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The Influence of Hate Speech on TikTok on Chinese College Students

Tengyue Chen
University of South Florida

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The Influence of Hate Speech on TikTok on Chinese College Students

by

Tengyue Chen

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
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Zimmerman School of Advertising and Mass Communications
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Artemio Ramirez, Ph.D.
Roxanne Watson, Ph.D.
Yao Sun, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the research is whether Chinese college students' attitudes to hate speech and hate speech censorship systems will be affected by the hate speech in TikTok. Meanwhile, the research could explore the third-person effect of hate speech on TikTok on Chinese college students. An online survey was designed for this research. 658 participants who are college students in China completed the online survey. The results showed that Chinese college students believed hate speech on TikTok would affect themselves, while others will affect less by hate speech. The results also stated that the attitude toward the censorship system affects by the first-person effect.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Hate speech is a message of low racial self-esteem to target the persecution, hatred, and insults of oppressed groups in history (Matsuda, 1993, pp.23). Hate speech is generally regarded as offensive and verbal attacks against certain groups, and hate speech is highly inflammatory (Hylton, 1996, p. 35). Meanwhile, the threat of hate speech to minority or disadvantaged groups may transform from online to real harm (Susan, 2014; Cohen-Almagor, 2018). Due to social media's popularity and anonymity, social media has become an important channel for spreading hate speech. In the United States, it is generally believed that the existence of hate speech will be worse (Rainie, Anderson & Albright, 2017).

In China, social media is overgrowing. What is worrying is that despite the late start of social media in China, there is still a lot of hate speech. Verbal attacks against women, regions, homosexuality, ethnic minorities, and Africans have appeared on Chinese social media (Song, Dai & Wang, 2016). Among the emotions expressed by Chinese users on social media, anger has become one of the primary emotions (Wu & Liang, 2020). Li (2020) states that Chinese users are more inclined to use offensive and robust language to express anger. It can be said that hate speech has become a typical user language behavior on Chinese social media. For example, the speech about "people in Henan Province stealing manhole covers" have been a hot trend on Chinese social media, which has triggered hate speech against people in Henan Province (Chen, 2018). Hate speech against people in Henan province makes "Henan People" synonymous with

low-cost crimes such as theft and fraud (Chen, 2018). Therefore, hate speech exist on Chinese social media.

The short video is a new video model that can be shared on media platforms, and one Chinese short video app, namely, TikTok, was reported by the Cable News Network (CNN), having "been gaining global momentum" (Yurieff, 2018). TikTok's app was launched in September 2016. The product is introduced to establish a music short video community focusing on young people. However, the negative impact and concerns on TikTok have also been raised. Unlike Weibo and other Chinese social media that use text, the short video format of TikTok may have new changes in the impact of hate speech. In 2019, users on TikTok posted a taunting video aimed at a mentally disabled person, which caused many users to reprint and insult the mentally disabled group of people (Pang, 2010). In 2020, "tea art photos" aimed at women are popular on TikTok. "Tea art photos" described some photos of the female as sexually suggestive, and some critics considered them to be stigmatizing women (Miao, 2020).

Compared with TikTok, YouTube pays attention to hate speech earlier. YouTube tries to avoid hate speech in the most popular videos (Burgess & Green, 2018. p119). However, previous research shows that hate speech on YouTube is a common issue, and hate speech has caused harm to some people (Döring, Mohseni & Kopecký, 2020). Some researchers try to propose a censorship system to regulate or detect hate speech on YouTube (Matamoros-Fernandez, 2017; Barnett, 2007; Mariconti et al., 2017).

Guo and Johnny (2020) studied hate speech on Facebook through the third-person effect theory. Through the third-person effect, the relationship between hate speech's influence on users and users' attitudes towards the hate speech censorship system has been proved (Guo & Johnny, 2020). In the context of TikTok and China, the impact of hate speech and hate speech censorship

systems is worth studying. Meanwhile, this research can complement research on hate speech on TikTok. Therefore, individual attitudes towards hate speech on TikTok have become a third-person theoretical topic worthy of research,

This research focuses on whether Chinese college students will be affected by hate speech in TikTok. Meanwhile, the research could explore the third-person effect of hate speech on TikTok on Chinese college students. The researcher hopes to help the government or society improve the widespread problem of hate speech on Chinese social media.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Social media

Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) stated that social media is "a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content." Social media allow users to create, post, and view content or information they can interact with in websites and applications (Choukas-Bradley et al., 2019). A common feature of social media is creating and exchanging user-generated content through internet-based channels such as Facebook and Google + (Carr & Hayes, 2015; Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). The use of visual interaction by users to share and modify images or videos related to the user's life experiences is widespread on social media (Haferkamp et al., 2012). Social media is becoming a part of people's lives. Clement (2020) stated that the global average of daily social media usage by Internet users is 144 minutes per day.

Social media can impose an impact on users' consciousness explicitly or implicitly. A study found that when users have similar political and ideological concepts with the celebrities they follow, they will think that they know the celebrity themselves, which is a para-social relationship (Paravati et al., 2019). Images of women on social media can affect young women's perceptions of their appearance (Choukas-Bradley et al., 2019). Body images on social media

can cause anxiety among young people about their appearance (Zimmer-Gembeck, Hawes, & Pariz, 2020).

Chinese social media has penetrated all aspects of social life, including Weibo, WeChat, QQ, and SNS, which can be sorted into many categories, such as integrated social platform, video application, music application, live application, photo application, news, blog, integrated community, functional/vertical community (Delisle, Goldstein, & Yang, 2016, p. 1). Among these, functional and vertical communities may cover e-commerce, fashion, beauty, automotive, childcare, health, travel, reading, and other subdivisions (Yu, Asur, & Huberman, 2011).

In August 2009, Sina launched a microblog product that uses 140 words for instant expression and supports multimedia content such as pictures, audio, and videos to benefit the interaction between retweets and comments. Weibo quickly gathered a large number of users (Cao et al., 2014). In the wake of the mobile Internet, WeChat and other mobile client products emerge one after another. WeChat is a mobile chat software developed by Tencent in 2011, which can quickly send voice, SMS, video, text, pictures, and even files through the network and support multi-person chatting at the same time (Li, 2016). WeChat, as the fastest growing social media, has evolved from a simple version to a feature-rich new media in just a few years, such as website collaboration, business payments, and health and exercise steps (Jiang et al., 2016). Weibo is a kind of broadcast social network platform that shares, disseminates, and obtains information based on user relationships and shares real-time information in a short time via a so-called "focus" mechanism (Liu et al., 2015).

TikTok, also known as Douyin, is a popular social media in China and a video platform originated there. Short video usually lasts around seconds. It mainly relies on mobile media to complete beautification, video editing, and fast shooting. The short video is a new video model

that can be shared on media platforms, and the short video industry of China has developed rapidly, and a lot of short video applications such as Micro-vision, Second-shot, and Beauty-shot have appeared over the past few years. The TikTok app appeared in 2016, and its uniqueness makes it quickly attract a large number of users (Xiao, 2018). TikTok also makes great efforts on the content, emphasizing the originality and participation of the creating content (Yi, 2017). The TikTok short video platform combines video and music, with user-generated content as the core, allowing users to tell the world in their eyes within 15 seconds. High-quality short video works will quickly spread to the public, bringing the mobile short video more rapid dissemination effect.

TikTok is easy to use, which lowers the threshold of making a short video, promoting the operating mode of user-generated content and arousing users' enthusiasm (Zhang, Wu, & Liu, 2019). Everyone can be the source of information and information communicator, with unprecedented access to information and dissemination channels. There are two kinds of functions used by users. The first is a short video browsing function, which is used to push a series of short videos with a duration of fewer than 15 seconds. The audience can praise, comment, forward, and collect the videos. The second is the function of producing a short video. The users can use background music and editing functions provided by the platform to complete their personalized editing of short videos through simple operation, then upload and share the content after creation. TikTok has become a kind of mass communication with rich content and strong form interaction, which can better meet people's social needs, such as self-expression, communication of information, bringing more fun to users, and satisfying people's entertainment requirements. Because TikTok can meet the needs of user, TikTok has become one of the popular video-based social media.

In China, short video media like TikTok has always been controversial. Zhang, Wu, and Liu (2019) found that the overuse of short video apps could be addictive for people, leading to social anxiety and social isolation. The reasons that lead to the overuse of video streaming services are the use of recommendations, the lack of self-control, the lack of self-esteem, and the use of information seeking motivation (Hasan, Jha, & Liu, 2018). TikTok has more than 150 million active users a day, opening the app 4.7 times a day, and an average of about 22% of TikTok users enjoy this app for more than an hour per day (Biznext, 2018). These studies indicate that TikTok may cause Chinese college students to overuse TikTok and become addicted to it. However, other studies state that the short video platform industry's potential mechanism has transferred from customer co-creation value to electronic word-of-mouth (Xie et al., 2019). Microfilms and short videos are increasingly popular in China through social media marketing destinations (Shao et al., 2016).

Third-person effect and first-person effect

Davison (1983) first proposed the third-person effect hypothesis in 1983, and since then, the third-person effect theory has attracted extensive attention and considerable research. The third-person effect hypothesis holds that when individuals perceive media information, the influence on others is more significant than that on themselves (Davison, 1983). This hypothesis explains why the public is biased against others under the influence of the media. Past research included ego involvement, the elaboration likelihood model, social categorization theory, attribution theory, and biased optimism, which have been used to explain the third-person effect and its consequences (Paul, Salwen, & Dupagne, 2000). Brown and Stayman (1992) stated that biased optimism is motivated by the need for self-improvement, and this optimism is made up of

comparisons between an individual self and others. Biased optimism leads individuals to believe they enhance their view of themselves, and other people are more likely to be influenced by the media (McLeod, Eveland, & Nathanson, 1997). Therefore, when information is perceived to be highly negative, the gap between the impact on the individual and others would become much greater (Eveland & McLeod, 1999).

Meanwhile, Eveland and McLeod (1999) believed that the lower the social desirability of information, the stronger the third-person effect. In other words, the third-person effect is influenced by social expectations of information. If the media information has nothing to do with an individual's own benefits, the individual could feel it is unwise to be influenced by the media, and the third-person effect will rise (Perloff, 1989). White (1997) suggested that the audience who thinks that they are smarter than others will more likely resist a topic they determine has no benefit or may even have harmful consequences.

Several factors may influence the existence and intensity of the third-person effect. When individuals try to understand the impact of media on them, they would compare themselves with others. Banning and Sweetster (2007) suggested that the third-person effect could be particularly pronounced if the person thinks they are more socially distant from others. The types of content that one individual receives from media may also affect third-party effects. Undesirable media content may cause third-party effects, while popular media information may not have the same effect (Gunther & Mundy, 1993).

Research on the third-person effect has long been focused on mass media. However, the third-person effect could also be seen on social media. In the research on online game addiction, the third-person effect is related to network performance; that is, the more effective an individual think self, the more worried he is about others than self (Zhong, 2009). Facebook users tend to

attribute privacy risks more to others than to themselves, therefore, third-person effects may also occur in Facebook privacy violations (Debatin et al., 2009). Lev-On (2017) believed that due to the influence of the third-person effect, individuals always think that others are more vulnerable than themselves in the face of several Facebook risks. Pham, Shancer, and Nelson (2019) found that individuals believe they post less frequently on Facebook than others, especially about objectionable content. In social media, in the case of a small number of sharing and comments, individuals believe that the general story has a more substantial impact on others than themselves (Stavrositu & Kim, 2014).

The first-person effect is different from the third-person effect. The first-person effect says that people often think that positive information affects them more than it affects others (Gunter & Thorson, 1992). After studying unattractive advertisements, Sharma and Roy (2016) found that the positive influence on consumers' perception would affect consumers' purchase intention. Innes and Zeitz (1998) stated that individuals who receive public service announcements believe that the media affects them more than others. Other research supports the idea that individuals who read news articles with many social media indicators believe that the media affects themselves more than others (Chung, 2018).

In the past research on the third-person effect, the restrictions on the Internet such as advertising, prejudiced speech, and fake news have been studied (Jiang & Kim, 2018; Ho et al., 2019; Driscoll & Salwen, 1997; Dority, 1989; Shah & Faber, 1996). When an individual shows more third-party effects, the individual is more likely to support intervention and restriction of fake news (Jiang & kim, 2018). The third-person effect affects parents' attitudes towards Internet legislation to protect their children (Ho et al., 2019). The bias of the media has a third-person effect, and the bias of the media guides the public's attitude toward ethnic minorities, such as

Korean Americans (Park et al., 2012) and African Americans (Driscoll & Salwen, 1997).

Censorship is a psychological condition or behavior, and the purpose of censoring pork belly is to protect the public from being harmed by reading, seeing, or hearing content (Dority, 1989).

Rojas, Shah, and Faber (1996) state that the perceived gap between first-person and third-person effects results in individuals showing support for censorship.

Hate speech

Hate speech is no consistent definition of academic. Matsuda (1993) believes that hate speech is a message of persecution, hatred, and insulting low racial self-esteem directed at oppressed groups in history. Extensive explanations for hate speech are "based on race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, disability, and other identity characteristics, deliberately inciting violence and prejudice against individuals or groups" (Hylton, 1996, p. 35). Speech and expression are hatred of someone or a group of people because of the characteristics of someone or a group of people (Saleem, Dillon, Benesch & Ruths, 2017). Hate speech is generally expressed through aggressive and insulting speech. Meanwhile, hate speech targets the disadvantaged or a specific minority. Therefore, hate speech can be a "mechanism of violent subversion," including fear, harassment, intimidation, and discrimination (Lederer & Delgado, 1995, p. 3-13).

Although the victimized group can fight back with language, a social environment created or maintained by hate speech is harmful and disadvantageous to members of vulnerable social groups, making its statements challenging to work (Simpson, 2012). Susan (2014) believes that hate speech could cause actual violence against a group of people. For example, the Stormfront website users incite and express hate speech, and they are indirectly responsible for the deaths of

nearly 100 people (Cohen-Almagor, 2018). Therefore, hate speech on the Internet may have an impact on the real world.

Social media becomes the primary platform for online hate speech. Social media provides users with anonymity for encouraging users to express themselves. Users can make hate speech without exposing their information. Therefore, social media users perceive higher exposure to hate speech (Barnidge et al., 2019). In addition, the preservation of information by social media has resulted in the information being retained indefinitely on social media. Hate speech on social media may not be deleted. As a result, the possibility of hate speech appearing and reusing indefinitely on social media is provided (Jakubowicz et al., 2017, pp. 95-145).

Hate speech is increasingly becoming an important issue on the Internet in China, and hate speech is not defined in Chinese law. Many attacks on women, homosexuals, ethnic minorities, and Africans appeared on Chinese social media (Wu & Liang, 2020). Chinese hate speech targets can be divided into four categories: racial hate speech, regional hate speech, religious hate speech, and gender hate speech. Li (2020) study offensive language on Weibo. Chinese Internet users prefer strong or directly offensive words to express anger, and offensive language is becoming a common issue in China (Li, 2020). Anger emotions spread faster in Chinese social media than other emotions (Song, Dai & Wang, 2016). Therefore, hate speech can spread widely on Chinese social media.

TikTok is a social media based on visual platforms. Video, as a unique form, facilitates the spread of hate speech. In the United States, hate groups use visual communication functions in videos to provide hate speech content on the Internet (Barnett, 2007). Moor, Heuvelman, and Verleur (2010) research a kind of hate speech (flaming) on YouTube, and they found that YouTube users think hate speech videos are ubiquitous. Some YouTube users intentionally

offend other users only for entertainment purposes (Moor, Heuvelman & Verleur, 2010). In addition, a study of the use of YouTube by young Czechs found that most people have been insulted and attacked (Kopecký et al., 2020). Meanwhile, the previous research on hate speech on YouTube includes video content and focuses on a large number of comments (Döring & Mohseni, 2019; Ernst et al., 2017). For example, lots of genders hate speech in the comments of the failed videos of women on YouTube (Döring & Mohseni, 2019).

CHAPTER THREE

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Hate speech represented by offensive language has become a common phenomenon in Chinese social media (Wu & Liang, 2020; Li, 2020). Hate speech can harm vulnerable or minority groups (Simpson, 2013). The harm caused by hate speech can also be transformed into social violence (Benesch, 2014). TikTok, as the most popular social media in China, has a strong influence. The author found that many hate speeches exist in the short video of TikTok. Hate speech on TikTok is harming some people. Meanwhile, most young people can use social media to learn offensive language and hate speech (Chen et al., 2012).

The third-person effect studied the media perception of others. It is believed that other people are more influenced by media information than media information (Davison, 1983). Meanwhile, media perception affects self, which is the first-person effect (Gunter & Thorson, 1992). Guo and Johnson (2020) studied 368 American college students to analyze Facebook hate speech, attitude toward the hate speech censorship system, and the third-person effect. Their study shows that hate speech on Facebook affects more other than self, and perceived influences on the self may lead to content restrictions that support Facebook's hate speech and government regulation of anti-LGBT hate speech, respectively (Guo & Johnson, 2020). The author attempts to understand whether Chinese college students' attitudes in China to hate speech on TikTok and the attitude toward the hate speech censorship system are similar to American college students.

The following abbreviations represent the variables being studied.

ATTS: Attitude toward hate speech on TikTok.

ATTR: Attitude toward hate speech censorship system on TikTok.

SELF: Perceived influence of the hate speech on TikTok on oneself.

OTHERS: Perceived influence of the hate speech on TikTok on others.

First, the hypotheses related to the relationship between attitude variables are:

H1: There is a negative correlation between the attitude of hate speech on TikTok and the hate speech censorship system's attitude. (ATTS \rightarrow ATTR)

The following hypotheses are based on the first-person effect and third-person effects:

H2: The perceived effects of hate speech on TikTok on self are positively correlated with the perceived effects of others. (SELF \leftrightarrow OTHERS)

H3: The perceived effect of the hate speech on self is positively correlated with the hate speech censorship system's perceived effect. (SELF \rightarrow ATTR)

H4: The perceived effect of hate speech on TikTok on others was positively correlated with the hate speech censorship system. (OTHERS \rightarrow ATTR)

The next set of hypotheses is about all five variables in the study: ATTS, SELF, OTHERS, and ATTR.

H5: Perceived influence of hate speech on TikTok on self mediates the relationship between attitude toward hate speech on TikTok (ATTS) and attitude toward the hate speech censorship system. (ATTS \rightarrow SELF \rightarrow ATTR)

H6: Perceived influence of hate speech on TikTok on others mediates the relationship between attitude toward hate speech on TikTok and attitude toward the hate speech censorship system. (ATTS \rightarrow OTHERS \rightarrow ATTR)

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

Sample

The study sample will include TikTok users among Chinese college students. Researchers contacted Chinese college students via email and social media. The current estimated sample size is 646 people.

The sample contains 281 females and 375 males. Participants are between 18 and 25 years old, with the largest number of participants being 20 years old. Among other participants, 8.1% were 18 years old, 17.8% were 19 years old, 20.7% were 21 years old, 13% were 22 years old, 7.9% were 23 years old, 2.1% were 24 years old, and 0.8% were 25 years old. Participants were 11.1% of freshmen, 36.1% of sophomores, 29.7% of juniors, and 23% seniors.

10 participants indicated they had not watched short videos from TikTok. Therefore, the data of these 10 participants would not be included in the following statistics. The remaining participants indicated rarely (11.7%), sometimes (25.8%), often (39.5%), and always (21.5%).

Instrument

The questionnaire will be translated into the Chinese language to prevent participants from misunderstanding the English version questions. The questionnaire consists of 20 questions, and one participant is estimated to take 10 to 15 minutes to complete the survey. Participants read the

instructions and privacy protocols before filling out the online survey. Appendix A and B provide the English and Chinese versions of the survey, respectively.

Measures

The four variables in the study be measured by the following: ATTS, ATTR, SELF, and OTHER. The main measures in this study included attitudes towards hate speech and hate speech censorship, and perceived effects of TikTok hate speech on the self and others. The questionnaire consists of five parts. The first part collects the basic information of the investigator. The second part focuses on attitudes towards hate speech on TikTok. The third part investigates the impact of the perception of hate speech on TikTok on users' self. The fourth part studies the impact of hate speech perception on TikTok on others. The last part is used to understand participants' attitudes towards the hate speech censorship system. The five parts of data collection could understand the relationship between variables, and the research could test the hypothesis in the research.

Attitude toward hate speech on TikTok was measured using 7-point Likert scale. The ATTS measures require participants to score on a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree), to what extent they support hate speech on TikTok. Sample items included attitudes towards content, perceptions of hate speech, and influence on behavior.

Guo and Johnny (2020) used 7-point Likert scale to measure support for hate speech censorship. Therefore, the study uses Guo and Johnny's (2020) 7-point Likert scale to measure attitudes towards hate speech censorship. Participants used 7 points to evaluate their attitudes towards hate speech censorship (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). The sample items include public communication, TikTok spread, viewing restrictions, and others. In other words, the question in the survey include mass communication, TikTok, viewing restrictions, and others.

According to the third-person effect theory (Davison, 1983; Paul, Salwen, & Dupagne, 2000; McLeod, Eveland, & Nathanson, 1997), the study measured the perceived effects of TikTok hate speech on the self and others. The measurement of SELF and OTHER used Guo and Jonny's (2020) 7-point Likert scale instrument. Participants were asked to use 7 scales to explain the extent to which hate speech affects themselves and others (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). The sample items include influence of content, affect feeling, and affect behavior.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESULTS

The research used descriptive and reliability statistics to measure ATTS (average ATTS = 2.65, SD = 0.732), SELF (average SELF = 3.2126, SD = 1.29886), OTHER (average OTHER = 4.5454, SD = 1.33007), and ATTR (average ATTA = 5.23, SD = 1.1567). Meanwhile, through descriptive and reliability statistics, the study first tested the internal consistency of each variables. After ATTS3 was deleted, the internal consistency of ATTS could reach the acceptable level (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.773$). The internal consistency of ATTR reached the good level (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.825$). The internal consistency of SELF reached the acceptable level (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.719$), and OTHER (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.840$) reached a good level of internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.840$). Therefore, after removing ATTS3 from ATTS, all Cronbach's Alpha indicated that these metrics had reached an acceptable level of internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha > 0.7$).

The results of the paired-sample t-test compares participants' perceptions of hate speech on themselves and others. The test results show that the participants' self-perception influence is more significant than others' perception ($t = -23.06$, $df = 645$, $p < 0.001$).

Table 1
Measurement Results

| | Standardized Regression Weight Estimate (β) | S.E. | C.R. | P |
|---------------------------|--|------|--------|-----|
| ATTS1 \leftarrow ATTS | .727 | | | |
| ATTS2 \leftarrow ATTS | .581 | .072 | 13.009 | *** |
| ATTS4 \leftarrow ATTS | .709 | .083 | 14.581 | *** |
| ATTS5 \leftarrow ATTS | .755 | .066 | 15.362 | *** |
| SELF1 \leftarrow SELF | .607 | | | |
| SELF2 \leftarrow SELF | .701 | .107 | 11.929 | *** |
| SELF3 \leftarrow SELF | .764 | .100 | 12.089 | *** |
| ATTR1 \leftarrow ATTR | .828 | | | |
| ATTR2 \leftarrow ATTR | .859 | 0.45 | 22.889 | |
| ATTR3 \leftarrow ATTR | .828 | .054 | 14.075 | *** |
| ATTR4 \leftarrow ATTR | .777 | .049 | 18.040 | *** |
| ATTR5 \leftarrow ATTR | .569 | .062 | 13.049 | *** |
| OTHER1 \leftarrow OTHER | .797 | | | |
| OTHER2 \leftarrow OTHER | .818 | .050 | 19.514 | *** |
| OTHER3 \leftarrow OTHER | .771 | .049 | 18.490 | *** |
| SELF1 \leftarrow SELF | .607 | | | |
| SELF2 \leftarrow SELF | .701 | .107 | 11.929 | *** |
| SELF3 \leftarrow SELF | .764 | .100 | 12.089 | *** |
| ATTR1 \leftarrow ATTR | .828 | | | |
| ATTR2 \leftarrow ATTR | .859 | 0.45 | 22.889 | |
| ATTR3 \leftarrow ATTR | .828 | .054 | 14.075 | *** |
| ATTR4 \leftarrow ATTR | .777 | .049 | 18.040 | *** |

*** $p < .001$

The study analyzed the data using SEM analysis to verify the hypotheses in this study. Table 1 shows the standardized regression weight estimates of the measurement items and standard errors for the construction indicators. The regression weights of all indicators are statistically significant ($p < .001$). Meanwhile, the standard error indicating that the measurement method is acceptable.

Table 2
Estimates of Standardized Regression Weights

| | Standardized Regression Weight Estimate(β) | S.E. | C.R. | P |
|--------------|--|------|--------|-------|
| SELF ← ATTS | .133 | .061 | 2.524 | 0.012 |
| OTHER ← SELF | .522 | .075 | 8.974 | *** |
| OTHER ← ATTS | -.237 | .072 | -4.959 | *** |
| ATTR ← ATTS | -.390 | .069 | -8.109 | *** |
| ATTR ← OTHER | .366 | .055 | 6.412 | *** |
| ATTR ← SELF | -.006 | .068 | -.109 | 0.913 |

$\chi^2=197.528$, $df = 84$, $p = .000$; GFI = .959; AGFI = .942; RMSEA = .046, *** $p < .001$

Table 2 shows the results of SEM analysis. Among them, the chi-square test data may be sensitive to the sample size of this study ($\chi^2=197.528$, $df=84$, $p=.000$). However, the other measures showed that the research model or method is acceptable (GFI = .959; AGFI = .942; RMSEA = .046).




Figure 1
*SEM Results (** $p < .001$, * $p < .05$)*

H1 stated a negative correlation between the attitude of hate speech on TikTok (ATTS) and the hate speech censorship system (ATTR). The H1 was supported ($\beta = -.390$, $p < 0.05$). The H2 indicated that the perceived effects of hate speech on TikTok on self (SELF) are positively correlated with the perceived effects of others (OTHER), and the results supported the hypothesis ($\beta = .522$, $p < 0.05$).

H3 and H4 indicate the relationship between the third-person effect and ATTR. H3, which stated the perceived effect of hate speech on self (SELF), is positively correlated with the perceived effect of hate speech censorship system (ATTR), was not supported by the results ($\beta = -.006$, $p = 0.913$). However, the H4 was supported ($\beta = .366$, $p < 0.05$), which means the perceived effect of hate speech on TikTok on others (OTHER) was positively correlated with the hate speech censorship system (ATTR).

H5 and H6 contained all variables, including SELF, OTHER, ATTS, and ATTR. H5 stated that the perceived influence of hate speech on TikTok on oneself (SELF) would mediate the relationship between attitude toward hate speech on TikTok (ATTS) and attitude toward hate speech censorship system (ATTR). The results were not supported in this study ($\beta = .133$, $p = 0.012$; $\beta = -.006$, $p = 0.913$). On the contrary, H6 is supported ($\beta = -.237$, $p < 0.05$; $\beta = .366$, $p < 0.05$), and H6 stated that perceived influence of hate speech on TikTok on others (OTHER) would mediate the relationship between attitude toward hate speech on TikTok (ATTS) and attitude toward hate speech censorship system (ATTR).

Table 3

Estimates of Standardized Regression Weights (SELF, OTHER, ATTR)

| | Standardized Regression Weight Estimate(β) | S.E. | C.R. | P |
|-------------------------|--|------|--------|------|
| ATTR \leftarrow OTHER | .421 | .067 | 7.175 | *** |
| ATTR \leftarrow SELF | -0.80 | .084 | -1.388 | .165 |

$\chi^2=183.286$, $df = 33$, $p = .000$; GFI = .943; AGFI = .905; RMSEA = .084, *** $p < .001$

Further testing showed the influence or relationship of SELF and OTHER on ATTR ($\chi^2 = 228.291$, $df = 42$, $p = .000$; GFI = .936; AGFI = .899; RMSEA = .083, *** $p < .001$). Table 3 and Figure 2 shows that self-perception affects ATTR is not significant ($\beta = -.0.80$, $p = .165$), while others' perception affects ATTR is significant ($\beta = .421$, $p < 0.05$).




Figure 2

*SEM Results for SELF, OTHER, and ATTR (** $p < .001$, * $p < .05$)*

In summary, other hypotheses except H3 and H5 were supported by the results. By the results, users' support for hate speech on TikTok will affect their censorship against hate speech,

which means that there is a negative correlation between ATTS and ATTR. In addition, self-perception of hate speech can lead to increased perception by others. H4 and H6 were supported by the results suggesting the existence of third-person effects in hate speech in TikTok. When Chinese college students use TikTok, they support restrictions on hate speech because of the influence on others. However, H3 and H5 are not supported by the results, indicating that there is no first-person effect in this study. In other words, self-perception may not affect attitudes towards hate speech censorship.

CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION

Theoretical

This study explores the impact of hate speech on Chinese college students under the third-person effect through TikTok. According to the third-person effect theory, audiences are more likely to believe that others are more affected by the media than themselves (David, 1983), and the third-person effect theory examined people's attitudes towards censorship (Jiang & Kim, 2018; Rojas, Shah & Faber, 1996). Therefore, the study first suggested that the third-person effect or first-person effect exists in the spread of hate speech on TikTok. The impact of hate speech on TikTok on Chinese college students may include: 1) attitudes towards hate speech; 2) self-perception; 3) perception of others; 4) attitudes of censorship. The research examines the relationship between the four impact.

Research first examines that attitudes towards hate speech can influence attitudes towards hate speech censorship. The audience's attitude towards hate speech censorship is negatively correlated with their attitude towards hate speech. The result implied that if the audience accepts or likes hate speech, the audience does not support hate speech censorship. The underlying reason may be that the audience's attitude towards the content affects the audience's acceptance of censorship. The potential influencing factor in this study is the audience's perception of hate speech. Most participants believed that the frequency they watch hate speech on Tik

Tok is lower than occasionally. Meanwhile, according to the results of the t-test, participants' self-perception of hate speech attitude is higher than other perception. Since hate speech is widespread on Chinese social media (Wu & Liang, 2020; Li, 2020), participants may have been accustomed to such information. Therefore, they may fail to identify hate speech information.

The third-person effect theory is used to examine people's supportive attitudes towards censorship or behavioral intentions in the previous studies (Jiang & Kim, 2018; Driscoll & Salwen, 1997; Shah & Faber, 1996). Therefore, the second stage of the hypothesis in the research explores how the perceived impact of hate speech on TikTok affects the attitude of Chinese college students towards the censorship system. First, the hypothesis about the relationship between self-perception and the other perception is proved. In other words, the more Chinese college students think they are affected by hate speech, the perception of others will increase. The following hypothesis examines the relationship between the first-person effect, the third-person effect, and the attitude of the censorship system. The results showed that when Chinese college students believe that hate speech on TikTok has a significant impact on others, they will be more willing to support the censorship system. However, Chinese college students' support for the censorship system has unrelated to self-perception. This finding indicates that Chinese college students' willingness to support the censorship system is only related to their belief that others will be affected, proving the third-person effect. The possible reason is that Chinese college students believe that they will not be affected by hate speech, and they do not care to watch hate speech.

In the hypothetical third stage, the research examines the relationship among attitudes towards hate speech, self-perception, perception of others, and attitudes of censorship. Perceived

influence of hate speech on TikTok on self mediates the relationship between attitude toward hate speech on TikTok (ATTS) and attitude toward the hate speech censorship system is not been supported by the results. In other words, when the attitude towards hate speech is linked to the attitude towards hate speech censorship, the first-person effect is not significant. On the contrary, the results showed that the third-person effect was significantly present in the attitude towards hate speech and the attitude towards hate speech censorship. The results suggest that the attitude of Chinese college students to the hate speech censorship system depends on the level of influence on others, not on the level of influence on themselves.

This research provided a theoretical basis for the research on the third-person effect theory and the first-person effect theory. The results showed that attitudes towards hate speech affect self-perception and the perception of others. Research on Facebook shows that users believe that hate speech affects others more than it affects themselves (Guo & Johnson, 2020). In the TikTok, the audience's attitude towards hate speech leads the audience to believe that they have been greatly affected. However, the audience believes that hate speech has less impact on others. Therefore, the audience believes that they are more susceptible to hate speech, while others may be less affected. Therefore, this study may imply that Chinese college students do not think hate speech on TikTok is harmful. Because Chinese college students' positive attitude towards hate speech is not apparent, another possible explanation is the influence of other factors, such as support for freedom of speech.

Additionally, the third person's attitude towards hate speech censorship is significant. Self-awareness of hate speech does not affect Chinese college students' attitudes towards censorship. However, others' perceptions of hate speech may affect Chinese college students' attitudes towards censorship. In the research, the hypotheses about the relation among hate speech

attitudes, self-perceptions, and censorship attitudes are not supported. The result is consistent with the effect produced under the influence of the third-person effect. Chinese college students may change their attitude to censorship because of other people's feelings.

The first-person effect believes that media messages contain positive information, and the first-person is more likely to be convinced (Gunter & Thorson, 1992). However, when the media contains negative information, the audience will think that others will be more vulnerable due to a lack of knowledge (Davison, 1983; Perloff, 1989). Hate speech is generally considered negative information (Matsuda, 1993; Saleem, Dillon, Benesch & Ruths, 2017). Interestingly, Chinese college students believe that hate speech affects them more than others. However, Chinese college students change their attitude to censorship because of others' feelings rather than their feelings about hate speech. The research implies that Chinese college students on TikTok accept hate speech themselves and may be affected. However, Chinese college students may support the censorship of hate speech for the feelings of others. Therefore, the possible situation on TikTok is that individuals will support censorship of hate speech for other feelings, but most individuals do not mind the spread of hate speech, and even most individuals will be affected by hate speech. Therefore, the possible situation on TikTok is that individuals will support censorship of hate speech for others, but in fact, most individuals do not mind the spread of hate speech, and even most individuals will be affected by hate speech. Furthermore, it will be difficult for individual users to distinguish hate speech, which makes it easier to spread hate speech on TikTok.

Implication

The research may fill a gap in the third-person effect theory on hate speech. The research is the first to study the third-person effect of hate speech on TikTok. First, research shows the

existence of third-person effects in the spread of hate speech on TikTok. Moreover, Chinese college students believe that the perception of others affects their attitude towards the censorship system. There is a positive correlation between self-perception and the perception of others, however, the first-person effect is not significant in the research. In other words, Chinese college students do not think they are affected by hate speech, nor will they affect their attitudes towards censorship because of their self-perception.

In addition, this research helps to understand the hate speech situation on TikTok. On TikTok, Chinese college students believe that they do not watch hate speech very often. However, considering that China has not defined hate speech, the frequency of hate speech on TikTok may be affected by the perception of hate speech by Chinese college students. Another possible reason is that the TikTok platform has a strict censorship system for hate speech. On the other hand, because participants' self-perception influence is more significant than others' perception, Chinese college students may not consider hate speech as negative information. However, the results show that when considering the censorship system, the third-person effect is significant, while the first-person effect is not supported. Research still has practical significance.

The research may help Chinese society solve the problem of hate speech on TikTok or Chinese social media. First, the Chinese government or legal institutions need to improve or clarify the definition of hate speech in China. A law definition of hate speech can help social media distinguish hate speech and make people aware of hate speech information in Chinese society. Second, the Chinese government may need to guide Chinese college students' understanding of hate speech. Although Chinese college students dislike hate speech, the results implied that Chinese college students might not consider hate speech to be negative information. Therefore, the Chinese government may need to strengthen moral education for college students,

and the Chinese government may need instructions or guidance on a more specific censorship system for hate speech.

For social media companies, this research can help them manage hate speech. Because Chinese college students are worried about the potentially harmful effects on others, they are willing to accept hate speech censorship. Therefore, if TikTok or other social media needs to censor hate speech, the censorship system needs to be clear that it is beneficial to reduce others' impact by hate speech. However, because the attitude of Chinese college students towards hate speech not change their attitude towards censorship, social media companies need to carefully consider the censorship system to avoid opposition from Chinese college students. Meanwhile, social media should explain the concept and definition of hate speech to Chinese college students.

Limitations and Future Directions

According to the survey results, it is necessary to explore further Chinese college students' understanding and attitude towards hate speech. This study did not explore further what Chinese college students think is hate speech. Although the research questionnaire has explained the general definition of hate speech to Chinese college students, more research is needed on what Chinese college students think of hate speech. Future research could also target specific hate speech, such as female hate speech or ethnic hate speech. Second, Chinese college students' views and attitudes towards hate speech need further research. This study suggests that Chinese college students do not consider hate speech to be negative information. However, Chinese college students have no evident positive attitude towards hate speech. Therefore, future research needs to exam the attitudes of Chinese college students towards hate speech.

Secondly, the limitations of this study also include research objects. The participants in this study are Chinese college students. However, the results obtained from them may not indicate the situation in Chinese society or other countries. Besides, the leading social media for this study is TikTok (Chinese edition). Therefore, future research may need to examine the situation of hate speech on other social media.

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APPENDIX A
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH)

Consent

Overview: You are being asked to take part in a research study. The information in this document should help you to decide if you would like to participate. The sections in this Overview provide the basic information about the study. More detailed information is provided in the remainder of the document.

Study Staff: This study is being led by Tengyue Chen who is a graduate student at University of South Florida. This person is called the Principal Investigator. Other approved research staff may act on behalf of the Principal Investigator.

Study Details: This study is being conducted at University of South Florida. The purpose of the study is to whether the Chinese college students will be affected by the hate speech in TikTok. The research contains 10-15 minutes online survey.

Participants: You are being asked to take part because you are a Chinese college student.

Voluntary Participation: Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to participate and may stop your participation at any time. There will be no penalties or loss of benefits or opportunities if you do not participate or decide to stop once you start. Your decision to participate or not to participate will not affect your student status, course grade, recommendations, or access to future courses or training opportunities.

Benefits, Compensation, and Risk: We do not know if you will receive any benefit from your participation. You will not be compensated for your participation.

Confidentiality: Even if we publish the findings from this study, we will keep your study

information private and confidential. Anyone with the authority to look at your records must keep them confidential.

Why are you being asked to take part?

Study Procedures

If you take part in this study, you will be asked to complete an anonymous online survey, which takes about 10-15 minutes.

Voluntary Participation / Withdrawal

You do not have to participate in this research study.

You should only take part in this study if you want to volunteer. You should not feel that there is any pressure to take part in the study. You are free to participate in this research or withdraw at any time. There will be no penalty or loss of benefits you are entitled to receive if you stop taking part in this study. Decision to participate or not to participate will not affect your student status (course grade) or job status.

Benefits and Risks

We are unsure if you will receive any benefits by taking part in this research study. This research is considered to be minimal risk.

Privacy and Confidentiality

We will do our best to keep your records private and confidential. We cannot guarantee absolute confidentiality. Your personal information may be disclosed if required by law. Certain people may need to see your study records. The only people who will be allowed to see these records are: Tengyue Chen, The University of South Florida Institutional Review Board (IRB).

It is possible, although unlikely, that unauthorized individuals could gain access to your responses because you are responding online. Confidentiality will be maintained to the degree permitted by the technology used. No guarantees can be made regarding the interception of data sent via the Internet. However, your participation in this online survey involves risks similar to a person's everyday use of the Internet. If you complete and submit an anonymous survey and later request your data be withdrawn, this may or may not be possible as the researcher may be unable to extract anonymous data from the database.

Contact Information

If you have any questions, concerns or complaints about this study, call Tengyue Chen at 1-303-960-3278. If you have questions about your rights, complaints, or issues as a person taking part in this study, call the USF IRB at (813) 974-5638 or contact the IRB by email at RSCH-IRB@usf.edu.

We may publish what we learn from this study. If we do, we will not let anyone know your name. We will not publish anything else that would let people know who you are. You can print a copy of this consent form for your records.

I freely give my consent to take part in this study. I understand that by proceeding with this survey, I am agreeing to take part in research and I am 18 years of age or older.

ATTS: Attitude toward hate speech on TikTok.

Seven Likert-scale measures six questions about ATTS (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree or Disagree, 5 = Somewhat disagree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly Agree).

1. I enjoy watching strongly hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin).
2. I have a positive view of hate speech content.
3. I hate TikTok's hate speech, which reminds me of hatred or anger.
4. I have no objection to the strongly hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin).
5. The strongly hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin) can bring more fun.

SELF: Perceived influence of the hate speech on TikTok on oneself.

Seven Likert-scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree or Disagree, 5 = Somewhat disagree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly Agree) are used to measure SELF by three questions.

1. Seeing hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin) can affect your attitude towards hate speech.
2. Seeing Hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin) can make you feel angry or fierce towards the characters in the video.
3. Seeing Hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin) can affect your actual behavior 3. How much does see strongly offensive content on TikTok affect your real action?

OTHERS: Perceived influence of the hate speech on TikTok on others.

Seven Likert-scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree or Disagree, 5 = Somewhat disagree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly Agree) are used to measure OTHERS by three questions.

1. Seeing Hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin) can affect others attitude towards hate speech.

2. Seeing hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin) can make other feel angry or fierce towards the characters in the video.

3. Seeing hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin) can affect others actual behavior.

ATTR: Attitude toward hate speech censorship system on TikTok.

Seven Likert-scale measures six questions about ATTR (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree or Disagree, 5 = Somewhat disagree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly Agree)

1. Strongly hate speech content should not be shown in public.

2. TikTok (Douyin) should not spread hate information on social media.

3. Chinese college students should not watch strongly hate speech content.

4. The government should plan to impose more restrictions on strongly hate speech content.

5. I would support the hate speech censorship system.

Hate speech is a message of racial inferiority directed at the persecution, hatred, and insults of oppressed groups in history. Hate speech is often seen as offensive and verbal attacks against certain groups, and hate speech is highly inflammatory.

Personal Information

1. What is your gender?

1. Female 2. Male

2. What is your age: _____

3. What is your current status?

1. Freshman 2. Sophomore 3. Junior 4. Senior

4. Do you use or watch other use TikTok (Douyin)

1. Yes 2. No

5. Do you watch any short video come from TikTok (Douyin)?

1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Often 5. Always

6. How often do you use TikTok (Douyin)

1. Very infrequently 2. infrequently 3. Somewhat infrequently 4. Occasionally 5. Somewhat frequently 6. frequently 7. Very frequently

7. How often do you see hate speech on TikTok (Douyin)

1. Very infrequently 2. infrequently 3. Somewhat infrequently 4. Occasionally 5. Somewhat frequently 6. frequently 7. Very frequently

Attitude toward hate speech on TikTok (DouYin).

8. I enjoy watching strongly hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin).

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Neither agree or Disagree 5.

Somewhat disagree 6. Agree 7. Strongly Agree

9. I have a positive view of hate speech content.

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Neither agree or Disagree 5.

Somewhat disagree 6. Agree 7. Strongly Agree

10. I hate TikTok's hate speech, which reminds me of hatred or anger.

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Neither agree or Disagree 5.

Somewhat disagree 6. Agree 7. Strongly Agree

11. I have no objection to the strongly hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin).

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Neither agree or Disagree 5.

Somewhat disagree 6. Agree 7. Strongly Agree

12. The strongly hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin) can bring more fun.

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Neither agree or Disagree 5.

Somewhat disagree 6. Agree 7. Strongly Agree

Perceived influence of the hate speech on TikTok (Douyin) on oneself.

13. Seeing hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin) can affect your attitude towards hate speech.

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Neither agree or Disagree 5.

Somewhat disagree 6. Agree 7. Strongly Agree

14. Seeing Hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin) can make you feel angry or fierce towards the characters in the video.

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Neither agree or Disagree 5.

Somewhat disagree 6. Agree 7. Strongly Agree

15. Seeing Hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin) can affect your actual behavior.

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Neither agree or Disagree 5.

Somewhat disagree 6. Agree 7. Strongly Agree

Perceived influence of the hate speech on TikTok (Douyin) on others.

16. Seeing Hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin) can affect others attitude towards hate speech.

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Neither agree or Disagree 5.

Somewhat disagree 6. Agree 7. Strongly Agree

17. Seeing hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin) can make other feel angry or fierce towards the characters in the video.

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Neither agree or Disagree 5.

Somewhat disagree 6. Agree 7. Strongly Agree

18. Seeing hate speech content on TikTok (Douyin) can affect others actual behavior

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Neither agree or Disagree 5.

Somewhat disagree 6. Agree 7. Strongly Agree

Attitude toward hate speech censorship system on TikTok (Douyin).

19. Strongly hate speech content should not be shown in public.

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Neither agree or Disagree 5.

Somewhat disagree 6. Agree 7. Strongly Agree

20. TikTok (Douyin) should not spread hate information on social media.

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Neither agree or Disagree 5.

Somewhat disagree 6. Agree 7. Strongly Agree

21. Chinese college students should not watch strongly hate speech content.

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Neither agree or Disagree 5.

Somewhat disagree 6. Agree 7. Strongly Agree

22. The government should plan to impose more restrictions on strongly hate speech content.

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Neither agree or Disagree 5.

Somewhat disagree 6. Agree 7. Strongly Agree

23. I would support the hate speech censorship system.

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Neither agree or Disagree 5.

Somewhat disagree 6. Agree 7. Strongly Agree

APPENDIX B

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE (CHINESE)

Consent

概述：您被要求参加一项研究。本文档中的信息应有助于您确定是否要参加。本概述中的各节提供了有关研究的基本信息。本文档的其余部分提供了更详细的信息。

研究人员：这项研究是由南佛罗里达大学的研究生 Tengyue Chen 主持的。此人称为首席调查员。其他经批准的研究人员可以代表首席研究人研究细节：该研究正在南佛罗里达大学进行。该研究的目的是确定中国大学生是否会受到 TikTok 中仇恨言论的影响。该研究包含 10 到 15 分钟的在线调查。

参与者：因为您是中国大学生而被要求参加。

自愿参与：您的参与是自愿的。您不必参加，并且可以随时停止参加。如果您不参与或决定一旦停止就停止，则不会受到任何惩罚或利益或机会的损失。您决定参加或不参加的决定不会影响您的学生状态，课程等级，推荐或未来的课程或培训机会。

收益，补偿和风险：我们不知道您是否将从参与中获得任何收益。您的参与不会获得任何补偿。

机密性：即使我们发布本研究的结果，我们也会将您的研究信息保密和保密。有权查看您的记录的任何人都必须对其保密。员行事。

为什么要求您参加？

学习程序

如果您参加本研究，系统将要求您完成一个匿名的在线调查，该调查大约需要 10-15 分钟。

自愿参与/退出

您不必参加此研究。

仅当您想自愿时才应参加本研究。您不应感到参加研究有任何压力。您可以随时参与此研究或退出。如果您停止参加本研究，则不会受到惩罚或损失您有权获得的利益。是否参加的决定不会影响您的学生状态（课程等级）或工作状态。

收益与风险

我们不确定您是否可以通过参与本研究获得任何好处。这项研究被认为是最小的风险。

隐私与保密

我们将尽力使您的记录保密和保密。我们不能保证绝对保密。如果法律要求，您的个人信息可能会被披露。某些人可能需要查看您的学习记录。唯一将被允许查看这些记录的人是：南佛罗里达大学机构审查委员会（IRB）的 Tengyue Chen。

尽管不太可能，但未经授权的个人有可能会访问您的回复，因为您是在线响应。机密性将保持在所使用技术允许的范围内。无法保证截取通过互联网发送的数据。但是，您参与此在线调查所涉及的风险类似于一个人每天使用互联网的风险。如果您完成并提交匿名调查后又要求撤回您的数据，则可能会或可能不会，因为研究人员可能无法从数据库中提取匿名数据。

联系信息

如果您对此研究有任何疑问，疑虑或投诉，请致电 1-303-960-3278 致电 Tengyue Chen。如果您对参加本研究的权利，投诉或问题有疑问，请致电 (813) 974-5638 致电 USF IRB，

或通过电子邮件 RSCH-IRB@usf.edu 与 IRB 联系。

我们可能会发表从这项研究中学到的东西。 如果这样做，我们将不会让任何人知道您的名字。 我们不会发布任何其他会让别人知道您是谁的信息。 您可以打印此同意书的副本作为记录。

我自由地同意参加这项研究。 我了解继续进行这项调查即表示我同意参加研究，并且我年满 18 岁。

仇恨言论是针对历史上受压迫群体的迫害，仇恨和侮辱的种族自卑的信息。仇恨言论通常被视为针对某些群体的攻击性和口头攻击，仇恨言论具有很强的煽动性

个人信息

1. 你的性别是什么？

1.女 2.男性

2. 你的年龄是多少？

3.你目前的状况如何？

1.大一 2.大二 3.大三 4.大四

4. 你用还是看别人用抖音？

1.是的 2.没有

5. 你看过来自抖音的短视频吗？

1.没有 2.很少 3.有时 4.经常 5.经常总是

6. 你使用抖音的频率

1. 极少 2. 很少 3. 偶尔 4. 有时 5. 经常 6. 频繁 7. 非常频繁

7. 你看到有仇恨言论视频的频率

1. 极少 2. 很少 3. 偶尔 4. 有时 5. 经常 6. 频繁 7. 非常频繁

对抖音仇恨言论的态度

8. 我喜欢在抖音上看带有仇恨言论的内容。

1.完全不同意 2.不同意 3.有些不同意 4.既不同意也不不同意 5.有些不同意 6.同意 7.完

全同意

9. 我对带有仇恨言论的内容有积极的看法。

1.完全不同意 2.不同意 3.有些不同意 4.既不同意也不不同意 5.有些不同意 6.同意 7.完

全同意

10. 我对抖音的仇恨言论感到非常讨厌，这让我想到了仇恨或愤怒

1.完全不同意 2.不同意 3.有些不同意 4.既不同意也不不同意 5.有些不同意 6.同意 7.完

全同意

11. 我不反对抖音上的带有仇恨言论的内容。

1.完全不同意 2.不同意 3.有些不同意 4.既不同意也不不同意 5.有些不同意 6.同意 7.完

全同意

12. 抖音的带有仇恨言论内容可以带来更多的乐趣。

1.完全不同意 2.不同意 3.有些不同意 4.既不同意也不不同意 5.有些不同意 6.同意 7.完

全同意

抖音仇恨言论对自我的影响

13.在抖音上看攻击性很强的内容对你对仇恨言论的态度有影响

1.完全不同意 2.不同意 3.有些不同意 4.既不同意也不不同意 5.有些不同意 6.同意 7.完

全同意

14. 在抖音上看仇恨言论内容会让你对视频中的人物产生愤怒或激烈的情绪

1.完全不同意 2.不同意 3.有些不同意 4.既不同意也不不同意 5.有些不同意 6.同意 7.完

全同意

15. 在抖音上看攻击性很强的内容对你现实的行为有影响

1.完全不同意 2.不同意 3.有些不同意 4.既不同意也不不同意 5.有些不同意 6.同意 7.完

全同意

抖音仇恨言论对他人的影响

16. 你认为在抖音上看到攻击性很强的内容对他人对仇恨言论的态度有影响

1.完全不同意 2.不同意 3.有些不同意 4.既不同意也不不同意 5.有些不同意 6.同意 7.完

全同意

17. 在抖音上看仇恨言论内容会让他人对视频中的人物产生愤怒或激烈的情绪

1.完全不同意 2.不同意 3.有些不同意 4.既不同意也不不同意 5.有些不同意 6.同意 7.完

全同意

18. 在抖音上看攻击性很强的内容对他人现实的行为有影响

1.完全不同意 2.不同意 3.有些不同意 4.既不同意也不不同意 5.有些不同意 6.同意 7.完

全同意

对仇恨言论审查机制的态度

19. 攻击性很强的内容不应该在公共场所播放。

1.完全不同意 2.不同意 3.有些不同意 4.既不同意也不不同意 5.有些不同意 6.同意 7.完

全同意

20. 抖音不应该传播攻击性很强的内容。

1.完全不同意 2.不同意 3.有些不同意 4.既不同意也不不同意 5.有些不同意 6.同意 7.完

全同意

21. 中国大学生不应该看攻击性很强的内容。

1.完全不同意 2.不同意 3.有些不同意 4.既不同意也不不同意 5.有些不同意 6.同意 7.完

全同意

22. 政府应该计划对攻击性很强的内容施加更多限制。

1.完全不同意 2.不同意 3.有些不同意 4.既不同意也不不同意 5.有些不同意 6.同意 7.完

全同意

23. 我支持在抖音禁止攻击性很强的内容。

1.完全不同意 2.不同意 3.有些不同意 4.既不同意也不不同意 5.有些不同意 6.同意 7.完

全同意