July 2019


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by

Nathan D. Barrick

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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College of Arts and Sciences
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Julia Irwin, Ph.D.

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April 25th, 2019

Key Words: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military, NeoClassical Realism

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Dedication

BATTLE STAFF OFFICER!
REMEMBER…
EVERYTHING YOU PLAN AND WRITE MUST BE EXECUTED BY THIS MAN.
HE AND HIS BUDDIES WILL BE THE FIRST TO PAY FOR YOUR MISTAKES.
DO YOUR JOB WELL – FUTURES DEPEND ON IT

I can still see the simple black and white Army poster in my mind’s eye – the only image on it the haggard, muddy soldier in a helmet with thousand-mile stare expression. I can still feel the hard knot of conviction forming in my gut at the charge the poster issues to me. For 29 years I have been working on military plans. Sometimes for them to be executed in training; sometimes for them to be placed on a shelf. And many times to have American blood and treasure at risk…

I never forget this responsibility – this duty which must be performed well, no matter what else is going on in my life...

But rarely was I alone…

This dissertation is dedicated to the strategic planners, in uniform and in civilian clothes, who imagine the worst, account for the last details, and envision the best of what we, as a nation, can accomplish.

It always matters.
Acknowledgements

I start these acknowledgements with my parents. I thank them for instilling a love of learning and a commitment to excellence in education. My father has been a Doctor of Theology for not quite fifty years. I say “not quite” because I can remember when he was not. I can remember the times he was working on his dissertation in his office in the basement, not far from us kids’ playroom. From my “now” perspective, I laugh and wonder at how we must have distracted him. I can remember holding his completed written work in my hands and being so proud of him. I am confident in a father’s love to know he will feel very similar emotions when he holds this tome.

I am very thankful to Dr. Jongseok Woo, my committee chair, for his guidance and support – I needed his endorsement and he made me work for it, what more could I have asked? I owe special thanks as well to the other members of my committee. I planned my choices strategically, because I knew how they could potentially contribute to helping me improve my research – they did that and more! Dr. Nicolas Thompson, Political Science, was the first professor I TA’d for and in our many discussions, I knew I wanted more of his piercing insight into American political science. As iron sharpens iron, we did not always agree; but, humbly, I must acknowledge I could not have formed this research agenda without his theoretical expertise and intellectual support. Dr. Julia Irwin, History, was commended to me by the History Department head Dr. Fraser Ottanelli, who graciously permitted me into his small seminars on TransAtlantic Migration and supported my acceptance to University of South Florida. I only wish I could have taken a class Dr. Irwin offered every single semester – an excellent teacher,
scholar and the right kind of demanding professor a doctoral student requires. Where this research might appeal to historians, I owe that to her. Where this research fails to meet professional historian standards, the fault is my own – and be assured, she told me where it did not! Dr. Thomas Searle, Joint Special Operations University, military historian, kept reminding me where I came from in pursuing this research and kept me mindful of my audience. His own doctoral work on a very challenging subject inspired me to engage hard questions and hard truths, to be clear-eyed and objective – and careful. Jongseok, Nic, Julia, and Tom – thank you!

I want to express my thanks to the faculty and staff of the School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies for their kind, generous, and substantive support during my research. Dr. Steven Tauber, the department head, engaged with me during my early research, in independent study, and gently mentored me. I will always appreciate his honesty in our first interview and his care and concern that I make the right choice. I am confident I made the right choice, Sir, thank you! Dr. Bernd Reiter and Dr. Steven Roach, graduate course directors during my studies, thank you for your classroom brilliance, availability, and for seizing those moments of opportunity to mentor. One hard part about being a doctoral student in my circumstances was the administrative processes the university required – I could not have completed this work without the assistance, guidance, reminders and support from Linda Boyette, Jamee Stiffler, Codi Babb, Jennifer Vincent, Marisa Laccone and Fedia Deshommes.

My cohort of fellow doctoral students motivated me, providing friendship and encouragement – my best wishes for your success! – Felix Scholz, Cave McCoy, Maria Gonzalez Malabet, Dragana Mrvos, Sajjad Hussein, and Ehsan Kashfi. This course of study at USF was enriched by the broader crowd of students, graduate and undergraduate, who attended
classes, either beside me or taught by me – I enjoyed spending time with and investing in our future!

Finally, my family and friends! So many of you have offered encouragement over the years, I could not list you all. But I want to single out my brother, Colonel Tim Barrick – you know why! And my children, Sarah, Elena, Ian, Sydney, Connor, and Sarena – I hope my achievement can be an example to you for pursuing your dreams and ambitions no matter how long it takes or when the opportunities best arise for you to make them come true by sheer force of will. I appreciate the encouragement, love and motivation I took from you, whether you realized it or not! You made me feel like I could not give up.

My loving wife, Sandra, you read every word, made more corrections and suggestions than I can count. How many hours upon hours did you have to listen to me tell you about this research? I am so very grateful for all that you have done to support my pursuit of this lifelong goal. Of all those that I have acknowledged here, the one indispensable person was you – this literal work would not have been possible without you – I love you.
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<tbody>
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<td>ABC</td>
<td>American Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
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<td>ADM</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>APD</td>
<td>American Political Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APNSA</td>
<td>Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARCENT</td>
<td>Army, Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT</td>
<td>Battalion Landing Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAA</td>
<td>Concept and Analysis Agency</td>
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<td>CBS</td>
<td>Columbia Broadcasting System</td>
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<td>CCS</td>
<td>Combined Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODEL</td>
<td>Congressional Delegation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Contingency Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic &amp; International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DPM</td>
<td>Draft Presidential Memorandums</td>
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<tr>
<td>EO</td>
<td>Executive Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDR</td>
<td>Franklin Delano Roosevelt</td>
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<td>FL</td>
<td>Florida</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPE</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Establishment</td>
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<td>FT</td>
<td>Fort</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>FYDP</td>
<td>Future Years Defense Program</td>
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<td>GA</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>General</td>
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<tr>
<td>GI</td>
<td>Government Issue</td>
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<tr>
<td>H.</td>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>HASC</td>
<td>House Armed Services Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Historical Institutionalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMAC</td>
<td>House Military Affairs Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRES</td>
<td>House of Representatives Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Intelligence Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMP</td>
<td>Industrial Mobilization Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IN</td>
<td>Indiana</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLRSS</td>
<td>Joint Long-Range Strategic Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operations Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPAM</td>
<td>Joint Program Assessment Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities (Campaign) Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOA</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSOP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Operations Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSPD</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Planning Document</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSPS</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Planning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSSC</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Survey Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFK</td>
<td>John Fitzgerald Kennedy</td>
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<tr>
<td>KS</td>
<td>Kansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA</td>
<td>Louisiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtCol</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel (USMC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDMP</td>
<td>Military Decision-Making Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td>Maine</td>
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<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSNBC</td>
<td>Microsoft – National Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>National Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCR</td>
<td>Neoclassical Realism</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGA</td>
<td>National Guard Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGB</td>
<td>National Guard Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>NME</td>
<td>National Military Establishment</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSRB</td>
<td>National Strategic Resources Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECS</td>
<td>Organization of Eastern Caribbean States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKW</td>
<td>OberKommando Wehrmacht</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operational Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPN</td>
<td>Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPNAV</td>
<td>Office of the Chief of Naval Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA&amp;E</td>
<td>Program Assessment &amp; Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning, Programming Budget System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>Policy Review Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>WI</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPD</td>
<td>War Plans Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WV</td>
<td>West Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War I</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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<td>Map 3</td>
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Abstract

This dissertation applies a Neoclassical Realism model to examine how the evolution of United States (U.S.) national security strategy-making institutions has resulted in a path dependent accrual of autonomy and increasing influence over the formulation of American grand strategy. Once U.S. national security strategy-making institutions were created, their existence inexorably led to increasing autonomy, the creation of new strategy-making institutions, and subtle influence in shaping American grand strategy by preferential focus on a militarized foreign policy. Additionally, the more autonomous these strategy-making institutions have become, the further they have strayed from the Constitutional mandate to create a government which provides for the common defense and the less successful they have been in implementing grand strategy for national security.

This dissertation examines this evolution in strategy-making institutions across three grand strategic moments: the end of the Spanish-American War (1898-1911), World War II and the beginnings of the Cold War (1940-1950), and the end of the Cold War (1980-present). Each case study discusses the historical facts of the grand strategic moment’s evolution in strategy-making institutions. These facts indicate durable shifts in autonomy and influence. The increasing autonomy is evidenced by the ability of these national security strategy-making institutions to define their own evolution, despite traditional American strategic culture perceptions about civilian control of the Military. These strategy-making institutions also shaped the formulation of American grand strategy and their evolution has had important transformative
effects on American strategic culture and civil-military relations. While, fortunately, the U.S.
can rely on ethical military professionalism, and the nation still holds its Military in high regard,
this path-dependent process of structural evolution generates concern for the American People’s
future and common defense.
Contextual Quotes

“The American political system has been largely incapable of dealing with national security in a mature and rational manner – at least in a sustained fashion.”

“Plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”
– President Dwight D. Eisenhower

“Civilian voices have been relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy, undermining the concept of civilian control...

“It is critical that DOD – and Congress – reverse the unhealthy trend in which decision-making is drifting away from civilian leaders on issues of national importance…

“America is very near the point of strategic insolvency, where its ‘means’ are badly out of alignment with its ‘ends’.”
—National Defense Strategy Commission, 2018
Preface

This is not a historical work, it is political research. There are inherent tensions among perspectives about this subject matter. There are good reasons why there are gaps in the public policy literature on the subject of national security. This research offers a challenging approach to Structure and Agency in American national security – it is certain to offend some patriotic sensibilities. It will not be enough to assert academic license, nor to point to personal professional experience, to fend off charges of heresy. A prefatory, so-called “trigger warning” is in order – perhaps all works dealing with national security should come with trigger warnings.

This dissertation is focused on Structure. It discusses lines and blocks on an organization chart and what roles and responsibilities those symbols have meant and how they changed over time. I have deliberately minimized the naming of the men and women who have served in these organizations. Someday, perhaps someone will be able to attempt to replicate this theoretical research by engaging the personal stories of the agents who served in these organizations to verify, or refute, some of this research’s claims. I want to emphasize I believe in the power and superiority of Agency over Structure – I believe individuals can make a difference. Although this research presents a critical view of Structure, I do not wish to impugn the integrity, patriotism, or professionalism of the Agency operating inside these organizations.

I have heard the concerns I raise in this dissertation summarily dismissed by individuals – who I know have political views predicated indirectly on humanity’s historical experience of these concerns in other lands, in other cultures, or in other times – because the American Military
is special among militaries. Americans justifiably have a high regard for their Military. The freedom to hold differing political views in the United States has been purchased by the sacrifices of the agents in this research. Indeed, the ethical professionalism displayed by the agents of the United States Military is the only reason Americans have not experienced the worst evils this Structure has manifested elsewhere and at other times. Despite the fears about a standing, professional Army rooted deeply in America’s strategic culture, the United States incrementally built the most powerful military force in human history. As a People, we cannot afford to accept this matter-of-factly and blindly trust in the ethical professionalism of our patriotic armed servants. But, thank God, we can. For now…

I must also explain a capitalization convention in this dissertation. Military, Government, and People will be capitalized throughout this dissertation when they represent the theoretical magnets of Carl von Clausewitz’s Trinity model.¹ When the terms are adjectival, they will generally not be capitalized. I adopt this capitalization convention to draw increased attention to the theoretical substance of the discussion, which the editing process has indicated can be problematic for readers. I hope this convention can help readers remember the forest (theory) when faced with all the trees (repetitive detailed references).

This dissertation examines the strategic planning capability of the Military and how strategic planning has affected institutional evolution, as well as grand strategy. Strategic planners wrestle with defining necessary requirements to ensure the future success of military operations in achieving the Commander-in-Chief’s selected national objectives. These requirements then drive the Military’s asks of Congress for resources and asks of the Executive

¹ Clausewitz’s Trinity model will be further discussed on pages 43-44.
Branch for policy guidance or diplomatic support for access and basing to support military readiness to wield military force to defend or secure national interests. Frequently, these plans are tested by wargames or military exercises to prove the validity of assumptions or rehearse the skills and capabilities required for success. When the tests reveal shortcomings, the Military responds by attempting to correct the baseline needed, as well as investigating plan modifications. These corrections may involve the reorganization of the Military, the securing of forward bases to ensure timely response or reactions, or the pre-positioning forward/abroad of forces or resources.

The aspect of this process I would ask for the bulk of your attention is towards the “how” of the Military’s corrections. Set aside the question of whether the military logics and strategies are correct; let us assume the experts in the Military are military experts. Instead, absorbing the story of institutional evolution, is this how America believes the Military should evolve? Is this trajectory of evolution consistent with defending the Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic? Is this evolution still providing for the common defense? Or is this evolution defending someone, or something, else?
Introduction

This dissertation examines how the evolution of U.S. national security strategy-making institutions has resulted in a path-dependent accrual of autonomy and increasing influence over the formulation of American grand strategy. However, an understanding of just the terms of reference in this first sentence could be developed in separate dissertations. Indeed, many scholars and practitioners have authored innumerable volumes on those subjects. The average citizen educated in the United States understands the nation has a Military; and has also learned the Military was significant to winning independence from the British Empire, resolving the difference of views on slavery in the Civil War, helping end World War I (WWI), and was responsible for defeating Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in World War II (WWII). The American People appear to have a high regard for the Military, and an implicit trust in the Military’s purpose and ability to defend the nation and the American way of life. However, the truth is not all of these statements about what U.S. citizens “know” about the Military are entirely accurate.

Theoretical Approaches

This research is focused on discussing the consequential change in national security strategy-making institutions, and not intended to correct the U.S. citizen’s understanding of American military history, although a thorough understanding of this military history is assumed. Military history is a very important basis for this dissertation and this research’s reliance on history drove the selection of political science’s neoclassical realism (NCR) as the theoretical
construct by which to study this consequential change in institutions. Scholars may also recognize elements of Historical Institutionalism (HI) and American Political Development (APD) approaches during this examination, which are very compatible with NCR – each is also characterized by a heavy reliance on historical methods and understanding.

The following theory chapter will discuss NCR in more detail; but briefly, NCR identifies four intervening variables which influence the formation of policy (in this case, a grand strategy) based on stimuli from the international environment – Leader Images, Strategic Culture, State-Society Relations, and Domestic Institutions (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016). In each chapter, this dissertation will address significant aspects of how national security institutions amalgamated Strategic Culture, State-Society Relations, as well as Domestic Institutions. Path dependency can grow the autonomic character of institutions, I argue this evolutionary process is what President Eisenhower cautioned the American People about in 1961, when he warned about the rise of the military-industrial complex (see Chapter 3). This path-dependent institutional evolution is illustrated by identifying and understanding durable shifts in governing authority.

Thesis.

I argue that once U.S. national security strategy-making institutions were created, the existence of strategy-making institutions inexorably led to increasing autonomy and increasing influence over the formulation of American grand strategy. The more autonomous these strategy-making institutions have become, the further they have strayed from the Constitutional mandate to create a Government which provides for the common defense and the less successful they have been in implementing grand strategy for national security.
The Literature.

The above argument is deceptively simple because it elides richly complex and exhaustive debates about International Relations (IR), national security, and American politics. I believe this argument fills a discernible gap in the above literatures because it aspires to bridge a divide between theory and praxis; a gap reinforced by an academic requirement for parsimonious theory and by professional fields ambivalent to such theory. This argument also specifically fills a recently identified gap to address theoretical aspects about the formulation of U.S. national security policy in the fields of American Government and Public Administration. (Archuleta, 2016). More importantly, though, this argument calls attention to the urgent need for the United States to fundamentally re-examine its grand strategic approach to ensuring national security.

However, far from eliding the debates in IR theory, national security strategies, and American politics, this argument is instead predicated upon understanding core principles and concepts in each. For the sake of brevity, if not parsimony, this dissertation will not exhaustively review the literatures of the above fields. However, this argument must be situated within the terms of reference and explanatory value provided by these great debates and classic works; they form the pillars for understanding the strategic environment and political systems within which American grand strategy is made. This research will also attempt to promote portions of the literature created by national security practitioners. Additionally, as highlighted by the approaches to this argument, reliance on history respects the complexity of causality and aids in tracing change across grand strategic moments.

From the field of history, an informal theory posits the role of history is “missing” in national security strategizing; history is certainly undervalued in most IR theories, but is reintegrated appropriately in NCR (Ericson & Melin, 2010, p. 326). In this view, leaders should
have a ‘hermeneutical situatedness’ in terms of being a social historical being under the constant influence of what has happened before (Ericson & Melin, 2010, pp. 326, 328). In this “Living History” theoretical approach, history is not reified as a factor, but instead is a dynamic constant (Ericson & Melin, 2010, p. 341). Military strategists and generals alike consistently refer to the importance of history; one of the best-known, earlier works highlighting this approach is Thinking in Time (Neustadt & May, 1986). An early 20th century Russian military theorist in the vein of Clausewitz, Alexander Svechin, warned if the “most important military phenomena of history” does not inform our strategic reflections with military-historical facts, then it is possible to drift into “confusion in abstract propositions” (Svechin, 1992, p. 77). In characterizing this theoretical approach, Neustadt and May relay the memorable anecdote, the ‘Goldberg Rule,’ suggesting leaders should not query “What is the problem?” but instead insist “Tell me the story” (1986, pp. 105-106).

This supports the significantly influential role of history in NCR. Unlike other IR theories focused on developing parsimonious theory to predict likely outcomes given selective conditions, NCR is a descriptive theory embracing complexity to provide a construct for decision-makers and policy-makers to craft foreign policy and even grand strategy. By avoiding the evident weaknesses in other IR theories, whose thinkers dutifully advise practitioners to avoid application due to those weaknesses, NCR can exploit the explanatory value across all theoretical approaches to deliver organized stories about a state’s implementation of grand strategy. In the case of the United States, there is a story that needs telling – the Government’s Constitutional mandate to provide for the common defense has been undermined by aspects of the evolution in national security strategy-making institutions, which eroded the influence of Congress, and diminished attention to the interests of the American People.
Terms of Reference

To follow through on the opening comment about separate dissertations being possible on the terms in the first sentence, these following sections will explain important concepts necessary to understand before proceeding with this dissertation’s argument.

“...In the interest of national security...”

The ambiguous nature of what constitutes “national security” is so well-known in the American public that invoking the “interest of national security” is understood as a euphemism for “you don’t need to know” or “I don’t need to tell you.” The expression is an appeal to a higher authority – a common, though nebulous, public interest – intended to shut down debate or discussion and at the same time engender trust in a well-intentioned and shared purpose. The appeal is fallacious; because, rather than national security being a concretely defined concept, national security is an inherently contested concept. There are psychological, emotional, and social aspects to national security, which defy concrete, shared understanding. Instead, national security is constituted by perceptions of risk and cost-benefit analysis, which are subjective and most likely not actually fully shared by all the citizens and leaders of the nation. When “in the interest of national security” is invoked, the default public reaction should not be suspicion-overwhelmed-by-implicit-trust evidenced through non-action. Citizens should challenge authorities to explain the risks associated with potential threats and to provide evidence and insights about the cost-benefit analysis supposedly justifying the operations, activities, or investments “in the interest of national security.”

The situation where an individual or group questions the objective, or level of effort required to achieve that objective, of a larger community is nothing new to human endeavors. Defining the community’s shared interests has been a perennial challenge and how to address
those interests absorbed the minds of mankind’s historical leaders and their advisors across all civilizations. The contestation of these ideas, interests, and activities can be called politics. Before leaping ahead to what we understand is political science, it is important to note the political contest is associated with individuals attempting to answer group-related questions about shared interests; this predates and leads to the evolution of Government (Bentley, 1908).

Narrowing the shared interest to security concerns, differing views arise out of threat perceptions, risk mitigation strategies, and the level of effort or investment the group can agree to commit to security, including assigning some individuals to roles as security providers. As this arrangement evolved through the increasing size of communities, the complexity of human and geographic environments, and technological advancements, the community differentiated itself into the Government (those individuals designated to make key decisions for the community), the Military (those individuals designated as the security providers), and the People (everyone else, and even sometimes inclusive of the Government and the Military). In simplified conceptual terms, when human communities fight with one another it is called war; and how the community will apply human and material resources to achieve its shared interest in security is called strategy.\(^2\) Over time, to distinguish this national-level strategy from other common uses of the term (such as military, business, problem-solving approaches, etc.), this is referred to as grand strategy.

National security means more than simply the defense of a state from external attack by another state’s military forces, but that is still the fundamental essence of national security and the quintessential task for a state’s Government and why the Government supports a Military.

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\(^2\) According to U.S. Department of Defense, strategy is a “prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.” (Joint Publication 3-0, *Operations*)
The U.S. Constitution refers to national security in the Preamble as providing “for the common defense.” Over time, the concept of national security for the United States has evolved beyond simply “defense,” and has increasingly involved offensive military action or pro-active diplomatic or economic initiatives to ensure national security. The idea that the offense sometimes provides the best defense likely pre-dates George Washington, but his articulation of this idea in a letter he wrote bears consideration:

It is unfortunate when men cannot, or will not, see danger at a distance; or seeing it, are restrained in the means which are necessary to avert, or keep it afar off. I question whether the evil arising from the French getting possession of Louisiana and the Floridas would be generally seen, until it is felt; and yet no problem in Euclid is more evident, or susceptible of clearer demonstration—Not less difficult is it to make them believe, that offensive operations, often times, is the surest, if not the only (in some cases) means of defence.³

Depending on the prescience of the observer or how a threat is determined, national security may be addressed by a range of activities beyond military action. Security may mean physical safety, or more broadly, it can imply freedom from the dictates of outsiders. Security is a subjective condition due to the element of fear or paranoia involved. The Military’s definition of security is “a condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences” (OCJCS, 2019, pp. 209-210). However, the Military’s definition of national security does not preserve this sense of security for the nation, instead skewing it with a particular emphasis:

“A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States with the purpose of gaining: a. A military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. A favorable foreign relations position; or c. A defense posture capable of

A former U.S. Secretary of Defense elaborated on the idea of national security being simply the physical safety of a state when he articulated “security must depend on the nation’s internal political and economic strength; the will of the people and their ability to persevere in a given course; the quality of U.S. education and technology; the state of national leadership; and the degree of confidence the public has in that leadership” (Brown, 1983, p. 262). Cost and benefit perceptions and geography are important characteristics about national security which differentiate it from other issues (Wirls, 2010, pp. 11-12). This expands the military definition of national security, from simply the ability to preserve territorial integrity, to include an ability to conduct economic and trade relations freely, and prevent any disruption to the state’s governance or ability to govern. It is this broader definition of national security upon which this research is based – national security encompasses the physical defense of the state’s border, territorial integrity, and population, as well as the defense of those mechanisms ensuring an effective economy and governance of society, including the People’s confidence in the Government. These various concerns of national security are defined as interests and, frequently in this sense, the term “national interest” is nearly interchangeable with “in the interests of national security”.

Returning to the challenge of identifying the shared interests of the group, theorists and practitioners have wrestled with why identifying “shared” interests should be so difficult (Trubowitz, 1998, pp. 2-3). One explanation is that the source of the conflict over identifying national interests lies in political culture. In this sense, the difficulty derives from differences in popular opinion about national identity and purpose. While Americans often refer to the Founding Fathers or make appeals based on the Constitution as though it were a fixed value, in fact, the Constitution and the Founding ideas are an example of compromise between Federalist
and Anti-Federalist sentiments (Lim, 2014). Over the course of American history, our values have evolved in light of this compromise and this is illustrated in significant values-based changes evident in civil rights for African-Americans, other minority groups, and for women. Despite the United States’ repeated deference to American Values in its published National Security Strategies (NSSs) of the past thirty years, in fact, these values are not constants. Predicating U.S. grand strategy on American values necessitates grand strategy adapting as American values continue to evolve. The grand strategic approach after WWII may not be relevant for U.S. values today; we are truly a very different nation in terms of how we operationalize values in our society today compared to 1945.

The source of conflict in identifying national interests is also institutional. In this sense, the division of responsibility between the President and Congress, with their inherent differences in Constitutional powers and constituencies, makes the identification of national interests fraught with political considerations. To a degree, this may mean that a hierarchy of interests might be identifiable based on how enduring the interest is in surviving changes in presidential administrations, Congressional sessions, and reversals in party control over either institution. Yet another explanation uniquely challenges that the source of conflict in identifying American national interests stems from the fact the interests are really driven by regional (sub-national) interests. Peter Trubowitz’s *Defining the National Interest* (1998) makes this argument based on how the regional differences in power and influence between the Northeast, South, and West have changed over the course of American history.

Interestingly, none of these explanations places the source of the conflict over national interests in the complexity of, or changes within, the international environment. Certainly, the United States responds to these changes, but these changes or issues do not drive American
interests. In other words, an international event cannot create an American interest where one did not exist before. This logical conclusion is challenged by the modern 24/7 news cycle which goads its audiences to believe international events require U.S. responses, thereby driving U.S. interests. However, what these explanations of the U.S. national interest indicate is a possibility the U.S. Government or Military might respond by committing blood and treasure to an international event before the contested interpretation of the national interest is determined. In this respect, the velocity of U.S. decision-making privileges certain institutions within the United States when in this reactive mode.

In the longer duration contestation of the national interest, the institutional approach also gains explanatory power. Even if sub-national regions generate interests or if critical moments of national identity generate changing values to affect the national interest, these interests are arbitrated through the policy-making process of U.S. political institutions (Trubowitz, 1998, p. 4). This dissertation engages the subject of national security at the institutional level to highlight the role of strategy-making institutions in developing grand strategy and, in effect, defining national interests.

In U.S. strategic culture, discourse tends to be divided between domestic and foreign issues, with national security forming an insulating, or transitional space, between the two. In the domestic policy space, American political leaders address issues like race, poverty, economic stability, education, health, resilience and sustainability, but do not necessarily link them to national security in a meaningful, or purposive, way. While the attention of U.S. government leaders to these issues is not lacking, the ends and means of national strategy are not coordinated across the whole of Government. There is not a formal mechanism for evaluating the importance of these domestic issues in comparison with conventional wisdom’s version of national security
issues and ensuring a programmatic prioritization of resource allocation to these concerns. Part of this is because the attention of national security strategy-making institutions has been Military and foreign policy focused – a symptom of fragmentation in constitutional power.

From its Founding until the 20th Century, U.S. national security considerations fit purely with the theoretical institutional explanation as a contest between the President and Congress in defining the national interest. Both institutions assiduously claimed adherence to the popular interest in advocating and contesting their definition of national interests. Influential leaders drew popular support to their ideas, and lesser leaders utilized the media, public engagement, and the electoral process to assess where the weight of public opinion fell. After the Spanish-American War, however, newly created strategy-making institutions in the military became an increasingly influential factor in the institutional contest.

National security strategy-making institutions.

Another starting point in this argument is to explain what national security institutions are. Essentially, this is the level of analysis for this dissertation, and it must also be detailed in the theory chapter of this dissertation. The challenge for the dissertation is that these institutions evolved over time and were typically shrouded in an understandable level of secrecy.⁴ At first, these nascent strategy-making institutions – the war colleges, a Joint Army and Navy Strategy Board, the Navy General Board, and a small War Department General Staff planning office – had a very limited influence over the President, the nation’s foreign policy, or Congressional committees and had no influence on non-military domestic policy. This stage of the evolution in

⁴ From the vantage point of an historical approach, perhaps most Top Secret documentation has been declassified for two of the three grand strategic moments and even a significant number of records have been released from the third grand strategic moment based on academic pressures levied by universities, think tanks and civil society organizations during their examinations of post-Cold War issues and an ongoing social pressure for government transparency.
American national security strategy-making institutions will be described in Chapter Two. However, understanding the Constitutional framework for warmaking powers precedes the evolution of these institutions.

The Constitution divides the warmaking powers between the Executive and the Legislative branches of the Government (See Figure 1). The Founders’ suspicion of a standing army and the American Revolution experience of reliance on the citizen soldier inspired them to enshrine in the Constitution that the Government would maintain a Navy (permanently), but only to “raise and support” an Army for a period of not more than two years. Along with the Constitution giving Congress the power to declare war, and the Senate the responsibility to approve international treaties, this control over the Military’s budget gives immense warmaking (and, thus, war stopping) powers to Congress.

The President, in turn, is entitled to be the Commander in Chief (CINC)\(^5\) and require officials to provide him with advice. In many respects, the understanding of what being the Commander in Chief means for the warmaking powers of the President is an embodiment of the legacy of the nation’s first President, General George Washington. The Constitution’s designation of Commander in Chief is a check on the prospect of a military coup, by placing the Military directly subordinate to the President. During the first two terms under the Constitution, there was a very real sense of power transference to the President from the Military, by virtue of Washington’s successful military command tenure. Washington’s own restraint, by being generally submissive to the democratic intent of the Continental Congress, helped influence American strategic culture to imbue the President with command and control over the nation’s

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\(^5\) This acronym has also been used as a acronym for the military commander of a Combatant Command under the Unified Command Plan.
Figure 1. Constitutional national security structures of the U.S. in Clausewitz’s Trinity Model.
military forces, even when no war was declared.

Even a hundred years later, and in spite of Mexican War, Civil War, and Indian Wars experience, the President was loathe to utilize the inherent powers of Commander in Chief to wield Military, especially Army, forces in pursuit of U.S. foreign policy. Part of this legacy was the number of pensioners after the Civil War, which was an important Congressional electoral concern and budgetary issue in the late 19th century. No politician wanted to increase the number of veterans drawing benefits or lobbying Congress for support. A very small, professional Army was left under-resourced to guard and enforce frontier policies, and a small, but growing Navy, and Marine Corps, provided a very limited foreign policy instrument for 19th century Commanders in Chief.

In terms of military professionalism, numerous European staff officers accompanied the headquarters of the Northern and Southern armies during the Civil War, sharing their observations with American generals and their field staffs. The American Military was exposed to the thinking of European military staffs, on the model of Napoleonic France and Bismarck’s Prussia. General William T. Sherman, when he became the Army Commanding General after the Civil War, even sponsored recommended reforms in the American Military to implement Emory Upton’s observations of these European models, but the incorporation of professional military concepts from Europe was rejected by Congress. Within the Military, officers’ preference for field command over staff duties reinforced Congress’ rejection of a professional Military or general staff. There were no staff colleges, no military intelligence services, and no staff officers dedicated to developing future war plans.

The Navy, leveraging its permanent status under the Constitution, developed a nascent planning and Naval War College service in the 1880s, and was able to provide key insights to
President McKinley, primarily by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, author of the seminal work *The Influence of Seapower Upon History*. It was the initiation of these professional staff services – planning and education – which formed the first national security strategy-making institutions. The impact of these first institutions provided a structural boost to professional military expertise, creating an increased ability for military experts to engage with Congress over the nation’s security-related issues. Over the next hundred years, their scope and influence would increase dramatically. These institutions evolved from providing organizational commentary and nascent war scenario thoughts to managing massive budgetary outlays for weaponry and force management, as well as conducting complex war planning for multiple global contingencies. Along this evolution, this professional Military provided structural support for an expansion of Presidential warmaking powers at the expense of Congress and the American People.

In terms of the bureaucratic aspects of the Military and the Founders’ intentions, the institutions of the Constitution were designed to prevent tyranny. The checks and balances act to thwart human ambition because they incorporate overlapping functions – such as in the case of the warmaking powers – and different constituencies for the two houses of Congress, the Supreme Court and the President. The Founders did not envision a large bureaucracy, nor a significant administrative function by the bureaucracy. It was not until the 20th century, and especially the New Deal and after WWII, that the U.S. experienced the rise of the administrative state and the President acquired the Chief Administrator role (Skowronek, 1992; Sparrow, 2011).

Gradually, these institutions began to exert more and more influence in Congress and increased the level of support provided to the President as Commander in Chief. During WWII, the expansion and success of the Military resulted in such a massive increase in the scope of
responsibility and influence of these strategy-making institutions that they were able to leverage the Executive and Legislative branches to authorize a reorganization wholly altering the institutional structure for strategy-making. However, these changes were in large part an endorsement of processes the Military created for wartime expediency, authorized by Executive Order (EO), but initiated and defined by the Military. This reorganization also created new institutions, the most significant for strategy-making purposes was the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the National Security Council (NSC). This evolutionary stage is further described in Chapter Three. Significantly, Chapter Three also describes the rise of the military industrial complex, about which President Eisenhower issued his famous warning to the American people in 1961. These strategy-making institutions played an outsized role in shaping American grand strategy in the post-WWII era, which privileged military perspectives on the conduct of the Cold War. President Eisenhower’s warning was as close as the President could come to speaking the truth without divulging the highly classified information that revealed the military industrial complex’s claims of a strategic Bomber Gap with the Soviet Union were unfounded.

Throughout the latter part of the 20th century, Congress received criticism for failing to conduct effective oversight, an indication of potential loss of influence to the Executive branch. This factor is very important to ascertain with regard to the military bureaucracy, because the experience of oversight and the extension of the military industrial complex into many Congressional districts and states gave rise to concerns about a conflict of interest in any effort to conduct oversight of the Military (Aberbach, 1990, p. 187). This latter stage of the evolution, including post-Cold War impacts on grand strategy, by these institutions is addressed in Chapter Four.
Autonomic Institutions.

As noted at the onset, the autonomy of government institutions has been a subject of academic research. By autonomy in a democratic society like the United States, we are really describing a measure of trust and influence within the broader framework of the Constitution (Carpenter, 2001). As such, autonomy must be understood in the sense of the system’s separation of powers, checks and balances, and methods of redressing or correcting aberrant developments. What we will see over the course of the historical case studies is that not only were national security institutions invented, but as they evolved (expanded) there were also added extra layers of institutions. This has had the effect of distancing, in the sense of autonomy, national security institutions from a particular node of Clausewitz’s trinity – specifically and importantly, the unique sovereignty of “We the People” in the United States.

An NCR model is utilized to explain the increasingly autonomous interaction of strategy-making institutions on the national security policy-making process – in this research, equated with the formation of grand strategy (see Chapter One). Where these strategy-making institutions are most effective is in the Perception and Decision-making processes of the NCR model. In addition to detecting, monitoring, and assessing external stimuli in the international environment, these institutions also must determine relative state power, both increase and decline, requiring a comparative analysis of global national power across the DIME – how military strategists and planners have operationalized national power as the qualitative sum of four variables: – Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME). Specifically,

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6 Current U.S. military doctrine identifies 7 variables, although this has not yet permeated the other fields who adopted the DIME as part of their narratives. The 7 variables are: Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL). While the DIMEFIL may be especially apropos for the third grand strategic moment and in discussing the future, the DIMEFIL may be less useful for the first two grand strategic moments.
more nuanced DIME analysis may help explain why the U.S. national security strategy-making institutions continue to advocate and implement an activist grand strategy, even while overall U.S. national power is in relative decline. Indeed, this exploration reveals a critical vulnerability in U.S. national security that may not be recognized, or even understood, through the lens of any other approach except NCR and Clausewitz’s trinity. More to the point, it is just this type of specific analytic work which informs the processes of the increasingly autonomous key stakeholders in U.S. national security strategy-making institutions.

One of those key stakeholders is the United States Military, which currently consists of four major services – Army, Air Force, Navy and the Marine Corps – who compete for prioritization of resource allocation through the budget and acquisition process (Jordan, et al., 1999, pp. 196-216). Congress has passed laws attempting to ensure inter-service rivalries do not unbalance national security considerations, such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986; Jordan, et al., 1999, pp. 177-78). As participants in the NSS development process, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provide military advice to inform the other stakeholders (Jordan, et al., 1999, p. 111). Other key stakeholders include Congress and other parts of the Executive Branch supporting the President: State Department, the intelligence agencies and other institutions and agencies which have increased participation in U.S. national security strategy processes. The Military provides a range of options based on military approaches and supporting recommendations (Jordan, et al., 1999, pp. 109-112, 217-233). But this current understanding was not always the historical reality of the Military’s role in grand strategy. This dissertation examines how the evolution of the Military’s strategy-making institutions affected the U.S.’s grand strategic choices.
Grand Strategy.

This argument begins with defining grand strategy as the organizing principle used by a state’s institutions to harness all aspects of state behavior towards a deliberate end. In NCR terms, grand strategy is the outcome of a decision making and policy formulation process which is initiated by the systemic stimuli of the international environment, interpreted through the perceptions of key actors who make decisions and implement policy. This process is shaped by the intervening variables of Leader Images, Strategic Culture, State-Society Relations and Domestic Institutions.

Conceptually, the dependent variable is grand strategy. Aided by strategic military theory and history, NCR provides the framework for understanding the range of organizing principles (grand strategic choices) by which the state applies its national power. The most important independent variables are the international environment and the state’s national power. Both of these independent variables are incredibly complex, which is why many scholars typically rely on designing alternative theoretical approaches to escape levels of analysis or required scales of empirical evidence problems. Thus, the four intervening variables are NCR’s approach and this dissertation will narrow the focus to considering specifically the role and influence of national security strategy-making institutions on American grand strategy across these intervening variables.

American grand strategy is disjointed in formulation and decentralized in execution. The pluralist interests of the participants do not reflect the supposed benefits of a pluralist democratic process, but instead diminish the effectiveness of, and may even undermine, U.S. national security. A significant part of the problem is the lack of an authoritative, attributed theoretical foundation for a coherent and effective grand strategy. The bureaucratic system for making
grand strategy has also been identified as part of the problem (Brands, 2014, pp. 12-13). In a
democracy, grand strategy and democratic politics operate on different timelines (Brands, 2014,
p. 13). In fact, making and implementing American grand strategy has been considered by some
to be so difficult they have advocated for a non-policy as the best policy to implement (Brands,
government processes, and military strategies indicate that despite over 100 years of democratic
national security strategy formulation in the United States, the U.S. does not have a national
security-related theory which effectively addresses the national interest as viewed by all
stakeholders. Instead, political and bureaucratic elites claim that their plans and policies defend
the American people and provide national security. However, upon a detailed examination of
resources and outcomes, the reality is that personal and proprietary elite interests are privileged,
and the interests of the People often subordinated to elite interests.

How the state addresses its national security is through grand strategy. Grand strategy is
the orchestration of all elements of national power in the service of national security, not only the
elements considered “hard” – military, economic – but also “soft” power, such as informational,
and those elements considered a mix of hard and soft power, such as diplomatic, financial,
intelligence, and law enforcement. Grand strategy has been called the highest form of statecraft
and defined as “the intellectual architecture that lends structure to foreign policy; it is the logic
that helps states navigate a complex and dangerous world” (Brands, 2014, p. 1). However, the
concept of grand strategy has been challenged as “slippery,” “fuzzy,” and “jumbled;” other
commentators question whether grand strategy is even possible given the complexity of the task
to identify and counter adversaries, forecast the cost of strategic choices, predict outcomes, or
control for uncertainties, not to mention whether the whole of government can even be organized
and directed by a grand strategy, especially in a democracy like the United States (Silove, 2018, p. 28; Betts, 2000, pp. 5-50; McDougall, 2010, pp. 474-493). Nina Silove’s recent analysis of the meaningfulness of the term ‘grand strategy,’ reveals three distinct meanings: a deliberate, detailed plan; an organizing principle; and a pattern in state behavior. She shorthands these three meanings to “grand plans,” “grand principles,” and “grand behavior;” and argues understanding and differentiating these three concepts of grand strategy facilitates investigating “fundamental and important questions about grand strategy” (Silove, 2018, p. 29). Antulio Echevarria, highlights another difficulty with American grand strategy, that military strategy in the war plans is not always directly linked to grand strategy (Echevarria, 2014, pp. 129-131).

Some critics have called American grand strategy apolitical (giving little attention to the peace after conflict) and astrategic (not thinking in strategic terms) (Gray, 2006; Wilson, 2007; Buley, 2008). Others believe American grand strategy is actually more political and strategic than generally perceived (Lind, 2006; Echevarria, 2014). Antulio Echevarria emphasizes the American war plans became the practical face of strategy (p. 111). Michael Lind argued American grand strategy had inconsistencies explained by tensions in American politics and foreign policy (2006). Hal Brands highlighted American grand strategy was hard work, but had to be thought through or the political consequences would likely be worse, also the need to be resource-constrained forced American planners to be both strategic and political in accounting for demands for resources (2014, pp. 194-96). Brands also suggests investing in planning, and also advises remembering power is multi-dimensional; but he does not go far enough (2014, pp. 197-201-203). This research approaches the issue of American grand strategy from a slightly different perspective – not substantively, but procedurally. When the historical record of U.S.

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7 Antulio Echevarria II is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and noted Clausewitzian scholar.
strategy-making institutions is reviewed, where the tensions arose as described by the scholars mentioned above, these institutions acted strategically and politically to correct institutional shortfalls. Expanded capacity substituted for better strategic planning and contributed to an over-reliance on military solutions to national security problems.

Overview of Chapters

Each of the chapters covering the selected historical case studies will examine what happened as national security strategy-making institutions evolved. In one sense, strategies that are successful can be understood to be successful until the point that they are not. While appearing to be a statement of the obvious, this begs the question whether the temporary period of effectiveness should be judged to be successful or not. Just because the strategic environment outside the span of control of a single state changes does not mean that state’s grand strategy has failed. This dissertation will not debate the efficacy of particular grand strategic choices. The scope of a complete analysis of U.S. grand strategy from the formation of the Republic to the present exceeds the present requirements for this dissertation, but that fact does not undermine the value of this approach.

Chapter One, the theory chapter, will explain the NCR theoretical approach which is built on Clausewitz’s “trinity” of Government, Military, and People to understand the purpose and role of institutions in national security. Additionally, Clausewitz’s model and famous dictum “War is an extension of politics by other means” provide a structural way of conceptualizing how institutions exercise power for national security, as well as providing the basis for understanding how increasing autonomy of national security institutions can affect grand strategy for a democracy.
In Chapter Two, the grand strategic moment after the Spanish-American War, the United States was faced with the choice to become a global Empire. Military problems identified during the war and the challenges of making this grand strategic choice resulted in the creation of multiple strategy-making institutions. This evolution resulted in significant substantive shifts in governing authority, primarily by Congress ceding certain authorities to “experts” in these new national security strategy-making institutions. However, I argue this evolution was controlled by Congress retaining and exercising limits on these institutions’ natural efforts at expansion.

In Chapter Three, in the grand strategic moment after World War II, the United States was faced with how to exercise its globally dominant power status. National security strategy-making institutions had evolved during WWII and the substantial reorganization was formalized in the National Defense Act of 1947. The JCS and NSC were new national security strategy-making institutions, the JCS an embodiment of its wartime changes, and the NSC, a military-led initiative to rope in the resources and participation of the rest of the Executive Branch. Importantly, the 1961 warning from President Eisenhower energized a public debate about the rise of the military-industrial complex.

In Chapter Four, the continued evolution and increasing autonomy in strategy-making institutions resulted in increased Congressional efforts to regain influence over the Executive Branch and its strategy-making institutions. The War Powers Act of 1973, the establishment of Intelligence Oversight Committees, the Church Commission, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 are efforts to assert Congressional authorities over the President’s war-making powers and over the Military’s responsiveness to civilian authority and to ensure overall military effectiveness. After the Cold War ended, however, the fragmented nature of national security strategy-making made identifying national interests extremely difficult and skewed the contest
towards military-defined results. Some of the strategic challenges the United States faces in the 21st Century are due to the velocity of military decision-making and strategy-making, which has outpaced other institutional processes. I argue in this chapter that the autonomy of the national security institutions, boosted by the credibility of alleged victory in the Cold War, and propelled by the increasing power and influence of the military industrial complex, has resisted these Congressional controls, even shaping their own evolution. This has important and far-reaching consequences, which will be further developed in this dissertation’s conclusion.

Relevance

Consequently, I argue, the evolution in national security institutions has influenced change in American strategic culture. In allowing President Eisenhower’s warning to go too much unheeded, We the People have permitted a well-intentioned, well-respected national security enterprise to usurp a level of autonomy far beyond what the Founding Fathers intended in the Constitution. The intense commitment of most Americans, especially those within the national security strategy-making institutions, to the Constitution has preserved a degree of important, if misguided, American exceptionalism. But this overt, symbolic obeisance to American values does not pre-determine successful grand strategy. Grand strategy is more properly formulated by a careful balancing of the Government’s, Military’s, and People’s interests, as understood in Clausewitz’s Trinity model. Ironically, the institution the Constitution established to reflect the will of the American People is the government institution least respected by the American People today – Congress, also the one institution most opposing a durable shift in autonomy regarding national security towards the military industrial complex.

Significant reforms are necessary to evolve U.S. national security institutions to engage in more effective processes; NCR provides the theoretical basis to generate this increase in
effectiveness. Theory may help to fundamentally understand the complex world environment, a huge amount of information, and the broad scope of issues involved in national security (Jordan, Taylor & Mazarr, 1999, pp. 6, 49; Deibel, 2007). By re-calibrating strategic approaches to include domestic politics, strategy-making institutions should also take into consideration non-Western strategic thinking as well, to reflect the greater diversity in the American People and its domestic politics, as well as the effects on the strategic environment by increasing globalization.

Perhaps, if the national security institutions and the People can better understand Congress’s role in formulating grand strategy, and how that institution has preserved a hope for grand strategic success, the prestige of that branch of Government can be restored. If Congress can better understand and operationalize its responsibility to ensure the People’s interests are aligned and supported with the nation’s grand strategy, it might be able to overcome the polarization and gridlock apparent in American politics.

The national security of the United States is in jeopardy, but the most significant threat is not external. Unfortunately, the evolution of increased autonomy in American national security institutions has prioritized and privileged the foreign policy and military role, so the Government, Military and People are out of grand strategic alignment. I argue more attention to America’s Constitutional values, seen through the lens of Clausewitz’s trinity, should undergird the next necessary evolution in American national security institutions.
Chapter 1
Resurrecting Clausewitz for Neo-Classical Realism

This dissertation’s examination of the evolution of United States national security strategy-making institutions and the implications for American grand strategy relies upon Neo-Classical Realism from IR theory. This NCR research incorporates important ideas from the fields of History and Sociology. NCR allows this research to appropriately engage the complexity inherent in policy-related studies, and this approach is aided by causal process tracing in linking various independent and intervening variables with the multiple dependent variables frequently encountered in public policy (Kay & Baker, 2015, pp. 3-4). At its core, this research privileges the complex interests and experience of praxis over theory, which accounts for the heavy reliance on history in three case studies. Also, where possible in the literature, this research highlights works authored by practitioners, instead of an exclusive rendering of ideas by academic theorists. Far from evading the more normal scholarly debates in IR theory, national security strategies, and American politics, this argument is instead predicated upon understanding core principles and concepts in each.

Before International Relations theory: Classical Realism

Not surprisingly, selected intellectuals in history sought to capture in writing thoughts about the importance of strategy and the impact of war on communities from even ancient origins. Sun Tzu and Thucydides illustrate the historical beginnings in non-Western and Western strategic thought, respectively. Two and a half millennia ago, Sun Tzu, in China, wrote:
“War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied,” (Sun Tzu, 1963, p. 63). Sun Tzu advised the state’s leaders to understand the environment, the enemy, and themselves through a process of ‘calculations’ and ‘foreknowledge’ gathered from spies and experts (Sun Tzu, 1963, pp. 64, 71, 77, 145; Freedman, 2013, pp. 44-46). Nearly contemporaneously with Sun Tzu, Thucydides, in Greece, articulated the quintessential national security interest dilemma in the Melian dialogue. Athens tried to convince Melos through logical reason to surrender and live, or be destroyed and dead before the Melians’ ally, Sparta, could come to the Melians’ rescue (Thucydides, 1954, pp. 400-408). Another classic national security dilemma of current relevance is the Thucydides Trap, so called for Thucydides’ depiction in Thucydides classic work, History of the Peloponnesian War, of the struggles and decision-making a hegemon faces when presented with a rising power expected to challenge the hegemon (Allison, 2017).

In tracing the evolution of strategy through history, the dominant influence of military theories and strategies is evident, but so too is the idea of applied reason to a complex phenomenon of many elements, ranging from “politics to technology to human emotions under extreme stress” (Paret, 1986, pp. 3, 8). Even before the rise of the modern, political nation-state, Machiavelli described a balanced approach to melding the national security interests of the state’s leaders, army, and People (Freedman, 2013, p. 53). Machiavelli claimed this was the most essential activity of political life and should concern the whole society; it could not be left to “deliberative assemblies of men,” to whom “pleasing the masses [is] more important than promoting the general good,” (Machiavelli, 1950, p. 354; Gilbert, 1986, pp. 24, 29). Strategy, in terms of national security, has always been about the rational determination of a nation’s vital
interests,\textsuperscript{8} its relations with external groups, and its foreign and domestic priorities, and not only warfighting and the military (Craig & Gilbert, 1986, p. 869). Grand strategy is the highest form of statecraft, giving structure to foreign policy and providing the organizing principle to apply all aspects of national power towards achieving desired deliberate ends in the international environment (Brands, 2014, 1; Silove, 2018).

*International Relations: Theory versus Praxis*

In the social sciences, during the interwar years of the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the field of Political Science appropriated the topic of national security, and even grand strategy, from the philosophers, historians, and generals. In the 20\textsuperscript{th} and 21\textsuperscript{st} centuries, IR studies differentiated approaches based on assumptions about the international system and prejudicially relegated most of earlier human thinking on the subject to what was labeled Classical Realism.

The differentiation of IR approaches results in a pluralist study of the struggles over power in the international realm (Griffiths, Roach & Solomon, 2009, p. vii); IR theories are commonly referenced, and frequently conflated, in discussions of national security and grand strategy (Betts,\textsuperscript{9} 2004, p. 7; Silove, 2018). IR theories are predicated on explaining the international environment states exist in – anarchic, orderly, unipolar, bipolar, multipolar, civilizational, and populated by states, non-state actors, institutions and even ideas. Recurring

\textsuperscript{8} Vital interests are those interests for which a state will go to war to protect; they justify the state’s use of military force. It is important to not abuse this term, because it is understood among practitioners that these types of interests are so important to the state they must be achieved or preserved as a matter of life and death – for the state. If “important” interests are inflated to the level of “vital” interests, the state may skew its selection of strategies towards the military, rather than relying on other elements of national power, such as diplomatic, economic, or informational. Approaches skewed towards military strategies incur high investment costs and risk strategic overreach, which may be contrary to preserving actual “vital” interests in national security.

\textsuperscript{9} Richard Betts is a former Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staffer and has served on the National Security Council. He is a practitioner, as well as noted scholar, who has also been a consultant to the National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cfr.org/expert/richard-k-betts
themes of stability, security, change, and progress illustrate the theoretical challenges IR thinkers face in explaining international developments.¹⁰

Importantly for this research, despite the relevance of IR theories, scholars and experts have critiqued the gap between theory and policy practice; there appears to be little application of practicable IR theory in real life (Walt, 2005; Betts, 2004; Snyder, 2004, pp. 61-62; Frappier, 2008, p. 35).¹¹ Indeed, many scholars, like Kenneth Waltz, even deliberately emphasize their commentaries were not to be applied as prescriptive theories to the practice of statecraft (Waltz, 2005).

¹⁰ The national security literature frequently mentions various IR theories, especially Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism or Idealism (Betts, 2004; Snyder, 2004; Walt, 2005; Wu Yue, 2006). The Realist school of thought focuses on the sufficiency of understanding the anarchic international environment and its effects on state interactions to explain international relations (Griffiths, O’Callaghan & Roach, 2014, p. 292).

Liberalism includes three theoretical pillars of international liberalism - interdependence, republican, and institutional approaches – which are not necessarily wholly integrated with each other (Griffiths, O’Callaghan & Roach, 2014, pp. 203-206). Constructivism emphasizes the role of ideologies and identities (Snyder, 2004, pp. 52-54, 60). However, explaining changes in the international environment in the late 20th Century, especially the end of the ideologically-framed Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, required these core IR approaches to further evolve.

A Neoliberal view of the post-Cold War global environment identifies the United States as a unipolar superpower who should primarily perpetuate values-based, international institutions to address international conflicts affecting U.S. national security. Neoliberals believed the U.S. needed to shift from a collective security mindset to a cooperative security approach, but policies and institutions were still far from implementing necessary steps (Bonder, 1994, pp. 31, 33). In the absence of necessary institutions, Neoliberals recognized the need for a Military for national security and to contribute to international order (Bonder, 1994, p. 37). The Neoliberal approach fares better than Liberalism in national security discussions, because the reality of the global environment forced an adjustment recognizing a role for the Military. Neoliberalism appears to be more flexible than Liberalism in devising mechanisms to address uncertainty, a shift towards realism, but also a shift towards Constructivism in placing those mechanisms in the hands of international institutions.

Neorealism represented a shift towards Liberalism and Idealism in recognizing the role of international institutions, or multilateral methodologies, in addressing national interests. Where Constructivism sees states behaving more responsibly, and less self-interestedly, as a project for the future, Neorealism placed the attainment of such behavior or actions in the “reality of the present” (Claude, 1986, p. 722). Neorealism also claims only Great Powers have the ability to advocate the values-based ideas of international responsibilities, but the experience of small states in the international institutions belies this observation (Claude, 1986, pp. 724, 726). Neorealists recognized a balance of power system could function towards equilibrium and would attempt to “correct” any hegemonic power (Claude, 1989, pp. 79-80). Claude criticized balance of power theorists who tried to formulate rules for this revised international environment and credited Constructivist ideas, including Human Rights and societal objection to war (Claude, 1989, pp. 81, 84). This approach improved on Realism by incorporating the policy strength and relevance of ideas, but still lacks a theoretical component related to the People (domestic influences and institutions) who presumably hold these ideas.

¹¹ Snyder refers to several high-profile expert practitioners by name; Frappier is included because he specifically articulates the same idea and, based on personal experience, Frappier’s critical view of IR theories reflects a commonly held view among senior American military officers who occupy positions and perform the planning in strategy-making institutions.
2001). Yet at their core, these ideas and approaches are relevant for reflecting how individuals in communities understand security and inform the strategies they will employ to accomplish their national security interests. IR theories have often wrestled with their relevance for policy and utility for practitioners. Steven Walt claims academic scholars are devoting more attention to policy-relevant theoretical work (2004, pp. 23-4). This process of attempting to adjust the general IR theories to better explain the changing world environment has led to the promotion of lesser-known, but increasingly important to consider, IR theories (also relevant to national security grand strategy, such as the writings of Robert Gilpin, who integrated economic markets into his description of the international environment) (Gilpin, 1987). Policy debates in national security are often based on competing theoretical claims and theory generates possible courses of action to resolve situations (Walt, 2004, p. 28).

International Relations approaches have become more sophisticated since 1996, differentiating from Neorealism and Neoliberalism material-based calculations of power to an ideas-based power to address national interests (Frappier, 2008, p. 8). John Frappier expands upon Peter Katzenstein’s seminal work The Culture of National Security (1996), making a case for a culturally relevant national security strategy at the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), a developmental lab for elite strategists at Fort Leavenworth’s U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (Frappier, 2008). Frappier contends the United States could develop a grand strategy with identity theory, a Constructivist idea resembling four precepts of Neorealism, but based on ideas and values: “the role of structure in world politics, the effects of anarchy on state behavior, the definition of state interests, the nature of power, and the prospects for change” (Frappier, 2008, p. 29).12 Michael Vlahos, professor of Global Security

12 Interestingly, Christopher Hemmer in Comparative Strategy argues President Obama produced an identity-based, Constructivist National Security Strategy in 2010 (Hemmer, 2011; Obama, 2010). Hemmer identified the
Studies at Johns Hopkins University and the U.S. Naval War College, explains the U.S. tends to fight wars on an identity basis and enemy acceptance of this “[American] war-frame has always been the critical and unacknowledged factor in American battle success” (2007, p. 4). 13 Vlahos cautions an identity-based NSS may be ill-advised in a world where “emerging societies and alternative communities” have a greater identity-based sense of power than the U.S. (2007, p. 8). An additional weakness of Constructivism’s approach for practical national security purposes is Richard Betts’ argument the U.S. conflates international and national interests due to American political culture and economic conceptions (Betts, 2004, p. 7).

Richard Betts, substantively involved in the Princeton Project on National Security, comments the historical record does not indicate whether a generally Realist or generally Liberal approach works better, nor which IR theory best explains national security or grand strategy (2004, p. 30). In addition to the dogma and practicable shortfalls in IR theories, another reason IR theory cannot adequately explain United States national security issues, is because the U.S. deliberately blends the theories.14 Snyder quotes Senator John Kerry, many years before his appointment as Secretary of State: “Our foreign policy has achieved greatness only when it has combined realism and idealism” (2004, p. 54). Another analyst observed the American people were not comfortable with the pure balance of power (Realist) approach, but honored it in practice (Maynes, 2000, pp. 10, 12).15 A Chinese commentator at Hubei University, Wu Yue, 

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13 Dr. Vlahos was formerly a senior staff member of the National Security Assessment team of the National Security Analysis Department at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. [https://www.theglobalist.com/contributors/michael-vlahos/](https://www.theglobalist.com/contributors/michael-vlahos/)


15 Charles W. Maynes is a former Assistant Secretary of State. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/06/AR2007060602456.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/06/AR2007060602456.html)
charges the U.S. synthetically combines various IR theories, which results in the U.S. tending to exaggerate threats, work policies to cross-purposes, and be unpredictable (2006). Wu neglected to include Liberalism, which actually pervades strategic thinking across the U.S. theoretical spectrum, in his critique of American national security strategy development (Wu Yue, 2006; Snyder, 2004, p. 57). To illustrate how Liberalism pervades American thinking and describes the United States’ activist approach and moralistic world view, President George W. Bush’s 2006 National Security Strategy was variously described as ‘liberal realism,’ ‘national security liberalism,’ ‘democratic realism,’ and ‘muscular liberalism’ (Doyle, 2007, p. 628). These labels were applied even though the Bush 43 Administration was considered neo-conservative (Heilbrunn, 2008; Brands, 2014, pp. 144-189).

Despite its increasing sophistication and attempted engagement with an increasingly globalized strategic environment, the established core of IR theory does not measure up to the requirements for a holistic, complex, practicable approach to addressing national security issues. IR theories form an important part of national security discourse and will continue to influence national security policy discussions and issue development, particularly when academics make increased efforts to publish policy-relevant work in the national security domain. Additionally, the sterile realm of parsimonious theory asserts a certainty in expected outcomes, which does not correspond with historical experience, nor adequately describe the decision-making environment actors face during implementation. Such simplistic theoretical approaches are certainly useful to aid decision-makers in identifying and understanding possible outcomes, but they cannot replicate the uncertainty regarding reactions by other actors or the uncertainty of achieving the

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16 Wu Yue published his article in the UK’s Defense & Security Analysis which is an independent, interdisciplinary journal, scholarly in content and style and claiming to be a forum for exchange of ideas and methodological approaches in the analysis of defense policy.

17 Wu’s omission may indicate some political bias at the point of origin, or Chinese government interference.
intended effects or outcomes of the decisions. IR theorists well understand this aspect, which is why they are reticent to advocate for implementation of their theories.

The actuality of uncertainty requires a practical approach which accounts for the possible accuracy about the advantages and disadvantages, strengths and weaknesses, of all theoretical approaches regarding any given activity, policy or investment. This is the realm of the practitioner – where all the theoretical approaches of IR theory are at the same time more or less valid and still mostly, albeit often wisely, inapplicable. The identified gap between IR theory and policy experience indicates a more practical theoretical foundation is needed to inform grand strategy -- actual national security policy-making.

Neoclassical Realism

The onset of the 21st century has evidenced a domestic politics turn in IR theory; multiple scholars have attempted to investigate innenpolitik\(^\text{18}\) as it relates to IR theory issues and national security (Kaarro, 2015; Trubowitz, 1998). This approach allows an examination of many issues that have national security implications, as well as transnational concern and impacts, such as race, ethnicity, gender, poverty, health, and education. Domestic considerations for national security are vitally important and must be weighed in the balance with the normally constructed understanding of the security dilemma for the state. For example, Government will risk overstating threats if they view the People as “ignorant, uncomprehending, and resistant” (Nathan & Oliver, 1994, pp. 5-6); the linkage between national security policies and mass values must be credible (Jordan, Taylor & Mazarr, 1999, p. 50); foreign policy must be managed on the basis of domestic constraints (Jentleson & Whytock, 2005, p. 82); the strategic process needs to be participated in by elected officials to ensure fundamental value differences in the electorate.

\(^{18}\) Innenpolitik is a German term used commonly in political science works to refer to domestic policy related approaches.
are properly proportioned (Snider & Nagl, 2001, p. 139); Congress must solicit input from civil society (Stolberg, 2012, p. 119); strategic choices are made at the elite level but supported by majority of the people (Maynes, 2000, p. 17). The very pertinent contributions from innenpolitik combine with recent historical experience, reinforcing Neorealism’s claims about the anarchic international environment, to inform a new theoretical approach in NCR.

Within the last decade, some thinkers have begun to develop NCR as a theoretical approach specifically predicated on the praxis of foreign policy and national security (Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro, 2009; Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016). NCR embraces complexity and uncertainty, and relies upon historical experience. Regardless of which IR theory some may believe best explains how the international environment should operate, NCR asserts the actuality of a mostly anarchic system. In this system, the various actors, state and non-state, as well as multi-state institutions, choose their own activities, policies, or investments – in effect, anarchic, even though states or non-state actors may abide by, or be pressured to respond in accordance with, international institutional norms. These choices do not always appear rational, because the choices are influenced by misperceptions, misunderstandings, ideological values, differing prioritizations within their strategic calculus, or other internal actor-based factors. However, there are consequences for any chosen activity, policy, or investment because other actors are affected by them, or multi-state institutions have established rules or norms which they may seek to enforce regarding the choices or consequences. In this actuality, theoretical perspectives which prioritize institutions over actors, or actors over institutions, in the interests of parsimony, are less useful than NCR which recognizes the complexity of the international system. Similarly, NCR accepts multi-factor explanations, which is more useful than approaches which privilege the influence of the external international environment over the influence of
internal factors, and vice versa, also in the interests of parsimony. Additionally, NCR improves on IR approaches which limit their scope to states and ignore the role of non-state actors or multi-state institutions (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016).

Neoclassical Realism is a salient effort to bridge the gap between IR theory and praxis through foreign policy theory, building on Fareed Zakaria’s state-centered realism and, more broadly, NCR ideas as expounded by Steven Lobell, Colin Dueck, Norrin Ripsman, Jeffrey Taliaferro, and Randall Schweller, among others. Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell in a 2016 published Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics advance a more formalized description of NCR (see Figure 2). Zakaria developed state-centered realism to address deficiencies in other IR theoretical approaches to explain why he believed the United States was not expansionist in the late 19th Century.19 Zakaria’s state-centered realism included the role of decision-makers’ perspectives. While state-centered realism addressed Zakaria’s question about U.S. expansionism, it is also important to see how well state-centered realism addresses other national security scenarios – such as hegemonic position and great power decline. If, as state-centered realism suggests, “nations try to expand their political interests abroad when central decision-makers perceive a relative increase in state power” (Zakaria, 1998, p. 38), then when decision-makers perceive a relative decrease in state power they should adopt retrenchment and scale back an activist foreign policy. Zakaria’s approach mirrors the preference of IR theories for a focus on predictable outcomes and falls short in explaining the continued activist foreign policy by the U.S. in the 21st century, despite declining relative state power for more than 50 years.

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19 Zakaria focused on the international system and did not include the westward expansion of the United States, which he viewed more as an internal stabilization dynamic than expansion at the expense of other great powers.
Figure 2. The gray circles and red arrow outlines indicate the focus of this dissertation; the NCR theoretical model is adapted from Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro (2016).
In their 2009 book *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro argued a state’s foreign policy is a function of relative material power, but the material power influence is “indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions and state structure” (Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro, p. 5; Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016, loc. 256, loc. 1224). Formally, NCR emphasizes the importance of the anarchic international environment, relative power distributions, as well as the concepts of complexity and uncertainty. This theoretical approach, predicated on sustaining relevance for policy-making, allows for the investigation of a particular great power’s grand strategy choices at a given time or place, rather than trying to explain recurrent patterns of international political outcomes (pp. 6-7). Grand strategy choices are varied, even when there is no clearly discernible threat within the international environment. These choices are more likely driven by leaders’ perceptions of the world, the strategic culture of the state, and domestic political constraints (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016, loc. 632-634). Beyond simply the theoretical constructs of IR theory, these choices also include psychological, organizational, societal, and institutional theoretical influences which shape and constrain the formulation of policy planning and grand strategies. (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016, loc. 1436, 1470).

*Roots of NCR: A Philosophical Foundation for Grand Strategy*

Neoclassical Realism should not be seen as strictly a 21st century development in IR theory. NCR’s approach recalls the works in Classical Realism unjustly consigned to near irrelevancy in the dustbin of history by the academic discipline of IR scholars. In the main, the behavioralist turn in 20th century political science likely accounts for the relegation of non-quantitative approaches out of orthodox IR literature. Additionally, the aversion to praxis in
many components of modern political science made less acceptable the more holistic and advisory nature of classical realist works like Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Tacitus, Musashi, Marcus Aurelius, Macchiavelli, Jomini and Clausewitz. However, these works continued to be studied by military historians and professional military officers educating themselves on military science to better serve in national security strategy-making institutions. In this sense, the relevance of these works for practitioners of grand strategy, who work in national security strategy-making institutions, has not been lost and the advent of NCR can bring these important works back into literature – particularly *On War* by Carl von Clausewitz.

In the early 19th Century, Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz endorsed Machiavelli’s views on national security and famously dictated “war is nothing but the

![Figure 3. Clausewitz’s Trinity.](image-url)

continuation of policy with other means,” (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 69; Gilbert, 1986, p. 31). Blending theory and reality, Clausewitz’s seminal *On War* articulated an enduring concept of
national security, orienting force and statecraft for a political end (Craig & Gilbert, 1986, p. 871). In most of the military strategy and national security literature, Clausewitz is also referenced for many important strategic concepts: friction, chance, or uncertainty; coup d’oeil;20 center of gravity; and the “trinity” (Clausewitz, 1984; Paret, 1986b, p. 213). Echoing notable predecessors and conceptualizing the discrete components of a nation-state, Clausewitz’s concept of the “trinity” – Government, Military, and People – forms the foundation of much strategic thinking for practitioners throughout the world, especially approaches favored by American strategists in the institutions in this research (Paret, 1986; Freedman, 2013; Bassford, 2014). Clausewitz more deeply explained the trinity as: the passion of primordial violence (People), the courage and talent in the face of probability and chance (Military), and subordination of force to political objectives (Government) (Clausewitz, 1984).

Clausewitz believed establishing any arbitrary relationship in the trinity would be useless as theory, because the relationships were too variable. He sought to develop a theory which maintained a balance in the trinity “like an object suspended between three magnets;” and believed On War was only the “first ray of light on the basic structure of theory” (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 89). Clausewitz advised theory “should be study, not doctrine” (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 142). Clausewitz’s perspective on theory can offer insights to a holistic theoretical foundation to grand strategy in any international environment, such as that offered by NCR.

Critics have claimed modern advances in technology made Clausewitz’s trinity obsolete (Bassford, 2014).21 In actuality, significant modern strategic thinkers still rely on Clausewitz’s

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20 Coup d’oeil in French means “a stroke of the eye.” Clausewitz uses the term to embody strategic intuition -- the ability of a commander to “glance” at a situation and understand intuitively how all the elements interact from the obvious geographic terrain, to the timing and movement of forces, to the morale factors in contest (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 102).

21 The notable critics are Martin van Creveld, John Keegan and Basil Liddel-Hart in Regier, "The Essence of War: Clausewitz as Educator," found in the recommended readings on The Clausewitz Homepage (Bassford, 2014).
enduring trinity. Alexander Svechin, an interwar period Russian military theorist, asserted Clausewitz’s relevance to the industrial age by placing economic power, ideologies, and technological advances in transportation, communication, and weaponry within the same trinity (Svechin, 1991, pp. 78, 82, 86, 106; Kokoshin & Larionov, 1991, p. 7; Kipp, 1991, pp. 36, 55). The destructive power of nuclear weapons significantly altered the timing and recoverability from the consequences of war, but theorists noted the enduring trinity to frame conceptual elements of nuclear war (Freedman, 1986). Strategic thinkers still cite Clausewitz’s trinity as foundational to developing strategy (Bassford, 2014; Dilday, 2012; Monk, 2017).

Interestingly and importantly, Clausewitz warned being too formulaic in applying theory to reality “defies common sense,” and “has often been used as a pretext by limited and ignorant minds to justify their congenital incompetence” (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 142):

“Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side. But it can give the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and of their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realms of action” (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 578).

For Clausewitz, the only theoretical foundation was one which studied “the nature of ends and means,” keeping close to the practical reality of experience (Clausewitz, 1984, pp. 61, 142; Dale, 2013, p. 2; Cornish & Dorman, 2011, p. 340). Keeping Clausewitz’s warning in mind, a practicable theoretical framework for grand strategy is not a checklist or formula for blind application; rather, it must encompass the variables actually impacting national security and grand strategy. With this philosophical foundation, an assessment of other existing theoretical approaches with national security relevance may help identify or explain independent and

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22 “Just as some plants bear fruit only if they don’t shoot up too high, so in the practical arts the leaves and flowers of theory must be pruned and the plant kept close to its proper soil – experience” (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 61).
intervening variables which should be incorporated into a complex theory about the policy-making of grand strategy.

*Strategic Culture: Military-focused Contributions to Grand Strategy*

As mentioned above, the aversion of IR theory to praxis ceded intellectual space to practitioners and theorists attempting to blend developments in political science and technological innovation in warfare, as well as actual experience, into theoretical approaches to national security concepts and grand strategy. For reasons which will be explained later in this work (see Chapter Three), the vast majority of the significant military-focused contributions to grand strategy came after World War II. In many cases, these theories frequently cited Clausewitz’s dictum “war is an extension of politics” as the bridge to incorporating their military strategic thinking into grand strategy. In essence, these approaches (Game Theory, Deterrence Theory and Coercive Diplomacy) should be understood to characterize U.S. strategic culture. Strategic Culture is an NCR intervening variable in this research – these ideas concern theoretical, but also practical approaches (some not so advisedly implementable, as was learned through experience).23

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23 The first relevant theory after World War II, Game Theory was a military think tank adaptation of Rational Choice theory using scientific methods to control uncertainty, defining probable outcomes to identify the right strategy (Freedman, 2013, pp. 151-153; Belletto, 2009, pp. 334, 337). Game Theory approach was popular early in the superpower nuclear arms race, but fell out of favor in the mid-1960s as a useful tool for determining strategic options. In its attempt to tackle uncertainty directly by subordinating chance to the theory of calculable probability, Game Theory ignored the reality randomness and chance cannot be controlled. Game Theory was directly lampooned in Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 “Dr. Strangelove” nightmare-comedy movie on the irrationality of serious nuclear strategies (Belletto, 2009, p. 344); Game Theory attempted to master the realm of uncertainty – in the current vernacular: an epic fail.

The U.S. developed Deterrence Theory as a strategic approach contemporaneously with Game Theory, but predicated it on the ability to communicate with an opponent and demonstrate the credible capability to follow through on strategic threats as leaders grappled with the nuclear Cold War (Wilner, 2011, p. 31; Freedman, 2013, p. 158; Jordan, et al., pp. 73-81). The weaknesses in Deterrence Theory were the ability to effectively communicate and the confidence in recognizing assigned values for each side’s interests and objectives (Wilner, 2011, pp. 12, 32). Deterrence theory was somewhat effective and remained a core part of the U.S. strategic thinking, even after the end of the Cold War. Important for consideration in a more complex view of the international environment, deterrence was deemed less effective against non-state actors (changes in the U.S. 2017 National Defense Strategy (NDS) to prioritize revisionist great powers and rogue states have revitalized Deterrence theory (NDS, 2017)). By
Focusing on military-based approaches exposes the actual process of grand strategy and NSS\textsuperscript{24} development, as well as the role of different stakeholders within the United States specifically, especially the interaction of the executive and legislative branches with the Military. This process is inherently bureaucratic and involves various institutions and hierarchical

\textsuperscript{24}The national security strategy is a document prepared periodically by the executive branch of the government of the United States for Congress which outlines the major national security concerns of the United States and how the administration plans to deal with them. The legal foundation for the document is spelled out in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The document is purposely general in content and its implementation relies on elaborating guidance provided in supporting documents. The NSS “provides a vision for strengthening and sustaining American leadership in this still young century. It clarifies the purpose and promise of American power. It aims to advance our interests and values with initiative and from a position of strength” (Obama, 2015).
structures. The nature of this “black box” in the United States opens the aperture to consider other types of theory for relevance to the national security and grand strategy processes.

**Domestic Institutions: Management Theories and National Security Strategy**

The complex bureaucracy participating in the NSS process draws organizational management theory commentary in the literature, especially Complexity Theory and Bureaucratic Theory. The literature on Complexity Theory also specifically draws on

25 Complexity Theory was intended to fix organizations’ tendency towards linear, sequential approaches to problem solving (Edmunds, 2014, p. 532). The key concepts of Complexity Theory are: the eponymous complexity, emergence (meaning the whole is different than just the sum of the parts), self-organization (order increases from the bottom up), attraction (dynamism starts locally), autonomous agents (self-interested actors using local information to make local decisions with possible ripple effects), and adaptation (fitting in to the environment) (Ryan, 2009, p. 72). Organizations can find ways to “leverage informal mechanisms, exploit emergence, and shape the environment” if they can better understand its complexity and adapt (Ryan, 2009, p. 88). Alex Ryan advocated the Adaptive Approach to national security in the Australian Army Journal (2009). Ryan suggested the Government not use “prediction-based controls” or deterrence and shift from trying to impose order on chaos, but instead to “harness complexity” (2009, p. 85). Clausewitz’s concept of uncertainty is embraced by the adaptive approach via the same mechanisms Clausewitz advocated – courage, flexibility, intellect, and intuitive genius (Ryan, 2009, pp. 75-6). Complexity Theory differs from the Military Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy in its intention to accomplish solely constructive, positive outcomes – in a business sense (Edmunds, 2014). Relevant to the NSS process, Complexity Theory advocates: taking the initiative, risk management methodologies, assessments of effectiveness, horizon scanning, driver and trend analysis, scenario planning, holistic approaches over the utilization of subject matter experts, and developing a grand narrative to guide the strategic project across the whole of government – particularly relevant for grand strategy (Ryan, 2009, p. 74; Edmunds, 2014, pp. 525, 527-8, 533-4; Cornish & Dorman, 2011, p. 339; Kilcullen, 2013, p. 17).

26 Bureaucratic Management Theory, applicable to the process of making national security strategy (NSS), involves an organization structured hierarchically and governed by clearly defined decision-making rules. Several authors describe the bureaucratic NSS process from its original checks and balances on national security advice to the President (Souers, 1949, pp. 534, 535) to its whole of government interagency process (Snider & Nagl, 2001, p. 140; Stolberg, 2012, p. 102), the linkage to resourcing in the federal budget (Doyle, 2007, p. 629; Brook, 2012, pp. 43-44), to the months-long coordination process to produce an NSS (Doyle, 2007, p. 624; Snider & Nagl, 2001, p. 131). The NSS is a “planned, systematic, and rational process . . . shaped by strong leaders, organizational cultures, and governmental structures” (Stolberg, 2012, p. 13). The authors identified several apparent implementation problems: claiming the NSS process was out of date and sub-optimized for national security coordination since civilians were underfunded (Brook, 2012, p. 37); claiming a bureaucratic approach reached a lowest common denominator due to consensus or else a “surfeit of strategies” due to inclusiveness (Doyle, 2007, pp. 624, 628); the process resulted in muddling through or “serial disjointed incrementalism” (Cornish & Dorman, 2011, pp. 343-4); mid-level bureaucrats more knowledgeable about implementation requirements were left out of the process (Stolberg, 2012, p. 116); or the process was hampered by the ‘demosclerosis’ afflicting divided government (Snider & Nagl, 2001, p. 139).

In terms of Clausewitz’s trinity, the Bureaucratic Management Theory is too skewed towards the Government and the Military; but does closely link the two in coordinating the NSS (Brook, 2012, p. 39). However, the theory is intimately absorbed with politics, an essential element of Clausewitz’s concept of national security. Clausewitz’s concept of uncertainty does not appear to be addressed in the theory, and this is illustrated by the plethora of problems scholars and experts identified in the bureaucratic process. The NSS process appears to be explainable through Bureaucratic Management, but the substance of the NSS can only be linked to organizational inputs; the theory does not explain fundamental issues of national security.
Clausewitz’s *On War*. The concept of uncertainty which Complexity Theory embraces is exactly the same as Clausewitz describes (Edmunds, 2014, p. 531). One author noted how Clausewitz’s trinity concept is the “quintessential demonstration of a nonlinear system highly sensitive to the initial conditions under which it operates” (Beyerchen, 1997, p. 72). The key concept of “attraction” in Complexity Theory evokes the image of the magnets in Clausewitz’s trinity. An organization is assumed to be in a state of rivalry with its competitors, as well as in a relationship with its environment – labor, resources, distribution networks, customers, etc. Organizations use theory to employ means to an end and develop strategies (Rumelt, ~1970, p. 199).27 Given the government’s bureaucratic process, these approaches also merit review because they elaborate on the NCR intervening variable of domestic institutions, and will help understand how national security strategy-making institutions behave and how their evolution shapes Strategic Culture and State-Society Relations, in this case civil-military relationships.

An alternative organization management theoretical approach intended to address this issue of strategic substance in an organization’s bureaucratic process is the relatively new Strategy as Practice approach. This approach can be succinctly summarized: strategy is not something an organization “has” strategy is something an organization “does” (Seidl, Chia & MacLean, 2006). Strategy as Practice researches the “black box” of strategy formation in depth by examining strategic planning, strategy implementation, and other strategic activities. This avenue of research may lead to the formation of a theory as it deliberately shifts away from organizational management’s focus on how strategy affects performance (Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl & Vaara, 2010). David Seidl published an interesting perspective in the field discussing strategy not as a monolithic concept, but instead as an ecology, fragmented into a multitude of

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27 Richard Rumelt is the Harry and Elsa Kunin Chair in Business and Society at the UCLA Anderson School of Management. Publication data for the document in the author’s personal files is not defined, likely from 1970s.
strategic discourses (2007). Given the various strategic approaches in the literature review, this idea has compelling merit for inclusion into a complex, holistic theoretical framework for grand strategy.28

Significantly, the bureaucratic aspects of management theories are relevant to the study of public policy in political science, particularly as it addresses the political institutions of the United States Government. For the purposes of NCR, these points aid in understanding the Decision-making and Policy Implementation processes, as well as informing the intervening variables of Leader Images, Strategic Culture, State-Society Relations and Domestic Institutions. The concepts and ideas are cross-cutting and therefore broadly applicable, however, they are not sufficient to explain grand strategy formulation on their own. Other theoretical approaches which inform the complexity of national security strategy development in grand strategy were examined in the research, but excluded for being less germane to analyzing the evolution of strategy-making institutions.29

28 Another management-style approach is Risk Management. In Risk Management, threats are identified, vulnerabilities assessed, risks determined, and mitigating methods of reducing risk are prioritized and resourced. While identifying threats and assessing vulnerabilities is straightforward, the assignment of risk is a more subjective process, giving room for theory, even in fields related to national security as noted in a psychological study on risky decision making by intelligence analysts (Reyna, Chick, Corbin & Hsia, 2014). As discussed earlier, Game Theory and scientific management contribute to the subjective risk management process especially in terms of estimating risk. Possibility Theory seeks to refine the risk determination process with a particular application to national infrastructure security from cyber threats (Baskerville & Portougal, 2003). Possibility Theory purports to build on probability in Game Theory. Analysis and insights inform the prioritizing of options into those “more likely” based on subjective consideration of the quantified risk estimates. The attractiveness of the scientific approach and the maturity of Risk Management theory also led to further refinement of military-based Game Theory into management-related Decision Theory (Brams & Kilgour, 1988). The field is driven by the assumption individuals make rational choices in decision-making situations (Brams & Kilgour, 1988, p. 185). Brams and Kilgour agree national security is too important to be left to Game Theory but advocate its ability to assist in solving “seeming paradoxes” in national security issues (1988, p. 196).

29 Borrowed from sociology and applied to the NSS process is Role Theory. In Role Theory states assume identities as global actors determining how and why they will influence others (Gaskarth, 2014, p. 559). The state develops a role orientation based on leadership, domestic pressures, and external expectations (Gaskarth, 2014, pp. 561-563). Role theorists believe this represents the highest order of strategic thinking, but are cautious about how much agency policy-makers can exercise (Gaskarth, 2014, pp. 563, 565). Over-reliance on Role Theory can lead to short term gains harming longer term interests (Gaskarth, 2014, p. 577).

Also from sociology, a very interesting theoretical approach analyzed the rhetoric of published NSSs and suggested analysis based on word choices. The essential premise is the way states talk matters (Mohr, Wagner-
Bureaucratic Autonomy

Until the 21st Century, most scholars were content to cede national security theory to the IR field; but, after the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States, Public Policy scholars recognized a critical vulnerability in the deliberate avoidance of national security policy-making by American Government scholars (Archuleta, 2016). This dissertation addresses the identified gap in national security literature; a gap outlined by the division of disciplinary labor between the fields of IR and Public Policy – the disconnects between theory and practice, and the rarefied air of Top Secret classification of war plans and strategic intelligence analysis. Despite scholars recognizing the importance of examining U.S. national security from Public Policy perspectives, or even American Government institutional approaches, there remains a significant gap in the literature (Archuleta, 2016; Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro, 2009, pp. 13, 295, 297; Ripsman, 2009, pp. 170, 179).

Pacifici, Breiger & Bogdanov, 2013, p. 696; Hartnett & Stengrim, 2006). Organization management ideas also influence this approach noting value in presenting strategy in narrative forms (See Appendix 4) (de la Ville & Mounoud, 2010, p. 195). This research might present compelling observations about the value, or consequences, of publicly producing the NSS (Hemmer, 2011, p. 270). This research may also reveal whether a document with plurivocity (de la Ville & Mounoud, 2010, p. 190) is the deliberate product of a small group (Stolberg, 2012, p.101) or the procedural result of the bureaucratic process across the whole of government (Snider & Nagl, 2001; Jordan, et al., 1999). Certainly, these are areas for further research, but which fall outside the scope of this project. Another approach with noteworthy theoretical relevance to the NSS development process, which grew out of risk management and interest group activities, is an Environmental Security approach (Mathews, 1989). This theoretical approach, although included in other theories by reference to natural hazards and risks, assigns more weight to environmental considerations given the national security impacts (Gaines, 2006, p. 322; Mathews, 1989). The Environment was first included in President Clinton’s 1994-95 NSS (Gaines, 2006, pp. 321, 346). While environmental scarcity is “neither a necessary nor sufficient cause” of violence on its own it will increasingly become intrinsic to conflict areas causing further instability around the world (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 7; Gaines, 2006, p. 370). States will have strategic choices to make grappling with three types of scarcity: supply-induced, demand-induced, and structural scarcities (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Additionally, work in environmental theory emphasizes the role of non-state, transnational, and international institutions as necessary to solve the complex problems related to the environment (Conca, 2006; Ciplet, et al., 2015; Pellow, 2007). Especially if grand strategy and national security are to encompass climate change and more complex securitization of environmental concerns, the lessons learned from strategic and international institutions should be incorporated into a complex, holistic theoretical framework. However, this approach is less explanatory for historical cases, but it may be more necessary for future considerations of grand strategy.
Examining the national security strategy-making institutions requires qualitative assessments of the Domestic Institutions and their roles, State-Society Relationships, Strategic Culture and the personalities involved. Public Policy scholarship in understanding bureaucratic autonomy permits increased accuracy by identifying the interaction of interest groups or stakeholders in the policy-making process. Other approaches to the subject of national security tend to summarily anthropomorphize the state as a unitary actor, or in other words, conflating the “black box” of the state’s domestic influence. Often, much analysis has properly focused on the President because the Presidency’s singular ‘buck stops here’ role as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief permits a reasonable degree of relevance for conducting research and theoretical analysis by social scientists across many disciplines from psychology and political science to sociology and history. Also, security classification constraints (TOP SECRET information is not typically reviewed for declassification for 30 or 50 years after it is developed) and a requirement for specific professional knowledge (military staff college experience) have limited research opportunities to investigate the role of military national security strategy-making institutions. The expanded model from NCR permits a more formalized process to examine a finer nuance of how Strategic Culture, State-Society Relations, and Domestic Institutions of national security actually influence not only the executive branch, the President in particular, but also influence the entire strategy-making process. From their beginning, national security strategy-making institutions increasingly drew power away from Congress, and gained influence over the Presidency, becoming more and more autonomous.

According to Daniel Carpenter in *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy*, bureaucratic autonomy emerges under three conditions (2001). Firstly, autonomous bureaucracies are politically differentiated from their former controllers. They will exhibit unique preferences and
interests which diverge from other political actors, including the other branches of Government and interest groups. Secondly, autonomous bureaucracies require the development of unique organizational capabilities, which allow them to act upon their unique preferences and interests. These capabilities may involve the ability to assess and analyze the political and international environment, the ability to solve problems by generating new programs or solutions, or possess the ability to plan and administer programs effectively and efficiently. Carpenter also identifies that to exercise these organizational capabilities, they will typically possess bureaucratic entrepreneurs. Thirdly, bureaucratic autonomy requires the political legitimacy evidenced by their reputation and the level of trust among the rest of the Government and the People. When these bureaucratic agencies are most autonomous, they will also be grounded in multiple networks which can influence the processes of Government (Carpenter, 2001, p. 14). Of particular concern for this research is Carpenter’s emphasis that:

Bureaucratic autonomy prevails when a politically differentiated agency takes self-consistent action that neither politicians nor organized interests prefer but that they either cannot or will not overturn or constrain in the future (p. 17).

This ability to prevail is accomplished because the legitimacy of the bureaucracy is so ensconced in the Government and the People there is concern constraining the bureaucracy would be harmful to their own interests. In this sense, the high regard in which their Military is held by the American people and the deference paid to military leaders by all parts of the Government, commonly seen as a “good thing,” is actually, possibly, fundamentally inimical to traditional American concepts of national security and military professionalism. The case studies will illustrate in detail the evolution of national security strategy-making institutions and also examine the how autonomous these institutions, and the Military as a whole, have become.
The challenge for scholars in examining the bureaucracy is the ability to pierce the veil, so to speak, of access to and objectivity from civil servants or military professionals, and in some cases past the safeguards of secrecy to protect these national security institutions. It is not only difficult to gain access, but even with the information gained it is challenging to measure it appropriately for the purposes of scientific analysis. How does one measure the discretion afforded to bureaucracies by Congress? Indeed, even the conduct of oversight can be deferential and only give the appearance of effective control, considering the context of the interactions (Huber and Shipan 2002, p. 9). Is the process of oversight “good enough” for the purposes of retaining civilian control over the Military? Does this protect the People’s sovereignty in the sense of reserved powers in the Tenth Amendment? While this dissertation will not fully engage or answer these questions, it does create a theoretical premise and provide evidence and analysis which can support and illuminate further scholarly examination of this important issue.30

Part of the American political culture is to be suspicious of Government. Americans want a small bureaucracy, but they want the benefits Government can provide as well. Part of Congress’ appeal to their constituents is when they successfully demonstrate oversight over bureaucratic excesses. (Aberbach, 1990, pp. 9-10). However, there is a tension regarding successful Congressional oversight of the Military in cases where excesses like the oft-used anecdotal $600 toilet seats (Hiatt, 1985) and the assertion of Congressional control in a clash of prestige – the Military is a far more highly regarded institution among the People than is

30 Bureaucratic theories of delegation may help inform future research in analyzing Congress’ effective ability to provide oversight of the Military. The more detailed Congress makes the laws over the Military, the more likely there is for conflict to be generated, which could eventually prove risky if current military professional ethics erode over time. The greater the Military’s bureaucratic autonomy becomes, the less Congress and the People can rely on the Military to constrain its own reactions to intrusive or controversial oversight. However, if Congress delegates, or cedes, certain types of oversight authority to the Military to minimize this type of conflict, the more difficult it may become structurally for the Military to accept other forms of Congressional oversight.
Congress. The case studies over these grand strategic moments indicate the Military in general, but national security strategy-making institutions in particular, gained increasing bureaucratic autonomy, as Congress ceded warmaking and policy-making powers to the executive, especially during the New Deal and World War II timeframe. This more powerful Presidency also rotated administrations more frequently in mandated election cycles than significant changes in strategic environment generated requirements to adjust grand strategy. In this sense, the national security strategy-making institutions increased autonomy as they were able to sustain their policy preferences despite Presidential administration turnover, resulting in increased military budgets and furthering the influence of the military industrial complex. However, once the Military’s (and military industrial complex’s) national security strategy expertise was called into question by the Vietnam War experience, an emboldened Congress exerted oversight, attempting to redress the durable shift in warmaking powers (see Chapter Four).

Expertise

The concept of bureaucratic expertise is problematic. The state is interested in gaining the best expert advice to address problems; however, those experts then develop distinct policy preferences and their objectivity across the political spectrum may not be representative of the People’s political preferences. Since the bureaucrats are not elected, the bureaucracy risks implementing values-based, preferential policies out of synchronization with Congress or with the People. If Congress exerts oversight, it may constrain the best policy advice from implementation. In such an environment, convincing experts to remain inside strategy-making institutions when their preferred policy implementation is frustrated may be inconsistent with the protections supporting job security and providing pensions. The tension between service, competence and representative preferences is of particular interest to Public Policy scholars.
Whose preferences should be heeded -- Congress or the expert bureaucracy? (Aberbach, 1990; Gailmard & Patty, 2007, pp. 873-4, 886; Carpenter, 2001; McCubbins, Noll, Weingast, 1987, 1989; Weingast and Moran, 1983; Whitford, 2005; Wood and Waterman, 1994). These questions have been investigated by scholars examining other parts of United States bureaucracy, but the role of bureaucratic expertise in how professional military staffs have affected the implementation of American grand strategy and foreign policy in strategy-making institutions has been underexamined.

**Congress**

Scholars have noted concern arises when the bureaucrats have policy preferences which differ from the members of Congress or the President. Policy choices by politicians are periodically subjected to electoral discipline; the bureaucrats experience only such disciplinary controls in this regard as Congress or the President are willing to exert. Agencies with deep expert capabilities can outlast political tenures with their enduring policy preferences and expertly managed processes to control information and influence elected representatives in committee hearings or during Congressional delegation (CODEL) visits to the bureaucracy fieldwork (Fisher, 2013; McCubbins, Weingast & Noll, 1987, pp. 247-8). Whether or not legislation is used to exert Congressional control over the bureaucracy depends on four factors-the political context (i.e., conflict of interest), bargaining costs, legislative capacity, and the nature and availability of non-statutory opportunities for control (Huber, Shipan & Pfahler, 2001, p. 332).

Congress exerts influence over the Military through the use of budget processes, oversight, and statutory control via legislation (Huber, Shipan, & Pfahler; 2001, p. 330; Aberbach, 1990; McCubbins, Weingast & Noll, 1987, pp. 243, 246). Some scholars have argued
that what might appear as a neglect of oversight is really a choice to use administrative controls, admittedly less effective, but also subtly influential (McCubbins & Schwarz, 1984, p. 165). In the case of the Military, Congress is the approving authority for promotions among all officers and senior noncommissioned officers. Congressional representatives frequently engage in the interests of servicemembers who are also constituents, upon the appeal of those servicemembers. There exists, between servicemembers as constituents and the interests of the military industrial complex located within congressional districts or senators’ states, an electoral connection beyond the voting constituency (Huber & Shipan, 2002). It is possible that Congressional processes in the budget appropriation cycle or the submission of regular reports and hearings by senior military leaders on topics of Congressional interest may also exert the necessary controls over an empowered expert Military in a democracy. In this case, the level of oversight devolves to the Congressional committee level, where it is possible to question whether Congressional power has become fragmented, if that is the level where it exerts oversight of the bureaucracy (Weingast & Moran, 1983, pp. 767-9, 792-793; McCubbins, Weingast & Noll, 1987, pp. 247-8).

Significance of History

Scholars across the disciplines of social science, dedicated to empirical approaches, have shied away from too closely examining national security strategy, because much of the necessary data is shrouded by high-level classification and constrained by restricted access to practitioners. Bearing this in mind, a thorough examination of declassified records in the archives by an experienced practitioner can underpin confidence in the scholarly value of this research. But beyond the access and classification issues that have prevented careful Public Policy analysis of national security, the Public Policy approach challenges scholars to provide longer duration, vice episodic analysis.
To address this challenge, and to aid in the integration of the international and domestic variables, NCR crucially relies on the social science discipline of History. Path dependency, which is revealed through a review of institutional history, can grow the autonomic character of institutions. This process is what President Eisenhower cautioned the American People about in 1961, when he warned about the rise of the military industrial complex (see the end of Chapter Three). This research also illustrates how understanding durable shifts in autonomy has characterized the evolution of U.S. national security strategy-making institutions across three grand strategic moments. The further U.S. national security strategy-making institutions have strayed from the Constitutional mandate to create a Government which provides for the common defense, the less successful they have been in implementing effective grand strategy ensuring U.S. national security.

*Measuring Change across Grand Strategic Moments*

I leverage the theoretical model of NCR, examine the requirements for assessing the bureaucratic autonomy of national security strategy-making institutions, and identify durable shifts in American power fragmentation across three grand strategic moments occurring during and after the following conflicts: the Spanish-American War, WWII, and the Cold War. Across each of these moments, I examine how national security strategy-making institutions affected the NCR intervening variables of Strategic Culture, State-Society Relations, and Domestic Institutions. NCR identifies these variables as most pertinent to Policy Implementation, which in this research equates to grand strategy.

The above conceptualizations of Domestic Institutions (national security strategy-making institutions), Strategic Culture, State-Society Relations, and Bureaucratic Autonomy frame the research approach to operationalize and measure these intervening variables. The challenge is to
capture qualitative examples illustrating NCR’s intervening variables across the historical examination of the three grand strategic moments. In each intervening variable, the measure is encompassed by identifying change from one grand strategic moment to the next, most significant are the changes describing durable shifts in bureaucratic autonomy and fundamental ideas about the other three variables.

For the national security strategy-making institutions, the change over time is demonstrated by organizational evolution. In many cases, new strategy-making institutions are created in the grand strategic moment. In other cases, the existing strategy-making institutions are reorganized or reformed, creating an increased scope of responsibility or identifiable increase in bureaucratic influence. The measure of these changes is revealed in organizational charts and in the promulgation of Congressional legislation formalizing the new strategy-making institutions and their responsibilities. Process-tracing is the methodology to investigate the impetus for Congressional legislation and the role of the strategy-making institutions in defining the evolution in powers. Specifically, the research will explore War Plans and other strategic planning functions to illustrate these changes.

For the intervening variable of State-Society Relations, this research examines the role of militias. In the later grand strategic moments, the militias become the National Guard and Reserve Component structures of the Military. In a broader sense, issues in civil-military relationships form the basis of operationalizing this variable. The measure of this intervening variable is encompassed by durable shifts in how the American concept of the citizen-soldier evolved. Additionally, measuring this variable is aided by polling data conducted during other scholars’ research on public opinion of civil-military relationships.
Bureaucratic Autonomy is measured by examining three aspects of the strategy-making institutions. The first is identifying the institutional preferences regarding organizational roles and responsibility. There should be variance between the previous grand strategic moment’s operationalization of the institutions and the other Government or Military stakeholders in national security. The second is identifying how strategic planning capabilities evolved over the grand strategic moment. Lastly, durable shifts in Bureaucratic Autonomy should be measured by the success or failure of the strategy-making institution in accomplishing the formalization of its new autonomous capabilities or role in law or de facto implementation. In some cases, this may be measured by identifiable changes in the scope or effectiveness of the strategy-making institutions’ influence on grand strategy formulation.

In the case study chapters which follow, this dissertation will describe the process of changes in durable shifts in the structure of national security strategy-making institutions, civil-military relationships (particularly the concept of the citizen-soldier militia and the relationship between the People and the Military, in terms of Clausewitz’s trinity), and in Bureaucratic Autonomy. The narrative discussion will also address changes in Strategic Culture and implications for grand strategy. Where the research reveals gaps in evidence or opportunities for future research, these issues will also be highlighted. The final chapter, the Conclusion, will summarize the evolution in these variables and implications over the course of the three grand strategic moments and discuss the potential for change in a future grand strategic moment.
Chapter 2

A New Global Power: The Spanish-American War

Introduction

This chapter explains briefly how the Spanish-American War generated an important evolution in the NCR model’s Domestic Institutions, specifically how the conduct of the war resulted in the nascent formation of U.S. national security strategy-making institutions. This evolution serves to baseline within this dissertation the roles and capabilities of the U.S. Military in providing for the common defense. Additionally, this evolution in strategy-making institutions also resulted in a significant change in State-Society Relations, since the War Department’s new General Staff gained a measure of authority over the state militias. This chapter will continue with a consideration of the grand strategic moment discussing how the United States addressed the question of Imperialism as a grand strategy and the status of the newly-acquired foreign territories. Throughout the chapter, I will highlight how the institutional changes also affected Strategic Culture, specifically the important role of the American People.31

31 “Fear and pride may have come together in the early months of 1898, following the sinking of the Maine, to produce that extraordinary burst of public opinion to which a struggling president could find no effective antidote. In any event, the people, acting out powerful irrational impulses, dictated the decision of April 1898” (Trask, 1981, p. 59).
Many noted scholars highlight the United States’ victory in the Spanish-American War as the moment it became a great power\footnote{“Thus, we begin with the shared, self-evident premise that the United States acquired an overseas empire after 1898…In a complex reciprocal process, the practice of military domination in the overseas colonies drew, in part, from the experience of the Indian wars of the 1870s to 1880s, just as policies of Americanization via the school and health clinic drew on experience with “unassimilables” such as African-Americans, Native Americans, and many European immigrants…Direct colonial rule represented something of an aberration within a distinctively indirect American hegemony” (McCoy, Scarano & Johnson, 2009, p. 5).} (May, 1961; Wiebe, 1967, p. 244; Trask, 1981, p. ix; Smith, 1994, pp. 216, 226; Schoonover, 2003, p. 4; McCloy, Scaranno & Johnson, 2009, p. 5). More nuanced research and analysis points to the United States’ growing industrial might and economic potential attaining great power status prior to that conflict, whether American foreign policy exercised such power and potential on a global scale or not (Zakaria, 1998; Wiebe, 1967, pp. 224-5). However, President McKinley’s “splendid little war” did initiate a grand strategic moment for the United States (Smith, 1994, p. 212). Although the United States had been continuously expanding, admitting seven large states to the union in the decade prior to the war,
the end of the Spanish-American War left the United States in possession of foreign territories. The democratic republic’s wartime acquisition of overseas territories meant the United States had become a global empire.33 A nation formed over a century earlier out of a self-determination claim against an unrepresentative and distant imperial authority found itself repressing the self-determination struggle of the Filipino people. This grand strategic moment intensified an ongoing debate about the United States’ role in the world and crystallized that debate around two fundamental issues – the capabilities and roles of the Military and the colonial status of conquered territories.

Considered separately, neither of these fundamental issues is necessarily a question of grand strategy. The capabilities and roles of the Military are policy questions nested in a national context of civil-military relations, military theories about organizational effectiveness, geostrategic considerations of national vulnerabilities and threats, and resource-constrained distribution of manpower and money – often more simply referred to as “blood and treasure.” The colonial status of conquered territory was a foreign policy - as well as an economic policy - question, but it was also a moral/ethical dilemma for a former colony who had achieved independence through violence and formed a rights-based polity. Furthermore, the acquisition of new territories raised racially-based questions regarding potential statehood for non-white territories (Hoganson, 1998, pp. 12-13; Trubowitz, 1998, pp. 72-74; Linn, 2009, p. 428; Miller, 2011, pp. 74-5; Beaupre, 2012, pp. 711-12, p. 720; Hickey, 2013, pp. 102-3; Vernon, 2014, p.

33 While the claim is a common appeal throughout both political science and historical literature, the question of the United States’ status as an empire has been consistently challenged by scholars seeking better explanations of U.S. decision-making and attitudes towards imperialism and colonial development. The U.S. acquired territories by force from the Native Americans throughout the 18th and 19th centuries and had acquired some Pacific island territories decades prior to the Spanish-American War. The grand strategic moment is important from a decision-making and institutional change standpoint, but from the standpoint of facts – the United States had had expansionist, imperial behavior since its Founding; it would be disingenuous to ignore these facts. The descriptor “global” to empire is but a symbolic fig leaf to capture the significance of the question at that moment.
This presented a change from the pre-Spanish War approach to foreign policy eloquently described as “composed of incidents, not policies – a number of distinct events, not sequences that moved from a source toward a conclusion” (Wiebe, 1967, p. 225). While Wiebe’s description does not do proper justice to the Luminary Grand Strategy of the period before the Spanish-American War, this important empowering of the bureaucratic methodology embodied by military reform led to enhanced strategic planning; although its practice and quality were certainly nascent. Significant for this particular grand strategic moment at the end of the Spanish-American War, these crucial questions about two fundamental issues were implicitly about defining what America’s grand strategy would be and how it would be accomplished.

Building the New American National Security State

In examining the autonomy of these new national security institutions, I build upon Stephen Skowronek’s seminal *Building A New American State*. Skowronek’s seminal *Building A New American State* is an important early work in the American Government branch of Political Science known as American Political Development (APD). APD’s approaches to research are consonant with NCR’s.

Skowronek summarizes his analysis of the impact of Progressive state-building in the War Department: “In all, the champions of nationalism, professionalism, and corporatism made their way into the War Department only to end up locked in alternative and competing systems of control” (p. 247). In Skowronek’s interpretation, the struggle for autonomy between the War Department bureaus and the executive leadership was “resolved” by Congress institutionalizing “the scramble among them” (p. 245). Skowronek concludes, “cooperation and coordination fell victim to a confusion of governmental
“authority” (p. 246). However, looking more specifically at the evolution of national security institutions, Skowronek’s assessment may have been parsimoniously abridged to fit his comparative indictment of how bureaucracy’s rise undermined the courts and the American party system. Skowronek’s assessment did not reflect an accurate assessment of the nascent military-industrial complex. Evidence of this stems from Skowronek’s own contradictory descriptions of institutional development in the Army.

Skowronek argues “In nineteenth century America, the basic operating structure of the state was clear and simple; yet it worked to destroy the organizational integrity of the army.” He then states, “In the case of the army, a parallel political struggle over the reconstitution of institutional power relationships was focused within a single bureaucracy.” Skowronek claims the army of the 1870s and the army of 1920 were “two entirely different institutions” and that the 1920 army “embodied an institutional accommodation to the champions of nationalism, professionalism, and corporatism. The army had become a powerful bureaucratic institution in its own right, able to claim a distinctive place in the national government, the corporate economy, and the universities” (Skowronek, 1982, pp. 246-7).

While Skowronek does discuss the 1903 Dick Act regarding reform of the Militia, he ignores the 1911 rule change in the 62nd Congress that eliminated the House Committee on the Militia, merging it with the Committee on Military Affairs. Skowronek claims that though the militia had been nationalized, its autonomy within the War Department had been secured in the creation of the Division on the Militia, which Skowronek alleges reflected the influence of an interest-group – the National Guard Association (NGA). Further detail not included in Skowronek’s account is that Representative Charles Dick, who initiated the Dick Act was at the same time Chairman of the House Committee on the Militia and the NGA (Capozzola, 2009, p. 86).
Skowronek’s analysis diminishes the significance of this issue when he relegates it to a political concession made by Secretary of War Elihu Root to achieve his desired reforms (p. 219). Much of the evidence Skowronek deploys supports a more nuanced conclusion that the bureaucratic autonomy increased, rather than becoming more controlled. Because of the similarity in facts and assessments of those facts, Skowronek would likely not disagree strongly with this argument, as it pertains to the impact on American grand strategy and the bureaucratic strength of the Military evolving in this grand strategic moment.

Support for this more autonomous perspective in the rise of scientific Government is derived from Wiebe’s *The Search for Order*, where the desired objectives of “opportunity, progress, order, and community” would be accomplished by creating a “paradise of new middle class rationality” (Wiebe, 1967, p. 170). However, as the Progressive era advanced and progressive thinking infiltrated the major political parties, a gap between progressives at the national level and the local level developed (Greenspan & Wooldridge, 2018). When certain progressives took their local successes to the national level, seeking a role in the federal government, they became a part of a new system they were invested in and desired to protect. The progressive spirit forged a common, unifying perspective about the future, but the implementation broke down between a national level bureaucracy, which began aggrandizing its influence on its own trajectory, and the local sympathies of the people, which were left behind (Wiebe, 1967, pp. 186-223; Beaupre, 2012, p. 712). Wiebe highlights how the increased reliance on expertise (lobbyists and experts in the bureaucracy) pulled power away from Congress, because the politicians now required the information provided in order to make decisions (Wiebe, 1967, pp. 174, 184-5; Tuason, 1999, p. 49). This is illustrated in the experience of military reforms, where the new military bureaucracy – not quite yet a general staff – pulls
control of the militia away from Congress and injects strategic planning about basing and war plans into driving aspects of Presidential decision-making and foreign policy.

_The Spanish American War_

United States popular interest in Cuba precipitated the Spanish-American War. However, the United States had not coherently planned for such a conflict (Trask, 1981, pp. 72, 162), because the institutional mechanisms to conduct such preparation did not exist (Trask, 1981, pp. 88, 147-8, 322). Instead, increasing U.S. pressure on Spain to resolve its colonial administration problems in Cuba caused tensions between the two powers, generating a diplomatic crisis. Some of the tensions were exacerbated by the religious differences between Catholic Spain and its colonies and the predominantly Protestant United States (Smith, 1994, pp. 28-30). United States diplomatic rhetoric on Cuba lagged behind the angry fervor of public sentiment and Congressional demands, but gradually escalated on behalf of stability and human rights in Cuba. The slow pace of diplomacy had nearly succeeded in ending the crisis, when the tragic accidental explosion aboard the U.S. battleship (USS) _Maine_ in Havana’s harbor exacerbated the domestic political pressure for war and led to a U.S. declaration of war on Spain (May, 1961, p. 147; Trask, 1981, p. xiii; Hillstrom & Hillstrom, 2011, pp. 47-50).

At the time the USS _Maine_ exploded, the U.S. Army and Navy were unprepared for war with a European power, especially beyond the frontiers of the United States (Smith, 1994, pp.

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35 Spain’s troubles in Cuba began in the 1870s with the beginnings of colonial dissatisfaction with an oppressive regime. After more American citizens became involved and interested in Cuba’s growing insurrection in 1895, Congress passed a Joint Resolution in 1896 to recognize the Cuban revolution (Trask, 1981, pp. 6-29, 475; Hillstrom & Hillstrom, 2011, pp. 30-34).

36 The Navy did begin a minimal planning effort among a few key officers at the Naval War College founded in 1884. The Navy began its planning because of the attention and diplomatic awareness the Cuban insurrection against Spanish rule had gained in American newspapers.
The regular U.S. Army was spread across 77 different posts throughout the country, and the state militias had never exercised the possibility of being employed outside their home states. President McKinley’s April 1898 call to activate the State militias and raise 100,000 volunteers was answered enthusiastically, thanks to the American people’s intense interest in the conflict, which had been fed by years of inflammatory reporting in the country’s newspapers (Smith, 1994, p. 49; Musicant, 1998, pp. 238-249). The challenge the Army faced was to redeploy the regular Army and the volunteer forces from the scattered forts and the home states along a privately owned and operated railroad system. No plans existed to aid this mobilization. In the period between the USS Maine’s explosion and the American Congress’ declaration of war, it is likely the President and his cabinet were misled by Secretary of War Russell Alger’s false assertion the Army could be ready in two weeks to go to war (Trask, 1981, p. 539 fn 30). Some rudimentary calculations related to sailing distances or deployment estimates may have given the Secretary the erroneous perception that the Army could be ready. However, the complex reality of organizing and accomplishing the redeployment of U.S. military forces to embarkation points to move quickly to Cuba soon forced him to dramatically revise the estimate. Instead of two weeks, it took 2 months for the Army and Navy to be ready to invade Cuba.

The Army mustered in six different locations: at Camp Thomas, TN near Chickamauga, GA; New Orleans, LA; Mobile, AL; Camp Alger, VA; the Presidio at San Francisco, CA; and Tampa, FL (see Map 3 at end of Chapter). Also, the Army and the militia were organized at the Regimental-level (between 1000-2400 men in each regiment); there were no higher headquarters and no officers had been trained or conducted higher echelon operations, such as Division and

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37 Even as late as April 7th, 1898, Teddy Roosevelt was complaining that only the Navy had any plan but nothing else (Trask, 1981, p. 93).
Corps level, since the Civil War. The troops were formed into Corps and Divisions at the mobilization sites. Only two corps saw action in the war, the Fifth Army Corps, formed at Tampa, deployed to Cuba and Puerto Rico; and the Eighth Army Corps, formed in San Francisco, deployed to the Philippines (Smith, 1994, pp. 48, 98-106).

Very quickly, problems arose at the Tampa mobilization site (Smith, 1994, pp. 104-106, 112-116). Supplies arrived in a haphazard fashion and it was difficult to identify where various supplies were loaded in different railroad cars. The rail lines were backed up for hundreds of miles, all the way into South Carolina. The difficulties in ensuring units had the proper equipment and uniforms delayed the readiness to deploy to Cuba and commence operations. The delay and evident confusion drew the attention of reporters for the major newspapers and political leaders in Washington, DC. The delay at Tampa did not disguise the fact that inadequate shipping existed to transport the Army to Cuba. The Navy did not have official transports and the Army had to scour the ports of the country to buy up available ships that the Navy had not already grabbed, so that more transport capacity was available.

After General Shafter’s force sailed from Tampa on June 14th, his landing and operations in Cuba culminated in the Battle for San Juan Hill before Santiago de Cuba on July 1st (Brown, 1967, pp. 335-364; Smith, 1994, pp. 129-42; Musicant, 1998, pp. 418-422). The Navy defeated the Spanish fleet when it tried to escape Santiago de Cuba on July 3rd. Despite the successful battles, the conduct of the Army and Navy leaders, in failing to coordinate their operations more effectively, garnered criticism.38 The Spanish began negotiating for surrender, which was agreed

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38 One of the most visible scandals was likely the public controversy surrounding Admirals Sampson and Schley about their conduct and responsibility for the tactical and operational failures maneuvering the U.S. Navy warships off Santiago. A post-war inquiry was conducted by Admiral Dewey, of White Fleet and Manila Bay fame, and the topic was still an issue in 1901 (Jessup, p. 247).
to on July 15th (Musicant, 1998, pp. 492-498). After the war was over, the scandalous mobilization period and military operations were investigated by the War Investigating Commission, better known as the Dodge Commission.

**Commodore Dewey’s Victory in Manila Bay**

Bookending the operations in Cuba were the significant events in the Far East, which had been set in motion by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, a luminary with a grand strategic vision. Roosevelt wanted a ‘consistent foreign policy’ to go beyond the Monroe Doctrine and drive European powers out of the hemisphere. But, he claimed, “our people are not yet up to following out this line of policy; the thing to be done is to get whatever part of it is possible at the moment,” such as annexing Hawaii (Trask quoting from Roosevelt’s correspondence, 1981, p. 79, see fn 12). Roosevelt had intervened in October 1897 to get Commodore Dewey assigned to the Asiatic Squadron by suggesting he court Senator Redfield Proctor (R, VT), from Dewey’s home state to request his appointment from President McKinley. Also, Roosevelt constantly nagged Secretary of the Navy John Long to take steps to prepare for war with Spain so as to prevent precious time being wasted after the commencement of hostilities to figure out what needed to be done. Long wrote in his diary in January 1898 about Roosevelt’s pesterling, “He bores me with plans of naval and military movement, and the necessity of having some scheme of attack arranged for instant execution in case of an emergency” (Trask, 1981, p. 79).

Ten days after the USS *Maine* sank, Secretary Long took February 25th off, leaving Roosevelt in charge. Roosevelt took the opportunity to issue multiple orders attempting to launch a one-day campaign to increase the readiness of the Navy for war (Smith, 1994, p. 56).
When Long returned he reversed many of Roosevelt’s orders, but he did not change the order Roosevelt sent to Admiral Dewey in the Asiatic Squadron:

Secret and confidential. Order the squadron, except Monocacy to Hongkong [sic]. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war [against] Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands. Keep Olympia until further orders.

Dewey was already in Hong Kong when he got the order and immediately acted upon it, continuing regular contact with the U.S. Consulate in Manila for intelligence about the Spanish fleet (Trask, 1981, p. 81; Musicant, 1998, pp. 193-4). There is no evidence of any consideration in Washington DC, or on Dewey’s flagship, that any thought was given to what catastrophic success might mean – all leaders were too absorbed with operational matters.

Perhaps the most forward-thinking American official was the U.S. Consul General in Singapore, E. Spencer Pratt, who contacted the Filipino rebel leader Emilio Aguinaldo after the United States declared war in April and asked him to ally with the United States. Pratt promised that U.S. treatment of the Philippines would be better than Spain’s treatment, but he refused to put his promise in writing for Aguinaldo. Instead, Pratt explained the Teller Amendment to Aguinaldo, suggesting that what was good for Cuba would also apply to the Philippines.39 Aguinaldo said he would agree to fight alongside the Americans if Commodore Dewey gave the invitation. Pratt cabled the Commodore in Hong Kong who responded, “All right; tell him to come on.” Dewey sailed for Manila before Aguinaldo reached him. Dewey later claimed he had

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39 The Teller Amendment, sponsored by Senator Henry M. Teller (R, CO) specified the United States would not annex Cuba after defeating Spain and would leave Cuba to the political rule by its people. The motivation for the amendment has been variously ascribed to discriminatory reasons (not wanting to add to the number of blacks or Catholics in the United States if Cuba was annexed) and economic reasons (the negative impact to the domestic sugar industry – Colorado’s sugar beet farmers – if the import tariff on Cuban sugar was removed when Cuba was annexed).
more important matters to deal with than the desire of young Filipino men (Aguinaldo was 29 years old) to go back to the islands and fight (Trask, pp. 399-402; Musicant, 1998, pp. 197-8).

On May 1st, 1898, Commodore Dewey surprised the Spanish in Cavite in Manila Bay, achieving a complete victory, for which he later was given a hero’s celebration when he returned home (Smith, 1994, pp. 77-85; Bogle, 2017, p. 106). In securing the Spanish surrender, the Americans deliberately excluded Filipino rebels from the final occupation of the Spanish forts, because they wanted to diminish bloodshed. Unfortunately, the misunderstandings with Aguinaldo and the lack of a forward-looking Philippines strategy in Washington DC drove a wedge between the rebels and the Americans, resulting in the Filipinos attempting to oust the Americans quickly. The voyage to Manila from San Francisco took 30 days and President McKinley ordered the first troops to depart on May 19th, which they accomplished by May 25th (Trask, 1981, pp. 95-107, 369-388). On May 26th, Dewey received a cable from Secretary Long instructing him to make no political alliances with the Filipinos (Trask, 1981, p. 404). Aguinaldo meanwhile took over control of the Filipino rebels and initiated operations against the Spanish troops, achieving notable successes, but not capturing Manila, by the time the first American troops arrived at Manila on June 30 (Trask, 1981, pp. 386, 406-408).40 As the American forces were reinforced over the course of the summer, the Spanish troops decided a surrender to the Americans would be preferable to a Filipino takeover. The American commander of ground troops, Colonel Merritt, conspired with the Spanish commander for American forces to seize control of the Spanish fortifications without the Filipinos being involved. This coup de main was

40 The force had captured the island of Guam by surprise en route to the Philippines. The Spanish garrison did not even realize there was a war going on. The Spanish rowed a boat out to the American ships, who were warily watching the Spanish fort’s guns, to apologize for failing to offer a salute because of problems with the guns. The Americans informed the Spanish of the state of war and immediately took the Spanish prisoner, claiming the island without a shot being fired nor incurring any casualties on either side (Trask, 1981, pp. 385-6; Musicant, 1998, pp. 544-46)
accomplished on August 14th, the day after the peace protocols were signed ending the Spanish-American War. The Filipinos felt betrayed and tensions immediately escalated. But the Americans were momentarily more concerned about whether the Philippines ought to be returned to Spain because they had technically been seized after the peace protocols were signed. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R, MA) opined on the matter, however, that “whatever happens we cannot return to Spain the people whom we have set free. To hand Aguinaldo and his men back to Spain would be an act of infamy” (Trask, 1981, p. 439). The Spanish-American war ended officially with the Treaty of Paris signed on December 10th, 1898, ratified by the Senate in February 1899, and went into effect on April 11th, 1899.

Dodge Commission\(^3\)

The Dodge Commission’s in-depth examination exonerated most of the military’s leadership of personal negligence in executing their duties and blamed most of the problems on the government’s poor management of the military (Trask, p. 484; War Investigating Commission).\(^3\) The commission found that insufficient attention had been given to maintaining the Army at the appropriate level of readiness during peacetime to enable an adequate response to a wartime emergency. The railroad problems in Tampa and the problems transporting the Army to Cuba garnered sharp criticism from the Dodge Commission. Additionally, responding to the public outrage about the high number of casualties to disease (5,462 deaths), compared to

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\(^3\) General Grenville M. Dodge, a leading railroad executive, believed the U.S. could not afford war with Spain and that it would cause economic instability, escalation, and destruction (Trask, 1981, p. 30). Formed Commission on September 26th, 1898 (Trask, p. 484).

\(^3\) The lengthy report of the Dodge Commission provided key information regarding what deficiencies were identified during the Spanish American War that the bills for improving the military’s efficiencies were intended to address. The 1st Volume begins with a list of the questions the Commission investigated and information requirements they sought from the military. For the Dodge Commission’s principal conclusions, see War Investigating Commission, I, pp. 111-14, 124, 147-48, 153, 189, 199-200, 209, 221-22. Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain, 8 volumes, S. Doc. 221, 56th Congress, 1st Session, 1900.

In February 1899, the Dodge Commission recommended improvements to military organization that reflected concerns raised for decades by military reformers like Emory Upton, but ignored by Congress and the Army’s leadership (Musicant, 1998, p. 239; Skowronek, 1982, pp. 89-92). The Dodge Commission found numerous faults in Army planning, but also explained much of the difficulties were experienced due to the lack of a general staff which other modern armies used to plan mobilization and military operations. Subsequent critique by military scholars of General Shafter’s decision-making at Santiago de Cuba included a failure to properly coordinate with the Navy and operate jointly. Military experts assessed the use of a general staff system in the War and Navy Departments would have coordinated military and naval operations at Santiago de Cuba more effectively (Trask, 1981, p. 252). Secretary of War Elihu Root endorsed the Dodge Commission’s findings when he highlighted the Army’s need for a General Staff and petitioned Congress to allow the creation of an Army General Staff (Annual Report of the War Department, 1901 & 1902). The Dodge Commission also addressed the issue of the militia, highlighting the need for better federal oversight of the competence and training of Volunteer officers and of the state National Guards (Cosmas, 1998, pp. 297-8; War Investigating Commission; Capozzola, 2009).

The Dodge Commission generated renewed Congressional discussion on the roles and capabilities of the U.S. military. In addition to the lack of readiness in the militia, another issue

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43 *Efficiency of the Army*, S. Docs. 3917, 6332, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 1902; *Efficiency of the Army*, Hearings on S. 3917, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 1902.
the recent war had drawn attention to was the inadequate size of the Army (Kennedy, 1987, p. 248). Part of the solution recommended by the Dodge Commission was to increase the size of the regular Army to over 100,000 men, which Secretary Root also recommended and pushed through Congress (Annual Report of the War Department, 1900).

*The Birth of U.S. National Security Institutions*

Prior to the Spanish-American War in 1898, there were no national security strategy-making institutions outside the President’s immediate advisors and the Naval War College. The birth of these institutions constitutes the first important grand strategic moment in this research. Once these institutions formed, they grew steadily, accumulating more and more influence over the decision-making process and the national budget, even usurping national security-related powers away from Congress. As the Dodge Commission revealed, the Army’s organization and structure were not conducive to serving in a national security decision-making role. The Navy was ahead of the Army in 1898, because it had already created a Naval War College in 1884, and had already begun developing planning systems to address potential future conflicts or naval requirements to support national strategic objectives (Challener, 1973).

**Naval Planning**

Early Naval War College academic exercises in war plans focused on the possibility of a war with Spain; and according to extant records, conflict with Spain was the only major planning task undertaken prior to the war. The prospects of doing anything about Cuba brought the issue of naval access to Cuba and Spain’s ability to project power to Cuba to the strategic

44 There are few records indicating any strategic planning occurring in the Navy prior to the Spanish American War, and there are no extant documents in the National Archives about any Army strategic planning. For the strategic planning documents of the General Board and Joint Board, there were only a couple rolls of microfiche documents. In terms of military intelligence reporting, which must necessarily assume a foundational role in such planning, I did find two very large (in page size, like posters) volumes cataloguing reports for a period of years, but the actual reports listed in the ledger were unattainable.
The focus on Spain was not surprising, since other possible planning options were much less likely; and, very likely, the reason for this planning focus was an awareness of public interest in Cuba and increasing demands for government action against Spain. A naval war with Great Britain was considered unthinkable and other European powers would likely have to risk challenging Great Britain, the world’s foremost naval power by far, to get to the United States unless they already had significant holdings in the Western hemisphere, as only Spain did.

In March 1898, after the USS Maine’s explosion, the Department of the Navy formed a Naval War Board consisting of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Chief of the Navy Bureau for Navigation Captain Arent Crowninshield, the Commander of the Atlantic Station Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, and a Captain Albert Barker (who was quickly reassigned to take command of the USS Oregon) (Smith, 1994, pp. 56-57). After Roosevelt left to command a volunteer regiment, the eminent naval strategist, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan was added to the War Board on May 9th. The Navy War Board did not determine ship movements (Trask, 1981, p. 88), that responsibility was the privilege of the Station Commanders, although Captain Barker’s access to strategic thinking of the War Board likely shaped his assignment to the Oregon for its independent, strategically consequential maneuver around South America from West coast to East coast. In later writings, Mahan diminished the role of the Navy War Board during the war because he believed a single person (likely himself) could work better than a committee. However, likely due to Mahan’s influence, the Navy War Board was influential and preceded the establishment of the General Board (Challener, 1973; Trask, 1981, p. 89).

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45 Great Britain’s Royal Navy was as large as the next two largest naval powers combined (Kennedy, 1987, p. 226).
The Navy established the General Board in 1900 to address shortfalls in long-range planning demonstrated by the experience of war. The General Board was comprised of the heads of the prestigious Navy staff bureaus of Navigation and Equipment, the President of the Naval War College, and the chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Its president was the Admiral of the Navy, Admiral (ADM) Dewey, the victor of the early war naval battle at Manila Bay, which had ejected the Spanish from the Philippines. This board started meeting in April 1900, just two weeks after it was formed (Challener, 1973, p. 7). The first item on its agenda was to discuss the issue of naval coaling stations around the globe to support the deployment of the U.S. Navy. This issue was sparked by recognizing the limitations the Spanish Navy had suffered during the short war and the challenges the U.S. Navy had confronted in how to defeat the Spanish. While the Navy looked at this issue from a strictly pragmatic perspective – sailing distances, access to fuel, and proximity to expected U.S. interests – the ability to justify their findings and gain Congressional approval for the necessary appropriations rested on the ability to tie the necessity to U.S. policy objectives. Navy Department efforts to get State Department guidance on policy or endorsement on recommendations was problematic because there was no Presidentially- or Congressionally-approved national policy; also, the General Board and its brain trust in the Naval War College were not Congressionally-mandated organizations, but existed because the Navy bureaucracy created them. Because no formal institution existed to provide national-level coordination of strategic policy, these attempts served as the nascent beginnings of informal interagency processes to address parochial interests before Congress (Challener, 1973, pp. 45, 47). Part of the General Board’s planning efforts were directed against Germany at the instigation of ADM Dewey who apparently never quite recovered from the post-Manila Bay experience of having German warships show up to shadow his victorious squadron. Dewey also
favored the British, but this did not entirely prevent planning efforts against them (Schoonover, 2003, p. 115).

**Army Planning**

While the Navy had done a minimum amount of thinking of a strategic nature, the Army had done even less (Smith, 1994, pp. 54-55). The Army had been focused on being a frontier constabulary and was less than 30,000 men,\(^{46}\) ranked 16\(^{th}\) in the world by size (Nelson, 1946, p. 23). The Army was organized administratively into geographic divisions (see Map 2), that were reorganized to facilitate command and control of the Army’s mobilization in March 1898, in expectation of the April declaration of war with Spain. Part of the confusion the Army experienced was likely related to this “last minute” reorganization. However, it is evidence the

\(^{46}\) As of April 1\(^{st}\), 1898, the Army had 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men (Alger, 1901, p. 7).
Army was not organized to respond to any strategic threat to national security (Smith, 1994, pp. 60-61). The Army had created a Military Intelligence Division in 1881, but there is no indication that its work contributed to strategic or operational effects in the Spanish-American War (McCoy, Scarano, & Johnson, 2009, p. 26). There were few officers noted for strategic thinking about the world. There is no evidence the Army conducted any formal strategic war planning for potential conflicts prior to the reforms implemented after the war and the establishment of the Army War College in 1902. Soon after the Army War College creation though, the Army did begin to think strategically. General Tasker Bliss, one of the first members of the Army War College Board, notably attempted to interject into strategic consideration the idea that Americans might “find ourselves fighting for our Monroe Doctrine on one side of the world and against somebody else’s Monroe Doctrine on the other side of the world” (Challener, 1973, p. 25).

An additional challenge evident in the Army’s preparation for war was the relationship between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Army. The Army itself was organized by the geographic divisions, but its functions, logistics, and administration were directed by a series of staff bureaus at the War Department. Some staff bureaus resisted control by the Commanding General, believing that they worked directly for the politically-appointed Secretary of War. Long-tenured staff bureau leadership and for the Commanding General led to numerous personality-related conflicts at the senior level of military leadership. Part of the resistance to any military reform in the late 19th Century, well-covered by Stephen Skowronek’s analysis in *Building A New American State*, was because the staff bureau leadership was

47 Colonel Emory Upton, who authored a work advocating military reform, and General of the Army William T. Sherman, who sponsored Upton’s work and observed European wars, being notable exceptions.
48 Skowronek used the Army as one of his three case studies on state-building. His Chapter 4 “Patching the Army: the limits of provincial virtue” details the difficult path of Army reform in the late 19th century. His Chapter 7 “Reconstituting the army: professionalism, nationalism, and the illusion of corporatism” will be addressed in greater detail later in this chapter.
closely connected with Congressional leaders. The staff bureaus believed implementing reform to create a European-like General Staff would fundamentally change their power structures and lessen their autonomy from the Commanding General. The lack of staff integration across the bureaus resulted in many logistic disconnects and dysfunction that became glaringly evident during the war.

The War Board

There was no formal mechanism for coordinating Army and Navy planning efforts nor any formal institution for their cooperation during conflict. In order to manage the war effort, President McKinley quickly decided to form a War Board comprised of his Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and uniformed representatives from each service, including the luminary naval strategist Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. This War Board met at the White House and a room was set aside with maps and reports to monitor preparations and the conduct of the war, and telegraphic connections to military installations reachable by wire were installed (Trask, 1981, p. 169). During the day, representatives from the War and Navy Departments would remain at the White House to update the map and the President as required. President McKinley had immediate convenient access to the War Board and there are only records of a few formal meetings, but McKinley met frequently with the military and naval advisors (Secretary Alger, Commanding General of the Army Miles, and the Adjutant General Corbin from the War Department; Secretary Long, Admiral Sicard, and Captain Mahan from the Navy Department); General Corbin became de facto Chief of Staff for the President (Trask, 1981, p. 170). Most often, the interactions were informal and ad hoc, rarely resulting in official guidance from the President to affect the deployment or situation in the field. Sometimes cabinet officials would sit until late at night discussing the war (Trask, 1981, p. 169).
“In the evenings before retiring he goes to the war-room and studies the dispatches.” He [Cortelyou, McKinley’s personal secretary] thought that McKinley had provided remarkable wartime leadership and had shown himself, “the strong man of the Cabinet, the dominating force; but with it all are such gentleness and graciousness in dealing with men that some of his greatest victories have been won apparently without any struggle” (Trask, 1981, p. 196). In terms of strategic influence and thinking the President himself devised and executed a pressure campaign against Spain, coordinated the American military’s global operations with the advice of the War Board, and worried about European intervention49 more so than the military advisers who were focused on the Spanish War (Trask, 1981, p. 314; Smith, 1994, p. 201).

According to Trask, McKinley had an influential role as Commander in Chief – he accepted advice from War and Navy Departments, but the need to incorporate domestic political views and the problems in War Department forced McKinley to be more decisive. “During the war with Spain the U.S. government subordinated strategy to policy in a relatively disciplined manner” (Trask, 1981, p. 192). The President hoped for a short conflict with victory secured by forcing Spain to concede after losing quick fights on land and sea in unimportant areas (Trask, 1981, p. 423). McKinley believed more clearly than the military around him that an immediate attack might precipitate a rapid end to the war (Trask, 1981, p. 189). George Cortelyou described in his journal the stress the President was under – “short-sighted Congressional policies leaving country poorly prepared for hostilities, increasing the burden on Executive –

49 It is possible the President’s views influenced Navy Secretary Long to believe the navy could not risk losing a single armored ship – “the attitude of continental Europe forebade the reduction of our armored naval strength, because upon it we might have to rely for defense not only from the Spanish force in European waters but from an attack by the navy of another country” (Trask, 1981, p. 254).
bickering officers and ambitious gentlemen” who sought to parlay America’s early victories into a markets-focused empire (Trask, 1981, p. 169).

In May, after the victory in Manila Bay, McKinley had a better understanding of the influence of sea power. Despite this understanding, President McKinley was reluctant to start thinking imperialistically, because he was politically sensitive to the will of the People expressed through public opinion, which he believed had forced him into war. Whether or not victory in the Philippines justified becoming an Empire was a question the President was willing to play down and put off until the mid-term elections of November 1898 earned the Republicans majorities in the House and Senate (Trask, 1981, p. 429). McKinley believed the mid-term elections meant the American people validated his approach to “restore good times, not create an American empire” (Trask, 1981, pp. 168-9).

The Joint Board

After the war, the War and Navy Departments established the Joint Board in an attempt to continue the interservice coordination efforts required to support strategic planning and discuss national security concerns. The Joint Board consisted of several high-ranking staff bureau chiefs and representatives from the Naval War College and the newly established Army War College. There are few extant records in the National Archives regarding the work of the Joint Board, but its overall impact was minimal (Challener, 1973, p. 49).

The influence of the Naval War College’s strategic plans on the conduct of the Spanish-American War, specifically Commodore Dewey’s attack and capture of the Philippines, tied the coordination of military effort to accomplish strategic objectives, forcing a grand strategic choice that neither the President, nor Congress, nor the American People were ready to make. By 1907, the nascent national security strategy-making institutions were working very well together.
President Roosevelt, after arbitrating the Russo-Japanese War’s conclusion, asked his strategists to brief him about plans in the event of conflict with Japan. The Army General Staff, the Navy General Board, and the Joint Board conducted a series of meetings which culminated in a conference with the President at his residence in Oyster Bay. The President approved the basic strategic concept which would eventually be developed into Plan ORANGE (see Chapter Three), the American strategic plan for a war with Japan. Roosevelt and his military leaders determined to send the U.S. Navy battleships to the Pacific, and then to conduct a world cruise, the Great White Fleet, demonstrating the United States’ capability to project power to the western Pacific and around the globe (Challener, 1973, pp. 247-249). This major decision was to be the high-water mark of Joint strategic planning prior to WWI.

The Joint Board collapsed after the Army and Navy disagreed over Subig Bay in the Philippines later in 1907. The Army claimed it could not defend Subig Bay, which was the Navy’s desired location for a base. The Navy also objected to suggestions the battleships should be withdrawn from the western Pacific to the United States, in case there was a need for immediate naval power in the event of a European conflict (Challener, 1973, p. 250). Eventually the interservice squabble, and the Joint Board’s inability to resolve the tensions, reached Congress and President Roosevelt who caustically remarked, “It is quite evident that there is some defect in method which ought to be removed” (Challener, 1973, p. 49). It would require the exigencies of World War I to drive the two services to recreate another interservice national security decision-making institution to address joint military planning.

While each service had matured its national security institutions to better address strategic thinking, the coordination of grand strategy across all national security-related
institutions was lacking in effectiveness and no formal mechanisms to do so had been successfully developed prior to World War I. However, these institutions also began to effect evolutionary change in the distribution of national security influence in the government. The ability to influence Congress evolved in a manner which increased the bureaucratic autonomy of the War Department; while Congressional support for the Navy’s expensive modernization and shipbuilding program provided a more subtle shift in autonomy.

The Root Reforms

Political leaders debated the United States’ acquisition of an overseas empire with appeals to the American people to vindicate their expansionist or anti-Imperialist positions. The American economy was in chaos – labor disruptions, downtrodden and dirty American cities, and an agricultural sector “devastated” by a “perfect storm of problems” (Gilmore & Sugrue, 1994, p. 20). A lawyer of exceptional ability was summoned to Washington, DC to take over the War Department and fix the massive military problems revealed in Tampa, FL by the Spanish-

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50 Given the lack of comprehensive or definitive research into the military reforms of Elihu Root, this portion of the research relied heavily on primary sources. The secondary sources merely set the context to understand when, how and why the primary source documents were promulgated. The official documents of the War Department were useful. The Department of War reports are located in the National Archives. The Annual Reports of the Secretary of War, 1873-1905 are in multiple volumes and have substantial materials associated with them in terms of supporting reports. The staffs of the various Armies of the United States also had reports contributing to the Annual Report. Numerous Congressional documents about the appropriation bills for military funding and the guidance contained therein. The Congressional documents reviewed include legislation, hearings and testimony, correspondence, as well as Congressional research: Army Appropriations Act of 1901; Senate Documents “The Creation of the American General Staff” 68th Congress; CIS Number 8254 S.doc.119, May 26th, 1924; Army-Staff Organization. H. Rept. 74 to Accompany H.R. 495, 42nd Congress, 3d Session, 1873; A Bill to Reduce and Reorganize the Army of the United States. H.R. 5499, 45th Congress, 3d Session, 1878; A Bill for the Reorganization of the Army of the United States. H.R. 11017, 56th Congress, 1st Session, 1900; Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment. H.R. 11017, 56th Congress, 1st Session, 1900; Increase the Efficiency of the Army. Hearings on S. 4300, 56th Congress, 1st Session, 1900; A Bill to Increase the Efficiency of the Army. Hearings on H.R. 15449, 57th Congress, 2nd Session, 1902; Message from the President of the United States Communicating the Proceedings of the Commission for the Reform and Reorganization of the Army of the United States. S. Exec. Doc 26, 44th Congress, 2nd Session, 1877. Lastly, but also extremely important and valuable are the five annual reports of the Secretary of War authored by Secretary Root. A British leader, Lord Haldane, when teased by a friend about his lack of experience to serve in his newly designated post as Secretary of State for War, claimed “I do not need to know anything about armies and their organization, for the five reports of Elihu Root … are the very last word concerning the organization and place of an army in a democracy” (Jessup, p. 240 and fn2 p. 240, comment made to Jessup by the teasing friend of Lord Haldane).
American War and solve an insurgency in a new American dependency in the Philippines. As President McKinley’s pick to be Secretary of War in 1899, Elihu Root began a government career that would keep him at the forefront of American national security policy for more than a decade during a critical grand strategic moment.

Secretary of War Elihu Root oversaw the transition of the U.S. Army from a frontier Indian-fighting constabulary to an industrialized force capable of colonial acquisition, global power projection, and laying the foundation for an expeditionary capability to join WWI. The reforms were driven by Root’s vision, but also by the shortcomings identified by the Spanish-American War; more importantly, these reforms were driven by a sense of responsibility to the People (Leopold, 1954, pp. 39-42). The key elements implementing the grand strategy of the moment were the creation of a General Staff for the U.S. Army and the founding of the Army War College to provide trained officers for that General Staff. New army professionals “gained an institutional power base allied with the executive against the forces of localism, amateurism, and the pork barrel” (Skowronek, 1982, p. 213).

**Army Reforms: A Letter from Governor Roosevelt**

On December 16th, 1899, New York Governor and Spanish-American War veteran field commander Theodore Roosevelt wrote an editorial in *The Outlook* supporting Secretary of War Elihu Root’s plan for military reform. *The Outlook* was the nation’s third most widely read weekly news periodical in 1900 (Wagenknecht, 1982). Published in New York, the news weekly often featured editorial articles from Theodore Roosevelt, who also served for a time on *The Outlook*’s editorial board. It is doubtful there was any vetting of the Governor Roosevelt’s views by the journal and his views would likely have received wide attention from the readership. *The Outlook*’s editors claim in the byline that they requested Governor Roosevelt’s opinion on the
Root Reforms based on his experience “in Washington, his service in actual warfare, and his expert knowledge of political and National history.” This may have been a contrivance to make Roosevelt’s remarks seem solicited, because it is more than possible Roosevelt exerted personal influence to ensure his remarks were published.51

Roosevelt comments in the first paragraph: “…the real responsibility lay with the people and their representatives, who, during, over thirty years of peace, had resolutely refused to prepare for war…” Roosevelt’s claim the People have an active responsibility, presumably via their Congressional representatives, to be engaged on topics of national security is supportive of this dissertation’s approach. Roosevelt identifies the criticism levied against senior military leaders, but redirects the responsibility to the People. Roosevelt appeals to the People to review Root’s responsible reforms and to support them, again, via their Congressional representatives. Roosevelt continues in paragraph three “…the reorganization of the army deserves the most careful consideration of every good citizen who wishes to see our army put upon a satisfactory basis.” In the final paragraph, Roosevelt notes “It is proper that every patriotic American should, accordingly, give him [Root] the support to which he is entitled, and that our representatives in Congress should realize that the adoption of his plan for the betterment of our military conditions is of grave moment to the honor and interest of the Nation.” Just over eighteen months after writing this letter, Theodore Roosevelt was President and obviously in a position to provide even greater support to Root’s reforms.

Roosevelt’s candor about describing the difficulties experienced during the Spanish-American War are not too surprising given his personal experience on campaign. However, this

51 I did not find any references suggesting Roosevelt and Root coordinated this op-ed; nor did I discover any reaction by Root to the letter. However, it fits with American political tradition for politicians to seek editorial commentary by well-known or credible figures in support of policy advocacy or legislation.
editorial would widely publicize details such as: “The confusion in Washington at the outbreak of the war, and the confusion worse confounded at Tampa and outside of Santiago during its continuance, were absolutely inevitable under the then existing system.” Roosevelt claimed only Congressional action in support of Root’s reform agenda would ameliorate the situation. The Spanish American War ended in August 1898, Roosevelt became governor of New York in January 1899, Elihu Root became Secretary of War in August 1899, and the editorial published three and half months later in December 1899. Interestingly, the reforms only pass Congress after Roosevelt became President, likely due to the focus on electoral politics during 1900. Roosevelt’s letter is significant because of its appeal to the People for ultimate responsibility; its points reflect a broader, deeper validation of my argument.

The Army General Staff

The Fifty-Seventh Congress passed *An Act To Increase the Efficiency of the Army* on February 14th, 1903. This Act established a General Staff and gave specific details about its organization and function (57th Congress, p. 831). The Act comprised five sections, the first establishing the General Staff and indicating its support directly to the President – this small section was quite significant for it effectively placed the General Staff under the direction of the elected civilian President and not the senior uniformed military commander, nor even the Secretary of War. The second paragraph specified the purpose of the General Staff was to “prepare plans for the national defense and for the mobilization of the military forces in time of war” (57th Congress, p. 831). Other responsibilities included investigating and researching

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52 Roosevelt goes on to address five other issues he considered highly relevant for public awareness and to shape the future debate – systematic study of military science problems (a revolution in military affairs), the modernization of armaments, the selection of officers by merit, rotation of officers between staff and line, and the conduct of military exercises.

53 Four days after the act was passed, the War Department issued General Order number 20, on February 18th, 1903 to spread the instructions throughout the Army.
military affairs and developments, assisting the Secretary of War and other senior military commanders as needed, and another explicit instruction to assist the President directly. The third paragraph listed the manpower composition of the General Staff to include a Chief of Staff and two general officers, and 42 other officers from Captain to Colonel, as well as defining their tour of duty to be four years followed by rotation back to the line for at least two years. The fourth paragraph emphasized that the Army Chief of Staff was given authority over all other Army units, organizations, installations, and departments, as well as assuming the highly-politicized responsibilities of the former Commanding General of the Army, such as his membership on the Board of Ordnance and Fortification (a weapons acquisitions and budgeting responsibility with numerous Congressional pork-barrel pressures) and in the Soldier Home (dealing with veterans’ affairs).\(^{54}\)

The Commanding General of the Army Lieutenant General (LTG) Nelson Miles attempted to block Root’s reforms; he was opposed to the creation of the General Staff because it undermined his authorities (Owens, p. 48). Root’s early efforts to get Congressional approval were stymied by Miles’ direct attacks on his plans in Congressional testimony (Owens, p. 53). Root had to bring in even more renowned military personages to persuade Congress of the need for the General Staff. After the Act passed, a Board was set up to review personnel files and

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\(^{54}\)The last paragraph of the Act made the curious declaration that the new position of Chief of Artillery (first held by Colonel Wallace F. Randolph) would be an “additional member of the General Staff” and be promoted to Brigadier General (and the next open Brigadier General slot would not be replaced). Randolph was a Civil War veteran and had a number of interesting experiences as an Army officer, which may have led to this particular honor and its inclusion for some as yet unknown reason in this important Act of legislation. Randolph spent several years of his career in New York City and may have known Secretary Root personally. Randolph was involved in the funerals for Ulysses Grant and GEN Winfield Scott Hancock, participated in the unveiling of the Statue of Liberty, the dedication of the Chicago World’s Fair in 1892 and commanding troops responding to the labor strike there in 1894. Randolph retired less than a year after the Act was passed, but he had served in the role for a number of years prior to its elevation. Randolph eventually committed suicide.
determine which 42 officers would be assigned to the General Staff – political infighting again occurred (Owens, pp. 61-69).\(^5\)

*The Militia*

The other significant fault the Dodge Commission identified was the issue of the militia, the states’ National Guard units. The role of the militia also illustrates an important aspect of how the People’s response to crisis affects national security decision-making. In terms of NCR’s intervening variables Domestic Institutions, State-Society Relationships, and Strategic Culture, the citizen-soldier militia is an important American traditional concept. Congress had resisted for decades U.S. Army suggestions to exert more centralized federal control over the readiness and capabilities of the militia (Skowronek, 1982, pp. 91-2). The growing autonomy of the strategy-making institution of the General Staff in the Army began to argue somewhat successfully, on the basis of recent wartime experience, for greater control by the Regular Army over the militia. However, Congress’ resistance resulted in a compromise giving the General Staff some oversight and responsibility for state National Guard, but also led to an eventual dismantling of the Congress’ Committee on the Militia in 1912. The nascent strategy-making institutions began to influence and change Strategic Culture regarding the citizen-soldier’s role in modern warfare (Millet & Maslowsky, 1984, pp. 313-314). How to integrate the citizen-soldier concept with continuous national security requirements, in light of the Founding Fathers suspicions regarding a standing army is a perennial military reform question.

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\(^5\) The Board consisted of Generals Young (#2 in the Army at the time, and the first Chief of Staff), Chaffee, Bates, Carter (Root’s closest confidant), Bliss (head of the new Army War College) and Randolph with Major H.A. Greene as recorder.
At the start of the Spanish-American War, there were tens of thousands of volunteers who flooded the National Guard offices around the country desiring to fight (Thomas, p. 15). The problems subsequently faced with the use of not well-trained volunteer troops heightened a perennial debate in the Army about the benefits and vulnerabilities of the militia. The discussion in *The Federalist Papers* #29 (Hamilton) and #46 (Madison) highlighted the importance and role of the militia to the Founding Fathers. BG (retired) Palmer’s study *America in Arms* is based on Palmer’s research into George Washington’s plan for universal military training and a well-ordered militia. Palmer discovered Washington’s plan and the contributions of several of his senior subordinate commanders and military advisors (including Knox and Steuben). Palmer describes how Congress had requested George Washington to develop such a plan, but then neutered it through political debate and modifications. A critical point in Palmer’s argument is underscoring how Emory Upton failed to incorporate the Washington plan into his own views on the militia after Upton was tasked by the post-Civil War Burnside Commission to advise on militia reform (Palmer, p. 111).

After Secretary Root implemented his reforms of the Military, he asked for reform of the Army organization, including the role of the People in the militia. However, just at this propitious moment for the re-insertion of Washington’s ideas, instead an old copy of Upton’s advice was “discovered” and the opportunity lost, according to Palmer (pp. 132-3). Palmer believes this unnecessarily undermined the potential benefits that could have helped better prepare the U.S. for later mobilization and improved perceptions about national security.

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57 Upton’s views did not incorporate Washington’s actual views, but did rely on Washington’s pre-Congressional study commentaries.
Palmer’s views are important because they stem from his personal experience in the late 1930s and early 1940s in trying to advise on reforms of the National Guard. Some of Palmer’s efforts were later rewarded during his career, but he still felt that foundational flaws about how the United States conceives the role of the militia diminished its strategic effectiveness. The role of the militia, or National Guard, or Reserve Component, is vital to understanding the role of the People in mass mobilization and in the interests of national security. The standing professional Army (and Navy) is that element of Clausewitz’s “trinity” labeled the Military, and the militia belongs to the element labeled the People. Part of the expression of popular will in support of national security decisions is the responsiveness of people to volunteer for service or support mobilizing these militia formations for deployment. Much like buying war bonds allows people to demonstrate their values through their pocketbook, participation in the militia allows people to vote with their feet, so to speak.

In the two decades prior to the Spanish-American War, every state revised their military codes governing the militia. The state militias were divided into two categories; active and organized units were classified as the National Guard, and all other able-bodied men were designated the inactive militia. In the South, the revitalization of the National Guard was assumed by the states to justify replacing federal troops involved in policing the Reconstruction South. National Guard armories expanded across the country to support annual training and facilitating logistics and maintenance of armaments. The strength of the National Guard grew to over 100,000 men, and their primary role was as state police to control labor disturbances. In 1879, the NGA was created to assist the states in lobbying Congress for additional federal aid to support the state militias; however, even though the NGA successfully doubled the annual appropriation from $200,000 to $400,000 in 1887, it was not enough to ensure successful
preparation of the militia by 1898 (Cooper, 1993, p. 87; Skowronek, 1982, p. 107; Cosmas, 1998, p. 8; Capozzola, 2009). The National Guard saw itself as the embodiment of the citizen soldier-minuteman concept considered a foundational aspect of the American approach to war.

When practical-minded regular Army officers started developing the plan to mobilize the Army at the start of the Spanish-American War, they wanted to simply expand the Regular Army to 100,000 men, placing all volunteers under the control of the Regular Army. However, the NGA, the state governors and National Guard leaders persuaded Congress to reject the Army’s mobilization plan and preserve the states’ ability to dole out officer appointments as an act of patronage and ensure prestige for state units going off to war (Cosmas, 1998, pp. 86-87). Congress instead limited the expansion of the Regular Army to 60,000 men, which would presumably result in nearly half the Army’s requested 100,000 man requirement coming from the states’ National Guard. In the end, however, the size of the Army was much larger.

On April 15\textsuperscript{th}, 1898 the Secretary of War ordered the entire Regular Army to assemble at the six mobilization sites, but principally to Chickamauga, Tampa, New Orleans, and Mobile. War was declared by Congress on April 21\textsuperscript{st}, including the expansion of the Regular Army to 60,000. On April 23\textsuperscript{rd}, President McKinley called for 125,000 volunteers, which would be provided by the states’ National Guards and on May 25\textsuperscript{th}, he asked for another 75,000 volunteers. The second call-up was principally intended to satisfy the demands from state Congressional leaders and Governors to be permitted to make patronage appointments. By August 1998, the Army consisted of 56,365 Regulars and 207,244 Volunteers (Nelson, 1946, p. 23; Skowronek, 1982, pp. 114-5).

Combined with the beginning of mobilization, the surprise Presidential callup of additional forces strained Army logistics to equip and prepare the force for war. Commanding
General Miles wanted to keep the Volunteers at the training sites for a prolonged period, which might have excluded them from the war, however the Regular Army needed the added reinforcements (Millett & Maslowski, 1984, pp. 273-4). Even if mobilization plans had been more organized in terms of moving troops from all over the U.S. to mobilization centers, the logistics system was not ready to equip so many soldiers, providing the Dodge Commission with another critical issue for Root’s post-war reforms. Even though the Regular Army initially thought it would be able to prosecute the war without the Volunteer Army, it was forced through Congressional pressure to incorporate them. Beyond the Volunteers laying claim to the citizen soldier tradition, gaining the support of Congress, and sustaining popular support for the war locally, the success of future President Roosevelt’s Rough Riders, a volunteer unit, likely assured favorable consideration during his 1901 to 1909 presidential administration (Cooper, 1993, pp. 87-89).

During the late July and early August Puerto Rico campaign, there was political pressure in Washington DC to ensure volunteer units saw action. The War Department tried to ensure each state had its militia participating in at least one of the operational theaters – Philippines, Cuba, or Puerto Rico. Senator Charles W. Fairbanks (R, IN) persuaded the War Department to assign an Indiana regiment to the Puerto Rico operation after pointing out that Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Kentucky all had deployed volunteer units overseas (Trask, 1981, p. 366). On the same token, the pressure to bring these volunteer units home quickly was just as dramatic (Smith, 1994, p. 110). Supporters of state militias pressured the War Department successfully (Capozzola, 2009) and the President had to intervene to halt debate about the added expense of addressing the militia participation and redeployment demands many professionals considered unnecessary (Trask, 1981, p. 590 fn61).
The experience of the militia during the war was considered worthy of more examination in terms of improving the Army’s mobilization plans. The Army staff issued a request in late 1899 for the state National Guard leadership to offer comments for an Army-wide After Action Review. The results of this review were gathered by the end of the year, many of the responses from the states are extant in the National Archives. In February 1900, the results of this study were likely shared with key Army and National Guard leaders at a military banquet held in the Plant Hotel in Tampa.58

The Dick Act

Root’s proposed reform of the militia was a compromise with Congress called the Militia Act of 1903, or the Dick Act (for the Congressman and National Guard General Officer, Charles Dick who proposed it). The Dick Act sustained the recognition of two types of militia, but only the Organized Militia (National Guard) would receive federal aid and only if those units met federal standards. The more training the National Guard conducted under the federal tutelage of the Regular Army the more funding it would receive. The annual appropriation was increased to $2 million in 1906. In 1908, an additional Militia Act removed the time and geographic constraints on the National Guard (only able to be called up for 9 months and not deployable outside the U.S.). The 1908 Militia Act continued to recognize the citizen soldier concept and the influence of local popular sentiment regarding National Guard units, because it directed that National Guard units had to be deployed as units and not used as individual replacements for the Regular Army. Additionally, the reforms created a bureau within the War Department

58 The University of Tampa museum in Plant Hall, located in the historical landmark of the hotel has a menu for this event, which indicates the nation-wide participation of military representatives. The museum had no context for this banquet until the author was able to provide the results of this research to the museum’s director. The museum intends to update its exhibit with the added historical context based on this scholarly contribution.
(eventually called the National Guard Bureau) to handle militia affairs, whose director answered
to the Secretary of War and not the Army general staff (Millett & Maslowski, 1984, pp. 313-4).

Significantly for this research, the creation of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) within
the War Department eventually led to a transfer of bureaucratic influence on the militia away
from Congress to the Military. Congress managed its influence and oversight over the Military
through several committees. Congress had standing committees in the House of Representatives
on Military Affairs and on Naval Affairs from 1822, and in the Senate from 1816. In 1835, both
houses of Congress added standing Committees on the Militia. The Senate merged its
Committee on the Militia with the Committee on Military Affairs in 1858, changing the
committee’s name to Military Affairs and the Militia until 1872 when it reverted to the
Committee on Military Affairs. However, the House sustained its Committee on the Militia until
1911, when it was abolished and its duties taken over by the Committee on Military Affairs; the
House committee had had little to work on since the Dick Act.59

The Dick Act and the Militia Act of 1908 had secured the War Department’s influence
over the states’ National Guard, and the NGB ensured the preservation of a citizen soldier
concept. Although militia affairs would be subject to appropriations through Congress, it is
noteworthy that, in 1912, immediately after Congress abolished its Committee on the Militia,
reforms in the National Guard slowed after a ruling by the Regular Army’s Judge Advocate
General declared compulsory overseas service by the National Guard was unconstitutional. The
ruling was upheld by President Taft’s attorney general. This refocused the War Department’s
attention on creating an independent federal reserve force, which was aided by the Reserve Act

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59 The changes in Committee organization were found in the “About” section of both the Senate and House Armed
Services committees online, accessed at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/about/history and
https://armedservices.house.gov/about/committee-history, respectively.
of 1912 allowing regular soldiers to reduce their active duty obligations by joining the federal reserve (Millett & Maslowski, 1984, p. 314). The new national security institutions were asserting increasing influence over national security issues; shifting the influence over issues previously asserted as Congressional purview away from Congress to the War and Navy Departments.

The Philippines and American Grand Strategy

Another fundamental issue, besides the role and capabilities of the Military that arose after the Spanish-American War, was the grand strategic question of whether the United States would be an empire. Congress was keenly aware of this probability and was also predisposed to ensure it did not happen. When President McKinley issued his request to Congress to declare war on Spain and intervene in Cuba, Congress appended the Teller Amendment, which disclaimed “any disposition of intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people" (Beede, 1994, p. 120).

Such caution in trying to limit the imperial consequences of prosecuting a foreign war was disrupted completely by Commodore Dewey’s spectacular naval victory at Manila Bay on May 1st, 1898. In one stroke, the United States had ejected the Spanish from the Philippines and inherited Emilio Aguinaldo’s Filipino insurgency against their Spanish overlords. When President McKinley heard about the victory, he had to actually look the location up on a map because he had no idea where the Philippines were. Anecdotally, this event provides evidence to the impact national security decision-making institutions can have. In this case, the order represents the individual influence of Teddy Roosevelt, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who had issued the order for the attack on the Philippines in the event war was declared, but he had
arranged it when the Secretary of the Navy was absent for the day (Trask, 1981, pp. 80-1).

Roosevelt’s approval of the order was based on Naval War College plans discussing strategic opportunities in the event of a war with Spain. There was no national-level debate or discussion about the operation and no national-level consideration of how to manage a possible victory – no plan for Army operations. (Smith, 1994, pp. 177-187) The delay between Dewey’s naval victory and the decision by the U.S. government about what to do with the Philippines likely resulted in the unfortunate, tragic, and ill-advised American experience in the Philippines.

Which begs the question, why did the United States attack the Philippines? And for that matter, if the United States had no awareness of what might happen in the Philippines, why was the caution displayed for the possible occupation of Cuba not also applied to the Philippines?

Firstly, President McKinley made no mention of the Philippines in his War Message to Congress (McKinley, 1898). President McKinley claimed four reasons and one catalyst for war with Spain: 1) a humanitarian interest in ending bloodshed and atrocities; 2) to protect American citizens in Cuba; 3) to protect the commercial interests of Americans; 4) to address a source of dangerous instability in close proximity to the U.S.; and 5) – the catalyst – the February 15th destruction of the USS Maine in Havana harbor (McKinley, 1898). McKinley did not have long-range plans for the Philippines and was only reacting to what the President described as the “self-controlling nature of war” and only belatedly realized the strategic opportunity (Trask, p. 384).

The impetus to attack the Philippines stems from an 1894 Naval War College study into a potential war with Spain, the tenets of which were later understood, championed and implemented by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt (Trask, 1981, p. 73).

In 1894, several students at the Naval War College researched a possible war with Spain as a training problem. In 1895, another Naval War College group advanced the research adding
among other strategic options an attack on Spain’s possessions in the Pacific Ocean because doing so would be inexpensive and safe. However, it was recognized attacking in the Pacific would not force Spain to come to terms with the U.S.. A more formal plan was developed in June 1896 by a Lieutenant William Kimball, an Office of Naval Intelligence staffer posted to the Naval War College, in which Kimball suggested a supporting effort to the operations against Cuba using the Navy’s Asiatic Squadron to “reduce and hold” Manila, controlling its commerce as leverage during peace negotiations. In November 1896, an updated version of the 1895 plan emphasized that an attack on the Philippines would not be useful for bringing Spain to the negotiation table. In a summary of the Naval War College plan by Kimball, the president of the Naval War College, Captain Henry C. Taylor, included a “demonstration” against the Philippines. In December 1896, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation suggested the Asiatic Squadron should be used to attack Spain in Europe, instead of the Philippines. In June 1897, a new planning group revised the plan and put attacking the Philippines back as an option.60 Also in the summer of 1897, the Navy developed a plan that envisaged defending the eastern seaboard of the United States during a war with Spain. Up until six months before the USS Maine would explode in February 1898, the Navy had not set vision for what it would do in the Pacific regarding the Philippines (Trask, 1981, pp. 72-79).

The U.S. decision to keep the Philippine Islands was not the product of deliberate grand strategy planning, nor even of deliberate foreign policy decision-making. The ground swell of popular opinion was in reaction to Commodore Dewey’s spectacular success (Trask, 1981, p. 106). The question of annexation was not even considered until after the Battle of Manila Bay.

60 This plan also called for an early seizure of Puerto Rico, using a part of the force detached from the Cuban expedition, which would disrupt Spanish navy plans for breaking an American blockade of Cuba (Trask, 1981, p. 77).
Those of an imperialist mindset began to lobby for annexation, justifying it based on providing more enlightened leadership for the Philippines than Spain had provided. The anti-imperialist proponents argued humanitarian intentions could be met without seizing the territory and without making the military expansion permanent. But as public sentiment continued to grow in support of annexing the Philippines, Congress also became supportive of annexation. An advisor to President McKinley recorded in his diary that the President “believed the acquisition of territory was naturally attractive to the American mind…but thought it would probably be more attractive just now than later on, when the difficulties, expense, and loss of life which it entailed, became manifest” (Trask, 1981, p. 441). Ironically, the only role the Philippines played in the Paris negotiations with Spain to end the war, was that the Americans believed the Filipino insurgency justified why the United States could not return the Philippines to Spain. The United States became an empire by default and by the unwillingness to go against the public opinion of the moment – even though the President believed the public opinion was likely temporary (Musicant, 1998; Trask, 1981, pp. 437-443).

Grand Strategy

The United States, at this grand strategic moment, transitioned from what I call Luminary Grand Strategy to a more formalized, institutional approach. The strategy-making institutions’ decision-making was still characteristic of American decision-making since the Founding. However, the United States was required to make a grand strategic choice due to the influence of a strategy-making institution – the Naval War College. In some respects, the United States had operated strategically on impulse, not a formal grand strategic design, prior to the Spanish-American War. However, by some definitions of grand strategy, early American expansionist
policies or foreign policy principles like the Monroe Doctrine, could be considered grand strategy (Silove, 2018).

President George Washington warned about tangling alliances and American citizens and politicians heeded the warning assiduously. Isolationism is perhaps not the best word to describe the U.S. approach, which was more in the line of establishing regional hegemony and denying European empires access to their atrophying colonies and lands in the New World. In particular, the last Founding Father president issued the Monroe Doctrine, an expressed U.S. national interest in denying future interference in the New World from Europe and carving space for America’s political values to perhaps spread. These two strategic concepts – avoiding alliances and the Monroe Doctrine were the strategic visions of two American luminaries – Presidents George Washington and James Monroe. These strategic concepts are more important for their “emotional power rather than their contents” because “neither had the precision to guide everyday affairs” (Wiebe, 1967, pp. 226-7) Therefore, American grand strategy through most of the 19th Century can be characterized as Luminary, usually closely tied to concepts from the Founding Fathers, but driven by the force of strong personalities.

A Strategic Culture concern was the suspicion for standing professional armies. The United States’ deep-seated antipathy for a standing army is ensconced in the Third Amendment prohibiting the peacetime quartering of troops in the homes of citizens. The Third Amendment is one of the least controversial in the Bill of Rights and has rarely been litigated. This is not simply because history has made the concept obsolete; but reflects the simple idea that a small government will not be able to afford permanent barracks to house a professional Army. Instead, the United States relied on a citizens’ militia, which could train and equip at the discretion of
State and local authorities. In effect, this made the U.S. Army fundamentally reactive and strategically defensive.

However, the Root reforms after the Spanish-American War allowed nascent national security strategy-making institutions to become more autonomous, even to the extent of persuading the Government to change long-standing strategic concepts. The creation of the American General Staff and the Army and Navy War Colleges led to a more autonomous Military, which began to influence the nation’s grand strategic choices, even creating the need for those choices! These institutions also began to change the traditional concepts and structure of the American citizen soldier-minuteman concept as they wrested control of the citizen soldier away from Congress and the states to fall under the guidance and control of a Regular Army institution.

The Navy, on the other hand, could house its officers and sailors on ships and had only a small requirement for permanent bases with housing for personnel. The Navy was also strategically defensive because its most likely European opponents so far out-classed it in terms of strength and experience, there was little prospect of anything but defeat in a major war. This situation changed for the U.S. Navy during the Civil War, when the technological advent of steamships and ironclads levelled the international naval balance of power in a single decade. This initial boost in naval power faded over the next two decades and by the 1870s, the Navy was reduced to what was described as a “flotilla of death traps and defenseless antiques”; in a fleet of 1,942 naval vessels only 48 were capable of firing naval guns (Trubowitz, 1998, p. 37; LeFeber, 1963, p. 58). In the post-bellum period, the U.S. Navy actually joined the rolls of great naval powers in terms of size, with an attendant national emphasis on seaborne commerce and strategic thinking. This development, while not as overt as the evolution in Army institutions
was also evidence of autonomy. The Navy began to assert naval modernization and shipbuilding requirements, especially in the 1880s, when the Navy began to seek appropriations to fix the urgent needs. The Navy also sought State Department support in acquiring access to distant bases, in the strategic context of global naval competition and potential strategic requirements. The Congress and the public were ill-equipped to challenge the Navy, especially after the Navy’s decision in 1886 to “buy American” with its shipbuilding and rearmament programs (LaFeber, 1963, p. 59). By the 1890s, the Navy’s new battleships had begun to become symbolic of America’s national pride, which made the destruction of the new battleship USS Maine so provocative. The world cruise of the Great White Fleet from December 1907 to February 1909 cemented international perceptions of the United States as a global naval power and re-energized U.S. Navy planning for overseas basing access (Challener, 1973, pp. 256-60).

The State Department

The State Department, on the other hand, did not bureaucratically evolve with the same sense of strategic metamorphosis. The example of Second Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee, who kept his position from 1886 to 1924, illustrates the lack of bureaucratic centralization of thought at State (Wiebe, 1967, p. 227). Instead, the State Department remained mired in the Luminary approach to Grand Strategy, reliant on the force of personalities like Secretary John Hay who championed an Open Door approach, which has garnered much scholarly attention as a contributing element to early 20th Century American foreign policy and grand strategic thought (Layne, 2006). Two very small groups of influential individuals attempted to determine U.S. foreign policy – a markets-based interest and a power-based interest. The markets-based were more able to influence Congress than the Executive; but the power-based held Executive Power: Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay and Elihu Root as Secretaries of State, and Roosevelt’s close
friend Henry Cabot Lodge, who sustained a powerful influence on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Other key individuals who impacted U.S. foreign policy included Mahan, John Bassett Moore (who advised the State Department on international law), Whitelaw Reid (editor of *New York Tribune*), Albert Shaw (editor of *Review of Reviews*), Lyman Abbott (at *Outlook*), Franklin Giddings (Columbia University), and the metaphysician Brooks Adams. This group exerted an informal, but powerfully impactful, influence over U.S. foreign policy, and therefore what could be labeled U.S. grand strategy during this moment (Wiebe, 1967, pp. 232-3). But systemically, strategy-making institutions in the foreign policy realm did not exist to gather and assess information or develop plans to implement policy – instead the luminary approach relied on informal connections and unofficial sources, resulting in knee-jerk reactions and less satisfactory, controversial results (Wiebe, 1967, pp. 254-5; Challener, 1973). Tellingly, however, the influence of idealistic, utopic visions of the future guided the foreign policy aspect of American grand strategy – it was self-centered, unrealistic, and hopeful.

*“We the People” and Grand Strategy*

This disconnect between the People and the Elites on the vision for the future is a critical component of how the American People have a vested interest in America’s grand strategy. In the People’s sense, grand strategy is not the specific plans or designs, nor even the determination of the specific objectives or principles, but it is a guiding, directing impulse which compels the leadership to eventually respond and operate within the People’s will. Grand Strategy in this perspective is more akin to what Nina Silove calls “grand behavior:”

**Grand behavior** is the long-term pattern in a state’s distribution and employment of its military, diplomatic, and economic resources towards ends. In this context, the ends that receive the greatest relative resources can be deemed to be priorities, but the concept implies no inference that those ends were necessarily prioritized as a result of grand plan, a grand principle, or any other factor (Silove, 2018, p. 49).
The People can demand action, their will constituting a force resistant to constraining behavior on the basis of even well-laid plans. The increasing public demand for the Government to respond to the political tension and humanitarian crisis in Cuba, eventually led to Congressional insistence on Executive Branch action (Trask, 1981, pp. 27, 475-6; Hoganson, 1998, p. 5):

“The jingoism in the air is a curious craze and unaccountable, except on account of the unrest of our people, and the willingness to turn from domestic to foreign affairs, always making the greatest allowance for political maneuvering, and the ridiculousness of conducting foreign affairs by such town meetings as the House and Senate have become.” -- Postmaster General William L. Wilson (Trask, 1981, p. 11).

American political leaders felt keenly the pressure of the People, especially in the sense of going to war. Kristin Hoganson delves deeper into the public pressure argument by investigating psychological influences and a gendered explanation providing further insights into the clamor for war (1998, pp. 8-14). The role of the media, especially cartoonists, provides supporting evidence for many of Hoganson’s points, as well as playing a significant role in shaping public opinion (Miller, 2011, p. 55).

The Government had not prepared for war, tried to avoid war through diplomacy, tried to uphold the Founding Fathers intent about avoiding foreign wars and entanglements, but were forced to go to war or suffer the political consequences. President McKinley’s April 11th, 1898 message to Congress noted the “perilous unrest” among the People (a mid-term election year) and both the President and Congress felt unable to resist the public pressure for war (Trask, 1981, pp. 52-3). The Executive’s perception of public opinion even impacted specific military decisions on matters most observers would intuitively believe lay strictly in the realm of military expertise. The Navy was forced to divide its combat strength to create a “Flying Squadron,” whose purpose was to allay public fears about Spanish attacks along the Atlantic Coast (Musicant, 1998, pp. 298-99).
However, as consequential as the public’s demand for government intervention in Cuba and war with Spain, was the role of public opinion in the peace negotiations with Spain after the war, which influenced how the imperialist American elites were able to advance their agenda (Trask, pp. 437, 440, 616, fn 18). The President believed the Manifest Destiny appeal among the People for territorial acquisition would not last long, but he did not want to risk upsetting the People before the 1900 Presidential election (Trask, 1981, p. 441). From October 11th-21st, 1898, President McKinley travelled throughout the American mid-West trying to gauge the People’s will on an empire. In one speech, McKinley noted:

“We have been united up to this hour; we do not want to be divided now. And we want the best wisdom of the whole country, the best statesmanship of the country, and the best public sentiment of the country to help determine what the duty of the American nation is, and when that is once determined, we will do it without fear or hesitation” (Trask, 1981, pp. 452-4).

The People supported annexation, but even as the mid-terms passed and the negotiations in Paris continued into 1899, the issue of annexation played out in the Senate under the aegis of preparation for the 1900 Presidential elections. While McKinley adapted a pro-annexation stance to satisfy the people, his expected political opponent William Jennings Bryan supported annexation in order to rapidly get foreign affairs off the electoral agenda so he could focus the debate on domestic concerns. Even after fighting in the Philippines broke out in February 1899, the Senate still voted 57 to 27 to accept annexation of the conquered territories (Trask, 1981, pp. 452-4; 468-70). Once again, the President bowed to his perception about the will of the People, despite what he believed was in America’s longer-term best interest.

In this post-Spanish-American War grand strategic moment, it is well-documented by the letters and historical commentary on the period, key American leaders couched their decision-making by adhering to the People’s expressed opinion. However, just as powerfully, but less
documented, the American people tired of the resource drain and reports of Filipino resistance to
American rule and eventually Congress voted to approve a path to independence for the
Philippines in August 1916 in the Jones Act, or Philippine Autonomy Act. According to one
scholar, the People’s view on keeping an empire changed around 1905 (Leopold, 1954, p. 50). Undoubtedly, the lack of strategic agreement between the Army and the Navy in 1907, contributed to the Government’s acquiescence to eventual independence for the Philippines. There was no People-driven demand nor approval for sustaining military or naval bases in the Philippines, but independence had not been fully implemented before the events leading to World War II and Japan’s rise in the Pacific complicated the process.

Critics of the People’s role and influence in foreign affairs are likely to point to such examples of temporal fluctuation to challenge the idea that this is a part of grand strategy. However, the weakest element of scholarly attention to grand strategy is the consideration of Time. Especially given the difficult challenge of sustaining a grand strategy in a democracy with potential political transitions every four years, there exists the idea that grand strategy must transcend certain types of political events to be valid. Actually, this critique is superficial; because is it not also desirable for grand strategy to shift when the facts change or assumptions underpinning the strategy are no longer valid? In fact, the attempt to pursue a grand strategy after such changes is actually a hallmark of failed powers and the dramatic historic defeats nations have suffered in the past. As a condition of determining the validity and enduring nature of a grand strategy, the will of the People must be a crucial element, especially in a democracy. Amazingly, scholarly attention to this intuitive fact has been obscured by academic and professional military hubris.
It is the experience and example of President McKinley in the post-Spanish American War grand strategic moment which evidences this verity about the People’s significance to grand strategy. Some theorists might attempt to give McKinley’s strategic perceptions (another significant NCR intervening variable) the decisive influence, citing his orchestration of events as evidence for a theoretical emphasis on the leader’s agency, rather than the People. McKinley’s secretary George Cortelyou tells a story that could support such an approach. Cortelyou was noting with wonder how McKinley’s note to Spain regarding the American decision to annex the Philippines was an example of how the national bureaucracy could amend and evolve such a document as it went through a review and comment process. McKinley however had carefully engaged with the various equities of the institutions involved and orchestrated the result – he pulled from his pocket the notes of his initial intent before the review had begun and Cortelyou was surprised to see how exactly the final product evidenced McKinley’s initial design (Trask, 1981, p. 431). But from a broader review of McKinley’s leadership in this grand strategic moment we see his genuine emphasis on understanding, following and implementing the People’s will for American grand strategy.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I make the case that the evolution in national security strategy-making institutions began to provide the United States with the tools to conduct grand strategy. United States “strategy” prior to the Spanish-American War can be described as luminary grand strategy, where strong personalities in positions of leadership defined long-standing or strategically significant visions. The role national security strategy-making institutions played in key events of the Spanish-American War and the outcomes of military reforms indicate the U.S. began to exercise a more formalized grand strategy. This evolution placed these strategy-making
institutions on a path determined to accrue an expanding and autonomous role in developing and implementing grand strategy, which will be elaborated on in successive chapters.
Map 3. The Administrative Organization of the Army and Navy in 1898 with specific Army forts and Naval stations and yards identified by Departments, including foreign bases acquired during the Spanish-American War.
Chapter 3

Post-World War II Reorganization

Introduction

This chapter explains how the experience of WWII resulted in a significant evolution in U.S. national security strategy-making institutions. The immediate post-WWII era is a watershed of theoretical significance across multiple academic disciplines; it has been almost exhaustively analyzed and discussed from a great number of conceivable angles (Mabee, 2011, p. 41). Over-analysis has a consequence for the general population; while scholars and experts may dive into the details with enthusiasm and interest, the average person takes away a superficial understanding of only the significant highlights of major events and possibly understands scholars and experts still haggle over the details. Even for scholars more familiar with the details, newly discovered details may even shape how they interpret those events, possibly even reframing their previously-held views of their larger historical or political significance. This era brought the Atomic Age, the start of the Cold War, the global economic order of Bretton Woods, opened the international institutional influence of the United Nations, and ripped apart empires through decolonization, all presided over by the dominant military and economic power of the United States. The shell-ploughed fields and rubble-strewn cities of most of the industrialized world provided fertile fodder for human intellectual development. It is little wonder that out of such destruction should arise an ideological contest over the way human society ought to be governed to avoid more war.
In this grand strategic moment of obvious American supremacy, the United States completely reorganized its national security establishment in 1947, most significantly formalizing in law the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS was designed by the War Department at General (GEN) George C. Marshall’s direction, and was implemented by EO, but expanded under its own controls. Interestingly, Congress also reorganized itself in 1946, updating its committee system and overhauling procedures in the most comprehensive legislative reform in U.S. history. The national security reform was intended to consolidate the systemic and procedural lessons learned from conducting a global war and to ensure national security interests were protected during what was a vast demobilization effort after the end of the war. Congress’ reform was intended to stop the hemorrhaging flow of power from the Legislative Branch to the Executive Branch; a consequence engineered and aided by President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (FDR) New Deal programs, long tenure, and assertion of wartime executive powers. Congress was not as successful as the national security strategy-making institutions in accomplishing their objectives. The result for Congress was a steady, but under-appreciated, decline in Congress’ influence and prestige among the People, eventually becoming one of the least respected institutions of the Government. For the Military, however, wartime success engendered much prestige, an image shared liberally with the veterans and workers of the “greatest generation,” but also an honor that did not mask the rise of the military-industrial complex.61

In terms of NCR, the Strategic Culture of the United States underwent as dramatic a transformation as the Domestic Institutions experienced during reorganization. What has been

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understudied in these transformations is the role of the national security strategy-making institutions in orchestrating the national security transformation and in the undermining of Congressional influence. The rise of the military-industrial complex and its suborning influence on Congress has not been ignored by researchers, especially after President Eisenhower’s 1961 shocking warning to the American People about the influence of the military-industrial complex (Baier, 2017). However, these academic research efforts focused mainly on validating the existence of the military-industrial complex and bringing pressure to bear to correct or mitigate allegedly corruptive influences on Congress and the Military. During the 1960s, it was extremely difficult for scholars to challenge the existence of the military-industrial complex without being entrapped by the ideological construct of the Cold War – criticizing its existence, so soon after the end of McCarthyism’s witch hunt for Communists, would likely have been risky professionally and personally.

After the Military’s fall from grace during the Vietnam War, the newly-warranted criticism of the military-industrial complex centered on its capitalistic greed in leveraging a war of ideas to profit from an attendant arms race. Researchers blamed defense contracting companies and irresponsible, and at their worst corrupt, military acquisitions processes for the military-industrial complex’s existence (Berkhout, 2017, pp. 471-3; Hooks, 1990; Hooks, 1991; Hooks & McLauchlan, 1992). Yet, the institution-based explanation for its rise is not so blatantly corrupt as its alleged behavior. Instead, the rise of the military-industrial complex resulted from path dependent forces unleashed by the evolution and expansion of national security strategy-making institutions causing a durable shift in constitutional warmaking powers.

If the concerning influence of the military-industrial complex can be attributed to the growth in systemic influence of national security strategy-making institutions, perhaps the role of
these institutions in developing and formalizing U.S. foreign policy and national security strategies at the start of the Cold War should be reexamined. Even if we attribute benign intent and unintended consequence to the role of these professional, mostly military, institutions in the rise of the military-industrial complex, the possibility of similar unintended consequence and misperception at the very heart of American strategic culture must be investigated. The national security assumptions and principles on which the Cold War was prosecuted may be flawed, in which case, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a fortuitous, but not inevitable, outcome. Before the United States reverts to an approach predicated on repeating how Americans faced great power competition during the Cold War, it would be prudent to examine whether those strategy-making institutions should be trusted to secure the People’s real, long-term interests in developing that grand strategy.

The Illusion of Open Door Delusions

In the *Peace of Illusions*, Christopher Layne leverages NCR to argue U.S. grand strategy after WWII was a natural extension of the United States’ Open Door approach to foreign policy. Layne argues against a Cold War initiated by a Truman Doctrine reaction to Communist threats by asserting the counterfactual circumstance that had the Soviet threat not existed, the United States would still have pursued an expansive, aggressive, hegemonic grand strategy. Layne implicitly disregards Containment as a propagandistic buzzword; instead, he argues the United States was determined to remove the Soviet Union’s as a competing threat to America’s view of an open (free) global market. The militarization of U.S. foreign policy and formulations of national security during the Cold War, Layne sees as the extension of an ideological adherence to an Open Door frame of reference. The crucial evidence Layne deploys in his primary argument - - how to explain the United States’ continued internationalist activism after the Soviet collapse
and end of the Cold War – is an alleged continuity in U.S. grand strategy stemming from the late 19th century and especially as promulgated after WWII. Layne argues there is no retrenchment despite the United States’ decline in overall economic power, because the United States is still pursuing an economically-driven expansionist Open Door foreign policy (Layne, 2006).

The problem with Layne’s explanation is his use/understanding of history and how it supports his hypothesis about what drove American national security strategy-making in the immediate post-WWII timeframe. Layne argues the United States “played Hartford” in Latin America from 1890 until WWII; playing Hartford is an entertainment industry metaphor for how Broadway producers would run a play in Hartford, Connecticut as a pre-test for whether it would be successful on Broadway (Layne, 2006, p. 37). After validating the success of the Open Door model from the early 20th century, Layne argues the United States then employed the proven Open Door approach to the post-WWII era. Considering the theoretical framework, Layne’s argument claims grounding on the intervening variable of Leadership Perspectives as an input to policy formulation. While Layne deploys very little evidence in support of his pre-WWII claim, he does adequately support his post-WWII claim for an economic basis to the U.S. grand strategy. However, Layne’s argument is not as well grounded in neoclassical realism’s other intervening variables, domestic and political institutions and strategic culture, to also explain policy formulation. Indeed, Layne’s interpretation of the pre-WWII history reads more like a warped type of backcasting, because Layne’s primary intellectual contribution was intended to

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62 Backcasting is a technique utilized in intelligence analysis to help policy-makers and decision-makers understand the “story” of what implications a predictive intelligence assessment is intending to convey. The analyst creates a narrative describing the future situation and discusses how the narrator arrived at that point by reflecting on the recent “past” as though it were historical fact. The technique is to describe complexities and uncertainties of the future via the more comfortable and discernible format of relating history. This use of this technique reveals more about the lack of reader capacity to understand true intelligence analysis and the creative writing skills of the analyst than it does about the complex linkage of causalities more relevant to strategic understanding of an issue.
explain why the United States retained an activist foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. The bulk of Layne’s argument is leveraged on his excellent discussion of American strategic thinking at the end of WWII. The strength of Layne’s argument about U.S. views on the liberal international order, the validity and applicability of many of his conclusions for the post-Cold War era, and his warning about the dangers of over-extension and inevitability of multipolarity in the international order should not be discounted due to his erroneous description of pre-WWII American national security decision-making. The archival and historical record of American strategy-making institutions simply does not support Layne’s assertion in this particular respect.

Turning to a historian sympathetic to the assertion of underlying economic stimuli to international affairs, Melvyn Leffler in *Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism* (2017) argues:

By focusing attention on certain apparent economic imperatives of American diplomacy, exponents of the open door thesis have compelled all diplomatic historians to grapple with a complex set of criteria that heretofore had been frequently minimized. By failing to weigh and to balance the relative importance of commercial considerations vis-à-vis other economic, fiscal, strategic, and political factors, they have been able to emphasize a particular viewpoint of foreign policy development. To examine the commercial aspects of foreign policy, however, is to analyze only one phase of a complex process. Consequently, the full significance of the open door thesis will emerge only after its advocates – and its critics – judiciously weigh the relative importance of frequently conflicting pressures upon those responsible for shaping national policies (Leffler, 2017, pp. 45-46).

Significantly, Leffler’s criticism above is at the end of a chapter discussing the influence of European WWI debt on U.S. foreign policy decision-making. Leffler continues in highlighting President Hoover’s influence over U.S. foreign policy in the 1920s. Hoover brought an engineering approach emphasizing expertise, human intelligence and cooperative action (Leffler, 2017, p. 52). Hoover had a broader interest than the Open Door, his interest in economic issues
was predicated on maintaining international economic equilibrium and financial stability, especially in Europe (Leffler, 2017, p. 64). Hoover’s policies, dominant over the foreign policy process at the time, were protectionist (Leffler, 2017, p. 69). Leffler argues Hoover’s attempts to rationalize foreign policy decision-making, which would support deterministic economic approaches like the Open Door, were foiled by the inability to escape political, emotional, and psychological factors (Leffler, 2017, pp. 72-73). Neither the expansive Open Door nor the economic equilibrium and financial stability approaches present satisfying arguments. Although debunking strictly-interpreted isolationist arguments and highlighting the importance of economic-based interests, American foreign policy for the 1920s and 1930s is described as “engagement without commitment” – and also Eurocentric -- not exactly evidence of Layne’s Latin America “Hartford” approach (Leffler, 2017, pp. 79-93).

Additionally, the course of the 1930s, after the economic crash and onset of the Depression, compelled American national security policy to adopt more isolationist tendencies. U.S. policymakers advocated for arms limitation and invested heavily in the American military – especially coastal defense. Expenditures in battleships and aircraft carriers also accounted for a significant percentage of the defense budget, but the strategic plans for utilizing these weapons systems were predicated, not upon forward presence enforcing an Open Door but, on defensive posture in the Western Hemisphere to be followed by offensive actions to project power as needed to secure bases in the planned area of hostilities. The increases in spending by the Military in comparison to the rest of the world highlighted by Leffler and Layne, do not take into account the actual drop in appropriations for the Military during the same time period as an indicator of strategic preference. Further, Layne’s argument does not account for the strong differences and lack of effective policy coordination between the State, War, and Navy
departments prior to WWII. The State Department had no strategic planning cell and the Army
and Navy strategy-making institutions disagreed with each other’s strategic preferences.
Presidents, from McKinley to FDR, were forced to arbitrate between the separately devised
policy recommendations from the national security institutions and any Presidential decisions
were then implemented separately, including separate justifications presented to Congress for
appropriations. In fact, the grand strategic underpinnings of the post-WWII formation of the
U.S. national military enterprise and the architecture of institutions established to address
national security and foreign policy reveal fundamental tensions and not the unified perspective
Layne alleges (Nelson, 1946; May, 1955; Morton, 1959; Greene, 1961; Caraley, 1966; Stoler,

As it would seem, Layne’s hypothesis about “playing Hartford” will not play in Peoria. This chapter will present evidence to highlight how national security strategy-making institutions evolved into the post-WWII era and better describe how the grand strategic approach, ascribed by Layne to an Open Door perspective, was developed through the arbitration of competing institutional demands on the strategy-making processes of the United States. A broader application, than Layne employed, of NCR’s theoretical model to explain policy formulation provides a more complex picture based on how the evolution of national security strategy-making institutions affected U.S. grand strategy.

63 Interestingly, the coordination difficulties cannot be attributed to lack of access to each other – the three Departments occupied the same building in Washington, DC, before WWII.
64 For those possibly unfamiliar with the once popular Americanism, “Will it play in Peoria?” see the excellent article by Amy Groh at https://peoriamagazines.com/ibi/2009/jun/phrase-put-peoria-map.
Many scholars have noted the seeds of WWII were sown into the Versailles Treaty ending WWI. Similarly, the evolution in national security institutions for WWII also were rooted in WWI, specifically the National Defense Act of 1920. The War Department developed a proposed reorganization plan at the request of Chief of Staff GEN Peyton March. However, the responsible War Department office developed the reorganization idea from a clean slate, with little guidance from the Chief of Staff or Secretary of War on limitations or constraints to the reorganization effort. When GEN March was shown the plan, he immediately rejected it as an increase in General Staff authorities and capacity that would be unacceptable to Congress (Nelson, 1946, pp. 275-6). Congress, and the American People, were still steeped in suspicion of a European-style General Staff and the proposed reorganization would have strained Congressional and popular understanding (Nelson, 1946, pp. 280-81). Instead, GEN March redrafted the plan to attempt to preserve the War Department General Staff organization and authorities it had developed during the war. March routed it through a reservedly supportive Secretary of War Baker, but still, even this watered-down version of reorganization faced resistance in Congress. The final result, a moderate increase in capacity for war planning and no additional authorities beyond a further extension of Regular Army control over the militia, would stand without modification throughout the interwar period, even though personalities as influential as early 1930s Chief of Staff GEN Douglas MacArthur would suggest necessary revisions (Nelson, 1946, pp. 281-87, 298-99).

A key indicator of the increased planning capacity the National Defense Act of 1920 engendered was the development of the Color Plans. The Color Plans were Joint Army and
Navy Board plans assigning a color to potential nation-state threats (i.e., ORANGE=Japan; BLACK= Germany; RED=Great Britain; CRIMSON=Canada; GREEN=Mexico; TAN=Cuba; BROWN=Philippines; VIOLET=Intervention in Latin America; etc.) and developing Estimates of the Situation and proposed courses of action to account for various scenarios. The Color Plans were numbered on the basis of permutations of the situation and scenarios which might lead to conflict. Each service developed separate plans for a given strategic problem, the General Board for the Navy and the War Plans Division for the Army developed the service specific plans. These plans were then submitted to the Joint Army and Navy Board for adjudication of differences. These plans evidenced detailed analysis of military geography, including port capacities and air distances, as well as addressing expected political and geo-strategic challenges associated with conducting military and naval operations of a much greater complexity than WWI or the Spanish-American War. The plans indicated the incorporation of intelligence analysis, political analysis, economic considerations, as well as the expected military and naval factors and calculus (Rearden, 2012).

One of the important Color Plans developed was Joint Basic War Plan – ORANGE, which dealt with a possible war with Japan. As an example of the differences the Joint Army and Navy Board would have to resolve, the issue of unified command and control to accomplish Plan ORANGE was a major pre-war issue, whose resolution laid the groundwork for the Joint Chiefs of Staff during WWII. In Section IV “Conduct of Joint Action,” Plan ORANGE, the

65 The composition of these war plans included annual requirements to review and update: Army monograph (Military Intelligence by December 31st), Navy monograph (Office of Naval Intelligence by December 31st), Joint Estimate of the Situation (The Joint Board by March 31st), Joint Army and Navy War Plan (The Joint Board by June 30th), an Army War Plan in furtherance of the Joint War Plan (submitted to SECWAR by September 30th), and a Navy War Plan in support of the Joint War Plan (submitted to SECNAV by September 30th), (J.B.No.325, Serial No. 210 “Coordination of Army and Navy War Plans;” June 7th, 1923).
66 Joint Basic War Plan – Orange (J.B. No. 325, #228), March 12th, 1924, August 15th, 1924.
Army and the Navy disagreed on who would command the overall operation. Each service agreed that Army units should be commanded by the Army and Navy units by the Navy, but neither service wanted to subordinate to the other in the important actions after the first two phases of the operation. The Navy was designated to be in charge of projecting force across the Pacific to the Philippines (and other islands). The Army was designated to be in charge of the forces ashore to prosecute any land fighting to seize required objectives. However, after the forward base in the western Pacific was seized, the determination of which commander should provide the decision for what both naval and land forces should do next was a problem they referred to the Joint Army and Navy Board. The solution articulated in paragraphs 17 and 18 of Plan ORANGE was:

> The efficient exercise of mutual cooperation requires that the commander of the Naval forces and the commander of the Army forces in the principal theater of operations should each be assisted by a Joint Army and Navy Staff. Joint planning and joint action of the War and Navy Departments incident to the preparation for and prosecution of the war should be coordinated by the Joint Board and other Joint agencies.

However, the underlying strategic concept of what might drive this command architecture was not resolved prior to the war. The Army wanted to abandon the Philippines because it believed the islands to be indefensible and to conform to American isolationist tendencies. However, the Navy argued for investment to oppose Japan’s rising militarism which was supported by Congressional sentiment. The compromise strategy adopted was hampered by a gap between the military means provided by Congressional appropriations and the disagreement on ultimate ends to be achieved in Plan ORANGE (Morton, 1959, p. 250). The question of shifting to a defense of the continental United States driven by the Army (signified by huge investments in coastal defense artillery) and the Navy’s desire to preserve access to Asia (partially justified by an
explicit reference in planning documents to the benefits of an Open Door policy) had de facto
shifted toward hemispheric defense by 1938-1939 (Greene, 1961, p. 361).  

Eventually, in early 1939, the prospect of a coalition of adversary nation-states led to the
creation of the RAINBOW Color plans, considering various possible combinations of opponents.
Five variants of the RAINBOW plans were initially identified, with RAINBOW-1 68 being
approved by the President in October 1939. Much work was completed on RAINBOW-2, 69 but
RAINBOW-3 70 & RAINBOW-4 71 were skipped in order to prioritize RAINBOW-5, due to how
the world situation in late 1939 had changed. RAINBOW-5 envisioned a two-front war by a
Germany-Italy-Japan Axis against a U.S.-Great Britain-Canada (ABC) Alliance; RAINBOW-5
was initiated in April 1940, with its latest formal revision before being adapted for
implementation in May 1941 (six months before Pearl Harbor). By late 1940, the review of the
RAINBOW plans led the Joint Planning Committee (a replacement for the Joint Army and Navy
Board) to articulate the prioritized national objectives required to be met by the Army and Navy
as: (1) “the preservation of the territorial, economic, and ideological integrity of the United
States and of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; (2) the prevention of the disruption of
the British Empire and the consequences of such an eventuality; and (3) the opposition to the

\[\text{notes}67\text{See also the archival memos in the Army’s War Plans Division and correspondence between Secretaries of War,}
\text{Navy, and State, including specifically a Letter from Secretary of War to Secretary of State, September 22nd, 1921,}
\text{WPD 77; a Memo, Assistant Chief of Staff (AC of S), War Plans Division (WPD) to the Chief of Staff (C of S),}
\text{April 27th, 1927, Subject: Three Power Naval Conference at Geneva, WPD 2938; and Memo, AC of S WPD to C of}
\text{S, November 1st, 1939, Subject: War Department Concept of Military Mission of National Defense Prior to}
\text{Adoption of Policy of Hemisphere Defense, WPD 4175-2 (Greene, 1961, p. 361).}
\text{68 RAINBOW-1 envisioned the European war being terminated and a subsequent threat to the Western hemisphere}
\text{by Germany and Italy, as well as aggression against American interests in the Pacific region by Japan. US response}
\text{would be limited to defeating enemy objectives and employing forces nearer the Homeland.}
\text{69 RAINBOW-2 envisioned UK and France waging war in Europe and an alliance with the US in which the US’s}
\text{contribution was to conduct military operations in the Pacific region as a priority.}
\text{70 RAINBOW-3 envisioned UK and France waging war successfully in Europe and the Pacific, but the United States}
\text{is responsible for controlling the Eastern Pacific and only later projecting force to the Far East in Asia.}
\text{71 RAINBOW-4 was identical to RAINBOW-1, except US response would be escalated to defeating enemy}
\text{aggression anywhere in Western hemisphere.} \]
extension of Japanese rule over additional territory, while protecting our economic and political interests in the Far East” (Greene, 1961, p. 377). However, identifying the national objectives and designing the operational plans to achieve them was not a sufficient level of planning; the development of the Color Plans, informed by the U.S. military experience in WWI and the Dodge Commission investigation of Spanish-American War, generated the requirement for the development of comprehensive mobilization plans.

**Industrial Mobilization Plan**

The specific requirements of modern industrialized conflict necessitated the development of an Industrial Mobilization Plan (IMP), including plans regarding strategic war materials and the control of the national economy to shift to a wartime effort. These plans were extremely sensitive and highly classified not only to protect them from espionage, but also because the strategic planners and Army leadership understood these plans fell outside the purview of the Navy and War Departments. The rest of the U.S. government lacked offices where such planning exercises could occur. To meet the need to develop expertise in economic mobilization, the War College started special courses in 1923. This effort was followed by the creation of the Army Industrial College in February 1924 (Abramo, 1995, p. 35). Efforts to secure Congressional authorization to conduct preliminary preparations for the IMP were rejected numerous times throughout the 1930s. The War Department eventually persuaded Congress to allow the Assistant Secretary of War to develop a responsible office to ensure lessons learned in the mobilization for WW I were not forgotten. The WWI Council of National Defense and War Industries Board provided the basis for the War Department’s planning assumptions about how the United States might organize for a future conflict (Abramo, 1995, pp. 16-20). Congress feared permitting the further development of the IMP, by requiring other
Departments and agencies to provide supporting plans to the IMP, because it would give the Military too much power and influence in domestic economic concerns.

However, the lack of civilian guidance from Congress and assistance from other government agencies forced the Military to develop planning assumptions related to the economy and the nation’s ability to convert industries in the event of a major war which required extensive mobilization (Abramo, 1995, p. 42). The Military sent officers to civilian universities to study the economy and gain familiarity with economic planning factors (Abramo, 1995, p. 49). By 1940, the Army had 118 officers graduate from Harvard, and 14 others from the Babson Institute; these officers, along with 870 officers who completed training at the Army Industrial College became the foundation for the military influence in economic mobilization for WWII (Abramo, 1995, p. 52). Eventually, this influence would establish the conditions for the military-industrial complex to arise after WWII. Civilian agencies and corporations did not have strategic planning offices; the Military had to conduct this planning for them. This intellectual investment paved the way for the mobilization of the “Arsenal of Democracy” and the more permanent military-industrial planning and relationship after the war (Abramo, 1995, p. 55). In this sense, military planners assisted in the development of the U.S. modern political economy. According to one researcher, the Military conducted this influence “while working within the parameters of the liberal American economic tradition of a free marketplace and private ownership of property” (Abramo, 1995, pp. v-2). This assertion may be true, but likely only due to the ethical professionalism evidenced by most military officers, who kept the nation’s values

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72 According to Abramo’s research, the Navy sent officers to Harvard’s Graduate School of Business, New York University’s School of Commerce, Accounts, and Finance, the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Finance and Commerce; the Philadelphia School of Textiles, and Georgetown University.
in this regard; yet, whether or not the ends justified the means for this strategic planning may give sufficient cause to examine the American approach to such important warmaking issues.

Additionally, the Military could not rely on public support for industrial mobilization planning efforts due to the high-profile Congressional Nye Commission investigation (1934-1936) into profiteering and corruption in WWI contracts (Willtz, 1961, p. 211). Another influence on public opinion for this topic was the influence of a best-selling book, *The Merchants of Death*, by Helmuth Englebrecht and Frank Hanighen. The “merchants-of-death” theory postulated defense industries lacking profits during peacetime would provoke tension and eventual hostilities between nations to create a profitable market for munitions (Willtz, 1961, p. 222; Jeffreys-Jones, 1995, p. 74; Denson, 1999, p. 50; Nielsen, 2000, p. 78). As another indicator of the reluctance of businessmen to support military planning efforts, a 1940 *Fortune* magazine survey found 77% of business executives believed FDR’s administration was anti-business (Higgs, 1995). Congress and the American public were reluctant to empower the Military, preferring to rely on the sense of security gained by the tyranny of distance, which afforded the United States security from attack (except from Canada and Mexico) due to the oceanic separation from the rest of the world’s great powers. Other great powers lacked the ability to project enough military power to threaten the U.S. homeland.

In July 1937, Japan invaded China using the July 7th Marco Polo Bridge incident as pretext for their aggression. On October 5th, President Roosevelt gave his “quarantine” speech in Chicago, where he emphasized a prophetic passage from John Hilton’s *Lost Horizon* to point to...
a need for the United States to reverse its isolationist stance and prepare for war to stop the horrors of growing international instability. This signaled FDR’s determination to prepare the United States for eventual conflict and his subsequent efforts to increase military funding and advance planning efforts were not strongly resisted by Congress. In early 1939, after the Germans annexed Czechoslovakia, FDR tried to get an adjustment to the 1937 Neutrality Act that would allow him to provide limited military assistance to selected partners (France and the United Kingdom), but Congress rejected the plan. After the Germans invaded Poland on September 1st, 1939, the United States updated its Neutrality Act in November 1939, approving FDR’s “cash and carry” clause allowing belligerent nations to purchase arms in the United States.

The Joint Army and Navy IMP, developed in the early 1930s and most recently revised in 1939, began to be relooked for implementation under the auspices of the Joint Army Navy Munitions Board, which began working closely with the President and his designated civilian industry leaders in the War Production Board. While industry began ramping up for production, at first to support purchase requests from France and Great Britain, the U.S. military’s requests for production had to be integrated within these priorities. The War Department’s War Plans Division (WPD) also began to consider in 1940 a reorganization effort for the War Department which would be necessary to support a wartime footing.

**War Department Reorganization of March 1942**

The strategic planners of the WPD identified a reorganization plan for the War Department and the General Staff to support the increased planning, resourcing, administration, training, deployment and operations required by the Army in the expected conflict. While there was general agreement on the principles of the reorganization, the specific details fell into
contention between the Army Air Forces, the Supply Division, and the WPD. One of the interesting elements of one version of the reorganization plan was to provide the President with a small, permanent staff of military officers to help him assess the international environment and support foreign policy and national security planning efforts. The Chief of Staff GEN George C. Marshall convened a board in August 1941 which determined that a major reorganization was in order, but that it was unlikely to gain Congressional approval. During Congressional interactions, the sense of Congress was that a wholesale reorganization of the War Department would undo the many years of hard negotiations the Congress had conducted in implementing General Staff reforms since the 1903 Root Reforms. Congress was afraid the War Department reorganization might diminish Congress’ ability to influence and control the War Department, especially when the potential for war was looming (Nelson, 1946, pp. 335-345).

Just prior to the December 7th, 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Chief of Staff directed a revised version of the reorganization plan to be distributed through the War Department for comment. But after the attack, General Marshall saw that attempting to staff the reorganization plan in a routine fashion would result in endless squabbling over staff section equities and implementation would be delayed. The Chief of Staff selected a distinguished Army Air Forces General Joseph McNarney, known for an ability to communicate directly, who had much experience working with the British during the early WWII years and had served in various General Staff positions, including in the WPD, to make a recommendation on reorganization. By January 31st, 1942, General McNarney drafted a very succinct, one-page plan, which would implement the very top level of the WPD’s 1940 reorganization plan, designating commanding generals of the new organizations, and proposed that those senior leaders then implement the rest of the reform. The Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War took
General McNaurney’s plan to the President, who issued EO 9082 on February 28th, 1942 directing the reorganization occur on March 9th. The EO invoked the President’s wartime powers by directing the reorganization to remain in effect for the war’s duration and for six months afterward (Nelson, 1946, pp. 347-48). The War Department was freed to reorganize as it saw fit without Congressional involvement or approval.

The Military Reorganization of March 1942, fundamentally changed the General Staff and War Department organization. It was further modified through experience over the conduct of the war, but such modification was expected given the ad hoc nature by which the reorganization was implemented. Expediency and exigency with regards to the war effort governed the path of organizational change for the next three and half years. However, the work of the WPD in laying out a proposed reorganization plan in 1941 heavily influenced the implementation. When General McNaurney was summoned to a March 6th, 1942 hearing held by the Senate Military Affairs Committee (SMAC) to discuss the reorganization plan, McNaurney told them:

“…I might say that this reorganization has been under study for a period of about a year. The Chief of Staff gave considerable thought to the problem and decided that for the purpose of actually winning the war which appeared to be close upon us at that time some reorganization of the staff of the Army was necessary…It was decided that the time had come when a reorganization was necessary, and as a result, this reorganization has now been approved by the President, and is about to go into effect on March 9th.”

The SMAC Chairman’s resigned response was a request to be briefed on what the reorganization entailed (Nelson, 1946, pp. 394-96).

Formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Once the United States entered the war, the requirement to conduct combined planning with the British drove the formation of a JCS, in order to mirror British leadership. At the
ARCADIA conference, held in Washington, DC, from December 22nd, 1941 to January 14th, 1942, the most senior leaders of the Army and Navy accompanied FDR and met with their counterparts in the British military. The Army representatives were Army Chief of Staff GEN George C. Marshall and the soon to be Commanding General of the Army Air Forces LTG Henry H. Arnold. The Navy representatives were Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Harold Stark and Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the U.S. Fleet Ernest King. The first formal meeting of the JCS occurred in February 1942 when the ARCADIA attendees met to discuss and make decisions about fulfilling the obligations they had signed up for with the British at ARCADIA (Nelson, 1946; Lederman, 1999, pp. 10-11; Rearden, 2012). The President decided there would be no formal document authorizing the JCS in order to keep it as flexible as possible to meet his wartime requirements as his advisors – the lack of a formal document also meant it would not require review, approval, or appropriations by Congress.

The Army and the Navy quickly realized their cooperation and effectiveness in the JCS depended upon developing very formal procedures for committee actions and document transmittal and management. Despite the lack of an authorizing document by Congress or the President, the JCS, on its own, assigned manpower, implemented administrative systems, occupied offices around the Washington, DC area, and conducted international military cooperation and planning for the war effort. If necessity is the mother of invention, then exigency was the father of the Joint Staff.

When Admiral Stark was sent to a command position in the United Kingdom in March 1942, the JCS became unbalanced in terms of Army and Navy representation. General Marshall suggested assigning an Admiral to be a military Chief of Staff to the President in his role as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. The President approved the idea and selected his
close friend and former CNO Admiral William Leahy. Marshall’s recommendation for the Navy to provide the President’s Chief of Staff was likely calibrated to maximize the President’s and the Navy’s acceptance of the new strategic planning structure and role of the Joint Staff – FDR had served in the Navy Department during and after WWI.

The Joint Staff was different from the Army’s General Staff and the Navy Staff in that it was created in wartime, rather than peacetime. The Service Staffs relied on meetings, phone calls, and conferences and minimized detailed written staff studies in the course of their routine work. However, the experience of the Joint Army and Navy Board demonstrated the need for written staff studies to facilitate interservice coordination. The Joint Staff’s wartime development was reflected in early policies which emphasized: non-partisanship (best interests of the war effort over particular service equities), objectivity (no specific guidance given to Joint Staff committees to restrict their deliberations), and timeliness (the Joint Staff would operate at the speed of necessity). The significance of this in terms of bureaucratic autonomy of these institutions requires further elaboration.

The battle rhythm of meetings by the senior military leadership was deliberately defined to support the provision of information for decision-making. For example, in the War Department, the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War received a daily morning briefing in the Chief of Staff’s office from a select group of officers who provided a verbal intelligence and operations update. Each of the senior leaders received a briefing book each morning with all the cable messages that had come in the previous evening and during the night, which they read prior to the verbal update. On Mondays at 1130 hours, the War Department held a General Council, which included the broader staff representation who provided updates in their respective areas. This General Counsel would begin with a brief weekly review of what had
happened in intelligence and operations the previous week. On Tuesdays, the minutes of the General Council would be disseminated throughout the rest of the War Department and General Staff. On Tuesday afternoons, the JCS would conduct a meeting to discuss issues arising from the General Council and the war updates. The JCS would identify topics for a Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) meeting held every Friday with Allied officers. Every other Wednesday was a War Council brief, which typically included the President and Secretary of State, as well as other key administration leaders (Nelson, 1946, pp. 398-401; Schnabel, 1996).

The Joint Staff created committees of officers to address particular issues (such as a Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment, or Joint Meteorological Committee, or Joint Military Transportation Committee, among others), who at first were dual-hatted with responsibilities in the War and Navy Departments or their respective staffs (Nelson, 1946, p. 399). Initially, these Joint Staff committees would meet weekly to support the Tuesday JCS and the Friday CCS meetings. However, the exigencies of wartime operations required these committees to begin continuous operations and the JCS authorized the committees to consist of officers who had no dual responsibilities in their service headquarters and to meet as often as necessary to conduct business.

Over the course of over three years of operations around the globe, the Joint Staff continually grew in number of committees and scope of responsibility for decision-making. The Army and Navy Departments and service staffs focused on the administrative and training tasks associated with the provision of forces for the war effort, while the Joint Staff coordinated the logistics and operations globally. This is an important distinction from the Congressional constraints placed on the pre-WWII Army General Staff and Navy bureaus and boards. There was an important difference between the “operators” of the line units, officers in command and
responsible for leading troops and ships, and the “staff” in rear and Washington, DC headquarters. It was a characteristic of European staffs, particularly the Prussian (later German) General Staff, that the senior staff would involve themselves in the execution of military operations – in effect, wielding a decision-making power which in American Strategic Culture Congress and the People had been resistant in surrendering to the Military.

American Strategic Culture had shaped Congressional authorizations regarding military staff organizations, which ensured civilian control. The staff advised the civilian leadership on the reports received from field and fleet commanders. The President relied on the civilian Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy to monitor the day to day management of the Military. The President made the key military decisions, which would be transmitted through the headquarters staffs to the commanders in the field for implementation. During the Civil War, the Indian Wars, the Spanish American War and WWI, this had been accomplished by Presidential leadership on war efforts through a very small staff of military and civilian advisors. The shift during WWII was that many key military decisions were now made by the JCS, and then approved by the President. When the President had already established policy or the policy was known, the Joint Staff made decisions without referring them to the President. If the issue was significant, it would inform the President of its decisions after the fact. It was only in the matters of major policy decisions, usually with regard to an Allied partner, that the JCS sought the President’s guidance before implementing decisions. The Department Secretaries were routinely bypassed (Caraley, 1966, pp. 19-20). It can be reasonably argued the global nature of WWII and the characteristics of modern warfare naturally and appropriately devolved more operational decision-making powers to senior military leaders. However, this change makes the process more vulnerable to human weaknesses (such as that demonstrated by the German General Staff
in WWI) which American strategic culture and Congressional constraints had attempted in the past to prevent.

It may be reasonable to rely on experts to implement war plans and make important operational decisions. Certainly, the personalities of political and military leaders, their trust for each other, and the effectiveness of their interactions all factor into whether this change in institutional autonomy should be concerning. For example, the Allied coalition’s political leaders demanded the opening of a Second Front in Europe for many months, but military leaders determined when and where those operations would occur. This decision-making was momentous, and the discussions exacerbated tensions between the Allied powers. Counterfactuals are difficult to prove, but the celebration of Allied military success in WWII possibly blinds us to what may have resulted with a different approach to conducting the war by the American national security strategy-making institutions.

But where was Congress during these preparatory developments in the Military?

*The Wartime Congress*\(^{74}\)

The 76\(^{th}\) Congress did not ignore the potential national security ramifications of the war in Europe and Asia; it approved increased military appropriations to expand the Military. The authorization for the Army increased to 1.4 million soldiers, along with the equipment for up 2 million soldiers. The Navy was authorized to expand from its 176,000 tons total displacement to a 2-ocean navy with over 3 million tons of total displacement (Scott, 2012). Congress even

\(^{74}\) The following paragraphs discussing the actions of the 76\(^{th}\) Congress are all drawn from Boeckel, R. M. (1940). *Record of the 76th Congress*. Editorial research reports 1940 (Vol. II). Washington, DC: CQ Press. Retrieved from [http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre19400701010](http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre19400701010) and the subsequent similar references in the Bibliography for the succeeding Congresses. All information from this section on the Wartime Congress is from various volumes of the Congressional Record unless otherwise cited.
approved peacetime conscription in order to ensure the military expansion was achieved.\textsuperscript{75} \textsuperscript{76} Both services were approved to purchase up to a combined 35,000 aircraft. These represented massive increases requiring the support of industry, but these increases were carefully specified by Congress to not include the increased production to support military aid to future Allies. Understanding the difficulties involved in converting industries to wartime production, Congress approved increasing the accessibility to loans for defense industries to participate in the arsenal of democracy. The President and Congress cooperated in enacting legislation to tax the profits defense-related industries, and other businesses expected to profit during a future war.

However, Congress did attempt to restrain the President’s war powers by only allowing an activated National Guard to be deployed in the United States or its possessions. After Germany invaded Poland on September 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1939, the Congress was called into special session. In the course of 44 days, September 21\textsuperscript{st} to November 3\textsuperscript{rd}, the Congress passed the Neutrality Act by permitting cash and carry sales to the Allies, but still keeping the United States out of the war. Later, after France was invaded by Germany in May 1940, FDR sought increased authority to call up the National Guard, but Congress demurred. FDR attempted again after France’s

\textsuperscript{75} The American citizen-soldier tradition believed in a small Regular Army, which would be reinforced when needed to defend the Nation by a citizens’ militia. However, until WWII, the United States generally did not identify the need to call up the militia for preparation to go to war until after the nation was already at war. The Burke-Wadsworth Act of 1940 attempted to change the traditional approach (Houston, 1969). The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, or Burke-Wadsworth Act, initially called for the registering of all men from ages 18 to 64, and ages 21-45 were subject to 8 months military training. But the final approved bill registered all from 21 to 36 (16.5 million) and selection for increments of up to 900K for one year. An interesting controversy arose over the “Draft of Industry” and plant amortization provisions of the conscription bill. The new bill repealed a proviso in the Naval Speed-Up Bill which allowed the Secretary of the Navy to take over companies and fix the compensation of workers in the event of contract disputes between the government and business. The law re-emphasized still extant provisions of the National Defense Act of 1916, which allowed the government to rent these industries on a fair basis for the duration of a war.

\textsuperscript{76} Congress also passed a revised Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act (a prior version had been promulgated during WWI and expired soon after the war), which afforded numerous protections to those who joined military service. Some of the protections for drafted and volunteer personnel included job protection and no jobs could be filled by Communists or German-American Bund members; the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940 also included special protections regarding tax, insurance and other financial obligations.
surrender, and this time the House passed a bill allowing the states to reform Home Guard units if their state National Guard forces were called to federal service (Houston, 1969, p. 6). Some of what FDR attempted to implement in preparation for the war was frustrated due to the tensions of Presidential election year politics in 1940.

**Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program**

After unanimously declaring war against Japan on December 8th, 1941, and on Germany and Italy three days later, Congress focused its wartime attention on the Home Front. The most significant Congressional hearings related to the military occurring during WWII were the investigatory hearings conducted by the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program (March 1941 to 1948) and the supporting investigatory hearings conducted by the Naval Affairs and Military Affairs committees, also on national defense program topics. This Special Committee was more popularly known as the Truman Committee.

Harry S Truman, after winning re-election to the Senate in November 1940, started a 10,000 mile road trip to visit various military installations and national defense-related industrial sites investigating claims of waste, fraud, and abuse in military contracts (Poole, 2012, p. 55; 78)

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77 One of the 76th Congress’ other major national security legislative actions prior to the 1940 election was to pass Senate Joint Resolution 271 in June 1940 which reiterated Monroe Doctrine principles for the belligerents. The United States declared it would not acquiesce to Western hemisphere territories being transferred to non-American powers. The Organization of American States agreed to implement trusteeships to preserve the status quo for European territories of nations who had been occupied by Nazi Germany.

78 The Congressional votes were unanimous in the Senate, but Jeannette Rankin was the only dissenting vote in the House in the Declaration of War on Japan. After the furor caused by her December 8th vote, she abstained from the votes against Germany and Italy.
Truman, p. 165). When the next Congressional session opened in March 1941, Senator Truman proposed and organized the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program (Poole, 2012, p. 56). The Truman Committee held its first hearings in April 1941 (76 Cong Rec. Pt 2, 1941, pp. 1265). Truman appealed to the people to report on defense contractor malfeasance and shoddy workmanship and America responded (Poole, 2012, p. 57). Popular morale and confidence in the government surged when realizing the work of the Truman Committee in holding businessmen to account for the quality and legality of their labor (Poole, 2012, p. 58). The Committee further subdivided into two to four man subcommittees focused on particular industrial sectors to facilitate the technical understanding, as well as divide the workload and address priority investigations (Maher, 1962, pp. 76-77). The investigatory committee responded to specific Congressional requirements as well, such as Senator Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma’s resolution S.Res 112 asking for a special study of the “location and maintenance of defense establishments necessary for the production of needed military supplies” (76 Cong Rec 3606, 1941). According to its Final Report, the Truman Committee held 432 public hearings with 1798 witnesses, compiled in 27,568 pages; there were also 300 executive hearings with another 25,000 pages of transcripts.79 The Special Committee to Investigate the

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79 The holdings in the National Archives for the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program (including the years it operated while Truman was Vice-President and President) comprise 400 feet.
National Defense Program published 48 reports, 32 of them under Truman’s chairmanship (Maher, 1962, p. 25).

The Committee conducted many of its private meetings in “Harry’s Doghouse” which was a room off Senator Truman’s office with high-ceilings, several small desks, easy chairs and a couch and decorated with Senator Truman’s personal memorabilia from his Army days and autographed pictures from numerous friends and celebrities. Often, interested Senators or other Administration officials would sit in on these meetings to understand what the Committee had discovered and how they handled issues unearthed during hearings and visits (Truman, 1955, p. 172; Maher, 1962, pp. 72-3). Truman claimed he thoroughly studied other investigatory committees, especially the post-Civil War investigation into military contracts. Truman specifically guided the investigations in a manner to be well-received publicly, but not to be seeking headlines (Truman, 1955, p. 168). Well-documented research into the Committee indicates the Truman Committee had an excellent relationship with members of the Washington press corps and other newspaper journalists and columnists around the country (Maher, 1962, p. 120 fn4). The positive rapport the Truman Committee had with public opinion contributed to the political leverage of the Committee and likely led to FDR selecting Harry Truman for his running mate in 1944. The Truman Committee may have saved the United States $15B.

Congress at War

Several important legislative activities reveal the tension between division of authorities and power between the Executive branch and Congress during wartime. One significant piece of legislation was the War Labor Disputes Act, which was an “anti-strike” act, actually a combination of two pending pre-War bills (the Tom Connally (D, TX) plant seizure bill (the Senate had passed on June 12th, 1941, but it was not acted on by the House) and the Howard W.
Smith (D, VA) labor disputes bill (the House passed it on December 3rd, 1941, but it was not acted on by Senate in the 77th Congress). The Smith-Connally Act was finally passed due to the high visibility confrontation involving three general walkouts in the coal fields during the April-June 1942 timeframe and the President of the United Mine Workers John L. Lewis’s defiance of the War Labor Board. FDR vetoed the War Labor Disputes Act on 15 June because he believed the Act’s provision to allow up to 30 days to pass before implementing anti-strike measures would result in more disruption to the war effort, but both houses overrode the veto. FDR suggested to Congress that strikers should be drafted into the military, but Congress ignored the suggestion. FDR issued an Executive Order in August directing the government to withhold contracts and other benefits from employers who failed to comply with the Act (including the “checkoff”, which issued deferments to individuals).

The Lend-Lease Act of 1941 and revising the Neutrality Act of 1939 were the most important acts by Congress prior to declaring war on the Axis powers in December 1941. Lend-Lease allowed the U.S. to support expected future allies with military equipment at a price or exchange the President deemed appropriate; but Congress did insert provisions to retain an influence over the Act’s implementation. Congress required the Executive Branch to report on all Lend-Lease transfers and gave restrictions on amounts and timings; providing support could not violate Neutrality Act provisions. Congress also added the Dirksen Amendment which allowed Congress to terminate Lend-Lease with a Concurrent Resolution, not requiring signature by the President.

After the December 7th, 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the 77th Congress declared war on Japan on December 8th and on Germany and Italy on December 11th. The President’s war powers during the emergency were extended further than President Wilson’s had been during
WWI in the First War Powers Act (H.R. 6233) on December 18th. Most were approved for limited timeframe (two years) unless extended by Congress; the powers included giving the President the ability to shift administrative agencies, modify war contracts, control alien financial transactions, and establish a censorship of foreign communications. However, the Congress also included a provision to allow Congress to terminate extraordinary powers “by concurrent resolution.” In March 1942, a Second War Powers Act extended the President’s authority to enact emergency measures until the end of 1945. The President used his War Powers to establish the War Production Board, the War Food Administration, and other special war agencies all of which allowed the Military to utilize its pre-war preparations for economic mobilization to influence the economic conversion to a war footing (Herman, 2012). Congress also increased the debt limit from $49B to $65B to permit expected wartime deficit spending (the debt ceiling would gradually be raised to $300B by April 1945, but in the 79th Congress the debt ceiling was reduced to $275B in June 1946).81

Military operations during the war were perceived favorably and Congress did not interfere. However, by mid-1943, Congress began to resist further tax increases and started to question military or naval appropriations which seemed excessive. Congress withdrew the President’s authority to modify the gold-content of the dollar and nullified an Executive Order limiting salaries to $25K after taxes. Significant military victories during 1943 prompted Congress to begin thinking about the post-war peace, but there was little compelling need to

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80 Freedom’s Forge is a riveting account of business response to converting industry. An interesting aspect to the book is the focus on the businessmen’s perspective, including the $1 a year men. Repeatedly the book recounts instances of military officers showing up with detailed plans, or guidance, regarding conversion problems already worked out. In many cases, the businessmen found the interference frustrating, but most of the time there was a begrudging recognition the military had been very well-prepared to implement the Industrial Mobilization Plans.

81 Revenue Bill – SecTreas Morgenthau December 20th, 1943 said the renegotiation of war contracts opened the way to “truly extraordinary profits” and “scandal” by creating a “new crop of war millionaires.” The veto was the first of a tax bill in history of U.S. on February 22nd.
resolve any contentious issues. There was early agreement in Congress to agree the United States would participate in a post-war world organization to prevent aggression and preserve peace – this was seen as a reversal of the post WWI resistance to the League of Nations.

Principally, a broad perception that Congress’ failure to endorse the League of Nations was a strategic policy error that would not be repeated after WWII (November 5th Connally resolution, S. Res 192). The Senate also passed a concurrent resolution (S. Con Res 9), which would form the basis for the post-war Nuremberg Trials to bring war criminals to justice.

Some projects to aid the transition from a war to a peace economy, including “cradle to grave” social security plan were submitted, but not approved, in 1943. The National Resources Planning Board was disbanded when further appropriations were denied. There were bills presented to Congress to create a war cabinet and a separate Department for Air Warfare, but these were not acted upon. Additionally, of moment for the future Congressional consideration described below, a bill was submitted to establish a single Department of National Defense.

The service departments were criticized during the debate for wasteful excess spending; alternatively, other senators expressed fear that the existence of huge unexpended balances would free the military and naval establishments from congressional control, perhaps for the remainder of the war. In October 1943, the Truman Commission was joined by the Senate Appropriations Committee in an investigation of Lend-Lease and the foreign activities of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Export-Import Bank, and the Office of Inter-American Affairs. This investigation was initiated after a battlefield circulation tour by a group of Senators who identified possible improprieties in the programs which might jeopardize U.S. interests.

Significantly for this dissertation’s research, a lesser known Smith Committee was formed in February 1943 (H.Res 102) to investigate the activities of executive agencies which
exceeded the scope of authority granted by Congress. The Special Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies conducted numerous hearings during the 78th Congress and was continued in the 79th Congress. The Smith Committee also investigated issues where Executive action violated citizens constitutional rights or inflicted penalties without proper hearings before an impartial tribunal. In November 1944, its report recommended reforms to the Legislative Branch to strengthen its ability to check the excesses of the Executive Branch. These recommendations included improved administrative processes and support, but also importantly recommended a reorganization of Congressional committees to improve oversight. The Smith Committee warned that much of the legislation enacted by Congress “was drafted by the very executive officials who are intended to be the recipients of the powers which the legislation delegates” (78th Congress, 2nd Session). In its hearings, the Committee focused on wartime agencies overseeing domestic programs, price controls and defense contracts, including, notably, the War Labor Board. Congress approved the sharply critical report: “the framers …of the Constitution never contemplated that the Legislative Branch… would become a mere ratifying body of a supreme Executive will.” Additionally, the Smith Committee recommended a bipartisan joint committee with the Senate (six members from each house) to study the organization and operation of the Legislative Branch. The Congress approved the recommendation and the joint committee was directed to submit its recommendations not later than April 1st, 1945.\(^2\)

There is no record of the Smith Committee investigating the War Department or JCS reorganization efforts or the strategic planning efforts of the War and Navy Departments. This was likely because the Congressmen believed such an investigation might interfere with the

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\(^2\) Hearings before the Special Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies. Two Volumes; 78th Congress, pursuant to H.Res. 102.
Military’s ability to effectively conduct the war. Indeed, a pre-war House of Representatives proposal to investigate the entire national defense program, to include the war planning efforts, had been rejected by the House in favor of a nearly unanimous (327-1) proposal to instruct the Military Affairs and Naval Affairs Committees to ensure the War and Navy Departments were implementing expansion measures “efficiently, expeditiously, and economically.” This earlier instruction was implemented when, on April 1st, 1941, the Senate established the Truman Commission.

When Congress returned from its 1943 summer recess, President Roosevelt sent Congress an official report of progress in the war effort on September 17th, particularly noting the developments concerning Italy’s political collapse and withdrawal from the Axis.\(^{83}\) The Senate also had the benefit of hearing a report from Senator Russell (D, GA), whose five man Congressional Delegation had conducted a 65-day, 40,000 mile battlefield tour.\(^{84}\) The Senators, including two each from the SMAC and the Truman Committee visited U.S. military installations around the world. Their closed session report on October 7\(^{\text{th}}\)-8\(^{\text{th}}\) was followed by secret meetings with Army Chief of Staff GEN Marshall and other defense officials on October 20\(^{\text{th}}\)-21\(^{\text{st}}\). Certainly, the positive news the President, the Army Chief of Staff and others relayed to Congress initiated the post-war thinking by Congress. In March 1944, informed by the Bernard Baruch-John Hancock report published in February 1944, the Senate established the Committee on Post War Economic Policy and Planning. The Committee conducted hearings in November after 8 months of study.

\(^{83}\) Text of FDR report, including edits suggested by Winston Churchill can be found at [http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/msf/msfb0107](http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/msf/msfb0107).

However, there is another important nuance to this timeline. On July 23rd, 1943, seven months earlier, General Marshall had directed the establishment of a Special Planning Division in the War Department with the specific task of planning for post-war military and related industrial demobilization. One of the specified tasks Marshall gave the new planning office was to conduct “Legislative planning to include the drafting of legislation and the timing of its submission to the Congress of those military postwar planning activities which require Congressional legislation” (Nelson, 1946, pp. 548-549). Major General Otto Nelson, Jr. questioned the formation of the Special Planning Division from both an organizational standpoint and from the perspective of jurisdiction and responsibility in his very detailed analysis National Security and the General Staff (Nelson, 1946, p. 550). While there is little direct evidence of General Marshall and the Special Planning Division providing Congress with the materials and insights to pursue the robust legislation it initiated in 1944 regarding the post-war demobilization of the military and industry, it is also not reasonable to assume the planning officers disregarded a very specific instruction to orchestrate the War Department’s interactions with Congress on the subject.

During 1944, many post-war relevant measures were considered such as a bill for equitable settlement of terminated war contracts, industrial reconversion, and disposal of surplus war properties. Congress also passed the Government Issue (GI) Bill of Rights\(^85\) and a

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\(^85\) The Servicemen's Aid Act of 1944 [S. 1767], the G.I. Bill of Rights, signed by the President June 22\(^{nd}\), embodied a major consideration for the service of conscripted and volunteer servicemen and women. This legislation went beyond prior support provided to WWI veterans, and included:

- Readjustment allowances: Unemployed veterans to receive a weekly allowance of $20 for a period of not more than 52 weeks, based on length of service (24 weeks for 90 days' service and four weeks for each additional month of service) during a period of two years after discharge.
- Self-employed veterans whose net income is less than $100 a month to receive cash benefits which will bring their earnings up to $100 a month. These benefits to be paid for not more than 12 months, according to length of service.
Mustering Out Pay Bill for servicemembers based on expected demobilization concerns. The GI Bill included education, home loans, and unemployment benefits, which were also later increased immediately after Japan surrendered in August 1945.  

Another prominent Congressional investigation examined the Pearl Harbor disaster. Within days after the surprise Japanese attack on the important U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, the Roberts Commission began a year-long fact-finding mission to determine if there were grounds for any charges of dereliction of duty. The Roberts Commission found fault with the senior Army and Navy commanders at Pearl Harbor, but exonerated political and military leaders in Washington, DC (NSA, 2019). There was a deliberate decision to delay further investigation until after the war ended. However, in early 1944, the Navy Department ordered Admiral Thomas Hart to conduct a four-month, one-man inquiry to ensure testimony by serving officers would not be lost in battle. Congress passed an act on July 13th, 1944 calling for official boards of inquiry by the War and Navy Departments. The Army Pearl Harbor Board lasted from July 20th to October 20th, 1944, taking testimony from 151 witnesses. The Army censured General George C. Marshall and General Leonard Gerow of the War Plans Division for not fully

- Guaranty of loans: The government will guarantee 50% loans made by a private financial institution or government lending agency, not to exceed $2,000. Interest not to exceed 4%; first year's interest on the amount guaranteed to be paid by the government. Proceeds of loans must be used for construction, purchase or improvement of a dwelling, purchase or improvement of a farm, or establishment of a business. Such loans must be paid in full within 20 years.

- Educational allowances: One year's education, plus a further period equal to time in service, not to exceed four years in all; the government will pay up to $500 a year for tuition, and a monthly subsistence allowance of $50 if the veteran is without dependents; $75 with dependents.

- The bill authorized $500 million of additional hospital facilities and provided priorities for the Veterans Administration in procurement of materials and personnel equal to those enjoyed by the War and Navy Departments.

The bill was passed by the Senate, March 24th, 50 to 0; the House approved the bill, May 18th, 387 to 0. Its cost was estimated as running from $3B to $6.5B.

86 GI Bill of Rights extended window of eligibility from 5 years to 10 years after the war and maximum terms for home and farm loans to 25 and 40 years respectively; maximum guarantee was increased to $4K, no age restrictions on the education benefit, increased the living allowance for veterans at educational institutions, and the benefits were extended to Americans who had fought in the armies of other allies.
informing the Army commander, General Walter Short at Pearl Harbor. A Naval Court of Inquiry was convened from July 24th to October 19th, 1944, exonerating Admiral Husband Kimmel, the Navy commander at Pearl Harbor and instead, like the Army, blamed the senior commander in Washington DC, Navy Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark. Navy Secretary James Forrestal and Secretary of War Henry Stimson determined courts martials were not justified for the senior commanders, but Congress was not satisfied with their findings and sent a Senate Joint Resolution 156 to the President in December 1944 extending the statute of limitations on the Pearl Harbor investigation until June 1945 (later extended until six months after the official end of the war) (Record 79th Congress). Both the Army and Navy conducted one-man studies to supplement the service inquiries with additional testimony until late 1945 when the formal Joint Congressional investigation commenced (NSA, 2019). On September 11th, 1945, Congress ordered a special joint committee due to discrepancies in the results of the Army and Navy investigations, made public by the President after Japan surrendered.

The Congressional investigation began on November 15th, 1945 and was immediately affected by partisan issues (the committee was 6 Democrats and 4 Republicans). The partisan dispute led to majority and minority reports with a focus on making findings which might resonate in future elections. The reports were finally released in July 1946, along with 40 volumes of its findings. The majority report cleared the President and his senior advisors of wrong doing and placed the ultimate responsibility for the attack on Japan. The minority report (signed by two members) blamed the President and his advisers for failing to “perform the responsibilities indispensably necessary for the defense of Pearl Harbor.” Both reports assigned responsibility to Major General Short and Rear Admiral Kimmel, differentiating from the Roberts Commission finding of “dereliction of duty” with the wording “errors of judgment”
(Congressional Record). A key recommendation the majority report made was for the President, Secretary of War and Navy Secretary to take “immediate action to insure that unity of command is imposed at all military and naval outposts” and to completely integrate Army and Navy intelligence services. The Pearl Harbor investigations reveal an aspect of the mindset of American leaders approaching the post-WWII strategic environment and questions of national security. “Never again!” cannot be discounted from the analysis assessing the origins of the American national security state established by the outcome of the military unification debate.

**Military Unification**

The growth in effectiveness and efficiency of the Joint Staff validated General Marshall’s approach to reorganization of the General Staff and the formation of a Joint Staff. So much so, that on November 2nd, 1943, less than two years after the American entry into the war, General Marshall proposed unifying the Departments in a memorandum to the JCS (Caraley, 1966, p. 23; Keiser, 1982, p. 5). The Navy was instinctively resistant and General Marshall’s idea was slow-rolled by Admiral Ernest King, who diverted the memorandum to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) with instructions to examine whether the post-war organization of the military should be developed on the basis of one, two, or three (having in mind a separate Air Force) departments (Caraley, 1966, p. 24). While the prospect of merging the Army and Navy had periodically arisen in the first decades of the 20th Century, the resistance to General Marshall’s suggestion, followed by the initiation of legislation in the House and Senate in early 1944 suggest more than coincidence. Jennings Randolph (D, WV) submitted a bill to the House and J. Lister Hill (D, AL) to the Senate (Huddle, 1945) calling for the military departments to be merged into a single national defense department under a civilian secretary and a single military
commander. After Congress initiated legislation, the JSSC returned its report on March 8th, 1944 advocating a single department (Keiser, 1982, p. 7).

Less than three weeks later, Representative James Wadsworth called for the establishment of a Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy, similar to the Senate committee with a similar mandate. Representative Clifton Woodrum chaired the House committee comprised of seven representatives from each of the Military Affairs and Naval Affairs committees and nine other representatives. The Woodrum Committee began hearings on April 24th, 1944 (Keiser, 1982, p. 8). Tensions were immediately revealed between the Army and the Navy on the benefits of merging, with the Navy vehemently opposed to integration (Huddle, 1945). The Navy were not the only opponents; the NGA President, a powerful interest group on the Hill, wrote a letter to the Woodrum committee suggesting the hearings should be delayed until after the war. The NGA President believed that in the War Department’s push to unify the military, it was also trying to abolish the National Guard (Keiser, 1982, p. 12). The hearings were ended on May 19th with a decision to defer any decisions until the war was over and when the views of senior commanders prosecuting the war could be heard (Keiser, 1982, p. 13).

The talk of unifying the services did not abate. The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the course of the Woodrum Committee hearings and directed a committee to start interviewing Commanders in the field. The JCS Richardson Committee started work on May 9th, 1944 and did not conclude its work until early April 1945 (Keiser, 1982, p. 14). Vice-Presidential nominee Harry S Truman weighed in publicly in a Colliers magazine article on August 26th, 1944 expressing his support for a single department, which he believed would eliminate duplication of effort and much of the administrative excess he had observed while chairing the Truman Committee.
After Victory in Europe was declared in May 1945, the Secretary of the Navy Forrestal commissioned Ferdinand Eberstadt, the former chair of the Army-Navy Munitions Board and the former vice-chairman of the War Production Board to conduct a study of the unified military. The Eberstadt Report was completed in late September 1945 and forwarded to the Senate Naval Affairs Committee in mid-October (Keiser, 1982, p. 17). Eberstadt argued that the real challenge was blending all the parts of the government concerned with national security into a single process. Eberstadt also emphasized civilian control over the military (Zimmerman, 2007). Each of the services knew that different Congressional committees and sub-committees tended to favor one service over the other and each service attempted to manipulate how the bills for reorganizing the military would be considered in Congress. Part of the reason the Navy commissioned the Eberstadt Report was to steal a march on the Army way ahead. The Army wanted to have legislation directing a unification of the services and then the military would work out the details. This very much reflected the methodology General Marshall had utilized to affect the War Department’s reorganization in 1941 and 1942.

The bills being considered before the SMAC proposed a single military department, a separate Air Force, and offered broad authority for a civilian secretary of the military department and to the President. But the focus of the hearings was on the succession of senior military leaders, who had gained renown during the war, presenting their views on military unification. Each of the services understood what was at stake and the Departments took many efforts to ensure the military witnesses were prepared with the appropriate talking points to support their views. The War Department’s perspective was for four main points: (1) a single department with (2) a military chief of staff required to submit annual recommendations on policy, strategy, and budget issues; (3) an air force co-equal to the Army and Navy; and (4) a common supply
organization. Beyond these points, the Army believed the President should direct the implementation of other organizational matters at the suggestion of the military chief of staff and the civilian secretary. Most of the witnesses were supportive of military unification, but the Navy witnesses were opposed (Keiser, 1982, pp. 21-30; Huddle, 1945). Public opinion favored military unification, 52% of respondents to a Gallup poll were assessed to understand what unified command meant, and 64% of those favored unification, 23% were opposed and 13% had no opinion (Keiser, 1982, p. 39).

The issue of a separate Air Force was mostly agreed upon by the Army and the Navy, as long as the Navy could keep aircraft on the aircraft carriers. However, the fate of the Marine Corps became quite controversial. The Army assessed there was no need for a second land army and, considering most of the amphibious operations during the war were carried out by Army units, the justification for a separate Marine Corps was no longer valid. Army leaders did not openly advocate for elimination of the Marine Corps. However, in the War Department’s discussion about post-WWII military force structure with some important committees on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a set of highly classified papers known as JCS 1478 “Mission of the Land, Naval, and Air Forces,” the intent of the Army to assume the duties of the Marine Corps was articulated. In papers JCS 1478/10 and 1478/11, General Eisenhower and Army Air Corps General Carl Spaatz articulated the Marine Corps should be kept very small, with no units larger than a regiment. They suggested the Marines should be used to guard U.S. citizens ashore in foreign countries and to serve as guards on naval ships and shore installations.
The Marine Corps was not surprised at the Army’s plan to abolish the Marine Corps, the suggestion had been raised before. In 1942, Marine officers serving on the Joint Chiefs of Staff learned of the Army’s post-war proposal and began planning how to block the Army’s plan for the Marines’ future (Keiser, 1982, p. 37; Rems, 2017). The Marines argued the Army had had to use doctrine for its amphibious operations which had been developed by the Marines; but the Army responded by insinuating it had required Army leadership to identify and ensure both services had the proper landing craft and improved amphibious operations included lessons learned throughout the various campaigns from where pre-war amphibious doctrine failed.

The SMAC adjourned hearings for the Christmas recess, but Senator Thomas, the committee chairman appointed a special subcommittee with Senator Hill and Senator Warren Austin, the ranking minority member, along with a representative from each of the military departments to work on a compromise bill. The War Department nominated Major General Lauris Norstad, the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Plans and the Navy nominated Vice Admiral Arthur Radford, the Deputy CNO (Air) (Keiser, 1982, p. 49). The compromise bill, S.2044, guaranteed the Navy the carrier-borne air force, but was silent on the issue of the Marine Corps. The Navy urged the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs to weigh in to block the legislation, and after the SMAC bill was introduced on April 9th, the Committee on Naval Affairs began its hearings on April 30th, 1946 (Keiser, 1982, p. 52).

87 In World War I, the press had highlighted the role of the Marines at Belleau Wood and failed to give similar credit to Army units fighting alongside the Marines. The incident generated bad blood between the Marines and the Army at the time and for long after the war.
88 Colonel Twining gained access to the Army’s plans from his role on a JCS committee. Twining confided in other Marines, including Lieutenant Colonel Victor “Brute” Krulak. Twining and Krulak led what was then affectionately called the “Chowder Society” by the members. Those in the know about their efforts referred to the group’s studies and speeches as Chowder. According to Marine Corps legend, the term Chowder was drawn from the likeness between Krulak and a popular comic strip character named Barnaby, who belonged to the “Little Men’s Chowder & Marching Society” (Rems, 2017; Zimmerman, 2007).
During the Committee on Naval Affairs hearing the Marine Corps Commandant GEN Alexander Vandegrift gave a noteworthy speech appealing for the future of the Marine Corps. The speech became known by its hallmark “bended knee” remark (see tone box). The public reaction to GEN Vandegrift’s remarks was overwhelmingly positive for the Marine Corps (Keiser, 1982, p. 56). However, the Commandant’s remarks did make waves with the President (Rems, 2017).

The President summoned the Secretaries of the military departments to a conference on May 13th and directed them to work out an acceptable compromise on unification by the end of the month. The President announced he did not agree on the need for a single military chief of staff because it “smacked of the ‘man on horseback’ philosophy.” On that same day the Senate reported on S.2044 and Navy supporting Senators announced the Congress would not approve the Army’s plan (Keiser, 1982, p. 58). On May 31st, Secretary Forrestal and Secretary Patterson (who had replaced Stimson as Secretary of War) presented their agreement to the President on the requirement for a Council of Common Defense (a Navy idea and what would later be designated the National Security Council (NSC)), a National Strategic Resources Board (NSRB) (an Army idea), a statutory continuation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (mutually identified as acceptable from the start of the debates), a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (which was an alternative suggested by both services in order to preserve their own intelligence programs) – notably, the Army’s initial suggestion for a single chief of staff was dropped (Keiser, 1982, p. 59). President Truman forwarded the agreement to Congress on 15 June, and S.2044 was

We have pride in ourselves and in our past but we do not rest our case on any presumed ground of gratitude owing us from the Nation. The bended knee is not a tradition of our corps. If the Marine as a fighting man has not made a case for himself after 170 years of service, he must go.

- General A. A. Vandegrift, USMC; Senate Hearings, 1946
updated to reflect the compromise. But it was too late to overcome the Committee on Naval Affairs continued resistance; there was a belief among many of the Committee’s confidants that the Navy Secretary had caved too much on some Navy issues. President Truman was forced to acknowledge it would not occur until after a new Congress was seated in 1947 (Keiser, 1982, pp. 60-64).

On September 10th, President Truman held another conference with his senior defense leadership and directed his military secretary Admiral Leahy and national security advisor Clark Clifford to draft up a bill in the White House, which would be the official policy of the administration (Keiser, 1982, p. 68). After the senior military leaders conducted further conferences in Secretary Forrestal’s home in November 1946, a letter from the two secretaries expressing the Army-Navy agreement to the President’s policy was forwarded on January 16th, 1947 (Keiser, 1982, p. 69). The Administration continued to refine the plan and submitted a revised version of the agreement to Congress on February 26th (Keiser, 1982, p. 82).

In the Senate, the bill was forwarded to the new Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), which had replaced the separate committees on Military Affairs and Naval Affairs as a result of the Congressional Reorganization Act of 1946. Congress had taken to heart the recommendations of the Smith Committee to Investigate the Executive Agencies exceeding their lawful mandate. One of those recommendations had been to reorganize the committee system to provide more effective oversight. While unification of the military was certainly involved in Congress’ decision to unify the committees, the official line was it was a necessary move to prevent Army and Navy from utilizing separate committees to manipulate the course of budget-related decision-making in Congress. Although designed as a means to reassert Congressional
influence over the military, it also made the Army’s objective of unifying the services under one
department that much easier to justify.

The Marine Corps was not yet finished ensuring that its survival was not left to the whim
of a future executive order. The Commandant established the Board to Conduct Research and
Prepare Material in Connection with Pending Legislation in January 1947, more commonly
known as the Edson-Thomas Board (Keiser, 1982, p. 73; Rems, 2017). Part of the reason the
Marine Corps was concerned was because the Army and the Army Air Corps had ramped up the
lobbying campaign in late 1946 to increase Congressional support for the Army’s preferences.
Even though at the most senior level, the President had defined the administration’s position,
each of the services continued to lobby Congress, not always subtly.89 Besides the NGA, the
Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) and American Legion also joined the lobbying efforts on
military unification (Keiser, 1982, p. 85). The difficulty in keeping the military lobbying in
check did undermine President Truman’s trust in his senior military leaders, which would play
out after the National Security Act of 1947 was passed.

After conducting its hearings on S.758 in April and May, the SASC met in executive
session starting on May 20th. The committee continued to consult with the military and the
White House (Keiser, 1982, p. 93). The committee unanimously approved the bill on 5 June,
because during the hearings, a suggested amendment providing protections for the Marine Corps

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89 The Army sent copies of William Bradford Huie’s book *The Case Against the Admirals: Why We Must Have Unified Command* to each congressman and congressman-elect, with the subterfuge of using the journalists’ letterhead. The Army Air Corps wrote letters to members of Congress urging unification. One sample letter read: Honorable [name]: You can save us taxpayers a lot of needless taxes if you will promote and vote for the proposed bill for unification ... I want to hear your statement as to your position regarding the plan. If you're for it, we're for you (Keiser, 1982, pp. 84-85).
was included based on developments during the House of Representatives parallel proceedings. On July 9th, S.758 passed the Senate in a voice vote (Keiser, 1982, p. 94).

In the House, S.758 was introduced as H.2319 on February 28th. The War Department wanted the bill to go to the House Expenditures Committee, because they believed its Chairman Clare Hoffman (R, MI) was not interested or informed about military affairs and likely distracted with labor-related legislation. The War Department expected Chairman Hoffman to pass H.2319 to a subcommittee headed by influential War Department advocate Representative Wadsworth. What the Marines managed however was unknown to the War Department until much later. One member of the Edson-Thomas Board was a Lieutenant Colonel Hittle who was closely associated with Chairman Hoffman due to his father’s friendship with the Congressman (Zimmerman, 2007). Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Hittle arranged for another marine LtCol Schatzel to serve as an unofficial advisor on the bill to Chairman Hoffman (Keiser, 1982, p. 98). Hoffman’s committee convened on April 2nd. During testimony, the chairman grilled GEN Eisenhower regarding the Army’s intentions to eliminate the Marine Corps. GEN Eisenhower admitted to being opposed to a second land army. Additionally, the Chairman had managed to get copies of the Top Secret document JCS 1478, a group of papers in which the War Department, including Eisenhower specifically, advocated nearly abolishing the Marine Corps (Keiser, 1982, pp. 50, 102). Eisenhower was forced to backtrack his remarks and claimed that it was not until the JCS 1478 papers that Eisenhower learned more specifically the Marine Corps significance to amphibious operations. When Hoffman’s committee reconvened on 10 June after an extended recess, the Marines had provided clearer language regarding the overall secretary’s authority ensuring civilian control over the military forces in the chain of command to the President as Commander in Chief, as well as defining the roles of each service.
On July 16\textsuperscript{th}, after easily overcoming some resistance from Representative Wadsworth, the House Expenditures Committee reported out a new clean bill as H.R. 4214. During a conference committee on July 24\textsuperscript{th}, the language from the House bill was reconciled with the Senate bill and both houses quickly passed the legislation. The President signed the National Security Act of 1947 into law on July 26\textsuperscript{th}. President Truman then issued executive order E.O. 9877 describing the “Functions of the Armed Forces” and nominated the former Navy Secretary, James Forrestal as the first Secretary of Defense (Keiser, 1982, pp. 110-2). The military unification battle was over, but the scrabbling of the services over the organization had exploited fissures in Congress, which resulted in preserving perhaps too much of the military’s autonomy in how it organized.

\textit{National Security Act of 1947— the evolution of strategy-making institutions}

The National Security Act of 1947 directed the formation of the National Military Establishment (NME) (amended in 1949 to be the Department of Defense), which internalized three independent Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Marine Corps remained part of the Department of the Navy. A civilian secretary, with assistant secretaries was placed in charge. Each of the services was headed by a civilian secretary and a uniformed military chief of staff. Each of the uniformed chiefs of staff also represented the senior military advisory group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the SECDEF. At first, the President’s Chief of Staff Admiral Leahy served as the senior member of the JCS. After he left the office in 1949, the first official CJCS was General Omar Bradley.

The act also created the CIA out of the Army Office of Strategic Services. The original intent to combine all the service intelligence offices into a single intelligence service was circumvented in the negotiations, which allowed each service to keep its own military
intelligence offices. The CIA was responsible for assessing the international environment and gathering information to analyze and incorporate into intelligence assessments regarding national security. Almost immediately, however, Congress began to have concerns about the roles and function of the intelligence community and issued guidance to keep responsibilities of the military intelligence agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and CIA separate and distinct (George & Rishikof, 2017, p. 21).

However, the Congressional guidance to separate FBI and CIA roles and responsibilities within the domestic United States is not exactly about civilian control, but was, in fact, an enshrining in law of an informal arrangement working out in 1940 between the former Chief of Army Intelligence Ralph Henry Van Deman and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. Van Deman after he retired from the Army in 1929, Van Deman established with the aid of the American Protective League a network of over 350,000 civilian operatives who amassed more than a million pages of surveillance reports on German-Americans in just 14 months in the period just before Pearl Harbor. In the secret meeting Van Deman and Hoover had in 1940 they divided the world through a “Delimitations Agreement” that assigned the counterintelligence responsibility for the Americas to the FBI. Military intelligence services took responsibility for intelligence gathering in the rest of the world. It was this agreement, then passed along to the Office of Special Services (OSS) and eventually the CIA (McCoy, 2017, pp. 116-7).

The interagency body of the NSC was also created by the act. The NSC formally consisted of statutory members -- President, Vice-President, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State – and an NSC staff. However, the function of the NSC was malleable by Presidential directive, since it served to assist the President with the high-level formulation and coordination of U.S. national security policy. The President usually included intelligence and military
advisors with the statutory members. In 1953, President Eisenhower adjusted the NSC to add a special assistant to the president for national security affairs (APNSA) who would guide and direct the NSC staff (George & Rishikoff, 2017, pp. 19, 33). A primary reason for the increased influence and importance of the NSC over time was its location institutionally and functionally in close proximity to the President (George & Rishikoff, 2017, p. 34).

Throughout the 1950s, President Eisenhower (elected in 1952) molded the NSC and formalized many of its processes to conform to how he expected a staff to support a Commander in Chief. The structure he molded differed in details, but not in general concept, from President Truman’s NSC. After Eisenhower, succeeding Presidents continued to reshape the NSC to fit their personal leadership styles, but the general structure of the organization remains intact as envisioned by the National Security Act of 1947 (Mabee, 2011, p. 39). The enduring nature of the NSC since 1947 has reinforced scholarly appreciation of the NSC’s path dependent development. This chapter links this path dependency to the processes developed by the Army General Staff’s WPD and the Joint Army and Navy Board / Joint Planning Committee participation. Ultimately, the fundamentals of JCS integration of all the elements of national power in support of the war effort, as managed by the senior military leaders provided the model for NSC implementation (Mabee, 2011, pp. 36-7).

The National Security Act of 1947 also formed the Munitions Board and the NSRB. The Munitions Board, a continuation of the Army-Navy Munitions Board was amalgamated into the Department of Defense. The Munitions Board was not in charge of procurement for all three services, but it did prepare and coordinate material and personnel requirements, as well as oversee the military aspects of economic mobilization. The Munitions Board planners also managed the allocation of over 20,000 industrial plants, which they apportioned between the
services to avoid the plants having to respond to different services. The Munitions Board controlled the survey of strategic materials and managed the stockpiling of those materials, especially the limited supply materials (Abramo, 1995, pp. 348-50).

The NSRB was independent of both the NME (later DoD) and the Council of Economic Advisors, which was a new executive agency inside the Executive Office of the President. The NSRB drew on the experience of the Truman Commission and cooperated at times with the Council of Economic Advisors in its focus on wartime economic capability. This was an important development specifically directed at downplaying the role of the Military in industrial mobilization. The NSRB was civilian-led, but it was responsible for performing the same planning efforts the military economic planners had accomplished before WWII. The NSRB conducted the material surveys and managed the Strategic and Critical Material Stockpiling Act (1946) requirements along with the Munitions Board. The NSRB was eventually replaced by the Office of Defense Mobilization in 1950 (Abramo, 1995, pp. 348-53).

State Department

The other key strategy-making institution to arise after the National Security Act was the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff created by George C. Marshall (after he retired as Army Chief of Staff and was appointed Secretary of State) and noted Foreign Service Officer George Kennan, who authored the Long Telegram and the “X” article, which served to inspire the Cold War strategy of containment. Interestingly, prior to the end of WWII, the State Department, War Department and Navy Department had all occupied the same building not far from the White House (Capozzola, 2009, p. 424). However, with the construction of the Pentagon at the end of WWII, the new Department of Defense (DoD) occupied that structure and the State Department started to expand in order to take on its new strategy-making
responsibilities. Given the prominent international role the United States took on after the war, the State Department has struggled to garner the necessary funding and institutional maturity (George & Rishikof, 2017, pp. 20-21). In terms of key American leaders involved in shaping U.S. foreign policy and national security decision-making, the State Department has provided a number of luminary figures – Dean Acheson, Paul Nitze, John Foster Dulles, and George Kennan – but until Marshall created the Policy Planning Staff, the State Department lacked a bureaucratic office to influence the larger bureaucracy of the Federal government, especially the rest of the Executive Branch.

This shortfall accounts for serious differences in strictly academic, scholarly approaches to studying U.S. foreign policy and the insights to be gained from the national security practitioners. Relying on the personal accounts of State Department figures prejudices the Leader Perceptions aspect of policy-making (as identified by NCR’s model), likely skews international relations theory approaches which rely on these perspectives for evidence, and underappreciates the strength of bureaucratic processes wielding influence on Congress and the rest of the Executive Branch, including the State Department and these key leaders. For very important periods of scholarly investigation of national security policy-making, the classification of these strategy-making institutions documents prevented the due diligence of scholars who had to connect the dots without such evidence. As the documentary evidence in the National Archives and Presidential Libraries is steadily declassified by time-stamp and Freedom of Information Act processes in support of more recent scholarship, this shortfall can be rectified.

The publicly documented history of the National Security Act of 1947 unifying the post-WWII Military might appear to demonstrate to the average observer the proper role of Congress debating and defining the reorganization of the new DoD and the beneficial establishment of
processes proven successful during the war. However, by delving deeper into the archives and exploring the role of especially the War Department’s strategy-making institutions, the influence on every aspect of Congress’ introduction of legislation, debate over legislation, and approval of significant authorizations affecting the Military is revealed. This is not meant to describe the Military’s institutional influence as deliberately conspiratorial or to have malicious intent. Indeed, the military officers involved acted in what they perceived was an ethical manner to uphold the American tradition of civilian control of the Military. The Military lobbied Congress for its approval, just as other interest groups did for their own legislative interests. Should this history give the American citizenry cause for concern?

Each of the four services – Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force (formed as part of the reorganization process) – devoted time and resources to bypassing the normal process of interaction with Congress in order to advance their interests. There were two routine methods for the Military to provide input to Congress. The most significant being in the appropriations process by submitting requests for funding. Military representatives would then be summoned to hearings to explain the need for the appropriations and Congress would deliberate on the requests. The other method was in the Annual Report submitted by each Department in which they accounted for spending the appropriations and highlighted developments of note across all aspects of the military. Undoubtedly, in both these processes, there were informal interactions between senior military leaders, the civilian secretaries and department staffs and the Congress. What distinguishes the behavior described in this chapter from the normal is the very deliberate planning for Congressional engagement and careful manipulation of information flow to accomplish desired purposes – such as reorganization or support for defense initiatives.
Through the technique of process tracing, this chapter details how the National Security Act of 1947 is essentially the formalization through Congressional legislation of the reorganization initiated by EO at the start of the war (see Chart on next page). Furthermore, the reorganization of 1942 was also the result of a planned reorganization that senior military leaders explicitly understood would not pass Congressional scrutiny. The Military leveraged its successful prosecution of the global war against fascism to preserve what it believed was necessary to secure the nation against modern military threats. In effect, by leveraging the prestige of its wartime victories, the Military managed to develop a robust National Military Establishment with extensive planning capacity – the scope of which had been steadfastly resisted by Congress for seven decades. Due to the complex nature of modern warfare and the total war mobilization of industry and economy that characterized WWII, these military actions also gave rise to the military-industrial complex.
Figure 4. Process tracing the formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reveals the significance of early military, especially Army, strategic planning efforts which laid the foundation for the subsequent influence of wartime exigency and interservice rivalry.
Military-Industrial Complex

The most significant step in the rise of the military-industrial complex was the dominance of the Military in the research and development (R&D) aspects of the aviation and electronics industrial sectors (Hooks, 1990; Hooks, 1991; Berkhout, 2017, pp. 477-78). Significantly, as WWII ended and the Military demobilized, portions of civilian industries were reconverted to commercial uses; however, in the aviation sector and in some parts of the electronics sector, the Government sustained funding in support of defense-related contracts and R&D. Indeed, some corporations were wholly dependent on United States defense spending, and frequently, over time, foreign military sales and military assistance as well. Most of the 200 largest industrial manufacturing companies at the end of WWII had constructed new laboratories, expanded technically and scientifically skilled employees, and pursued product diversification between military items produced for the war effort and commercial spinoffs for the civilian sector (Berkhout, 2017, p. 479). The newly-formed DOD kept the WWII agencies which had managed these efforts. One of the most important of the successful R&D efforts the Military had supported during the war was the Manhattan Project, which had developed the atomic bomb. The Military at first kept nearly the entire atomic energy scientific effort within the DOD. A civilian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was created, but Congress acceded to the Military’s request for a uniformed officer to preside over the AEC’s Division of Military Application.

The impact of the war on industry was stabilizing and growth-inducing. The largest fifty manufacturing corporations before the war, were mostly in the top 50 after the war. All but six companies were still in the top 100 even ten years after the war ended. The Military tended to choose dependable firms and their success was evidence of their corporate strength and benefit from defense contracts (Abramo, 1995, p. 335; Greenspan & Wooldridge, 2018). Since there
was little interaction between the Military and the business sector prior to the war, the Military was forced to conduct its Industrial Mobilization Planning autonomously, research suggests there was no real military-industrial complex before WWII (Abramo, 1995, p. 358; Herman, 2012). But after the war, the Government owned approximately 25% of the manufacturing assets in the country (Sweeting, 1994, p. 2). In many respects, the performance of business in the arsenal of democracy rehabilitated big business in the eyes of the People, who had for over a decade held business leaders responsible for the Depression (Sweeting, 1994, p. 7; Greenspan & Wooldridge, 2018).

Also significant for the military-industrial complex was its growing role in influencing the NSC and the various strategy-making institutions across the new national security architecture. Government-owned and managed corporations provided support to many different aspects of the Government. Professional civil service employees and military officers, experts in the fields of foreign policy and national security joined think tanks and influential interest groups to ensure their expertise continued to influence and shape policy and Congressional appropriations in support of the national security enterprise served by the military-industrial complex. The demobilization of the armed services after WWII also affected the rest of the government bureaucracy as the state down-sized and also reorganized to meet the requirements levied by the new national security and foreign policy institutions, including the establishment and participation in several new diplomatic and financial international institutions (Sparrow, 2011, pp. 242-243). It was not long before the series of national security issues, both generated organizationally, and also driven by external international events, required the National Security Council to articulate a more holistic grand strategy for the United States – NSC 68.
NSC 68 and Grand Strategy

After WWII, while the reorganization of Congress and the NME absorbed much attention, there were significant international events requiring resolution by the organizations and leaders in place. Many of them required inclusion in the formal policy-making process established by the establishment of the NSC. The table below provides a list of the first ten NSC policy papers, numbered sequentially. After President Truman’s re-election in 1948, the pace of NSC production of papers increased. The process also became more routine and empowered by the continuity in Presidential administration from the establishment of the institutions.

| NSC 1 FEB 1948 – The Position of the United States with respect to Italy |
| NSC 2 NOV 1947 – (A Report by Secretary of the Air Force) Base Rights in Greenland, Iceland and the Azores |
| NSC 3 DEC 1947 – (A Report by Secretary of State) United States Policy Towards Spain |
| NSC 4 DEC 1947 – Coordination of Foreign Information Measures |
| NSC 5 JAN 1948 – The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece |
| NSC 6 MAR 1948 – The Position of the United States Regarding Short-Term Assistance to China |
| NSC 7 MAR 1948 – The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism |
| NSC 8 APR 1948 – (A Report to the President) The Position of the United States with Respect to Korea |
| NSC 9 APR 1948 – The Position of the United States with Respect to Support for Western Union and Other Related Free Countries |
| NSC 10/5 OCT 1951 – Scope and Pace of Covert Operations; 10/2 Established an Organization for Covert Operations |

**Figure 5.** This table of the first ten National Security Council policy papers illustrates the scope and breadth of early national security strategy-making decisions.

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90 A note on the dating from the archival record. These dates represent the version of those documents in the archives. In some cases, the original date of the issue could not be identified and was not central to this research. For example, the initial policy document for NSC 1 “The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy” would have been initiated prior to February 1948 and was probably November 1947, like the other early documents.
In January 1950, President Truman directed the NSC to develop a strategic plan defining the objectives and programs for U.S. national security – the first programmatic and documentary NSS. By mid-April the NSC returned NSC 68, which identified in its Terms of Reference: “The moral, psychological, and political questions involved in this problem would need to be taken into account and be given due weight. The outcome of this reexamination would have a crucial bearing on the further question as to whether there should be a revision in the nature of the agreements, including the international control of atomic energy, which we have been seeking to reach with the U.S.S.R.” (NSC 68). Contrary to Layne’s claim about the Open Door perspective shaping U.S. foreign policy after WWII, the articulation of grand strategy in NSC 68 is clearly predicated on a particular threats-based ideological perspective of the Soviet Union and the implications of nuclear war.

To develop this point further, it is helpful to review in detail the Table of Contents of NSC 68:

Terms of Reference; Analysis
I. Background of the Present World Crisis
II. The Fundamental Purpose of the United States
III. The Fundamental Design of the Kremlin
IV. The Underlying Conflict in the realm of ideas and values between the U.S. Purpose and the Kremlin Design
   a. Nature of the Conflict
   b. Objectives
   c. Means
V. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities – Actual and Potential
VI. U.S Intentions and Capabilities – Actual and Potential
VII. Present Risks
VIII. Atomic Armaments
   a. Military Evaluation of the U.S. and USSR Atomic Capabilities
   b. Stockpiling and use of Atomic Weapons
   c. International Control of Atomic Energy
IX. Possible Courses of Action
    Introduction
    The Role of Negotiation
A. The First Course – Continuation of Current Policies, with Current and Currently projected programs for carrying out these projects
B. The Second Course – Isolation
C. The Third Course – War
D. The Remaining Courses of Action
   a. Rapid Buildup of Political, Economic and Military Strength in the Free World

Conclusions
Recommendations

The grand strategy articulated in NSC 68 drew its ideological inspiration from the Preamble to the American Constitution – conditions to live and prosper; individual freedom; and to fight to defend our way of life (NSC 68, 1950, p. 9). In its Analysis section, NSC 68 highlighted the already realized endemic conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States which had become apparent in world events between 1945 to 1950, and more importantly, the dangerous prospect of nuclear annihilation if a total war were to ensue. NSC 68 identifies two important lines of effort for which the United States must provide world leadership: the desire for a healthy international community and the need for containment of communism (NSC 68, 1950, p. 21). NSC 68 emphasized the difference between the U.S. and Soviet economies, but did not express the interests in terms of an Open Door perspective, but instead in terms of economic mobilization for war and whether the West would have the time to mobilize its superior resources to defeat the Soviet military (p. 25). The NSC 68 does mention the United States would still face a security challenge, even if the Soviet Union did not exist, but this is focused internally, and not in an Open Door perspective – it highlights the need for order, security and participation in our system and way of life, but balanced against individual freedom (p. 34).

Another significant element of NSC 68’s conception of U.S. grand strategy is the finding that WWII demonstrated the United States can be an economy mobilized for war and still
prepared to provide for the benefits of a growing, industrial society. It lays the intellectual
foundation for a nation dedicated to armaments and expanding the quality of life based on
economic production (pp. 39, 58). In several annexes, NSC 68 laid out specific programs related
to the Military, provision of economic assistance abroad, civil defense, stockpiling of strategic
resources, information warfare and propaganda, intelligence activities, internal security, long-
term economic sustainment and development, budget and process for managing NSC 68 issues,
and the economic implications of all the proposed programs (primarily a budgetary concern).
All these details about the issues, concerns, and programs of NSC 68 indicate an approach to
grand strategy which is focused on a specific threat and which understands the requirements for
moderating the impacts of security needs against individual liberty in modern society. Any
claims for the origins of Cold War to be found in the U.S. policy formulation in NSC 68 are
misguided. NSC 68 is clearly providing guidance for how to prosecute what is characterized as a
conflict with the Soviet Union, which means the Cold War started sooner. But this conclusion
does beg the question, is it possible that the militarization of U.S. national security policy by
evolving strategy-making institutions caused the Cold War?

Origins of the Cold War

Who started the Cold War? It should not be surprising to find answering this simple
question about an ideological conflict reveals deeply contested interpretations and
reinterpretations. For historians, this revelation can be frustrating and also exciting; frustrating
because finding scholarly, objective truth is elusive, which undermines the scientific side of the
profession. On the other hand, the search for answers in newly-opened archives and declassified
documentation can still provide exciting discoveries to expand the historiography. For a
strategist, the historical debate about Cold War origins can inform approaches to developing a
national security strategy and whether the process of developing a strategy actually contributed to the conflict. More recent *National Security Strategy of the United States* formulations are strongly weighted towards ideological constructs, a product of a Cold War strategic approach. A more realistic examination of Cold War origins might argue for more nuanced formulations of NSSs which embrace complexity and reduce risks for miscalculation or misunderstanding.

The U.S. and Soviet Union transition from WWII allies to Cold War enemies involved multiple coincidental, linked developments and decisions. The most salient moment in analyzing Cold War origins was the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. There is little argument in scholarship about the significance of the Atomic Age’s opening for the Cold War and certainly the possible use of nuclear weapons was a defining characteristic of Cold War concerns, as captured in NSC 68.91 However, given the United States and the Soviet Union were wartime allies, the use of atomic weapons against a mutual enemy was unlikely to be the proximate cause of a Cold War. The Soviet reaction to atomic weapons raises the question of whether Soviet strategic intentions made an eventual Cold War inevitable.92 The issue of Soviet strategic intentions necessitated considering whether Communist ideology held the seeds of future confrontation with the Capitalist world; a confrontation only kept “Cold” due to the possible deterrence of nuclear weapons.93

This broadened the scope to include changes in U.S.-Soviet relations, events impacting the potential for Leftist revolution in the United States, and heightened U.S. perceptions of

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91 See Holloway’s chapter “Nuclear weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945-1962” (Leffler & Westad, 2010).
92 Soviet reaction to the U.S. use of atomic weapons is difficult to assess, given it would mostly have been embodied in Josef Stalin’s perceptions. The possession of such a powerful weapon in other than Soviet hands piqued Russian paranoia, especially after the WWII invasion by Nazi Germany. The nature of the Cold War prevented authoritative examination of Russian reactions and the scholarly literature should be considered speculative on this topic until after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
93 See Vladimir Pechatnov’s chapter “The Soviet Union and the world, 1944-1953” (Leffler & Westad, 2010).
vulnerability after Pearl Harbor. Declassification of documents revealed discrepancies between intelligence assessments and U.S. public pronouncements of disparities in military and economic strength between the U.S. and Soviet Union. These discrepancies later fueled revisionist interpretations of the early Cold War tied to the gradually increasing voices of dissent and criticism in the United States after the mid-1950s repudiation of McCarthyism.

The economic component of American ideology, capitalism and global free markets, required the consideration of strategic resources like uranium for atomic weapons or oil for transportation and heating as inciting issues for the Cold War. While it is possible to identify the economic issues in early Cold War public discourse, these are masked by the ideological, political and military emphasis. The literature does not indicate economics, that is, economics separate from ideology, as a proximate cause of the Cold War, but economic issues have become intrinsic to Cold War discussions as a contributing factor. Declassified documents indicate the United States perceived threats of Communist expansion due to the political and economic vulnerabilities of war-ravaged western and southern Europe. In this sense, the Marshall Plan must be considered as a possible provocation to the Soviet Union.

Other major events in this period include the 1949 Communist victory in China, Soviet acquisition of atomic weapons in 1949, the Berlin crisis of 1948, the establishment of Israel in 1948, and the Greek civil war 1946-1949. Although these events are sometimes addressed in the Cold War origins context, the literature commonly accepts the existence of the Cold War prior to 1948.

94 See Charles s. Maier’s chapter “The world economy and the Cold War in the middle of the twentieth century” and David s. Painter’s chapter “Oil, resources, and the Cold War, 1945-1962” (Leffler & Westad, 2010).
95 After 1991, access to Russian archives and increased information from other countries’ Cold War experiences added further dimensions to the lack of consensus. Traditionalists, revisionists, and post-revisionist scholars found evidence to support their several opinions. The Soviet Union’s collapse also resulted in a muted triumphalism in the
The first key, publicly known at the time, source for interpreting the start of the Cold War was Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s March 1946 “Iron Curtain” speech in Missouri, given with President Truman at his side (Churchill, 1946). This was followed a year later by President Truman’s request to Congress for assistance to Greece and Turkey, in which the President articulated what became known as the Truman Doctrine -- a containment strategy of Communism and totalitarianism (Truman, 1947). Additionally, the “Sources of Soviet Conduct” article published in Foreign Affairs by George Kennan under the alias “Mr. X” made public many of the points of his “Long Telegram” of a year prior which greatly influenced the perceptions of U.S. leaders regarding long-term Soviet intentions (Kennan, 1947; Kennan, 1946; Leffler, 2006). These sources, pre-dating and informing NSC 68, indicate Soviet long-term intention to subvert the capitalist world through totalitarian means as the root cause of the Cold War. Secondary sources from subsequent historiography reiterate the public consensus regarding the Soviet Union’s responsibility for the ideological conflict. This is furthered by publication of Stalin’s February 1946 speech widely believed to evidence the Soviet Union’s intent to export revolutionary Communism to the world (Stalin, 1946).96 97

Very little outside of Stalin’s speech and Communist propaganda was public knowledge on the Soviet side of the early Cold War. However, a late 1946 memorandum from the Soviet scholarship, which allowed scholars to once again express consensus about the complexity of U.S. and Soviet actions generating the Cold War.

96 Stalin’s speech prompted Kennan’s Long Telegram.
97 Biographical histories indicate the ideological explanation for Cold War origins warrants scrutiny and reconsideration by historians. Dean Acheson, a very influential early Cold War advisor to President Truman, was not initially convinced of an ideological threat from the Soviet Union, but Kennan’s telegram and perceptions of Soviet persistence to threaten Turkey and Iran shaped a change of opinion (Beisner, 2006). As late as January 1946, Acheson thought it was “absolutely unthinkable we would fight” the USSR (Beisner, 2006, p. 69). In a 2011 biography of George Kennan, eminent Cold War scholar John Lewis Gaddis conceded Kennan himself regretted how deterministically his “Long Telegram” had influenced an aggressively military strategy of containment of Soviet Communism (Gaddis, 2011). However, Gaddis cites Kennan’s emotionalism for his lack of confidence in the robustness of the strategy his assessment inspired (Gaddis, 2011, p. 695).
Ambassador to Stalin assessing the United States’ expansionist, imperialist, capitalist design indicates Soviet truculence may likely have been defensive and reactionary (Novikov, 1946). A biographical history of Nikita Khrushchev illustrates a personality-driven foreign policy for the Soviet Union, rather than the strategic design of world domination credited to Stalin by Western pundits (Taubman, 2003). For a variation on this approach, a letter by former Vice President Henry Wallace, a Progressive Party leader, to President Truman in July 1946 argued for understanding Soviet perceptions of Western threats as a basis for building mutual cooperation (Wallace, 1946). Although this information was unknown at the time, it informed later historiographical revisionist and post-revisionist criticism of the traditionalist interpretation.

After the repudiation of Senator McCarthy’s hunt for Communists, scholars eventually approached the early Cold War, recent history at the time, with a more critical perspective. This period of challenging American patriotic mythology also led to identifying U.S. imperialism as a cause for the Cold War – such a proposition, if founded in fact, would implicate national security strategy-making institutions. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the traditionalist interpretation of Cold War origins was revitalized by the flagrant violation of the Eastern European sovereignty facade committed by the Soviet Union (Starobin, 1969).

98 Although not dispositive about whether U.S. grand strategy can be explained by an Open Door theoretical paradigm, the Soviet Ambassador does not describe this as an Open Door approach.
99 I was unable to determine when Wallace’s letter was made public.
100 The main proponents for the revisionist assignment of Cold War culpability to the United States are D.F. Fleming’s 1961 ‘The Cold War and Its Origins’ and William A. Williams’ 1962 ‘The Tragedy of American Diplomacy’, with works by David Horowitz, Gar Alperovitz, Gabriel Kolko, and Diane Clemens complementing the Revisionist school of thought (Schlesinger, 1967; Seabury, 1968; Leigh, 1974; Gray, 1977). Revisionists claim unilateral actions by the United States caused the Cold War because alternatives were available to continue working with the Soviets building upon the wartime alliance (Thomas, 1968). Alperovitz even argued U.S. leaders made the decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki after determining the use of nuclear weapons was not needed to save American lives (Seabury, 1968, p. 176). However, the revisionist argument is undermined by a couple of factors – many of its authors were known Leftists and their messaging reflected Soviet official positions (Seabury, 1968; Schlesinger, 1967). Some scholars like Arthur Schlesinger explained away the revisionist case by acknowledging human failings, invoking the image of Greek tragedy to explain how the Cold War resulted not from decisions, but from dilemmas (Schlesinger, 1967, pp. 45, 52).
post-revisionist period was marked by a distinct lack of consensus on Cold War origins explanations (Painter & Leffler, 1994, introduction).\(^1\) Essentially, the post-revisionist period benefited by the disclosure of classified material in the U.S. indicating a discrepancy between the public statements of the early Cold War and the intelligence assessments about Soviet lack of military and economic strength. Intelligence estimates revealed the Soviets were unlikely to seek a military confrontation with the United States (Leffler, 1984). Instead, the U.S. was concerned political and economic vulnerabilities in Europe and developing countries might make Soviet communism an attractive alternative to Western capitalism (Leffler, 1984; Stueck, 1973).\(^2\)

When the Soviet Union collapsed there was an initial rush by scholars to utilize the “trickle” of archival knowledge coming out of the former USSR to either correct past errors or take credit for being right.\(^3\) Leffler argued U.S. national security interests drove decision-making and U.S. leaders interpreted defending ideological and economic core values as a national interest. U.S. leaders differentiated between the Soviet Union as a long-term threat to economic interests and the short-term threats to specific regional issues. Given the U.S. dismissed the short term capabilities of the Soviet Union and recognized the Soviet Union did not seek a short term confrontation with the U.S., the U.S.’s aggressive actions to protect long-

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\(^1\) Melvyn Leffler’s earlier works supported Open Door like arguments, but he later acknowledged the economic approach needed to be considered in context with all the other aspects of the strategic environment and processes (Leffler, 1984; Leffler, 2017). Gaddis argued that while the U.S. may have made early mistakes in decision-making, those mistakes were justified, and eventually vindicated, by evidence of Soviet aggression (Gaddis, 1972; Gaddis, 2000).

\(^2\) A recurring element of post-revisionist and traditionalist thinking was the inevitability of an ideological Cold War conflict due to Stalinist policies (Gaddis & Mark, 1978; Mark, 1989; Kramer, 1999; Gould-Davies, 1999). This approach continued to focus on the deep ideological conflict between competing visions of economic progress and state structure extending the possible starting point for some Cold War scholars to the early 20th century. Another aspect of this period was debate about the role of nuclear weapons and the arms race in starting the Cold War (Kaplan, 1983; Sherwin, 1973). As the Cold War progressed through a series of arms race events and confrontations like the Cuban Missile Crisis, increased assessments of nuclear strategies led to re-evaluations of whether WW2 timeframe decision-making inadvertently contributed to starting a Cold War.

\(^3\) One of the first major works was Melvyn Leffler’s *A Preponderance of Power* in 1992.
term interests provoked a more hostile response from the Soviet Union (NSC-68; Leffler, 1992; Eden, 1993; Trachtenberg, 1995; Westad, 2017). However, a consensus about some revisionist and post-revisionist concepts, such as American imperialism, grew out of a shared American triumphalism with regard to the Cold War’s end with Soviet collapse.

More recent scholarship highlights the complexity of assessing origins and points to multi-factor contributions (Engel, 2017; Westad, 2017). This discussion of Cold War origins highlights the difficulty of applying theoretical constructs to praxis for strategic planners. The attempt to impose order and simplicity on complex environments in order to proceed with strategic planning causes an acknowledged detachment of contingency plans and war plans from reality.

**Implications for National Security Strategy formulation**

When formulating its NSS, the U.S. Government should rightly examine the political, economic, and military capabilities of potential enemies to determine threat possibilities. However, strategic planners and decision-makers must also examine the impact of U.S. values and policies abroad and how U.S. capabilities are perceived by others. It is reasonable for other nations to pragmatically consider U.S. capabilities independently of the U.S.’s stated values because leaders and policies can change. Strategists apply this logic when assessing threats, they

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104 Odd Arne Westad’s *The Cold War: A History* explores whether the Cold War was more deeply rooted in the ideological underpinnings of the 20th century political and economic movements and developments.

105 One of the seminal works for this seasoned analysis was Gaddis’ *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, which unsurprisingly sparked a response from Melvyn Leffler (Gaddis, 1997; Leffler, 1999). Leffler’s “modest” response highlighted Gaddis’ alleged abandonment of post-revisionist views and a return to traditionalist perspectives (Leffler, 1999, p. 503). Leffler also pointed out Gaddis’ early work claimed democratic pluralism hindered effective policy-making, but in *We Now Know*, Gaddis described it as a great attribute (Leffler, 1999, p. 504). Leffler took issue with Gaddis’ claim about the inevitability of the Cold War due to Stalin’s strategic intent by citing Mastny’s futile search for Stalinist designs on world domination (Leffler, 1999, p. 507; Gaddis, 1997, pp. 292-3; Mastny, 1996). Leffler’s commentary took the liberty of responding to criticism of his own 1992 work by noting the triumphalism in *We Now Know* and suggesting, “we should not confuse [the Cold War’s] ending with its origins and evolution” (Leffler, 1999, p. 524).
must also start to evaluate the strategic threat perceptions of other countries and groups about the United States.

The historiography of Cold War origins illustrates ultimate responsibility for the Cold War is still hard to define conclusively, but there is ample evidence U.S. policies and decisions contributed to an environment of confrontation. It is possible the confrontation was inevitable and U.S. victory vindicated the risks assumed during the Cold War’s 45-year history. It is also possible other courses of action may have forestalled a Cold War crisis and some other form of great power interaction would have governed international affairs for the same period or resulted in a different, less risky, less volatile environment. Strategists must embrace the complexity of these issues, drawing in cultural and social perspectives to broaden the analysis. As Cold War scholarship continues to evolve, scholars should revisit whether the methodologies of U.S. strategy-making institutions contributed to an unwarranted militarization of the U.S. grand strategy for the Cold War. Thanks to President Eisenhower’s provocative warning about the potential excesses of the military-industrial complex, the idea that excessive militarization of the American national security processes may have contributed to the Cold War might just play in Peoria.

*Eisenhower’s Warning*

President Eisenhower was uniquely qualified by virtue of his WWII role as Supreme Allied Commander, followed by his tenure as Marshall’s replacement for Chief of Staff of the Army, to assess the role of the Military in national security. As this chapter has demonstrated, the role of the Military in important aspects of the economy and the division of warmaking powers between the President and Congress had grown exponentially since the pre-WWII era. Eisenhower’s efforts to ensure interagency participation and balance in the staff-driven processes
on the NSC actually elevated the NSC’s significance as an influential element over policy. In a very real sense, as the NSC documents evidence, the “main business of the United States government had become the development, maintenance, positioning, exploitation, and regulation of military forces” (May, 1992, p. 276). Although President Eisenhower attempted to ensure cabinet officials like the Secretary of the Treasury were included, the national security positions grew in influence (Jablonsky, 2002, pp. 9-10).

President Eisenhower, soon after entering office, challenged the broad scope and programmatic cost of NSC 68’s grand strategic vision; he did not think it was sustainable. He initiated an academic and professional debate over national security policy called Project Solarium. The focus of Project Solarium was to ensure highly qualified experts, trusted by the senior government leaders, thought through the very difficult dilemmas and issues of global and domestic concerns impacting national security (Flourney & Brimley, 2006, p. 82). Soviet strategy and Soviet intentions was the focus of strategic contemplation by Project Solarium, further evidence the institutional process of grand strategy formulation was not predisposed to an Open Door formulation. Months later, this strategic review process resulted in the publication of NSC 162/2, better known as Eisenhower’s New Look strategy, published in October 1953.

Eisenhower devoted great efforts to provide balance in the government; he understood he was the first Republican President since the start of the Depression two decades earlier. He was also conscious of his long experience as a soldier and the requirement for civilian control of the Military; Eisenhower did not want to lead the nation as a military general. Sensitive to military influence over his decision-making and the national priorities, the President grew very concerned about the Military’s excessive influence, especially after U2 flights revealed that estimates of Soviet military strength, especially the so-called Bomber Gap, were greatly exaggerated.
However, the President could not reveal his concerns without acknowledging the top secret strategic reconnaissance program. Throughout his second administration he attempted to rein in the Military and initiate arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. He struggled with doubts about handing over Presidential power, backed by thermonuclear munitions, to another President who did not share Eisenhower’s understanding of the cost of war and the burdens of command responsibility for global peace and security.

By the time, John F. Kennedy (JFK) was elected in 1960, President Eisenhower decided he must warn the country and his successor about the over-militarization of U.S. national security processes and decision-making. He understood intuitively the added momentum nuclear weapons and the National Security Act of 1947 had generated for the path dependence of the military-industrial complex and its influence on the nation’s strategy-making institutions. In January 1961, he issued his warning in a farewell address to the nation, it warrants an expanded reference:\textsuperscript{106}

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction. Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea. Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend

\textsuperscript{106} \url{http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eisenhower001.asp}
its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades. In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded. Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.

It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system -- ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

The President claims “an alert and knowledgeable citizenry” can aid in ensuring the United States’ ultimate objectives, enshrined in the Constitution, do not become absorbed by the inexorable scientific rationality of fears propagated by the military-industrial complex. This dissertation is not the venue to continue a deep dive into the alleged perils of the military-industrial complex, but it is a place to re-iterate President Eisenhower’s warning and elucidate
further how the evolution of national security strategy-making institutions helped create, shape and sustain the military-industrial complex. This dissertation is also the venue to emphasize President Eisenhower’s appeal for reliance on the People to engage in questions of grand strategy, or else “security and liberty” will not “prosper together.”

"We the People" and Grand Strategy

The evolution of strategy-making institutions discussed in this chapter does not provide hints on how to ensure the People are engaged in grand strategy, but it does reiterate the significance of popular support. Prior to WWII, the Military understood it could not directly challenge Congress, representing the will of the People, and thus the institutions had to delay implementation of new ideas about reorganizing the military bureaucracy for wartime. Additionally, the Military elected to train officers in economics to study how to convert industries to wartime mobilization requirements, rather than pressure the civilian, commercial, or private sector to provide or participate in this level of strategic planning. The actions of the Military to bypass civilian participation and Congressional resistance should give the People pause today. This possible tendency of the military establishment to work in secret what it knows will meet public scrutiny, but which the military planners genuinely believe necessary for the benefit and security of the nation, needs to be examined. Later, the Military unconsciously leveraged its prestige in victory to convince Congress to officially sanction the changes in organization, which earlier would not have been approved by Congress. These changes essentially implemented a permanent wartime footing for the Military, requiring the permanent support of portions of industry dedicated to technical military production – the military-industrial complex. In addition, large amounts of R&D funding were paid to businesses to conduct
research, which in many cases was spun off in commercial applications also to the derivative
benefit of the People (Greenspan & Wooldridge, 2018).

The Military benefitted socially and politically from the millions of citizens who served
in WWII and the millions more who supported the war effort on the Home front. This
widespread familiarity with the American military services garnered popular support and aided
in the popular activism of the post-WWII era. The People mirrored the activist nature of the
federal Government. While the Government was actively engaged in addressing global security
concerns in the ideological Cold War, the People were actively seeking change in civil rights,
consumer affairs, women’s liberation, and growing participation in public expression through
protest and interest groups (Mayhew, 1962; Halberstam, 1993; Greenspan & Wooldridge, 2018).
However, most often, the People “participate” in grand strategy, or even policy-making,
indirectly, in mainly passive ways (Almond, 1960). This passive support should be interpreted
as approval or endorsement of the policy, provided there is a reasonable expectation the People
understand the policy, the alternatives and the consequences.

For example, the People supported FDR’s initial wartime policy of unconditional
surrender for the Axis powers. The government conducted a public information campaign
(propaganda) to explain the concept to the People – the policy would convince the Soviet ally of
Western intentions to cooperate in the defeat of the Axis, it would aid allied unity, and prevent
future wars. The People supported the concept, even when elite advisors tried to persuade
President Truman to soften the policy, the President kept to the message communicated to the
People. It can be argued that if public opinion was unimportant, then why did the American
government bother investing in trying to communicate, persuade, and convince the People of the
message (Smith, 1998, 269, 278)? Similarly, the President was willing to challenge public
opinion when necessary, such as regarding the fate of Japan’s Emperor. The People wanted the Emperor tried as a war criminal, but Truman counted on public approval over the end of the war to mitigate any disappointment with his decision to let Japan’s Emperor remain. One scholar characterizes Truman’s consideration of public opinion over the issue as a negotiation (Smith, 1998, p. 379). Because Truman explained and communicated with the People, public opinion behaved mostly as the President hoped, endorsing his end-the-war decision-making.

President Truman had a keen sense of public opinion based on his political skills and intuitive sense of the People’s demands. His creation of the Committee to investigate corporate fraud in military contracts was immensely popular. His understanding of the People’s support to military unification was part of the senior leadership discussions during the institutional debates. Indeed, the awareness of how the bickering of generals and admirals in front of Congress might indelibly damage the Military’s credibility with the People energized Secretary Forrestal and Secretary Patterson to settle their differences over military unification and advance the President’s agenda (Keiser, 1982, pp. 76-77; Caraley, 1966).

Undoubtedly, the People’s support for the national security agenda the United States embarked upon at the end of WWII was based upon trust in President Truman and President Eisenhower and the respect and prestige of the many public-facing leaders memorialized through the public’s rapt attention to the war effort. The victors were paraded and appreciated; their policies were accepted. Part of the credit also falls to Congress, whose early decisions to not repeat the “mistakes” of WWI, when the United States stepped back from an international role. In a sense, Congress took some responsibility for failing to support international institutions, even if the assertion of some linkage may in fact be spurious. The point is the perception was keen in the Senate that the post-war internationalist agenda would be supported by the United
States as a potential means to avert war, and this position was also accepted by the American People. The People did not want war and there was a collective belief and trust in American political leadership that the desire was mutual. President Eisenhower’s warning permitted popular skepticism about Government, perhaps revitalizing traditional American suspicion of Government and a standing, professional Military.

The experience in this grand strategic moment supports a contention it is possible to communicate grand strategic ideas to the People and gain approval or dissent. A key factor in whether this is possible is obviously built upon public trust in the institutions and the leaders. There must be transparency and clarity in communication, and perhaps even the effort to communicate is enough to garner support. But there must also be proven performance by the leaders asking for trust and understanding for their competence to offer opinion or judgment on the matter. The role of the People in grand strategy is to be “alert and knowledgeable”, attentive to the requirements of the grand strategic moment, and not to be a mindless mass of humanity pulled or pushed along some politician’s intended path to a national destiny. Congress, in a representative democracy, plays an important official role in oversight of the national security strategy-making institutions. There must be a positive, constructive relationship between Congress and the Military or the dysfunction will tarnish the People’s views of one or the either, or both.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I make the case that the evolution in national security strategy-making institutions built upon nascent abilities to conduct grand strategy and began to influence the distribution of warmaking powers between the President and Congress. The increasing autonomy of the strategy-making institutions with the War and Navy Departments developed
plans outside the oversight of Congress resulting in a vast expansion of military influence after WWII – over the executive and legislative branches, and even in the economy. This evolution resulted in the creation of the military-industrial complex. The military-industrial complex and the American national government may be the most enduring artifacts of the Cold War still extant in the 21st century (May, 1992, p. 270). This path dependent development of autonomy and influence challenged Presidential control and Congressional oversight and would, as we shall see in the next chapter, result in a breach of faith and loss of confidence from the American People. Whether or not the militarization of national security processes by the strategy-making institutions in fact caused the ideologically characterized Cold War is an unproven possibility warranting further examination. Additionally, the evolution described in this grand strategic moment evidences the need for Congressional oversight and a re-negotiation of constitutional warmaking powers. However, the necessity for an “alert and knowledgeable” citizenry to be concerned about issues of grand strategy and how national security is addressed, has been clearly demonstrated.
Chapter 4
Post-Cold War

Introduction

This chapter explains how the Goldwater-Nichols Act resulted in a significant evolution in U.S. national security strategy-making institutions.\textsuperscript{107} The Goldwater-Nichols Act culminated a decade of Congress attempting to reassert its constitutional warmaking powers with respect to the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief. In a grand strategic sense, the Military had just suffered a mostly self-inflicted loss of credibility in the Vietnam War (Poole, 2012, pp. 254-256). The Military also had fallen under a socio-political microscope after President Eisenhower’s warning about the military-industrial complex. From the perspective of the People, there was a great divide between America’s Military and the nation’s apparent views on requirements and strategies for national security. As the Military implemented reforms to improve its warfighting capability, restore its credibility as a deterrent force, and regain the People’s confidence, the domestic political and international geo-strategic environments of the 1980s continued to reveal shortfalls in military readiness and warfighting proficiency. In the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, Congress implemented a significant overhaul of how the Military conducted joint operations and strategic planning, as well as setting unprecedented Congressional standards.

\textsuperscript{107} This chapter will not rely as heavily on declassified documents and archival research as the previous two chapters. The discussion will focus on the public documents associated with the War Powers and the Goldwater-Nichols Acts, as well as public-facing strategic documents prepared by the Executive branch at Congress’ direction. As more and more classified documents from this timeframe become available, aspects of this research will need to be re-examined.
inside what had been traditionally within the sphere of military control. However, even this Congressional success was initiated and facilitated by the Military’s strategic planners circumventing the established norms to accomplish change despite interservice rivalries and standing legislative and executive mandates. In some respects, the Goldwater-Nichols Act is justifiably hailed as a Congressional check on the Executive branch. However, I argue in this chapter, the manner in Goldwater-Nichols was achieved generates concerns about the level of autonomy in national security strategy-making institutions.

With regard to the Cold War, the strategic defeat in Vietnam ushered in a series of strategic reversals in the United States’ economic security and relationships with the Third World. The rising strategic significance and perceived need for U.S. military interventions in the Middle East presented the United States with a power projection requirement. The United States also received challenges to its superpower influence, which deepened the importance of nuclear weapons to provide strategic deterrence against the Soviet Union. Both the United States and the Soviet Union, seeing the prospects for confrontation, also sought confidence-building measures through Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) to reduce the likelihood of executing the nuclear strategies guaranteeing mutually assured destruction. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990-91, just as successful Goldwater-Nichols reforms demonstrated the much-improved warfighting qualities of the American Military in Operation DESERT STORM, re-established the United States as the world’s pre-eminent superpower.

However, it was a superpower without an ongoing grand strategic vision. In the bipolar Cold War paradigm, which had existed for nearly fifty years, the United States had allowed effective strategic planning skills to atrophy. The combination of increased Congressional influence through Goldwater-Nichols and the sustained growth and influence of the military-
industrial complex expanded the voices offering strategic advice. The evolution and expansion of strategy-making institutions allowed differing views to become powerful influences into policy-making. The ability of strategy-making institutions to influence the strategic choices made by the Executive and Congress increased, continuing a steady accrual of autonomy, until the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Despite the illusory check on increasing autonomy provided by Goldwater-Nichols, the United States’ ability to develop and articulate grand strategy was hampered by the vastly expanded institutional inputs for strategy-making and atrophied strategic planning processes.

In terms of NCR, the failure of national security strategy-making institutions to provide effective strategic planning in the immediate post-Cold War decade meant a problematic impact on the policy-making process and American grand strategy. The institutional voices from strategy-making institutions were incoherent, divided by partisanship and unrealistic theoretical constructs. The Goldwater-Nichols reforms on Joint Staff planning processes were recent enough when the Cold War ended, that the Military’s strategy-making institutions privileged the new processes over finding strategic substance in the 1990s. Supporting Congressionally-mandated strategic planning initiatives served to advance the Military’s interest in ensuring continued heavy investment in defense spending appropriations. In an uncertain world, the People’s expectation of a “peace dividend” and the Military’s diligence to identify and mitigate strategic risk parted ways. Once again, success in a global conflict reaped a large measure of prestige for the Military from the People. Unfortunately, at the strategic planning level, the path dependent evolution privileging process over substance, moved the Military away from the core interests of the American People.
Forged for War: the Joint Chiefs of Staff Identity Crisis

For several decades, Samuel Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State* (1957) had been the defining theoretical work on U.S. civil-military relations. Huntington apprentice Peter Feaver in *Armed Servants* (2003) extrapolated on what he claimed were shortfalls in Huntington’s theory, by applying principal-agent frameworks to an agency theory of civil-military relations. Feaver considers his approach a “first cut at a general institutional theory” and, as such, warrants engagement in this dissertation’s NCR approach to the evolution of strategy-making institutions (Feaver, 2003, pp. 1-7, 283).

Feaver’s argument is that the ultimate principal, the American People, elect representatives who serve as the principal authorities overseeing the military agent. The principal can intrusively monitor the agent, or not, and the agent can work or shirk. If the agent shirks then the principal must choose whether to punish the agent in order to achieve work. Feaver describes Huntington’s theory falling into the non-intrusive monitoring / agent working category in the framework. Feaver argues the agency theory better explains the observed behavior in the Cold War and post-Cold War environment. Without providing an argument proving the assertion, Feaver asserts the United States won the Cold War, but it did not win by becoming a conservative republic; therefore, Huntington’s theory falls short in explanatory value. Additionally, Feaver argues the civilian leadership actually intrusively monitored,

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108 After WWII and the Korean War, Huntington argued the United States needed to abandon Liberalism and adopt a conservative republic approach to national security in order to survive the Cold War. Specifically, Huntington suggested the institutional implementation of his theory was for the civilian leadership to adopt a “hands off” approach in delegating missions to the Military, allowing the Military to conduct its unique business in a professional manner. Civilian authority should not micromanage nor get too deeply involved in the Military business, according to Huntington, or the state would be placed at risk. Huntington trusted the Military’s professional and patriotic ethos would adhere to Constitutional authorities in the institutions of the Presidency and the Congress and that the Military did not require careful monitoring.

109 Feaver notes and apologizes for the use of the term “shirk” in this discussion because shirking has a very specific negative connotation with respect to the performance of military duties. Feaver claims no other term serves the same explanatory value and he regrets, and pleads understanding, about the unfortunate overlap in meanings.
contrary to Huntington’s advice, the Military during the Cold War, and that the Military “worked.” During the post-Cold War period, however, the civilian leadership continued to intrusively monitor the Military and there was obvious “shirking” (Feaver, 2003, pp. 284-86).110

In terms of NCR’s policy making model, Feaver’s agent theory focuses on a narrowly conceived construct of a Domestic Institution in the context of a fixed Strategic Culture, which reflects State-Society Relationships under variable Leader Images responding to various exogenous events. Feaver possibly provides an improved theoretical construct over Huntington’s to explain how civilian control over the Military – a “crucial” institution in a democracy – is implemented on a day-to-day basis. Military behavior is controlled by Congress requiring periodic reporting, the President’s establishment of rules of engagement, and the assignment of missions, orders, and directed planning efforts by the SECDEF in annualized guidance. The professional ethos of obedience over time appears to be a norm indicating civilian expectations of continued military compliance under any circumstances (Feaver, 2003, pp. 76-82, 301-2). In this construct, the media plays an important element of monitoring the Military (Feaver, 2003, pp. 80-81, 301-2). Feaver suggests further research, along institutional lines should be conducted to examine how splitting the principal into Congress and the President separately might better indicate democratic control, as opposed to simple “civilian control” (Feaver, 2003, pp. 295, 301). It is this angle that I seek to explore in this Chapter.

110 In Feaver’s formulation, shirking can be indicated by the Military bypassing the civilian leadership by leaking information to the press, or going public with its concerns, inflating its assessments or estimates to influence the reception of preferred decisions, or slow-rolling the implementation of executive or Congressional guidance (such as President Clinton’s efforts to remove the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy restricting the service of homosexuals in the military) (Feaver, 2003, pp. 68, 181-85). For example, the Military “shirks” when it evades providing advice, such as providing President Obama only three military options after the 2009 Bruce Reidel Afghanistan strategic review, in which two of the options are infeasible throwaways leaving only one real choice; a technique sometimes called the “Kissinger model” (Feaver, 2003, p. 287; Woodward, 2010, p. 103).
In an examination of civil-military relations when the Congress and President are disaggregated, the focus becomes an examination of who influences whom. In *Armed Servants*, Feaver ignores specific consideration of the rise of the military-industrial complex and the increased militarization of foreign policy (as discussed last chapter, and will be continued below) but he does explore the gaps in U.S. civil-military relations as part of describing the complex interaction of state and society with the military institution. Feaver highlights how the Military was still held in high regard, even during the Vietnam war – civilian defense leaders like McNamara took the brunt of public disdain, but there was a general drop in the People’s confidence in the Government (Feaver, 2003, pp. 20-25, 283-4). Additionally, Feaver assesses the liberal elites became anti-Military in the 1960s, but the People became anti-defense spending (Feaver, 2003, pp. 26-36). Even in more recent analysis, Feaver’s focus is on characterizing the nuances of civil-military relationships – but not in the vein of discussing autonomy and the institution’s impact on grand strategy or foreign policy. In Kori Schake’s and General James Mattis’ *Warriors & Citizens: American Views of Our Military* (2016), Feaver, along with a few other colleagues, builds on describing the trajectory of increasing public reverence, but also increasing ignorance, about the Military, as well as demonstrating the increasing separation of the Military from the small, but extremely influential, “Very Liberal” component of society (especially elites) (Golby, Cohn & Feaver, 2016; Lindberg, 2016).

Despite acknowledging the fundamental impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 reforms on his argument (Weiner, 1997; Feaver, 2003, p. 82), Feaver only briefly addresses the impact of Goldwater-Nichols; keeping his attention on relationships of principal and agent over the interaction of the institutions. However, Feaver reveals important evidence supporting the existence of increasing Military autonomy, despite “proving” intrusive civilian monitoring of the
Military. Feaver highlights twelve issues in the 1990s—in seven of them the Military got their way; Feaver identifies this as evidence of shirking, but for this dissertation, I argue it indicates autonomy and influence (Feaver, 2003, pp. 189, 199-201; Stockton, 1996; Dauber, 1998; Desch, 1999). Goldwater-Nichols is highlighted for its assertion of intrusive controls on the Military, which indicates a prior lack of control. Feaver also emphasizes Goldwater-Nichols preserved the Joint Staff’s ability to bypass the military services, since the CJCS’s authorities increased. Additionally, the Act weakened interservice rivalries, which some argued constituted a check on the Military’s autonomy (Feaver, 2003, pp. 82, 206-8).

Further, Feaver engages the issue of potential military coups in the United States. Importing argument from a Parameters article warning of the increasing gap in civil-military relations, the decline in the People’s trust in Government and increase in the Military’s popular prestige, some military and civilian observers, including noted military historian Russell Weigley, indicated the potential for the U.S. to experience a military coup. However, the United States avoided experiencing a coup, despite the situation, because it had avoided the exacerbating influences of a catastrophic military defeat, economic collapse, or collapse of the civilian political system, as well as avoiding institutional stressors from persistent underfunding of the Military or cronyism and corruption in military personnel management (Feaver, 2003, pp. 11-13, 184-185). Feaver is clearly implying coup avoidance is equivalent to sustaining civilian control. While Feaver’s conclusion is accurate in a logical sense, I contend it is much more indicative of the increasing bureaucratic autonomy of national security strategy-making institutions.

Finally, Feaver’s closing commentary concludes the American republic is “better served by foolish working than enlightened shirking” (Feaver, 2003, p. 302). Feaver means he would
prefer military leaders comply with civilian instructions, which are less than militarily sound, rather than resigning *en masse* or refusing to follow orders the Military believes harmful to national security. However, Feaver is dismissive of assumptions fueling such a provocative conclusion. Civilian advice is not necessarily unwise, especially when one considers Clausewitz’s dictum of warfare being an extension of politics. It is better for the Military to abide by civilian guidance which presumably has more political strategic value than military strategic downside. Also, there is no guarantee that Military advice is infallible or certain to succeed. Feaver’s conclusion is likely intended to be provocative to stir a discussion about civilian control of the Military, in which his work is likely to figure prominently. Feaver’s 2016 analysis, along with his colleagues’, continues to downplay potential for coup, emphasizes the People’s hopeful assumptions regarding Military trustworthiness, and bases that hope on military professionalism, which has thus far been confirmed in American political history (Schake & Mattis, 2016).\(^{111}\)

I hesitate to challenge the truth and reliability of the Military’s professionalism; it is a humbling and inspiring mantle to shoulder and live up to for all national security professionals. However, I aver the United States has been lucky, in a way which indicates the possible superiority of agency over structure. Because structurally, the national security strategy-making institutions have increased autonomy and influence over the policy-making processes of the U.S. Government. This continuing institutional evolution has been on a path dependent basis and has steadily influenced generational change in American Strategic Culture and State-Society

\(^{111}\) On a personal note, many people summarily dismiss concerns about American military professionalism, even in what conventional wisdom might label a sometimes anti-Military leaning academia, which points to the Military’s excellent, eminently laudable record of sustained public trust. It is interesting that those scholars dedicating themselves to advancing knowledge on more empirical bases, so readily place what can only be called hope in what would seem a different ontological premise – either the infallibility of man or a divine Providence undergirding American exceptionalism from the rest of human historical experience. Caveat emptor!
Relationships. There is a need for reform in these national security strategy-making institutions to improve the coherence of, and improve the success of, the United States’ grand strategic ventures, and not just to avoid unduly testing the Military’s professionalism. But before discussing the charter for a second Goldwater-Nichols reform, this dissertation needs to elucidate the post-Cold War evolution in national security strategy-making institutions and the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

Joint Planning, Programming, Budgeting System

The backbone of the Military’s strategic planning for nearly six decades has been a Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara innovation sponsoring Charles J. Hitch’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS). In March 1961, McNamara had issued a list of 96 problems, nicknamed his “96 trombones,” across the DOD needing reform or updating; one of those systems was the better integration of military and civilian budgeting processes (Poole, 2011, p. 7). The challenge was to pair long-range strategic planning with a two-year Congressional budget cycle. Military planners tended to look further than five years out, especially when considering the acquisition of major weapons platforms, like ships, aircraft, and armored fighting vehicles. The Congressional appropriations process had a much narrower time horizon – two years. The PPBS has retained much of its original process. The first phase, Planning, consists of estimating requirements, which would then be grouped into programming packages112 after the requirements were confirmed to meet strategic guidance from the SECDEF. Each of the services would then provide its proposed force structure requirements to accomplish the strategic guidance – this is usually referred to as a posture plan. In the Programming phase,

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112 The first ten programming packages were: Strategic Retaliatory Forces; Continental Defense Forces; General Purpose Forces; Airlift and Sealift; Reserve and National Guard Forces; Research and Development; Service-Wide Support; Military Assistance Program; Classified Projects; and Department of Defense (e.g., retired pay, Defense Agencies) (Poole, 2011, p. 7).
the Joint Staff integrates the services’ posture plans with the programming packages. Both of
these longer term planning and programming processes, now considered the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP, pronounced “Figh-Dip”),\(^{113}\) are analyzed and, in McNamara’s time,
were called Draft Presidential Memorandums (DPMs) describing and justifying the force levels
and funding in each program package. When the Budget phase is complete, the SECDEF sends
it to the President for approval and inclusion in the President’s budget. When the Defense budget
is submitted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made a “blood statement” affirming the budget would
increase combat effectiveness and satisfy national security needs. The FYDP provided the
justification for sustaining programs longer than two years by allowing planners and budgeteers
to project out five years (Poole, 2011, pp. 7-9).

The principal document containing the strategic guidance on requirements the services
and programs needed to address was the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP, pronounced
“Jay-Scap”). The JSCP is a Top Secret classified document providing general guidance to
Commanders of unified and specified commands about what they were required to do within the
next two years. The Joint Strategic Operations Plan (JSOP, pronounced “Jay-Sop”) provided
mid-range strategic planning guidance for fiscal years five to eight ahead (JSOP-67, approved in
1962, provided guidance for 1967 through 1969). Lastly, the Joint Long-Range Strategic Study
(JLRSS) provided planning guidance for 8 to 12 years ahead, which would influence research
and development programs (Poole, 2015, pp. 12-16). The JSOP was the principal document in
which the services would make their competing demands for major weapons systems and

\(^{113}\) Over the past six decades, some terms and acronyms involved in the PPBS system have changed. For example,
the FYDP is sometimes referred to as “Five Year”; some of the documents have sometimes changed names. The
PPBS is now known as the PPBES, adding “Execution” to the phases. Overall, in a general sense, this process has
undergone refinement, but remains an enduring, fundamental process driving the Department of Defense’s strategic
planning and implementation.
platforms, just before the strategic guidance enters the FYDP and PPBS. As the PPBS was implemented at the start of President Kennedy’s administration, key military leaders like Generals Curtis LeMay and Maxwell Taylor, voiced concerns about how the PPBS process driven by McNamara’s “whiz kids” could suborn military judgment and advice (Poole, 2011, pp. 9-11). Over time, the PPBS process has evolved, but sustained this general character; for example, one of the early changes was to have Unified and Specified Commanders start submitting their own estimates of requirements and justifications into the Planning phase (Poole, 2011, p. 12).

No other part of the Government had such a robust strategic planning process nor as many planners trained in the intricacies of a PPBS-like process. The Military was able to leverage the military education system to include courses of instruction on the PPBS for all future staff officers. However, in reality, the PPBS was so detail-intensive, with meetings at multiple levels for multiple time horizons, officers would usually only gain an understanding of the PPBS if their actual assigned duties required it.

The only other government agency to attempt to match the strategic guidance preparation of DoD was the State Department.114 Even the NSC gave up on redrafting a formal Basic National Security Policy. The State Department produced country and regional plans that were seemingly given short shrift at the White House. State’s Strategic Policy Planning Staff

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114 This assertion warrants further research. Other Executive Branch departments besides State and Defense participate in NSC-level discussions – notably, Treasury, Justice, Energy, and Commerce, and, since 2002, Homeland Security. The strategic planning capabilities of these agencies likely improved in relation to Congressional requirements for strategic planning by executive agencies under their purview, in support of strategic plans requiring interagency coordination, and especially since the post-9/11 era of extended conflict against violent extremist organizations.
attempted to draft National Policy Papers, but these did not gain traction in shaping national grand strategy either (Poole, 2011, pp. 14-15).

*Vietnam and the War Powers Act*

The legacy of the Vietnam War era has a complex impact on American national security considerations, far beyond the scope of this dissertation’s focus on national security strategy-making institutions. Significantly, for the sake of argument, the Vietnam experience may at first be contrarian evidence to the suggestion of increasing autonomy for the strategy-making institutions, because Secretary of Defense McNamara clearly controlled the accessibility of the JCS to the NSC. When McNamara learned of any attempted efforts by the Joint Staff planners to engage with the NSC, he quickly shut it down. After General Maxwell Taylor was designated Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1962, he chose to side with Secretary McNamara and Taylor contributed to undermining the ability of the other Joint Chiefs to provide military advice to the President. However, while the JCS were sidelined by McNamara and Taylor during the buildup to the war’s crisis moments, it was the influence of the national security strategy-making institutions that got the United States into Vietnam in the first place (McMaster, 1997; Poole 2011; Poole 2012).

*The War in Vietnam*

President Eisenhower’s engagements with France over dismantling France’s empire led to the provision of U.S. military assistance, including bombing raids to France. France’s defeat at Dien Bien Phu resulted in a peace agreement dividing Vietnam into a Communist North and an imperial South. Emperor Bao Dai of the South acceded to U.S. pressure to create a nominally more democratic government and named Ngo Dinh Diem as prime minister. Although the United States had 600 troops in South Vietnam when Kennedy became President, by 1963, President
Kennedy had ramped up American commitments to over 16,000 troops. This investment was intended to build up South Vietnam’s ability to resist Communist domination, which was demonized in American strategy-making institutions as a domino theory – if Vietnam fell, then other nations would soon fall under the Communist yoke (Westad, 2017, 314-7; Poole, 2012, p. 251). Some realists like George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and Walter Lippman opposed the war in Vietnam, because they believed it would be overreach (Layne, 2006, p. 203). Walt Rostow justified American policy in Vietnam on the basis of national credibility – the United States could not withdraw from international responsibilities like South Vietnam, leaving them to fall into chaos and violence, to focus on America’s domestic society (Layne, 2006, p. 257 fn17). President Kennedy and President Johnson after him believed the United States, and Democrats specifically, would pay for weakness against Communists in public opinion and the elections process (Ahlberg, 2008, pp. 121-2; Westad, 2017, pp. 318-9). While it is important to note the responsibility for remaining in Vietnam belonged to the American President, it is also clear he was soliciting advice from the JCS (Neustadt & May, 1986, pp. 75-90). The JCS were either blocked by McNamara and CJCS GEN Maxwell Taylor or reconsidered being honest with the President about their concerns. Although initially concerned about getting involved in Vietnam, Taylor bonded with McNamara and together they sought to control JCS access to the President (McMaster, 1997, pp. 13-23, 74-76, 105-6; Poole, 2012, p. vii). The Joint Chiefs earned the moniker the “five silent men” (Lederman, 1999, p. 26). Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson would later describe his decision to not confront the President with his misgivings as a “lapse in moral courage” he would carry to his grave (Singlaub, 1991, p. 279; McMaster, 1997, pp. 81-84; Poole, 2012, pp. 254-56).
The issue of JCS culpability for the strategic failure in Vietnam is masterfully portrayed in former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster’s 1997 Dereliction of Duty. McMaster’s purpose was to determine how and why key decisions were made to more deeply involve the United States into the Vietnam conflict (McMaster, 1997, p. xv). Despite President Kennedy’s lack of trust in military advice, learned from the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco, he bought into the domino theory and authorized expanded U.S. troop buildup in South Vietnam. After Kennedy’s assassination in late 1963, the new President Lyndon Johnson kept McNamara as SECDEF and relied on him for military advice. Although President Johnson sometimes solicited input from the JCS directly, more frequently his primary military advisor was McNamara (McMaster, 1997, pp. 8, 41, 61). The SECDEF aided the President in attempting to deceive Congress and the American People about the true cost and trajectory of the Vietnam War (McMaster, 1997, pp. 54, 325-26, 330-31).

The Joint Chiefs faced a situation in 1966, which gave them an opportunity to reveal to Congress their Vietnam War reservations. In December 1965, the Joint Chiefs had informed McNamara they were concerned the FY67 budget request was “inadequate” to support global operations, including the escalating conflict in South Vietnam. The JCS had conducted the SIGMA I and II wargames in late 1964, in which the RAND Corporation defense industry thinktank had tested the Operational Plan (OPLAN) 37-64 graduated bombing campaign to apply psychological pressure against North Vietnam, also called the “Rostow Thesis.” The SIGMA

115 “The first thing I’m going to tell my successor is to watch the generals, and to avoid feeling that just because they were military men, their opinions on military matters were worth a damn.” According to former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Kennedy told him he had concluded that he was too unfamiliar with Pentagon processes, and too deferential to the CIA and the military chiefs. JFK said he had previously felt “the military and intelligence people have some secret skill not available to ordinary mortals” (Dallek, 2013).

116 Named after the State Department civilian advisor Walt Rostow, who would eventually become President Johnson’s National Security Advisor.
wargames prophetically predicted eventual U.S. strategic failure, but McNamara blocked the results from being briefed to the President. The JCS had requested mobilization of additional resources to prosecute military operations in Vietnam in the budget cycle in early 1965, but their request was not included in the FY67 budget, because McNamara privileged the analysis of his own “Whiz kids” over the JCS’ information derived from intelligence reports received from American assets in South Vietnam (McMaster, 1997, pp. 58-59, 62, 89-91, 156-63; Lederman, 1999, p. 27; Poole, 2012, pp. 251-55). After McNamara secured supplemental funding, the JCS still did not think the amount adequate, however, they were willing to agree the increase would meet near-term vital security interests; but they believed it was still not sufficient to address any contingencies and was greatly increasing the strategic risk for failure in Vietnam. However, in Congressional testimony on the Budget both in 1966, and for the FY68 budget the following year, JCS representatives did not vocalize the same concerns to Congress they expressed to the Secretary of Defense. The JCS expressed their reservations to Congress only within the constraints imposed on them by the civilian Secretary of Defense. The JCS told Congress they disagreed with the bombing campaign against Vietnam and the role of McNamara’s systems analyst “whiz kids,” but they equivocated in their testimony about how concerned they were (Poole, 2012, pp. 254-56).

After the increase in American casualties suffered in the 1968 Tet Offensive, public protests and anti-war demonstrations in the United States increased, reflecting the loss of confidence in the Military’s leadership. President Johnson also elected not to attempt another Presidential term, leading to a Republican President after Richard Nixon’s electoral victory. The combination of loss of military prestige and President Nixon’s strong National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, meant the JCS did not recover much influence on Presidential decision-making.
although they did regain access to the President on occasion. President Nixon and Kissinger rejected military advice more often than they accepted it (Poole, 2013, pp. 251-52). There were even rumors the CJCS had to set up a spy system in the NSC to ensure DOD was kept informed about ongoing national policy efforts, because they were so often left out of key decision-making processes (Poole, 2015, pp. 2-4). Another indicator of how the JCS was sidelined on key issues was the Military was not involved in Nixon’s outreach to the People’s Republic of China (Poole, 2012, p. 251).

In line with campaign promises, President Nixon and Kissinger pursued peace negotiations with Vietnam, eventually leading to an agreement to withdraw U.S. forces from Vietnam. President Nixon resigned, due to the Watergate scandal, before all U.S. forces left Vietnam. The Watergate scandal added to the JCS woes in terms of its influence on decision-makers and Congress. As anecdotal evidence, when CJCS ADM Moorer phoned Senator William Scott (R, VA) in September 1973 to ask the Senator to vote against a bill requiring large American troop withdrawals from overseas, the Senator responded:

“When I vote I don’t just… shoot from the hip… I wrote the President four years ago suggesting that there be a troop reduction—and I have yet to receive the courtesy of a reply… I represent five million people… How many people voted for you to become an Admiral? As a matter of fact, I resent calls like this. . . I know what I am doing, Admiral, and I hope you know your job as well!” (Poole, 2015, p. 3).

Despite President Nixon’s efforts to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War, his decision to bomb Laos and expand the war into Cambodia aroused considerable controversy (Fisher, 2013, pp. 139-144). Even the President’s decision to end the draft in 1972 and shift to an All Volunteer

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117 The scandal generated a media circus which kept the CJCS decisively engaged for over a month. Despite denials and the public support of Kissinger himself, ADM Moorer had to repeatedly deny the spy ring rumors. The rumors resurfaced in the Watergate hearings, but were then finally put to rest.
Force in 1973 did not lessen the growing demand for Congress to do more to correct the perception the Government had failed the nation with regards to national security in Vietnam. Congress decided the experience of the war in southeast Asia demanded Congress should assert itself to curtail the President’s warmaking powers.

The War Powers Act of 1973

The War Powers Act (frequently called the War Powers Resolution) was the product of decades of debate and academic investigation, manifested at the height of a very unpopular war (Fisher, 2013). Even though the House of Representatives began hearings on submitted bills in 1970, it would take over three years to get the War Powers Act passed by Congress, including overriding President Nixon’s use of the veto. The House and Senate were not agreed on the scope and requirements the law would require of the President. The House attempted to apply procedural safeguards to the President’s use of the power, requiring consultation, reporting and formal expressions of intent if deadlines were violated. The Senate wanted to try to identify conditions under which the President could use force and to require the President to withdraw forces within 30 days if Congress did not specifically grant its approval. In conference, the provisions were blended into the War Powers Act of 1973. Although it is likely the Congressional support to override President Nixon’s veto was a product of partisanship and political environment in 1973 (Watergate scandal among other issues), other Congressional attempts to modify the War Powers Act in 1983, 1995, and 2014 failed (Fisher, 2013, pp. 150-51; Haas, 2017), indicating an enduring sense of purposeful intent to the War Powers Act, even if Congress and the President have subsequently, and substantively, given only lip service to its provisions.
It is important to note, what many scholars have already pointed out, rather than restricting the President’s war making powers, the War Powers Act actually ensconced in law a measure of Executive freedom of action to utilize military force, which arguably contradicts the Founders’ intent (Fisher, 2013, p. 144). Part of this argument reflects the historical record. In over 230 years of Constitutional government, Congress has declared war only 11 times in five separate wars (Haas, 2017, pp. 240-41; CRS, 2018). A declared state of war, or federally-recognized hostilities, has numerous legal consequences for determination of veterans’ benefits, of course, but also across the breadth of government activity from reserved military purpose for facilities, to taxes, to agricultural products, immigration, espionage, criminal standards under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and hundreds of other provisions (Elsea & Weed, 2014).

Since the passage of the War Powers Act of 1973, Presidents have submitted 168 reports, but only President Ford cited Section 4(a)(1), which triggered the 60-day withdrawal requirement, during his response to the 1975 Mayaguez seizure. Although the military action was completed prior to the 60-day deadline, the President’s compliance with the War Powers Resolution was still challenged by critics. President Ford maintained he had consulted with Congress by informing them prior to the operation, but some believe the consultation requirement is not met by simple notification (Bolger, 1988, pp. 19-98; CRS, 2019, p. 10). Presidential compliance with the War Powers Resolution has been controversial. This attempted legislative check on Presidential power has not effectively limited the President’s use of the Military. Indeed, the War Powers Act may have had the unintended consequence of increasing the militarization of U.S. foreign policy by providing formal guidelines condoning the

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118 Congress declared war against the United Kingdom in 1812 (War of 1812), against Mexico in 1846 (War with Mexico), against Spain in 1898 (War with Spain), against Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1917 (WWI), and against Japan, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania (WWII) (Haas, 2017, pp. 240-1).
President’s accelerated authorization to utilize military force whenever the President deems necessary, ambiguous consultation requirements notwithstanding.

As far as enforcing the War Powers Act, the Congress has been decidedly reticent to withdraw financial support to the Military when it is in a harm’s way (Clark, 2001, p. 180). Congress perceives the People would vehemently oppose an action seen as backstabbing the troops, and it would have a decidedly negative effect on re-election prospects. In effect, the War Powers Act leaves to the President the burden of reducing the Military’s role in foreign policy, it is not an effective Congressional check on the Executive. However, when Presidents have attempted to reduce the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, most notably President Carter, circumstances in the international environment and the domestic political situation have blocked the efforts.

The Carter Administration

President Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski dismantled Kissinger’s NSC committee structure and simplified the NSC into a Special Coordination Committee (SCC) (led by Brzezinski) and a Policy Review Committee (PRC) headed by the Secretary of State. The significant departure from prior procedures fortified the President’s prerogative to organize the NSC in a way which suits his strategic objectives and leadership style. Each President has reorganized the NSC as an early decision in their administration. President Carter, however, attended few NSC meetings (less than one a month). Planners at the JCS encountered new procedures in President Carter’s NSC that they felt worked against them in obtaining a fair hearing for their views. NSC procedures did not allow for much dissent or opposing analysis prior to formal NSC decision-making at the PRC/SCC level. After repeated experiences of not being allowed to provide timely input due to NSC procedures, the Joint Chiefs
complained to the SECDEF in May 1977, but the SECDEF refused to forward their complaint (Rearden, 2015, pp. 6-7).

Following a trend initiated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the early 1970s, the JCS made adjustments to the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). During the Carter administration, the Secretary of Defense Harold Brown launched the most change to the JSPS since the 1950s. The biennial JSCP remained the same, providing short-range planning guidance, assigning tasks and allocating forces to the unified and specified commands. In support of longer range planning guidance the JCS directed the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) to look out seven years and to provide a risk assessment of the composite Services’ budget submission in a Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM). Secretary Brown also directed the CJCS to lead a Defense Resources Board (DRB) to increase the JCS influence over the budget process. In October 1977, Congress approved the addition of an Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), effectively the number two influential position in the DoD (Rearden, 2015, pp. 10-12, 246-47).

Although President Carter\textsuperscript{119} attempted to reduce the role of the Military in foreign policy, two major crises near the end of his first term hindered his ability to do so. The first situation was the 1979 Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis. In January, radicalized students under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini overthrew the Shah and later that year, in November, they occupied the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, seizing 52 hostages. The hostage crisis dragged on throughout the 1980 election year, seriously undermining President Carter’s re-election bid.

\textsuperscript{119} Carter was a 1946 graduate of the US Naval Academy, and served seven years as a nuclear submarine officer. President Carter downplayed his military background and declined to surround himself with “service buddies.” In fact, few on President Carter’s staff had seen military service, and there were some who had been active in the anti-war movement of the 1960s (Rearden, 2015, p. 2).
Eventually, President Carter was persuaded to attempt a rescue operation in April 1980, Operation EAGLE CLAW, in which newly formed special operations forces conducted a long-distance helicopter raid into Iran. The operation failed catastrophically due to weather complicating refueling operations and causing a fiery aircraft collision at Desert One, a remote desert site inside Iran (Bolger, 1988, pp. 99-168; Lederman, 1999, p. 30; Rearden, 2015, p. vii). The incident provoked efforts to better organize United States special operations forces, and the President authorized the formation of the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA) as a major operational decision, which normally would have required Congressional approval. However, the JCS recommended JSOA’s establishment as a purely military function supported within the Military’s responsibilities and budget appropriations for such forces. In hindsight, from the perspective of how the Congress in the 21st century has monitored and investigated U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), JSOA was an expansive use of JCS’s authority.

The second crisis was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The two events occurring so close together exacerbated perceptions of the weaknesses in President Carter’s national security leadership. For the JCS, the strategic situation validated a recognition of the requirement to have contingency plans for military responses to the strategically important Middle East, which had been identified in a 1978 JCS led strategic review of the Middle East. The Military might be called on to evacuate American citizens, protect access to oil fields, or respond to international conflict in the region (Rearden, 2015, pp. 21-23). The JCS had already determined the need for a corps-sized Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) supported by naval and air forces and able to sustain operations without relying on Europe-based logistical support, which was retained in the event of a higher-priority European conflict (Rearden, 2015, p. 26).
By June 1979, after a five month focused planning effort, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), with JCS planning support and the CJCS’s personal attention, developed OPLAN 4230.\(^\text{120}\) Although OPLAN 4230 was never formally approved, despite being briefed to the President in August 1979, it was an important evolution in being the first contingency OPLAN devised under JCS supervision and it was a standard setter for its mission statement, assumptions, and conditions for execution (Rearden, 2015, p. 29). To military planners, OPLAN 4230 clearly demonstrated the geo-strategic importance of the mission and they recognized that the Service which was given the lead for the OPLAN would be able to garner large additional resources justified by the responsibility to execute the contingency – especially, either the Army or the Marine Corps.

Interestingly, in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) in effect at the time, the land area of the Middle East and North Africa was assigned to USEUCOM, and the water areas of the Indian Ocean belonged to U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). The Persian Gulf was a divided responsibility, what later became known as a “cross-Combatant Command (COCOM) seam issue.” However, the JCS did not resolve the command and control differences of opinion between the services, so the plan was not evolved to a higher degree of detailed fidelity (Rearden, 2015, pp. 29-30). As a first step, the JCS directed the RDF to establish a headquarters at MacDill AFB in Tampa, Florida (Rearden, 2015, p. 31). The next step was to begin negotiating the access and basing rights in the Middle East to support the potential contingency plan (Rearden, 2015, p. 34). However, despite the Iranian hostage crisis, Soviet invasion of

\(^{120}\) OPLAN 4230 included a 20-day preparatory phase to deploy up to 7,000 troops (an airborne brigade task force and two tactical fighter squadrons, with headquarters). It included the concept to put ~1000 airborne troops on the ground within 72 hours. The plan assumed a Saudi government invitation and National Command Authority direction through the JCS. The objective was to make a “show of force” to protect the oil fields and other critical sites against any threats short of a Soviet invasion.
Afghanistan, and the evolution in regional war plans, the JCS influence in the Carter Administration was always much less than critics believed (Rearden, 2015, pp. 90, 138, 152-3).

Just as President Nixon had left the JCS out of his China strategic planning, President Carter was not inclusive of JCS input in his efforts to initiate SALT with the Soviet Union to restrict nuclear weapons. Instead Carter relied on State Department and NSC leaders to develop proposals and restart negotiations. The State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) believed the best way to prepare for negotiations with the Soviets was to exclude the Pentagon from the planning. The JCS was reluctantly willing to accept negotiated reductions in nuclear arms, but only as long as nuclear arsenal modernization and upgrade efforts could continue (Rearden, 2015, pp. 203-212). The JCS eventually testified in Congress in support of President Carter’s SALT II treaty, but stressed the need for boosted defense spending. The JCS indicated how hard it would be to support monitoring the Soviet arsenal given the loss of the strategic access to Iran. The JCS calls for increased spending on both nuclear and conventional forces in their Congressional testimony resonated with many Congressmen, and critics of SALT. President Carter did not understand the military logic behind demanding the building of new nuclear weapons to gain the JCS support for reducing nuclear weapons; eventually, the President had to give up on concluding SALT II (Rearden, 2015, pp. 220-25, 280).

President Carter accepted JCS advice only sparingly. The high point of JCS interaction with the President was in gaining his approval for Operation EAGLE CLAW. After its failure, President Carter did not give in to temptations to blame the Military. Unlike JFK’s castigation of military leaders after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, President Carter accepted the responsibility for his decision, even though he had had misgivings about approving the raid. Undoubtedly, this
behavior was likely related to President Carter’s intimate understanding of military professionalism based on his own military service (Rearden, 2015, p. 278).

*Goldwater-Nichols Act – Evolution in Joint Doctrine*

President Reagan’s election in 1980 presaged a massive defense buildup in line with his strategy of challenging the Soviet Union. President Reagan would push aggressively, employing the military frequently in efforts to rollback Soviet influence, either by supporting proxy forces like the mujahedin in Afghanistan, or by sending advisors to assist in foreign internal defense missions in Latin America, and deploying to peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions like Lebanon. However, just after Reagan’s election, the implications of Reagan’s military buildup gave the CJCS significant concerns. Air Force General David Jones had been CJCS since 1978, and before that he had served as the Air Force Chief of Staff. By 1981 he had nearly 7 years serving as a four-star general of the JCS. One of the issues which concerned General Jones the most was the quality of military advice. He was concerned because over 99% of all JCS documents were unanimously supported by the senior generals, which meant they had reached the lowest common denominator that all the Services could agree upon. The reason the JCS would agree to compromise was to avoid having a civilian arbitrate the substantial differences in some Service views and budget demands based on their projective for requirements in future conflicts (Lederman, 1999, p. 36). General Jones well understood there were deep interservice rivalries and competition for defense spending resources and the Services did not agree as much as published or formally staffed documents would indicate. Additionally, General

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121 Lederman provided a statistic listing the number of JCS documents “between October 1955 and March 1959” at 2799, and that on only 23 documents were there a “split decision” indicating lack of consensus among the Joint Chiefs. The use of a period of months in the source from the late 1950s, tied to General Jones’ claim of 99% unanimity, makes me believe the dates in the text may be a typographic error and “between October 1975 to March 1979,” seems a more reasonable citation.
Jones explained one aspect of the problem was the reasonable need for evolutionary steps to improve upon Joint concepts which had not changed fundamentally in 35 years from a system which in effect represented “arrangements developed in a patchwork way” during WWII (Jones, 1982, p. 140). General Jones’ claim of little fundamental evolution in 35 years requires a closer examination.

Post WWII Evolution in the Joint Staff

Each of the Services were dogmatic in their assertions that their role in war, based on claims staked upon WWII accomplishments, was the deciding element in accomplishing America’s strategic objectives (Lederman, 1999, p. 8). After WWII, the advent of the Cold War with its emphasis on the European theater fundamentally challenged the strategic concept for the roles of the Military in providing for the United States’ common defense. For the first time in history the U.S. Military identified a distant land theater as the strategic planning priority. However, interservice rivalries and the expectation of reduced defense spending exacerbated debates over future force structure. This debate hampered the ability of the Services to agree on fundamental concepts included in strategic war plans. When the JCS Deputy Director for Strategic Plans completed the first “emergency war plan” after the National Security Act of 1947 established the new structure of the DOD, he noted to the Director of the Joint Staff that joint concurrence with the plan was only predicated on using the forces in existence in July 1948. The intention for such strategic plans is to identify force requirements necessary to deal with future contingencies, the Services then justify their requests for force authorizations and budget appropriations on the basis of needing to support such strategic plans. In this case:

“there are therefore no questions concerning justification for the forces. It is for this reason and this reason only that we are able to submit this Plan without a split…We still have great difficulty putting out plans involving
requirements for forces in the future which may establish the size and composition of the respective Services” (Condit, 1996, p. 87).

For the Navy, this required a major adjustment from its prior planning focus on the threat of Japan in the Pacific, a clearly naval rival and arena. The Navy did not want to have its principal strategic role defined as convoy escorts for Army forces mobilizing and shipping off to Europe. This strategic dilemma was consequential for the Navy, because it impacted what type of warships would be the focus of its acquisition efforts – cruisers and destroyers to escort transports to Europe or aircraft carriers and submarines to globally project offensive naval power. The Navy’s admirals wanted aircraft carriers, and they needed to ensure the establishment of the Air Force and the merger of Congressional committees responsible for reviewing defense spending did not undermine the Navy’s justifications to build aircraft carriers and maintain a naval air force. In addition to the continuing debate on the role of naval air power, the Air Force’s apparent claim to managing the United States’ strategic nuclear weapons also bothered the Navy. The Navy wanted to utilize the aircraft carriers to launch aircraft capable of delivering atomic attacks anywhere in the world and argued it would be many years before strategic bombers were able to accomplish such a mission (Condit, 1996, pp. 89-94).

In March 1948, the Joint Chiefs convened a four-day offsite conference with Secretary of Defense Forrestal in Key West, Florida to discuss the Services’ concerns about their strategic roles and functions. After the conference, Secretary Forrestal forwarded a letter to President Truman on March 27th outlining a request for a new Executive Order to enforce the Key West Agreement. On April 21st, 1948, President Truman issued an EO revoking E.O. 9877 of July 26th, 1947, preserving the Navy’s claim to aircraft carriers and naval air forces. However, the
Key West Agreement included the caveat that the Air Force was responsible for “strategic air warfare.”

This caveat was an important reference to nuclear weapons. Without dictating specifics regarding nuclear weapons, the President’s EO noted there should be “full utilization and exploitation of the weapons, techniques, and intrinsic capabilities of each of the Services in any military situation where this will contribute effectively to the attainment of over-all military objectives,” but this should not warrant additional force requirements (Lederman, 1999, pp. 13-4; JCS 1478, 1948, p. 3). Importantly, the EO acknowledged technological, economic, or geo-strategic considerations might require changes in specific functions and responsibilities for the Services and this discretionary authority was granted to the SECDEF. Based on the President’s EO, the Air Force Chief of Staff General Carl Spaatz requested the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, governing the research and development of nuclear weapons, be transferred to the Air Force, since the Air Force had the role of strategic air warfare.

The Navy objected and a further meeting was necessary, held this time at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island in August 1948. While the Newport Agreement favored the Air Force in terms of the overall responsibility for the nuclear weapons project, the Navy was allowed to plan for and incorporate nuclear weapons and nuclear propulsion considerations into its future force structure. Additionally, the Services agreed to consider each others’ capabilities

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122 Defined in the JCS document as “Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy’s war-making capacity to a point where he no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stock piles, power systems, transportation systems, communications facilities, concentrations of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems (p. 14).
when developing war plans and their separate force requirements, in order to prevent unnecessary overlap in functionality (Condit, 1996, p. 98).

In March 1949, President Truman abruptly asked Secretary Forrestal to resign due to a media scandal regarding Forrestal’s alleged agreement to work in Governor Dewey’s administration had he been victorious against Truman in 1948. Forrestal was replaced by Louis Johnson who, unlike Forrestal, wholeheartedly supported the President’s defense reform efforts. One of the first acts Secretary Johnson took was to cancel the production of the Navy’s super aircraft carrier project the *United States* class. The Navy’s response, later known as the “Revolt of the Admirals” leveraged a special staff directorate in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) called OP-23, Organizational Research and Policy Division, which inherited the Navy’s public information campaign to oppose any unification or centralization efforts in the Military. Future Admiral Arleigh Burke had been newly assigned to OPNAV and placed in charge of OP-23. OP-23 led a public relations campaign to mobilize veterans’ groups and naval enthusiasts to successfully pressure Congress and the President to preserve the Navy’s aircraft carrier projects (Lederman, 1999, p. 18; Rosenberg, 2013; Jones & Kelly, 2014, p.149).

The Navy also succeeded in getting Congressional legislation to enshrine the preservation of the Marine Corps and Marine Corps aviation. In addition to the legal protections provided a three division and three air wing Marine Corps, the U.S. Marine Corps Commandant became an official member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Mansfield-Douglas Act in June 1952 (Lederman, 1996, p. 18). The Navy was likely concerned about the potential election of retired General Eisenhower and the prospect that as President he may attempt to eliminate or dismantle the Marine Corps, which he felt was unnecessary as a large land force.
What President Eisenhower did do was establish the Rockefeller Committee to look into management issues across the government, including the NME. President Eisenhower issued an Executive Order in April 1953 implementing Reorganization Plan No. 6, which Congress decided not to undo via legislation (Lederman, 1999, p. 18). The EO mandated the chain of command proceeded down from the President through the SECDEF and then to the Service Secretaries and finally the uniformed Service Chiefs. The President also gave the CJCS a veto on the selection of Service Chiefs to prevent appointing generals or admirals who were considered too Service parochial and unwilling to compromises on Joint issues. In July 1954, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson made the Service Chiefs primary responsibility their JCS duties. In 1958, President Eisenhower eliminated the Service Chiefs from the operational chain of command, instead assigning command responsibilities to the CINCs of the Unified and Specified Commands. This was a significant change in the overall character of the JCS, and one which advanced the influence of the JCS strategic planners and the oversight of war plans. The JCS was designated as a staff supporting the SECDEF and authorized to issue orders to the CINCs in the name of the SECDEF (Lederman, 1999, pp. 18-22).

At the prompting of Service lobbyists, Congress also examined President Eisenhower’s executive decisions holding extensive hearings, but finally validated and formalized the changes in the 1958 Reorganization Act. Congress increased the size of the JCS to 400 officers. It clearly explained the JCS had not formal executive authority and specified the JCS should not be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff. The hearings revealed the prevailing strategic culture regarding suspicion of a standing, permanent, professional general staff on the Prussian/German model was still very much apparent. Congress gave the Chairman a vote in JCS deliberations among the Service Chiefs and authorized the Chairman to design and
implement function organizations. The military testimony in the hearings indicated the JCS’s desire to move away from the cumbersome committee system that had been formed on an ad hoc basis during WWII. The SECDEF then issued to directives 5100.1 and 5158.1 defining the roles, functions, and procedures of the armed forces, including the Joint Staff’s relations with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The directives also identified the dual chains of command in the Military – one for the separate services to the Service Chief focused on the administrative and logistic responsibilities as force providers to the CINCs; and an operational chain of command, as the President had directed, through the CINCs. SECDEF’s directive 5100.1 also provided guidance on the JCS primary responsibility to develop strategic plans and provide strategic direction for the armed forces. This planning responsibility included the coordination of operations to be conducted by unified and specified commands (Lederman, 1999, pp. 22-23).

As demonstrated above, General Jones’ perception of no fundamental change in the JCS over the course of the 35 years since its founding was not quite accurate. The continuing interservice rivalries requiring adjudication by civilian authorities in the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress masked the gradual accrual of more military autonomy. Defense management concerns and deficiencies during the Cold War led to the convening of several high-level studies: the Symington Study in December 1960, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel report in July 1970, and the Steadman Report in July 1978. Each of these studies recommended steps to improve defense management, which usually involved a degree of centralization or accrual of military influence over policy-making processes that were considered too much against the American strategic culture to be accepted without generating political concerns. Where administrative improvements could be implemented the studies served to provide minor adjustments to overall Department of Defense processes. These studies also usually endorsed or
drove some of the changes in the JSPS described earlier in this chapter (Lederman, 1999, p. 24; Rearden, 2015, p. 13). As will be seen in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, when centralization and expansion of military influence over policy-making processes occurs, this indicates the strategic culture has shifted.

Nifty Nugget, the Beirut bombing, and URGENT FURY

As part of the strategic preparations related to establishing a RDF, DoD conducted exercise Nifty Nugget in 1978 to test the transportation procedures of the Air Force, Army, and Navy. The exercise revealed substantial discrepancies and disconnects in Service plans and procedures to deploy to Europe which were determined to result in catastrophic strategic failure to a war fight in Europe against the Soviets. As a result of the exercise, General Jones created the Joint Deployment Agency in 1979 to be a single manager for deployments. The Joint Deployment Agency had coordination capability but no transportation assets and no command authority (Lederman, 1999, p. 30).

After President Reagan was inaugurated, in March 1981, General Jones set up a 6-man Chairman’s Special Study Group to look into the need for military reforms to support President Reagan’s defense buildup initiatives. Those who believed reform was necessary understood the JCS would not reform itself and that such an effort would need bipartisan support to overcome powerful Service-specific influence in Congress. The new Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was opposed to a military reform effort because he felt it might undermine public confidence and Congressional support for the President’s military buildup (Lederman, 1999, pp. 48-49). Secretary Weinberger referred to Jones as the “holdover Chairman” because the effort to replace him had failed. During the Reagan transition, the incoming defense team leaked an intention to replace General Jones as Chairman because he had supported President Carter’s
defense policies, including eliminating the B-1 strategic bomber program. General Jones was in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, Israel when he received the news and commented, “Where better to be when you’re crucified than in Jerusalem.” Former Secretaries of Defense Harold Brown, James Schlesinger and Senator Barry Goldwater responded publicly and vocally to the media reports about replacing Jones by indicating there was a problem with firing a CJCS who had not been sufficiently insubordinate to a President (Lederman, 1999, pp. 51-3; Locher, 2002, pp. 40-42).

In January 1982, during a routine Congressional hearing about the defense budget, General Jones shocked the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and the Secretary of Defense, who had just finished answering questions about his testimony, by testifying that the JCS organization was inadequate and in serious need of reform (Lederman, 1999, pp. 33, 53). Responding to the HASC chairman Melvin Price’s (D, IL) query for comment, General Jones acknowledged and intent to testify on the budget, then continued:

“However, there is one subject I would like to mention briefly here. It is not sufficient to have just resources, dollars, and weapon systems; we must have an organization which will allow us to develop the proper strategy, necessary planning, and full warfighting capability. ... We do not have an adequate organizational structure today” (Correll, 2011, p. 68).

General Jones also echoed and emphasized President Eisenhower’s sentiment that “when military responsibility is unclear, civilian control is uncertain” (Jones, 1982).

In February 1982, the Chairman’s Special Study Group completed their report, emphasizing the need for a Joint Staff specialization for officers with Joint Staff duty. Their study also recommended strengthening the position of the Chairman and minimizing the role of the Service staffs in Joint Staff planning. Also, the report included anonymous quotes from
numerous generals and admirals from across the Military pointing out problems with the Joint Staff system (Lederman, 1999, p. 52).

In March 1982, General Jones published the article “Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change” in the Armed Forces International Journal; in it, he attributed the JCS problem to both personnel and organization. General Jones advocated the need for professional military education and other personnel policies to ensure joint qualified staff officers were given service on the JCS and rewarded professionally for their service (Lederman, 1999, pp. 33, 51-53). The next month, in April, Army Chief of Staff General Edward “Shy” Meyer also published an article calling for JCS reform; however, he called for replacing the Joint Staff with a National Military Advisory Council made of selected general officers as a final duty assignment before retirement (much like the Symington) (Lederman, 1999, p. 53). General Meyer agreed with the Chairman on the need for improved decision-making and the parochial self-preserving instincts of the Service Chiefs (Lederman, 1999, p. 4; Rearden, 2015, p. 14).

From April to August 1982, the HASC Investigations Subcommittee chair Richard White (D, TX) conducted hearings on JCS reform issues – the hearings were initiated at the instigation of Dr. Archie Barrett, the subcommittee’s professional staffer. Their attention had been attracted by a JCS report about naval petroleum reserves that was not considered very well thought out. The Subcommittee focused on the quality of advice, the dual-hatted roles and problems with the JCS structure (Lederman, 1999, p. 54). Just before the close of the HASC subcommittee hearings, the new CJCS General John Vessey attempted to block further

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123 Dr. Archie Barrett was the HASC investigations subcommittee staffer and well respected by Representatives White and Nichols. Barrett was also a retired Air Force pilot and wrote a paper at National Defense University in 1981 “critical of the undue influence of the individual services on defense decision-making.” At Barrett’s instigation, the HASC investigations subcommittee held the first hearings on defense reorganization and introduced the first legislative proposal (Correll, 2011, p. 70).
discussion of reforms to the JCS by highlighting some minor changes he and Secretary Weinberger had agreed to implement – the most significant removing the statutory limits on the size of the JCS. These changes and some of the subcommittee’s findings, agreeing with Jones’ assessment were passed in a House bill a couple weeks before the close of the legislative session in September. However, Senator John Tower (R, TX), a pro-Navy opponent of increasing unification of the services blocked the legislation from moving forward. In January 1983, General Vessey directed a Management Restructuring Working Group to convene, but they produced no recommendations. In June 1983, Senator Tower directed James Locher III, a committee staffer, to prepare a comprehensive report on defense management. Hearings were held on every area of the DoD, but no results were published that year (Lederman, 1999, pp. 64-65). Until October 1983, little progress was made on advancing the likelihood of JCS reforms.

Grenada

However, on October 14th, the NSC tasked the JCS to evacuate American students from a medical university in the Caribbean island nation of Grenada. Grenada had been becoming increasingly more unstable since a Marxist coup in March 1979 brought Maurice Bishop to power. Bishop invited other Communist nations to send advisors and assistance and by October 1983 there were several detachments of armed advisors from the Soviet Union, Cuba, North

124 James R. Locher III was a graduate of the United States Military Academy and spent ten years as a “whiz kid” systems analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the 1960s. Prior to joining the Senate Armed Services Committee, Locher served in the various positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation. After the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, which he significantly aided, Locher become the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict from October 1989 to 1993. Locher served on the SECDEF's Task Force on Defense Reform and the National Security Study Group of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century. Locher served as an Executive Director of the Project on National Security Reform, an effort to reorganize the U.S. national security system. His book Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon was published in May 2002. He was awarded the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, the department's highest civilian award (Correll, 2011, p. 70; and his bio https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=4095528&privcapId=3642010).
Korea, North Vietnam, Libya, and several Warsaw Pact nations. On October 13th, Bishop’s deputy Bernard Coard conducted a palace coup to remove Bishop and place him under house arrest. The move was unpopular and Grenadians protested. On the 19th, 10,000 to 15,000 Grenadians protested before Bishop’s house, broke him free and installed him in the army headquarters in FT Rupert. Coard rallied an armed group who assaulted Bishop’s supporters and summarily executed Bishop. But then the commander of Grenada’s military Austin Hudson conducted a military coup and proclaimed himself in charge (Bolger, 1988, pp. 261-273).

Hudson’s military coup changed the United States government’s perspective on Grenada and the NSC updated its instruction to the JCS on October 21st, after an official Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) request to the United States, to neutralize Hudson’s military forces and its Communist advisors and restore democracy to the island (Lederman, 1999, pp. 66-67).

The JCS had appropriately assigned the mission in Grenada to the CINC of U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM). USLANTCOM conducted an accelerated planning process devising an invasion approach utilizing a single Marine Amphibious Unit. However, when LANTCOM briefed the JCS, the JCS directed a modification to the plan to have the Army invade the southern part of the island and the Marines the eastern part. Special Operations Forces, Rangers, SEALs, and Delta Force were also added to the mission to perform several tasks deemed critical. The reason for bolstering USLANTCOM’s proposal were the NCS and JCS appreciation of the situational similarity between the medical student hostages in Grenada and the Iranian hostage crisis (Bolger, 1988, pp. 273-351).

The Cuban-trained and paramilitary defenders quickly reacted to the U.S. invasion and fought fiercely. However, by day two of the invasion the fight was essentially over due to overwhelming U.S. military firepower and superior numbers. During execution however, four of
the Navy’s elite SEAL divers drowned swimming to their objective, along with 15 other U.S. fatalities. Numerous communications failures and coordination disconnects marred perceptions about how the Military performed during Operation URGENT FURY. The logistical side of the operation was also tarnished by the Joint Deployment Agency’s coordination failures between transportation elements under separate commands (Lederman, 1999, pp. 65-67).

Beirut Bombing

Early in the morning, on October 23rd, 1983, an Islamic Hezballah Amal suicide truck bomb crashed into a U.S. Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) headquarters building near the Beirut airport. The horrific explosion destroyed the building, killing over 240 American servicemen, mostly Marines. The incident called the entire multinational peacekeeping effort into question, and the U.S. eventually withdrew from Lebanon not many months later. On October 31st, 1983, Marine General P.X. Kelley testified before Congress blaming politicians for the fiasco in Beirut, which only incited poor relationships between the JCS and the Armed Services Committees in Congress. An investigation into the reasons for security failures at the BLT headquarters bombing reflected poorly on the U.S. Military at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Local Marine leaders had become complacent despite the escalating attacks and increasing risks the force was experiencing. Additionally, the local Marine commander failed to balance the political and military requirements of his mission, privileging the State Department guidance to sustain a military presence and keep the Airport open. Strategically, the lack of JCS oversight and awareness of the situation in Lebanon caused speculation about what the proper

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125 The Joint Deployment Agency was forced to coordinated with three separate commands, one in each service -- Military Traffic Management Command (Army), Military Sealift Command (Navy), and Military Airlift Command (Air Force). This rigmarole was required due to Navy Secretary Lehman’s orchestration of September 1982 legislation prohibiting unification of the Military’s transportation assets into a unified command (Lederman, 1999, pp. 66-67).
The Need for JCS Reform

The JCS experiences in 1982 and 1983, challenged by the calls for organizational and personnel reforms by a highly experienced CJCS, as well as suffering embarrassing and tragic consequences in two high visibility operations, highlighted the pressing need for substantial military reforms. Reform advocates pointed to multiple issues, besides the weakness of the CJCS and the dual-hattedness of the Service Chiefs, including:

- The poor quality of military advice given a bureaucratic culture in which the uniformed members felt they had to reach a least common denominator consensus on issues or hand it over to the civilians to decide (Lederman, 1999, p. 41).

- The subservience and lack of capacity of the Joint Staff officers compared to Service headquarters staffs who vastly outnumbered the Joint Staff. Out of a JCS of 1405 in 1983, 1000 of the officers were not actually in official Joint Staff duty positions; 2% of officers in 1982 had prior Joint Staff experience, only 33% had experience on a Service headquarters staff; General Officer assignments generally lasted 24 months, other Joint Staff officers for 30 months; of General Officers on the Joint Staff from 1976 to 1981, 60% had prior Joint Staff service (Lederman, 1999, p. 42).

- The lack of joint education – in 1981, only 13% of JCS officers had attended the 5 month course for joint duty officers at the Armed Forces Staff College; only 25% of O-6s (Colonels and Navy Captains) had graduated from the National War
College or the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; the Navy personnel considered a Joint Staff assignment as a “kiss of death” for a career (Lederman, 1999, p. 43).

- The weaknesses of the CINC in contributing to strategic and operational plans, CINC staffs were excluded from the budget process, which connected resources to strategic guidance, this is because the budget process was biased towards Service inputs (Lederman, 1999, p. 45).

- The role of the Service Secretaries and other OSD civilian appointments.
  Appointees usually lacked experience and were rotated frequently, as well as positions having frequent vacancies (Lederman, 1999, pp. 46-47).

- In the PPBS system, the JPAM was not objectively prioritized, it was simply a composite of the Services’ individual POMs – effectively a wishlist; since, the JPAMs were passed to OSD’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), this meant OSD’s and the Congressional subcommittees would have the dominant influence (Lederman, 1999, pp. 37-38).

The implicit complaint across the spectrum was that organizational and systemic problems were to blame for JCS weaknesses and flaws, not personality-based incompetence. In fact, frequently, the brilliant officers had had to develop workarounds which were inherently ad hoc and unstable (Lederman, 1999, pp. 34-48).

Once JCS initiatives passed over to Congress, the political hurdles intervened to frustrate JCS intentions. Many Congressmen were veterans who were very protective of their particular Service, giving the Services considerable clout on the Congressional committees. Congress historically hesitated to insert itself inside the military business of the Services, and preferred to
sustain relationships which provided them information about executive branch intentions on national security issues. Congress had grown accustomed to the Defense Department’s budgeting process and there was no known viable alternative method; additionally, Congress was able to massage the Defense budget, given the lack of prioritized (programs directly linked to specific strategic priorities) line items. Compounded with Congress’ political and constituent benefits related to sustaining DoD’s decentralized management techniques, was the negative public relations risk of being labeled soft on national defense during the Cold War if a Congressman was too critical of the Defense Department (Lederman, 1999, pp. 48, 61).

Against all these complaints, there were notable opponents to conducting reform, especially the SECDEF who believed a reform effort was more likely to undermine than help President Reagan’s military buildup (Lederman, 1999, p. 34). The Navy, true to its long-standing resistance to the unification efforts sided with the opponents of reform (Lederman, 1999, p. 57). In 1984, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army (General John Wickham, Jr) and the Air Force (General Charles Gabriel) jointly released an AirLand Battle doctrine identifying 31 initiatives each Service was going to pursue to improve the combat readiness and battlefield cooperation (incorporating many lessons from Grenada and numerous Army and Air Force training exercises since the end of the Vietnam War). The AirLand Battle doctrine was an important supporting argument put forward by the opponents of JCS reform – they pointed to the successful ability of interservice cooperation, as though it obscured all other complaints the JCS leveraged (Lederman, 1999, p. 69).

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986

Representative William Flynt “Bill” Nichols (D, AL) drafted H.R.3718 and attached it as a rider to the FY85 Defense Authorization Bill H.R. 5167, which was passed by Congress in
September 1984 and signed by President Reagan in October. The law provided increased authorities to the Chairman, in line with some of the suggestions SECDEF Weinberger and General Vessey had offered as a means of diverting reform attention. This new law allowed the CJCS to act as a spokesman for operational requests from the CINC’s, to set the JCS agenda, and increased the CJCS’s ability to influence the assignment of Joint Staff officers. The tour of duty was extended to 3 or 4 year assignments. Finally, the law required the Department of Defense to conduct a poll by March 1st, 1985 of senior defense officials regarding necessary changes in JCS strategic requirements and processes (Lederman, 1999, p. 68).

The next significant developments in the ramp-up to the legislative process for the Goldwater-Nichols Act were the contributions by influential beltway thinktanks the Heritage Foundation in late 1984 with a manifesto on defense management reform and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), who established the Defense Organization Project and published a report in February 1985. The CSIS report recommended sweeping changes in the DOD and was endorsed by six previous Secretaries of Defense (Robert McNamara, Clark Clifford, Melvin Laird, Elliot Richardson, James Schlesinger, and Harold Brown), William Cohen (R, ME and future SECDEF), Leon Panetta (D, MI and future SECDEF), Les Aspin (D, WI and future SECDEF), Sam Nunn (R, GA), Nancy Kassebaum (R, KS), Newt Gingrich (R, GA) and notably the political scientists Samuel Huntington, Edward Luttwak, and Vincent Davis126 (Lederman, 1999, pp. 68-69; Correll, 2011, p. 70).

126 Vincent Davis taught at the University of Kentucky and headed up the Patterson School of International Diplomacy and Commerce. Davis and Huntington teamed up to run two pro-reform conferences in 1983, one hosted at Harvard and the other in Kentucky. Davis was a naval reservist and carrier aircraft pilot who retired as a Navy Captain; he authored two books on the post-WWII Navy (Locher, 2002, p. 176).
Another important development for the success of the pro-reform effort was the retirement of pro-Navy, anti-reform stalwart Senator Tower from the SASC. Senator Barry Goldwater succeeded Tower and soon thereafter, he and the minority leader Sam Nunn formed a bipartisan group on military reform. In the House, Representatives Skelton, Nichols and Aspin submitted four bills on military reform. Throughout the spring and summer of 1985, Locher, Barrett and other staffers for the SASC and HASC met with several military members on the Joint Staff, including two and three star generals in an effort to circumvent the SECDEF’s anti-reform opposition. They even approached President Reagan’s APNSA Bud McFarlane, who was also pro-reform, and asked him to intercede with Secretary Weinberger and convince him to support defense reform. Instead, McFarlane approached the President about leveraging the David Packard Commission on Government Management to also investigate the Department of Defense. McFarlane couched the suggestion to the President as a move to build support for increasing defense spending (Lederman, 1999, p. 70).

In October 1985, Senators Goldwater and Nunn hosted a weekend retreat at FT A.P. Hill in Virginia for SASC members to meet with pro-reform advocates retired Generals Jones and Meyer, Admiral (ret.) Harry Train and General (ret.) Paul Gorman (former CINC USSOUTHCOM). Gorman relayed to the group how the Army had interfered with the Congressionally-approved military advisors Gorman had requested be sent to El Salvador. Of the 55 authorized advisors, the Army had insisted two of them be converted to administrative personnel; Gorman’s appeals to the JCS to support him fell on deaf ears. Gorman also relayed to the committee members that his Air Force component commander had had to take extended leave of absence for chemotherapy and that the Air Force refused to replace him as Commander because it would hurt the officer’s morale (Lederman, 1999, pp. 70-71). The weekend retreat
was an impressive event which helped solidify the efforts and inform the committee of the benefits of military reform (Locher, 2002, p. 354).

Also in October 1985, the SASC released Locher’s 645 page report *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*. As a deliberate tactic the report intended to bludgeon the opposition both with a barrage of facts and issues, as well as outmaneuver anti-reformists with 91 recommendations, some extreme enough to distract the Services from the more consequential reform suggestions to be incorporated in the legislation. Some of the “bullet traps” were increasing the rank of the CINCs over the Service Chiefs, removing Service component commanders in the unified commands from the operational chain of command, reducing the number of Service staff allowed to work Joint issues to 25 officers, and merging the Service military and secretariat staffs to reduce overhead (Lederman, 1999, pp. 71-72; Locher, 2002, pp. 329-31; Correll, 2011, p. 71). The bullet traps were certain to be extremely inflammatory to the Service Chiefs who would feel forced to defend their own headquarters rather than attempting to refute arguments the report was making about the JCS. The strategy was wholeheartedly supported by Senator Nunn who acknowledged the benefit of letting Locher take the brunt of the attacks the Services would launch at his report. Senators Goldwater and Nunn deliberately chose to release Locher’s report as a staff report, so that it only required the Chairman’s approval and it also gave the two Senators the flexibility to negotiate away any aspect of the report in order to advance the reform agenda (Locher, 2002, p. 329).

Yet another significant event in October 1985 was the new CJCS Admiral William Crowe’s SASC testimony. Admiral Crowe criticized Locher’s staff report for downplaying the successes the Joint Staff had achieved and not acknowledging the recent changes in enhancing the CJCS position from recent legislation. Admiral Crow was a conciliator by nature and when
he was CINC, USPACOM, he had been in favor of strengthening the Joint Staff system. In his current position, he supported enhancing the role of a Vice-CJCS. After his Senate testimony, Admiral Crowe tried to persuade Secretary Weinberger to send their legal counsel Navy Captain Rick Debobes to discuss legislative drafts with James Locher. Although Weinberger remained unconvinced, Debobes did participate in reviewing legislative drafts on what was at the time a “close hold” basis, meaning very few people were aware of it (Lederman, 1999, p. 72; Locher, 2002, pp. 7, 427).

The SASC started hearings on defense reform after the Locher staff report had been released. The first to testify was James Locher about his own report. The Secretary of Defense “Cap” Weinberger followed on November 14th, 1985 (Locher, 2002, pp. 376-78). Senator Nunn pitted reform opponents against each other; he asked the Secretary to explain a remark by noted reform opponent Navy Secretary Lehman “The Pentagon could be run at twenty-percent savings if we could get rid of those 6,000 bureaucrats in OSD who are accountable essentially to nobody.” Senator Nunn asked the Secretary if those 6,000 bureaucrats were under his control. Secretary Weinberger replied, “The 6,000 have never been identified to me by name or function; I think there is a bit of hyperbole there.” Senator Warner, a former Navy secretary himself, interjected, that “he would have been beheaded” if he had made such comments when he was in the Pentagon. Secretary Weinberger retorted, “Occasionally you have to take executory measures, but we try to limit them.” The Defense Secretary’s unflappable manner and calm, lawyer-like responses frustrated the committee. At the end of the hearing, Senator Goldwater let Secretary Weinberger know how he felt, “Mr. Secretary, I have to be honest with you, you did not answer the questions, you have not approached this thing right. I think you had better go back and read this report of ours. We are going to get you back again. We want your answers.”
When Secretary Weinberger said he would be glad to return again, Senator Goldwater slammed the gavel down to end the hearing and ordering Weinberger to “Read it again” (Locher, 2002, pp. 377-78).

After the hearings concluded, the SASC scheduled markup on the bill for February 4\(^{th}\), 1986. On February 3\(^{rd}\), Senators Goldwater and Nunn, Locher and a couple SASC staffers met with Admiral Crowe and the Joint Chiefs, who were all opposed to the legislation. The meeting did not go well and Goldwater took the Chiefs opposition personally and he “roared” saying, “If you think you can bully Sam and me, you are mistaken!” (Correll, 2011, p. 71). The next morning the SASC received nine letters from the Pentagon senior leaders, seven opposed and only Admiral Crowe’s in favor and Secretary Weinberger’s just less critical than the other seven (Lederman, 1999, pp. 73-74). During the markup session, Senator Warner (R, VA) indicated that Secretary of Navy Lehman had promised naval ports or bases to 5 re-election risk Senators. Senator Warner then offered 87 written and 40 oral amendments to the bill, some believed he may even have had an open line to the Department of the Navy during the markup session given the specificity of the oral amendments. Most of the amendments were rejected (Lederman, 1999, pp. 73-74; Correll, 2011, p. 71).

The Packard Commission published its interim report on February 28\(^{th}\), 1986. There had been some intercommunication between the SASC and the Packard Commission, especially after the Packard Commission’s deliberations in January revealed a pro-reform report would be forthcoming. One of the key issues the SASC attempted to convince the Packard Commission to endorse was giving the CJCS a true deputy, the Vice-Chairman. The primary significance of the Packard Commission’s report was to undermine the anti-reformists (Locher, 2002, pp. 394-98). In March 1986, the SASC passed the bill unanimously over the objections from the Pentagon.
Some media reports decried the SASC’s action as violating American civil-military traditions and establishing a unified general staff. They also tried to shame the SASC by claiming this bill represented a “victory for McNamara’s whiz kids, the super bureaucrats, against the uniformed professional military” (Correll, 2011, p. 71). This was one of the few times the media had an impact on the Goldwater-Nichols deliberations. For the most part, the media ignored the monumental bureaucratic debate. The headlines were dominated by Mikhail Gorbachev’s succession to lead the Soviet Union, several terrorist incidents like the Achille Lauro, the Unabomber, and perhaps a Colombian volcano which killed 25,000 people. More likely, the reason was that the details of the intra-military debate were not clearly understood by journalists – the subject was too esoteric and its implications not readily discernible to those not steeped in interservice rivalry and defense budgetary and personnel management systems.

Senator Goldwater would credit the media’s absence from the process as a key facilitating factor in the successful passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Media attention might have mobilized the veterans’ interest groups to come out in support of their chosen Service (Lederman, 1999, p. 76).

President Reagan in a radio address on April 5th, urged Congress to approve the reorganization legislation, citing the results of the Packard Commission and that the President believed reform would curb waste, abuse and inefficiency in the Pentagon. The Senate passed the DOD Reorganization Act 95 to 3 on May 7th, 1986. The House passed Representative Nichols version 406 to 4. The House bill went further than the Senate’s by proposing the merging of the civilian and military staffs of each Service into a single staff, enhancing the command authorities of the CINCs, and establishing a Joint Staff Officer specialty identifier in the Military’s
personnel management systems. The differences required Congressional Conference Committee to work out the final bill’s language (Lederman, 1999, pp. 74-75; Correll, 2011, p. 71).

In a meeting about the upcoming conference committee between the JCS and the HASC, the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Watkins was so upset that he called Nichols’ bill “un-American.” Representative Nichols, who had lost a leg in WWII, got up and walked out of the meeting (Lederman, 1999, p. 75). The Conference committee began on August 13th and ended on September 12th. The Senate passed the revised bill on September 16th and the House on September 17th. President Reagan signed the Goldwater-Nichols Act into law on October 1st, 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986; Lederman, 1999, p. 76).

Senator Barry Goldwater commented the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was “the only goddamn thing I’ve done in the Senate that’s worth a damn” (Lederman, 1999, p. 84; Correll, 2011, p. 71). HASC Chairman Les Aspin labeled the Act “one of the landmark laws of American history” and “probably the greatest sea change in the history of the American military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army in 1775” (Correll, 2011, p. 71). While the sentiments may be exaggerated by the triumphalism of seeing a few years hard work come to fruition in an obviously powerfully influential act of legislation, there is substantive truth to real significance. As noted above, the lack of media attention meant the Goldwater-Nichols Act was something better understood within professional military circles, thinktanks, and the military-industrial complex. Even as the Military adapted to the impacts of the new legislation over the next few years, the media was further distracted by events of momentous magnitude – the liberation of Kuwait in Operation DESERT STORM and the startling, history-stopping collapse of the Soviet Union ending the decades-long Cold War.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act’s passage on October 1st, 1986, the start of Fiscal Year (FY) 87, meant that immediate adjustment would occur throughout the FY88-93 PPBS FYDP process. FY87 would have been the “current year,” and all defense funding for that year had already been appropriated. The President’s FY88 budget submitted in February of 1987 would have already incorporated the Defense Department inputs for FY88. The major POM cycle occurring in March through May of 1987, would have been finalizing FY89 submissions to the President. It would have been possible for significant major budgetary muscle movements to adjust in the Spring and Summer Congressional appropriations processes, but the resistance of the military services to Goldwater-Nichols likely meant many of the measures would be carefully studied and incorporated slowly. President Reagan and his NSC did immediately comply with the Act’s requirement to publish a NSS, which they did on January 1st, 1987 (Reagan, 1987).

This tracing of the post-Goldwater-Nichols Act timeline indicates that heading into the 1988 Presidential election year, few major budget-strategy related changes would have been implemented by the DoD. Defense spending is typically not significantly impacted by election years according to pre-Goldwater-Nichols analysis; however, this topic likely warrants further quantitative research which falls outside the scope of this dissertation (Zuk & Woodbury, 1986). However, programmatically, the Defense Department is hesitant to institute major change, which might be negatively impacted by a change in administration. The 1988 election year offered prospects of possible continuity in national security policy if Vice-President George H.W. Bush won the election, but likely significant change if Democratic opponent Michael Dukakis succeeded. The Pentagon would have begun to implement the statutory requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, especially as it pertained to adjusting the personnel management
systems regarding Joint Staff service. Also, during 1987, the Reagan NSC placed much more
detailed attention to the National Security Strategy it expected to publish in January 1988.
Critically examined, the 1988 NSS has been credited as being one of the most comprehensive of
the NSS strategic documents published by any President (http://nssarchive.us/national-security-
strategy-1988/). Under the new Bush administration, the NSC conducted a six-month review of
national defense strategy between January and June 1989. The review was conducted by two
groups; one led by the NSC’s Arnold Kanter focused on future arms control issues and the other
by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P) Paul Wolfowitz focused on defense
policy and strategy, and non-nuclear forces (Larson, Orletsky & Leuschner, 2001, p. 9 fn6).

This review of national strategic guidance impacts and timeline considerations after
Goldwater-Nichols supports increased CINC capability to conduct strategic planning for major
contingencies by FY89. In U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), a unified command
headquarters established in 1983 as a consequence of resolving the cross-COCOM seam issues
recognized in 1980 and the increasing significance of the Middle East for U.S. national security,
the Army component command (ARCENT) began coordinating in March 1989 with the Army’s
Concept and Analysis Agency (CAA) to conduct a wargame testing the concept for the defense
of Saudi Arabia contingency plan (OPLAN 1002). USCENTCOM’s primary contingency plan
OPLAN 1021 envisioned a Soviet invasion of Iran requiring a U.S. forward deployment of over
five divisions to the Zagros Mountains in Iran; whereas OPLAN 1002 required only two
divisions (Swain, 1994, p. 6). The USCENTCOM Commander General Norman Schwartzkopf
agreed with the focus on the defense of Saudi Arabia contingency plan and in July 1989 he
directed his planners to use the scenario for the following year’s Internal Look exercise. Given
the influence of Goldwater-Nichols on the 1987 formation of U.S. Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM), General Schwartzkopf directed his planners to ensure a review of the Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL, pronounced “tip-fiddle”) (Schwartzkopf, 1992, pp. 286-95).

In February of 1990, ARCENT conducted the wargame exercise Persian Tiger and although the findings of the exercise were not published until August 1990, the report was communicated earlier to USCENTCOM that there was a problem with the time flow of forces into theater (Swain, 1994, pp. 6-7). By July’s Internal Look 90 exercise, USCENTCOM had already begun to address the necessary changes to ensure OPLAN 1002 was sound. On August 2nd, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait.

DESERT STORM

Operation DESERT STORM, sometimes referred to as The Gulf War, tested and validated Goldwater-Nichols efforts to improve the Military’s strategic planning. The influential role of the General Colin Powell as CJCS and the increased responsibilities of the CINC were amply illustrated by the conduct of the campaign (Correll, 2011, p. 71). However, there was still room for the Services’ to take credit because Service-specific planning capabilities proved very impactful in DESERT STORM.

The Air campaign in support of DESERT STORM received unprecedented TV coverage and showcased the precision-guided munitions capabilities of the U.S. Military. Much of that success can be attributed to augmentation by the Air Force’s Checkmate group of planners who developed the Instant Thunder air campaign for USCENTCOM. However, notably for the purposes of assessing Goldwater-Nichols, the selection of targets was based more on the Air Force’s understanding of general Presidential and DoD guidance and not based on integrating the plan with USCENTCOM’s ground maneuver plan. As such, by the time the ground war reached
a crucial phase, the failure of the Air Campaign to target Iraq’s Republican Guard became apparent.

To support the development of the ground campaign, General Schwartzkopf, having just finished Internal Look 90, submitted USCENTCOM’s plan to the JCS. USCENTCOM had simply modified OPLAN 1002 from a defense into a direct attack into Kuwait. This course of action was rejected by GEN Powell and the JCS war planners. The Army augmented USCENTCOM’s planners with four Jedi Knights, as graduates of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College’s School of Advanced Military Studies were commonly called (Swain, 1994, pp. 75-77). The plan was reworked as a left hook through the desert, labeled alternatively Operation Scorpion or Western Excursion. The concept for this left hook came from Secretary of Defense Cheney, USD(P) Wolfowitz and a few retired general officers brought back for consultations. The details and the orchestration of the battlefield operating systems were developed by the Jedi Knights. Notably absent from the small planning group was a Marine officer; as a consequence, the Army Jedi Knights gave the Marine forces a holding mission on the east side of the coalition in front of Kuwait, so that they would be near the water. When the Marine Commander Lieutenant General Walter Boomer heard the proposed task for the Marines he complained to General Schwartzkopf. Not wanting to cause an interservice problem, and cognizant of the support the Army and Air Force were providing, Schwartzkopf allowed the Marines to define their own mission. The Marines elected to also conduct an attack, which was not synchronized well with the rest of the ground maneuver plan. The Marine attack was successful in penetrating Iraqi defenses in Kuwait and forcing the withdrawal north of Iraq’s elite Republican Guard forces. This meant that instead of trapping the Republican Guard inside Kuwait the left hook instead encountered the withdrawing Republican Guard along what would
become known as the “Highway of Death.” This stunning tactical victory and the savage destruction of the hindmost elements of the Republican Guard accelerated the end of the campaign, but left Iraq’s premier military forces nearly intact allowing Saddam Hussein to sustain his hold on power despite the crushing defeat he suffered in Kuwait. The incident highlights the still evident justification for continued reforms that will be cited by future advocates for expanding national security strategy-making institutions influence and capabilities (Bolger, 1995, pp. 223-265; Lederman, 1999, pp. 99-101).

One of the more trumpeted successes of DESERT STORM was the successful projection of American military power into the Middle East during the buildup to the offensive. USTRANSCOM successfully transported 504,000 passengers (the equivalent of two Army corps and two Marine Expeditionary Forces, 6.3 million tons of dry cargo, 6.1 million tons of petroleum products, and 28 Air Force tactical fighter squadrons. The importance of Goldwater-Nichols for clearing the way for the creation of USTRANSCOM was one of the most concrete early successes of the legislation (Lederman, 1999, p. 102).

Operations ENDURING FREEDOM

Fast forward just over a decade to the U.S. Military response to the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 and compare the above experience of Secretary Cheney, Generals Powell and Schwartzkopf with their 2001 successors SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld, and Generals Hugh Shelton and Tommy Franks. Secretary Rumsfeld exerted a strong influence as SECDEF, wielding his statutory power to restrict the influence of the CJCS. Rumsfeld attempted to pressure Shelton into not participating in NSC deliberations and to route all military advice through himself as SECDEF. General Shelton characterized Rumsfeld’s behavior as being greatly “concerned with marking his territory like a little bulldog” (Correll, 2011, p. 72).
Rumsfeld also tried to exert control over the CINCs. In 2002, he would strip them of the Commander-in-Chief title, a modification which has lasted until at least 2019. Rumsfeld leveraged the access of the combatant commanders to himself and the President to undermine the JCS. USCENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks did not think highly of the Service Chiefs, but in September 2001, after preparing his plan for attacking Afghanistan, the Joint Chiefs requested a briefing on the plan. General Shelton thought the meeting was productive, but General Franks was disparaging in his remarks, claiming it was “aimless dialogue” and a “waste of time” and said the Service Chiefs at the briefing “came across like a mob of Title 10 motherfuckers” (Correll, 2011, p. 72).

The evolution Goldwater-Nichols set in motion has matured over the past 33 years. Firstly, the gradual implementation of Goldwater-Nichols requirements in PPBS, strategic planning, increased combatant commander responsibilities and authorities, and personnel management was measured and required the completion of programmatic implementation to be realized. It literally took years to incorporate aspects of the personnel management and planning evolution into the routine processes of the Military. Secondly, the end of the Cold War changed the defense spending dynamic from being centrally focused on balancing the military power of the Soviet Union to decentralized attention at the regional level by combatant commanders seeking readiness to respond to crises. Thirdly, the War on Terror after 9/11 greatly expanded the wartime influence of combatant commanders and emphasized the Service Chiefs as force providers. This evolution has greatly changed the dynamics of most fundamental Pentagon processes regarding PPBS and force management. Lastly, the continuing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) brings technological elements to increased capacity and capabilities causing a reformulation of command and control, as well as situational awareness of the strategic
environment. These influences have so shaped, and possibly skewed the balance of influence in
the Pentagon between civilian leadership, the Services, the Joint Staff, and the combatant
commanders that some close analysts have initiated calls for a second Goldwater-Nichols Act to
redress the issues (Kohn, 1994; Clark, 2001, p. 460; Correll, 2011, p. 72; Donnelly, 2016, pp.
191-192).

**Total Force Policy – End of the Citizen-Soldier?**

An important thread of analysis in this dissertation is the role of the citizen soldier. The
citizen soldier is a concept cutting across the NCR variables of Strategic Culture, State-Society
Relationships, and Domestic Institutions. Congress has consistently, steadfastly defended the
concept of the citizen soldier, resisting the Regular Army efforts to gain control over the militia,
the nation’s strategic reserve. The most significant change in the course of the military history of
the American militia, the Dick Act, was addressed in Chapter Two. In that reform, the War
Department’s General Staff gained some oversight of the state militias constituting a National
Guard, especially the training standards and federal mobilization procedures. Additionally, the
bureaucratic change resulted in a significant decrease in direct Congressional involvement when
the Committee on the Militia was disbanded in 1911 (see Chapter 2).

In November 1947, the new Secretary of Defense James Forrestal convened the Gray
Board to examine the post-WWII status of the National Guard and Reserves. Assistant Secretary
of the Army Gordon Gray led the board, completing its report in June 1948. The Gray Board
recommended the formation of a federally controlled National Guard of the United States by
merging the National Guard and the Reserves. The rationale was that a force with dual
allegiances not practical for the Cold War; it imagined Reserve Component\textsuperscript{127} readiness could not be maintained appropriately enough to respond to the expected speed of a possible escalation to nuclear war. Secretary Forrestal did not endorse the Gray Board’s recommendation and Congress also rejected the recommendation under lobbying pressure from the still influential National Guard Association and the National Guard itself (Buckhalter & Elan, 2007, pp. 2-3).

Another attempt occurred in 1964, to merge all the Reserve Component into the management of the NGB under the SECDEF McNamara. Strong lobbying by veterans’ organizations and the NGA, as well as state-level interest groups who were resisting the DOD efforts at integration. President Truman had ordered all the armed forces integrated in 1948, however, many states resisted integration until after the Civil Rights Act of 1965. Even then, integration only occurred after the DOD threatened to not recognize, and thus not fund or train or authorize equipment for any state-level units which rejected integration. Between 1965 and 1970 the National Guard was utilized to control anti-war demonstrations and race riots; the Kerner Commission investigating the 1967 race riots recommended in 1968 that National Guard units improve the recruitment of minorities because they found mostly white Guard units attempting to quell primarily black rioters was not as effective as it should have been. This was not only due to lack of integration, but also to lack of training in crowd control and urban fighting (Buckhalter & Elan, 2007, pp. 3-14).

In 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird introduced the Total Force Concept, which was intended to address expected difficulties for the Active Component after the Draft was ended.

\textsuperscript{127} The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 established seven different reserve components: the National Guard of the United States (Army), the Air National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. The reserves were divided into three levels – Ready, Standby, and Retired – with a total authorized strength of 1.5 million for the Ready Reserve (Buckhalter & Elan, 2007, p. 3).
and due to defense budget cuts. Under the Total Force Concept, the Reserve Component would act as augmentation for Active Component units. There would be a habitual relationship between the active unit and the reserve unit designated to augment it, which was intended to improve the training and readiness of the reserves. The Total Force Concept became the Total Force Policy upon activation in 1973 (Buckhalter & Elan, 2007, p. 15).

Almost immediately after the end of the Vietnam war, the drawdown in Active Component forces combined with difficulties experienced in implementing the Total Force Policy drew criticism. Many felt the Military had been reduced too much and its inability to meet readiness standards meant it had become a “hollow” army. Exacerbated by the sting of the strategic defeat in Vietnam, most Army leaders in the late 1970s were focused on trying to rebuild the Army (Clark, 2001, p. 17; Buckhalter & Elan, 2007, p. 14). Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams developed improved the Roundout Strategy, which linked reserve brigades to an active division to “roundout” their full complement of soldiers and equipment. This gave rise to the Abrams doctrine, which reinforced the Military’s desire to never go to war again without having mobilized the Reserve Component. Under the Roundout Strategy, the intent was that major elements of the U.S. Army could be deployed without its required augmentee roundout brigade. Another way of viewing the Abrams doctrine was as an extra-constitutional tripwire constraining the President’s ability to deploy military forces, although Abrams son rejected the idea his father was motivated in the Roundout Strategy by political objectives (Carafano, 2004, p. 4). Abrams was more likely interested in ensuring there was popular support for the employment of the Army for military operations. (Clark, 2001, pp. 436-7; Carafano, 2004, p. 5; Rearden, 2015, p. 277).
Most military officers believed the Reserves should have been mobilized for Vietnam, which would have drastically altered manpower considerations for the conflict. There was much criticism of the Army’s personnel management of the war effort, which also seemed to undermine operational and strategic objectives, when timelines became constrained by unit rotations into and out of Vietnam. Some experts believe the diminished significance of a Reserve Component too closely integrated with the Active Component means Presidents can freely employ the military to resolve foreign policy crises. If more substantial barriers existed for employment of the reserves, it might constrain Presidential warmaking powers (Carafano, 2004, pp. 6-12).

Most importantly, the end of the Cold War in 1991, diminished the urgency to resolve the issue of Active Component-Reserve Component integration and Presidential war powers. During the 1980s, the readiness of many Reserve Component organizations suffered despite Department of Defense efforts to ensure reserve and National Guard units got the latest equipment and were prepared to meet readiness standards. After Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, the lack of readiness noted in some reserve component units (the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of Georgia, the 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of Louisiana, and the 155th Armored Brigade of Mississippi) led to an Active Component/Reserve Component training requirement where experienced Regular Army officers and NCOs were assigned to reserve component units to improve their training readiness (Buckhalter & Elan, 2007, p. 16). However, it also led to the end of the Roundout Strategy. Instead a “Roundup” approach was adopted, sustaining the relationship between 5 active divisions and their reserve component brigades, but reducing the Active unit’s reliance on its Reserve element for the post-Cold War environment.
From 1991 to 1995, the Army National Guard also reduced its overall size by 70,000 positions as part of post-Cold War reduction in defense spending (Buckhalter & Elan, 2007, pp. 14-17).

During the rest of the 1990s, the role of the Reserve Component was debated, but no consensus was reached. In line with the Abrams doctrine, some advocates suggested the Reserves were not be used except for a major conflict. But the concentration of combat service support and combat support elements in the Reserve Components and the requirements for these types of forces in post-Cold War deployments, meant the Reserves were increasingly called upon to back up and reinforce overseas deployments. After the events of 9/11, the experience of the Reserves has been an increased use as individual augmentees for deployed units and for reserve unit rotations into combat theaters. At times, reserve units and personnel accounted for up to 30% of the deployed force (Buckhalter & Elan, 2007). Unfortunately, the burden of deployments has forced reserve component units to cannibalize themselves to meet deployment obligations resulting in equipment shortfalls and an overall strain on the force. The Military is cognizant of a need to re-examine the use of the Reserve Component (Carafano, 2004, p. 12). This challenge warrants further examination when considering what the role of the American People is in national security.

"We the People" and Grand Strategy

During the scope of the grand strategic moment covered in this chapter, the role and perspectives of the People changed considerably. After the Vietnam War, the People experienced distrust of the Government, disillusionment with senior military leadership and increasing anti-military sentiment, especially the civilian leadership, and an increasing resistance towards providing foreign economic assistance without a clear demonstration of its value or importance (Hook & Spanier, 2000, pp. 285-289; Ahlberg, 2008, p. 108; Rearden, 2015, p. 5).
Complicating the issue of whether the People can understand the importance of providing foreign assistance or the nation being active in international affairs is the impact of a reduction in media attention to such events prior to 9/11. Between 1989 and 2000, the TV networks closed down foreign bureaus and reduced foreign content in the news by 2/3rds (Nye, 2002, p. ix). Among ABC, CBS, and NBC in 1989 they devoted 4,032 minutes to international affairs, in 2000 the same networks devoted only 1,382 minutes; ABC reduced foreign bureaus from 17 to 7, NBC and CBS echoed similar reductions (Rutenberg, 2001). The President of MSNBC described public sentiment as “a national fog of materialism and disinterest and avoidance” (Rutenberg, 2001).

However, after 9/11 the People’s attention, if not their awareness of international issues, dramatically reversed. Americans, enraged and offended, were very supportive of retaliatory strikes against al Qaeda and the Taliban regime which sheltered them in Afghanistan. Much like Pearl Harbor had galvanized the American People’s participation in WWII, 9/11 energized a level of popular understanding about what a war against the al Qaeda and its jihadi affiliates would involve (Jablonsky, 2002, p. 11). But, after President George W. Bush shifted the priority to eliminating the possible nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), then invaded Iraq – the surge in public support eroded rapidly. Especially after Former Regime Elements joined cause with al Qaeda and started an insurgency against the U.S. occupation of Iraq, public interest and support almost evaporated (Wilson, 2007, pp. 4-5).

Very much about the United States’ ability to prosecute grand strategy depends on public opinion (Nye, 2002, p. 40). Sustaining the People’s interest should be a key line of effort in modern warfare; indeed, it is akin to the national interest, because the national interest is, in effect, what the People say it is (Clark, 2001, p. 203; Nye, 2002, p. 139). The challenge is how
to structure the government, or at least national security institutions, to best keep the People informed, engaged, supportive, and committed to the strategic patience, perseverance and endurance necessary to solve the sometimes intractable, or “wicked,” problems (Jablonsky, 2002, p. 18). But this frames the problem as though the Government knows best what the national interest is and the challenge is to convince the People of the same.

Perhaps it is even more complex – the Government must understand what the People care about, not try to convince the People about what the People should care about. Henry Kissinger once defined the requirement of leadership in international affairs as the ability to be a true reflection of popular sentiments, rather than as an effort to raise the sights of the American People. If the focus is in raising the interest and elevating the attention of the People to align with the aspirations of the political elites, then special interests, likely privileged interests with access and influence over immense reserves of national power may have a stronger influence than they should, or at least what would be considered objectively normal. So what is the in the People’s interest (Nye, 2002, pp. 132-36)?

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs conducts a poll every four years regarding public support for an overseas role. In 2002, public support for overseas interests was at 61%, compared to 96% of those who could be considered elites or leaders. The People preferred multilateralism to unilateralism and economic strength over military strength. For the most part, though, the People cared more about domestic affairs in the present and less about a global future (Nye, 2002, pp. 132-36). Although the poll subject areas have shifted, the 2018 poll reflects America’s heightened sense of international awareness as in 2002. Some of the 2018 poll data

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128 Formerly the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.
may reflect a skewing due to negative media treatments in opposition to President Trump’s America First foreign policy agenda. The percentage favoring multilateralism increased to 66%; and record number of Americans acknowledge the benefits of international trade. The American People are more willing to use force to defend allies and partners if they are attacked (Smeltz, Daalder, Friedhoff, Kafura, & Wojtowicz, 2018, pp. 2, 19). The People, according to this poll prefer a foreign policy supporting free trade, valuing its allies, and working within the international system (Ahlberg, 2008, pp. 207-8; Smeltz et al., 2018, p. 23). It should be noted these are highpoints in the past forty years (Hook & Spanier, 2000, pp. 182-3). In other words, President Trump has had a similar effect as 9/11 in gaining the People’s interest in international affairs. However, both surveys indicated these were significant shifts in public opinion, which is usually less supportive and apathetic of engagement in international events.

This raises the question of whether a “fickle” public opinion is a reasonable basis from which to derive national interest. The question does not have a simple answer. By one approach, well-informed and engaged elites and experts can calculate potential long-term benefits, but if efforts to achieve those benefits surpassed public tolerance for the sacrifice, then the Government would have to apply more resources, more rapidly, to achieve effects before the loss of public support was realized in an electoral outcome, civil protests, or even revolt. However, if there was general bipartisan agreement on those long-term objectives, such as pertained during the Cold War, then the political vagaries of public opinion would have little effect on the United States’ ability to pursue longer term efforts to secure its interests. In this case, the different partisan administrations would alternate pursuing the shared perceived interest and suffering electoral defeats.
On the other hand, elite dominance on the issue of the national interest seems exploitive and undemocratic. It implies the elites know better than the ignorant masses, which is not the letter of the U.S. Constitution, even if it may have been in accordance with what some believe to have been the Founders’ spirit, who were mostly elites themselves, after all. If history demonstrates the American People have from time to time been aligned with America’s political elites for a consensus national interest, this would seem to indicate the capacity for such a realization and alignment to nearly always exist. Certainly, it promises the ability to correct the situation when the People and the elites are out of alignment. Who influenced whom may seem to be a chicken and egg type question. However, when compared to the evolution of national security strategy-making institutions, it would appear that the more influential these institutions have become over the policy-making process, the more difficulties the nation has experienced in aligning the Government’s grand strategy in pursuit of the national interest with the People’s perception of the same.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I make the case that the evolution in national security strategy-making institutions continued to accrue dominant influence over the warmaking powers of the President and the Congress. The common perception that the War Powers Act of 1973 constituted a Congressional check on the warmaking powers of the President is erroneous. In fact, Presidents have largely ignored any acknowledgment of a restriction on the implied powers of the Commander in Chief. Congress has de facto surrendered warmaking powers to the President because it perceives an existential threat to the possibility of re-election, if not enduring historical infamy, should it refuse to appropriate funds for American troops in harm’s way. Congress has never tested whether this assumption is even true with regards to the opinions of
the People. Additionally, the evolution described in this grand strategic moment, the increasing autonomy of the strategy-making institution of the Joint Staff, embodied by its successful co-option of Congressionally-mandated reform in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, sets the stage for another future grand strategic evolution in national security strategy-making institutions – an arbitration of strategy-making influence between the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, and the NSC.
Conclusion

Grand Strategic Moments

Prior to the Spanish-American War, the U.S. exhibited what I call Luminary Grand Strategy, where America’s great leaders, usually Presidents, but also leading citizens in the mold of the Founding Fathers, influenced national policy such as the Monroe Doctrine or Manifest Destiny. During the period of Luminary Grand Strategy, formal national security institutions were non-existent, and national security-related authorities were divided between the President, the Congress, and the States as detailed by the Constitution. During the Spanish-American War, nascent national security institutions were created on an ad hoc basis and then formalized to address identified shortcomings in U.S. military readiness to pursue expressed U.S. national interests. Building on Tilly’s “war made the state” and Zakaria’s concurrence that structural reform occurs only in response to crisis, a more detailed examination of the evolution of U.S. national security institutions indicates that the national security state expands perpetually and aggrandizes inexorably, unless checked by institutional failure (such as military defeat) or effective oversight. In the first grand strategic moment, I examined how an ad hoc War Board to aid the President in prosecuting the war with Spain, expanded into a formal institution which eventually stripped powers from Congress over the Militia and Coastal Defense (See Figure 6). Institutional change was incrementally driven by the expanding requirements justified by bureaucratic expertise, without the exigency of external crisis.
Figure 6. Post-Spanish-American War national security structures of the U.S. in Clausewitz’s Trinity model.
In the second grand strategic moment, a watershed moment for many IR theories, the United States had just successfully prosecuted a long global conflict with the national security strategy-making institutions it started the war with -- only expanded by scale and necessary geographic responsibility. Closer examination, however, demonstrates the Military reorganized without Congressional approval and evolved independent of Congressional oversight. The post-WWII reform of national security institutions in the National Defense Authorization Act of 1947 was an institutionally-driven effort to preserve new military-industrial complex powers during massive demobilization and downsizing of the wartime military, and not driven by external crisis. Additionally, the new Pentagon formalized the JCS structure it had built outside Congressional authorizations through a Congressional review during which it specifically leveraged its war-winning prestige to overwhelm political opposition (See Figure 7). NCR allows an examination of how national security strategy-making institutions evolved, incrementally increasing power and influence to a point that caused a retiring President Eisenhower to warn American citizens about its insidious threat to democracy.

More importantly, however, national security institutions were expanded formally and informally through Congress reasserting Constitutional authorities and the expanding role of think tanks. While evolutionary events like the War Powers Act, the Church Committee, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act can arguably be claimed as driven by external crises, these are more properly understood from public policy perspectives as a fragmentation of constitutional

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129 The Church Committee (the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities) investigated intelligence community abuses of power and process, notably highlighting alleged CIA programs to conduct assassinations abroad. During 1975, the hearings revealed publicly information about highly classified intelligence activities. The nature of the investigation has drawn speculation that some intelligence activities may be extremely difficult for democracies to conduct legitimately. The Church Committee also garnered criticism decades later, when its deleterious impact on intelligence activities, especially the lack of capacity to develop human intelligence (HUMINT), was blamed for contributing to the 9/11 intelligence failure.
Figure 7. Post-WWII national security structures of the U.S. in Clausewitz’s Trinity model.
warmaking powers and diffusion of national security strategy-making authority across diverse national security institutions.

The third grand strategic moment begins near the end of the Cold War, an event which caused strategic surprise in the official U.S. national security realm and in academia. I argue that the diffusion of authority, responsibility, and influence in broadly expanded national security strategy-making institutions results in failure to develop coherent, unified grand strategy and an inability to accurately assess strategic intelligence. Additionally, the fractured and fractious institutional environment precludes an ability to reach strategic consensus, except when disputed perspectives become obvious facts when overcome by events (Lobell, 2009, p. 46). The plethora of experts and theoretical perspectives extolling America’s great power and responsibility obscures the truth about America’s relative decline. Zakaria’s state-centered realism, just one exemplar of IR theory weakness, suggested in such a period of relative decline that the nation should retrench, but instead U.S. foreign policy remains activist and interventionist. Analyzing U.S. state power over the long term, as is the preferred hallmark of most advanced public policy research, reveals misperceived comparative facts about the international environment. These misperceptions are compounded by scholars and practitioners focusing on the assumptive aggregate of state power without more closely examining the so-called “black box” of the state (Trubowitz 1998; Lobell, 2009). External crises are only relevant for their agenda-setting impact; the more impactful national security vulnerability is the inability of U.S. national security strategy-making institutions to reach grand strategic consensus and their failure to account for relative U.S. decline, among other underappreciated strategic intelligence failures.

The National Security Council process is minorly adjusted by Presidential preferences, but the institution established in 1947 still governs U.S. foreign policy and national security
decision-making. In terms of coordinating all aspects of national power (or the lack of coordination), the NSC integrates the interagency at the mid- and senior-level management positions. Planners across the government support interagency planning efforts for priority issues identified and organized by the NSC. In terms of resources and planning support, DOD and the intelligence community (IC) dominate the bureaucratic processes. In issues germane to their focus areas, State, Energy, Treasury and Commerce will play leading influential roles, but they have neither the budgets nor the manpower to match the ability of DOD or the IC to drive policy (George & Rishikoff, 2015). More importantly, the NSC is not directly subject to Congressional oversight (Bellinger, 2016); however, Congress does have the ability to summon individual members from the Deputies or Principals committee to testify before Congressional committees. The NSC process and bureaucratic autonomy have evolved to the point where the President’s span of control can exploit Congress’ lack of political will to closely manage national security policies; the result is leaving the bureaucracy, and especially the military industrial complex, wielding incredible influence. The distance that has evolved between these institutions and the People has altered U.S. strategic culture and affected State-Society Relations. There are informal and organic elements of the bureaucracy that offer hope these institutions can mirror the People’s interests and values, but there is evidence for justifiable concern.

**NCR’s Strategic Culture**

It can be argued the Civil War experience and the service of the Army on the United States’ frontier had aligned organizational and popular strategic culture. Manifest Destiny and the initial experience of gaining status as a global power were uniquely shared. The size of the Military was very small, but the popular exposure to veterans of the Civil War aided in the
alignment of strategic culture, understanding of the Military’s role, and perceptions about military responsibility.

This variable included both the organizational culture of the Military, as well as society’s expectations about the role of the Military. The national security strategy-making institutions have become increasingly depersonalized (bureaucratized) as they have increased in scale. In the first grand strategic moment, specific influential individuals (like Mahan, Roosevelt and Root) had views on American Empire and role in the world which specifically shaped policy implementation presented to President McKinley. Over time, such as Teddy Roosevelt’s subsequent administration, these views shaped how America approached empire and military reform. In this moment, the national security strategy-making institutions were formed and the strategic culture was focused more on institutionalizing processes, such as war planning and increased staff responsibility for the professionalization and competence of all military organizations, including the militia and national defense structures like fortifications.

In a broader view of Strategic Culture, the People expected the Military to be professionally competent and successful in war as an instrument of the People’s will – rescuing Cuba from the Spanish empire’s inhumane repression. Additionally, the concept of the citizen soldier and suspicion of professional standing armies meant the People approved of retaining militias at State level and rejecting the idea of a European style General Staff. However, the expectations of professional competence and criticism of bureaucratic failures revealed in the Dodge Commission, supported incremental reform to address institutional problems. The strategic culture limited the amount of reform professional military officers could implement. However, despite the strategic culture, the Military was able to usurp power over militia management from Congress and the several States.
During WWII, the Military’s organizational culture experienced the massive expansion for wartime deployment requirements. Certain organizational processes had to adapt to handle the increased scale of organizational responsibility, as well as the pressure of supporting global military operations. Significantly, this reform was self-managed and not imposed by Congress nor other external influence. Military professionalism adjusted in two ways, instilling military ritual on millions of recruits and young leaders, and in adapting to how mid-20th century society viewed the world and authority. The significant mobilization of industry for the war effort meant many management practices were shared in mutual experience – in essence the organizational cultures of the Military and industry rubbed off on each other. The impact of this aided, even accelerated a similarly-minded relationship between the Military and industry which formed the military industrial complex.

The Strategic Culture of the United States also evolved during this post-WWII strategic moment based on the veneration of service and triumphalism which shaped what became known as “the Greatest Generation” in American lore. Demobilization of millions of servicemembers and programs such as the GI Bill and housing for veterans influenced not only the development of the welfare state, but also a deference to the Military which placed its activities above popular oversight. The People accepted the Cold War need for a large Military based on the influence of democratic and capitalist ideology, and by leveraging the respect for the Greatest Generation’s endorsement of the Military. This culture alignment lasted until the nation experienced the lack of popular support for the war in Vietnam.

In the third grand strategic moment, the military’s post-Vietnam organizational culture had undergone significant reform and rebuilding. However, there were still significant organizational problems which eventually had to be addressed by Congress’ reassertion of a role
in warmaking powers in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1984, which imposed standards in joint military doctrine on the Military. This process was heavily influenced by the professional Military, but is admittedly an attempt to restrain the bureaucratic autonomy of the Military. However, the scope of the military industrial complex had expanded beyond the Pentagon and included think tanks, as well as defense industries. The iron triangle effect of lobbyists and military veterans interacting with Congress limited the amount of reform possible in the acquisition fields, while the purview of actual warfighting was adjusted through Goldwater-Nichols. The organizational culture of the Military continues to celebrate its adoption of civilian management principles, such as Total Quality Management, and the Military has also adapted corporate management decision-making to the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). The combination of MDMP and joint doctrine have served to distance the Military strategy-making effort from the requirements it likely should incorporate. Increasingly, the military’s strategy-making process is being challenged as insufficient for the country’s strategic needs (Monk, 2017; NDS Committee 2018). In other words, the strength of the military bureaucracy’s autonomy is so ingrained that the NSC process is more important than the result.

The strategic culture of the American People is experiencing increasing isolation from the Military, even while the Military sustains a high prestige among the People. Fewer and fewer of America’s growing population have military service (although admittedly it is higher in the second decade of the 21st century than it was in the 1990s). There are increasing disconnects between how the Military views the role of the U.S. in the world and how the People perceive the U.S. role. Unless trends are corrected, it is possible the disconnects may be dangerous for future national security concerns. The activism and interventionist bent to the Military is increasingly distant from the desires of the People. Other elements of the Government and
society’s elites in academia and the wealthiest industries also share an activist leaning in international affairs as a product of globalization. There is a risk of fragmenting ideas between the Military, the elites influencing government, and the People’s society which has weakened strategic culture in the United States. The impact of 17 years of the “War on Terror” on this weakened strategic culture is recommended for further research – the result could be a realignment in state-society relations or possibly even revolution.

*NCR’s State-Society Relations*

NCR defines State-Society Relations as the interactions between the state’s institutions and the socio-economic groups which comprise society (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016). When these relations can be considered in harmony, the People will likely arbitrate the policy implementation. This arbitration does not occur directly, of course – it is indirectly evidenced through the People’s ties to the Military and the Government. There are organizational aspects to the Military which can tie the Military closely to the People – basing, the role of citizen-soldiers (militia or National Guard), how military demographics compare with the population’s, and popular perceptions and understanding of military service. Additionally, how responsive the Government is to the People is also critical to assessing the role of the People in national security strategy. In the United States, elections are the principle method by which the People substantially influence the Government. Constitutionally, the Founders intended the House of Representatives to most closely adhere to the sense of the People, since they are elected in toto every two years. The Senate was intended to represent the longer-term statesmanship qualities of mature wisdom and experience to temper the House. How responsive Congress is to the People is a topic of recurring concern for political scientists, as well as Congressmen and the People. It is likely that many agree with Macchiavelli that such responsibilities cannot
responsibly be left to “deliberative assemblies of men,” but perhaps the experience of democratic
government requires some adaptation to facilitate or enhance the role of Congress in national
security strategy-making.

When there is tension and conflict between the institutions and the People the ability to
make and implement grand strategy is challenged. Part of the difficulty experienced in U.S.
foreign policy today is due to these tensions illustrated by the variance in Strategic Culture
between the Military, the elites and the People. This variance has evolved over the course of
American history, but most significantly since the military reforms after the Spanish-American
War. Altering domestic institutions can occur fairly quickly, but structural change takes longer.
Affecting change in state-society relations and strategic culture requires decades of
transformative or incremental change. We see over the course of this research that the evolution
of national security strategy-making institutions in the Army & Navy early in the 20th century;
the Department of Defense, CIA, and NSC after WWII, during the Cold War, and in the post-
Cold War has steadily impacted core elements of U.S. State-Society Relations and American
Strategic Culture. In the 21st century, these changes have so fundamentally altered State-Society
Relations and Strategic Culture that the U.S. now struggles to construct a grand strategy coherent
to the desires and interests of the American People. There are only important vestiges of military
professionalism, genuine Presidential leadership, and a sporadically re-assertive Congress which
preserves the United States from the disastrous consequences of repeating the historic failures of
other great states and empires in human history.

NCR provides additional insights, along with defensive realists and innenpolitik scholars,
given the identification of its theoretical model and these important intervening variables
integrating internal and domestic factors into the state’s policy-making “black box”. Schweller
sees domestic constraints (domestic > foreign interests; potential domestic political risks, balancing too high). If the foreign policy establishment (FPE) maintain cohesion, then they have an advantage in attempting to push their strategic agenda on the People, but this also improves the chances the People may concur and endorse the grand strategy. Lobell argues economic factors influence domestic balance of power for the FPE. But, if the FPE is fragmented, then the system is structured to choose the lowest common denominator of policy (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016, loc 1673). In these circumstances, the likelihood of divergence from the People’s interests and approval is increased, as this research as illustrated.

This research indicates that while the United States still values the citizen-soldier concept of the National Guard, the close integration of these citizen-soldiers into the Military has essentially created a standing professional Army with multiple components. The shift of combat arms out of the U.S. Army Reserves and the need to deploy combat units of the National Guard over the past decade and a half have increased this sense of a standing professional Army. An important aspect preserving stability in the United States is the high regard the People have for their Military. The U.S. is experiencing a circumstance where the People support the Military, but increasingly are less supportive of the wars the Military wages. As the People’s respect for Congress continues to remain extremely low, there is less and less connection between the Government’s implementation of national security and foreign policy and the People’s will. More and more, the national security strategy references American values over the People’s interests – this is because in many respects the People are becoming less interested in activist foreign policy and are becoming more reticent about the use of American military forces as a key instrument of foreign policy.
Implications for NCR Theory

This research suggests the NCR model should be further refined to provide causal relationships between the intervening variables, as well as pointing to their influence on policy-making. The influence of institutional evolution on Strategic Culture and State-Society Relations revealed in this research provides evidence of these relationships. While this increases the complexity of the theoretical model, it is also more accurate. It does not undermine the parsimony of the theory to recognize how the intervening variables affect each other. In some circumstances, recognizing how changes in one intervening variable affect other intervening variables, such as in this research, can lead to increasing significance being attributed to the change, where if other intervening variables were held constant, then error would result, or at least a misperception about the scope of change occurring.

The evolution in national security strategy-making institutions has affected America’s State-Society Relationships and its Strategic Culture. Undoubtedly, there have also been significant impacts on Leader Perceptions, especially Presidents, some of which has been discussed throughout this research.130 Looking at just the institutional evolution, one might conclude the evolution has been consonant with a professional military requirement to address modernization of war-related technologies and bureaucratic systems, as well as the effects of globalization on the strategic environment. However, when tied to the impacts on State-Society

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130 The role of the President certainly merits further research regarding presidential interaction with national security strategy-making institutions. The character, strength, or confidence of different Presidents have had definitive impacts on how autonomous or influential the Military in the U.S. can be. Presidents McKinley, FDR, JFK, and Reagan initially had deferential views to the Military leaving them to operate with few constraints. Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Eisenhower were much more directive with the Military, exerting significant influence. Other Presidents, Truman, Johnson, Nixon, Carter had a much more interactive, complex relationship with the Military which affected the ability of the Military to influence events. Since the role of the President is likely to be so experience or personality based, it may be much more difficult to assess the institutional impact of the Presidency, without generalizing it to a division of warmaking authorities with Congress.
Relationships and Strategic Culture, which suborn traditional Constitutional understandings and place the People’s interests in jeopardy, the institutional evolution generates cause for further consideration. The rest of this Conclusion will explore some of these issues.

*Autonomy*

The increasing autonomy of the Military significantly privileges the FPE when there is ideological coherence between strategic perception and grand strategy, such as during the early Cold War. The People’s common defense is served when they also agree with the ideology and the grand strategy. When there is alignment and balance in Clausewitz’s trinity of Government, Military and People national security is experienced; however, when these become imbalanced or incoherent, then national security is jeopardized. Historically, great powers and empires have failed when the trinity became imbalanced or incoherent, typically exemplified by overreach or defeat in war. Sometimes, the People or the Military take the initiative to attempt to rebalance the trinity through revolution (Russia/Soviet Union) or military/FPE coup (Nazi Germany; Pakistan). How the United States will redress its imbalance is an open question.

While, admittedly, the prospects for revolution or coup in the United States seem remote at the present time, it is worth considering whether states which experienced such were keenly aware of their imminent experience. Perhaps while the impending crisis is apparent to some, most members of these societies likely experience some measure of self-delusion about their own political future; how else to explain the occurrence of revolutions and coups and lack of remediation? There likely needs to be a “durable shift” in power distribution driven by the Government as reform or grand strategy, before there is a possibly catastrophic durable shift brought about by coup or revolution.
Human history is replete with states and civilizations who failed to prevent failure – the only examples in history where this is not true are the contemporary nation-states we see today. In this collection, the United States is one of the oldest – history, while not determinative, indicates probabilistically the U.S. is vulnerable to experience a civilizational failure of historic import. This research argues the “prevention is worth a pound of cure” approach may lie in a reinvigoration of the People’s role in grand strategy. A Ghanaian proverb provocatively warns: “The ruin of a nation begins in the homes of its people.” Machiavelli warned if “evils” affecting the state are not checked or corrected, they will result in the ruin of the state. Can a Government by the People, and for the People let the question about the People’s role in national security go unexamined? As the acknowledged pre-eminent, global hyperpower, American leaders should devote as much, if not more, attention to internal, domestic concerns as is given to those external forces who are currently attempting to change that status. The U.S. must bring the theoretical magnets of Clausewitz’s trinity – Government, the Military, and the People into balance – for a democracy, the challenge of how to involve the People in national security grand strategy may be an existential problem.

*The Next Evolution: Joint Chiefs of Staff vs Combatant Commanders and NSC*

This dissertation argues the evolution of national security strategy-making institutions in the United States has followed a path dependent course towards the accrual of more autonomy and more influence over American grand strategy. This evolution has not culminated where these three case studies end. The U.S. Government and its Military are at this moment inside another grand strategic moment. Nearly 18 years of conflict combatting terrorism have seen much change and frequently successful adaptation in the American Military’s operational and tactical approaches, techniques, tactics, and procedures. At the strategic level, however, these
tactical and operational successes have not translated into strategic success; in fact, the global strategic environment has steadily eroded towards conditions that more reflect the goals of salafi-jihadist terrorist organizations than the stability and security goals of the United States and its allies and partners (Barrick, 2018). The U.S. Military, including specifically USSOCOM, are endeavoring to redefine how to do strategic planning for present and future complex environments and conflicts (Monk, 2017; Miller, Erfourth, Monk & Oliver, 2019). Serious calls by well-known congressmen for another round of Goldwater-Nichols scale reform have already been heard (Clark, 2015; Serbu, 2015; Cancian, 2016).

In line with the durable shifts in influence described in this dissertation, the next evolution should involve a substantial change in the strategic planning responsibilities and capabilities among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and the National Security Council, or even result in the establishment of an entirely new strategy-making institution. The prospect of a new strategy-making institution is not far-fetched. A new strategy-making institution would likely be one intended to reflect the ability to integrate the whole of government aspects of national power – a new interagency institution, but substantively different from the National Security Council. More likely, the durable shift in influence will be felt among the JCS, NSC, and the Combatant Commanders.

While predictions can be notoriously inaccurate, I would expect the shift to be away from Combatant Commanders and towards the JCS. Presently, the Combatant Commanders are responsible for developing Combatant Command Campaign Plans in support of planning tasks provided in the JSCP. The strategic guidance is derived from the NSS, NDS, and National Military Strategy (NMS). The unclassified versions of these documents identify the resurgence of great power competition and a global scope to those strategic challenges. However, the
Combatant Commanders will likely find it very difficult to coordinate global approaches towards these problem sets without some hierarchical structure and authorities across what can be considered peer organizations. Enhanced global coordination is within the capabilities of the JCS, but there are structural and cultural restraints against too much of this evolution happening on anything other than an ad hoc nature, bypassing statutory procedures, unless significant defense reform legislation is promulgated.

Alternatively, the shift could move towards the NSC and away from the Military’s strategy-making institutions. The rationale for this is similar to that justifying the possible creation of a new interagency strategy-making institution – there is a compelling need for improved interagency integration and implementation of national strategies. However, there are also structural and cultural obstacles towards this development occurring without significant change directed by the President through Executive Orders or by Congress through legislation. Even if the President were to enact this type of evolution through the fiat of an Executive Order, much like FDR established the JCS at the start of WWII, it is very likely such a step would be soon followed by an appeal for Congressional legislation. Part of the reason this durable shift in the influence of the national security strategy-making institutions is imminent is because there are challenges in how national strategies appear to be failing.

Atrophying Strategy-making Skills

The Military is well known for its planning; the oft-heard anecdote is that the Military has a plan for everything – even apparently a Zompocalypse (Crawford, 2014). The Military’s planning methodology is not uniform. Each of the Services has its own planning and

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131 Zompocalypse = Zombie Apocalypse. The Military does not actually have such a plan, according to the CNN source; the plan is a training purposes only document. However, the Government agency Center for Disease Control and Prevention does (see https://www.cdc.gov/cpr/zombie/index.htm).
decision-making method. After Goldwater-Nichols, however, the Joint Staff promulgated a joint doctrine approach to planning and decision-making called the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP), articulated in Joint Publication 5-0. Some leaders at the cutting edge of shaping new approaches to planning are critiquing the inability of JOPP, or the service-specific decision-making processes, to be adequate in approaching the modern and future geopolitical environment, which is complex, changing, and unpredictable (Monk, 2017). Applying the Military’s current linear and mechanistic planning approach to complex strategic problems requires the discipline to implement adaptive planning throughout each level of a military organization. “Planning a linear operation in a non-linear environment … is essentially an attempt to force a predictable outcome from an unpredictable system” (Monk, 2017, p. 12). Not many leaders are capable of this, and persisting in doing the wrong thing right only makes things “wronger and wronger,” according to the Dr. Russell Akoff quote on organizational effectiveness.132

Two aspects of the current strategic planning problem are the identification of interests and end states. The United States has pursued an activist, liberal, expansionist foreign policy since the end of the Cold War (Layne, 2006, pp. 118-128). Since the 9/11 terrorist attack the United States has pursued defeating and degrading terrorists in multiple countries (Barrick, 2018). I argue in some respects the United States has lost sight of its real interests. The United States is pursuing preferences, not interests. There is little evidence of long-range cost-benefit analysis in terms of applying resources to strategies to accomplish defined objectives. Rather, there are platitudes in the national security strategies, instead of processes to orchestrate national power in purposeful, effective ways. These platitudes are often expressed in terms of American

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132 https://www.orgsthatmatter.com/category/russell-ackoff/
values, which are not adequately or conscientiously developed with respect to the viability or receptivity to those values in areas with the United States deploys its national power. Often, inarticulate ambiguous end states are claimed to be the goal – what right looks like. However, if one applies Clausewitz’s theory of war as a continuation of politics by other means, then the end of an application of military force should be a return to politics – a condition inherently fraught and not a stable state.

“Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date” (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 80).

When military organizations apply planning efforts to unachievable end states, the “method conceals viable alternative options, obfuscates potential ramifications, and drives momentum … often at the expense of other options or planning for follow-on phases…Worse, this preoccupation with achieving the military end state can actually lead to mission failure” (Monk, 2017, pp. 7-8). Just as identifiable problems led to evolutionary change after the Spanish-American War and after a series of sharp military reverses in the 1980s, the atrophying of the Military’s strategic planning skills can be a driver for change.

Returning to the touchstone of values being inappropriately applied to strategic calculus, concerns about a resumption of Great Power competition have drawn parallels to the post-WWII onset of the Cold War. However, such parallels may not be relevant for today’s strategic environment. While a resurgence in Great Power competition with Russia and the People’s Republic of China might superficially mimic the ideological conflict of the Cold War, important differences exist. The international institutions established by the United States after WWII may not be relevant for an international system in which significant military, economic, diplomatic,
and informational power is shared by multiple nations. After WWII, the United States was a dominant global power in every respect, with no competition – the strategic environments of then and today are not similar. Additionally, this is not a moment to reach for American values. While the words might be the same, the United States’ interpretation and operationalization of its values was very different in the late 1940s than today, especially with racial minorities and gender-related issues. How wise is it to blithely attach strategic significance for today to strategic principles considered essential in the post-WWII strategic environment when neither the geostrategic dynamics nor American values remain the same? In this respect, it may be the so-called revisionist states who are on the correct side of historical change and recognition of strategic relevance. If the nation’s strategy-making institutions fall into the so-called Thucydide’s Trap\textsuperscript{133} with erroneous perceptions about the relevance of international institutions, and universal perceptions about values, based on trying to uphold a post-WWII international order, then the results may indeed be catastrophic. Perhaps this calls for the advantages to strategic planning offered by a General Staff.

Does the United States need a General Staff?

The path dependent evolution in national security strategy-making institutions has moved the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff closer and closer to becoming the type of General Staff which Congress has consistently resisted approving, blocking the efforts of professional military men to implement this step for nearly 150 years. As described in Chapter Two, the beginnings of the American General Staff were contentious and circumscribed. Effectively, though,

\textsuperscript{133} The Thucydides Trap is described in a 2017 \textit{Foreign Policy} article by Graham Allison entitled “The Thucydides Trap.” The trap refers to the geostrategic situation of a dominant power feeling threatened by competition with a rising power, notably described in Thucydides’ \textit{History of the Peloponnesian War}. Allison invokes the term in reference to the present-day challenge in U.S. and People’s Republic of China relations.
evolution has enhanced the strategy-making capabilities and influence of the Army’s nascent General Staff and the Navy’s General Board, through the War Department’s War Plans Division and the Army and Navy Joint Board to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Goldwater-Nichols shifted planning power away from the services to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is little doubt the Joint Chiefs of Staff now wields the most powerful military force the planet has ever witnessed. Are the concerns about the Prussian/German style General Staff warranted?

I believe the fears about the consequences of the U.S. Military possessing a General Staff are overblown and not understood past the traditionally negative aspersions cast on the Prussian staff model. It would seem the principal argument against a Prussian-style General Staff was the aggression it propagated against its neighbors and the usurpation of authority on a whim from field Commanders. In the first case, the numerous military engagements the United States has initiated since the start of the 20th Century would seem to indicate the Government is capable of ordering the Military to be perhaps even more aggressive than the German General Staff of the WWI and WWII Wehrmacht. The ostensible difference are the political ends and perception about the legitimate uses of military force. Frequently, such perceptions are more easily maintained when the nation is victorious. Were the United States ever to face catastrophic defeat, or experience the frustration of elusive victory after many years of conflict, future historians might very well describe U.S. military activities in a very different light.

In the second case, I am skeptical American military and strategic culture would succumb to allowing General Staff officers to usurp the authorities and responsibilities of Commanders in the field. The American valuation of the individual, the citizen-soldier, and the deference provided to Commanders in the field by Congress, the Media, and the citizenry all point to this concern being much exaggerated.
Further, the benefits of a General Staff in terms of enhanced strategic planning, organizational, and personnel management have steadily been realized to progressive degrees by the evolution experienced in national security strategy-making institutions. As described in Chapter Three, the wartime development of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff demonstrated skills at adaptation and its success in implementing staff actions rivaled that of the German General Staff equivalent, the OberKommando Wehrmacht (OKW). Can a case be made that the victory in WWII evidenced an exceptional, enduring American superiority in military capability (immune to abuse by political authorities, unlike the Nazi influence over Germany’s OKW)? Or was it only a similar, or lesser, staff capability the United States employed, but which was tied to overwhelming economic resources and industrial might? This too, is a topic worthy of further development as the evolution in strategy-making institutions continues, especially if the predicted shift to even more strategic planning influence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff is realized.

Military-Industrial Complex

As described in Chapter Three, the creation of the military-industrial complex may be the most enduring artifact of the Cold War. Despite President Eisenhower’s warning and the reputational damage the Military received from Vietnam, continued heavy investment in defense spending, and the scale and scope of the industries dependent on defense spending, has continued. The waste, fraud, and abuse tied to extended weapons platform acquisition processes has garnered Congressional and DoD efforts at reforming and implementing anti-corruption measures, such as regulating how and when former military officers can join defense contracting companies or government civil service. The military-industrial complex is also becoming polarized to a degree by the same partisanship divisions occurring in the American polity. Especially among thinktanks which have sought funding exclusively from globalist organizations
or more conservative organizations, the politicization of strategic advice is affecting strategy-making institutions. To incorporate some measure of reform on the military-industrial complex in the next evolutionary stage for national security strategy-making institutions will require significant examination and further research to provide concrete recommendations. The sad fact is the marketplace of ideas in the strategic planning space is one in which strategic perspectives can be propped up by the investment of resources no matter the actual geostrategic or military-economic value of the ideas – this contributes to strategic incoherence.

*Interservice Rivalry and Defense Unification*

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 had a profound impact on the U.S. Military, directly impacting the professional lives of military officers and indirectly the experiences and effectiveness of every servicemember. At first glance, such a powerful influential impact by a legislative act on the Military seems to be evidence of what Americans would like to believe constitutes civilian control of the Military. However, upon closer examination, this Act significantly evolved the scope and power of the Military’s strategy-making institutions. At its core, the Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened the power of the JCS at the expense of the military services – Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines. While it was careful to specifically prohibit allowing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to function as a General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Act diffused the General Staff-like command responsibilities to the unified and specified combatant commanders, known as the CINCs in the late 1980s (now called Functional or Geographic Combatant Commanders). As described in Chapters Three and Four, interservice rivalries were exploited by those seeking to accomplish reform in the institutions. It can even be argued the evolution occurred as the outcome of interservice rivalry and a push for the economies and efficiencies in defense unification.
Significant to understanding the implications of the increased planning capabilities Goldwater-Nichols brought to the Combatant Commanders, the Act also tasked the President to prepare an annual National Security Strategy articulating the interests and broad national security, foreign and economic policy objectives of the United States. The lack of this type of strategic policy guidance had negatively impacted the Military’s strategy-making institutions hindering the development of effective war plans, which could anticipate the need to respond with military force to secure the nation’s interests. The “lucky” and “timely” USCENTCOM preparations aligning exercises and planning efforts to advance the viability of OPLAN 1002 to respond to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait were not luck nor coincidence. Those efforts were exactly the type of grand strategic preparation Goldwater-Nichols intended to achieve – ensuring “that the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that responsibility to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning” (Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986).

Unfortunately, the same factors which led to impediments to the Military’s ability to conduct effective strategic planning are extant: the dominant political role of the National Security Advisor and the NSC staff, informal methods of Presidential decision-making, and the President’s and NSC’s continuing focus on crisis management and daily operations leaving a gap in strategy-making which others\(^\text{134}\) try to fill (Flournoy & Brimley, 2006, pp. 83-84). Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, strategic planning in the Department of Defense was fiscally constrained, and linkages between strategy and resources were weak or prejudicially managed by organizations far from the front lines of the national interest. Additionally, contingency plans

\(^\text{134}\) Congress, other government agencies, and think tanks; as well as special interest groups and insistent partners or allies.
were not relevant to the crises experienced because they were formulated on the basis of invalid political assumptions. Just as the Navy after the Spanish-American War, as described in Chapter Two, requested policy guidance from the State Department to guide overseas basing strategies, the present day Military continues to request needed strategic guidance from the NSC to facilitate strategic planning. Since Goldwater-Nichols, the National Security Strategy and DoD planning documents, under the auspices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, driving the revised PPBS provide corrective measures to address the shortcomings. Although the quality of the strategic documents has varied since Goldwater-Nichols, there has been increased attention and improved effectiveness in strategy-making and contingency planning (Locher, 1996, p. 14).

Any future effort to conduct a second Goldwater-Nichols review should encompass the hindrances to effective strategy-making in the White House and Executive Office of the President. Such an effort should also include a closed session review by security clearance possessing (cleared), experienced strategists with selected Congressmen of the Joint Staff’s and Combatant Commands’ deliberate and contingency plans.

As much as Goldwater-Nichols intended to improve strategic planning in DoD, it also attempted to elevate the quality of military advice provided to civilian decision-makers – the President and Secretary of Defense, as well as the National Security Council. The role of the CJCS in this regard was significantly increased. While this presents challenges to strong Secretaries who wish to monopolize the military advice to the President, it opens the aperture to ensure effective military advice gets to the President and the NSC (Swain, 1994, p. 27). There is an aspect to providing military advice that is personality-based, as much as it is systemic. Just as in McMaster’s eponymous description of the Joint Chiefs’ Dereliction of Duty, the Service Chiefs in their JCS role and the Functional and Geographic Combatant Commanders must be
willing to voice concerns to the President and not feel inhibited by either the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor give in to the petty rivalries.

There is a concerning aspect to the provision of military advice. As General Wesley Clark commented, a uniform is the ultimate power suit (Clark, 2001, p. 52). Senior military commanders will frequently be able to heavily influence the orders they receive (Clark, 2001, pp. 16-17). This can be abuse of power and influence when the advice provided to decision-makers is deliberately skewed by their own personal opinions. In other cases, it may involve a fundamental mismatch in priorities and perspectives. The military leader evaluates the criteria of “blood and treasure” (what will the action cost in terms of lives and resources) and on “fear, honor, and interest” (the realist calculus of security, credibility, and risk). The political leader evaluates on the criteria of the question of responsibility (should an action be taken, not just how) and accountability to the People (what the consequences are of success/failure or inaction). These are incredibly important and significantly different perspectives which can result in poor decision-making when communication is fraught or disrupted.

*Gaps in grand strategy may be vulnerabilities to national security*

As much as possible, this investigation of U.S. national security strategy-making institutions avoided the distraction of evaluating the effectiveness, outcomes, or advisability of particular strategies. This research has also avoided the unfortunate scholarly precedence of conflating such evaluations with the validation of a theoretical approach. The impactful role of the United States in the international environment over the past century can modestly suggest the substantive value of this research. However, an examination of the experience of the United States should not be misunderstood to be theoretically applicable to all actors in the international environment and the existence of those other actors should not be dismissed or discarded as
irrelevant. In fact, it is the absolute relevance of those other actors to the national security of the United States that forms a key assumption of this research.

A non-rigorous survey of security issues in the media and scholarly literature can identify a number of trending concepts such as environmental security, food security, energy security, ethnic conflict, poverty and gender-related conflict or vulnerable populations. However, these topics are most frequently addressed on a global scale and are calls for concerted or specific actions globally. What appears to be lacking is a formal integration of these issues from a domestic U.S. perspective into the national security strategy development process. These issues are not normally considered priorities by the national security strategy-making institutions and thus they have been under-represented in national security documents and have failed to be incorporated into an effective, holistic grand strategy. In essence, the autonomy of these institutions and the fragmentation of constitutional power in this respect has privileged the preferences of the Military. As a result, these important issues are often only considered in the margins of national security documents, or are inserted cosmetically only to satisfy the preferences of selected politicians, including the President. Alternatively, the Military has given increasing attention to these issues only after they have clearly generated crises requiring the United States to develop responses.

Reflecting on the framework of Clausewitz’s trinity, the skewed impact of the military industrial complex has pulled power and attention away from the interests of the American People. Although the Military prides itself on representing the nation and is quite justifiably proud of leading many types of social innovations – such as racial integration, civil rights, equal

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135 Citing my own professional 25 year experience as a West Point military historian, Army officer, US Army-trained strategist, Stanford international affairs graduate and national security think tank researcher, and subject matter expert intelligence analyst at US Central Command.
opportunity and gender pay equality – it does not reflect, in its strategy-making role, the American People. One significant observation is that in two different studies of U.S. government agency policy preferences, a group of 26 academic experts on the American government and a subsequent survey of over 7400 federal mid-level managers, identified the Department of Defense and the three service departments as the most conservative agencies of the U.S. Government (Clinton & Lewis, 2008; Clinton et al, 2012, p. 348).

Additionally, as we look across the NCR intervening variables, in Strategic Culture and State-Society Relations, as well as Domestic Institutions, it is highly probable the Military as a bureaucracy is losing touch with the People. The fundamental proposition undergirding representative bureaucracy is that the attitudes and policy preferences of the People are mirrored in the bureaucracy. If external controls over the bureaucracy, such as Congressional oversight and budget controls, are not effective in ensuring the bureaucracy is responsive to the People’s interests, then internal controls through similar attitudes and policy preferences can meet the need (Meier & Nigro, 1976, pp. 458-9). While the Military may make some effort to ensure geographic and demographic representation, the Military’s relatively small, and diminishing, size in relation to the population as a whole, its increasing isolation from American urban development, and the lack of popular representation at the strategy-making institutional level undermine the Military’s ability to adequately address the interests of the People in the provision of a common defense.
The last point in terms of what Goldwater-Nichols accomplished is particularly relevant to the NCR variables encompassing Strategic Culture, State-Society Relationships, and the character of some Domestic Political Institutions. Goldwater-Nichols intended to strengthen civilian authority inside the Department of Defense. There are significant problems in a system of civilian control if the civilians believe only the Military can make responsible decisions regarding military affairs (Lederman, 1999, p. 54). When change is necessary in the Military, an important truism about Militaries, an anecdote by eminent American grand strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, author of the *Influence of Seapower upon History*, no Military would ever reform itself or voluntarily give up an area of its sovereignty (Jones, 1982). An important caveat to the prospects for Goldwater-Nichols success in this objective – it is incumbent upon civilian authorities to exert decision-making influence and not be swayed by Military power suits. Not only did Goldwater-Nichols strengthen the mechanisms by which civilian control inside the Pentagon can be maintained, but Goldwater-Nichols also strengthened the Military, especially the Joint Staff vis-à-vis the services. In a very real respect, the Goldwater-Nichols Act created the mechanisms for the national security strategy-making institution of the Joint Staff to exert dominance over the services and the Combatant Commanders (Owens, 2016, pp. 77-78, 90).

The ability of the Secretary of Defense and the civilian assistants to exert effective management of the Pentagon requires the collaboration and cooperation of the Joint Staff. When the resources are plentiful, all the various entities of the Military can find ways to cooperate; but when the

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136 Five other explicit Goldwater-Nichols objectives will not be argued in this dissertation. These are subjects for further research and expansion: (1) to place “clear responsibility” on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and (2) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources, (3) to improve joint officer management policies, (4) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and (5) improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.
resources threaten to diminish, it is not the better angels of human nature nor the benign intentions of powerful institutional forces which govern the day. The U.S. Military proudly asserts “We own the Night!” to demonstrate technological superiority, tactical proficiency, and a measure of credible reputational deterrence to give the nation’s enemies pause or fear. However, when defense spending drops, it is not the nation’s enemies who must pause or fear.

This temptation to privilege selfish concerns over the greater good is something all who work in elements of large organizations face (Locher, 2001, p. 113). Like the wild dogs of a pack will snarl and snap at each other over scraps of meat, so the various offices of an organization will scrabble over the resources available for allocation. However, one expects unity of effort in the common defense if the pack is threatened. The People of the United States expect more from its Military than animalistic, pack-like behavior. Throughout most of the nation’s history, the Military has sustained the trust and confidence of the People, and worked hard to recover it if the Military felt the trust or confidence lost. The evolution of national-security strategy-making institutions has steadily marched down a path accruing ever more influence and power over the structures of Government and the national security policies it pursues. A future predicated on the Common Defense of the Constitution’s Preamble is at risk, if these evolving institutions cannot identify a way to ensure the People’s interest is identified, then continually and consistently faithfully served.
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