April 2018

Towards Utilization of Distributed On-Chip Power Delivery Against EM Side-Channel Attacks

Ahmed Waheed Khan

University of South Florida, ahmedwaheedk@mail.usf.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd

Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons

Scholar Commons Citation
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/7178

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Towards Utilization of Distributed On-Chip Power Delivery Against EM Side-Channel Attacks

by

Ahmed Waheed Khan

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Electrical Engineering
Department of Electrical Engineering
College of Engineering
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Selçuk Köse, Ph.D.
Gokhan Mumcu, Ph.D.
Mehran Mozaffari Kermani, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
April 15, 2018

Keywords: Hardware security, EM side-channel attacks, distributed voltage regulation, security implications, power grid lines

Copyright © 2018, Ahmed Waheed Khan
DEDICATION

To my parents for all their love, support and putting me through the best education possible.

I wouldn’t have been able to get to this stage without them.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to extend my profound gratitude to many people, who generously contributed to the work presented in this thesis.

Special mention goes to my supporting and passionate supervisor and mentor, Dr. Selçuk Köse. My thesis has been an amazing learning experience and I thank him wholeheartedly. His willingness to offer me so much of his time and intellect is the major reason behind the completion of this thesis. Similar profound gratitude goes to my committee members Dr. Gokhan Mumcu and Dr. Mehran Mozaffari Kermani for being truly dedicated advisors. The constant support and resources provided by the Electrical Engineering Department at USF are also gratefully acknowledged. Special mention goes to my lab mates Mahmood Azhar, Mohammad Ali Vosoughi and Longfei Wang for frequently offering me wise counseling at opportune times.

Finally, but by no means least, I would like to thank my family to whom I owe a great deal. A big thanks goes to my mother Sufia Gul, father Abdul Waheed Khan and my wife Nimrah Ahmed for almost unbelievable support throughout. They are the most important people in my world. I thank you all.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................... iii

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................... iv

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. v

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 2: ELECTROMAGNETIC ATTACKS ............................................................................. 5
  2.1 Magnetic Field and Electric Field – Revisited ................................................................. 5
  2.2 EM Attack Methods ........................................................................................................... 8
    2.2.1 Active Attack ............................................................................................................... 8
    2.2.2 Passive Attack ............................................................................................................ 8
  2.3 EM Side Channel Analysis Types ..................................................................................... 8
    2.3.1 Simple Side-Channel Analysis .................................................................................. 9
    2.3.2 Differential Side-Channel Analysis ......................................................................... 9
  2.4 EM Emanation Types ....................................................................................................... 9
    2.4.1 Direct Emanations ..................................................................................................... 10
    2.4.2 Indirect Emanations ................................................................................................. 10
  2.5 Near-field and Far-Field Approximation ......................................................................... 11
    2.5.1 Near Field ................................................................................................................ 11
    2.5.2 Far Field .................................................................................................................. 12
  2.6 EM Propagation ............................................................................................................... 12
  2.7 EM Probe ......................................................................................................................... 13

CHAPTER 3: LEAKERGING ON-CHIP POWER DELIVERY .................................................... 15
  3.1 Background ...................................................................................................................... 15
    3.1.1 Low Dropout Regulators ....................................................................................... 16
    3.1.2 Switched Capacitor Converters ............................................................................. 17
    3.1.3 Buck Converters ..................................................................................................... 17
  3.2 Working of AES ............................................................................................................... 19
  3.3 Threat Model .................................................................................................................... 20

CHAPTER 4: EVALUATION MODEL ......................................................................................... 22
  4.1 Simulation Setup .............................................................................................................. 22
  4.2 Effect of the Size of Power Grid and Distance from the Probe ...................................... 23
  4.3 Security Implication of the Implemented Design ........................................................... 27
  4.4 Shielding with MIM Capacitor ....................................................................................... 29
  4.5 Effect of Upper Metal Layers on the EM Emanations From Lower Layers ................. 31
  4.6 Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 32
CHAPTER 5: FUTURE WORK ........................................................................................................... 34
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 36
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................... 37
APPENDIX A: COPYRIGHT PERMISSIONS ................................................................................. 41
LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Simulation parameters</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>EM emanations from local vs global grid at varying probe distance</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>EM emanations from the local and global power grids to a probe for different wire lengths</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>EM emanations from the local and global power grids to a probe placed at 100 um</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>EM comparison with MIM shielding</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>EM comparison with upper layer</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Side channel attack model</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Magnetic field of current and carrying conductor</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Electric field of current and carrying conductor</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Near field and far field illustration</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>EM waves propagation</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Distributed on-chip power delivery network</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Leveraging local power delivery reduces EM emanations originating from the power delivery network</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>AES flow chart</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Measurement setup</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>EM emissions from local grid at varying probe distances</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>EM emissions from global grid at varying probe distances</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>EM emissions from local grid at varying wire lengths</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>EM emissions from global grid at varying wire lengths</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>EM emissions comparison of local and global grids at 100 um</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Using MIM capacitor as a shield</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Reduction in EM emission due to shielding effect of the MIM capacitor</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>Effect of the global grid on the emanations from the local power grid</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>EM emanations captured from 1 mm distance</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

Non-invasive side-channel attacks (SCAs) are potent attacks on a cryptographic circuit that can reveal its secret key without requiring lots of equipment. EM side-channel leakage is typically the derivative of the power consumption profile of a circuit. Since the fluctuations of the supply voltage strongly depend on the topology and features of the power distribution network (PDN), design of the PDN has a direct impact on EM side-channel leakage signature.

In this thesis, we explore the security implications of distributed on-chip voltage regulators against EM side-channel attacks. Extensive HFSS simulations have demonstrated that the maximum EM radiation can be reduced by 33 dB and 11 dB, respectively, at the top and bottom sides of an integrated circuit through distributed on-chip voltage regulation. The primary reason is that the power is delivered locally through partially shorter and thinner metal lines as compared to off-chip implementation.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

As data security becomes more and more important as a modern design metric, most systems these days make use of a cryptographic module for processing secure data. Although employing a dedicated cryptographic module does help to improve data security, it is still possible for an attacker to get through the security of the device by using passing and non-invasive attacks in order to extract the secret key used for encryption. These "side-channel" attacks use information that gets leaked from a device while it is processing secure data through observing it in real-time [34]. Side-channel attacks (SCA) are a major threat to the security of cryptographic devices. A significant amount of work has been performed on SCAs over the past two decades. One of the primary types of SCAs is the power analysis attack. While simple power analysis (SPA) obtains the data directly from power consumption, differential power analysis (DPA) attacks require certain statistical operations on numerous power traces to get relevant information [1,2]. Apart from the power consumption, other leakage information such as electromagnetic emission, computation time and temperature can also be used to attack a device [3,5]. SCAs attempt to define the correlation between any kind of side-channel information and the internal operations of the device. These attacks pose a threat to many modern-day devices, for example smart cards, that use cryptographic algorithms like the Data Encryption Standard (DES) or the more intricate Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm [34].

While the popularity of power analysis attacks has risen, there are certain benefits attached with using EMA (Electro-Magnetic Analysis) for analyzing devices with unconventional interfaces, when a power tap is not easy to implement or when there are countermeasures in place for power analysis [32,33].
In circumstances where a power side channel is not possible or a non-contact type of attack needs to be implemented, electromagnetic (EM) attacks offer an advantage over conventional power analysis attacks. Additionally, Agrawal et al. [6], discussed how electromagnetic radiations can be modulated using an inner loop structure and also described how a suitable AM demodulator is useful in performing effective attacks even at a distance of some meters from the chip. They also showed that EM attacks can be used to nullify many of the countermeasures that are effective in the face of power analysis attacks. Just as in the case of SPA and DPA, EM side channel attacks can be used for both simple electromagnetic (SEMA) as well as differential electromagnetic (DEMA) attacks. The different surveillance methods that are practiced by the US National Security Agency (NSA) are all cited in a classified document the NSA advanced network technology (ANT) catalog, which was famously revealed by Edward Snowden in 2013. ANGRYNEIGHBOR was one of the technologies mentioned in that catalog. This technology and its many variants are attack techniques built on the RF retroreflector attack (RFRA) standard, an active EM side-channel attack [35]. Despite the gravity of this topic, very few publications have taken it upon themselves to discuss it.

Figure 1.1 Side channel attack model [41]
Modern ICs have transistors and interconnections in the millions through which data-dependent current flows. The amplitude of the EM radiation is proportional to the dimension of the current carrying conductor in the circuit under attack. Longer interconnect wires emit greater EM signals, resulting in a higher amount of leakage. As the conducting wires become shorter and narrower, the EM radiation reduces, making it more and more challenging for the assailant to obtain sufficient level of useful information from a distance to perform a successful EM attack. Therefore, utilizing shorter interconnect wires can help in minimizing the unintentional leakage of critical side channel information. While near-field probes could be used to detect emissions in the near field, larger antennas can be used to capture information bearing signals from a distance, making the EM attacks non-invasive. With these factors in mind, distributed on-chip voltage regulators may potentially provide certain inherent security benefits against EM attacks. Besides, tailoring the placement of capacitors in the power delivery network can further mitigate the EM side-channel leakage. In recent years, quite a few techniques have been suggested to implement voltage regulator fully on chip to obtain faster voltage scaling and multiple power islands [7,10].

In recent times, interest has been shifting towards leveraging power delivery network (PDN) as well as on-chip integrated voltage regulator (IVR) as a preventive measure against power analysis attacks. This thesis, for the first time ever, aims to analyze the implications of an on-chip power delivery network (PDN) on EM emissions. Utilizing on-chip voltage regulators enables the utilization of shorter and thinner interconnect wires to deliver power as compared to their off-chip counterparts.

In addition, various design options such as placing voltage regulators close to the cryptographic module and locally delivering power to the crypto circuit through the bottom metal layers are examined in this thesis with the aim of making detection of EM radiation by any probe difficult [11].
The remaining part of the thesis is organized as follows. EM attacks are explained in chapter 2 and the introduction to the on-chip power delivery and AES with the threat model is provided in chapter 3. The evaluation of the security implications is provided in chapter 4. The direction of future work is discussed in chapter 5 and finally the thesis is concluded in chapter 6.
CHAPTER 2: ELECTROMAGNETIC ATTACKS

2.1 Magnetic Field and Electric Field - Revisited

The power consumption of modern day cryptographic circuits is a function of the data that is being processed during encryption or decryption, contributing to the change of EM emanations from cryptographic engines. Today’s integrated systems potentially generate a greater level of side-channel leakage to such attacks due to the high operating frequency, more number of pins serving as external antennas, and higher voltage levels [13]. The variations in power consumption patterns due to switching operations in a crypto circuit lead to these unintentional radiations, which may aid an attacker in obtaining useful information about the encryption algorithm being executed within the target circuit. The radiations are also produced from the inadvertent electromagnetic coupling between different components on a chip [6, 14]. Due to the rapid changes in the current, the EM field surrounding the chip varies and can be monitored by sensitive probes [14]. However, these probes have to be placed in close proximity to the source as the signal is mixed with interference from the neighboring components. In the subsequent sections, we will demonstrate that incorporating on-chip voltage regulators significantly reduces these EM emanations. As the required power is delivered to from the voltage regulators to the load circuits through local, thinner metal lines, the detection of the corresponding EM emanations becomes difficult.

Electromagnetic emanations, just like power signals carry certain information about the information being executed on the circuit. Considering a wire of length L, carrying constant current I, as shown in Fig. 2.1, the magnetic field B is calculated at a point along the middle of the wire at a distance R, using Biot Savart’s Law [12].
Figure 2.1 Magnetic field of current and carrying conductor

\[ B = \frac{\mu_0 I}{4\pi R} \left( \frac{L}{\sqrt{L^2/4 + R}} \right) \]  

where \( \mu_0 \) is the magnetic constant, \( R \) is the distance between the current and the field point while \( I \) is the current carried on a conductor of infinitesimal length.

The electric field generated can be approximated to be a cylindrical Gaussian surface as shown in Fig. 2.2. The Gaussian cylindrical surface is assumed to be coaxial with the wire of radius \( R \) and length \( L \).

\[ \Phi E = E \int dA \approx E(R)(2\pi RL) \]  

where \( E \int dA = Q_{in}/E_0 \) and \( Q_{in} \) is the new charge inside the Gaussian surface \((\lambda L)\).

Additionally, according to Faraday’s law any variation in the surrounding of the loop probe will generate an induced voltage (emf) in the coil:
\[ emf = -N \frac{d\phi}{dt} \]  \hspace{1cm} (3)

\[ d\phi = \int_{\text{surface}} B \cdot dS \]  \hspace{1cm} (4)

where \( N \) is the number of turns in the coil and \( \phi \) the magnetic flux.

When the wire length is significantly greater than the distance, the magnetic field \( B \) can be simplified as:

\[ B = \frac{\mu I}{2\pi d} \alpha_{\phi} \]  \hspace{1cm} (5)

where \( d \) is the spacing between the wire and \( \alpha_{\phi} \) is a unit vector which is azimuthally oriented with respect to the wire. As can be seen from the above equations, the electric and magnetic fields are inversely dependent on the distance among the surface and point of observation (what was observed in our simulation results as well). While these modest equations do not define the
precise conduct of the magnetic field, they highlight two noteworthy points, firstly that the field is
dependent on data and the orientation of the field is dependent on current orientation [36].

2.2 EM Attack Methods

The side-channel information from each device can be retrieved via two methods which are classified based on their approach as:

2.2.1 Active Attack

For these attacks, probes are placed directly onto different parts of the device in order to collect information. These attacks tamper with the outer layer of the device and then analyze its behavior [40].

2.2.2 Passive Attack

This means of attack involves observing leakages and radiations from the device without direct contact or any kind of tampering of the device in order to collect data which can be used to extract confidential information. The passive attack method is dealt with in this work from the EM SCA perspective.

2.3 EM Side Channel Analysis Types

Although they are considered extremely efficient, EM side-channel analyses require extensive technical familiarity of the inside operation of the system on which the cryptography is
executed. These side-channel analyses when classified based on their complexity comes under two broad categories:

### 2.3.1 Simple Side-Channel Analysis

This method of side-channel analysis involves retrieving the key of a cryptographic design by simply picking up a trace and pinpointing the operations and guessing the key based on clocks. This is done mainly through visual inspection.

### 2.3.2 Differential Side-Channel Analysis

This is a more complex method and is used in cases where the direct relationship between the waveform and the key is unknown. This side-channel analysis involves extracting the key through repeated performance of a sequence of steps of statistical analysis. These days, with more sophisticated systems in place, nearly all attacks require this type of analysis [40].

### 2.4 EM Emanation Types

The examination of electromagnetic interferences (EMI) or Radio Frequency Interferences (RFI) in relation with electrical devices is known as Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC). There are generally two types of electromagnetic emissions distinguishable using EMC depending on the type of radiation source, the differential-mode and the common-mode. Differential-mode radiation is produced by loops created by printed circuit traces, components, cables, etc. These loops behave as small circular antennas and ultimately start producing radiations that are quite low and that neither disturb the entire system nor are influenced easily by outside radiations. They can also be avoided quite easily by system shielding [53]. Conversely, common-mode radiations
are generated as a consequence of undesired internal descents in voltage within the circuit which mostly appear in the ground loop. Currents in the ground loop arise due to the unpredictable characteristics of conventional transmitting and receiving circuits. So the outer cables that are contained within the ground loop start behaving as antennas that are energized by some internal voltage drops. Since these voltage drops are unintentional, it is often much harder to identify and control these radiations as compared to differential-mode radiations [37]. From the view point of attacker there are two major types of emanations, known as direct and indirect.

2.4.1 Direct Emanations

During the time taken for the transition among two states, digital devices eventually emit electromagnetic waves at a determined frequency related to the interval of the rise/fall time. These conceding radiations are called direct emanations owing to the fact that they are produced directly by the wire communicating sensitive data [58].

2.4.2 Indirect Emanations

Sometimes new types of emanations are induced through the interaction of electromagnetic radiations and active electronic components. These unintended emissions start appearing as modulations or inter-modulations (amplitude, phase or frequency) or as carrier signals. Oftentimes, conceding modulated emissions are produced by non-linear coupling between carrier signals and sensitive data signals like crosstalk, ground or power supply DC effluence. Compared to direct emanations, these indirect emanations often have better propagation and can thus be intercepted at a greater range. Predicting these emanations are immensely hard and they are usually exposed during compliance tests [37].
2.5 Near-Field and Far-Field Approximations

The electromagnetic behavior of EM emitting sources can be studied by defining near field and far field approximations.

2.5.1 Near Field

With the wave number of \( k = \frac{2\pi}{\lambda} \), the near field region is characterized by \( kr << 1 \) where \( r \) is the space between the source and the probe. This can be written as:

\[
    r \ll \frac{\lambda}{2\pi}
\]

which is typically the maximum distance to be considered in the near field region. Since the magnetic fields are more prominent in near field measurements, large magnetic probes are preferred.

![Figure 2.3 Near field and far field illustration [42]](image-url)
2.5.2 Far Field

As opposed to the near field region, the far field boundary is specified by $k_r >> 1$ which can be written as:

$$r >> \frac{\lambda}{2\pi} \quad (7)$$

This area is controlled by radiated fields where the electric and magnetic fields are at right angle to each other. In far field measurements, both $E$ and $H$ fields can be measured and the larger amplitude of the field makes this measurement easier. A successful EM attack on a smart card from a far field distance of approximately 5 meters has been performed in [2]. Also in [38], authors were able to validate full extraction of ECDSA secret signing keys from OpenSSL and CoreBit coin executing on iOS devices. In these experiments, a shielded environment requires only a few hundred traces, which is analogous to a near field attack. Alternatively, in an unshielded environment, the number of required measurements may increase to a few thousand.

2.6 EM Propagation

Electromagnetic emanations propagate from the source in four ways:

i) Electromagnetic radiation.

ii) Conduction.

iii) Modulation of another signal.

iv) Acoustic signals.

Radiated EM emissions can be seized by using near field probes or antennas at a close proximity. If the amplitude is low, direct radiation should be computed in the near field. Cryptographic chip can be considered to contain multiple radiation sources in the form of current elements.
Accordingly, a cryptographic chip is modeled by replacing small current loops with magnetic dipoles and common mode currents with electric dipoles in [16], considering their very similar field characteristics.

![EM waves propagation](image)

Figure 2.4 EM waves propagation [43]

### 2.7 EM Probe

A diverse range of EM probes is available to choose from for performing an EM side-channel attack. A probe is usually a combination of an amplifier and a sensor. The most commonly used probe is the one with a coil as sensor. Picking a suitable EM probe has a large impact on the captured EM results. Different EM probes have different measured quantities (magnetic H- and B-fields), sensitivities, resolutions and frequency bandwidths. The orientation of this probe needs to equate the course of the originated EM field. Usually, B-field probes have a coil with several windings which provides a robust output signal while the H-field probes have a single winding coil that is electrically shielded. The exact placement of the EM probe above the chip exterior also matters. This is because several processes with different clock frequencies are
running simultaneously in a chip. Another thing that matters is the probe resolution. Probes which have a lesser resolution will pick up EM emanation of executions that are running in neighboring die areas, which will add more noise to the signal being picked. On the other hand, probes with a greater resolution will measure only a fragment of the process being surveyed. The transistor switching period is typically smaller than the clock cycle in most modern chips. In order to capture emissions, the probe bandwidth must be kept to be roughly five times the clock frequency [39].
CHAPTER 3: LEVERAGING ON-CHIP POWER DELIVERY

3.1 Background

In today's hardware market, the demand for very efficient electronics in for all sort of purposes is increasing, different types of countermeasures are being proposed and developed. These measures will always require a power regulation system. This is because they are strongly dependent on power that is very specific with its behavior whatever type of prerequisite they require. The power density is becoming more challenging task for designers as we go down to smaller nodes of technology [64]. This is making the on-chip voltage regulation into a huge and hot research area so that it will be able to cater for small, fast, efficient, robust, and high power-density voltage regulators which will be located very close to the on-die load circuits [9]. The main advantages they bring are faster voltage scaling, reduction in I/O pins of the chip, and improve fine-granularity power distribution techniques [9,19]. The design of voltage regulators on die also calls for new challenges on process and design technologies. On-chip integration of voltage regulators increases complexity and consequently and can take significant design efforts. On-chip integration requires the same process technology as other chip components making it a difficult task as it requires to maintaining high efficiency and excellent performance. The level of integration also increases the chip size [20,52]. In order to have optimum level integration for power delivery, we require to decrease the total area under these devices and yet make sure to do that under acceptable range of power efficiency. The manufacturing cost is directly related to the area needed by the on-chip voltage converter also it is highly desirable to keep the regulator in close proximity of the load [60].
In today's modern circuits, we are mainly using three types of voltage regulators: low dropout regulators, switched capacitor also called charge pump and buck converters [21].

### 3.1.1 Low Dropout Regulators

The most common and simplest solution the power delivery problem is provided by Low Dropout Regulators (LDOs). The power transistor inside an LDO is dependent on a feedback loop that stabilizes its output voltage. These regulators provide a fast response as there is no limitation on the feedback loop other than the stable bandwidth of the error amplifier. The output power to the goes through the power transistor, the density of which is generally controlled by the current density of transistors fabricated in the used technology node. This current density is generally high enough to exceed the current density of the other widely applied topologies. As the differences between the output and input voltages gets higher, the LDO suffers from a significant drop in power efficiency. Thus the dependence of this type of regulator on the $V_{\text{OUT}}/V_{\text{IN}}$ ratio
reduces its efficiency. LDOs are very useful in producing a cleaner output from a noisy power supply [60].

### 3.1.2 Switched Capacitor Converters

These use capacitors in various configurations for delivering power to the output. These types of converters usually start from a charging phase during which capacitors are pumped to a voltage that is pre-determined, as well as a discharging phase when the charge accumulated by the capacitors is delivered to the output. The output voltage levels are regulated using frequency of operation and the duty cycle. In any given configuration, the capacitors charge to a certain voltage, so these converters generally have a distinct ideal conversion ratio which allows them to operate at 100% efficiency. The large size of the capacitor in this topology, which occupies a greater than desired area on the chip hinders the efficiency of on-chip implementation and is a significant disadvantage. If the capacitor size is reduced, less charge may be stored in it, and thus less charge is available to the load [60].

### 3.1.3 Buck Converters

The inductor current and its direction in these inductance based converters can be adjusted to generate a precise output voltage. The standard method for regulating the current flow through the inductance employs a pair of power transistors. One is connected to the supply voltage while the other is connected to ground. In this topology, the output voltage is generated when the switching activity causes a changing current to flow through the inductance. This switching activity produces some ripple voltage in the output. There are also some serious concerns in the usage of this configuration in the case of on-chip implementation. The inductor in this topology occupies a large area, which is a major shortcoming. The size of all the filters needs
to be much reduced because the regulator is integrated on-chip, which results in higher switching frequencies, significantly reducing the efficiency of the regulator [60].

IBM uses a distributed on-chip power delivery network in the POWER8 processor where the entire die has more than 750 ultra-small voltage regulators [24]. Intel utilizes a fully integrated voltage regulator (FIVR) architecture to adaptively change the number of active phases within a buck converter dependent on the workload to maximize power efficiency over a wide current range [25]. One of the properties of distributed on-chip power delivery that will be investigated in this thesis is that the distance between the voltage regulator and load circuit (i.e., cryptographic circuit) becomes significantly smaller. Alternatively, voltage regulator delivers the voltage closer to the point of load (i.e. in close proximity to the load circuits) [56]. Since the current does not travel long distances, the regulated power can be distributed using semi-global and partly local power grid lines to minimize the voltage drop across the metal vias, as illustrated in Fig. 3.1. Already some work has been published regarding utilization of on-chip voltage regulators as an effective countermeasure against power side channel attack [44 - 50] however, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first one to investigate it from the EM SCA perspective.

Figure 3.2 Leveraging local power delivery reduces EM emanations originating from the power delivery network.
When the power is delivered through thinner metal lines as shown in figure 3.2 at significantly closer distances, our hypothesis is that the EM emanations are expected to be significantly mitigated. There are four intuitive explanations [54]:

i) The amount of current will be significantly smaller.

ii) The cross-section of the wires carrying current will be thinner.

iii) The local metal lines may be farther from the probe.

iv) The higher metal layer may partially act as a shield to reduce the EM radiation from the lower metal lines.

In this thesis, we validate our hypothesis with extensive HFSS simulations, as explained in next chapters. The simulation of EM SCA attacks on crypto-circuits requires certain number of EM traces to be observed easily by a nearby placed EM field probe, which needs to be further analyzed during perilous execution cycles of different encryptions. Once the attacker captures the traces, the susceptibility of the hardware design to different EM SCA attacks can be explored.

3.2 Working of AES

AES has been in widespread use since 1999 for symmetric cryptography. It is a substitution-permutation network, has a fixed block size of 128 bits and uses 128, 192 or 256-bit keys [59]. The number of transformation rounds that the unencrypted text undergoes in order to produce the cipher depends upon the key size. AES has a well-known flaw in that there is side-channel leakage at the final transformation round. In ASIC operation, a register is utilized for the AES state to be kept in at the end of each round; consequently, the round key which is used in the last round can be inferred by working the side-channel leaks when this register is updated. It is assumed in this work that the EM emission produced by the AES circuit depends on how many transitions there are at the state register and at the same time, the hamming distance between the values on the state register.
This model is valid since the amount of current that is drawn by the AES circuit is dependent on the number of CMOS logic gate transitions [61].

Figure 3.3 AES flow chart [61]

3.3 Threat Model

A threat is defined as a situation or occurrence with the likely to reason harm to a system in the form of obliteration, disclosure, modification of data, and/or denial of service [55]. In our threat model, the targets are cryptographic circuits, which are running confidential information on the chip. The goal of the attacker is to learn information that s/he normally has no valid access to, e.g., the secret keys. For the EM side channel attacks, the attacker typically needs little capabilities [57]. The measurement setup for EM attacks consists of a sensor or antenna, analog preprocessing equipment, analog to digital converter, and a cable connection.
Many near field probes such as integrated inductors, hard disk heads, magnetic probes, and solenoids have been described in literature. The use of far field antennas like biconical antennas, discone antennas, and the folded dipole antennas have also been mentioned [14]. We assume that the secret keys are stored in the device and the attacker does not physically invade the device by decapsulation or touching the chip with the probe. The attacker can achieve his objectives without necessarily finding or exploiting system faults, but rather just running the normal process and performing reasonable operations. We also assume that the target device is at the disposal of attacker, and will like to operate it for multiple times, possibly with input values of his likeness. In addition, during the processing, the attacker will be able to extract the device’s electromagnetic field pattern [18].

Figure 3.4 Measurement setup [62]
CHAPTER 4: EVALUATION MODEL

4.1 Simulation Setup

The implications of delivering power through the off-chip and on-chip voltage regulators on the amplitude of EM emissions are presented with extensive simulations in HFSS [26]. Driven Modal type simulation is selected in the HFSS to compute the modal-based S parameters in terms of power. The S matrix solutions are articulated in terms of the incident and reflected powers of the waveguide modes. An excitation port permits energy to in and out of the structure. For this model, a lumped port is chosen as the excitation port. The local/global power grids are modeled based on the metal layer parameters in [27]. The solution frequency is chosen as 1 GHz. The frequency is swept from 400 MHz to 6 GHz with the step size of 0.1 GHz, where the rest of the data at intermediate frequencies is interpolated. The maximum number of adaptive passes allowed is 20 and the extreme change in the scale of S parameters between two successive passes (Delta S) is 0.02. The S parameters are plotted in the 2D Cartesian plane. The antenna used as a near field probe is a loop antenna with a circumference of 600 um.

Table 4.1 Simulation parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Simulator</th>
<th>High Frequency Electromagnetic Field Simulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incident and reflected power</td>
<td>S matrix solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution frequency</td>
<td>1 GHz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>400 MHz – 6 GHz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step size</td>
<td>0.1 GHz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near field probe model</td>
<td>Loop antenna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circumference</td>
<td>600 um</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2 Effects of the Size of the Power Grid and Distance from the Probe

While the highest two metal layers (eighth and ninth) are considered to form the global power grid, the lower metal layers (third and fourth) are considered to form the local power grid. We first analyze the emanations when a probe is placed at the top of the circuit. The emanations from the local and global power grid lines are extracted when the distance of the near field probe to the chip is swept from 25 um to 150 um, as shown respectively, in Figs. 4.1 and 4.2. The lengths of the local and global power grid lines are, respectively, 100 um and 250 um. The amplitude of the EM emissions from both the global and local grids to the probe increases with frequency and with a reduction in the distance from the probe.

Table 4.2 EM Emanations from local vs global grid at varying probe distance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance from probe (um)</th>
<th>Local grid (dB)</th>
<th>Global grid (dB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>-104.4053</td>
<td>-70.4994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>-122.6810</td>
<td>-79.5490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>-132.9984</td>
<td>-95.3681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>-144.0217</td>
<td>-108.4753</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The EM emanations from the global power grid lines are, however, more than 25 dB (up to 34 dB) greater than the EM emanations from the local power grid lines, as summarized in Table 4.2. The primary reason is that the thinner interconnect wires cause lower EM emanations as compared to the thicker global lines.

Next, the EM emanations from the local and global power grid lines with various lengths have been simulated. For the same probe distance of 50 um, the EM emanations from the local grid are reduced by almost 40 dB as compared to the global grids, as seen from Figs. 4.3 and
4.4, due to shorter wire lengths. For the same interconnect length of 85 um, the emission from the local grid is almost 35 dB lower than the emanations from the global grid due to thinner dimensions of the wires. Typically, the length of the global interconnect is roughly equivalent to the size of the die (1-2 mm). As seen from Table 4.3, even for an interconnect length of 250 um, the EM emission is approximately -79.5490 dB, which is significantly larger than that from the local grid which are of much smaller lengths.

So far, we assumed that the attack is performed from the top of the chip as the signal strength in this case is significantly higher and the attacker would require less post processing elaboration. To verify this assumption the probe was moved to the bottom of the chip to capture and compare the electromagnetic traces. The probe was placed at a distance of 100 um from both the local and global interconnects. The simulation were rerun and we get the results mentioned on next page. The captured EM emanations are shown in Fig. 4.5, which confirms our above mentioned hypothesis.
Table 4.3 EM emanations from the local and global power grids to a probe for different wire lengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wire length (um)</th>
<th>Local grid emissions (dB)</th>
<th>Global grid emissions (dB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>-127.1706</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>-125.6433</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>-123.8549</td>
<td>-88.4574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-86.4093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-84.0472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-79.5490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When capturing the EM emanations from the bottom, there is a decrease of 8 dB in emissions from global interconnect wires. The increased distance and shielding from the substrate are the two main reasons for this drop. The emissions from the local wires however are increased. This is because the probe is now relatively closer to the wires as compared to the previous case when the probe was placed at the top of the chip. The emanations from the global wires can still be seen to be higher than the emanations from the local wires, which supports our claim that on chip regulation will significantly improve the security.

Figure 4.5 EM emissions comparison of local and global grids at 100 um.
The comparison can also be seen in Table 4.4, for the interconnect length of 100 um, the EM emission from global grid is -103.4635 dB, which is significantly higher than the local grid of the same length.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probe position</th>
<th>Local grid (dB)</th>
<th>Global grid (dB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top</td>
<td>-132.9984</td>
<td>-95.3681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom</td>
<td>-114.6810</td>
<td>-103.4635</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.3 Security Implication of the Implemented Design

Although we have discussed the reduction in the signal strength in the previous sections, the security implications as a function of the signal strength are explained in this section. This section validates our discussion with mathematical calculations performed under the same scenarios stated in the previous sections.

Assuming that \( P_S \) is the power of the EM signal without the proposed countermeasure, \( P_N \) is the measured power noise, and \( P_S \) is the power of the signal with countermeasure,

\[
10 \log \frac{P_S}{P_N} - 10 \log \frac{P_S^2}{P_N} = 33 \\
10 \left( \log P_S - \log P_N - \log P_S^2 + \log P_N \right) = 33 \\
10 \log \frac{P_S}{P_S^2} = 33 \\
\frac{P_S}{P_S^2} = 1995
\]

Signal to noise ratio (SNR) is a degree of how much useful information there is in a system.
\[
SNR_1 = Var \frac{PS_1}{P_N} \quad \text{With Countermeasure}
\]
\[
SNR_2 = Var \frac{PS_2}{P_N} \quad \text{Without Countermeasure}
\]
\[
SNR_2 = SNR_1 \frac{Var (PS_2)}{Var (PS_1)} = SNR_1 \frac{1}{1995}
\]

SNR has a relationship with the correlation coefficient given by the following equation:

\[
Correlation \gamma = \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 + \frac{1}{SNR}}}
\]

From the security perspective, we are interested in computing the number of plaintexts that are mandatory to have a fruitful attack with a success rate of 0.9 as a function of the correlation coefficient value [28]. We witnessed that the quantity of plaintexts with a success rate of \(N_{0.9}\) required to perform a correlation analysis attack can be expected with [28].

\[
N_{0.9} \approx C \times \frac{1}{\gamma^2} = C \left( 1 + \frac{1}{SNR_2} \right)
\]
\[
\approx \frac{C}{SNR_2} = \frac{C}{SNR_1} \times (1995)^2
\]

where \(C\) is a constant reliant on the numeral of key guesses considered and the necessary success rate. The enhancement in the measurement to disclosure (MTD) value comes out to be \((1995)^2\) which is considered a significant improvement. Similarly, from Table 4.4 it can be observed that the EM emanations from the global interconnect is approximately 11 dB higher than that captured from the local grid. Using this result and following the same procedure:

\[
10 \log_{10} \frac{PS_1}{PS_2} = 11
\]
\[
\frac{PS_1}{PS_2} = 13
\]
\[
N_{0.9} \approx C \times \frac{1}{\gamma^2} = \frac{C}{SNR_1} \times (13)^2
\]
It is observed that the MTD enhancement ratio is not decreased significantly if the attack is performed from the bottom. This is primarily because when captured from the bottom, the EM emanations by the global grid is decreased but increased by the local grid, due to the close proximity to the measuring probe.

Although the MTD enhancement ratio is significantly larger for the attacks that are performed from the top side, the EM signal strength is still larger when the attack is performed from the top side as compared to the bottom side. The focus of this thesis is to reduce the emanations from the top side to make the EM side channel attack difficult to perform. We have shown that using on-chip voltage regulators, EM emissions are reduced by 33 dB and the MTD enhancement ratio is increased by a factor of (1995)$^2$. In the following sections, two techniques will be discussed which will further reduce the EM emissions from the top probe, making the attack even more difficult to perform.

4.4 Shielding with MIM Capacitor

Sheet metal is typically used for shielding EM radiation. Copper absorbs radio and magnetic waves and is used for RF shielding [29,51]. The electric field in EM radiation produces forces on the electrons in the conductor, which causes displacement of charges inside the conductor and cancels the applied field. Similarly, magnetic fields produce eddy currents inside the conductor which reflect the electromagnetic radiation from the surface.

However, due to the electrical resistivity of the conductor, the excited field does not completely cancels the applied field. Any holes in the shield must be significantly smaller than the wavelength of the radiation that is trying to be kept out. Holes bigger than the wavelength allow the current to flow around them so the incident wave does not excite the opposing electromagnetic fields [30]. High frequencies (100MHz- 40 GHz) are extremely sensitive to gaps in the shielding enclosure. Also, due to the ferromagnetic response of the conductors to low frequency magnetic
field, these fields are not completely mitigated by the conductor. All these factors reduce the shielding capability of a conductor [30].

EM shielding also occurs due to absorption. The loss due to absorption is proportional to the thickness of the shield, and is because of the presence of electric or magnetic dipoles, which interact with the fields in the incident radiation. Shielding can also occur due to multiple reflections from the conductor surface. The loss due to multiple reflections is directly related to the surface area of the shield where a larger interface area increases the radiation loss. At higher frequencies, electromagnetic radiation penetrates only the near surface of an electrical conductor which is known as skin effect [31,59].

Accordingly, we experimented with MIM capacitors and investigated the effectiveness of MIM capacitors on minimizing the EM emanations from the local power grids, as illustrated in Fig. 4.6. MIM capacitors are typically implemented between the fifth and sixth metal layers, making them physically appropriate to shield the local power grid lines which use the third and fourth metal layers in our simulations. Fig. 4.7 shows the effect of using an MIM capacitor to shield the local power grid. As tabulated in Table 4.5, the MIM shielding leads to a reduction in the EM
emission by almost 3 dB at the solution frequency of 1 GHz. The MIM shielding therefore does not significantly reduce the EM emanations from the local power grid lines. The primary reason is that the MIM shield, while blocking some of the radiation, may boost the emanations by creating a certain amount of current due to the inductive coupling form the local power grid. The generated inductive current therefore negates the shielding effects of the MIM capacitors.

![Graph showing reduction in EM emission due to shielding effect of the MIM capacitor.](image)

Figure 4.7 Reduction in EM emission due to shielding effect of the MIM capacitor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solution frequency (GHz)</th>
<th>EM without shielding (dB)</th>
<th>EM with shielding (dB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-104.4053</td>
<td>-107.7182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4.5 Effect of Upper Metal Layers on the EM Emanations from Lower Layers**

The effects of higher metal layers on the EM emanations from the lower metal layers to a probe are investigated. As shown in Fig. 4.8, due to the inductive coupling between the different metal layers located close to each other, the EM radiation emitted by the lower metal layer increased by a small amount (~2.7 dB) at the solution frequency of 1 GHz as shown in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6 EM comparison with upper layer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solution frequency (GHz)</th>
<th>EM without upper metal layer (dB)</th>
<th>EM with upper metal layer (dB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-104.4053</td>
<td>-101.4948</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to the presence of gaps in the upper metal layers which are almost as large as the wavelength of the incoming radiation, the upper layers do not act as an effective shield and fail in attenuating the incident radiation. Instead, because of the magnetic field generated in the lower layer, a small current is induced in the upper layer, which further creates an additional electromagnetic field that is coupled with the one generated by the lower metal layer. As a result, the upper metal layers, if no intentional current is flowing, would even boost the EM emanations from the local power grids by a small amount (i.e. ~2.7 dB).

![Image](image.png)

Figure 4.8 Effect of the global grid on the emanations from the local power grid.

4.6 Discussion

The primary issue of delivering power through the local interconnect lines is the increased impedance of the local interconnect as their cross-sectional area is lower than that of the global power interconnect lines. The physical distance from a local voltage regulator to a load circuit is considerably reduced as associated to the distance from an on-chip regulator to an on-chip load circuit. Additionally, the power provided by an on-chip voltage regulator also needs to go through
the package and/or board level interconnects as well as the pad/pin parasitic impedance. As compared to going through all of these parasitic impedances, the output power of a localized on-chip voltage regulator only needs to travel small distances. Considering these differences between the on-chip voltage regulators and distributed on-chip voltage regulators, delivering the required power through lower metal lines to the circuits at close proximity would not cause significant amount of noise. Additionally, the power output of each individual distributed voltage regulator is considerably smaller than that of the on-chip regulators, making it possible for the localized regulated power to be delivered through the local power grid lines.
CHAPTER 5: FUTURE WORK

So far we have mainly utilized on-chip voltage regulators to counter the actual EM emanations of the cryptographic circuit from a malicious attacker. However, as mentioned before, some of the assumption made were over simplified. We plan to address them in our future work. We will do so by simulating all the scenarios from the bottom side in order to have a better understanding about the protection level of on-chip voltage regulators. Also since this type of attack is non-invasive, post looking at the chip package dimensions, we will redo the simulations sweeping around 1 mm probe distance.

![Figure 6.1 EM emanations captured from 1 mm distance](image)

We also plan to sweep certain parameters like MIM capacitor dimensions along all three axis, try different type of material types for the capacitor/dielectric and also sweep the capacitor distance from the local/global grids. We also plan to stack multiple capacitors on top of each other and get an idea about the improvement in shielding. We will look into how changing one or more
than one of the above mentioned parameters change the shielding effectiveness of the MIM capacitor. The shielding effectiveness (SE) is equal to ratio quantities at the receptor without the shield and with shield:

\[
SE_{\text{dB}} = 20 \log_{10} \frac{EM_1}{EM_2}
\]

where, \(EM_1\) represents emanation at the receptor without shielding body, \(EM_2\) denote the emanations at the receptor with a shielding barrier (MIM) between the emitter and receptor. This formula is valid as long as the thickness of the shield is much less than a skin depth, \(\delta\), where the skin depth is defined as follows:

\[
\delta = \sqrt{\frac{2}{\omega \mu \sigma}}
\]

We also plan to sweep the local/global grid dimensions for more accurate and realistic assumptions. Right now the dimensions used were from [27] which is around a decade old technology standards. Since then, with the rapid development of nanoscale integrated circuits (ICs), the thickness of interconnects has been decreased dramatically. Moving forward we will model our local and global grids according to the information provided in [63]. This will provide us more accurate and realistic results.

Lastly we plan to replace MIM capacitor with other available on chip passive devices like inductor and see what impact they create on the captured EM emanations by the attacker.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

In this work, the implications of distributed on-chip power delivery on EM side channel attacks are investigated. The key idea is the observation that on-chip voltage regulators can utilize shorter and thinner local interconnect wires, and the EM emissions from the circuit would be considerably lower than those from circuits using on-chip voltage regulators which have to utilize thicker global wires. A 33 and 11 dB reduction in the EM emanations from top and bottom can be achieved, respectively, when distributed on-chip voltage regulators are utilized instead of on-chip voltage regulators. In the analysis, we are able to simulate global grid up to 0.25 mm length due to computational complexity of the simulation with longer wires. With typical global grids having lengths of 1-2 mm, the EM radiation will be significantly higher than local grids when captured from either top or bottom. We also demonstrate that shielding a cryptographic circuit with MIM capacitors can further decrease the emission of EM side channel information by less than 3 dB.
REFERENCES


https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=20417753


APPENDIX A: COPYRIGHT PERMISSIONS

Significant part of this thesis is based on our previously published work.

Title: Implications of Distributed On-Chip Power Delivery on EM Side-Channel Attacks
Conference: Computer Design (ICCD), 2017
Proceedings: IEEE International Conference on
Author: Ahmed Waheed Khan
Publisher: IEEE
Date: Nov. 2017
Copyright © 2017, IEEE

Thesis / Dissertation Reuse
The IEEE does not require individuals working on a thesis to obtain a formal reuse license, however, you may print out this statement to be used as a permission grant:

Requirements to be followed when using any portion (e.g., figure, graph, table, or textual material) of an IEEE copyrighted paper in a thesis:

1) In the case of textual material (e.g., using short quotes or referring to the work within these papers) users must give full credit to the original source (author, paper, publication) followed by the IEEE copyright line © 2011 IEEE.
2) In the case of illustrations or tabular material, we require that the copyright line © [Year of original publication] IEEE appear prominently with each reprinted figure and/or table.
3) If a substantial portion of the original paper is to be used, and if you are not the senior author, also obtain the senior author's approval.

Requirements to be followed when using an entire IEEE copyrighted paper in a thesis:

1) The following IEEE copyright credit notice should be placed prominently in the references: © [year of original publication] IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from [author names, paper title, IEEE publication title, and month/year of publication]
2) Only the accepted version of an IEEE copyrighted paper can be used when posting the paper or your thesis online.
3) In placing the thesis on the author’s university website, please display the following message in a prominent place on the website: In reference to IEEE copyrighted material which is used with permission in this thesis, the IEEE does not endorse any of [university/educational entity's name goes here]'s products or services. Internal or personal use of this material is permitted. If interested in reprinting/publishing IEEE copyrighted material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution, please go to http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/rights_link.html to learn how to obtain a License from RightsLink.

If applicable, University Microfilms and/or ProQuest Library, or the Archives of Canada may supply single copies of the dissertation.
The following is the copyright permission notice for Fig. 2.3 and 2.4 of Chapter 2.

The following is the copyright permission notice for Fig. 3.3 of Chapter 3.
The following is the copyright permission notice for Fig. 3.4 of Chapter 3.