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Cause Placement: A Conceptual Framework and Empirical Findings

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Cause Placement: A Conceptual Framework and Empirical Findings

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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DEDICATION

I owe enormous gratitude to the cherished people in my life without whom this work would not have been accomplished. This dissertation is dedicated to them. To my parents, Rawya and Alaa, thank you for your love, encouragement, and prayers, and for always valuing my education and career endeavors. To my husband, Mohamed, thank you for your love, support, and patience, and for taking such a genuine interest in my work. To my children, Nada and Nour, thank you for making the days brighter with your endless love. To my siblings and siblings-in-law, Ahmed, Amr, Hoda, Dana, Amira, and Mahmoud, thank you for being my faithful cheerleaders every step of the way.
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ABSTRACT

The use of embedded marketing, the practice of seamlessly integrating advertising messages into entertainment vehicles, continues to grow as media consumption shifts to on-demand forms, and reaching audiences with traditional advertising becomes more challenging. This dissertation investigates cause placement, the term proposed for the social marketing equivalent of product placement, the more widely known form of embedded marketing. Cause placement is the promotion of pro-social causes by verbally and/or visually inserting related elements into entertainment programming. Cause placement merits its own stream of research, because consumers are expected to react differently to the placement of social issues than to the placement of commercial products. However, cause placement has enjoyed little empirical research. This two-essay dissertation proposes a theoretical framework for the relationship between six independent variables, three of which have not been previously investigated in the embedded marketing research, on three dependent variables that measure the effectiveness of cause placement. The independent variables are placement modality, placement centrality, programming genre, image of the character, consistency of the behavior, and brandedness of the cause. The dependent variables are recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause. Each of the two essays tests a portion of the proposed framework.

Essay 1 (Chapter 4) investigates the effects of brandedness of the cause and placement modality on the three dependent variables using a 2 (branded/unbranded) by 3 (verbal/visual/both) between-subjects design. As hypothesized, a branded cause was found to yield better recall than an unbranded one regardless of modality. Contrary to expectations however, there was no
interaction effect between modality and brandedness on attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause. The branded cause resulted in higher attitudes than the unbranded ones, and there were no significant differences among the groups for intention to support the cause, likely due to a ceiling effect reached because of the familiar cause used. The pattern of results plotted for attitude toward the cause was in the predicted direction, such that for the unbranded conditions the both verbal and visual modality had the highest attitude while for the branded conditions the opposite was true.

Essay 2 (Chapter 5) investigates the effect of image of the character and consistency of the behavior on the three dependent variables using a 2 (“good guy”/”bad guy”) by 2 (consistent/inconsistent) between-subjects design. As hypothesized, recall of the cause was higher when the main character’s behavior was consistent with his personality, regardless of the image of the character. Also as predicted, there was an interaction effect between image of the character and consistency of the behavior, such that attitude toward the cause was higher for consistent than inconsistent behavior when the image of the character was “bad guy,” but there was no significant difference in attitude toward the cause for consistent versus inconsistent behavior, when the image of the character was “good guy.” The analogous pattern hypothesized for intention to support the cause did not hold, however, perhaps due to the moral obligation that participants may have felt to follow the promoted behavior regardless of their personal attitude toward the cause. Limitations for both essays are discussed, as well as areas for future research.
CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

Marketers face an increasingly challenging environment as they advertise and promote their brands. In particular traditional media advertising, in the form of short television spots and print ads, for example, no longer commands a captive audience, as viewers practice “zipping” (fast-forwarding through ads on programs pre-recorded on their DVRs) and “zapping” (avoiding commercials by switching channels as soon as ads appear) (Belch and Belch 2012). Similarly, newspaper readership continues to decline steadily as it has for the past decade. (Edmonds, Guskin, and Rosenstiel 2011). Marketers address these trends in various ways, such as the allocation of more advertising dollars to interactive and social media (Belch and Belch 2012). Another practice that continues to grow as the effectiveness of traditional advertising becomes less certain is that of embedded marketing. Embedded marketing, sometimes also referred to as “entertainment marketing” involves seamlessly inserting promotions, or embedding them, “within entertainment vehicles such as films, video and personal computer games, television and print media sports coverage or television shows” (Hackley and Tiwsakul 2006, p. 64). A widely-practiced and -researched form of embedded marketing is product placement, whereby brands are integrated, visually and/or verbally, in television shows or movies in return for cash or other compensation (d’Astous and Séguin 1999; Gould and Gupta1997). Indeed, Nielson (2011) reports that the number of major primetime product placements increased by a massive 22% between 2006 and 2010.
A second form of embedded marketing, namely “entertainment education” (Kaiser Foundation 2004), similar to what this dissertation proposes to term “cause placement,” has emerged as a tool for social marketing. Social marketing is “the application of commercial marketing technologies to the analysis, planning, execution, and evaluation of programs designed to influence the voluntary behavior of target audiences in order to improve their personal welfare and that of their society” (Andreasen 1995, p.7). Kotler and Lee (2008, p. 7) propose an alternative, though similar, definition: “a process that applies marketing principles and techniques to create, communicate, and deliver value in order to influence target audience behaviors that benefit society (public health, safety, the environment, and communities), as well as the target audience.”

Thus the aim of social marketing is to promote pro-social causes or issues, or ones that benefit the welfare of society. Recycling, exercising the right to vote, and preventing breast cancer by undergoing screenings are all pro-social causes. Pro-social causes may or may not be linked to one specific organization, whether governmental or non-profit. For example, breast cancer screening has a close affiliation with the Susan G. Komen Foundation. Other pro-social causes and issues do not have a link with a single particular organization, but have any number of organizations promoting them. For example, EarthShare, the US Environmental Protection Agency, and many other organizations promote recycling. Cause placement is thus the practice of promoting pro-social causes and issues by inserting related elements into entertainment vehicles, either visually (such as by showing the logo of the organization promoting the cause), verbally (such as through a mention of the social issue by an actor), or both (such as by inserting audiovisual actions related to the cause into the script). The best cause placements do not feel forced or contrived, but appear as a natural part of the script or the scene. Cause placement often
takes the form of a demonstration of a pro-social behavior being performed, such as when a character drops an empty bottle into the recycling bin. However, merely showing a logo (such as the three-arrow recycling sign) in the background is also a form of cause placement.

Cause placement is an especially befitting term, because it is analogous to its commercial marketing counterpart “product placement.” NBCUniversal recently coined a similar term denoting the same concept, “behavior placement,” in its efforts to purposely integrate pro-environmental messages and storylines into various programs, as one part of its sustainability initiative, “Green is Universal” (Chozick 2010). This initiative has resulted in characters speaking about the issue, as when Dwight obsessively, and humorously, promoted recycling on The Office, and in other ways of highlighting the social issue within the script, as when the hospital staff on Mercy held an organized group bike ride to exercise while reducing their carbon footprint. The idea was to place the cause into the programming in order to highlight and promote it, hence the expression “cause placement.” “Cause placement” seems more accurate than “behavior placement” because the placement does not necessarily entail any particular behavior on the part of the actors. The placement may be visual and passing if, for example, only a logo of the organization promoting the cause is shown in the background.

Initiatives such as those that NBCUniversal has undertaken point to the current timeliness of studying cause placement. It is no surprise that social marketing organizations, whose reason for existence is to promote pro-social causes and issues, are inherently interested in cause placement. However, what is more surprising and what makes this an especially opportune time to study cause placement, is that producers and other entities in the entertainment media are now showing increased eagerness from their side to collaborate on these efforts, especially as the idea of the importance of corporate social responsibility continues to proliferate (e.g., Carroll 1999;
Porter and Kramer 2006). This interest comes both from media production conglomerates such as NBCUniversal and Warner Bros., who inserted anti-drug messages into the popular show ER, and from industry associations such as the Entertainment Industries Council, who has presented awards to programs for their efforts in practicing cause placement (Nida 2003). However, there is neither a conceptual model nor adequate empirical research to guide this growing interest.

Cause placement exists since at least 1988, when the Harvard School of Public Health’s National Designated Driver Campaign began an initiative to incorporate the designated driver concept into programming (Kaiser Foundation 2004). Just as commercial marketers view product placement as an additional promotional tool through which to reach audiences, social marketers use cause placement to extend and diversify their arsenal of techniques. However, as Evans (2008) aptly summarizes, cause placement, relative to other promotional tools, is particularly useful in social marketing because: 1.) it makes it easier to reach and influence audiences that are otherwise difficult to reach, such as children or illiterate individuals, and 2.) it serves as a counteractive force to negative messages that audiences are exposed to in the media, such as the attractiveness of smoking or unhealthy diets.

Despite its use as a promotional tool for social marketing, there is little academic empirical research and no controlled experimental research, in the area of cause placement. Rather, as Chapter 2 details, most of the literature on the topic describes anecdotal findings or involves limited case studies. For example, Boumon, Maas, and Kok (1998) evaluated the effectiveness of embedding cardiovascular health messages into a Dutch TV drama. Similarly, Obregón (2005) conducted focus groups and in-depth interviews with viewers of Colombian soap operas addressing HIV/AIDS issues, in order to assess the viewers’ degree of engagement and motivation to change their behavior based on the characters’ experiences. There are a few
instances of works that have attempted to address the theoretical underpinnings of cause placement. For example, Moyer-Gusé (2008) provided a conceptual analysis of mechanisms, including identification and parasocial interaction with the characters, by which cause placement may succeed. Singhal and Rogers (2002) proposed a theoretical agenda for cause placement, suggesting a series of questions that researchers studying the topic should seek to answer. However, these scholars stop short of constructing a comprehensive conceptual framework to explicate the relationship between the various executional factors of cause placement and the measures of its effectiveness, and finding empirical support for such a framework. Without controlled experimental research, and a comprehensive theoretical framework, social marketers’ practice of cause placement will not be based on empirical research findings that are in turn grounded in theory. Rather, cause placement will be based on anecdote or unsubstantiated logic of practitioners. Moreover, without empirical research in cause placement, social marketers do not have a basis on which to formulate a cause placement strategy, making decisions regarding which types of programs to use, characters to employ for the placements, and modality of the placements, among others. The current work is an attempt to begin to fill these gaps, starting with a theoretical foundation for cause placement, on the basis of which controlled experimental research may be conducted, leading in turn to managerial implications, and thus is of relevance to academics and practitioners in the field.

Furthermore, the findings in the product placement literature cannot be assumed to apply to cause placement. While both product placement and cause placement are forms of embedded marketing, the placed entities (commercial products vs. social causes) are categorically different. This situation is analogous to the case of goods and services. While both goods and services are products, marketing scholars recognized in the 1970s and early 1980s that it would be beneficial
to address the specific questions that service marketing posed separately. For example, Lovelock (1981) argued that “generic differences,” such as intangibility, and “contextual differences,” such as differential government regulation, make services different enough from goods to merit a separate research stream. Indeed, while research on goods marketing and service marketing overlaps, and while the two streams can benefit from one another, it proved useful to dedicate an independent stream of research to services marketing (e.g., Murray 1991; Zeithaml, Parasuraman, et al. 1985). By the same token, while cause placement can make some use of the research already done in the area of product placement, the former would benefit from a separate stream of research. This is in large part because, as Chapter 2 outlines, there is evidence in the affect and altruism motivation literatures that in some cases consumers would be expected to react differently to the placement of social issues than to the placement of commercial products.

Only through sound empirical investigation can social marketers begin to understand the true utility of cause placement and to use it effectively to the benefit of the social issues they promote. The purpose of this dissertation is thus to propose a conceptual framework for cause placement message factors, and test the parts of that framework that might provide the most useful insights to social marketers. The dissertation addresses the following foundational research questions:

1. What executional factors (independent variables) impact the outcomes of cause placement as a promotional tool for social issues?

2. How do the various decisions about the executional factors (levels of the independent variables) that social marketers make when placing causes in television shows affect recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause?
Thus the aim of the dissertation is to identify and explicate the independent variables that are relevant to the outcomes of cause placement, and investigate the effects of manipulating some of these independent variables on recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause.

In undertaking these research questions, the dissertation makes several theoretical, methodological, and managerial contributions. In the theoretical arena, this work: 1.) outlines the foundational basis for separating research on cause placement from research on product placement, and 2.) provides a viable conceptual framework for the effects of cause placement message factors on recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause, combining variables that have previously been investigated in embedded marketing research with ones that have not been studied, and that will be particularly relevant to social marketing. In doing so, the dissertation builds upon a number of established theories and models, including the persuasion knowledge model (Friestad and Wright 1994), social learning theory (Bandura 1977), the excitation transfer theory (Zillman 1971), the social intuitionist model of moral judgment (Haidt 2001), the theory of moral development (Kohlberg 1971), the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975), human associative memory theory (Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968), the dual-coding model of information processing (Paivio 1986), the cognitive-experiential self theory (Epstein 1990), and congruity theory (Osgood and Tanenbaum 1955). Thus, the theoretical contribution lies in the proposition of a new framework for the effects of cause placement message factors on recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause, and clarifying why frameworks designed to describe product placement effects are not applicable in this context.
With regard to methodological contributions, the dissertation uses a unique type of storyboard in an experimental design. Storyboards have been used in advertising research (e.g., Escalas and Luce 2004; Labroo and Lee 2006), but this method has not been put to use in the product placement literature. Moreover, the dissertation relies on a novel type of storyboard, dubbed a “rough video,” wherein participants view a slideshow of the scenes of the mock TV program, with voiceover and narration performed by professional actors. This novel type of stimulus is more accessible and less cost-prohibitive than mock sitcoms created specifically for the study, but also allows for more control and thus more internal validity as compared to using ready-made programming in the stimuli. With regard to managerial contributions, this work provides guidance for social marketers when collaborating with entertainment producers, in decisions relating to, for example, the use of brand marks and the consistency of the placed behavior with the character’s personality.

The structure of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 provides a detailed review of the embedded marketing literature, including the history of the practice, its theoretical underpinnings, extant research findings on product placement, and current practices and findings, though mostly anecdotal, in cause placement. Perhaps most importantly, Chapter 2 will demonstrate why findings in the product placement literature are unlikely to apply seamlessly to cause placement, by providing evidence from the altruistic motivation and affect literatures that shows why consumers’ responses to messages relating to social causes will likely differ categorically from their responses to messages relating to commercial products. Chapter 3 proposes a conceptual framework for cause placement factors and dependent variables, outlining the relationships between these factors (placement modality, placement centrality, consistency of the behavior, programming genre, and image of the character, and brandedness of the cause) and
the dependent variables (recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause). Chapter 4 (Essay 1) reports an empirical study that investigates the relationship between placement modality and brandedness of the cause, and the outcome variables outlined. Chapter 5 (Essay 2) reports an empirical study that investigates the relationship between consistency of the behavior and image of the character, and the outcome variables outlined. Chapter 6 summarizes the findings of both essays and their managerial, theoretical, and methodological implications, and makes suggestions for future research.

References


CHAPTER TWO:
BACKGROUND ON EMBEDDED MARKETING

While Chapter 1 defined embedded marketing, and provided an overview of the dissertation, the purpose of Chapter 2 is threefold. First, the chapter provides detailed background relating to why embedded marketing came about, and in particular, what influence mechanisms it relies on. Second, the chapter presents a detailed literature review of embedded marketing, including history and major findings for each of product placement and cause placement. Third, Chapter 2 provides a review of literature relevant to the distinctions between cause placement and product placement, in addition to outlining antecedent variables that are relevant in cause placement but not in product placement. Specifically, the chapter reviews pertinent findings from the moral processing, affect, and altruistic and volunteer motivation literatures, and explains the relevance of “consistency of the behavior” and “presence of a brand element” to cause placement, to show why it makes sense to treat cause placement as a separate field of research where distinct effects are likely to emerge.

Why Use Embedded Marketing: Influence Mechanisms

Embedded marketing involves seamlessly inserting promotions, or embedding them, “within entertainment vehicles such as films, video and personal computer games, television and print media sports coverage or television shows” (Hackley and Tiwsakul 2006, p. 64). Marketers use embedded marketing as an alternative or complement to advertising, in order to overcome
some of the shortcomings of traditional advertising. These shortcomings include cluttered media, where ads must compete with many others for consumers’ attention, the annoyance of consumers with ads, and consumer skepticism toward advertising (Belch and Belch 2012, Obermiller and Spangenberg 1998). In addressing these disadvantages, embedded marketing relies on three distinct influence mechanisms: 1) the avoidance or reduction of consumer skepticism and of consumers’ reliance on what Friestad and Wright (1994) termed “persuasion knowledge” when reacting to ad messages, 2) the parasocial relationship that forms between consumers and characters in the entertainment media, and 3) consumers’ preference for stories, or narratives, to lists as a source of information. This section discusses each of these influence mechanisms in turn.

**Consumer Skepticism and the Persuasion Knowledge Model**

Obermiller and Spangenberg (1998) define consumer skepticism as consumers’ tendency to distrust advertising content, and both polls and experimental research support this notion. In polls that Calfee and Ringold (1988) conducted, for example, 70% of respondents expressed their belief that US businesses attempt to slyly influence the public through advertising, and 52% of respondents indicated that they were not at all confident that advertisements were truthful. Similarly, respondents in a study by Obermiller and Spangenberg (2000) rated advertising as the least trustable source of product information among a total of five sources. Koslow (2000) conducted a study in which consumers were found to be skeptical even of honest, reasonable advertising that did not use aggressive persuasion tactics.

The persuasion knowledge model (PKM; Friestad and Wright 1994) further explains why consumers may react with skepticism to traditional advertising, or anytime a persuasion attempt
is detected. Building upon Wright’s (1986) conceptualization of “schemer schema,” or people’s beliefs about the persuasive tactics advertisers use, Friestad and Wright (1994) proposed a comprehensive model of how people develop and use knowledge about the motives and tactics of persuasion “agents” such as salespeople and advertisers, and use that knowledge to cope with the persuasion attempt. In addition to using persuasion knowledge to cope with the persuasion attempt, or “episode,” people also use their existing topic (i.e., product) knowledge and their agent knowledge (Friestad and Wright 1994). However, because persuasion knowledge applies to a larger number of situations and to numerous topics and agents, people often not only rely more heavily on it than on the other two types of knowledge, but they also use persuasion knowledge to help them develop and refine their topic knowledge and/or agent knowledge (Friestad and Wright 1994).

Perhaps the most critical aspect of the PKM in the current context is the “change of meaning” notion (Friestad and Wright 1994, p. 12-13). Friestad and Wright (1994) alleged that when a person realizes that an agent’s seemingly neutral or unimportant action is actually a persuasion tactic, a change of meaning occurs. The person, or target, will begin to react in a different way, such as by disengaging or becoming distracted from the situation or becoming more skeptical of what the persuasion agent is saying.

Embedded marketing attempts to overcome consumer skepticism and the related change of meaning described in the persuasion knowledge model, by making the message appear non-commercial. The salient feature of embedded marketing is the covertness of the promotional objective or the intent to persuade the audience (d’Astous and Chartier 2000). Thus embedded marketing involves what Balasubramanian (1994, p.30) termed “hybrid messages,” or “paid attempts to influence audiences for commercial benefit using communications that project a non-
commercial character.” If the communication appears non-commercial in nature, it is less likely to result in the consumer skepticism associated with advertising. Using the terminology of the PKM, the implicit goal of embedded marketing is thus to avoid the change of meaning that occurs when viewers perceive a persuasion attempt, and the possible disengagement of the consumer that would result (McCarty 2004). For example, a person watching his favorite TV character throw an empty bottle into the recycle bin as she jogs through the park, talking to another character, is unlikely to view this as an attempt to persuade him to recycle. There will thus be no change of meaning, and no resulting skepticism regarding the utility of recycling. If the same person watches a commercial about recycling, however, he will see it as a clear persuasion attempt, and will likely become less attentive and more skeptical about recycling, as predicted by the PKM. This will be the case even if the commercial is informative, in fact even if it is a 30-minute infomercial, as there will be a tendency to see it as a persuasive attempt simply because it is an ad.

**Parasocial Relationships with Characters**

A second influence mechanism associated with embedded marketing is what Russell and Stern (2006, p. 7) refer to as the “parasocial” relationship that develops between television characters and viewers. As consumers repeatedly watch a television show over a period of months or years, they become familiar with, or even attached to, its principal characters. Products that are associated with a character may thus be influenced by the viewer’s “relationship” with that character (Russell and Stern 2006). Furthermore, social learning theory (Bandura 1977) posits that a primary way that people learn is by watching others’ behaviors and modeling them, as behaviors are reinforced when their consequences are observed in the process
Bandura described as “vicarious learning” (Bandura 1971, p. 3). As a consumer increasingly views characters as real, he or she may therefore become influenced by their behavior, including their use of specific products or brands. This is also in line with the widespread view of mass media as one of the major socialization agents (Moore et al. 2002).

**Preference for Narratives to Lists**

The third influence mechanism of embedded marketing is consumers’ preference for narratives, or stories, as a source of information (Adaval and Wyer 1998). Embedded marketing makes use of this preference by showcasing the product within a story, rather than directly presenting facts and information about the product. Numerous studies demonstrate that consumers prefer narratives to a direct presentation of facts. For example, participants in a study by Adaval and Wyer (1998) evaluated a vacation in a travel brochure more positively when the brochure presented information in a narrative/story format than when it presented information in a list. Research also shows that people tend to store and recall information as stories (Woodside, Sood, and Miller 2008).

Researchers have also compared the effectiveness of what Wells (1989) referred to as “lecture” (straight-sell) advertisements, which employ a direct presentation of facts and information, and “drama” (slice-of-life) advertisements, which rely on stories in which the persuasion attempt is implicit. Studies by Wells (1989) and Deighton, Romer, and McQueen (1989) showed that consumers are less skeptical and argumentative toward the advertising message when exposed to slice-of-life than to straight-sell advertising. Similarly, Hamby, Daniloski, and Brinberg (2015) found that online consumer reviews that employed a story format rather than an informational format were more persuasive to consumers and had a stronger effect.
on behavioral intentions. Within a social marketing context, Chang (2008) reported that narrative advertising about seeking help for loved ones with depression led to higher evaluations of the ads than argument-based advertising, as well as higher behavioral intentions. While many conventional commercials employ storytelling, embedded marketing has the potential to integrate the product into much longer, more complex, and more engaging narratives.

**History and Research Findings for Cause Placement and Product Placement**

As outlined in Chapter 1, the most common form of embedded marketing is product placement, where brands are integrated into television shows, movies, or even video games in return for cash or other compensation (d’Astous and Séguin 1999, Gould and Gupta 1997). In the less commonly-known form of embedded marketing, cause placement, a pro-social cause or issue (rather than a commercial brand) is incorporated into the entertainment vehicle. While the influence mechanisms described above apply to embedded marketing in general, this section describes the history and research findings for each of product placement and cause placement.

**Product Placement**

*Origins and History of Product Placement*

Predecessors to product placement have existed for centuries. The nineteenth-century entrepreneur Thomas Holloway, for example, paid for actors to mention his medicinal ointments in theater plays (Hackley and Tiwsakul 2006). The practice emerged in Hollywood movies in the 1930’s, and was particularly common with automobiles, and with tobacco and alcohol (Wenner 2004). The classic example is the bottles of Gordon’s Gin that Katherine Hepburn’s character threw overboard in the 1951 *The African Queen* (Ta and Frosch 2008).
Product placement saw a leap in status and popularity after the prominent use of Hershey’s Reese’s Pieces in *E.T. The ExtraTerrestrial* in 1982, which resulted in a 65% increase in Reeses’s Pieces sales (Hackley and Tiwsakul 2006, Wenner 2004). Agencies specializing in finding placement opportunities and negotiating them proliferated (McCarty 2004, Ta and Frosch 2008), and the practice continued to grow. Product placement spending in the U.S. increased by 12.8% to 6.01 billion in 2014, and is projected to nearly double to 11.44 billion by 2019 (PQMedia 2016). It is currently projected to have a compound annual growth rate of 9.7% through 2015 (Verunis, Suhler, and Stevenson 2011). Advertisers either pay directly for product placements, or engage in bartering, whereby the advertiser provides products for use both in the movie or television program and off-screen (Wenner 2004, Ta and Frosch 2008).

*Notable Research Findings for Product Placement*

**Classification of Product Placement Forms**

Balasubramanian (1994, p. 31) defines product placement as “a paid product message aimed at influencing movie (or television) audiences via the planned and unobtrusive entry of a branded product into a movie (or television program).” This entry can take on various forms, including casual visual appearances, verbal references, or actual use by a character (Wenner 2004). Russell (1998) also proposes three dimensions along which product placements may be classified. The first is the level of visual placement, or how prominently and how often the product appears in the movie or television program. The second is the level of auditory placement, which reflects how much the product is verbally emphasized and/or how frequently it is mentioned. The third dimension is the degree of importance of the placed product to the storyline. A product may simply be a prop, or it may be as integral to the movie as AOL e-mail was to *You’ve Got Mail* (McCarty 2004). In addition to the mechanisms of embedded marketing
influence described above, the effectiveness of product placement also relies on the excitation transfer theory (Zillman 1971). The excitation transfer theory posits that the high level of positive arousal that movie-viewing causes will transfer from the movie to the cues in the environment, including brands that are even vaguely visible in the scene (Pechmann and Chih 1999). For example, the arousal caused by a sensational car chase scene where the cars pass by a Pepsi billboard would be expected to transfer to the Pepsi brand, because of its mere proximity to the excitement.

Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of Product Placement

Research shows, sometimes with mixed results, that various factors affect the effectiveness of product placement. This section reviews two streams of research on factors affecting how the audience responds to product placement. The first stream of research relates to the effects of the constructs of placement centrality (prominence) and placement modality (visual or verbal). The second stream relates to media context factors, including program image, genre, and informational value.

Prominence (centrality) and modality (visual or verbal) of the placement are two independent variables that a number of works have investigated. Interest in these variables came about after contradictory effects were found regarding brand recall for placed products. For example, Ong and Meri (1994) found weak brand recall for many placed products, while Vollmers and Mizerski (1994) found very strong recall in their studies, although this high recall did not seem to affect attitude. Gupta and Lord’s (1998) research partly reconciled these seemingly contradictory results, by showing that recall was high (relative to advertising) when the product placement was prominent, but not when it was subtle, and that verbal placements produced higher recall than visual placements that were not prominent. D’Astous and Chartier

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(2000) investigated the effect of the degree of integration of the product into the movie on recall and evaluation, and found that products that were well-integrated into the scene enjoyed higher evaluations but lower recall than those that “did not fit” the scene. Russell (2002) studied the effects of congruence between modality (visual or verbal) and connection between the placement and the plot on recall and attitude. Because verbal information is normally more important for story development than visual information, Russell (2002) considered verbal placements paired with strong plot-placement connections to be congruent, and visual placements paired with weak plot-placement connections to be incongruent. She found higher brand recall for incongruent pairings, but a stronger effect on attitude for congruent pairings (Russell 2002).

Another set of factors affecting product placement effectiveness falls within the realm of media context. These are factors relating to the characteristics of the media vehicle in which the product is placed. One such factor is the image of the program or other media vehicle. Van Reijmersdal, Neijens, and Smit (2007) conducted both a survey and experiment investigating the effects of repeated exposure to the same brand placed in a television program. They found that as participants repeatedly viewed, over time, the same brand placed in episodes of a program, the brand image increasingly reflected the image of the program. The human associative memory theory, which states that associations between two stimuli are strengthened when the two stimuli appear together, served to explain this effect.

In related survey research, van Reijmersdal, Smit, and Neijens (2010) studied the effects of a program’s informational value and genre on brand recognition and behavior (e.g., searching for information about the brand or buying the brand). They found a significant positive association between genre and brand recognition, whereby “special interest” programs (e.g., do-it-yourself or cooking shows) were more strongly associated with brand recognition than
“general interest” ones (e.g., reality shows). They also found a significant positive association between the information value of a program and brand-related behavior.

**Cause Placement**

*Origins and History of Cause Placement*

The Kaiser Family Foundation (2004, p.1), a non-profit organization specializing in analyzing and disseminating public health information, defines cause placement (which the document refers to as “entertainment-education”) as a strategy that “incorporates an educational message into popular entertainment content in order to raise awareness, increase knowledge, create favorable attitudes, and ultimately motivate people to take socially responsible action in their own lives.” Cause placement has enjoyed much less, if any, controlled experimental investigation guided by basic marketing theory than product placement, and the literature addressing it appears predominantly in public health publications.

Among the first and most impressive cause placement initiatives was the one undertaken by the Harvard School of Public Health’s National Designated Driver Campaign, which successfully incorporated the designated driver concept into 160 primetime shows between 1988 and 1992, helping to achieve a 97% awareness of the concept among 18 to 24-year-olds (Kaiser Foundation 2004). Cause placement efforts have since appeared for a number of different causes, including HIV/AIDS, immunization, and even SARS transmission (Kaiser Foundation 2004). In a few cases, social marketing organizations even create and fully fund television series to promote particular social issues (Obregón 2005; e.g., Tufte 2001, Jibaja-Weiss et al. 2006). In addition, some organizations provide prizes to encourage, albeit in a less proactive way, the incorporation of public health and other social messages into entertainment content. The
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), for example, collaborates with the Entertainment Industries Council (EIC) to present the annual PRISM awards to movies and programs that most accurately depict addiction and health issues (EIC 2009). Most recently, NBCUniversal’s corporate social responsibility arm, Green is Universal, has worked to actively incorporate pro-environmental content into popular NBC shows, such as *The Office* (Chozick 2010).

*Notable Research Findings for Cause Placement*

Cause placement has not enjoyed nearly as much experimental research as product placement has, which is a gap that this dissertation aims to address. Evidence of the effectiveness of cause placement, in terms of both comprehension and motivation to act in the pro-social way promoted, is largely anecdotal (Evans 2008). Quantitative research conducted to date is mostly in the form of public health survey research to assess the effects on attitudes and behavior of a single, particular placement effort (case studies), without reference to theories or influence mechanisms (e.g., Rogers, Vaughan, et al 1999).

However, there is some qualitative research that shows that the influence mechanisms of embedded marketing apply in the sub-category of cause placement. For example, Ta and Frosch (2008, p. 10) found that viewers considered clinical information presented in the popular medical drama *ER* as “new factual knowledge.” This finding supports the notion of the parasocial relationship (Russell and Stern 2006) that develops between media and their audiences. Similarly, Obregón (2005), in studying a Colombian soap opera incorporating HIV/AIDS-related messages, found strong engagement with the story and characters, even among non-heavy viewers, and evidence of motivation to change behavior (support a cause) based on the main characters’ experiences. Given this scarcity of research in cause placement, the focus of cause
placement research should be on identifying the factors that will affect its utility as a persuasive social marketing tool, and evaluate the effects of these factors on measures of effectiveness of cause placement such as recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause. The research questions outlined in Chapter 1 stem from this proposed focus.

Why Study Cause placement as a Separate Form of Embedded Marketing?

While a fair amount of empirical research exists in the area of product placement, including qualitative, experimental, and survey-based, there has been much less research in the area of cause placement, and, to my knowledge, no experimental research. While the two areas certainly share some commonalities, and both fall within the realm of embedded marketing, it cannot be assumed that all of the research findings in product placement can apply seamlessly in cause placement. There are at least two literature streams that demonstrate why placing social causes, as opposed to commercial brands, in entertainment vehicles should lead to differential effects. The first of these is the area of emotion, because it is reasonable to expect that the morality-related nature of social causes would evoke a heightened emotional response compared to the response evoked by commercial products. The second area is that of altruistic and volunteer motivation, or the question of what factors are associated with individuals’ likelihood to engage in altruism and volunteerism. This section will address each of these areas in turn. In addition, there are questions relevant to the study and practice of cause placement that are irrelevant within the realm of product placement. One example is the question of whether or not the placement includes a branding element, or a unique identifier such as a logo, slogan, or organization name. A second example is the question of whether the placement should be
positively-framed (demonstrating the positive consequences of making the right decision or supporting the cause) or negatively-framed (demonstrating the negative consequences of making the wrong decision).

The Role of Heightened Emotional Arousal

It is useful to start with a definition of “emotion.” Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Nyer (1999, p. 184) define an emotion as “a mental state of readiness that arises from cognitive appraisals of events or thoughts,” thus adopting Lazarus’ (1984) famous and widely-accepted view that cognition precedes affect. That is, before an emotional reaction can arise, a cognitive appraisal of the circumstances must first occur, even if that appraisal is momentary or even subconscious. (Lazarus 1984). Bagozzi and colleagues (1999) go on to differentiate emotions from two other affective states: 1) moods, which last longer, but are lower in intensity, than emotions, and 2) attitudes, which are enduring evaluative predispositions. For example, a person may be in a general melancholy mood after a death in the family. The mood might persist for days, weeks, or months, regardless of specific daily events in the person’s life, be they happy or sad. A person may also have an optimistic attitude, with a propensity to see the “bright side” of situations. This will be a lasting predisposition, once again regardless of specific happenings. Emotions, however, form in reaction to a specific stimulus. A person receiving news of a job promotion may feel joy or pride in direct response to the news. The intense joy or pride will probably last for only a few hours or days. Thus, among these three types of affective states, attitudes are the most enduring, moods are less enduring than attitudes but last longer than emotions, and emotions are more intense than moods, but occur in response to a specific stimulus and thus are the shortest in duration.
In studying the effects of a consumer considering a social cause as opposed to a commercial product, emotions, rather than attitudes or moods, are thus the most relevant type of affective state, because the audience’s exposure to the cause will affect emotions first and most intensely. While there is much research on the effects of attitudes on consumers’ reactions to promotional messages (e.g. Batra and Stayman 1990; Bohner, Chaiken, and Hunyadi 1994), research has also found that emotions (both their valence and the degree of emotional arousal) mediate the relationship between ad content and attitude toward the ad (e.g., Olney, Holbrook, and Batra 1991). Moreover, Moore and Harris (1996), in studying positive emotional appeals, found that stronger emotional arousal led to stronger attitudes toward the ad. Yoon, Bolls, and Muehling (1999) similarly found a significant positive relationship between degree of emotional arousal and attitude toward the claims-related attitude toward the ad. Based on these works, it appears that the most immediate and direct effect of the placement will be on emotions, rather than on moods or attitudes. Moods, unlike emotions, are not contextual, and neither moods nor attitudes will be formed as an immediate result of viewing a product placement or a cause placement. However, emotions, and specifically their intensity or degree of arousal, come about as a reaction to a specific stimulus, in this case the product or cause being placed, and go on to affect the more enduring attitudes. Even though emotions help differentiate between cause placement and product placement, it is important to note that attitudes are still an important outcome variable, in that they are more enduring than emotions and may thus have a longer-term effect on the decision of whether or not to support a cause.

Furthermore, consumer behaviorists most commonly construe emotions in one of three ways, as follows. Emotions may belong to broad dimensional, positive and negative factors (e.g., Watson, Clark, and Tellegen 1988). Alternatively, they may be specific “discrete” emotions that
cannot be categorized into two broad factors (e.g., Roseman 1991). Finally, they can be plotted in a spatial, or circumplex, model according to their degree of pleasure and arousal, rather than along a series of dimensions that vary independently of each other (Russell 1980; Posner, Russell, and Peterson 2005). This latter view of emotions has proven useful in a wide variety of marketing contexts, including understanding what motivates a consumer to make a purchase when mystery is involved (Hill, Fombelle, and Siriani 2016), how product designs that resemble various facial expressions affect attitudes and purchase decisions (Landwehr, McGill, and Herrmann 2011), and how the presence of employees in a hotel lobby while consumers are waiting and browsing affects consumers’ satisfaction (Söderlund 2016). For the purposes of the current work, it is most constructive to view emotions according to this latter view, because, as elucidated in the remainder of this section, it is the mere presence and the intensity of emotional arousal, rather than the specific emotion or its valence, that distinguishes between social causes and commercial products when they are placed in entertainment programming.

It is reasonable to expect that social causes will, in general, evoke stronger emotional reactions than commercial products, especially the types of products that have been studied in past product placement research. For example, we cannot expect that soft drinks or laundry detergent will evoke the same degree of emotional arousal in consumers that HIV prevention or recycling will. This is because social causes, insofar as they relate to the well-being of society, often involve a moral aspect, or a question of what is “right” versus what is “wrong.” Psychological theory shows that emotion plays a central role in the processing of moral situations. Most notably, Haidt’s (2001) widely-cited social intuitionist model (SIM) of moral judgment suggests that emotions are aroused immediately and critically when a moral question arises, lie at the heart of what Haidt (2001, p. 1) terms “moral intuition, and play a much more
fundamental role than cognitive reasoning in moral judgment. Perhaps more important is the degree of emotional arousal arising from moral situations relative to that arising from non-moral (or morally neutral) situations. Neuroscience shows that the processing of moral situations is linked to a significantly higher degree of emotional arousal than the processing of non-moral (or morally neutral) situations. In a series of functional neuroimaging studies, Moll and colleagues found that the parts of the brain linked to what they termed “moral emotions” underwent significantly stronger activation when participants were shown either images or statements relating to moral situations, than when they were shown images or statements relating to non-moral situations (Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger et al. 2001; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, et al. 2002). Thus, a situation which invokes social causes, as in cause placement, is likely to result in a high level of emotional arousal simply because it is a moral situation, and regardless of what side of the issue the individual is on.

Granted, due to differences among individuals, causes, and products, there may be commercial products that lead to high emotional arousal for certain individuals, as well as social causes that do not lead to high emotional arousal for others. However, based on Kohlberg’s (1971) theory of moral development (which concerns moral thinking, not moral behavior), by the time individuals reach adulthood, they are in what he termed the social-contract or universal ethical-principle stages of development. In these stages, the assessment of what constitutes a moral or non-moral issue is universal, or at least culture-specific (universal within a given culture). Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude, based on the preceding evidence, that if causes and products appear along a continuum showing the degree of emotional arousal, causes, which tend to involve moral implications, will for the most part fall towards the “high arousal” side, and products will fall towards the “low arousal side.” The important issue here is once again the
intensity (strength, or degree of arousal) rather than the valence (whether they cause pleasure or displeasure) of the emotions. The presence of such a categorical difference between social causes and commercial products puts in question the applicability of the findings of product placement research to cause placement, or should at least lead to caution in assuming this applicability.

The question thus becomes: what effect would a higher degree of emotional arousal, or heightened emotions, have on consumers viewing a cause placement? In two separate works, Bagozzi (1994 and 1996) examined the relationship between emotional arousal and behavioral intentions. Bagozzi (1994) conducted an experiment in which participants first completed a task that involved stimuli causing high emotional arousal in one group and low emotional arousal in the second group. Participants were then asked to provide cognitive evaluations as well as attitudinal measures relating to another stimulus. High emotional arousal reinforced the relationship between positive cognitions and attitudes, and weakened the association between negative cognitions and attitudes. Bagozzi (1994) interpreted these findings by positing that high arousal leads to a coping response whereby a person welcomes associations of positive cognitive beliefs with attitudes, but avoids associations of negative cognitive beliefs with attitudes. Thus, if cause placements will lead to more emotional arousal compared to product placements, then we can expect that cause placements will reinforce positive cognitions and attitudes toward the placed cause, and weaken the association between negative cognitions and attitudes toward the cause, but that effect will not be present to the same degree for product placements, because they would not cause the same degree of emotional arousal.

In another work using a similar experimental design, Bagozzi (1996, p. 3) studied the association between emotional arousal and the halo effect, which he defined as “the influence of one’s attitude toward an action on beliefs about perceived consequences of the action.” He found
that the high-arousal condition strengthened the halo effect towards positive beliefs but weakened it towards negative beliefs. This means that individuals with positive attitudes toward the stimulus were more likely to hold positive cognitive beliefs about it in the high-arousal than in the low-arousal condition. However, individuals with negative attitudes toward the stimulus were less likely to hold negative beliefs about it in the high-arousal than in the low-arousal group. Once again extrapolating to the embedded marketing context, we can expect that cause placements, with the heightened emotional arousal they should evoke, will strengthen the halo effect when viewers have a positive view of the cause, but weaken it when they have a negative view. However, this effect is much less likely to occur with product placement.

While Bagozzi (1994 and 1996) measured physiological arousal, through galvanic skin response, to indirectly assess emotional arousal, Sanbonmatsu and Kardes (1988) directly manipulated physiological arousal through a physical exercise task. They found that, consistent with the Elaboration Likelihood Model, participants in the high-arousal condition were more likely to form attitudes towards the brand based on peripheral cues (presence of a celebrity endorser or lack thereof), but participants in the moderate-arousal condition were more likely to base these attitudes on central cues (strength of the arguments presented). While physiological arousal was manipulated directly here, we can expect that emotional arousal, which leads to a similar physiological response, would produce similar effects. This is in line with the findings of White, Fishbein, and Rutsein (1981), who found that arousal (in the form of perspiration and increased pulse rate), whether it resulted from physical exercise or an emotional stimulus, had the same effect on male participants’ response toward female targets. Thus, because cause placement should lead to greater emotional arousal than product placement, there should also be a difference between the processing of information about social causes and the processing of
information about commercial products. It is more likely that viewers of cause placements would process these placements along the peripheral route than viewers of product placements, which provides further support for the utility of studying cause placement as a distinct form of embedded marketing.

Finally, Gorn, Pham, and Sin (2001) investigated the interaction between an ad’s affective valence and participants’ emotional arousal, which they manipulated through music. They found that under high-arousal, a “polarization effect” emerged, with participants evaluating the ad more intensely in the direction of the ad’s affective tone (p. 50). Gorn and his colleagues attributed this effect to the excitation transfer theory (Zillman 1971), which posits that arousal is nonspecific, and may be misattributed to a source other than that from which it resulted. Because cause placement should lead to higher emotional arousal than product placement, the polarization effect described by Gorn and colleagues (2001) should occur to a greater extent in cause placement than in product placement.

The Role of Altruistic and Volunteer Motivation

In addition to the role that heightened emotions play in causing a differential reaction to cause placement versus product placement, it is reasonable to assume that when social causes are in question, many of the variables that affect altruism and volunteerism will come into play and affect consumers’ response to cause placement, because the subject matter involved is the same. Many of the same causes that inspire people to donate (e.g., breast cancer prevention) or volunteer (e.g., environmental cleanup) may also be placed in entertainment vehicles. However, even cause placements whose primary objective is not to promote altruism or volunteerism (e.g., cause placements discouraging against drug abuse or ones promoting recycling), likely evoke the
same compassion that causes associated with donating and volunteering do. Typical commercial products, such as candy, cell phones, or even hotel brands, are much less likely to evoke such compassion. The paragraphs below briefly outline some of the variables that affect altruism and volunteerism and thus would likely also have an effect on how consumers respond to cause placement.

Green and Webb (1997), for instance, identified seven factors that play a role in influencing charitable donations. Two of these factors (attitude toward helping others and attitude toward the organization) are attitudinal, and the others constitute intrapersonal motives (altruism and negative state relief), a social motive (social exchange), and economic motives (tax incentives and financial ability). Many of these factors, including attitude toward helping others and social exchange, may be quite relevant in the realm of cause placement but are much less important in product placement. For example, social exchange could be relevant when a consumer views a cause placement relating to drunk driving and perhaps contemplates the social obligation to help save lives by not drinking and driving, but not when she views a placement of shampoo or soft drinks.

Similarly, many of the motives that researchers have uncovered for volunteerism would seem relevant to motivate the adoption of a social cause, but are likely unrelated to attitudes towards or intention to purchase most commercial products. For example, Geroy, Wright, and Jacoby (2000) reported that employees choose to volunteer in corporate social responsibility efforts because they feel obliged to serve their community. Mattis, Jager, Hatcher et al. (2000), and Wymer (1997) found an association between religiosity and likelihood to volunteer. Once again, these are factors that might be relevant in the context of social causes, but much less likely to come into play in the context of the majority of commercial products. Thus, to the extent that
the decision to support a cause is related to a set of variables and motives that would be irrelevant in the decision to purchase a commercial product, cause placement once again merits distinction from product placement as a separate form of embedded marketing.

**Outcome Variables Relevant Only to Cause Placement**

The conceptual model that Chapter 3 proposes includes the six independent variables outlined in Chapter 1. Three of these variables, programming genre, image of the character, and consistency of the behavior, despite being potentially relevant to both product placement and cause placement, have enjoyed little attention in the product placement literature. One variable, brandedness of the cause, is applicable and relevant only in the area of cause placement, and thus represents a third critical distinction between cause placement and product placement. Chapter 3 discusses each of the six variables in detail, but the current section briefly discusses the latter variable only in the context of how its relevance is unique to cause placement.

Keller and Lehmann (2006) describe a number of elements that serve to uniquely identify a brand, such as the brand name, logo, slogan, etc. While social marketers make extensive use of brand elements, those using cause placement have the option to do so without using any branding elements, and in fact, it appears that social marketers by and large have chosen to exercise this option. Product placement would be impossible without the use of at least one brand element. For example, it would be inconceivable for either Coke or Pepsi to pay for placements that involved unbranded soft drinks, for example a character drinking out of a can without the brand name being visible or being mentioned. It would only be a “product placement” if the character mentioned the brand name or if the actual product and its logo appeared as a prop. However, in cause placement, conversely, the placement may occur without including a brand element. Social
marketing organizations do indeed often wish to include a branding element in their promotions, primarily in order to increase donations (Ritchie, Swami, and Weinberg 1999). However, there are instances when social marketing organizations measure their success as it relates to improving recall of, attitude towards, and support of the causes they espouse, and may be less concerned with promoting the organization’s own name or branding elements. It would be logical for the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to work on a placement where a character mentions that he has set a goal of eating more produce, without ever mentioning the CDC or its “Fruit and Veggies—More Matters” slogan. The social marketing organization, the CDC in this example, would still have met its objective of promoting healthier diets. Thus, the presence or absence of a brand element, which this dissertation terms “brandedness” of the cause, is a variable that is only of relevance for cause placement, because product placement by definition must include a brand element. This is especially true because while product placement is always paid for, cause placement may be done as a pro bono initiative by the producers of the show (Chozick 2010). It is worth noting that it appears that social marketers who have used cause placement in the past have by and large chosen to use unbranded placements. Some recent examples include a “going green” placement on The Office, a placement relating to prescription drug abuse on ER, and a placement relating to organ donation on Grey’s Anatomy. None of these used branding elements, inviting the question of whether the social marketers behind such unbranded cause placements constituted missed opportunities, or were the right choice.

References


CHAPTER THREE:
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EFFECTS OF CAUSE PLACEMENT
MESSAGE FACTORS ON RECALL OF THE CAUSE, ATTITUDE TOWARD THE
CAUSE, AND INTENTION TO SUPPORT THE CAUSE

The area of cause placement lacks both the conceptual explication and the empirical research that product placement enjoys. The remainder of this dissertation aims to address this gap. The current chapter proposes a conceptual framework containing six cause placement message factors (the independent variables) and three dependent variables relating to cause placement effectiveness (Figure 1), while the two subsequent chapters examine parts of the model in detail, introducing moderation effects among the factors and empirically testing them. The proposed cause placement message factors are placement modality, placement centrality, programming genre, image of the character, consistency of the behavior, and brandedness of the cause. The proposed dependent variables, or measures of cause placement effectiveness on which each of these factors is proposed to have a direct effect, are recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause. It is important to consider these three measures because while models of response to promotional efforts differ on the exact sequence and relative importance of the components of the response, many of them agree that consumers’ responses involve cognitive (e.g., recall), affective (e.g., attitude), and conative (e.g., purchase intention) aspects (Vakratsas and Ambler 1999).
Figure 1: The Effects of Cause Placement Message Factors on Recall of the Cause, Attitude Toward the Cause, and Intention to Support the Cause

The framework introduces new constructs (e.g., brandedness of the cause) that may not be relevant to product placement, and builds upon social learning theory, congruity theory, and findings from previous research in the broad areas of advertising research. Two of the proposed
The antecedents of cause placement (placement modality and placement centrality) appear in the product placement research. The remaining four antecedent variables (programming genre, consistency of the behavior, and image of the character, and brandedness of the cause) have received either marginal attention or none at all in the product placement literature, but are relevant to cause placement, and their effects may lead to important managerial implications.

The framework operates within an important boundary condition. It assumes that placed causes, especially branded ones, enjoy at least moderate familiarity. This appears to be a typical assumption in past embedded marketing research (e.g., Gupta and Lord 1998; Russell 2002), perhaps because placements are less obvious than traditional advertising, and thus empirical effects would only be present when the brand is somewhat familiar. Thus, the framework assumes that the value in cause placement lies primarily in affecting the three dependent variables for at least moderately-familiar causes, and not necessarily in introducing new causes.

The following section defines the three dependent variables in the model and explains why they were selected. The subsequent section defines each of the six independent variables (cause placement message factors) and explains their proposed relationship with each of the dependent variables. Table 1 summarizes the definitions of the independent variable and the dependent variables, as well as the definitions of social marketing and cause placement.

**Definitions of the Dependent Variables**

Advertising and promotions academia and practitioners use a variety of variables to measure promotional effectiveness (Du Plessis 1994). At a broad level, these measures fall into three categories: 1) cognitive, relating to mental or rational states, 2) affective, relating to feeling states, and 3) conative or behavioral, relating to striving and actions (Lavidge and Steiner 1961;
Vakratsas and Ambler 1999). The current framework includes a cognitive (recall of the cause), an affective (attitude toward the cause), and a conative (intention to support the cause) dependent variable that serve as measures of the effectiveness of cause placement. While cause placement, as outlined in Chapter 2, has not been the topic of much empirical research, these three variables are common measures of advertising effectiveness and of product placement effectiveness (the degree of success of such campaigns). For example, Bart, Stephen, and Sarvary (2014) use product attitudes and purchase intentions as measures of mobile advertising effectiveness. Brasel and Gips (2014) use brand recall and behavioral intentions to measure TV advertising effectiveness when same-language subtitles were used. In the area of product placement research, brand recall and attitude have likewise been used as measures of effectiveness, most notably in Russell’s (2002) landmark study on placement modality and plot congruence. More recently, researchers have also used behavioral intentions as a measure of product placement effectiveness (Tessitore and Geuens 2013). Since cause placement, like advertising and product placement, is a form of promotion, it is logical to use similar variables for measuring its effectiveness.

Recall of the Cause

Based on Keller’s (1993) definition of brand recall, recall of the cause is the consumer’s ability to retrieve the cause or social issue from memory, given the category of social causes, the needs fulfilled by that category, or any type of cue besides the cause itself. For example, if the cause in question is recycling, a consumer may receive the cue “a measure that helps protect the environment” and would achieve correct recall if he lists recycling. It is helpful to contrast recall with recognition, which is the ability to “confirm prior exposure” to a stimulus when given the
stimulus itself as a cue (Keller 1993, p. 3). For example, a consumer may receive a list of measures that one could take to protect the environment, and be able to recognize that she was previously exposed to the cause of recycling.

Researchers report mixed results for the relationship between recall and affective and conative measures of promotional effectiveness. A variety of hierarchical models of response to promotional efforts exist, some of which suggest that recall precedes attitudes and behavioral intentions in the response to promotions (e.g., Lavidge and Steiner 1961), while others omit recall altogether from the response (e.g., Aaker, Stayman, and Hagerty 1986). However, even though recall does not guarantee favorable attitudes or behavioral intentions, it is important in that it is central to the brand awareness dimension of brand equity, or the strength of the brand’s node in memory, the brain “space” that the brand occupies (Keller 1993). Within the context of social causes, awareness is in turn important because it improves the chances of the cause being included within the consideration set of the consumer, the different alternative causes that one might choose to adopt or support (Nedungadi 1990).

**Attitude toward the Cause**

Attitude is an affective measure. Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Nyer (1999) describe attitude as an enduring, valenced affective state toward a particular stimulus, or more simply the degree of “liking” or “disliking” of an object. Scholars most commonly define attitudes as overall or summary evaluations of a particular stimulus. For example, Eagly, Mladinic, and Otto (1994, p. 113) define attitudes as “overall evaluations of attitude objects.” Keller (1993, p. 4) similarly defines brand attitudes as “consumers’ overall evaluations of a brand,” and Mitchell and Olson (1981, p. 318) define brand attitudes as the “individual’s internal evaluation of a brand.” The
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERM</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Marketing</td>
<td>“A process that applies marketing principles and techniques to create, communicate, and deliver value in order to influence target audience behaviors that benefit society (public health, safety, the environment, and communities), as well as the target audience” (Kotler and Lee 2008, p.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cause Placement</td>
<td>The practice of promoting pro-social causes and issues by inserting related elements into entertainment vehicles, either visually (such as by showing the logo of the organization promoting the cause), verbally (such as through a mention of the social issue by an actor), or both (such as by inserting audiovisual actions related to the cause into the script)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Placement Modality</td>
<td>The sensory form in which the social cause is placed in an entertainment vehicle (visual, verbal, or both)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placement Centrality</td>
<td>The degree of connectedness between the placement and the entertainment vehicle’s plot; the significance of the placement as a part of the plot (low centrality or high centrality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programming Genre</td>
<td>The stylistic category of programs to which the entertainment vehicle being used for the placement belongs (comedy or drama)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image of the Character</td>
<td>The degree to which the character is perceived or not perceived as a socially-responsible, honest, and trustworthy person who consistently does the right thing (“good guy” or “bad guy”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency of the Behavior</td>
<td>The extent to which a character’s behavior in relation to the social cause is congruent or not congruent to the character’s personality traits (consistent or inconsistent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandedness of the Cause</td>
<td>The extent to which branding elements, such as brand name, logo, or slogan, are used or not used, whether individually or together, when referring to the cause (branded or unbranded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recall of the Cause</td>
<td>The consumer’s ability to retrieve the cause or social issue from memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude toward the Cause</td>
<td>The overall positive or negative affect that an individual has toward a cause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention to Support the Cause</td>
<td>A person’s subjective probability that he or she will actively espouse the cause in question, for example, by donating, volunteering, adopting a specific behavior that is being advocated, or engaging in other behaviors that advance the cause</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
current work defines attitude toward the cause as an overall evaluation of the cause such that can be measured using bipolar adjectives such as “favorable” and “unfavorable.”

Attitudes form through both affective and cognitive routes, and may therefore be based on both affect and beliefs or cognitions (Eagly et al 1994; Fabrigar and Petty 1999). Historically, researchers have differed on which of the two routes plays a primary role in attitude formation. Most notably, Zajonc (1980) contends that affect (including attitudes) does not form based on cognition. Instead, affect results from complex interactions (“preferanda”) between the features of the attitude object and a person’s internal states, which dictate inherent tendencies to prefer certain attributes over others (Zajonc 1980, p. 159). The expectancy-value model (Ajzen and Fishbein 2000), however, views beliefs (cognitions) as the basis of attitudes. According to the model, a person’s beliefs regarding the likelihood that an object possesses certain positive or negative attributes are what determine the person’s attitude toward the object. More specifically, a single belief is the subjective probability (assigned by the person) that the object possesses an attribute. Attitude toward the object is the sum of a set of such beliefs or subjective probabilities. Bagozzi and colleagues (1999) contend that it makes sense to treat affect and evaluative judgments as one and the same in the context of attitude, or to at least recognize the high correlation among the two. However, Eagly and her colleagues (1994) have shown that affect and cognition can have an impact on attitudes independently of each other.

**Intention to Support the Cause**

Intention to support the cause is a conative variable, or one relating to behavioral tendencies and volitions. Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p. 168) define behavioral intention as “the person’s motivation in the sense of his or her conscious plan to exert effort to carry out a
behavior,” while Fishbein and Ajzen (1975, p. 288) similarly define it as “a person's subjective probability that he will perform some behavior.” Within the current context, intention to support the cause is a person’s subjective probability that he or she will actively espouse the cause in question, for example, by donating, volunteering, adopting a specific behavior that is being advocated, or engaging in other behaviors that advance the cause. Behavioral intentions are important in that they mediate the relationship between attitudes and behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Kim and Hunter 1993), and thus may serve as an indication of the probability that the person will engage in the actual behavior in question. However, it is important to note that contextual factors, such as a person’s ability to perform the behavior, the behavior’s level of difficulty, and unanticipated events and environmental factors, may prevent the actual behavior from occurring even when behavioral intentions are high (Kim and Hunter 1993; Fishbein 2008).

Why These Three Dependent Variables?

The proposed framework considers these three outcome variables not only because they cover the cognitive, affective, and conative/behavioral aspects of promotion effectiveness (Vakratsas and Ambler 1999), but also because the effect of any given antecedent on each of the dependent variables is not necessarily the same as it is on the others. The framework proposes that several of the antecedent variables affect recall in one way, and attitudes and intentions in a different way. This pattern exists because while recall is valuable to both social and commercial marketers because it is an important component of brand awareness and thus of brand equity, it does not guarantee favorable attitude (Keller 1993). This is in line with the independence principle of the information integration theory (Anderson 1981), which suggests that the brain processes memory and attitudinal judgment independently of one another, and that there is hence
often no correlation among them. Empirical research also corroborates the lack of robust
correlation between recall and attitude (e.g., Hastie and Park 1986). Behavioral intentions, on the
other hand, are generally consistent with and follow attitudes, as predicted by Fishbein and
Ajzen’s (1975) theory of reasoned action, which suggests that behavioral intention is a direct
function of attitudes and subjective norms. Once again, this prediction has extensive empirical
support, a large portion of which is summarized in Kim and Hunter’s (1993) meta-analysis of 92
studies, which found significant correlations between attitude and behavioral intention. Hence,
for several of the antecedent variables in the current framework, the variable affects each of
attitudes and behavioral intentions in a similar way, while the effect on recall might be quite
different.

Definitions of the Independent Variables and Relationships with the
Dependent Variables

Placement Modality

Placement modality is the sensory form in which the social cause placement occurs in an
entertainment vehicle (Gupta and Lord 1998). A placement modality may be visual only
(perceivable only by the sense of sight), verbal only (perceivable only by the sense of hearing),
or both verbal and visual (perceivable by both sight and hearing). For example, a visual
placement of recycling might involve a character throwing a bottle into the recycling bin, or
placing recycling boxes at the curb, without mentioning what he is doing, or might involve
simply showing the three-arrow recycling symbol in the background of a scene. A verbal
placement of the same social cause might involve the character mentioning to his coworker that
they should start recycling paper at the office. In a placement of combined modality, the
character could ask his daughter if she has anything else to place in the recycling bins at the same time that viewers see him carrying the bins to place them at the curb.

The framework presented here proposes that placement modality has a direct effect on recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause. With regard to recall, the framework predicts that placements that are both verbal and visual should produce the best recall, while placements that are verbal only should produce weaker recall, and placements that are visual only should produce the weakest recall, in line with the dual-coding model of information processing (Paivio 1986) and the multi-store model of memory (Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968; Craik and Lockhart 1972). Likewise, for attitude toward the cause, placements that are both visual and verbal should produce the most favorable attitudes, in line with the cognitive-experiential self theory (Epstein 1991), followed by placements that are verbal only, followed by placements that are visual only. Intention to support the cause will follow a similar pattern to that of attitude toward the cause, as the theory of reasoned action predicts and as detailed above (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975).

The framework expects that a verbal/visual modality should produce better recall than either a verbal only or visual only modality. Paivio’s (1986) dual-coding model suggests that verbal and visual information is each processed and mentally coded in a distinct and separate way. The brain stores words as verbal mental codes, and images as visual mental codes. When dual codes are present, it is easier to retrieve the information. Thus placements that are both verbal and visual should result in the best recall. Moreover, the framework predicts that verbal placements will produce better recall than visual ones. Multi-store theories of memory (e.g., Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968) suggest that memory may be categorized into the short-term memory store (or working memory), in which information is held only transiently for a matter of
seconds, and the long-term memory store, in which information may be held and retrieved indefinitely. Information that is not transferred from the short-term to the long-term memory store within seconds of its arrival in short-term memory is forgotten. Information that carries more meaning is more likely to make the transfer between the short-term memory store and long-term memory store (Craik and Lockhart 1972). Verbal information in television programming constitutes the core of the program or show—the script—and thus is inherently important and transfers more meaning (Russell 2002). Visual information, by contrast, tends to be more contextual and less consequential. To the extent that a verbal placement carries more meaning than a visual placement, a cause in a verbal placement is thus more likely to be stored in the long-term memory store, and more readily recalled later on.

The model predicts the same pattern of effects of placement modality on attitude toward the brand, though the processes may be different. Epstein’s (1990) cognitive-experiential self theory suggests that information is processed along two independent systems: the cognition-based analytic-rational system and the affect-based intuitive-experiential system. The analytic-rational system is slower and more systematic, and relies on conscious, logic, and often, language. The intuitive-experiential system is faster, relies on holistic affective processing, and often works at a subconscious level. Visual stimuli and verbal stimuli each tend to be processed along a different system. Visual stimuli are holistic, and involve a “chunking” of information (Sojka and Giese 2006), and thus are more fluently processed along the likewise holistic, intuitive-experiential system. Conversely, verbal stimuli tend to involve language, logic, and the decomposition of information, and are therefore better suited for processing along the analytical-rational system. Sojka and Giese (2006) studied the interaction between types of processors (cognitive, affective, or both) and message modality (verbal, visual, or both), and indeed found
that visual stimuli produced better attitudes for participants who were affective processors and verbal stimuli produced directionally better attitudes for participants who were cognitive processors. Thus, visual stimuli are more fluently processed along the intuitive-experiential route than the analytical-rational route, while verbal stimuli are more fluently processed along the analytic-rational route. As previously described, attitudes form along both cognitive and affective routes that are independent of each other (Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Nyer 1999). When the placement is both verbal and visual, there are thus two different routes to persuasion, or to producing a favorable attitude. Hence, attitude toward the cause should be most favorable when the placement modality is both verbal and visual.

The framework predicts that attitude toward the brand will be more favorable for verbal than for visual placements. As detailed above, because verbal information in a TV program typically carries more meaning than visual information, the multi-store theory of memory (Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968) predicts that verbal placements are more likely to be elaborated upon than visual placements. As long as the placement is not so central and prominent as to become too obvious (a concern that will be addressed under the Placement Centrality factor), this increased elaboration should produce better attitude toward the cause, especially given that viewers tend to be involved with the TV series that they follow. Thus attitude toward the cause should be better for placements of verbal modality than for those of visual modality. Once again, as the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen and Fishbein 1975) predicts, intention toward the cause will follow attitude toward the cause, and thus will be most favorable for placements that are both verbal and visual, less favorable for placements that are verbal, and least favorable for placements that are visual.
Placement Centrality

A second variable that the model proposes to influence recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause is placement centrality, also referred to in the literature as “plot connection.” Placement centrality is the degree of connectedness between the placement and the entertainment vehicle’s plot, or the significance of the placement as a part of the plot. As Russell (2002, p. 308) summarizes, high placement centrality involves “instances when the brand makes a significant contribution to the story and will thus facilitate memory.” An example of extremely high-centrality product placement is that of FedEx in Tom Hanks’ Cast Away, where Tom Hanks’ character is a FedEx employee who is stranded on a deserted island after the FedEx plane crashes, and who proceeds to open one FedEx package after another in an attempt to find items that will help him survive. An analogous example of high centrality in cause placement occurred when Dwight of the sitcom The Office wears a “Think Green” t-shirt and cape, and obsessively enforces recycling throughout an entire episode. Low cause placement centrality might occur if the slogan for a cause (e.g., “scoop the poop”) appears as a street sign prop, or a character mentions in passing that he will participate in the American Cancer Society’s Relay for Life. Placement centrality is not the same as placement prominence, the extent to which a placement is noticeable due to its sheer size and the length of time that it occupies, per se. However, as the preceding examples demonstrate, a placement of high centrality is nearly always prominent, occupying a relatively large physical presence or amount of time, while a placement of low centrality is typically not prominent or obvious.

The current framework predicts that high placement centrality will result in better recall than low placement centrality, as both the dual-coding model (Paivio 1986) and the levels-of-processing effect would suggest (Craik and Lockhart 1972). Conversely, the framework predicts
that high placement centrality will produce less favorable attitudes and behavioral intentions than low placement centrality, because a high centrality is more likely to result in the change of meaning predicted by the persuasion knowledge model (Friestad and Wright 1994), while low centrality can lead to positive attitudes through the mere exposure effect (Zajonc 1968).

High placement centrality should produce better recall than low placement centrality due to two distinct processes. First, cause placements with high centrality are more likely to involve both verbal and visual elements, simply because they involve integrating the cause more fully into the storyline than do placements with low centrality. The dual-coding effect (Paivio 1986) would once again come into play. However, there are cases when the placement might be central to the plot without involving a modality that is both verbal and visual. For example, an episode of a program might revolve around the suffering that a family endures when one of its members is a drug addict, without verbally referring to the addiction. Craik and Lockhart’s (1972) levels-of-processing effect would predict, still, that recall will benefit from the central placement. The levels-of-processing framework of memory suggests that information that carries more semantic meaning is stored at a “deeper” level, or in the long-term memory store, than information that is simply phenomic (Craik and Lockhart 1972; Lockhart and Craik 1990). Cause placements with high centrality carry more meaning than ones with low centrality, and are thus more likely to be stored in the long-term memory store. Indeed, Roberts, Cowen, and MacDonald (1996) showed that even parts of a plot that are implicit but central to the storyline produce better recall than parts of a plot that are explicit but secondary to the storyline. Hence, cause placements that are central to the plot will produce higher levels of recall than ones that are not.

The framework expects, however, that placement centrality will have the opposite effects on attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause, with low centrality producing
more favorable effects than high centrality. The persuasion knowledge model predicts that when
consumers perceive that a persuasion attempt is underway, a change of meaning occurs, and
counter-argumentation becomes more likely (Friestad and Wright 1994). The prominence of a
highly central placement is thus likely to cause this change of meaning. Moreover, the mere
exposure effect (Zajonc 1968) predicts that a less obvious, low centrality placement may produce
more favorable attitudes than a prominent, high centrality placement. The mere exposure effect
suggests that simply becoming familiar with a stimulus increases a person’s liking for that
stimulus (Zajonc 1968; Bornstein 1989) even when this familiarity is unconscious (Hansen and
Wänke 2009). This unconscious familiarity (as opposed to conscious recognition) has been
stressed by some (e.g., Hansen and Wänke 2009) as an essential component of the mere exposure
effect. However, Labroo, Dhar, and Schwarz (2008) demonstrate that it is perceptual fluency, not
simply unconscious familiarity, that is responsible for the favorable attitudes described in the
mere exposure effect. Thus, a prominent, highly-central placement would increase skepticism
due to the revelation of an obvious persuasion tactic, and to the detriment of attitude toward the
cause. A low-centrality placement, even if the viewer was conscious of it, however would be
expected to result in a more favorable attitude because it does not trigger the change of meaning
predicted by the persuasion knowledge model, and might instead trigger the mere exposure
effect. Intention to support the cause will follow the same pattern of effects as attitude toward the
cause.

Programming Genre

Programming genre is the stylistic category of programs to which the entertainment
vehicle being used for the placement belongs. Various ways of categorizing entertainment
vehicles have appeared in the literature. For example, D’Astous and Seguin (1999, p.4) focused on television programming, which they categorized based on viewer motive: “need for entertainment (quiz/variety shows); need to identify oneself with characters (mini-series/dramas); and need for information (information/services [programs]).” Similarly, van Reijmersdal, Smit, Neijens (2010) categorized programming genre as special interest (e.g., interior design program) and general interest (e.g., police series). The focus of the current framework is on scripted fiction television programming vehicles, which this dissertation categorizes simply as “comedy,” a scripted realistic fiction series that portrays stories among the characters through humor, or “drama,” a scripted realistic fiction series that portrays stories among the characters through serious dialogue.

The current framework proposes that a cause placement in a comedy will result in better recall than a placement in a drama. Support for these expected effects lie in the vehicle source effect (Aaker and Brown 1972) as well as in extant research findings relating to the use of humor in advertising, particularly the effect of humor on memory processes. The framework also proposes that a cause placement in a comedy will result in less favorable attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause than a cause placement in a drama, an effect that may be explained by the message discounting effect described by Gillig and Greenwald (1974).

Better recall of the cause should arise when the placement occurs in a comedy than when it occurs in a drama. The vehicle source effect was first described by Aaker and Brown (1972, p.11) as “the differential effect that an ad exposure will have on an audience exposed in one vehicle as compared to an identical group exposed in another.” Researchers have also referred to effects of this nature as “media-context effects” (e.g., Murry, Lastovicka, and Singh 1992). The question here becomes: how would a humorous media context affect recall of a cause placement.
in a differential way from a serious, dramatic media context? While research on the effect of humor in advertising has produced mixed results, researchers tend to agree that there is a positive relationship between humor and both recall and comprehension (Gulas and Weinberger 2006; Eisend 2009). The improvement in recall and comprehension caused by humor likely occurs because humorous content, perhaps due to the element of surprise that it involves, tends to attract attention (Madden and Weinberger 1982; Nabi, Moyer-Gusé, and Byrne 2007). According to Miller’s (1956) framework of working memory, individuals have a finite capacity, or a finite amount of attentional resources, with which to process information. Because humorous content, such as that in a comedy program, is able to command more of a viewer’s attention than non-humorous content, this content, including any cause placement within it, should undergo greater elaboration and thus become more strongly encoded in memory than non-humorous content, resulting in improved recall.

However, attitude toward a cause and intention to support a cause should suffer when the placement is in a comedy as opposed to a drama. Some may argue that the presence of humor may cause what Cox, Cox, and Mantel (2010, p. 31) refer to as positive “media-induced affect.” This means that the general positive affect experienced by viewers of comedies will serve as a prime when they are forming attitudinal judgments of the content of the program (including the placed causes), so that the judgments are valenced in the same direction as the affect being experienced (Schwarz 2001, Fedorikin and Cole 2004). However, the current framework proposes that, especially given the morally-charged nature of social causes, a comedic media context likely acts as what Gillig and Greenwald (1974) describe as a message “discounting cue,” or a context-related factor that causes unfavorable attitudinal judgment of a message, regardless of actual message content. Wright (1980, p. 372) cites “source derogation” as one
common discounting cue. The light-hearted, entertaining nature of comedies, whose characters are not to be taken seriously, would be expected to act as a discounting cue. In fact, researchers have suggested that humor in and of itself may act as a discounting cue (Nabi, Moyer-Gusé, and Byrne 2007). Cause placements within comedies should hence produce less favorable attitudes toward the cause and intention to support the cause than placements within dramas.

**Image of the Character**

A variable that is closely related to programming genre, because they both concern source effects, is the image of the character involved in the cause placement. Image of the character is the degree to which the character is perceived or not perceived as a socially responsible, honest, and trustworthy person who consistently does the right thing. The framework proposes that a character may have either a “good guy” or a “bad guy” image. A “good guy” is a character who the audience perceives as overall responsible, honest, and trustworthy, while a “bad guy” is a character who the audience perceives as overall irresponsible, dishonest, or untrustworthy. This is regardless of how well-liked the character is. For example, a character who is witty and personable, and thus popular among viewers, but who is still known for regularly engaging in morally- and socially-questionable behavior, would still have an image of a “bad guy.”

One noteworthy aspect of this definition is that trustworthiness is one of the main characteristics that distinguish a good guy from a bad guy. Trustworthiness is also one of the dimensions of source credibility, defined by Ohanian (1990, p. 41) as “a communicator's positive characteristics that affect the receiver's acceptance of a message.” Source credibility encompasses the dimensions of source attractiveness, expertise, and trustworthiness.
Furthermore, the relative importance of each of these dimensions depends on its relevance to the product being promoted (Lynch and Schuler 1994). According to the matchup hypothesis (Kamins and Gupta 1994), the degree of fit or matchup between the attributes of the product being promoted and the characteristics of the source or spokesperson impacts perceived source credibility, and in turn, the believability and persuasiveness of the promotion. For example, attractiveness of the source may have a significant effect on source credibility and persuasion when an attractiveness-related product (e.g., makeup or perfume) is in question, but not when a trustworthiness-related product (e.g., mortgage loan services) is in question. Friedman and Friedman (1979) indeed showed that in an ad for costume jewelry, source attractiveness, but not source expertise, had a significant relationship with affective and conative measures of ad effectiveness. Conversely, in an ad for a vacuum cleaner, source expertise, but not source attractiveness, had a significant relationship with the measures. There was therefore an interaction effect between product type and endorser type. These findings indicate that whichever source credibility dimension is most relevant to the product in question, is the dimension that is most significant in determining degree of source credibility, and in turn persuasiveness of the promotion. In the context of social causes, trustworthiness is expected to be the most relevant source credibility dimension, because social causes relate to the well-being of society, and thus promote socially-responsible, trustworthy behavior. Thus, when social causes are being considered, a character with a good guy image should have a higher degree of source credibility than a character with a bad guy image.

The framework expects that placements involving characters with a “good guy” image will result in less favorable recall of the cause, but more favorable attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause, than placements involving characters with a “bad guy” image.
Theoretical evidence for these expected effects derives from 1) the concept of the parasocial relationship that exists between the audience and the characters (e.g., Russell and Stern 2006), 2) the concept of source credibility in spokesperson endorsement, particularly as it relates to social learning theory (e.g., Dix, Phau, and Pougnet 2010), and 3) the correspondence bias aspect of attribution theory (Gilbert and Malone 1995).

One question that is important to address here is: Why should we assess the effects of the image of the character rather than the image of the actor playing that character on the dimensions of cause placement effectiveness? The answer lies in the parasocial relationship that Newton and Buck (1985) describe as forming between the audience members and the fictional characters in an entertainment vehicle. As people watch the entertainment vehicle, especially over time as in the case of TV programs, they begin to identify with the characters, model their behaviors, and thus engage in what resembles a real interpersonal relationship, the parasocial relationship (Russell and Stern 2006).

There is indeed empirical evidence that the parasocial relationship between characters and audience members has an effect on constructs related to cause placement effectiveness. For example, Obregón (2005) found that viewers of a TV drama were motivated to change their behaviors related to HIV/AIDS prevention based on the characters’ experiences. Ta and Frosch (2008) reported that viewers considered ER’s characters and their experiences as reliable sources of medical information. Perhaps most notably, Russell, Norman, and Heckler (2004) defined connectedness as the intensity of the parasocial relationship that viewers form with characters, and found significant relationships between connectedness and response to product placement. Specifically, Russell and her colleagues (2004) reported that, even after controlling for attitude toward the show and involvement, there was a significant positive relationship between
connectedness and placement recall, and a significant positive relationship between connectedness and the ability to imagine the TV character consuming real brands. Thus, unlike in a short ad where the actor is not playing a well-developed character with which viewers do not have a true parasocial relationship, our concern in cause placement should be with the image of character rather than that of the actor playing the role.

The framework proposes that placements involving a “bad guy” will produce better recall than placements involving a “good guy,” due to the increased cognitive processing expected to occur when source credibility is low. The focus of source credibility research has been on the role of source credibility as a peripheral cue (e.g., Priester and Petty 1995). However, source credibility may also affect systematic processing indirectly, by acting as a signal for whether a message should be coded as is or should first undergo further processing (Sparks and Rapp 2011). Specifically, if source credibility is low, a message should undergo more scrutiny and elaboration, command more attentional resources to process it, and once again as predicted by Miller’s (1956) working memory framework, be more strongly encoded in memory, than if the message were from a credible source.

Source credibility also explains the effect of image of the character on attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause. Source credibility is positively related to advertising effectiveness, specifically attitude toward the ad (e.g., Lutz, MacKenzie, and Belch 1983; Lafferty and Goldsmith 1999), which has been repeatedly shown to have a direct and positive relationship with attitude toward the brand (e.g., Lafferty, Goldsmith, and Newell 2002). As previously established, attitude toward the brand (which is analogous to attitude toward the cause in the current framework), in turn, has a direct positive relationship with behavioral intentions. Thus, a character with high credibility who endorses a cause, for example by engaging in related
behaviors herself within the plot, should lead to a positive attitude toward the cause and an intention on the part of the viewer to support the cause. Thus if Dr. Derek Shepherd, the world-renowned surgeon on *Grey’s Anatomy*, decides to undergo a particular cancer screening test, viewers are likely to form a positive attitude toward this screening test, and will perhaps decide to support the cause by undergoing the test themselves.

The correspondence bias component of attribution theory (Gilbert and Malone 1995) further serves to explicate this expected effect. Consistent with most attribution theories (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen 1975), the correspondence bias is defined succinctly by Gilbert and Malone (1995, p. 24) as “the inference of dispositions from situationally induced behaviors.” This means that people tend to assume that it is an innate characteristic of a person, not a situational factor, that causes him or her to engage in a particular behavior. This tendency holds even when it is more logical to assume that the situation, not a unique predisposition, caused the behavior (Gilbert and Malong 1995). This is important in the context of cause placement because it should strengthen the positive effects of source credibility. When viewers see a trustworthy character with whom they have a parasocial relationship associating with a particular cause, whether or not by explicit endorsement, they should assume that this behavior is because the character is predisposed to do so (perhaps because they are a trustworthy expert), not because anyone else in that situation would behave in the same way. This should in turn improve the viewers’ attitude toward that cause and their intention to support it.

**Consistency of the Behavior**

The fifth factor in the proposed framework that impacts recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause is the consistency of the behavior. This
variable refers to extent to which a character’s behavior in relation to the social cause is congruent or not congruent to the character’s personality traits (consistent or inconsistent). For example, does the script show a responsible character, who is expected to do the “right” thing cleaning up his dog’s waste at the park (consistent behavior), or does it show him failing to do the right thing and leaving the waste, only for a passer by to step in (inconsistent behavior)? Likewise, does the script show an irresponsible character leaving her dog’s waste on the ground as well as the poor resulting consequences (consistent behavior), or does it show her unexpectedly cleaning up after her pet (inconsistent behavior). The framework predicts that inconsistent behavior will produce better recall of the cause than consistent behavior, but consistent behavior will produce better attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause than inconsistent behavior.

According to congruity theory, individuals would like to maintain cognitive consistency, so that “changes in evaluation are always in the direction of increased congruity with the existing frame of reference” (Osgood and Tanenbaum, 1955, p. 43). If incongruity exists between two stimuli (e.g., the character’s image or personality and the character’s personality), the viewer sets out on extensive elaboration in an effort to resolve this incongruity (Priester, Godek, Nayakankuppum, et al 2004). This will especially hold in the current context because the fundamental attribution error (Ross 1977) posits that we attribute people’s behavior to internal personality traits rather than to external circumstances. Therefore, viewers expect characters’ behavior to be in line with their personalities. A responsible character will do the right thing; an irresponsible character will do the wrong thing (behavior is consistent). If the reverse happens (behavior is inconsistent), the viewer finds this troubling and engages in more processing and elaboration than if things had gone as expected.
Miller’s (1956) working memory framework suggests that the limited attentional resources available to individuals at any one time must be allocated among different stimuli. If a viewer must elaborate on a scene or portion of a TV show because the character’s behavior in it was inconsistent, this elaboration will “use up” a large proportion of the person’s total attentional resources. The large amount of elaboration and attention will increase recall. If processing is fluent, as when the character’s behavior is consistent, less elaboration and attention will be needed, and recall will decrease.

With regard to the effect of consistency of the behavior on attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause, the framework predicts opposite effects to those on recall. When high incongruity exists, the process and effort of resolving it leads to negative attitudes such as frustration (Meyers-Levy, Louie, and Curren 1994). By contrast, when there is processing fluency (e.g., when the character’s behavior is consistent with her personality), favorable attitudes have been shown to occur (Lee and Aaker 1994). The positive attitudes are not being formed simply because a good behavior and its positive consequences, or a bad behavior and its negative consequences, are being demonstrated, but because of the processing fluency that exists when the character’s behavior is consistent.

**Brandedness of the Cause**

Finally, the framework proposes that the brandedness of the cause will affect recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause. Brandedness is the extent to which branding elements, such as brand name, logo, or slogan, are used or not used, whether individually or together, when referring to the cause. A branded cause placement is one which encompasses one or more brand elements, while an unbranded cause placement is one that does
not include any brand elements. Social marketing entities, whether nonprofit organizations or governmental organizations, are increasingly relying on many of the elements of a brand described by Keller and Lehmann (2006) in the context of commercial branding, including brand name, logo, and slogan. For example, Susan G. Komen uses the symbol of the pink ribbon that resembles a running silhouette (see www.komen.org). UNICEF conducted extensive research to guide the creation of a new logo that would be recognized and well-received by its audiences (Quelch & Laidler-Kylander, 2006). Mothers Against Drunk Driving uses the slogan “Activism, Victim Services, Education” (see www.madd.org). Despite this wide-ranging use of branding in other social marketing promotional tools, social marketers using cause placement have the option to produce placements that include no branding element, and, as detailed in Chapter 2, have indeed typically chosen not to use these elements.

The framework proposes that the use of a branded cause in the cause placement will be associated with higher recall of the cause than the use of an unbranded cause, as predicted by the human associative memory theory (Anderson and Bower 1980). Conversely however, a branded cause placement should produce less favorable attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause than an unbranded cause placement. This is because the presence of a brand element is more likely to result in the change of meaning predicted by the persuasion knowledge model (Friestad and Wright 1994).

The framework predicts that better recall of the cause will occur when the cause is branded than when it is unbranded, due to the narrower-in-breadth, but stronger set of associations that a branded cause has in consumers’ minds, especially if the brand in question has a large amount of brand equity (Keller 1993). According to human associative memory theory (Anderson and Bower 1980) information is stored in the form of a network of interrelated
memory nodes, or individual units of memory for various entities, such as products, places, causes, people, etc. For example, one node may store a brand name, while there may be another node for the product category, one for a usage situation of the brand, another one for a friend who uses that brand, and various nodes for attributes of the brand. These nodes are linked in memory in what is referred to as an associative network. When one node in the network is recalled, it evokes recall of other nodes that are linked to it ("associations;" Anderson and Bower 1980). This activation of linked nodes is easiest for the nodes that are most strongly associated with the one that was first recalled. Strong associations may be thought of as ones involving the “shortest” and most direct links to the node. Thus, stronger associations among the nodes in an associative network should improve recall of a node (e.g., a cause) of the network when another node (e.g., the cause category) acts as a cue.

Research also shows that distinctive stimuli are more strongly encoded in memory than generic or common ones (Kintsch 1970). Distinctiveness of stimuli has often been operationalized in terms of word frequency, with low frequency words (ones that are not commonly used in everyday language) being more distinctive than high frequency words (ones that recur frequently in everyday language; e.g., Kintsch 1970; Bettman 1979). Low frequency (distinctive) words require more elaboration to encode because a person uses them only in a limited context and thus requires more thought to comprehend them. However, once learned, a distinctive word is strongly encoded in memory because it has a narrower set of associations (Meyers-Levy 1989). A limited breadth of associations results in a stronger memory network, with densely clustered nodes linked through strong associations (Meyers-Levy 1989). Overall, branded cause placements are more distinctive, and of a narrower breadth, than unbranded ones. A comparison of “EarthShare” to "environmental organization,” “Susan G. Komen” to “breast
cancer prevention,” and the Humane Society’s logo of animal silhouettes forming the shape of the U.S. map to a generic picture of an animal demonstrates this point. A branded cause should therefore have a narrower breadth of memory associations than an unbranded one (given the moderate degree of brand familiarity assumed by the model), resulting in better recall of the cause and its associations. Even when there is a low degree of brand familiarity, the distinctiveness of a branded cause vis-à-vis an unbranded one should nevertheless lead to more elaboration, stronger encoding, and thus better recall.

However, a branded cause placement, such as one that involves the social marketing organization’s name, a logo, or a slogan, may also provide a clue to the audience that a deliberate cause placement effort is taking place, and thus have a detrimental effect on attitude toward the cause, and consequently on intention to support the cause. As explained in Chapter 2, according to the persuasion knowledge model, when the consumer recognizes that a persuasion attempt is underway, a “change of meaning” may occur and cause him or her to either disengage or become more skeptical of the message (Friestad and Wright 1994, p. 12-13). While product placement may fare better than traditional advertising in avoiding this change of meaning, eliminating the use of a brand element in the placement altogether is likely to decrease this risk even further. A branded cause makes the placement more salient, particularly when there is some degree of brand familiarity. This salience should lead to a higher degree of counterarguing, as predicted by the PKM. This is especially because, despite the benefits of branding that many social marketing organizations have reaped, there still exists some skepticism regarding the use of branding by nonprofit and charity organizations. For example, Ritchie, Swamie, and Weinberg (1999, p. 32) suggest that nonprofit organizations that rely on branding run the risk of seeming “too commercial,” because branding is often perceived as a tool to increase profits. Thus, a branded,
rather than an unbranded, cause placement may improve recall of the cause at the expense of attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause.

**Research Agenda**

The research agenda for the remainder of this dissertation involves investigating relationships between the independent variables and dependent variables in the framework, and empirically testing portions of the framework. The focus will be on the variables that are uniquely relevant to cause placement, and on uncovering possible moderating effects between the message factors (independent variables). The broad underlying research question will thus be: What are the effects of brandedness of the cause, placement modality, image of the character, and consistency of the behavior on each of recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause? The managerial value of this question is in identifying how the cause placement message factors can be manipulated in such a way as to achieve the most desirable results for the cause placement campaign.

Chapter Four will study the combined effects of brandedness of the cause and placement modality on the recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause using a 2 (branded cause/unbranded cause) by 3 (verbal, visual, both) MANOVA design. Chapter Five will study the combined effects of image of the character and consistency of the behavior on the same three dependent variables, using a 2 (“good guy”/“bad guy”) by 2 (consistent/inconsistent) MANOVA design.

**References**


CHAPTER FOUR (ESSAY ONE):
THE EFFECT OF BRANDEDNESS OF THE CAUSE AND PLACEMENT MODALITY 
ON RECALL OF THE CAUSE, ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CAUSE, AND INTENTION 
TO SUPPORT THE CAUSE

In one episode of NBC’s The Office, the character Dwight Schrute wears a “Think Green” t-shirt while urging his office mates to recycle. Integrating sights and sounds related to recycling into the plot came as a part of NBCUniversal’s efforts to incorporate pro-environmental messages into its programming. NBCUniversal has dubbed this practice “behavior placement” (Chozick 2010). The current research uses instead the term “cause placement” as the more precise term to describe the practice of promoting pro-social causes and issues by inserting related elements into entertainment vehicles, either visually (such as by showing the logo of the organization promoting the cause), verbally (such as through a mention of the social issue by an actor), or both (such as by inserting audiovisual actions related to the cause into the script). Thus, cause placement is the social marketing equivalent to the more widely known product placement, the visual and/or verbal integration of brands into television shows or movies in return for cash or other compensation (d’Astous and Séguin 1999; Gould and Gupta1997).

Cause placement, like product placement, is a form of embedded marketing, the practice of seamlessly inserting promotions, or embedding them, “within entertainment vehicles such as films, video and personal computer games, television and print media sports coverage or
television shows” (Hackley and Tiwsakul 2006, p. 64). Like social media and mobile marketing, embedded marketing spending continues to grow sharply as marketers face an increasingly challenging environment in traditional media advertising, such as television spots and print ads (Quinn and Kivijarv 2014). TV program viewers now tend to “zip” (fast-forward through ads on programs pre-recorded on their DVRs) and “zap” (avoid commercials by switching channels as soon as ads appear) (Belch and Belch 2012), and often watch programs using on-demand options such as Netflix and Amazon Prime. Newspaper readership also continues to decline. (Edmonds, Guskin, and Rosenstiel 2011). Embedded marketing has provided a way to convey messages to audiences while their attention is captured by their favorite media programming.

Despite the use of cause placement as an important tool in social marketing, academic research in this area has focused on case studies and anecdotal findings, and no controlled experimental research was found. Instead, all of the empirical research found on embedded marketing is in the area of product placement. One stream of research in product placement has focused on the classification of product placement forms. Wenner (2004) shows that a placement may be through a visual appearance, verbal (spoken) reference, or actual use by a character. Russell (1998) proposed classification along three dimensions: level of visual placement, level of auditory (verbal) placement, and degree of importance to the plot.

A second stream of product placement research is concerned with factors affecting its effectiveness. Some researchers (e.g., van Reijmersdal, Neijens, and Smit 2007; van Reijmersdal, Smit, and Neijens 2010) have studied the relationship between media factors, the characteristics of the media vehicle, and product placement effectiveness. Other researchers have investigated the effects of the independent variables “centrality” (degree of prominence) and “modality” (visual or verbal) on placement effectiveness. Gupta and Lord (1998) found that brand recall was
high (relative to advertising) when the product placement was prominent, but not when it was subtle, and that verbal placements produced higher recall than visual placements that were not prominent. Russell (2002) studied the effects of congruence between modality and connection-to-the-plot on recall and attitude. Verbal information is typically more important for plot development than visual information, so she considered verbal placements paired with strong plot-placement connections to be congruent, and visual placements paired with weak plot-placement connections to be incongruent. She found higher brand recall for incongruent pairings, but a stronger effect on attitude for congruent pairings (Russell 2002).

Cause placement has not enjoyed the same conceptual model development and experimental research that product placement has. Evidence of the effectiveness of cause placement, in terms of comprehension of the message and motivation to act in the pro-social way promoted, tends to be anecdotal (Evans 2008). Quantitative research in the area is largely in the form of public health survey research to assess the effectiveness of cause placement campaigns, as well as case studies outlining and assessing individual programs and campaigns (e.g., Rogers, Vaughan, et al 1999).

While it is reasonable to make use of findings in product placement research as a starting point for the purposes of cause placement research, it is also reasonable to assume that commercial products and social causes are different enough that cause placement merits to be studied as a field on its own. Firstly, while emotional reactions certainly vary by individual, cause placements are likely to cause higher emotional arousal than product placement, with all other factors being held constant. Kohlberg’s (1971) theory of moral development posits that adult individuals universally agree on what constitutes a moral (vs. non-morally charged) issue. Furthermore, neuroimaging research by Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, and others (2002)
showed that individuals experienced higher emotional arousal when shown images or statements relating to moral situations than when they were shown ones relating to non-moral situations. Thus, insofar as social causes tend to have more moral implications than commercial products (regardless of which side of the social issue the individual supports), cause placements will lead to higher emotional arousal than product placements. Higher emotional arousal, in turn, is expected to affect reactions to the placement. Level of emotional arousal has been found to affect the relationship between cognitions and attitudes (Bagozzi 1996), the degree of reliance on peripheral versus central cues in attitude formation (Sanbonmatsu and Kardes 1988), and the intensity of participants’ ad evaluations (Gorn, Pham, and Sin 2001). While details of these findings are beyond the scope of this paper, the main point is that because cause placement should lead to higher emotional arousal than product placement, effects may be different among the two, and cause placement merits to be studied separately.

Secondly, adding to the logic of why cause placement requires separate research, there are independent variables that are relevant only in the area of cause placement. Of particular importance to the current study is the variable “brandedness,” which concerns the presence or absence of brand elements. Keller and Lehmann (2006) describe several elements that serve to uniquely identify a brand, such as the brand name, logo, slogan, etc. Product placement would be impossible without the use of at least one brand element. For example, it would be inconceivable for either Coke or Pepsi to pay for placements that involved unbranded soft drinks, such as through a character drinking out of a can without the brand name being visible or being mentioned. Conversely, while social marketers acknowledge the importance of and widely use brand elements (Ritchie, Swami, and Weinberg 1999), they have the option, and often do choose, to implement unbranded cause placements. Recent examples include a “going green” placement
on *The Office*, a placement relating to prescription drug abuse on *ER*, and a placement relating to organ donation on *Grey’s Anatomy*. Such unbranded placements have often been made by the show’s producers as a deliberate social responsibility initiative. However, they may also be useful to social marketing organizations, particularly governmental agencies, whose goal is to encourage behaviors such as recycling and preventing forest fires, and not to solicit donations.

Are such unbranded placements missed opportunities or the correct choice? That is an important question in the case of cause placement, but irrelevant for product placement.

This paper aims to begin filling the gap in experimental research in the area of cause placement. It investigates the combined effect of two important independent variables: “placement modality,” defined as the sensory form (visual, verbal, or both) in which the social cause is placed in an entertainment vehicle, considered one of the principal decisions made when designing a placement; and “brandedness of the cause” (branded or unbranded), defined as the extent to which branding elements, such as brand name, logo, or slogan, are used or not used, whether individually or together, when referring to the cause, whose special relevance in cause placement is described above. The study investigates the effect of these two independent variables on three dependent variables representing the effectiveness of cause placement. These dependent variables are “recall of the cause,” the consumer’s ability to retrieve the cause or social issue (and related details) from memory, given the category “social causes,” the needs fulfilled by that category, or any type of cue besides the cause itself, “attitude toward the cause,” an overall evaluation of the cause such that can be measured using bipolar adjectives such as “favorable” and “unfavorable,” and “intention to support the cause,” a person’s subjective probability that he or she will actively espouse the cause in question, for example, by donating, volunteering, adopting a specific behavior that is being advocated, or engaging in other
behaviors that advance the cause. Table 1 provides definitions for each of the independent and dependent variables. Specifically, the paper addresses the following research questions:

1. What is the relationship between brandedness of the cause and each of recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause?

2. What is the moderating role of placement modality, be it verbal, visual, or both?

The paper presents hypotheses and uses an experiment whose stimuli rely on a rough video animatic (a slideshow with voice-over) to test the hypotheses. Results are presented and limitations and suggestions for future research are outlined.

Table 2: Definitions of Essay 1 Variables

| Independent Variables | | |
|-----------------------|------------------|
| Placement Modality    | The sensory form in which the social cause is placed in an entertainment vehicle (visual, verbal, or both) |
| Brandedness of the Cause | The extent to which branding elements, such as brand name, logo, or slogan, are used or not used, whether individually or together, when referring to the cause (branded or unbranded) |

| Dependent Variables | | |
|---------------------|------------------|
| Recall of the Cause | The consumer’s ability to retrieve the cause or social issue (and related details) from memory |
| Attitude toward the Cause | The overall positive or negative affect that an individual has toward a cause |
| Intention to Support the Cause | A person’s subjective probability that he or she will actively espouse the cause in question, for example, by donating, volunteering, adopting a specific behavior that is being advocated, or engaging in other behaviors that advance the cause |

Relevant Theories and Hypotheses

H1: Recall of the Cause

As with any promotional campaign, one of the most basic goals of an embedded marketing campaign in general and a cause placement effort in particular is to produce better
recall. In the current study, it is hypothesized that the branded placement will result in better recall than the unbranded placement within each of the verbal, visual, and both verbal and visual conditions. Human associative memory theory (Anderson and Bower 1980) states that knowledge is stored in the form of a network of interrelated memory nodes. These nodes may be thought of as units or fragments of memories for objects, places, situations, people, etc. In the context of marketing, there may be an individual node in which a brand name is stored, a node for the product category, another node for a usage situation of the brand, yet another node for a person seen using that brand, and a number of nodes for attributes of the brand. These nodes are linked in memory, forming an associative network. When one node in the network is recalled, it evokes recall of other nodes that are linked to it ("associations"). For example, an associative memory network might involve the environmental organization EarthShare, the category of environmental protection, the cause of recycling, occasions during which one has recycled, the earth, and so on. When one of those nodes is activated, or retrieved from memory, it causes recall of the other nodes, starting with the ones that are most strongly associated with it (the ones that involve the “shortest” and most direct links to or associations with it). Thus, any measure that strengthens the associations among the nodes in an associative network should improve recall of a node (e.g., a cause) of the network when another node (e.g., the cause category) is used as a cue.

Furthermore, research has shown that distinctive stimuli are more strongly encoded in memory than generic or common ones (Kintsch 1970). Distinctiveness of stimuli has often been operationalized in terms of word frequency, with low frequency words (ones that are not commonly used in everyday language) being more distinctive than high frequency words (ones that recur frequently in everyday language; e.g., Kintsch 1970; Bettman 1979). Low frequency
(distinctive) words require more elaboration to encode because they are used only in a limited context. However, once learned, a distinctive word is strongly encoded in memory because it has a narrower set of associations (Meyers-Levy 1989). A limited breadth (not necessarily number) of associations results in a stronger memory network, one whose nodes can be pictured as densely clustered together, so closely-tied that recalling one quickly facilitates recall of another (Meyers-Levy 1989). While there may be exceptions, branded cause placements are expected to be more distinctive than unbranded ones. For example, “EarthShare” is more distinctive than "environmental organization,” “Susan G. Komen” is more distinctive than “breast cancer prevention,” and the Humane Society’s logo of animal silhouettes forming the shape of the U.S. map is more distinctive than a generic picture of an animal. As such, a branded cause should have a narrower breadth of memory associations than an unbranded one (given the at least moderate degree of brand familiarity assumed by the model), resulting in better recall of the cause as well as its associations.

This effect should hold whether the placement modality is verbal, visual, or both verbal and visual. Stated differently, within each modality, the branded cause placement should produce better recall than the unbranded cause placement. This is because the process by which the effect is expected to occur, as described above, remains unchanged across modalities. For example, a visual placement of a branded cause may involve a character volunteering in an emergency while wearing a t-shirt labeled “American Red Cross,” while a visual placement of an unbranded cause would involve an identical situation except that the character wears a t-shirt labeled “disaster relief team.” Comparing just these two cases, the visual, branded cause placement is likely to be better recalled because of the narrower but stronger set of associations with the American Red Cross relative to the broader, less distinctive category of disaster relief team. Hence:
H1: The placement of a branded cause will result in better recall of the cause than the placement of an unbranded cause within each of the verbal, visual, or both verbal and visual placement modality conditions.

H2: Attitude Toward the Cause

The brandedness of the cause in a placement, however, is expected to have a differential effect on attitude toward the cause depending on placement modality. The Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM; Friestad and Wright 1994) provides the foundational support for why a difference in the pattern of effects is expected to occur in the branded versus the unbranded conditions. The PKM proposes that when consumers are receiving information, for example from another person, a publication, or a TV program, they are more open to persuasion when they do not perceive that a persuasion attempt is taking place, than when they do perceive such an attempt. The perception of a persuasion attempt triggers what Friestad and Wright (1994, p. 12-13) termed a “change of meaning.” The essence of the change of meaning concept is that a shift in perception occurs, from viewing the information being delivered as free of ulterior motives to viewing it as a conscious effort to influence attitudes. When the change of meaning occurs, the consumer is likely to engage in counterarguing, and skepticism is likely to occur.

Quite significantly, the PKM emphasizes “common sense” and “folk” cultural knowledge as the forces that help consumers identify persuasion attempts (Friestad and Wright 1994, p. 7). It is thus reasonable to expect that the existence of a brand element in a cause placement would serve as a powerful cue that a deliberate promotional effort is taking place, and increase the salience of the persuasion attempt. This would in turn trigger the change of meaning, resulting in increased elaboration and counterarguing. This is an especially relevant threat in the case of cause
placement, because consumers tend to be skeptical of branding by social marketing organizations, which seems to be perceived as “too commercial” for social causes (Ritchie, Swamie, and Weinberg 1999, p. 32). Thus, branded cause placements will trigger the effects predicted by the PKM (less favorable attitude), and the more salient the placement, the more likely these effects will occur. This will not be the case, however, for unbranded cause placements. It is worth noting that cause placements are seldom, if ever, paid for by the social marketing organization. Rather, they are often offered as a corporate social responsibility initiative by the show producers. What is relevant here is that the placement attempt is a deliberate effort to persuade.

*Expected Effects for Branded Placements*

The dual-coding model (Paivio 1986) suggests that visual and verbal stimuli are cognitively processed along two different channels, and coded by the learner as two separate sets of codes. As explained in the preceding paragraph, the presence of a branded cause placement increases the likelihood that the persuasion attempt will be perceived as such. When the message is both verbal and visual, and will thus be cognitively processed in two distinct ways (Paivio 1986), this is expected to only further increase the salience of this persuasion attempt, and thus further increase the likelihood that a change of meaning will occur. Thus, in a branded cause placement, the increased salience of the persuasion attempt caused by the use of dual modalities should increase counterarguing and thus lead to a less favorable attitude toward the brand than the use of a single modality (either verbal only or visual only).

In addition, verbal placements are likely to be more salient than visual placements. Multi-store theories of memory (Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968; Craik and Lockhart 1972) suggest that information is stored in a short-memory store (or working memory) as it is received and
processed, but within seconds is transferred to the long term memory store, where it can remain indefinitely for future retrieval (Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968). Much information is lost before it reaches the long-term memory store. In line with the levels-of-processing framework of memory, information that is semantic is more likely to make its way to the long-term memory store or be stored at a “deeper” level, than information that is simply phenomic (Craik and Lockhart 1972).

Verbal information tends to play a more central role in a TV program than visual information, because verbal information is typically what moves the plot forward, while visual stimuli, such as props, are often contextual (Russell 2002). Hence, in a branded cause placement, when the viewer may be vigilantly aware of the persuasion attempt underway, a verbal placement will be more salient than a visual placement, and thus more likely to confirm the presence of a persuasion attempt and have a negative impact on attitude toward the cause by inviting counterargumentation.

*Expected Effects for Unbranded Placements*

A different pattern of effects is expected to occur, however, when an unbranded cause placement is being used; a more salient placement will not immediately mean a less favorable attitude. An unbranded cause placement is likely to be perceived by viewers as a natural part of the script, rather than a deliberate persuasion attempt. Therefore, no change of meaning, and less counterargumentation, is expected to occur. In the unbranded cause conditions then, placement modality is expected to have a different pattern of effects on attitude toward the cause.

According to Epstein’s (1990) cognitive-experiential self theory, information is processed along either the analytic-rational system, which is cognitive and logical in nature, or the intuitive-experiential system, which is affective and holistic in nature. The two systems work independently of each other. Visual stimuli are more fluently processed along the intuitive-
experiential system, whereas verbal stimuli are better suited for processing along the analytical-rational system (Sojka and Giese 2006). In a study of the interaction between types of processors (cognitive, affective, or both) and message modality (verbal, visual, or both), Sojka and Giese (2006) indeed found that visual stimuli produced better attitudes for participants who were affective processors and verbal stimuli produced directionally better attitudes for participants who were cognitive processors. This may be because attitudes form along both cognitive and affective routes that are independent of each other (Eagly, Mladinic, and Otto 1994). When the placement is both verbal and visual (and without the complication of a change of meaning caused by a brand element) there are thus two different routes to producing a favorable attitude. Therefore, when an unbranded cause is placed, attitude toward the cause is expected to be most favorable when the placement modality is both verbal and visual.

As detailed above, because verbal information in a TV program typically carries more meaning than visual information, the multi-store theory of memory (Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968) predicts that verbal placements are more likely to be elaborated upon than visual placements. Without the salience of the persuasion attempt that a branded cause placement would instigate, a verbal placement would cause enough elaboration to result in improved attitude toward the cause, while a visual placement may not, resulting in better attitude in the case of an unbranded placement. Therefore:

H2: A branded cause placement will result in the most favorable attitude toward the cause when the placement is visual, a less favorable attitude toward the cause when the placement is verbal, and the least favorable attitude toward the cause when the placement is both verbal and visual. However, an unbranded cause placement will have the opposite
sequence, resulting in the most favorable attitude toward the cause when the placement is both verbal and visual, a less favorable attitude toward the cause when the placement is verbal, and the least favorable attitude toward the cause when the placement is visual.

**H3: Intention to Support the Cause**

Finally, intention to support the cause is expected to follow the same pattern of moderation effects expected for attitude toward the cause. The theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) suggests that behavioral intentions are a function of attitudes and subjective norms. The prediction that behavioral intentions follow attitudes has also received ample empirical support (Kim and Hunter 1993). Thus:

H3: A branded cause placement will result in the most favorable intention to support the cause when the placement is visual, a less favorable intention to support the cause when the placement is verbal, and the least favorable intention to support the cause when the placement is both verbal and visual. However, an unbranded cause placement will have the opposite sequence, resulting in the most favorable intention to support the cause when the placement is both verbal and visual, a less favorable intention to support the cause when the placement is verbal, and the least favorable intention to support the cause when the placement is visual.

Figure 2 depicts the hypothesized relationships between the variables.
Methodology

Sample

Four hundred and sixty-nine undergraduate marketing students at a large Southeastern university were recruited to participate in the study, and were randomly assigned to each of the groups. A total of 330 completed the study to the end. As detailed later in this section, some of these responses were eliminated because the participants were deemed to have not watched the stimulus video or to have watched it more than once, leaving a total of 229 participants (122 females and 107 males). Group sizes ranged from 31 to 41, so the largest group was less than 1.5 times the size of the smallest group.
Target Stimulus

The American Red Cross was selected as the cause for the study from among 13 causes that were pretested (n = 65) with the study population to assess cause familiarity. A cause that had a high level of familiarity was necessary in order for the brandedness manipulations to make sense, so that branded and unbranded conditions could be compared. The brand name as well as logo of the American Red Cross enjoyed a high level of familiarity with the study population.

Independent Variables

The two independent variables were brandedness of the cause and placement modality. The study thus used a 2 (brandedness of the cause: branded or unbranded) by 3 (placement modality: verbal, visual, or both) between-subjects factorial design to test the hypotheses, and data were analyzed using multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA). As detailed in the procedure section below, participants were shown a rough video of a mock TV show excerpt involving a basketball team. Six versions of the video were produced, and they were identical except for the manipulation involving the cause placement, which related to a cause whose name was mentioned and/or logo placed on the team jersey, depending on the group, as follows:

1. Branded/visual: The coach refers to the cause as “these folks” and there is a Red Cross logo on the jersey.
2. Branded/verbal: The coach refers to the cause as “the American Red Cross” and there is no logo on the jersey.
3. Branded/both: The coach refers to the cause as “the American Red Cross” and there is a Red Cross logo on the jersey.
4. Unbranded/visual: The coach refers to the cause as “these folks” and there is a made up logo similar in size and using the same colors as the Red Cross logo on the jersey, but containing the words “disaster relief” instead of “American Red Cross.”

5. Unbranded/verbal: The coach refers to the cause as “that disaster relief organization” and there is no logo on the jersey.

6. Unbranded/both: The coach refers to the cause as “that disaster relief organization” and the made-up logo is on the jersey.

**Dependent Variables and Covariate**

Dependent variables were recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause. An open-ended item was used to measure recall, as is typical for measuring recall (e.g., Bagozzi and Silk 1983; Krishna, Lwin, and Morrin 2010; Mackie and Asuncion 1990; McQuarrie and Mick 1992). The item used by Krishna, Lwin, and Morrin (2010) was adapted to measure recall. Participants were provided with the definition for “social cause.” They were then asked to list the social cause mentioned or referred to in the video excerpt as well as all related details. The item was worded as follows: “A social cause can be an issue, or can be a charitable organization, relating to the welfare of society. There is one particular social cause or type of organization mentioned or referred to in the excerpt you watched. Please type everything you can remember about the cause or type of organization in the space below. Include AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE about anything that was discussed or anything that you saw visually, such as symbols.” This is analogous to the language used by Krishna, Lwin, and Morrin (2010). Responses were coded using a coding guide with points added for correctly naming the cause, as well as for each correct detail mentioned relating to the manipulation.
Attitude toward the cause was measured by asking the participants to rate their overall impression of the cause using three, seven-point bipolar scales, adapted from Burnkrant and Unnava (1995). The adaptation consisted of adding an adverb to each bipolar adverb to make it extreme (e.g., “very bad/very good” instead of “bad/good”). The scales were anchored by: “very bad/very good,” “extremely unfavorable/extremely favorable,” and “extremely negative/extremely positive.”

Intention to support the cause was measured using three, seven-point bipolar scales, adapted from Yi 1990, once again by adding extreme adverbs. After reading the definition for “supporting a cause,” participants were asked how likely or unlikely they were to consider supporting the cause. The scales were anchored by: “very unlikely/very likely,” “absolutely would not/absolutely would,” and “very improbable/very probable.”

The sets of three items measuring each of attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause were factor analyzed using the principal axis extraction method, and assessed for reliability. Each of the two variables was found to be unidimensional, with one factor accounting for 92.9% of the variance in attitude toward the cause and one factor accounting for 90.3% of the variance in intention to support the cause. Both sets of scales also demonstrated high reliability (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.962$ for attitude toward the cause and 0.946 for intention to support the cause). Because each set of items was unidimensional and had a high reliability, the set of items for each of attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause was summed to produce a single score for each dependent variable.

Familiarity with the American Red Cause was also measured for possible use as a covariate, with the intent to capture variation in the effects of brandedness on the results that are due just to the degree of familiarity with the cause. Familiarity was measured using three, seven-
point bipolar scales adapted from Kent and Allen (1994) by adding extreme adverbs. The scales were anchored by: “extremely unfamiliar/extremely familiar,” “very inexperienced/very experienced,” and “not at all knowledgeable/very knowledgeable.”

**Design and Procedure**

The study was conducted using Qualtrics. To avoid priming the participants and leading them to guess the purpose of the study, they read an introductory statement explaining that the study was to test viewers’ reactions to a potential new television show. They then read a brief background about the show, describing the characters and asking participants to pay close attention to the rough video excerpt they were about to watch. Next, they watched a three-minute video animatic of a supposed excerpt from a show, about a college basketball team who is on a trip to participate in a tournament, and whose new coach has to deal with the issues of an overbearing booster and a star player who is not completing school assignments. About 70 seconds into the video, the coach runs into the athletic director, who informs him that there has been a last-minute change to the team jersey, and (depending on the condition) the “American Red Cross” or “a disaster relief organization” would have their logo on the jersey. This encounter lasts about 30 seconds, and represents the manipulation section of the stimulus.

A professional writer created the script for the video, and actors were used to record the voice. The script idea and various stages of the script and video production were pre-tested to ensure they were clear and appropriate for the study population. The video was produced in the form of an animatic (with still photographs accompanied by verbal dialogue and other sound effects), and ran on Qualtrics in such a way that participants were not able to rewind and fast forward, but could watch it until the end, then watch it over if they so pleased. This was the most
restrictive option available due to YouTube video hosting controls. However, the amount of time spent on the video screen by each participant was captured by Qualtrics, and only those who spent between 100 and 250 seconds on the video were included in the analysis. Thus, only participants who watched the manipulation section, and only watched it once, were included. Six versions of the video were created, one for each study condition. The videos were identical except for changes in how the cause/organization is named and what type of logo appears on the jersey in the 30-second manipulation scene, as detailed under the Independent Variables section above.

The amount of time each participant spent on the video section of the questionnaire was inconspicuously captured by Qualtrics. Before analyzing the results, participants that had not completed the scene containing the manipulation (watched for under 100 seconds) and those that were suspected to have replayed the video and watched the manipulation scene twice (watched for over 250 seconds) were eliminated.

After watching the video, participants proceeded to complete open-ended items as well as scales related to the dependent variables, with distractors and items on other unrelated topics interspersed throughout the questionnaire. Questions appeared on the screen one at a time, and participants were not able to go back in the questionnaire once they proceeded forward. After data collection had ended, participants were debriefed via email.

Results

Analysis of the data began with an omnibus multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) test to detect whether differences in means existed among the four experimental groups. The omnibus MANOVA test was significant (Wilk’s F (15, 608) = 5.67, p < 0.001), indicating
significant differences among the group means. Thus, it was possible to proceed with a 3 X 2 full factorial MANCOVA to assess the effects of modality (verbal, visual, or both) and brandedness (branded or unbranded) on recall, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause, while accounting for the covariate familiarity with the American Red Cross. Correlations were first tested to determine the suitability of familiarity as a covariate, and there was indeed a correlation between this variable and intention to support the cause (r=0.328, n=209, p=0.000).

Table 3 shows a full correlation matrix for the covariate and independent variables. Table 4 provides a summary of all MANCOVA cell means. Table 5 provides summary statistics for the interaction between the two dependent variables as well as the main effects that were tested for significance.

There was no significant interaction effect between modality and brandedness (Wilk's F = 0.411, p = 0.872), but there were significant main effects for modality (Wilk's F = 2.85, p = 0.010) and brandedness (Wilk's F = 22.533, p < 0.001). I conducted univariate ANOVA's to determine which dependent variables significant differences existed for (also in Table 2). Modality had a significant main effect only on Recall (Wilk's F = 6.977, p = 0.001). Highest recall was for "both verbal and visual" (M=2.02), followed by verbal (M=1.85), followed by visual (M=1.04). However, ranking the group means based on the p-values of Tukey multiple comparisons showed no significant difference in recall between both verbal and visual, and verbal.

Brandedness had a significant main effect on recall overall (Wilk's F = 18.685, p < 0.001). As Table 1 shows, the mean values for recall are in line with Hypothesis 1. For example, within the two verbal conditions, the branded group had better recall than the unbranded group.
Table 3: Essay 1 Correlations of the Covariate and Dependent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Familiarity with the cause</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recall of the cause</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude toward the cause</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>-0.206</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention to support the cause</td>
<td>0.328*</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.462*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.01

Table 4: Essay 1 Mean Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Brandedness</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unbranded</td>
<td>Branded</td>
<td>Unbranded</td>
<td>Branded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recall = 1.23</td>
<td>Recall = 2.29</td>
<td>Recall = 0.63</td>
<td>Recall = 1.49</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attitude = 14.63</td>
<td>Attitude = 18.61</td>
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<td>Attitude = 17.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intention = 15.67</td>
<td>Intention = 15.68</td>
<td>Intention = 13.65</td>
<td>Intention = 14.24</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(n = 41)</td>
<td>(n = 40)</td>
<td>(n = 37)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recall = 1.50</td>
<td>Recall = 2.59</td>
<td>Recall = 1.50</td>
<td>Recall = 2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attitude = 14.93</td>
<td>Attitude = 17.36</td>
<td>Attitude = 14.93</td>
<td>Attitude = 17.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Intention = 14.87</td>
<td>Intention = 15.02</td>
<td>Intention = 14.87</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n = 42)</td>
<td>(n = 39)</td>
<td>(n = 42)</td>
<td>(n = 39)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recall = 1.12</td>
<td>Recall = 2.14</td>
<td>Recall = 1.12</td>
<td>Recall = 2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attitude = 14.29</td>
<td>Attitude = 17.79</td>
<td>Attitude = 14.29</td>
<td>Attitude = 17.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n = 112)</td>
<td>(n = 117)</td>
<td>(n = 112)</td>
<td>(n = 117)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To complete testing for Hypothesis 1, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to test whether there was a significant difference in the recall scores of the branded versus unbranded groups in each of the visual, verbal, and both verbal and visual conditions. Hypothesis 1 was supported for all three modalities, as the mean recall score was significantly higher in the branded group than the unbranded group in the verbal (F=3.311, p=0.042), visual (F=3.373, p=0.040), and both verbal and visual (F=3.500, p=0.035) conditions, even while controlling for familiarity with the Red Cross.
Table 5: Essay 1 MANCOVA Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Error df</th>
<th>F-ratio*</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>eta²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MANCOVA Statistics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familiarity (covariate)</td>
<td>Rcl/Att/Int</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>9.959</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Rcl/Att/Int</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>3.000</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandedness</td>
<td>Rcl/Att/Int</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>22.164</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modality by Brandedness</td>
<td>Rcl/Att/Int</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td>0.858</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOVA Statistics**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Rcl</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>6.977</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Att</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>1.600</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Int</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>2.271</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandedness</td>
<td>Rcl</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>18.685</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandedness</td>
<td>Att</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>43.971</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandedness</td>
<td>Int</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>.520</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*F-ratios for the MANCOVA (multivariate) statistics are for Wilks' lambda.
**Results for the recall dependent variable from this particular analysis are not relevant to the hypotheses and are thus not discussed in the results. A different analysis, discussed below, was conducted to test Hypothesis 1. An individual MANCOVA was not conducted for the modality by brandedness interaction because its multivariate statistics were not significant.

Hypotheses 2 and 3 predicted interaction effects between brandedness and modality on attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause, respectively, and were thus not supported, as Table 2 shows (F=0.432, p=0.858).

Although no main effects of modality and brandedness on attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause were hypothesized, individual ANCOVAs were conducted as a follow up to the omnibus MANCOVA for completeness of the analysis (Table 2). Modality did not have a significant main effect on either attitude toward the cause (F=1.600, p=0.204) or intention to support the cause (F=2.271, p=0.106). However, as Figure 1 shows, the unbranded conditions did follow the pattern of results predicted by Hypotheses 2, such that the modality that was both verbal and visual produced the highest mean attitude, followed by the verbal modality, followed by the visual modality. The branded conditions (Figure 2) did not follow the precise pattern predicted, but quite importantly, the modality that was both verbal and visual had the
lowest mean attitude, though once again differences were not significant. There did not seem to
be a distinct pattern of results for intention to support the cause (Table 1).

Figure 3: Estimated Marginal Means of Attitude Toward the Cause for Unbranded Conditions

Figure 4: Estimated Marginal Means of Attitude Toward the Cause for Branded Conditions

Brandedness had a significant main effect on attitude toward the cause (F = 43.971, p <
0.001), but not on intention to support the cause (F = 0.414, p = 0.520). Attitude toward the
cause was significantly higher in the branded group (M=17.79) than in the unbranded group (M=14.29). There was no significant difference in intention to support the cause between the branded (M=14.96) and unbranded (M=14.71) groups.

**MTurk Sample**

To further validate these results, additional data was collected from a sample of MTurk users. Because the stimuli were created with a younger audience in mind, and the pre-tests for the study conducted using a student population, participants were restricted to 18-35 year-olds residing in the U.S. After eliminating participants who had not completed the video or watched it more than once in the same way described for the student sample, 272 MTurk participants remained (35% males). Tables 3 and 4 show that while the means are not identical, the overall results for the two samples were similar. In fact, the reason that it was not possible to combine data from the two samples was that recall scores of the MTurk participants were significantly

**Table 6: Essay 1 MTurk Sample Mean Scores**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modality</th>
<th>Brandedness</th>
<th>Unbranded</th>
<th>Branded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verbal</td>
<td>Recall = 2.42</td>
<td>Recall = 3.04</td>
<td>Recall = 2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attitude = 17.00</td>
<td>Attitude = 17.80</td>
<td>Attitude = 17.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intention = 16.33</td>
<td>Intention = 14.84</td>
<td>Intention = 15.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n = 36)</td>
<td>(n = 50)</td>
<td>(n = 86)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Visual</td>
<td>Recall = 2.36</td>
<td>Recall = 3.10</td>
<td>Recall = 2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attitude = 16.41</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intention = 15.27</td>
<td>Intention = 15.78</td>
<td>Intention = 15.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n = 44)</td>
<td>(n = 51)</td>
<td>(n = 95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Recall = 2.76</td>
<td>Recall = 4.39</td>
<td>Recall = 3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attitude = 16.55</td>
<td>Attitude = 18.20</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intention = 15.20</td>
<td>Intention = 15.63</td>
<td>Intention = 15.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n = 49)</td>
<td>(n = 41)</td>
<td>(n = 90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recall = 2.53</td>
<td>Recall = 3.53</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intention = 15.54</td>
<td>Intention = 15.41</td>
<td>(n = 129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n = 129)</td>
<td>(n = 142)</td>
<td>(n = 142)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
higher than those of the student participants. MTurk participants wrote more detailed open-ended responses that seemed to indicate they were more engaged with the task. These observations support the use of an MTurk sample for future data collection.

**Table 7: Essay 1 MTurk Sample MANCOVA Summary Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Error df</th>
<th>F-ratio*</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>eta²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. MANCOVA Statistics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familiarity (covariate)</td>
<td>Rcl/Att/Int</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Rcl/Att/Int</td>
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<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandedness</td>
<td>Rcl/Att/Int</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>9.930</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modality by Brandedness</td>
<td>Rcl/Att/Int</td>
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<td>1.190</td>
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<td>0.013</td>
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<td><strong>B. ANCOVA Statistics</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Rcl</td>
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<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Att</td>
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<td>0.889</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Int</td>
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<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.972</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandedness</td>
<td>Rcl</td>
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<td>&lt;0.001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brandedness</td>
<td>Int</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*F-ratios for the MANCOVA (multivariate) statistics are for Wilks’ lambda.
**Results for the recall dependent variable are not relevant to the hypotheses and are thus not discussed in the results. A different analysis, discussed below, was conducted to test Hypothesis 1. An individual MANCOVA was not conducted for the modality by brandedness interaction because its multivariate statistics were not significant.

**Discussion**

**Theoretical Implications**

Hypothesis 1 was supported by the results, and while Hypotheses 2 and 3 were not, the results nevertheless provide valuable insights into the effects of brandedness and modality on the various measures of embedded marketing effectiveness within the context of social marketing. Hypothesis 1 stated that, based on the human associative memory theory (Anderson and Bower 1980) and the ways in which branded versus unbranded stimuli are encoded and recalled given the narrower sets of memory associations related to branded causes (Kintsch 1970; Meyers-Levy
Hypothesis 2 predicted that an interaction effect exists between modality and brandedness, such that a branded cause would result in the best attitude toward the cause when modality was visual, followed by verbal, followed by both visual and verbal, whereas the opposite pattern would occur when the cause was unbranded. Hypothesis 3 predicted analogous patterns for intention to support the cause. The results showed no significant interaction effect between modality and brandedness, and no main effects of modality on attitude toward the cause or intention to support the cause, though the pattern of the means for attitude toward the cause was largely in line with Hypothesis 2. Brandedness had a significant main effect only on attitude toward the cause, such that the mean attitude for the branded cause was higher, but no main effect on intention to support the cause.

The fact that the pattern of results for Hypothesis 2 was in the predicted direction, particularly for the unbranded conditions which followed the very pattern predicted, indicates that the theoretical reasoning described, relating to the multi-store theory of memory (Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968) and the various routes to attitude formation (Eagly, Mladinic, and Otto 1994) as they relate to modality, may hold, though the effect size may be small. Future studies using a variety of different causes and different placement lengths may be worthwhile to see if the pattern of results will continue to appear, and perhaps with significant mean differences.

Regarding the branded conditions, most importantly the both verbal and visual modality produced the least favorable attitude, as predicted by Hypothesis 2, but the mean difference was not significant. This indicates that the PKM (Friestad and Wright 1994) may indeed be at work, and that is why the most salient placement produced the least favorable attitude. An open-ended
item was placed near the end of the questionnaire asking participants how they would feel if they knew that the cause had been purposely placed in the show excerpt. While responses were mixed (e.g., “I don’t care, everyone does it now.”), many were negative and provide further insights. Some examples of the responses were: “If I had noticed, it would have made me feel very annoyed,” “It makes me feel more suspicious of the organization. I trust the organization much less and would be less likely to sponsor it,” “I’m not a fan of the Red Cross, so it would not surprise me if they did something like that,” “Slightly annoyed,” and “If they did, I would feel manipulated.” Such responses indicate that it would be worthwhile to conduct similar studies with larger sample sizes that would be suitable for detecting smaller effect sizes.

Next in rank from worse to best attitude toward the cause was the visual placement. Thus, attitude for the verbal placement was higher (though not statistically significantly) than that for the visual placement, contrary to the pattern predicted. The multi-store theories of memory (Craik and Lockhart 1972) suggest that in a TV show, verbal information carries more meaning than visual and would thus be stored in longer-term memory rather than immediately disposed of, in turn making it more salient and subject to being perceived as a persuasion attempt. While this was expected to be the case in this particular context, for example, as Russell (2002) found, it is possible that in the current example the branded visual stimulus made the placement more salient, in line with more general research findings that consumers have an easier time processing pictures than they do words (e.g., Bajo 1988; Job, Rumiati, and Lotto 1992). Since the attitude and intention items came towards the end of the questionnaire, it is also possible that the visual placements became more salient compared to the verbal placements during that period. Indeed, Childers and Houston (1984) found that memory for verbal stimuli deteriorated over time, unlike that of visual stimuli. This may also help explain why the mean
difference in attitude for the unbranded/verbal and unbranded/visual conditions was so minimal. The pattern of results for the interaction effect on intention to support the cause did not follow that of attitude toward the cause. Differences among the means were neither significant, nor followed the pattern of attitude toward the cause. While the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) predicts that behavioral intention will follow attitude, that has not always been the case as is elaborated on below.

The discussion above elaborates on interaction effects between brandedness and modality on attitude toward the cause, but while these patterns were in line with the hypotheses they did lack statistical significance. On the other hand, there was a main effect of brandedness on attitude toward the cause, such that the branded placements were associated with better attitudes. Thus, it appears that in this case the well-documented advantages of branding (see Keller and Lehmann 2006) trumped the disadvantages associated with any skepticism caused by the viewers’ persuasion knowledge. Perhaps, in line with the findings of Wei, Fischer, and Main (2008) the expected negative effects of the viewers’ persuasion knowledge were attenuated by their perception that the placement tactic was appropriate and by the high level of brand familiarity (although the results here do account for degree of familiarity).

Brandedness did not have a significant main effect on intention to support the cause. Therefore, intention was not in line with attitude. While this is contrary to what the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) would predict, there are a variety of variables that may have come into play, moderating that relationship. In the social marketing context in particular, social and moral norms may moderate the relationship between attitude and intention in the case of charitable behavior (Smith and McSweeney 2007). Thus it may be the case with this particular population, for example, that volunteering with or donating to the Red Cross or
other charities in general are not norms. It is worth noting that familiarity with social cause organizations in general, as well as experience or interaction with them, were measured, but were not statistically significant as covariates.

The results that followed the predicted pattern for the hypotheses but fell short of significant statistical support may have been due to a number of other reasons that also point to potential areas for further research. For example, there may have been a lack of fit or congruity between the selected cause and the TV show subject matter. Perhaps a health- and fitness-related cause, such as Livestrong, or a cause more specifically related to youth, such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving or NoBully, while they may be less familiar than the American Red Cross, would have had better fit with the show and produced different results. It is also possible that the American Red Cross enjoys such high familiarity and positive attitudes that a ceiling effect of sorts was reached and there was little room for the manipulations to have an effect.

Managerial Implications

The primary managerial implication of the current study is that cause placements should employ a brand, rather than simply be unbranded. For example, the recycling cause placement in The Office, mentioned at the very beginning of this essay, would have been more effective had it been associated with a familiar Earth- or environment-related brand, such as The Nature Conservancy. It would be useful to conduct further studies using various causes of different levels of familiarity to investigate how robust the findings and this recommendation are. Furthermore, such studies would provide additional opportunities to test the predicted interaction between brandedness and modality for stronger effects than the graphed pattern found here. With confirmation of that pattern, the implication is that branded cause placements produce better
recall and attitudes overall. However, they do make the persuasion attempt more salient, evoking persuasion knowledge, so when a branded placement is used, one with a single modality will be more effective than one that is both verbal and visual. When an unbranded placement must be used, for example, when an entire group of organizations is supporting the placement or the show producers themselves have initiated the effort (as was the case with NBCUniversal), the best attitudes will result from a modality that is both verbal and visual.

Limitations and Future Research

The study was limited in that only one cause and mock show excerpt were used for the stimuli. While this is expected to have led to more internal validity, external validity may be increased by replicating the study to various causes in a large variety of social areas as well as a large variety of shows, and also using different audiences. Such extensions of the study would also serve to investigate whether different contexts will lead to larger effect sizes for the results relating to attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause, such that Hypotheses 2 and 3 are supported, especially given (as detailed in the theoretical implications section above) that the results were starkly in the predicted direction here but lacked significant differences. It would be particularly interesting to use social causes that do not enjoy the high level of familiarity that the American Red Cross does, in case that had led to a ceiling effects in the current results.

References


CHAPTER FIVE (ESSAY TWO):
HOW IMAGE AND CONSISTENCY OF BEHAVIOR OF A TV CHARACTER IMPACT RECALL, ATTITUDE, AND INTENTION TO SUPPORT THE CAUSE

Almost every episode of the exceptionally popular ABC drama, *Grey’s Anatomy*, features one of the show’s good looking and successful doctors using a Microsoft Surface tablet. As the closing credits reveal, this is not by coincidence, but is an example of product placement, the common practice of visually and/or verbally integrating brands into television shows or movies in return for compensation (d’Astous and Séguin 1999; Gould and Gupta 1997). What is less common and much more intriguing is that the show also integrates messages regarding social causes into its episodes. For example, the story line often addresses organ donation, an effort deliberately made in conjunction with the Hollywood Health & Society program (Movius, Cody, Huang et al 2007). While some in the media industry have dubbed this practice “behavior placement” (Chozick 2010), the current research proposes the “cause placement” to refer to the practice of inserting elements of pro-social causes and issues into entertainment vehicles, whether visually (e.g., by showing an organization’s logo), verbally (e.g., by mentioning the cause or actions related to it), or both.

Like product placement, cause placement is one form of embedded marketing, the practice of seamlessly placing promotions “within entertainment vehicles such as films, video and personal computer games, television and print media sports coverage or television shows” (Hackley and Tiwsakul 2006, p. 64). Chapter Four outlines key findings in the product
placement literature and the much more limited cause placement literature. In addition, Chapter Four explains the need for a separate research stream for cause placement, due to the differential effects that the heightened emotional arousal that social causes are expected to result in compared to commercial products. The chapter then investigates the relationships between two cause placement message factors (placement modality and brandedness) and three measures of cause placement effectiveness (recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause).

This essay aims to continue filling the gap in experimental research in the area of cause placement. It investigates the combined effect of two other important independent variables. The first one is “image of the character,” (good guy or bad guy) defined as the degree to which the character is perceived or not perceived as a responsible, honest, and trustworthy person who consistently does the right thing. The second independent variable is “consistency of the behavior” (consistent or inconsistent), defined as the extent to which a character’s behavior in relation to the social cause is congruent or not congruent to the character’s personality traits. The study examines the effect of these independent variables on three dependent variables that together represent the effectiveness of cause placement. The first one is “recall of the cause,” the viewer’s ability to retrieve the social cause and related details (such as the socially desirable behavior) from memory. The second dependent variable is “attitude toward the cause,” the overall positive or negative affect that an individual has toward a cause. The third dependent variable is “intention to support the cause,” a person’s subjective probability that he or she will support the cause by adopting the behavior being advocated. Table 1 lists the definitions of the independent and dependent variables. Specifically, the paper aims to address the following research questions:
1. What is the relationship between the independent variable consistency of the behavior and the dependent variables recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause?

2. What is the moderating role of the independent variable image of the character?

The paper presents hypotheses and uses an experiment containing stimuli in the form of a mock TV show script excerpt, including photographic illustrations, to test the hypotheses. Results are presented and limitations and suggestions for future research are outlined.

**Table 8: Definitions of Essay 2 Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Image of the Character</td>
<td>The degree to which the main character is perceived or not perceived as a responsible, honest, and trustworthy person who consistently does the right thing (good guy or bad guy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency of the Behavior</td>
<td>The extent to which a character’s behavior in relation to the social cause is congruent or not congruent to the character’s personality traits (consistent or inconsistent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recall of the Cause</td>
<td>The consumer’s ability to retrieve the cause or social issue (and related details) from memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude toward the Cause</td>
<td>The overall positive or negative affect that an individual has toward a cause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention to Support the Cause</td>
<td>A person’s subjective probability that he or she will support the cause, for example by adopting the behavior being advocated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Relevant Theories and Hypotheses**

**H1: Recall of the Cause**

Almost any promotional campaign, including one that involves cause placement, will have increased recall as one of its basic goals. For cause placement, recall of the cause is important because social marketing involves convincing people to adopt a particular behavior (Kotler and Lee, 2008), so remembering the desired (or undesired) behavior and its positive (or
negative) consequences is essential. In the context of advertising and promotion in general, recall is a standard measure of effectiveness (Dubow, 1994). Higher recall of the brand makes it more likely to appear in the consumer’s consideration set (Moran, 1990), which is relevant here because even with causes an individual may be deciding which cause among many to donate to or advocate for. Improved recall has also been associated with improved behavioral (purchase) intentions (Axelrod, 1968) and actual behavior (Ambler 2003).

Congruity theory provides the basis of the rationale for the expected effects related to recall. Congruity theory states that individuals strive to maintain cognitive consistency, such that "changes in evaluation are always in the direction of increased congruity with the existing frame of reference" (Osgood and Tannenbaum 1955, p. 43). If there is incongruity between two stimuli (in this case, the image of the character and the character’s behavior), the perceiver engages in extensive elaboration in order to resolve this incongruity (Priester, Godek, Nayakankuppum, et al 2004). This is especially the case here because according to the fundamental attribution error described by Ross (1977), people tend to attribute individuals’ behavior to internal personality traits and dispositions rather than to external factors or circumstances. That is, people tend to assume that individuals behave in a certain way due to personality, rather than due to external circumstances. Thus, viewers expect each character to behave in a way that is consistent or congruent with his or her personality. A “good guy” is defined here as a character who is perceived as overall responsible, honest, and trustworthy, while a “bad guy” is a character who is perceived as overall irresponsible, dishonest, or untrustworthy, irrespective of how well-liked the characters are. The bad guy should therefore behave in irresponsible ways, while the good guy should make responsible decisions and behave in a trustworthy way, even if they are both in identical circumstances. If the bad guy in a TV show, for example, behaves responsibly and
conscientiously, this will be troubling to the viewer and will require more processing than if the bad guy were to behave as expected.

How will the more extensive elaboration that results from this incongruity lead to better recall? Miller’s (1956) working memory framework proposes that an individual has a limited amount of attentional resources with which to process information. Allocating some of these resources to attend to one stimulus means that attentional resources will potentially be diverted from another stimulus. Thus the increased elaboration resulting from an incongruity between a character and his behavior is expected to command a large proportion of the viewer’s attentional resources. The increased elaboration and attention that result should improve recall. If the behavior of the main character is consistent with his image, however, processing will be more fluent, and less elaboration and therefore less attention will be required, and recall would be expected to suffer. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:

**H1:** When the behavior of the main character is *inconsistent* with the image of that character in a scene with the cause placement, there will be better recall of the cause than when behavior is consistent with their images.

**H2 and H3: Attitude Toward the Cause and Intention to Support the Cause**

The pattern of effects predicted for attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause is more complex. Research has shown that the process of resolving high levels of incongruity can lead to negative attitudes such as frustration, because the incongruity cannot easily be resolved (Meyers-Levy, Louie, and Curren 1994). By contrast, fluency of processing, which would be expected to occur when the behavior of the good guy or bad guy is consistent
with the behavior of that character, has been shown to be associated with favorable attitudes (Lee and Aaker 1994). Thus, for example, when a character who is expected to behave badly fails to place his empty soft drink can in the recycling bin and throws it on the ground, where a runner trips on it, viewers should experience processing fluency in evaluating the situation, and favorable attitudes toward the cause should result. Also, when a character who is a true “good guy” demonstrates positive behavior in line with the cause in question, for example by walking a few steps to place his can in the recycling bin rather than throwing it in a nearby trash can, viewers will experience more processing fluency than when a “bad guy” goes out of his way to do the same thing. This behavior is what the viewer expects, so processing fluency occurs, and the cause in question is evaluated positively (attitude is greater). Thus, attitudes are more favorable not simply because inherently good or bad behaviors and their consequences are being demonstrated, but because of the processing fluency that exists when the main character behaves in the way expected with regard to the cause in question. In the viewer’s mind, “the irresponsible, slacker character didn’t dispose of the can properly and recycle it, causing harm to the environment and a fellow pedestrian, just as we’d expect from him” or “this trustworthy, responsible character put in the extra effort to recycle her can, making the world a better place, because she’s always so conscientious.” When the good guy or the bad guy behave in a way that is consistent with their characters, processing fluency occurs. Attitudes towards the cause are thus positive. In the reverse situation, when the behavior of the characters is inconsistent, the viewer is puzzled and feels that more scrutiny is required, processing is not fluent, and attitude toward the cause therefore suffers.

While the preceding logic holds overall, differential effects are expected for the good guy and the bad guy. When the image of the character is good guy, a positive “halo effect”
(Thorndike 1920) is expected to occur, leading attitudes toward the cause to be similar whether the behavior is consistent or inconsistent. The halo effect is the influence that a general evaluation of a person or entity has on the evaluation of that entity’s individual attributes or other things associated with it (Thorndike 1920, Nisbett and Wilson 1977). The halo effect has been found to hold in the context of evaluations of individuals (Nisbett and Wilson 1977) as well as brands (Leuthesser, Kohli, and Harich, 1995), among others. In the context of cause placement, even if the good guy character’s behavior is inconsistent (he behaves in a way that is contrary to the social cause), it would be expected that the harm caused by that behavior would be demonstrated. For example, if he chooses not to place his drink can in the recycling bin, and throws it on the ground instead, a runner passing by might trip and the good guy would be fined and realize that his behavior was not the right thing to do. Such a scenario is what is expected in a cause placement, as there would be no point if the harm resulting in the case of undesired behavior was not shown. In this example, though the behavior may be inconsistent causing uneasiness and lack of processing fluency in the viewer’s mind, the mere association between the cause (whose name, logo, or other branding element would be featured) and the good guy, is expected to still improve attitudes toward it through the halo effect. In this way, attitude toward the cause would be expected to be similar to when the good guy’s behavior is consistent and the benefits of the desirable behavior are highlighted.

In the case of the bad guy, there are other forces expected to be increasing rather than decreasing the differences in attitude toward the cause for consistent versus inconsistent behavior. Simply because he is not a good guy, the bad guy does not benefit from the positive halo effect when behavior is inconsistent (that is, when his behavior is good or socially desirable, for example, he recycles his can). Not only that, but a negativity bias (Wright 1981) will cause
attitudes toward the cause to increase further when behavior is consistent (his behavior is bad or socially undesirable) versus when it is inconsistent. In other words, in the case of the bad guy, there are forces driving attitude toward the cause higher when behavior is consistent, and lower when behavior is inconsistent.

Research in both the psychology (Meyerowitz and Chaiken 1987; Smith and Petty 1996) and marketing (Mahesweran and Meyers-Levy 1990; White, MacDonnell, and Dahl 2011) fields suggests that, provided there is a high degree of involvement on the viewer’s part, a negativity bias exists. Wright (1981) found that when involvement is high, the process of “overweighting” occurs, whereby negative information receives more weight than positive information. A high degree of involvement would be expected when a viewer is watching a television show, especially in this age when shows are typically viewed on demand and rarely is someone “stuck” watching a show. Even in a study such as this one where only a few scenes are being read, as described in the Methods section, a high level of involvement is expected, as participants are being compensated and know that they will be answering questions about the stimulus. Skowronski and Carlston (1989, p. 138) indeed state that, particularly in situations where morality, rather than ability or skill, is in question, “socially undesirable acts are more informative” than socially desirable ones in attitude formation. In the context of social causes, Chang and Lee (2009) reported that respondents evaluated ads asking for charitable donations in the short term more positively if the negative consequences of not donating, rather than the positive consequences of donating, were highlighted. In cause placement, a bad guy character whose behavior is consistent would act in a socially undesirable way, for example by littering rather than recycling, and the show or movie would go on to demonstrate the harm that results. In such a case, attitude toward the cause will benefit not only from the congruency between the
image of the character and the behavior being consistent, but it will also benefit from the
negativity bias caused by this behavior being undesirable and having harmful consequences. In
the case of the bad guy, these two forces will drive up attitude toward the cause when the
behavior is consistent. Moreover, the lack of a positive halo effect will drive down attitude
toward the cause when behavior is inconsistent. Hence:

H2: Attitude toward the cause will be greater for consistent than inconsistent behavior when the
image of the character is bad guy, but there will be no difference in attitude toward the
cause for consistent versus inconsistent behavior when the image of the character is good
guy.

Finally, the study predicts that intention to support the cause will follow the same pattern
of moderation effects predicted for attitude toward the cause. The theory of reasoned action
(Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) posits that behavioral intentions are a function of attitudes and
subjective norms. This pattern of attitudes directly predicting behavioral intentions has also
received empirical support (e.g., Kim and Hunter 1993). Thus:

H3: Intention to support the cause will be higher for consistent than inconsistent behavior
when the image of the character is bad guy, but there will be no difference in intention to
support the cause for consistent versus inconsistent behavior when the image of the
character is good guy.

Figure 5 shows a diagram of the hypothesized effects.
Methodology

Design and Participants

A 2 (image of the character: good guy/bad guy) by 2 (consistency of the behavior: consistent/inconsistent) between-subjects factorial design was used to test the hypotheses. Two hundred and ninety Mechanical Turk (MTurk) users were recruited to participate in the study, and were randomly assigned to each of the cells. Some of these responses were eliminated because the participants were deemed to have not read the script completely, or to have spent much more time on it than would realistically be spent watching a TV show. Specifically, responses of participants who spent fewer than 7 seconds or more than 35 seconds on each page of the script were eliminated. Responses of participants who completed items that asked them to leave these items blank (to test if they were carefully reading the questionnaire) were also
eliminated. This left a sample of 153 (76 female and 77 male). Because pretesting had been done with a sample of undergraduate students, only MTurk users in the age range of 18-35 were allowed to participate. This age group was selected by placing an MTurk recruitment ad that asked interested users to begin by completing a series of demographic questions on variables such as gender, age, level of education, and income, explaining that only participants in particular categories that could not be disclosed would qualify to participate. Group size ranged from 35 to 41, so that the largest group was well within 1.5 times the size of the smallest group.

**Stimuli**

The Smokey the Bear forest fire prevention program employed by the United States Forest Service was selected as the cause, and college students who go on a camping trip were selected as the subject matter for the script, based on a pre-test (n=36) conducted to test the manipulations and the degree to which the scenarios were thought to be realistic. Two pilot tests (n=37) were conducted using drafts of the complete data collection instrument to ensure that the stimuli, manipulations, and all questionnaire items were clear and sequenced in a logical manner.

**Procedure**

The study was conducted using Qualtrics. In order to avoid priming the participants and to prevent them from guessing the purpose of the study, they read an introduction explaining that they were going to be asked about their reactions to a partial script for a potential new television show. They were asked to read the script carefully and look at the photographs that accompanied it. When they clicked “next”, they were taken to the first page of a seven-page script. Each page contained only several lines of dialogue taking up about one third of the screen, with a
photograph directly below it. The script consisted of dialogue between Connor and Matt, two college students who are good friends and avid campers. At the beginning of the script, the two friends are on campus discussing their upcoming overnight camping trip. Through this conversation, they reveal Connor’s image (good guy or bad guy). Next, the script takes place at the campsite where they spend the night. The following morning there are only smoldering embers left of their fire, and Matt wants to put them out. Connor, depending on the image of the character condition, either supports him or convinces him that this is not necessary. In the final part of the script, Matt informs Connor that there is news of a campfire having been left smoldering, and almost causing a lot of damage.

Participants were not able to go back once they had finished a page of the script and moved on. The amount of time each participant spent on each of the seven pages of the script was captured by Qualtrics, and only those who spent between 7 and 35 seconds on each page of the script were included in the analysis. Seven seconds was deemed to be enough time to properly read the words and look at the picture, while anything more than 35 seconds was considered unrealistically long in a TV show setting. Four versions of the script were created, one for each study condition.

After watching the video, participants proceeded to complete a distractor to clear their short-term memory. This was followed by the item for uncued recall, then the scales for the dependent variables, covariate, and manipulation checks. Other items on unrelated topics (such as views on camping) were interspersed throughout the questionnaire to avoid purpose guessing. Questions appeared on the screen one at a time, and participants were not able to go back in the questionnaire once they proceeded forward.
**Independent Variables**

The two independent variables were image of the character and consistency of the behavior. As detailed in the procedure above, participants read illustrated scripts that were identical in each experimental cell except for the manipulation involving the cause placement, which related to Connor’s (the good guy/bad guy) decision to put out or leave a smoldering campfire, as follows:

1. **Good guy/consistent behavior:** Connor is very responsible, trustworthy, and a great student. He readily agrees to put out the embers of the fire completely as they leave the campsite. The friends later learn that nearby campers left their fire smoldering and a large fire could have ensued, but was caught early enough so that damages were small.

2. **Good guy/inconsistent behavior:** Connor is very responsible, trustworthy, and a great student. He refuses to put out the embers of the fire completely as they leave the campsite and convinces his friend that it’s not necessary. The friends later learn that campers (possibly them) left their fire smoldering and a large fire could have ensued, but was caught early enough so that damages were small.

3. **Bad guy/consistent behavior:** Connor is very irresponsible, untrustworthy, and an awful student. He refuses to put out the embers of the fire completely as they leave the campsite and convinces his friend that it’s not necessary. The friends later learn that campers (possibly them) left their fire smoldering and a large fire could have ensued, but was caught early enough so that damages were small.

4. **Bad guy/inconsistent behavior:** Connor is very irresponsible, untrustworthy, and an awful student. He readily agrees to put out the embers of the fire completely as they leave the
campsite. The friends later learn that nearby campers left their fire smoldering and a large fire could have ensued, but was caught early enough so that damages were small.

In all versions of the script, there is a photograph that appears twice containing a posted sign on a tree at the campsite, featuring the Smokey the Bear logo and the slogan “Only YOU can prevent forest fires.” The friends do not mention the logo or slogan by name but refer to the sign in the dialogue.

**Dependent Variables and Covariate**

Dependent variables were recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause. As is typical, an open-ended item was used to measure uncued recall, (e.g., Bagozzi and Silk 1983; Krishna, Lwin, and Morrin 2010; Mackie and Asuncion 1990; McQuarrie and Mick 1992). The uncued recall item was: “Thinking back to the illustrated script you read, please write down all of the details you remember from the point when the two friends woke up after spending the night at the camp site to the end of the script. Include everything in the dialogue and illustrations.” Responses were coded using a detailed coding guide, with points added for naming the generic cause, its logo, its slogan, and specific details regarding forest fire prevention, for a 5 point maximum score.

Attitude toward the cause was measured by asking the participants to rate their overall impression of the cause using three, seven-point bipolar scales, adapted from Burnkrant and Unnava (1995). The scales were anchored by: “very bad/very good,” “extremely unfavorable/extremely favorable,” and “extremely negative/extremely positive.” Intention to support the cause was measured using three, seven-point bipolar scales based on Yi 1990. Participants were asked how likely or unlikely they were to support the cause. The scales were
anchored by: “very unlikely/very likely,” “absolutely would not/absolutely would,” and “very improbable/very probable.”

The items for each of attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause were factor analyzed using the principal axis extraction method, and assessed for reliability. Each of the two variables was found to be unidimensional, with one factor accounting for 85.3% of the variance in attitude toward the cause and one factor accounting for 92.7% of the variance in intention to support the cause. Both sets of scales also demonstrated high reliability (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.910$ for attitude toward the cause and 0.960 for intention to support the cause). Because each set of items was unidimensional and had a high reliability, the set of items for each of attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause was summed to produce a single score for each dependent variable.

Existing familiarity with the Smokey the Bear program was also measured for use as a covariate in the analysis for H1, since the degree of existing familiarity would be expected to affect how well the cause and its elements were recalled. Familiarity was measured using three, seven-point bipolar scales adapted from Kent and Allen (1994) by adding extreme adverbs. The scales were anchored by: “extremely unfamiliar/extremely familiar,” “very inexperienced/very experienced,” and “not at all knowledgeable/very knowledgeable.” The items for familiarity were factor analyzed using the principal axis extraction method, and assessed for reliability. The variable was found to be unidimensional, with one factor accounting for 86.7% of the variance, and had a high reliability (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.924$), so the three items were summed to produce a single score for familiarity.
Results

The hypotheses were analyzed using a full MANCOVA. Correlations were tested to determine the suitability of familiarity with the cause as a covariate, and there was indeed a correlation between this variable and each of recall of the cause (r=0.206, n=153, p=0.011) and intention to support the cause (r=0.300, n=153, p=0.000). Table 9 shows a full correlation matrix for the covariate and independent variables. Analysis of the data began with an omnibus MANOVA test to determine whether differences in means existed among the four experimental groups. The omnibus MANOVA test was significant (Wilk’s F (9, 357) = 2.353, p=0.014), indicating significant differences among the group means. It was therefore possible to proceed with a 2 X 2 full factorial MANOVA to assess the effects of image of the character (good guy or bad guy) and consistency of the behavior (consistent or inconsistent) on attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause (H2 and H3), while H1 was analyzed using ANCOVA. Table 10 contains the values of all cell means, and Table 11 provides summary statistics for the interaction between the two independent variables and the main effects that were tested for significance.

Table 9: Essay 2 Correlations of the Covariate and Dependent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Familiarity with the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Recall of the cause</td>
<td>0.206*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Attitude toward the</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Intention to support</td>
<td>0.300**</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.359**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01
Table 10: Mean Scores for Attitude Toward the Cause and Intention to Support the Cause

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consistency of the Behavior</th>
<th>Image of the Character</th>
<th>Good Guy</th>
<th>Bad Guy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>Recall = 3.24</td>
<td>Recall = 2.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attitude = 18.50</td>
<td>Attitude = 19.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intention = 20.71</td>
<td>Intention = 20.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n = 38)</td>
<td>(n = 41)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistent</td>
<td>Recall = 3.37</td>
<td>Recall = 3.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attitude = 19.03</td>
<td>Attitude = 17.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intention = 20.37</td>
<td>Intention = 20.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n = 35)</td>
<td>(n = 39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recall = 3.30
Attitude = 18.75
Intention = 20.55
(n = 73)

Recall = 3.15
Attitude = 18.51
Intention = 20.60
(n = 80)

Table 11: Essay 2 MANCOVA Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Error df</th>
<th>F-ratio*</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>eta²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MANCOVA Statistics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familiarity (covariate)</td>
<td>Rcl/Att/Int</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>7.023</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image</td>
<td>Rcl/Att/Int</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>0.630</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>0.013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consistency**</td>
<td>Rcl/Att/Int</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>3.160</td>
<td>0.027***</td>
<td>0.061</td>
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<tr>
<td>Image by Consistency</td>
<td>Rcl/Att/Int</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>2.851</td>
<td>0.039***</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANOVA Statistics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Rcl</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>2.942</td>
<td>0.088†</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image by Consistency</td>
<td>Att</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>8.406</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image by Consistency</td>
<td>Int</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>1.095</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*F-ratios for the MANCOVA (multivariate) statistics are for Wilks’ lambda.

**ANOVA statistics are only reported for this independent variable for Recall, due to the nature of the hypothesis related to this dependent variable. ANOVA statistics for the variable are not shown for the other independent variables because it is part of an interaction effect.

***p < 0.05, †p < 0.1

Hypothesis 1 was analyzed using ANCOVA, to determine if there was a statistically significant difference between consistent behavior and inconsistent behavior on recall, controlling for familiarity with the cause. The results show a significant difference between the consistent and inconsistent conditions, controlling for familiarity with the cause, but at the p<0.1 level: Wilks’ F(1, 147)=2.942, p=0.088. Mean uncued recall for consistent behavior was 3.093,
and for inconsistent behavior was 3.362. The partial eta-squared for consistency was 0.02, between what Cohen (1988) suggested as a small effect size (0.01) and a medium (0.06) effect size. Thus, H1 was marginally supported.

With regard to Hypotheses 2 and 3, there was a significant interaction effect between image of the character and consistency of the behavior (Wilks’ F=3.555, p=0.039). Separate ANOVAs were conducted to determine if the interaction effect held for both dependent variables or for just one. They revealed that image and consistency had a significant interaction effect on attitude toward the cause (Wilks’ F=8.406, p=0.004), but not on intention to support the cause (Wilks’ F=1.095, p=0.297). Plots of the data (Figure 6) show that intention to support the cause followed a similar pattern of effects to those of attitude toward the cause, as predicted by H3, but the effect lacked statistical significance.

Figure 6: Results Plots for Attitude Toward the Cause and Intention to Support the Cause
Discussion

Theoretical Implications

Hypothesis 1 was supported by the results at $p<0.1$, with a small-medium effect size ($\eta^2=0.02$), showing that consistency of the behavior has a detrimental effect on recall of the cause. It is worth noting that in previous iterations of the question used in pilot testing, cued recall and recognition were also measured (following recall). They were dropped from the questionnaire and/or the final analysis because participants’ scores were very high overall, making it difficult to detect differences between conditions. (In one pilot test, every participant received a perfect score on the recognition test). While the uncued recall scores were much lower, it is still possible that they were high enough across all conditions so that only marginal differences existed between the group means, with an effect size that was rather small. The small effect size suggests insufficient power which could account for the marginal support.

Hypothesis 2 was likewise supported; image of the character and consistency of the behavior were found to have a significant interaction effect on attitude toward the cause, such that attitude toward the cause was better for consistent than inconsistent behavior when the image of the character was bad guy, but there was no significant difference in attitude toward the cause for consistent versus inconsistent behavior when the image of the character was good guy.

Hypothesis 3, predicting an analogous interaction effect on intention to support the cause, such that intention to support the cause would be higher for consistent than inconsistent behavior when the image of the character was bad guy, but there would be no significant difference in attitude toward the cause for consistent versus inconsistent behavior when the image of the character was good guy, was not supported, as significant differences were not found among the groups. However, a plot of the results shows a relationship in the predicted direction. Hypothesis
3 was based on the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1973), which states that behavioral intentions are a direct function of attitudes and social norms. However, there may be more at play in the case of a social cause. Gorsuch and Ortberg (1983) found that when an element of moral obligation was added to a situation, it predicted behavioral intentions better than attitudes or even subjective social norms. This may serve to explain why, in a situation where preventing a forest fire is in question, intention to support the cause was very high (mean=20.30 from a maximum of 21), and the interaction effect of the dependent variables observed on attitude toward the cause was not significant for intention to support the cause. It appears that in a case such as this one, where there is a lot at stake and the consequences are severe if one does not comply with the promoted cause, dire consequences would occur. The nature of this cause seems to lend itself to high levels of intention to support, unlike what may be expected for a cause where monetary donations, for example, are to be made.

**Managerial Implications**

The results suggest several important managerial implications. If the goal of a cause placement campaign is to produce better recall, then a character that behaves inconsistently with her personality traits in regards to the cause will lead to better results. If the goal of the campaign is to improve attitudes toward the cause, then pairing a bad guy character with consistent behavior (the character behaves in a socially undesirable way, consistent with his personality) will produce the best results. If a balance between improving recall and improving attitude is desired, then a good guy paired with inconsistent behavior (while still showing the harm that the undesirable behavior can beget) may be the optimum combination, because the inconsistent behavior will help recall, and pairing it with the good guy image of the character will mean that
attitude toward the cause will not suffer as a result. With regard to intention to support the cause, in the context of the current experiment and with this type of cause, there is some flexibility from the programming standpoint, because regardless of image of the character and consistency of the behavior, there is high intention to support the cause. All of these implications are important because more often than not, producers and writers will be restricted by an image of main the character that is already established (either good guy and bad guy) and will need to decide on the type of cause-related behavior (consistent or inconsistent) to write into the show based on the desired results of the cause placement campaign.

Limitations and Future Research

This study can be improved upon and extended in a number of ways. It would be worthwhile to investigate whether the results hold in different contexts, and with different social causes. For example, if the social cause was related to more/less serious or more/less immediate detrimental consequences, would the image of the character and consistency of the behavior have the same effects? What about if the characters were children, or older individuals, or if the cause was related to education, animal welfare, or recycling, would the results be replicable? The study may further be extended by producing stimuli that more closely resemble a full length TV show, with a complete professional cast, and a developed plot line in which the cause placement is only one element of many. In addition, measuring the degree to which participants would feel a moral obligation to put out a camp fire, or feel that this is a moral issue, may help explain the lack of significant differences in intention to support the cause among the groups.
References


Fishbein, Martin and Ajzen, Leek (1975), Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.


CHAPTER SIX:
CONCLUSION

Summary of Findings and Implications

This dissertation has sought to investigate variables that have the potential to make cause placement more effective and worthwhile to social marketers, who typically work with limited marketing budgets and without the luxury of having a large literature of dedicated research to draw from. Chapter 4 studied the combined effects of brandedness of the cause and placement modality on recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause using a 2 (branded/unbranded) by 3 (verbal, visual, both) MANOVA design. Chapter 5 studied the combined effects of image of the character and consistency of the behavior on the same three dependent variables, using a 2 (“good guy”/“bad guy”) by 2 (consistent/inconsistent) MANOVA design.

Chapter 4 found that, as hypothesized and in line with the human associative memory theory (Anderson and Bower 1980), a branded cause enjoyed better recall than an unbranded cause within each of the three modality conditions. With regard to attitude toward the cause, the interaction effect predicted between modality and brandedness, such that a branded cause would result in the best attitude toward the cause when modality was visual, followed by verbal, followed by both visual and verbal, whereas an opposite pattern would hold when the cause was unbranded, was not supported by the results. An analogous pattern was predicted for intention to support the cause based on the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1973), and was likewise not found. There was no significant interaction effect between modality and and
brandedness, and no main effects of modality on attitude or intention. Brandedness did have a significant main effect only on attitude toward the cause, such that attitude toward the cause was higher for the branded than unbranded cause, but the higher attitudes did not translate into higher intentions to support the cause. The pattern of the results, however, was in the direction predicted, especially for the unbranded conditions.

Chapter 5’s first hypothesis, that recall of the cause is higher when the character’s behavior is inconsistent than when it is consistent, regardless of the image of the character, was supported at p<0.1. Thus, in line with congruity theory (Osgood and Tannenbaum 1955), Miller’s (1956) working memory framework, and the fundamental attribution error (Ross 1977), inconsistency of the behavior was associated with higher recall. The second hypothesis, predicted that an interaction effect on attitude toward the cause exists between image of the character and consistency of the behavior, such that attitude toward the cause is higher for consistent than inconsistent behavior when the image of the character is “bad guy,” but there is no significant difference in attitude toward the cause for consistent versus inconsistent behavior, when the image of the character is “good guy.” This is due to a positive halo effect acting in the case of the good guy (Nisbett and Wilson 1977) and a negativity bias acting in the case of the bad guy (Mahesweran and Meyers-Levy 1990; Wright 1981). The second hypothesis was supported. Hypothesis 3 predicted an analogous interaction effect on intention to support the cause. H3 was not supported, as there were no significant differences for intention to support the cause among the study groups, but the pattern of the results was in the predicted direction.

Taken together, the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that, even in the context of social marketing, and despite the skepticism that may be caused by individuals’ persuasion knowledge (Friestad and Wright 1994) and the fact that some still find excessive use of branding
and marketing by nonprofits and charities to be distasteful (Ritchie, Swami, and Weinberg 1999), branded placements still have an advantage over unbranded ones for producing better recall of the cause and attitude toward the cause for causes that are familiar. Furthermore, and perhaps counterintuitively, when the objective of a cause placement campaign is to increase recall of the cause, it may be best to have the main character behave in a way that is inconsistent with his personality when it comes to cause-related behaviors. When the main objective of the campaign is to improve attitude toward the cause, pairing a bad guy with consistent behavior (so that the character behaves in a socially undesirable way) will produce the best attitudes. If a balance between good recall and good attitudes is desired, then it may be best to pair a good guy with inconsistent behavior, because the inconsistent behavior will help with recall, and attitudes will still not suffer. Thus, efforts like NBC’s general “recycling” cause placements may be misinformed, and could be made more effective by associating them with a brand such as Earthshare or The Nature Conservancy, and by having a character who is known to be a good guy, such as The Office’s Toby, behave inconsistently with his character such as by choosing to waste paper and not recycle it.

In addition to the managerial contributions outlined above, the dissertation has made theoretical contributions by introducing a foundational basis for separating cause placement research from product placement research, and has introduced a novel variable, “brandedness of the cause.” This variable, along with “image of the character” and “consistency of the behavior,” have not been previously studied in the embedded marketing literature. In addition, the dissertation has provided a conceptual framework for the effect of these independent variables, along with others, on the three dependent variables recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause in cause placement.
As for methodological contributions, the dissertation uses two types of stimuli that have not been previously used in embedded marketing research. The first is a rough video (a slideshow of photographs with professional voiceover) and the second is a script with photographic illustrations. These stimuli are not cost-prohibitive like mock full-length TV shows. They also allow the researcher more control over the manipulations and thus make for a higher degree of internal validity compared to using existing, ready-made media for the stimuli.

**Directions for Future Research**

There are several promising areas for future research that may be drawn from the limitations of and potential for expansion upon this dissertation. Because the results of Chapter 4 show a pattern of results so closely aligned to the hypothesized pattern for attitude toward the cause, it would be worthwhile to repeat the study with causes that enjoy various levels of familiarity. The causes used in both essays were deliberately selected to be familiar in order for the manipulations to be effective, but this level of familiarity may have resulted in ceiling effects on the dependent variables. Using causes with various familiarity levels would help investigate the robustness of the findings and recommendations, as well as provide opportunities to see if there is indeed an interaction effect between brandedness and modality. Likewise, in Chapter 5, the familiar cause may have contributed to the small effect size and marginal support for H1. Repeating the study with causes of various familiarity levels would be a worthwhile extension.

In addition, it would be useful to conduct similar studies with causes where the consequences of lack of support are less dire. In the current essays, the American Red Cross (disaster relief) and the Smokey the Bear campaign (forest fire prevention) were used. This may be why there were no significant differences for intention to support the cause, as Gorsuch and
Ortberg (1983) found that the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1973) did not hold when a person felt a moral obligation to act in a certain way; the moral obligation was a better predictor of behavioral intentions than were attitudes in such cases. Finally, while the study stimuli are unique in nature and well-suited for repeating many iterations of the studies, the research could be extended by using stimuli that resemble full-length television shows, with a complete cast, and a longer and more developed plot line. It could also be extended into other popular forms of media where embedded marketing is used, such as video games.

The two essays address four of the independent variables that are a key part of the Cause Placement Message Factors model presented in Chapter Three. Beyond extending the research in these two essays, incorporating one or both of the independent variables not addressed in the essays (placement centrality and programming genre), as well as exploring the interaction effects of different relevant combinations of variables, represent other important ways that the research may be extended. Relevant research questions to be addressed in future research include:

1. Given the expected role of increased emotional arousal in cause placement vis-à-vis product placement, and the different affective states that various programming genres would be expected to result in, what is the relationship between programming genre and recall of the cause, attitude toward the cause, and intention to support the cause? What is the moderating role of the independent variable image of the character?

2. What is the role of placement centrality in cause placement? Is there an interaction effect between placement centrality and consistency of the behavior? This is a particularly pertinent question, as an inconsistent behavior that is part of a peripheral placement is expected to be less salient than one that is part of a central placement.
3. What is the moderating role of placement centrality in the relationship between brandedness of the cause and each of attitude toward the cause and intention to support the cause? If branded placements lead to increased consumer skepticism as described in Chapter Four, and increased placement makes the cause placement more central, would a more central placement lead to lower attitudes and intentions than a peripheral placement when a cause is branded, while a central placement leads to higher attitudes and intentions than a peripheral placement when a cause is unbranded?

References


Fishbein, Martin and Ajzen, Leek (1975), Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.


APPENDIX ONE: ESSAY ONE QUESTIONNAIRE

Please note that the following questionnaire displays links to the videos for all six conditions in succession, but each participant was randomly assigned to only one. Each video was set up in Qualtrics as an embedded video so that participants could not rewind portions of the video as it was playing, and no “suggested” videos appeared at the end. The study was conducted in Qualtrics, so the following questionnaire does not display the formatting and pagination seen by participants.

Complete the following demographic verification questions to see if you qualify for the survey.

Please indicate your gender.
- Male (1)
- Female (2)

Please select the one response that best indicates your current age.
- 18-25 years (1)
- 26-30 years (2)
- 31-35 years (3)
- 36-40 years (4)
- 41-45 years (5)
- 46-50 years (6)
- 51-55 years (7)
- 56-60 years (8)
- 61-65 years (9)
- 66 years and over (10)
Please select the one response that best indicates your employment status.

- Student (5)
- Full-time employee (1)
- Part-time employee (2)
- Unemployed--searching for a job (3)
- Unemployed--not searching for a job. Please explain. (4) ________________

Please select the highest level of education that you have completed.

- 7th grade or lower (1)
- 8th grade (2)
- Some high school, no diploma (3)
- High school diploma or equivalent (4)
- Some college, no degree (5)
- Trade/technical/vocational training (6)
- Associate degree (7)
- Bachelor's degree (8)
- Master's degree (9)
- Professional degree (10)
- Doctorate degree (11)

Please specify your ethnicity.

- White (4)
- Hispanic or Latino (5)
- Black or African American (6)
- Native American or American Indian (7)
- Asian / Pacific Islander (8)
- Other (9)

Please indicate your total household income before taxes in the past year.

- Less than $25,000 (4)
- $25,000 to $34,999 (5)
- $35,000 to $49,999 (6)
- $50,000 to $74,999 (7)
- $75,000 to $99,999 (8)
- $100,000 to $149,999 (9)
- $150,000 or more (10)
Congratulations, you qualify to take this study! While leaving this window open, you should now accept the MTurk HIT. Once you have accepted the HIT in MTurk, you may proceed.

INFORMED CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

Information to Consider Before Taking Part in this Research Study

Researchers at the University of South Florida (USF) study many topics. To do this, we need the help of people who agree to take part in a research study. This form tells you about this research study. We are asking you to take part in a research study entitled: Evaluation of a Potential Television Show Storyboard (eIRB Number Pro00013529) The person who is in charge of this research study is Ream Shoreibah. This person is called the Principal Investigator. However, other research staff may be involved and can act on behalf of the person in charge. The research will be taken online and you may use any personal computer or laptop to provide your responses.

Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study is to assess the level of interest in a potential TV show.

Study Procedures

Your task is to read a short introduction on a potential TV show, followed by an excerpt of the show's script, and to answer the questions that follow it. At the end of the questionnaire, you will be asked for some demographic and background information. The survey should take about 15-20 minutes to complete.

Alternatives

You have the alternative to choose not to participate in this research study. You should not feel that there is any pressure to take part in the study, to please the investigator or the research staff. If you choose to participate, you will receive payment according to the terms and conditions of Mechanical Turk. Confidentiality

The researcher will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that you provided this information, or what that information is. No one can access the data and the computer storing the data is password protected. We may publish what we learn from this study. If we do, we will not let anyone know your name. We will not publish anything else that would let people know who you are.

Voluntary Participation / Withdrawal

You should only take part in this study if you want to. You should not feel that there is any pressure to take part in the study. You are free to participate in this research or withdraw at any time. There will be no penalty or loss of benefits you are entitled to receive if you stop taking part in this study.

Questions, Concerns, or Complaints

If you have any questions, concerns or complaints about this study, send Ream Shoreibah an email at rshoreib@usf.edu.

Consent to Take Part in this Research Study

It is up to you to decide whether you want to take part in this study. If you want to take part, please proceed to the next page, provided the following statements are true:

☐ I freely give my consent to take part in this study. I understand that by proceeding to the next page I am agreeing to take part in this research. (1)
Thank you for the time you will dedicate to participating in this study. Please set aside approximately 15-20 minutes to complete the study, which must be done all in one sitting. PLEASE COMPLETE ON A COMPUTER IN A QUIET PLACE. DO NOT COMPLETE ON YOUR SMARTPHONE.

Please select the one response that best expresses the extent to which you are familiar with fast food restaurants.

- Not at all familiar (1)
- Slightly familiar (2)
- Moderately familiar (3)
- Very familiar (4)
- Extremely familiar (5)

Please select the one response that best expresses the extent to which you are familiar with social cause organizations or charities.

- Not at all familiar (1)
- Slightly familiar (2)
- Moderately familiar (3)
- Very familiar (4)
- Extremely familiar (5)

Think about the last 12 months. Please select the one response that best expresses the extent to which you had an actual experience or an interaction with a fast food restaurant.

- None (1)
- Seldom (2)
- Occasionally (3)
- Regularly (4)
- Quite Often (5)

Think about the last 12 months. Please select the one response that best expresses the extent to which you had an actual experience or an interaction with a social cause organization or a charity.

- None (1)
- Seldom (2)
- Occasionally (3)
- Regularly (4)
- Quite Often (5)
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIONS CAREFULLY.

DIRECTIONS: On the following screen, you will see a ROUGH excerpt from an actual TV drama in the form of an animated storyboard. It is used by producers to test the concept prior to the actual production of the pilot episode. While it is VERY BASIC, it is designed to give you a feel for what the show will be about. Essentially, you will see simplified scenes from the show and hear the dialogue between the characters. PLEASE WATCH IT CAREFULLY, as you will be asked to answer factual questions about it without referring back to it.

ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND: The proposed TV show is about a college basketball team who has a new coach, Donald Oldman. The excerpt you will see takes place during the team's first big trip of the season. Coach Oldman is dealing with various challenges and conflicts. For example, there is a pushy booster that he must deal with. (A booster is someone who supports a sports team by raising or donating money. Out of fairness to all players and all school teams, it is illegal for a booster to give money or large gifts to players.) Coach Oldman must also deal with the issue of the star player on the team slacking off on his schoolwork and risking losing his athletic scholarship, or even his position on the team. The only bright spot of the coach's day occurs when he talks to the athletic director; she has some unexpected news to share with him. Click to the next page to see the rough excerpt based on the actual script that the actors will be using. It is about 3 minutes long. The rough excerpt will be followed by a brief set of multiple-choice and short-answer questions for you to answer. This will take you about 10-15 minutes.

VIDEOS:

Verbal/Branded: https://youtu.be/hZ-qaBzl5BI

Verbal/Unbranded: https://youtu.be/lHQ0Iwy_Ngc

Visual/Branded: https://youtu.be/dodFjq2mLBE

Visual/Unbranded: https://youtu.be/Od4rvQ7kTKs

Both/Branded: https://youtu.be/iFh7Q99_qjA

Both/Unbranded: https://youtu.be/HnKJI-W1h4w
The following questions pertain to the rough excerpt you just watched.

Using each of the three listed scales, please rate how likely or unlikely you would be to watch a TV show containing this excerpt.

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<tr>
<th>Using each of the three listed scales, please rate how likely or unlikely you would be to watch a TV show containing this excerpt.</th>
<th>1 (1)</th>
<th>2 (2)</th>
<th>3 (3)</th>
<th>4 (4)</th>
<th>5 (5)</th>
<th>6 (6)</th>
<th>7 (7)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Unlikely: Very Likely (1)</td>
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<td>Absolutely Would Not: Absolutely Would (2)</td>
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<td>Extremely Improbable: Extremely Probable (3)</td>
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Using each of the three listed scales, please rate how likely or unlikely people in your age group would be to watch a TV show containing this excerpt.

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<tr>
<th>Using each of the three listed scales, please rate how likely or unlikely people in your age group would be to watch a TV show containing this excerpt.</th>
<th>1 (1)</th>
<th>2 (2)</th>
<th>3 (3)</th>
<th>4 (4)</th>
<th>5 (5)</th>
<th>6 (6)</th>
<th>7 (7)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Unlikely: Very Likely (1)</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>Absolutely Would Not: Absolutely Would (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extremely Improbable: Extremely Probable (3)</td>
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</table>

The excerpt you watched may be produced into a full TV show. Using each of the three listed scales, please rate the TV show you believe would result.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The excerpt you watched may be produced into a full TV show. Using each of the three listed scales, please rate the TV show you believe would result.</th>
<th>1 (1)</th>
<th>2 (2)</th>
<th>3 (3)</th>
<th>4 (4)</th>
<th>5 (5)</th>
<th>6 (6)</th>
<th>7 (7)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Uninteresting: Very Interesting (1)</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>Does Not Hold My Attention at All: Holds My Attention a Lot (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extremely Unenjoyable: Extremely Enjoyable (3)</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</table>
A social cause can be an issue, or can be a charitable organization, relating to the welfare of society. There is one particular social cause or type of organization mentioned or referred to in the excerpt you watched. Please type everything you can remember about the cause or type of organization in the space below. Include AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE about anything that was discussed or anything that you saw visually, such as symbols.

From the list below, please select the aspect of the uniforms that the athletic director was worried that the coach would disapprove of.

- The uniforms were not cotton as the coach wanted, but were polyester instead. (1)
- A social cause or charitable organization that the coach respected was associated with the uniforms. (2)
- The coloring of the uniforms was wrong; the dominant color should have been much darker. (3)

[FOR UNBRANDED CONDITIONS:] Please describe the type of work done by the organization represented on the uniforms.

From the list below, please select the type of organization that is represented on the uniforms.

- A soft drinks company (1)
- A disaster relief organization (2)
- An animal protection organization (3)
- An insurance company (4)
- A breast cancer research funding organization (5)

From the list below, please select the colors of the uniform.

- White and red (2)
- Blue and white (1)
- Gold and blue (3)
My overall impression of disaster relief organizations is:

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<tr>
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<th>4 (4)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Very Bad:Very Good (1)</td>
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<td>☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extremely Unfavorable:Extremely Favorable (2)</td>
<td>☒</td>
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<td>Extremely Negative:Extremely Positive (3)</td>
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My overall impression of athletic boosters is:

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While watching the excerpt, did you get the impression that the disaster relief organization had arranged with the show producers, perhaps by making a payment to the show, to be featured on this TV show?

If so, how does that make you feel?

Please describe in your own words what you believe the purpose of this research is.

[FOR BRANDED CONDITIONS:]

Please type the name of the organization represented on the uniforms.

From the list below, please select the one organization that is represented on the uniforms.
  - The Coco-Cola Company (1)
  - The American Red Cross (2)
  - The Humane Society of the United States (3)
  - American National Insurance Company (4)
  - The Susan G. Komen Foundation (5)

From the list below, please select the colors of the uniform.
  - White and red (2)
  - Blue and white (1)
  - Gold and blue (3)

My overall impression of the American Red Cross is:

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If so, how does that make you feel?

Please describe in your own words what you believe the purpose of this research is.

Please provide any other thoughts you had about the script, the survey, or the overall process.
APPENDIX TWO: ESSAY TWO QUESTIONNAIRE

Please note that the following questionnaire displays all four conditions in succession, but each participant was randomly assigned to only one. The study was conducted in Qualtrics, so the following questionnaire does not display the formatting and pagination seen by participants.

Complete the following demographic verification questions to see if you qualify for the survey.

Please indicate your gender.
☐ Male (1)
☐ Female (2)

Please select the one response that best indicates your current age.
☐ 18-25 years (1)
☐ 26-30 years (2)
☐ 31-35 years (3)
☐ 36-40 years (4)
☐ 41-45 years (5)
☐ 46-50 years (6)
☐ 51-55 years (7)
☐ 56-60 years (8)
☐ 61-65 years (9)
☐ 66 years and over (10)

Please select the one response that best indicates your employment status.
☐ Student (5)
☐ Full-time employee (1)
☐ Part-time employee (2)
☐ Unemployed--searching for a job (3)
☐ Unemployed--not searching for a job. Please explain. (4) ____________________
Please select the highest level of education that you have completed.
☑ 7th grade or lower (1)
☑ 8th grade (2)
☑ Some high school, no diploma (3)
☑ High school diploma or equivalent (4)
☑ Some college, no degree (5)
☑ Trade/technical/vocational training (6)
☑ Associate degree (7)
☑ Bachelor's degree (8)
☑ Master's degree (9)
☑ Professional degree (10)
☑ Doctorate degree (11)

Please specify your ethnicity.
☑ White (4)
☑ Hispanic or Latino (5)
☑ Black or African American (6)
☑ Native American or American Indian (7)
☑ Asian / Pacific Islander (8)
☑ Other (9)

Please indicate your total household income before taxes in the past year.
☑ Less than $25,000 (4)
☑ $25,000 to $34,999 (5)
☑ $35,000 to $49,999 (6)
☑ $50,000 to $74,999 (7)
☑ $75,000 to $99,999 (8)
☑ $100,000 to $149,999 (9)
☑ $150,000 or more (10)
Congratulations, you qualify to take this study! While leaving this window open, you should now accept the MTurk HIT. Once you have accepted the HIT in MTurk, you may proceed.

Informed Consent to Participate in Research
Information to Consider Before Taking Part in this Research Study  Pro # 00023667  Researchers at the University of South Florida (USF) study many topics. To do this, we need the help of people who agree to take part in a research study. This form tells you about this research study. We are asking you to take part in a research study that is called: Consistency and Image. The person who is in charge of this research study is Ream Shoreibah. This person is called the Principal Investigator. Purpose of the Study  The purpose of this study is to assess your reactions to various elements placed in a TV show script excerpt. Why are you being asked to take part? We are asking you to take part in this research study because you are an adult who lives in the U.S., and that makes you a member of the population we are interested in for this study. Study Procedures  If you take part in this study, you will be asked to read an illustrated script excerpt and answer the questions that follow it. The survey should take about 15-20 minutes to complete. The entire process takes place online. Alternatives / Voluntary Participation / Withdrawal  You have the alternative to choose not to participate in this research study. You should only take part in this study if you want to volunteer; you are free to participate in this research or withdraw at any time. There will be no penalty or loss of benefits you are entitled to receive if you stop taking part in this study. Benefits and Risks  We are unsure if you will receive any benefits by taking part in this research study. This research is considered to be minimal risk. Compensation  You will receive payment according to the terms and conditions of Mechanical Turk. Privacy and Confidentiality  We must keep your study records as confidential as possible. It is possible, although unlikely, that unauthorized individuals could gain access to your responses because you are responding online. Certain people may need to see your study records. By law, anyone who looks at your records must keep them completely confidential. The only people who will be allowed to see these records are: Ream Shoreibah, Barbara Lafferty, The University of South Florida Institutional Review Board (IRB). It is possible, although unlikely, that unauthorized individuals could gain access to your responses. Confidentiality will be maintained to the degree permitted by the technology used. No guarantees can be made regarding the interception of data sent via the Internet. However, your participation in this online survey involves risks similar to a person’s everyday use of the Internet. If you complete and submit an anonymous survey and later request your data be withdrawn, this may or may not be possible as the researcher may be unable to extract anonymous data from the database. Contact Information  If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the USF IRB at 974-5638. If you have questions regarding the research, please contact the Principal Investigator at rshoreib@usf.edu. We may publish what we learn from this study. If we do, we will not let anyone know your name. We will not publish anything else that would let people know who you are. You can print a copy of this consent form for your records.

☐ I freely give my consent to take part in this study. I understand that by proceeding with this survey that I am agreeing to take part in research and I am 18 years of age or older. (1)
Please set aside approximately 15-20 minutes to complete the study, which must be done all in one sitting. PLEASE COMPLETE ON A COMPUTER IN A QUIET PLACE. DO NOT COMPLETE ON YOUR SMARTPHONE.

PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIONS CAREFULLY. On the next seven screens, you will read a partial script from a potential pilot episode of a new TV show. The show is about the life of two boys who are best friends attending college together. Conner is a serious student and does well in school. His class work is important to him and he is eager to learn new things. Conner is genuinely a good guy, always concerned about others and wanting to do the right thing. Matt is Conner’s best friend. They spend much of their free time together. Please read the following script, and look at the photographs that go with it, carefully in order to answer the questions regarding the pilot.
TWO COLLEGE STUDENTS ARE ON CAMPUS DISCUSSING THEIR UPCOMING OVERNIGHT CAMPING TRIP.

CONNER: Hey Matt. Are you ready for our camping trip on Friday?

MATT: No, Conner, I'm not, but I know you are. You’ve probably been packed for days now and have the supplies ready in the trunk of your car.

CONNER (chuckling): You know me pretty well, dude. I've finished all my class work so I could pack early. I can't wait to get out of here.

MATT: Why are you such a conscientious student anyway?
SCRIPT PAGE 2 OF 7

CONNER: I don't know. I guess I just really enjoy learning. It's just my style. So how did you do in your track meet?

MATT: Not too bad. I won the 100 AND the 200 meter dash.

CONNER: You're a running machine, Matt.

MATT: Speaking of running, I've got a class to get to. Let's meet at the usual place at 8 tomorrow morning. We can drive up to the camp ground in my truck.

CONNER: Sounds like a plan. I'm off to the library (laughs).
IT IS THE NEXT NIGHT...
MATT: Man, dinner was good. Leave it to you to figure out a way to cook the food fast and easy.
CONNER: Why not be creative and come up with something simple but delicious like putting food in foil, adding some spices, and sticking it in the fire? It makes camping fun.
MATT: It sure is peaceful up here. It's nice to have a change of scenery.
CONNER: No kidding. Just us and the great outdoors. I'm glad I finished my project and I'm caught up on my school stuff. I can really chill out.
MATT: I think I'll turn in. That hike of ours was outstanding but boy I'm exhausted.
CONNER: I'll be there in a bit. I'll be sure to zip up the tent. I know how you hate bugs.
IT IS THE NEXT MORNING...

CONNER: Man, this has been awesome. But, I can't believe I'm actually looking forward to a hot shower in our dorm.

MATT: Yeah, I know what you mean. I'll get the gear in the truck while you put the embers out from our campfire.

CONNER: Good idea. I see they're still smoldering.
MATT: Yeah, even embers can start a wild fire. Did you notice the sign on the tree?
CONNER: That's a fact. I'd feel awful if this caused a wild fire.
MATT: There's a bucket in the truck.
SCRIPT PAGE 6 OF 7

THE NEXT DAY...

MATT: Wow, I'm swamped this week. No getaway for me. Speaking of getaways, did you hear the news this morning?
CONNER: Nope, what's up?
MATT: You know our idea to put the embers out? Well some other campers didn't and a wild fire got started.
CONNER: No kidding. That is terrible!
MATT: The only good thing is that they caught it early enough and there wasn't much damage.
CONNER: I'm so glad that no one got hurt!
MATT: They were lucky this time. I'm glad we did the right thing.
CONNER: So am I. A little extra effort can make a big difference.
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIONS CAREFULLY. On the next seven screens, you will read a partial script from a potential pilot episode of a new TV show. The show is about the life of two boys who are best friends attending college together. Conner is a serious student and does well in school. His class work is important to him and he is eager to learn new things. Conner is genuinely a good guy, always concerned about others and wanting to do the right thing. Matt is Conner’s best friend. They spend much of their free time together. Please read the following script, and look at the photographs that go with it, carefully in order to answer the questions regarding the pilot.
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SCRIPT PAGE 2 OF 7
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MATT: Not too bad. I won the 100 AND the 200 meter dash.
CONNER: You're a running machine, Matt.
MATT: Speaking of running, I've got a class to get to. Let's meet at the usual place at 8 tomorrow morning. We can drive up to the camp ground in my truck.
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MATT: Yeah, I know what you mean. I'll get the gear in the truck while you put the embers out from our campfire.
CONNER: What, are you kidding? They're barely burning. Let's just head out and leave it for the next campers.
MATT: Even embers can start a wild fire. Can't you read the sign on the tree?
CONNER: Come on, man. Nothing is going to happen. Let's just head out.
MATT: Well, OK. I hope you're right.
THE NEXT DAY...
MATT: Wow, I'm swamped this week. No getaway for me. Speaking of getaways, did you hear the news this morning?
CONNER: Nope, what's up?
MATT: You know your bright idea to not put the embers out? Well a wild fire got started from a campfire that wasn't put out properly.
CONNER: Hey, it doesn't mean it was ours. Don't sweat it.
MATT: The only good thing is that they caught it early enough and there wasn't much damage.
CONNER: See, no one got hurt!
MATT: Maybe not this time. But next time we do the right thing, ok?
CONNER: I'll leave that up to you.
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIONS CAREFULLY. On the next seven screens, you will read a partial script from a potential pilot episode of a new TV show. The show is about the life of two boys who are best friends attending college together. Conner is not a serious student and doesn't do that well in school. His class work isn't that important to him and he isn't eager to learn new things. Conner is not a very tolerant guy. He isn't that concerned about others and isn't that concerned about doing the right thing. Matt is Conner’s best friend. They spend much of their free time together. Please read the following script, and look at the photographs that go with it, carefully in order to answer the questions regarding the pilot.
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MATT: Why does school bug you so much anyway?
CONNER: I don't know. I guess I just don't like being told what to do all the time. Cramps my style. So how did you do in your track meet?
MATT: Not too bad. I won the 100 AND the 200 meter dash.
CONNER: You're a running machine, Matt.
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CONNER: Sounds like a plan. Don't study too hard (laughs).
SCRIPT PAGE 3 OF 7
IT IS THE NEXT NIGHT...
MATT: Man, dinner was good. Leave it to you to figure out a way to cook the food fast and easy.
CONNER: Why waste time with mundane chores when you can just put all the food in foil, add some spices, and stick it on the fire for a few minutes? That's my kind of cookin'.
MATT: It sure is peaceful up here. It's nice to have a change of scenery.
MATT: I think I'll turn in. That hike of ours was outstanding but boy I'm exhausted.
CONNER: I'll be there in a bit. Be sure to zip up the tent. You know how I hate bugs.
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SCRIPT PAGE 7 OF 7
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CONNER: I'm so glad that no one got hurt!
MATT: They were lucky this time. I'm glad we did the right thing.
CONNER: So am I. A little extra effort can make a big difference.
The following questions pertain to the script excerpt you just read.

Keeping in mind that this is just a small segment of a potential full-length pilot TV show, please rate the script you just read using the following three scales:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did not like it at all: Liked it very much (1)</th>
<th>1 (1)</th>
<th>2 (2)</th>
<th>3 (3)</th>
<th>4 (4)</th>
<th>5 (5)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very bad: Very good (2)</td>
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<td>Very uninteresting: Very interesting (3)</td>
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If you are paying attention, and you read this question, please do not answer it. Leave it blank and move on to the next question.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Unlikely: Very Likely (1)</th>
<th>1 (1)</th>
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<th>4 (4)</th>
<th>5 (5)</th>
<th>6 (6)</th>
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<td>Absolutely Would Not: Absolutely Would (2)</td>
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<td>Extremely Improbable: Extremely Probable (3)</td>
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Now we would like you to answer a few questions that will help us understand how consumers make decisions when they are purchasing products they only buy once in a while, such as a bike. Imagine you are at your local discount store to buy a new basic bike. You narrow it down to three similar bikes, as follows: Brand A is a familiar brand that is currently selling for the full price of $160. It is a blue hybrid bike. Brand B is the store's private brand and is selling for its full price of $152. It is a red mountain bike. Brand C is a brand that you have never heard of, but it looks like it's high quality. Its full price is $200 and it is currently selling at 15% off. It is a silver road bike. Please answer the following questions.

What is the sale price of the bike whose regular price is $200?

- $160 (1)
- $163 (2)
- $168 (3)
- $170 (4)
- $175 (5)
Which bike would you buy?
- Brand A (1)
- Brand B (2)
- Brand C (3)

What was the single most important reason for your decision?
- Familiar brand (1)
- Lowest price (2)
- Nicest color (3)
- Best type of bike (road, mountain, or hybrid) (4)
- Other. Please specify. (5) ____________________

Do you currently own a bike?
- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Why or why not?

Thinking back to the illustrated script you read, please write down all of the details you remember from the point when the two friends woke up after spending the night at the camp site to the end of the script. Include everything in the dialogue and illustrations.

A social cause can be an issue, or can be a charitable organization, relating to the welfare of society. Describe everything you can recall in the excerpt that has anything to do with a social cause or organization that was either discussed in the script or portrayed in the pictures.

Describe any logo or symbol for any social cause that you recall seeing in any of the pictures.

Describe any slogan for any social cause that you recall seeing in any of the pictures.

My overall impression of the Smokey the Bear campaign used by the United States Forest Service to prevent forest fires is:

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<tr>
<td>Very Bad:Very Good</td>
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<td>Extremely Unfavorable</td>
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<td>Extremely Favorable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extremely Negative</td>
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<td>Extremely Positive</td>
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My overall impression of camping is:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Bad:Very Good (1)</td>
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<td>Extremely Unfavorable:Extremely Favorable (2)</td>
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<td>Extremely Negative:Extremely Positive (3)</td>
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Please rate how familiar or unfamiliar you are with camping.

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<tr>
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<td>Very Inexperienced:Very Experienced (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not at all knowledgeable:Very Knowledgeable (3)</td>
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Please rate how familiar or unfamiliar you were with the Smokey the Bear campaign before reading this script.

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<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>1 (1)</th>
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</table>
If you are paying attention, and you read this question, please do not answer it. Leave it blank and move on to the next question.

| Extremely Unfamiliar:Extremely Familiar (1) | 1 (1) | 2 (2) | 3 (3) | 4 (4) | 5 (5) | 6 (6) | 7 (7) |
| Very Inexperienced:Very Experienced (2) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Not at all knowledgeable:Very Knowledgeable (3) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |

Imagine that you are on a camping trip. How likely or unlikely are you to support the "prevention of wildfire" cause advocated by Smokey the Bear (and extinguish your campfire)?

| Very Unlikely:Very Likely (1) | 1 (1) | 2 (2) | 3 (3) | 4 (4) | 5 (5) | 6 (6) | 7 (7) |
| Absolutely Would Not:Absolutely Would (2) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Very Improbable:Very Probable (3) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |

Please select the one response that best expresses the extent to which you are familiar with social cause organizations or charities.
- Not at all familiar (1)
- Slightly familiar (2)
- Moderately familiar (3)
- Very familiar (4)
- Extremely familiar (5)
Think about the last 12 months. Please select the one response that best expresses the extent to which you had an actual experience or an interaction with a social cause organization or a charity, such as by donating, volunteering, adopting a specific behavior that is being advocated, or engaging in other behaviors that advance the cause.

- None (1)
- Seldom (2)
- Occasionally (3)
- Regularly (4)
- Quite Often (5)

Based on the script you read, what is your overall impression of Conner?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 (1)</th>
<th>2 (2)</th>
<th>3 (3)</th>
<th>4 (4)</th>
<th>6 (6)</th>
<th>7 (7)</th>
<th>8 (8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very inconsiderate:Very</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>considerate (1)</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very irresponsible:Very</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responsible (2)</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A very bad student:A very</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>good student (3)</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the script you read, what is your overall impression of Conner’s behavior about putting out the smoldering embers from the campfire?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 (1)</th>
<th>2 (2)</th>
<th>3 (3)</th>
<th>4 (4)</th>
<th>5 (5)</th>
<th>6 (6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all consistent with</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>his overall personality:Very</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consistent with his overall</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personality (1)</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totally not in character:Totally</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not in character (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all believable:Very</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>believable (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please describe in your own words what you believe the purpose of this research is.

Please provide any other thoughts you had about the script, the survey, or the overall process.
APPENDIX THREE: IRB LETTERS

1/22/2014

Ream Shoreibah, MBA
Marketing
4202 E. Fowler Avenue, BSN 3403
Tampa, FL 33620

RE: Expedited Approval for Initial Review
IRB#: Pro00013529
Title: The Effect of Brandedness of the Cause and Placement Modality on Recall of the Cause, Attitude toward the Cause, and Intention to Support the Cause

Study Approval Period: 1/22/2014 to 1/22/2015

Dear Ms. Shoreibah:

On 1/22/2014, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and APPROVED the above application and all documents outlined below.

Approved Item(s):
Protocol Document(s):
Shoreibah Protocol Revised.pdf

Consent Script(s):
Shoreibah Online Informed Consent.pdf

It was the determination of the IRB that your study qualified for expedited review which includes activities that (1) present no more than minimal risk to human subjects, and (2) involve only procedures listed in one or more of the categories outlined below. The IRB may review research through the expedited review procedure authorized by 45CFR46.110 and 21 CFR 56.110. The research proposed in this study is categorized under the following expedited review category:

(7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies.
Your study qualifies for a waiver of the requirements for the documentation of informed consent as outlined in the federal regulations at 45CFR46.117(c) which states that an IRB may waive the requirement for the investigator to obtain a signed consent form for some or all subjects.

As the principal investigator of this study, it is your responsibility to conduct this study in accordance with IRB policies and procedures and as approved by the IRB. Any changes to the approved research must be submitted to the IRB for review and approval by an amendment.

We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.

Sincerely,

John Schinka, Ph.D., Chairperson
USF Institutional Review Board
December 10, 2015

Ream Shoreibah, MBA
Marketing
4202 E. Fowler Avenue, BSN 3403
Tampa, FL 33620

RE: Exempt Certification
IRB#: Pro00023667
Title: The Effects of Behavior Consistency and Image of the Character on Recall of the Cause, Attitude toward the Cause, and Intention to Support the Cause

Dear Mr. Shoreibah:

On 12/9/2015, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets criteria for exemption from the federal regulations as outlined by 45CFR46.101(b):

(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless:
(i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.

Approved Items:

Shoreibah Protocol Pro00023667.pdf
Shoreibah Pro00023667 Informed Consent.pdf

As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this research is conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical principles outlined in the Belmont Report and with USF HRPP policies and procedures.

Please note, as per USF HRPP Policy, once the Exempt determination is made, the application is closed in ARC. Any proposed or anticipated changes to the study design that was previously
declared exempt from IRB review must be submitted to the IRB as a new study prior to initiation of the change. However, administrative changes, including changes in research personnel, do not warrant an amendment or new application.

Given the determination of exemption, this application is being closed in ARC. This does not limit your ability to conduct your research project.

We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.

Sincerely,

John Schinka, Ph.D., Chairperson
USF Institutional Review Board