tutsis to take from them all that was human and thus kill them more easily.” The same survivor goes on to articulate, “Neighbors of longstanding turned in a matter of hours into beasts.” Both statements imply a strong relationship between severity of dehumanization on the one hand and the close social proximity of the victim and perpetrator groups on the other.

In contrast to the Rwanda case, the genocide in Eastern Europe was defined by a vast social distance separating the German perpetrator group and the Eastern European (Polish and Baltic) victim groups. They were not only physically separated but they were also culturally and linguistically distinct. The victim group therefore represented an entirely foreign body requiring a level of severity of dehumanization necessary only to break the common bonds of general humanity, not those solidified by social closeness. With the paper’s theoretical framework constantly in mind, it can be concluded that this entrenched social distance enabled the perpetrator group to approach their victims with a level of detachment not possible in Rwanda and as such, less severe dehumanization was administered. As stated by Felix Landau, an Einsatzgruppen member, on recounting the experience of shooting Jews in the Eastern territories, “Strange, I am completely unmoved. No pity, nothing. That’s the way it is and then it’s all over. My heart beats just a little faster when involuntarily I recall the feelings and thoughts I had when I was in a similar situation.”

Importantly, brief attention should be given to the role played by local perpetrators within the Baltic region and their dehumanization practices, as it strengthens our case further. Recall, among the German forces that invaded the USSR were four units of the Sicherheitspolizei and Sicherheitsdienst referred to as Einsatzgruppen. A main purpose of these units was to kill all Jewish inhabitants as they came into contact with them. The swiftness with which these units operated was reflected in the magnitude of the killings they carried out. For example, Einsatzgruppe A, which was sent to the major cities of the Baltic States with their 250,000 Jewish inhabitants, reported the murders of 125,000 Jews by October 15 1941 – just four months after their initial invasion. In fact, the overall proportion of Baltic Jewish deaths constitutes one of the largest in Europe at 95%. The type of execution murder practice which predominated at the hands of the Einsatzgruppen was mass outdoor shootings. As described by Kaufmann “women and men embraced in farewell in the face of death. The luckless ones stood there in their thousands and had to wait their turn, watching their brothers and sisters being shot.” He goes on to describe, “it was the Germans who dragged Jews into the prayer house, not to pray but to be burned alive. Thus the prayer house disappeared, as did the old kworesman (gravedigger) R. Chaim.” The sheer number of these deaths can be attributed to a straightforward approach backed by vast army assistance. However, one cannot overlook the role played by local collusion.

The Einsatzgruppen in the former USSR territories were aided in their killing operations by local auxiliary police units. In fact, vast numbers of Baltic Jews were murdered by their fellow Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians, and dehumanization was particularly severe. As one Lithuanian survivor recalls, “the coarse Lithuanian mob […] acted with such beastly cruelty that by comparison, the Russian pogroms seemed like
humanitarian deeds.” Another survivor recalls: “The Lithuanian murderers [. . .] brought 550 men to the cemetery, forced them to dig a large pit and then ordered them to kill each other with the shovels they were holding. A father was made to kill his son, a brother his own brother.” The Lithuanians involved in the killings were often former customers, neighbors and classmates, which provides further corroboration for our hypothesis. So while local Baltic perpetrators are not included in the German perpetrator group under examination and their genocidal behavior has no bearing on the results, the level of their dehumanization is interesting and worth mentioning given the hypothesis posed.

Finally, the correlation between small social distance and severe dehumanization finds additional support in previous studies, particularly the 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment conducted by Phillip Zimbardo. To briefly explain, a sample of 24 college students from Stanford were selected to take part in a two-week experiment regarding the psychology of prison life. These participants were randomly divided into two groups – prisoners and guards – and were left to assume their respective roles. After just six days, the experiment was terminated due to the extreme levels of dehumanization and humiliation inflicted by the “guards” onto the “prisoners.” Although not a genocidal incident, this experiment illustrates characteristics that are present in genocide. Essentially, it pits two defined groups against one another where one group holds a dominant, more powerful position and the other is weaker and becomes victimized. Furthermore, the groups in this example are separated by relatively small social distance. The volunteers were characterized by several common features, which in turn assumes diminutive social distance. Specifically, they were all male college students of the same age, from middle class backgrounds and lived in the same area. It can therefore be assumed that the close social proximity defining these two groups played a role in the subsequent severity of dehumanization exhibited by those who played the part of the guards. In keeping with the reasoning of this paper’s proposed hypothesis, severe dehumanization was required in order to shatter the ties of humanity and social closeness thereby enabling the guards to perform their duties with greater ease.

The social distance-severity of dehumanization correlation intimated by Zimbardo’s study is strengthened further when compared to the BBC Prison Study. As with the Stanford Prison Experiment, this 2002 study, broadcasted on BBC, pitted a prisoner group against a guard group in a simulated prison scenario in order to study the psychological and social ramifications. Unlike, Zimbardo’s study, however, the participants were separated by a much larger social distance. The fifteen participants were composed of mentally stable men from all over Britain. Another distinction between the two studies lies in the contrasting behavior of the guards. In the BBC experiment the guards did not automatically adjust to their roles nor did they become accustomed to the power that came with those roles. More importantly, they did not humiliate nor did they dehumanize the prisoners under their charge. These particular developments confirm the proposed relationship between social proximity and severity of dehumanization. It is likely that the social distance was much smaller between the participants in the Stanford experiment, hence the severity of dehumanization. Conversely, the social proximity between the BBC participants was much greater limiting the necessary severity of dehumanization. Thus, the Zimbardo experiment conducted in 1971 along with the BBC Prison Study conducted in 2002 effectively corroborates our hypothesis.
The Anomaly of Germany (Western Europe)

When applying the same comparative lens to the findings for Germany, the inverse relationship between social distance and severity of dehumanization was not found. Recall, the results for Germany revealed a social distance of a medium degree. Bisected by two opposing forces, Germany was left with a social distance that was not as extensive as desired by the Nazi regime, yet neither was it of the social proximity evident in Rwanda. Moreover, the perpetrators within this context exhibited the least severe dehumanization behavior out of all three cases. If the findings were to support the reasoning behind the hypothesis, this case would have exhibited greater severity of dehumanization than Eastern European where the social distance was larger. The reasons behind these particular results shall be tentatively explained below.

The relatively mild dehumanization evident in the case of Germany finds its roots in the basic character of the Nazi regime and an underlying concern of Nazi bureaucrats for the psychological and spiritual wellbeing of their killers. The Nazi perpetrators were discouraged from excessive use of cruelty, torture and brutality, not just because such savagery was considered counterproductive to the organized nature of the genocide machine, but also because of their psychological wellbeing. The psyches of those employed to kill were considered to be of great importance to the functioning of the entire operation. As a result, a number of steps were taken to restrict opportunities for savage depravity and to lessen trauma and damage to the psyches of the perpetrators. It was these steps that set the stage for more mild forms of dehumanization behavior.

First and foremost, the workings of the Holocaust were kept sharply in check by the prohibition of unofficial killings. In the clinical style so favoured by the Nazis, killings fuelled by bloodlust or the emotional desires of the perpetrator were considered beneath the superiority espoused by the Nazi regime. As a result, any action or killing believed to be driven by cruel, sexual or egocentric intentions were punishable offences. Killings that were conducted in line with Nazi legislation or under the umbrella of political idealism went without penalty. Consequently, through these administrative and legal restrictions, the perpetrators were limited in their opportunities to kill German Jews brutally and were therefore restricted in their ability to dehumanize severely.

Second, and perhaps most importantly, the Nazi machine attempted to ease any damage to the psyches and souls of the perpetrators by distancing them from their victims as much as possible. To clarify, despite the large social distance characterizing the perpetrator and victim groups in Eastern Europe and the severe dehumanization inflicted by the perpetrators, the mass shootings still proved traumatic for many perpetrators. Not all the killers were able to approach the mass shootings with the degree of detachment illustrated by Felix Landau above. In truth, these mass shootings involved pervasive psychological distress that was illustrated by the widespread incidences of alcoholism. Rudolph Höss, SS Kommandant in Auschwitz, illustrates the extent of alcohol used by the firing squad men: “Most of the members of the Special Action Squads drank a great deal to help get through this horrible work. According to Captain Rudolf Höffle’s accounts, the men of Globocnik’s extermination section drank tremendous quantities of alcohol.” Such extensive alcoholism was not limited to those perpetrators stationed in the former USSR territories. As illustrated by Browning, alcoholism was equally prevalent amongst the firing squads of the Order Police stationed in Poland. Another reaction to the killings was the occurrence of suicide. As recalled by Höss: “Another thing on my mind was the many suicides among the ranks
of the SS Special Action Squads who could no longer mentally endure wading in the blood bath. Some of them went mad.”

In light of this, the Nazi administrators were impelled to find a solution for the more extreme “soul damage” and psychological distress that would certainly accompany the killing of Western and specifically German Jews who were of a closer social proximity to the perpetrator group. The solution was the gas chamber. Höss explains the reasoning behind it in the mass annihilation of Jews from Germany and other parts of the West: “Only gas was suitable since killing by shooting the huge numbers expected [. . .] would also be a tremendous strain on the SS soldiers who would have to carry out the order as far as the women and children were concerned.” Höss explains further: “Now we had discovered the gas and the procedure [. . .] I had had enough of hostage executions, and the mass killings by firing squad ordered by Himmler and Heydrich. Now I was at ease. We were all saved from these blood baths.”

Consequently, an artificial distance was imposed between perpetrator and victim that not only restricted the potential for greater psychological trauma, but also the severity of dehumanization that would have occurred with the killing of socially closer German and other Western European Jews. This artificial distance was increased further by the employment of Jewish inmates both in the gassing process and also in the subsequent clearing away of the dead bodies. The burial of the corpses as well as their later incineration was also the responsibility of the Jews.

The pervasive concern for the psychological wellbeing of the perpetrators allowed the mass slaughter of the Jews from Germany, and by extension from Western Europe, to ensue with milder dehumanization behavior. The synthetic distance imposed during the killing operations of the German Jews therefore provides an explanation as to why the German (Western Europe) case received the lowest score on the scale of severity of dehumanization.

Conclusion and Discussion
This paper developed the hypothesis that the smaller the social distance between the perpetrator group and the victim group prior to genocide the more severe the dehumanization behaviors of the perpetrators during genocide. In order to illustrate this hypothesis, the paper employed a literature-based analysis supplemented by a Vignette-orientated severity scale in three genocide cases: Rwanda, the Holocaust as it occurred in Western Europe and the Holocaust as it occurred in Eastern Europe.

The results show that Rwanda – the case with the smallest victim-perpetrator social distance – displayed the most severe dehumanization behavior. Conversely, Eastern Europe (Poland and the Baltic States) – the case with the greatest social distance between the German perpetrator group and the Jewish Polish and Baltic victim group – manifested less severe dehumanization behavior. From these two case findings, it appears as if the smaller the social distance preceding the outbreak of genocide the greater the severity of dehumanization during the killing operations of genocide. The corroboration of this hypothesis is, however, encumbered by the Western Europe (Germany) anomaly.

Despite greater intimacy between its victim and perpetrator groups, Western Europe displayed less severe dehumanization than its Eastern Europe counterpart. However, the distancing methods used by the Nazi administration to protect their perpetrators from psychological trauma provide a tentative explanation as to why Western Europe received a low severity of dehumanization score. Consequently, the demonstrated relationship
between social proximity and severity of dehumanization still stands: the smaller the social distance between the perpetrator and victim groups prior to the outbreak of genocide, the more severe the dehumanization behaviors of the perpetrators during the killing operations of the genocide.

It is acknowledged, that this research is limited in the extent to which it can draw unequivocal conclusions. It is readily admitted that the literature-based nature of such analysis contains restrictions in its ability to render unbiased objective information. However, despite the limitations this type of research may have, it appears that the hypothesis regarding the inverse correlation between social distance and severity of dehumanization during genocide has found corroboration. With this in hand, one is equipped with an adequate platform from which to launch further research and investigation.

The Holocaust and later the Rwandan Genocide introduced the world to humanity’s ability to circumvent all moral, ethical and bureaucratic obstacles in a merciless quest to exterminate fellow human beings. But more than this, the Holocaust and the Rwandan Genocide introduced the world to the fundamental role dehumanization plays in genocide and the ways in which its intensity varies and its trajectory is affected.

As long as humanity continues to commit genocide, dehumanization will continue to chaperon it. Consequently, it is our duty as scholars and as members of the human race to understand the dynamics of dehumanizing behavior during genocide, why it occurs, why it varies and what can be done to combat it.

Lisa Haagensen, MSc, is an independent researcher currently residing in Beijing. She completed her Master’s thesis at the University of Amsterdam in 2009. Titled “Relative Harm: The Impact of Social Distance on Dehumanization Behaviors during Genocide,” it dealt with the relationship between social distance and severity of dehumanization during genocide.

Marnix Croes, PhD, is a scientific researcher with the Scientific Research and Documentation Centre at the Ministry of Safety and Justice in the Netherlands. In 2009, he taught the comparative genocide analysis Master’s thesis project at the University of Amsterdam’s Department of Political Science.

Notes
1. Corresponding author. Correspondence to: lisahaag@gmail.com. We would like to thank the editors and the three anonymous reviewers of Genocide Studies and Prevention for their comments to a previous version that helped improve our paper.
8. Ibid., 75, 81.
10. Hatzfeld, Life Laid Bare, 81.
11. The 1935 Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor defined the term Jew as “persons descended from two Jewish grandparents belonging to the Jewish religion or married to a Jewish person on September 15, 1935 and persons descended from three or four Jewish grandparents.” Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), 80.
38. Ibid., 129.


47. Ibid., 91–3.


50. Ibid.


60. Ibid., 58.


67. Ibid., 159.

68. Ibid., 166.

69. Ibid., 168.


71. Institute of Jewish Affairs, *Hitler’s Ten-Year War*.

72. Ibid.


75. Ibid., 171.


81. Ibid.

82. Ibid., xxix.


Relying on human observers means that researchers have to worry about the reliability of the data. Are these data the result of human idiosyncrasies or do they reflect properties of the phenomena of interest on which others could agree as well? To test for this, we used Krippendorff alpha (see Andrew F. Hayes & Klaus Krippendorff, “Answering the Call for a Standard Reliability Measure for Coding Data,” Communication Methods and Measures 1,1 [2007]: 77–89) and the SPSS syntax Hayes and Krippendorff have made available (Andrew F. Hayes, “My Macros and Code for SPSS and SAS,” http://www.afhayes.com/spss-sas-and-mplus-macros-and-code.html [accessed 16 Oct 2011]). A still acceptable level of agreement between our respondents to draw conclusion meant that Krippendorff’s alpha had to be at least 0.67 (see Klaus Krippendorff, “Reliability in Content Analysis: Some Common Misconceptions and Recommendations,” Human Communication Research 30,3 [2004]: 411–433). However, using Krippendorff’s estimation procedure resulted in an alpha of 0.66 (with 10,000 bootstrap samples and p < 0.71 that alpha would be smaller than 0.67). We therefore opted to omit behavior 4 (see table 9) from our analysis because the standard deviation of the scores given by the respondents was the highest for this type of behavior while omitting it did not influence the results reported here in a fundamental way. Doing so resulted in an alpha of 0.70 (with 10,000 bootstrap samples and p < 0.05 that alpha would be smaller than 0.67). We therefore conclude that there is an acceptable level of agreement between our respondents.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
125. Ibid., 157.
126. Ibid., 157–8.
Hilmar Kaiser, one of the first German historians to work on the Armenian Genocide and one who has often written about it as a historical fact, is now trying to dilute that history. In his latest article, which consciously avoids use of the term genocide, Kaiser seeks to portray Mehmed Djemal Pasha, a member of the Young Turk triumvirate ruling the Ottoman Empire during World War I, as an individual resisting the genocidal policies of his co-conspirators within the Committee of Union and Progress. Kaiser claims to employ Ottoman documents to demonstrate that the initial intention of the Turkish government was to relocate the Ottoman Armenians for military reasons, although he admits that they posed no imminent danger to the state. Kaiser indicates that the first “relocations” of Armenians took place in areas controlled by Djemal and were initiated by him, then goes on to claim that even though the infamous death camp of Deir-es-Zor was located within his sphere of power, he, in reality, protected the Armenians. However, facts showing the extent of the genocide have been overlooked. This article will use archival documents from the Foreign Office of the German Empire, the Ottoman Empire’s wartime ally, to demonstrate the shortcomings of Kaiser’s evidence and arguments.

Key words: Armenian Genocide, Djemal, Young Turks, Kaiser, German archives, Ottoman archives, German compliance, Zeitun, deportations

Hilmar Kaiser’s latest publication, “Regional Resistance to Central Government Policies: Ahmed Djemal Pasha, the Governors of Aleppo, and Armenian Deportees in the Spring and Summer of 1915,” states that there never was a national Armenian revolution that seriously threatened the Ottoman Empire. This, however, is the key theory behind the main argument that previously denied the Armenian Genocide, a theory that was adopted at that time by the German allies of the Young Turk killers, against the better knowledge of their own observers on site who vehemently contradicted this, but were unable to assert themselves against their superiors.

Kaiser restricts his statements mainly to the sphere of control of the Fourth Army, which was commanded by Mehmed Djemal Pasha. This sphere ranged from Zeitun, the Armenian stronghold in the north, to the city of Urfa in the east, and included Syria and Palestine, as well as Arabia as far as Mecca and Medina.

Regarding the Armenians in this region, the German vice-consul of Alexandretta (Iskenderun), Hermann Hoffmann-Fölkersamb, who was often temporarily in charge of such important consulates in Djemal’s area as Aleppo, Damascus, and Haifa, was certain: “I do not believe that they would commit treason.” Furthermore, with regard to the alleged military danger posed by the Armenians, Hoffmann wrote,
Apart from the case of Van and its adjacent zone, particular caution is called for relative to the charge of a “militarily organized plot.” Certain local insurrectionary movements cannot be treated as proof of such. For example, the fact that the revolt in Zeitun cannot be singled out as a case of a conspiracy of that kind, is clearly evidenced in the reports of the Imperial Consulate in Aleppo. The uprising of the Armenians in the region of Suediye [Musa Dagh] (to the south of Alexandretta) was, according to the descriptions even on the part of the Turkish military, not a conspiracy. The recovery of the revolutionaries from Suediye by French warships was also not a long-planned act. This is apparent from the circumstances and the opinions of well-informed Turks.³

Kaiser agrees with him, albeit more theoretically, because he justifies the brutal actions of the Turks against the supposed revolutionaries. And after his verbal knockout against those who deny the genocide, he lets them land gently by claiming that Djemal did not carry out any genocidal actions against the Armenians and, therefore, the word *genocide* should not be included in his article.

Kaiser wants to prove that Djemal attempted to rescue the Armenians from annihilation. This is surprising because not only was the infamous death camp of Deir-es-Zor located within Djemal’s sphere of power, but also the desert strip along the Euphrates and especially along the Chabur River, where the surviving Armenians were literally butchered.

Kaiser divides those who have done research on this genocide into two schools of thought: on the one hand, there are those, including Vahakn N. Dadrian and Taner Akçam, who started with the assumption that there was a central plan for eliminating the Armenians; on the other hand, there are others, such as Raymond Kévorkian, who assumed that there was a policy of resettlement that was meant to create a general majority for the Turks or at least the Muslims. Both schools of thought, however, assumed that there was intent to annihilate the Armenians and other Christian minorities, whose fate, therefore, already settled before the beginning of the war.

Kaiser’s theory that originally there was no central plan at all opposes this. He writes,

> This article suggests that the notion of a unified body of genocidal conspirators exerting unrestrained control over the entire Ottoman Empire cannot be sustained. . . . This regional study will challenge such notions. It claims that Ottoman deportation policies concerning Armenians evolved in 1915 in a concrete historic context and not from a conspiratorial plan waiting to be revealed.⁴

It was only at the end of May 1915, according to Kaiser’s conclusion, that the “actual” situation led to the systematic deportation of Armenians from their areas of settlement and a central management was put into place.

With regard to Mehmed Talât, the main person accused, and the Interior Ministry, he writes,

> Far from simply imposing its decisions, the ministry quickly met with resistance from Djemal who doubted the wisdom of the central government’s policies. . . . The opposition against Talaat’s and the ruling [Committee of Union and Progress]’s policy was stronger than has been assumed so far, reaching into the leadership of the party. At its core stood Ahmed Djemal Pasha.⁵
Kaiser notes that by

introducing extensive documentation produced by Ottoman provincial and military authorities, the article contextualizes Ottoman central government directives. . . . [The] Ottoman officials at the highest level of government had detailed knowledge of the consequences of their decisions. The data also confirms in detail shocking Western consular reports. Thus, the various sources corroborate each other and form a consistent record.6

Many of these Western reports (mainly American and German) have meanwhile been published. What new findings does Kaiser now convey based on these internal files? He first describes events that are certainly known. For example,

Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa units were to perform acts of sabotage and stir up rebellions among the local Muslim population. In this connection, the CUP hoped to win the cooperation of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), which had branches in both countries. During CUP–ARF negotiations Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa members revealed their secret agenda, but failed to obtain the ARF’s cooperation.7

Kaiser then goes on to write of the Gulf of Alexandretta (Iskenderun), where the Turks feared naval attacks by the Entente fleet and arrested several Armenians whom, according to Kaiser, they suspected of being in contact with British ships. Vice-Consul Hoffmann reported the following regarding this episode from the Consulate in Alexandretta: twice, when the English cruiser Doris landed, Armenian soldiers were taken prisoner. "Once, an Armenian sergeant of a group of seven men (equipped with malfunctioning Martinis) in a trench (with no emergency exit) supposedly surrendered by waving a handkerchief."8 In his article, Hilmar Kaiser now presents the reasons, based on Ottoman files:

In the south, along the Gulf of Alexandretta, Ottoman commanders worried about an allied landing that could cut off the supply lines of the Ottoman armies in Palestine, Mesopotamia, and parts of the eastern front. In Adana province, authorities had apprehended some Armenians who had been in touch with British warships bombarding the coast. The espionage was deemed serious as few troops and hardly any artillery were available to defend the coast. Moreover, Adana provincial authorities had filed worrying reports about the activities of Armenian political parties. The governor now considered the removal of all Armenians from the coast to the interior of the province. Exemplary punishment was to be meted out to those Armenians found guilty in order to serve as a deterrent to others. Talaat approved the governor’s proposal for the deportation of the town of Dortyol on March 2, 1915. Moreover, the minister ordered the authorities to eradicate any Armenian revolutionary activity. On March 13, 1915, Djemal specified other measures against a feared Armenian uprising. A number of troops would stay in Adana, while regional commanders would establish courts-martial in Armenian-inhabited areas. Moreover, preparations for the deportation of Armenians from Aleppo province had been authorized.9

What Vice-Consul Hoffmann regarded as a trifle and, therefore, what the consulate ignored, was sufficient reason for Talât, Djemal, and the rest to initiate the genocide. According to Kaiser, courts martial were established for civilians, Armenians hanged
merely as a deterrent and driven from their native areas, not because of anything they had done that was proven, but solely on the basis of suspicions. Vice-Consul Hoffmann reported at the time on this matter, using Dortyol as an example, “Out of Fakhri Pasha’s own mouth I heard that they will not shy away from violence and even injustices.”

General Fakhri Pasha was Djemal’s military leader in that region.

In other words, internal reports also stated that the main initiator of the first Armenian deportations was the supposed member of the resistance, Djemal Pasha. Kaiser could hardly have begun the defense of his hero in a more curious manner, but it becomes even stranger! According to Kaiser, “In this climate . . . Zeitun gained special importance.” The mountain town of Zeitun, located north of Marash, had been an Armenian stronghold since time immemorial. It had previously defended itself against all of the persecutions against the Armenians. In August 1914, Armenians who were once again called to arms escaped to the mountains and entrenched themselves in a monastery just outside of the town. Kaiser states that “the Muslim population in the region was agitated as it had answered the call.” As a result, this could—and probably was meant to—create the impression that desertion was a very Armenian type of problem. In actual fact, the deserters in Zeitun also included Turks, and desertion was to become one of the largest problems faced by the Turkish Army. “Today, the number of Turkish deserters is higher than the number of soldiers actually in the army,” General Liman von Sanders, the commanding German officer, ascertained at the end of the war.

The events in Zeitun are described in far more detail in the German documents than in Kaiser’s article. For example, Kaiser does not reveal that, with the assistance of the German artillery officer Eberhard Count Wolfskeel von Reichenberg, the monastery the deserters escaped to was destroyed; nor does he mention the request made by the German gunner to prohibit the journey of the German consul in Aleppo Walter Rössler to Zeitun—which the Embassy then did—or the extremely detailed and enlightening report by the Armenian Catholicos of Cilicia on these events. In particular, Kaiser does not report that, after his investigation in Marash, Rössler did not find any evidence at all why the government should have had a reason for accusing the Armenians in Zeitun of conspiracy. The Armenians were deported simply out of fear (i.e., completely indiscriminately).

According to Kaiser, Djemal ordered the deportation of some families, but then local authorities “demanded that all Armenians should be investigated, including those who were not suspect, on the grounds that they all shared the same mentality.” Although the reader does not find out who these “local authorities” are, their attitude does become clear: “The local authorities alleged that Armenians had displaced Muslims in the past. Now Armenian villagers should be deported wholesale and replaced with Muslim settlers.” Djemal soothed his conscience by ordering that no innocent Armenian be harmed, but then agreed in practice with the unqualified arguments of the unnamed sources: “The general proposed sending two-thirds of Zeitun’s Armenian population to the plains of Konia province. There they would be dispersed and settled among Muslim villagers” because he “thought the time had come to solve the ‘Zeitun problem’ once and for all,” Kaiser reports. According to German reports, there was no uprising in Zeitun, and the Armenian population worked closely with authorities to turn in deserters. Why, then, in Djemal’s (or Kaiser’s) view, did a problem have to be solved “once and for all” by finally deporting all of the Armenians? Kaiser gives the following explanation: “This ambitious project went beyond controlling the area and
aimed at destroying the demographic basis for any possible sustained popular Armenian resistance.” However, the governor of Aleppo, Djelal Bey, did not see any reason at all for deporting the Armenians of Zeitun, and had this view placed on record. Djemal arranged that Djelal no longer have jurisdiction over the region around Marash, and therefore Zeitun, so that Djelal could not exert any influence on the deportations. Contrary to Djemal, Djelal was regarded by the Germans—and the Americans—as a real opponent of the Armenian deportations in Cilicia.

Kaiser writes that “by the middle of April 1915, Djemal extended the deportations within the 4th Army’s area, arguing that concentrations of Armenians might become dangerous in future”—in other words, pure and unadulterated ethnic cleansing. The settlement of deported Armenians was, therefore, to be carried out far away from other Armenian communities, but care was to be taken to ensure the safety of the Armenians. Kaiser offers as proof a report by Baron Max von Oppenheim, head of the German Information Service for the Orient, to Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg in Berlin, dated 29 August 1915. This report included five orders by Djemal as enclosures, written in French. Enclosure two, dated 2 April 1915, includes the following extract from Djemal’s orders to the commanding chief of the army: “Tout groupement arménien existant dans la zone de la IV. Armée et pouvant être dangereux à l’avenir doit être dispersé” (Any Armenian grouping existing in the zone of the Fourth Army and which could be potentially dangerous for the future must be dispersed). It is worded in a way that anticipates the subsequent national deportation order. However, Enclosure one contains an order issued by Djemal dated 16 March 1915, stating that “le bien et la vie et l’honneur de la population arménienne et musulmane sont sous la sauvegarde du Gouvernement Ottoman. Ils peuvent être convaincus qu’ils ne seront l’objet d’aucune oppression et peuvent vaguer tranquillement à leurs affaires et travaux” (The well-being and life and honor of both the Armenian and Muslim populations are under the protection of the Ottoman Government. They can be convinced that they will not be subject to any oppression and therefore can go about their business and work calmly).

Anyone who has dealt with the Armenian Genocide will rub their eyes in disbelief because it is documented there in black and white that Djemal ordered for both Muslims and Armenians to be treated equally well. He ordered this, but it seems no one followed this order. Strangely, however, Kaiser cites a German source for Djemal’s order, while previously he used only Ottoman sources for such orders. The reason is soon discovered: the author of this document is Baron Max von Oppenheim, who was extremely well-known in Germany at that time as a great archaeologist, while, at the same time, being one of the most ambivalent German politicians in the entire “Orient,” known by the British only as the “Lying Baron.”

Oppenheim described himself as a friend of Djemal’s and, therefore, his opinion of what constitutes the typical characteristics of an Armenian is not without interest:

Their proverbial trickiness in business, their addiction to intrigues, their conceit and sense of revolution, but especially the way they constantly sprawl all over their environment and, during the recent past, the way they openly show their hostility towards the Turks.

Oppenheim says that “should the enemy land, the Armenians would join the enemy to form a mutual revolt.” According to Oppenheim, “such a landing could be expected foremost just here, at the Gulf of Alexandretta and near Mersina.” He warned that
the consequences in connection with a large Armenian uprising could have been unforeseeable: once it held the passes over the Zeihun, the Djihan, and the Cilician highland, the enemy could have separated Asia Minor and the European part of Turkey from the entire southern and southeastern part of the empire.22

Vice-Consul Hoffmann’s reply to the report on Oppenheim’s fantasies of espionage in the Gulf of Alexandretta was, “I have never heard this accusation, not even from the Turkish Muslim side, although the case is known to me in full detail.”23

Kaiser deals with the prophylactic deportations of the Armenians from Zeitun and the coast of the Gulf of Alexandretta as events that were decided on from case to case, even though they follow exactly the same logic—or rather, illogic—as the deportation orders set out in writing on May 27. Kaiser claims that “more carefully planned and coordinated deportations were not part of Ottoman government action at this point” and believes that this allows him to conclude that “this indicates that the decision for such a change of policy came about significantly later than many authors suspect.” This is pure speculation. In fact, the differences between the deportations in February–March and those in May–June are minor.

Actually, one could say that a change in policy had already taken place several years earlier, when the leading Young Turks gave up their idea of a multinational country and began calling for a homogenous Turkish state. As early as 14 October 1910, Zitkovszky, the Austrian-Hungarian vice-consul in Monastir, reported to his foreign secretary, Aehrenthal, that Ottoman Home Secretary Talât had given a political speech in the secret circle of the Young Turk Committee in Thessaloniki, in which he had said the following:

You are aware that by the terms of the Constitution, equality of Muslim and Ghiaur was affirmed by you. One and all know and feel that this is an unrealizable ideal. The Sheriat and the history from the past oppose this, as do the feelings of hundreds of thousands of Muslims, and even the sentiments of the Ghiaurs themselves, who stubbornly resist every attempt to Ottomanize them, present an impenetrable barrier to the establishment of real equality. We have made unsuccessful attempts to convert the Ghiaur into a loyal Ottoman, and all such efforts must inevitably fail. . . .24

In documents currently housed at the Archives of the French Foreign Office, the Austrian consul is identified as the best-informed man about the secret circles of the CUP. And Talât’s long speech, reported by the French consul, was fully confirmed by Djavid, one of Talât’s closest friends, who examined the paper three days later.25 There was to be no room in this unitary state for Christian minorities, and ultimately, the concept of Ottomanizing the empire was consolidated into a policy of annihilation. Dje- mal’s deportations of the Armenians within his sphere of control were the beginning of the end of the Ottoman Armenians.

For Kaiser, the arrests and deportations of the Armenian elite from Constantinople on 24 April 1915 are not a reply to Van—where, after all, the Armenians took defensive action that was under military organization and successful for weeks—but to Zeitun. At least, “the Zeitun affair was given as one reason for the crack down” against the Armenians.26 He lists orders given by Talât during the days right after April 24 to the most important provincial towns, in which allegedly dangerous Armenians were staying.
Djemal was informed by Talât that the deportations from Zeitun to Konia had been stopped and the deportees were sent to Deir-es-Zor in the Syrian Desert; this suggests that a finalized and very definite plan already existed. Kaiser himself is forced to admit that

the order demonstrated that the central government asserted its leadership in the organization of deportations empire-wide, including the 4th Army’s region. Talaat did not wait for Djemal’s response and instructed the authorities at Adana, Aleppo, and Marash accordingly.27

Those Armenians who had been deported received very little assistance from the government. Kaiser reports that there were letters regarding financial aid that never materialized and writes, “In other words, the Armenian deportations would be disastrous and Ottoman authorities knew this from the moment they gave the orders.”28 Aleppo Governor Djelal Bey, especially, had repeatedly requested exact information on the form and financing of a (supposedly planned) resettlement; except for promises, he never received anything. The offers from foreign organizations—for example, the American Red Cross—were, according to Kaiser, rejected on “political grounds.”29 While the houses the Armenians were forced to give up became available to Muslim refugees from the Balkans, it was not possible to procure any housing whatsoever for the Armenians. Whatever Djelal requested—and he was supported by Djemal—was, at best, answered by Talât with promises. However, according to Kaiser, “Talaat’s promises for sufficient funding had not materialized.”30

Kaiser writes, “The Ottoman defeat at Van marked a turning point after which the deportations were gradually transformed into a comprehensive policy to eliminate the Armenian community as a political force.”31 Talât also sent Djemal a detailed plan of all those cities and regions from which the Armenians were deported, whereby “the Armenians were allowed to take along all of their movable property.”32 However, a “provisional law” was declared on 27 May 1915 and “details of the expropriations showed that the deportations were to create permanent changes in the demographic structure and that the deportations were not a temporary wartime measure as had been stipulated in the law.”33

Kaiser reports on the alarming information passed on by the German consul in Aleppo, Walter Rössler, to his embassy and comments on it:

The reports by Rössler document a degree of cooperation with Djelal that went beyond the usual consular practice. The two men tried to mobilize the German embassy in order to lobby the Ottoman central government on behalf of the Armenians. At the same time, Rössler cooperated with Sahag, a leader of a community accused of treason.34

Was Sahag, the Catholicos of the Armenians in Cilicia, a traitor in Kaiser’s eyes because he took care of his flock? Kaiser continues, “Obviously, both the consul and the governor entertained views on what needed to be done quite different from those prevalent in the capital.”35

During the ensuing period, Hilmar Kaiser quotes from letters written by Sahag to the German ambassador, Wangenheim, even though they were actually letters to the Armenian patriarch in Constantinople. The German consul in Adana, Büge, had had these letters sent via the embassy to the Armenian spiritual leader.36 There was,
however, no conspiratorial connection between Armenians and top German politicians and diplomats in Constantinople, who continued to be on the side of the Young Turks, who were guilty of genocide. On the embassy’s orders, letters from the catholicos to the patriarch were not even allowed to be transported by German couriers in the ensuing period without being opened. German censorship replaced that of the Young Turks. On July 26, the German embassy went even a step further in its refusal to send messages from the catholicos to the patriarch and simply returned an unopened letter from Sahag that had been passed on by Rössler.

Kaiser writes that Djemal ordered that those Armenians who were deported because of their political beliefs were to be treated “correctly,” whereby he refers once again not to Ottoman files, but to Djemal’s orders, which had been passed on to the German authorities by Max von Oppenheim. According to these texts, Djemal had ordered that Armenians were to be treated according to their social position (leur position sociale); this leaves room for a great deal of interpretation. The fact that Kaiser does not quote any Ottoman documents appears to make it questionable whether the orders passed on by von Oppenheim were issued at all and whether they were ever followed.

Another unclear point in Kaiser’s article is Djemal’s request to send a particular official to Aleppo; Kaiser does not make clear what assignment this official was to carry out in Aleppo. However, there is an indication from Rössler that may possibly refer to the same person: “A particular official, Eyub Bey, has been sent to Aleppo to carry out the government’s policies against Armenians. He reports directly to Fakri (Bey) Pasha,” the German consul said in his telegram. “This effectively eliminates the governor, Djelal Bey; the government knows that he is in favor of a more lenient policy.”

On the other hand, Kaiser gives the impression that the mild-mannered governor, Djelal, and the mild-mannered commanding officer, Djemal, were the best of friends; both advocated a more humane treatment of the Armenians. Eyub Bey, however, was a notorious annihilator of the Armenians, as proven by German sources. If Kaiser is referring to Eyub Bey when he speaks of the official, then the Armenian annihilator was at least subordinate to Fakhri Pasha and, therefore, Djemal.

Kaiser describes how Djemal attempted to inform Talât of the suffering of the Armenians and find money for them. In Aleppo, he ordered that five metallics be spent on adults and four on children. He referred to a report by Rössler dated 17 July 1915, who had listed the amounts in a single paragraph and remarked that, as a result of Djemal’s order, the deported Armenians were able to rest somewhat in Aleppo. However, Rössler’s report consists of a long list of atrocities that were carried out against the Armenians in Djemal’s sphere of control. It ends with the following paragraph:

The Turkish government has driven its Armenian subjects—the innocent ones, mark you—into the desert in thousands upon thousands, under the pretext of having to remove them from the war areas, exempting neither the sick nor pregnant women nor the families of conscripted men, has given them both food and water in insufficient quantities and irregularly, has done nothing against the epidemics which have broken out amongst them, has driven the women to such desperation that they have thrown away their babies and newborns by the wayside, has sold their adolescent daughters, with the result that they have thrown themselves even with their small children into the river. It has left them to the mercy of their guards and therefore to dishonor; an escort which dragged away the girls and sold them. It has driven them into the hands of the Bedouins, who have plundered and kidnapped

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them. It has had the men illegally shot in desolate places and the bodies of its vic-
tims fed to the dogs and birds of prey. It is supposed to have arranged for the mur-
ders of the representatives whom it had sent into exile. It has released prisoners
from the prisons, put them in soldiers’ uniforms and sent them to the areas where
the deportees would be passing through. It has called up Circassian volunteers and
set them onto the Armenians.42

Djemal had six of these Circassian murderers executed, as Kaiser proudly reports.
Kaiser picks harmless sentences out of the German reports so as to give the impression
that the foreign witnesses were covering up their euphemisms.

Kaiser’s article becomes even stranger. He writes, “Rössler met with Djemal and re-
ported positively on his talks.”43 In note 94, Kaiser quotes as his source “Consulate of
Aleppo, Package 1, Vol. 1/2, No. 1366, Rössler to Embassy, Aleppo, June 28, 1915, tele-
gram 18.” The text found in the consulate files goes as follows: “Have now repeatedly
negotiated with Djemal Pasha. All of my assignments will be handled smoothly together
with him. Will presumably travel south with Djemal in approx. eight days.” This text
was sent as telegram no. 18 to Constantinople on June 28, but not to the embassy and,
therefore, it is not in the files there. Kaiser has confused Rössler with Oppenheim, who
had written this text. In the document quoted by Kaiser, Rössler had struck out the sen-
der, “Oppenheim,” and had written “Rössler” beneath it. Kaiser, the historian, was
unable to interpret this event—or did not want to—because at the beginning of the text
Rössler had clearly added in his own handwriting: “No. 18 dated June 28—from Baron
Oppenheim.” The telegram was then sent to Oppenheim’s office in Constantinople.

Kaiser then describes the deportations and killings that began to take place
throughout the country, whereby he generally follows Rössler’s reports and Djemal’s or-
ders in Oppenheim’s report.44 Without doubt, the most important decision made by
the government during this period was to recall the mild-mannered Djelal, of which
Rössler informed his embassy in a telegram that is quoted by Kaiser, albeit once more
in an abridged fashion:

Rössler cabled that Djelal would have to leave his post because of his refusal to
deport Armenians from his province. Djelal had even guaranteed their good beha-
vior. Rössler suspected that the government wanted to have a free hand against
the Armenians.45

However, Kaiser suppresses an addendum to the telegram. Rössler had noted, “This
recall is regrettably not in Turkey’s interest; presumably, the result will also be an escala-
tion in the government’s Arabic policy.”46 Kaiser cites Rössler’s handwritten note as the
source on which his telegram was based.47 It includes not only the addendum regarding
Arabic policy, but also Rössler’s original sentence: “He [Djelal] had the opportunity to
send a telegram to the government during the past few days, informing it that he did
not approve of the actions against the Arabs in Beirut.” It was, therefore, apparent that
it was primarily Djelal’s protest against Djemal’s hard-line policy against the Arabs that
resulted in his being recalled. In his article, Kaiser does not mention the Fourth Army’s
commanding officer’s policy on Arabs anywhere at all.

Using Ottoman files, Kaiser describes in detail the purely statistical progress of the
deportations. With regard to a description of the inhuman treatment of the deportees
as well as the political consequences, he refers to Rössler’s reports.48 Rössler had written
that “it is becoming ever clearer that the orders for the harshest and most merciless implementation of the deportation decided on by the government must be put down to Fakhri Pasha and comes from him”—in other words, from Djemal’s military assistant.49 However, Kaiser also hints several times at Fakhri’s fatal role.

Kaiser argues that the fate of the deported Armenians proves the lack rather than the existence of an annihilation plan. As a consequence, the decision regarding the Armenians could not have been made in March, as some researchers claimed. Elements of planning were first cited in May and June as “a response to the ensuing chaos along the deportation routes and in the destination areas.” He states that the deportations had not begun when the long-awaited opportunity presented itself, nor was a long-term program put into action. In his view, the CUP pushed the deportations without any previous planning or preparation. There was neither a monolithic CUP nor a dominating group on the committee.

Kaiser offers very little proof in his article for his antithesis. The behavior of Djemal and his officers could certainly have also been explained if the Committee for Union and Progress had already agreed at this time on a deportation plan. The Young Turks’ fear that the Entente fleet would attempt to land in the Gulf of Alexandretta was understandable—the coastal strip was, in fact, without any defense whatsoever. Even the German consul in Adana had determined this to his great surprise and reported it to his embassy. The Entente’s fleet was intact and on site; ships landed several times in those Ottoman harbors of the Mediterranean that had declared themselves free cities. Without doubt, the Armenian population in this region sympathized with the British and the French, but they were by no means prepared or in a position to provide military assistance. The Armenians may have been deported into the interior for reasons of extreme military caution, or following a decision that had been made to eradicate them. Therefore, Kaiser’s conclusion is not substantiated.

At the beginning of the war, the situation for the Armenians within the sphere of control of the Fourth Army, of which Djemal was commanding officer, was somewhat worse than in the rest of the country, as shown by the actions taken against them. Towards the end of the war, the situation was reversed; apart from Constantinople and Smyrna, far more Armenians survived within Djemal’s sphere of control than elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. Western Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine were the only regions in which a relatively large number of Armenians (estimated at approximately 100,000–150,000 people) survived the end of the war, albeit under the most severe conditions.

Kaiser believes that this is due to the resistance of the governor of Aleppo, Djelal, and to a lesser extent that of his successor, Bekir Sami, which is even more surprising since the latter described the Armenians as “microbes,” thereby outing himself as a racist. Kaiser even speaks of a tacit agreement between these two and Rössler, without going into details. However, he presents Djemal Pasha as the chief resistance fighter. According to Kaiser,

If there ever was a secret CUP conference passing a decision on the deportations, CUP leader Ahmed Djemal had failed to learn about it. . . . He had his own ideas about settlement areas, the execution of deportations, the provisioning and reimbursement of deportees and, most importantly, also on their protection. Briefly put, he advocated some deportations and even initiated some others, but wanted to have them organized in a way that did not mean annihilation (of the Armenians). His orders for the protection of deportees were not empty words, as prominent
Kaiser remarks that the honor of the Fourth Army demanded that the Armenians be resettled and Armenian villages set up. Djemal transmitted this to the governor of Syria Hulusi Bey, who immediately reported him to the central administration, thereby passing this on for future generations.

Kaiser writes that neither civilians nor the military in the Fourth Army determined that there were either revolts or a widespread conspiracy by or a dangerous threat from the Armenians. The leader of the army, Djemal, gave political or social reasons as grounds for the deportation programs, which were temporary and limited to the duration of the war. Either he was unaware of the long-term plans of the home secretary or he opposed them. Djemal knew exactly what was happening in other regions; he certainly did not prevent deportees from being sent to these regions. Kaiser writes that this must have led to their annihilation: “at times collaboration and resistance were close neighbours.”51 According to Kaiser, the case of the Fourth Army “shows, however, that the notion of an empire-wide genocide of Ottoman Armenians perpetrated by a unified CUP is untenable. This kind of thinking needs to be revised and freed of claims that are based on imagination rather than evidence.”52

Until today, the only German historian who has seriously engaged himself with the Armenian Genocide—for which he was greatly admired—now argues against the theses of other researchers, but is not in a position to prove his own argument conclusively. He conceals severe atrocities committed by the Ottoman perpetrators, for example by Fakhri Pasha, who brutally suppressed alleged uprisings (e.g., in Urfa), and fantasizes about Western political powers who undertook less against the murderous frenzy of the Young Turks than the Fourth Army, even though he knows very well that the only Western power in Asia Minor that had military possibilities, namely Imperial Germany, was most definitely not prepared to do anything for the Armenians and permitted its own officers to drive Armenian civilians to their deaths.

There was a major difference between the age-old settlement areas of the Ottoman Armenians in northeastern Turkey and their settlements in the cities, and Djemal’s sphere of control. There were hardly any Armenians in Palestine or even in the Lebanese mountains, which even today is still a center of Armenian life. The majority of the Armenians within Djemal’s sphere of control came from Cilicia, the province around the city of Adana; Djemal was governor of this city before the war and had many old connections from that period.

While the Armenians in the northeast were mainly farmers and craftsmen in the towns, wealth was a characteristic of many of those Armenians in Cilicia and also in the west who were deported to Djemal’s sphere of control. They had built up economically flourishing businesses and accumulated property. Their wealth was one of the keys to survival for many deportees, by giving “rescuers” a share of their companies, transferring ownership of their properties to public officials, providing money for bribes, or creating ties between Turkish and Armenian businessmen. Consul Hoffmann, who often represented Rössler, suspected that “the Armenian population of Aleppo seem to owe the fact that they are still here mainly to the resistance of those local circles who would suffer great financial losses if they disappeared.”53 However, these economic components do not appear at all in Kaiser’s study, which only claims to identify “a definite historical connection.”
Djemal, who dreamed of building himself a long-term power base in Palestine and, if possible, Egypt, did a great deal to ensure that in future he would have wealthy and hard-working Armenians, namely those whose lives he had saved. He began by setting up Sahag, the catholicos who was expelled from his home in Cilicia, in Jerusalem and ensuring that, in accordance with the decree dated 30 July 1916, he became the catholicos-patriarch of all of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and resided in Jerusalem after the Young Turks dissolved the Constantinople patriarchate. In this way, he assured himself of the important spiritual leadership over the Armenians. Unfortunately, while preserving the lives of perhaps 150,000 Armenians—in terrible conditions—he helped kill another 150,000.

Instead of speaking of the opportunities missed by the Great Powers of the West to stop this genocide, Kaiser could have pointed out Djemal’s attempts to use these Great Powers for his own interests. Raymond Kévorkian brought up the subject of secret discussions that were held between Djemal on the one hand and the French, British, and Russians on the other. In December 1915, Djemal informed his partners in these discussions that he was prepared to march to Constantinople with an army in order to dismiss the CUP and take over power himself, provided the Entente guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, including Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Armenia, and Kurdistan, and, furthermore, provided it was prepared to make him the sultan with the right of succession for his descendents. In return, he would protect the Armenians and end the genocide. In the end, these discussions failed because of the fears of the French and the British that the Russians, who at that time had advanced as far as Trebizond and Erzerum, would use this opportunity to finally entrench themselves in Constantinople, for which they had been striving for a very long time.54

This was not the only aspect that Hilmar Kaiser completely ignored in his assessment of Djemal. What was inconsistent with his glorification of the good guy of Jerusalem was also the fanatical hatred with which Djemal persecuted the Arabs; he had begun to physically wipe out their elite.

It was not only the Arabs who trembled before Djemal, but the Jews and possibly other groups as well, as still unpublished German documents may show. One case was researched recently by German historian Michael Hesemann. At the beginning of 1917, the Palestine potentate had ordered the deportation of the Jews from Jaffa due to alleged collaboration with the British. Hesemann writes that

over 8,000 Jews were chased out of their houses without permission to take food or baggage with them. Their houses were looted by the Turks in front of their eyes. Two Jews were hanged at the gates of the Jewish suburb, as an example for anyone who dared to resist the looters. Eyewitnesses reported on the inhuman cruelty of the soldiers. Dozens of Jews were later found dead in the dunes of Jaffa. A dispatch from the Zionist office in Copenhagen ended by voicing the fear that after the threats from Djemal Pasha the Palestinian Jews could expect the same cruel fate as the Armenians: extermination by hunger, thirst and epidemics.55

At the beginning of December 1917, shortly before the British took Jerusalem, the Jews of that city were saved by German General von Falkenhayn, who received information through Eugenio Pacelli, the nuncio in Germany at that time who was to later become pope, and the Foreign Office. Jakob Thon, head of the Zionist office in Jerusalem at that time, wrote,
It was a particular stroke of good fortune that General von Falkenhayn had supreme command during the last critical days. In this case, [Djemal] Pasha would have chased the population out of the entire region, as he had often threatened to do, and turned the country into ruins. Together with the entire rest of the population, both Christian and Muslim, we must be deeply grateful to P[acelli] who protected the civil population from demise by preventing the complete evacuation of this region as planned.56

It will still take a long time before we are fully clear on all the details of the Armenian Genocide after so much effort has been spent on manipulating it to make it disappear.

Wolfgang Gust, born in 1935 in Hannover, Germany, has served as correspondent, editor, and director of the German news magazine DER SPIEGEL for 30 years. He has published books and an expansive collection of German Foreign Office documents on the Armenian Genocide, which is available at www.armenocide.net.

Notes
2. Wolfgang Gust, ed., Der Völkermord an den Armeniern 1915/16: Dokumente aus dem Politischen Archiv des deutschen Auswärtigen Amts (Hamburg: zu Klampen, 2005), Document 1915-03-07-DE-011. To access all of the documents on this genocide in the book, both in German and English, as well as more than 1,000 further files from the German and the Danish Foreign Offices, please visit www.armenocide.net.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Liman von Sanders, 20 June 1918, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (German Foreign Ministry Archives) [henceforth PA-AA], vol. R 1917.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 180.
22. Doc. 1915-08-29-DE-001.
23. Doc. 1916-01-03-DE 001, Appendix 1; remarks on Item 1: political and military reasons.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 184.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., 186.
31. Ibid., 187.
32. Ibid.
33. To read the footnotes quoted by Kaiser, please visit www.armenocide.net (e.g., 73 (1915-06-26-DE-012); 74 (1915-06-03-DE-011); 75 and 76 (1915-06-06-DE-012); 77 (1915-06-09-DE-003) and 78 (to some extent 1915-06-12-DE-013).
35. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
48. Footnotes 132 to 134 can be found on www.armenocide.net by entering the A numbers or B (consulate) numbers in the search window and searching for the documents from the corresponding years (the register numbers start from 1 again at the beginning of each year). The text from the consular file (no. 1657) is set out in Doc. 1915-07-30-DE-011, telegram 53 (this source is missing in Kaiser).
51. Ibid., 210.
52. Ibid.
56. Microfilm K 1800 72/73, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem in Hesemann, “Eugenio Pacelli.”
Despite all the good intentions and finely wrought promises of “never again!” in the aftermath of the Holocaust, genocide remains a scourge that won’t go away. This terrible fact is supported by evidence demonstrating the large number of genocides that have occurred since the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948, the best known of which took place in Cambodia, the Former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, although there were many others. Hundreds of books have been written about the Rwandan Genocide and although far fewer have been written about the atrocities in Darfur, there are still plenty to choose from.

While only deniers contest that what transpired in Rwanda was clearly a case of genocide, the arguments over how to classify violence in Darfur have been more complex and uncertain. Some have deemed the conflict to be ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity, while others assert it was clearly genocide. Interestingly, while the United States government deemed it genocide, the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (COI) asserted that it was a case of crimes against humanity. Just as critics of the US position claim that power politics were at the heart of the decision to call Darfur genocide, critics of the COI decision claim that a different set of political interests drove the COI’s position. In addition to this ongoing geopolitical debate over the appropriateness of applying the “G” word to the Darfuri case, scholars remain entrenched on different sides of this debate.

Making a powerful case for identifying and raising awareness about genocide are two new books by Samuel Totten: *We Cannot Forget: Interviews with Survivors of the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda* (co-edited with Rafiki Ubaldo) and *An Oral and Documentary History of the Darfur Genocide*. These masterful works combine oral history with scholarly analysis and official documents to challenge naysayers’ arguments. Both collections use interview data to effectively demonstrate that the human turmoil that took place in Rwanda and Sudan was motivated by an overarching theme of genocidal intent, perhaps the most useful concept for distinguishing genocide from war crimes.

The interviews in *We Cannot Forget* add greatly to our understanding of events and perceptions surrounding the horrific, 100-day genocide in Rwanda, which resulted in 500,000 to 1 million deaths. As relatively few Rwandan survivor testimonies make it into this type of literature, Totten and Ubaldo address a significant lacuna. Existing testimonies tend to be from geographically limited parts of Rwanda and do not provide in-depth accounts about the survivors’ experiences before and after the genocide.¹

Though *We Cannot Forget* focuses only on the stories of the survivors and not the perpetrators, the text presents detailed interviews with a diverse pool of individuals covering events in the years leading up to, during, and following the genocide, with the
goal of demonstrating the coordinated and vicious nature of the killings. Indeed, interviewees relate how they received instructions from church leaders, community leaders, and the military to travel to certain locations where they would be “protected” after Rwandan President Habyarimana’s airplane was shot down on 6 April 1994. Such instructions were used to dupe Tutsi into gathering in large numbers so they could be slaughtered.

A critique that is often made of the narrow, legalistic approach to genocide is that it forces the international community to be reactive versus proactive. This is because many international and national leaders argue that genocide can only be ascertained when clear intent is established. Thus, even when horrific violence is clearly taking place, such leaders may argue that it’s due to civil war, ethnic cleansing, or a flare up of “ancient animosities.” Totten and Ubaldo, however, point out the documented early-warning signs of the looming genocide in Rwanda that were ignored by the international community on several occasions. These included a January 1994 report by the US Central Intelligence Agency warning that if the unabated violence continued, up to 500,000 Rwandans could die. Human Rights Watch also issued numerous reports throughout the early 1990s warning the international community that something significant was afoot in Rwanda. Ultimately, the editors make it very clear that the UN decision to block an effective intervention was both conscious and unconscionable.

In the first volume of An Oral and Documentary History of the Darfur Genocide, Totten presents interviews with 19 victims whose communities were devastated by the scorched-earth policies and ethnic cleansing carried out by Government of Sudan (GoS) and Janjaweed forces even prior to 2003, which is when the international community began to focus its attention on the crisis. These detailed and vivid personal accounts, combined with the official documents in the second volume, which delineate the evolving stance of the international community as it lurched toward action, offer a compelling argument that GoS actions in Darfur constituted genocide.

The first of the two volumes provides a succinct and effective overview of the historical factors leading up to the conflict. Here, Totten discusses several antecedents that contributed to the genesis of mass violence, including drought and desertification; growing tension and violence between nomadic Arab herders and black African farmers; the breakdown of traditional methods of conflict resolution; the marginalization of black Africans; Arab supremacism; and a malevolent, scorched-earth counterinsurgency strategy. Throughout, Totten stresses the complexity of the situation and the fact that many Arabs in the region were in no way complicit in the killings.

Before transitioning into the interviews—19 powerful, first-person accounts collected at refugee camps in eastern Chad in 2007 and 2009, in N’Djamena in December 2009, and in the Nuba Mountains in 2010—Totten goes on to summarize the numerous attempts to bring about peace and their less-than-favorable results, as well as the international community’s rather ineffective response(s). The interviews were conducted using a standardized questionnaire administered by the author and his interpreter. Questions focused on basic demographic information, the survivors’ experiences with violent encounters and their chronology, any information they could give about the perpetrators, and personal insights into the causes and ramifications of the conflicts. Interviews were arranged by locating willing participants in refugee camps, or based on recommendations from personal contacts or umdas (camp sheikhs). The interviewees include four females and 14 males ranging in age from 23 to 70, with 11 being members
of the Massaliet tribe, six Fur, and one Dajo, most of whom lived in western Darfur prior to being displaced.

The interviews cover a broad range of topics and events, from growing tensions over access to water and land, to an increase in the prevalence of robbery and assault, to all-out attacks on villages by GoS-affiliated men on horseback in coordination with Antonov bombers and helicopter gunships. Though it would have been helpful for the author to analyze the testimonies to highlight patterns and parallels, it is easy enough for the reader to identify recurring themes or motifs him/herself. Repeated survivor accounts, for example, confirm that the GoS and Janjaweed were clearly pursuing a scorched-earth strategy against the black Africans of Darfur; entire communities were reduced to rubble and ash; those captured were raped, murdered, or both, and any sources of subsistence were destroyed (i.e., crops consumed or uprooted and water supplies poisoned), leaving people wandering the desert to perish. Particularly disturbing are the many accounts of mass rape, both during attacks on villages and later, as girls and women were often captured collecting firewood outside displacement camps.

One account in particular, given by an elderly imam, demonstrates the resolve and determination of the perpetrators to eliminate their black countrymen. He explains that the attackers dug a large grave between his village, which had been destroyed, and the camp that people were attempting to flee toward, and then waited for weeks, killing every man and boy they could capture. After their murders, the perpetrators buried their victims in the hole. The following is a noteworthy exchange between this imam and Totten:

The women, they didn’t kill, but they beat them and took what they have. [Note: At this point, Totten asks the interpreter what exactly the imam meant by “took what they have.” Totten says, “Could you please ask the imam, with sensitivity, whether he is talking about their . . . material wealth or something personal?”] Yes! They beat the women and raped the young women. Many women, young women—14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, or 20—were raped, for sure. They raped others, much older, but any women 20 or under were surely raped (5).

These narratives are packed with many similar accounts and are sometimes even more descriptive than that. With the wisdom of one who has visited Sudan and the Nuba Mountains on several occasions—most notably for the US State Department’s Atrocities Documentation Project and then four more times on his own between 2004 and 2011—Totten takes special care to ensure that interviewees clearly differentiate between those matters that they experienced firsthand and those they heard about from others. Respondents’ personal insights into the causes and ramifications of the conflicts are presented as such, and may or may not be accepted as fact, though I have found them to be among the book’s most engaging elements. The author is to be praised for allowing readers to see the informants not only as sources for eyewitness accounts but also as individuals able to reflect on their own experiences and to draw meaningful conclusions themselves.

It should be noted that only about a third of respondents are women, though this is likely to be attributed to the aversion of many survivors of rape—a well-documented weapon of genocide—to sharing their experiences with a male foreigner. The interviews are also largely limited to individuals from western Darfur, something the author explains is a result of tight GoS visa restrictions put in place to prevent such information
from becoming widespread. Still, the interviews include broad and varying perspectives from eclectic backgrounds, such as farmers, teachers, engineers, and community leaders. The survivors profiled in the book include individuals with no education, some with solely an elementary-level education, and a very few with college experience.

The second volume is composed of nine official documents, all pertaining to the issue of whether or not the actions of the GoS and the Janjaweed constituted genocide. This collection traces the international community’s response to Darfur from the first US-sponsored investigation of the situation, to its official declaration that genocide had occurred, to the ensuing UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations and decisions, leading ultimately to the ICC arrest warrant for Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

Totten begins the volume with the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the international community’s agreed-upon definition of genocide. The two documents that follow include the insightful findings of the US Atrocities Documentation Project (the US-sponsored investigation into the crisis) and the remarks of Secretary of State Colin Powell to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2004, declaring the GoS’s actions a case of genocide.

In the fourth document, Totten presents the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, which ultimately concludes that the atrocities committed by the GoS and Janjaweed were crimes against humanity and war crimes, but not genocide. He is fair when he admits here that many scholars agreed with this finding. The author’s even-handed analysis and criticisms are a key strength of the publication, which goes on to present other documents with controversial conclusions. Totten presents the Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, in which the majority of ICC judges (two of the three) rendered a decision that excluded the crime of genocide from the warrant. Alongside it is the powerful dissent of ICC Judge Anita Usacka, in which she delineates why she believed the charge of genocide should have been honored. The volume concludes with the revised arrest warrant for President al-Bashir, which charges him with three counts of genocide. To my knowledge the volume includes all the vital documents relating to the situation in Darfur and its international legal status, making it an invaluable reference tool for scholars of genocide and human rights.

Totten’s work shows us that researching genocidal intent and its execution on the ground—from the “bottom up,” through repeated individual accounts—is a necessary practice for changing the scholarly, legal and political climate around genocide. Such “bottom up” accounts are valuable precisely because accurate evidence of intent in the echelons of power is often suppressed, thus not available in time to stop atrocities from happening. Totten’s research and the conclusions he can draw from this research provide a valuable step forward in learning from the patterns of these horrific acts.

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Note