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An Analysis of Social Justice in Teacher Education Using W. B. Gallie’s Framework

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to three very important people in my life. First to my parents Kenneth D. Naumann and M. Mary Naumann who both made untold sacrifices to educate and raise their six children. They instilled in each of their children a love of learning, the drive to persevere through hardship, and the ability to see the good in the world. Second to my wonderful and beloved husband, Tom Banta, who supported and encouraged me throughout my journey.
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ABSTRACT

Essentially contested concepts result in continual disagreement over their meaning and use because important consequences flow from these disputes. Evidence of the contested nature of the concept social justice, in the context of teacher education, is documented in academic literature. Empirical evidence of the contested nature of the term is found in the transcripts of National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE)’s 2006 reauthorization hearing. Scholars note the complex nature of social justice and that teacher educators and colleges of education frequently use the term (e.g. Hytten & Bettez, 2011; North, 2008; Zollers, Albert, & Cochran-Smith, 2000). This study focuses on the various understandings and applications of the concept social justice in academic writing within teacher education. A directed qualitative content analysis of academic journal articles, guided by Gallie’s (1956) framework, was conducted to identify how the phrase, social justice, is used in the context of teacher education. Gallie’s framework was chosen because it has proved a useful tool to analyze complex concepts (Collier, Hidalgo & Maciuceani, 2006). One of Gallie’s goals in designing his framework was to help scholars’ reason about complex concepts. This study found evidence to support the classification of social justice as an essentially contested concept in teacher education. Additionally, this study found indications in the data that the term may be terminologically contested in the context of teacher education and recommends further investigation. I argue that teacher educators interested in social justice as a reform measure for
teacher education should define the concept and come to a consensus about what social justice in teacher education means. The lack of precision in the term makes debate over the merits of concept, in the context of teacher education, difficult.
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

In 2006, the U. S. Department of Education’s National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI) held a hearing to reauthorize the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education’s (NCATE) as an accrediting entity for teacher education programs. The following organizations, the National Association of Scholars (NAS), the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), and the American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA), objected to the use of the term social justice in the NCATE standards relating to pre-service teachers’ dispositions. FIRE, a nonpartisan civil rights group concerned primarily with free speech and the right to private conscience on college campuses, argued inclusion of the language was tantamount to allowing teacher-training programs to subject pre-service teachers to a political litmus test (Lukianoff, 2012). The NAS felt inclusion of the language made students vulnerable to the “the ideological caprices of instructors and programs” (National Association of Scholars, June 5, 2006, np). These groups maintained the term social justice is ill-defined, vague, and value-laden.

The NAS, FIRE, and ACTA appeared at the hearing to argue that the inclusion of the phrase, social justice, in accreditation standards authored by NCATE created the possibility that Colleges of Education could require students to subscribe to a particular ideology as a condition for graduation, thus violating the students’ First Amendment rights. Moreover, the primary accrediting agency’s decision to highlight social justice as an appropriate pre-service teacher’s
disposition was considered problematic for other reasons as well. Anne Neal, representing ACTA, argued NCATE was the motivating force behind teacher education programs adopting non-academic assessments like a “disposition toward social justice” and significantly reducing the focus on knowledge and learning which is the Department of Education’s primary concern (NACIQI, 2006, p. 286).

During the hearing, NCATE’s President, Dr. Wise, denied that NCATE had any standard or requirement that its institutions indoctrinate teacher candidates with a particular political or social ideology, specifically social justice. Furthermore, Wise stated NCATE decided to remove the phrase, social justice, from its standards. Dr. Wise explained, “the term is susceptible to a variety of definitions” and “the phrase has acquired some new meanings, evidently connected to a radical social agenda” (NACIQI, 2006, p. 255).

Wise’s statement was accurate. NCATE did not have specific language requiring pre-service teachers adopt a disposition toward social justice. However, the phrase social justice was used to define dispositions in the glossary section of the standards. The NCATE standards published in 2001 define dispositions as:

The values, commitments, and professional ethics that influence practices and behaviors toward students, families, colleagues, and communities and affect student learning, motivation, and development as well as the educator’s own professional growth. Dispositions are guided by knowledge bases and beliefs and attitudes related to values such as caring, fairness, honesty, responsibility, and social justice [emphasis added]. For example, they might include a belief that all students can learn, a vision of high and challenging standards, or a commitment to a safe and supportive learning environment. (p. 30)
Anne Neal’s concern that NCATE’s inclusion of the phrase was tantamount to the sanctioning of a disposition toward social justice is given weight by statements from various authors. For example, Cochran-Smith et al. (2009b) write, NCATE “included social justice as a desirable professional disposition in its 2000 standards” (p. 626). Additionally, Kasprisin (2007) writes, “Many colleges and universities incorporated the concept of social justice in response to the standards that had been proposed by NCATE, only to feel perplexed and dismayed when the accrediting agency suddenly removed ‘social justice’ from its standards” (p. 4).

NAS, FIRE, and ACTA did not argue that NCATE required all teacher candidates to have a disposition toward social justice. Their objection, at the reauthorization hearing, was based on NCATE’s acceptance of social justice as an appropriate value informing pre-service teachers’ beliefs and attitudes which were then subject to assessment by the faculty members of education programs. These organizations took the position that because the concept of social justice is vague, value laden and ideologically freighted; the effect of the enforcement of NCATE standards, in conjunction with a teacher-training program’s mandate that students show a disposition toward social justice, was problematic. This is because NCATE ensures teacher education programs adhere to their mission, conceptual framework, and program standards.

It should be noted that NCATE is a private nongovernment entity entitled to determine its own standards. However, at the reauthorization hearing, Dr. Stephen Balch, President of the NAS, pointed out that if a student holds a different view of social justice from program faculty, it is possible that the students’ First Amendment rights, their individual rights, are subject to the potentially coercive Federally endorsed restriction (NACIQI, 2006, pp. 261-262). Dr. Balch argued, although, many people believe in the concept social justice, the term is “fraught with contested ideological significance” thus different people use the term in different ways (p. 259).
Balch continued “So if you are going to apply it, you’re going to apply it in all likelihood in a particular way” (p. 259). Balch explains the potential problem. Suppose a student holds a view of social justice different from the faculty. In this case, the student will likely reject what he or she believes and adopt the particular view of social justice held by the evaluating faculty members. Of course, Balch notes this is not the student’s only choice. This student could choose to suffer the personal and financial loss associated with leaving the program (NACIQI, 2006).

At the hearing, Balch provided evidence to demonstrate this potential violation of student’s First Amendment rights is not hypothetical. During his testimony, Balch recounted several examples in which students argued their First Amendment rights were infringed. These examples included the case of Edward Swan, a student at the College of Education at Washington State University in Pullman. Balch explained Swan held religious and political convictions different from his instructors and was “threatened with expulsion from the program on the basis of social justice” (NACIQI, 2006, p. 262). Swan, a 42-year-old man, attending Washington State University’s College of Education, “expressed conservative views in class – and was ordered to sign a contract affirming his commitment to social justice or face expulsion” (Enforcing Social Justice, November 9, 2005). The contract included compulsory “diversity training,” completing other faculty directed projects, and the possibility of increased scrutiny during Swan’s student teaching. Swan refused to sign the contract and contacted FIRE and the College of Education at Washington State University backed down. They no longer required Swan sign a contract and no longer threatened to expel him (Leo, 2005; Leo, 2005, October 17). Balch stated the school only backed down when the issue began to draw unfavorable publicity.
Next, Balch recounted an incident at the Brooklyn College. In 2005, Brooklyn College, School of Education, had social justice as one of the central principles in its conceptual framework. *The New York Sun* reported that the education school states, “‘it develops a deeper understanding of the quest for social justice’” (Gershman, 2005, May 31). The education school also stated, “We educate teacher candidates and other school personnel about issues of social injustice such as institutionalized racism, sexism, classism, and heterosexism” (Gershman, 2005, May 31). Also in 2005, several Brooklyn College students filed complaints with the School of Education claiming an assistant professor, in the Education School “discriminated against them because of their political beliefs and ‘denounced white people as the oppressors’” (Gershman, 2005, May 31).

The professor in question was the only instructor teaching this particular literacy course and the course was required for all students who wished to teach at the secondary education level. This instructor built her literacy course around themes of social justice. One theme being the English language is the language of oppressors. Students’ claimed the instructor-ignored students seeking to challenge this assertion. Students also alleged that the instructor insinuated the students who did not agree with her views on Ebonics and the movie Fahrenheit 911 should not be teachers. These proclamations resulted in four students deciding to drop out of this professor’s course (Gershman, 2005, May 31; Leo, 2005).

Several students, who remained in the class, complained that during class students who disagreed with the instructor’s views were not called on preventing them from voicing alternative views. One student, in particular, became quite outspoken in his dissent. Unbeknownst to this student, “a sympathetic colleague of the instructor”, in question, began an investigation of the student contacting the student’s other teachers (Gershman, 2005, May 31).
At the beginning of the following semester, two of the students critical of this instructor, including the outspoken student, were accused of plagiarism. It seems that during the previous semester, the instructor asked education students to create “a critical literacy lesson plan for linguistically and culturally diverse students” (Gershman, 2005, May 31). Allegedly, one education student was accused of plagiarism because he paraphrased a question from a website without attribution. The other student used the definition of the Jim Crow laws from an encyclopedia. This student stated she was not aware that using the definition in her the lesson plan required a citation because it was not a term paper. She left the School of Education and switched majors because she wondered how she could continue in a department in which she was uncomfortable (Gershman, 2005, May 31; Leo, 2005).

The last example, cited by Balch, occurred at the School of Education, San Jose State. In this case, student Steven Head filed suit in the U. S. District Court in Northern California against San Jose State faculty, administrators, and NCATE alleging “his political and religious views have led to failing grades and faculty declarations that he was unfit to teach because they contravened what the faculty regarded as principles of social justice” (NACIQI, 2006, p. 263).

The claims of the NAS, FIRE, and ACTA were never fully addressed in the reauthorization hearing because, as stated above, Dr. Wise, NCATE’s President, opened his testimony by stating the term social justice had been removed from the NCATE standards. Wise made no attempt to define or defend the term social justice. Instead, NCATE dealt with these accusations by dropping the term social justice from their standards. Moreover, in a 2007 article written by Arthur Wise entitled, Setting the Record Straight, he states, “NCATE expects institutions to assess teacher candidate dispositions based on observable behavior in the classroom. NCATE does not recommend that attitudes be evaluated” (p.1).
It is interesting that NCATE chose not to define or engage in a debate over the meaning and merits of the term social justice given that the term is so pervasive in the field of education and that NCATE chose to include social justice as an example of an acceptable value informing pre-service teacher dispositions. Johnson and Johnson (2007) argue that NCATE capitulated to avoid any controversy that might “imperil its comfortable existence” (p. 4). In their article they take exception to the charge that social justice can be associated with a radical social agenda. These authors accuse NCATE of selling out needy pupils in order to insure its own survival. They write that NCATE lavishly lobbies key personnel in various states’ department of education in order to secure its partnership with the state. Johnson and Johnson argue NCATE has lost sight of its claim to “‘help protect school children’” (p. 4).

Heybach (2009) similarly faults NCATE for removing the term social justice without debate or explanation. She also rejects the idea that use of the term social justice could be problematic and asks why Dr. Wise failed to “discuss any legitimate educative role social justice might play within the nation’s culturally diverse classrooms” (p. 236). Heybach argues that members of the NACIQI were motivated by their own radical social agenda. She argues the various individuals who composed the NACIQI desire “to de-democratize the role of public education” (pp. 236-237).

In contrast, other scholars see the term social justice as problematic. K. C. Johnson opposes the use of the term as vague and sees the potential for abuse (Iannone, 2007, p. 212). Additionally, Robert Hunsaker (2011) is critical of the one-sided understanding of social justice in counseling education. Hunsaker writes that social justice ideology is flourishing in the social sciences, education, law, medicine and the humanities. Hunsaker argues for an examination of
social justice efforts. He warns that to have one “‘agenda’” or viewpoint in the academy is anathema to liberal education, as well as, to academic and professional freedom (p. 325).

Additionally, William Hare (2007) writes, “What counts as social justice is typically controversial, and reasonable people who are equally well informed and committed to justice will disagree” (p. 4). Hare cautions readers about the indoctrination of students and mentions the NCATE controversy. He contends that to require students conform to a particular ideology in teacher education is a problem because it prevents students from exploring questions, disagreements, problems, alternative ideas, etc. However, Hare also writes that teacher educators can try to “persuade” students that certain views are justifiable using reason and evidence as long as rival views are presented and students feel no pressure to agree with their professors’ views (Hare, 2007, p. 5).

Clearly, both Johnson and Johnson (2007) and Heybach (2009) see value in a social justice agenda in education. But it is not clear what social justice means because different people use the term differently. Many scholars consider social justice, a concept often used in education, to be a contested, value-laden concept with diverse meanings and usages. For example, Craig (2007) and Craven (2012) both specifically refer to social justice as a contested concept. Grant and Agosto (2008) write that education scholars contend that “social justice is a contested and normative concept and that theoreticians and policymakers use the term to mean different things” (p. 177). Zajda, Majhanovich and Rust (2006) write, “the term ‘social justice’ is a multi-layered ideal construct and refers to a contested and contentious concept” (p. 13). Focusing specifically on the use of the concept in teacher education, Cochran-Smith, Barnatt, Lahann, Shakman, and Terell (2009) state, “there is considerable variation in meanings of the term teacher education for social justice” (p. 626).
To be sure, the term social justice is widely employed in education discourse including published literature, conferences, programs, and teacher education programs’ mission statements (North, 2006; Zeichner, 2006). Hytten and Bettez (2011) write, “The phrase social justice is used in school mission statements, job announcements, and educational reform proposals, though sometimes widely disparate ones, from creating a vision of culturally responsive schools to leaving no child left behind” (pp. 7-8). Zeichner (2006) argues it is difficult to find a teacher education program in the United States that does not claim to prepare teachers for social justice (p. 328). A search of all publications in the ERIC database conducted in February 2016, in which “social justice” is used in the title, yields 1,424 items published from 1971 until 2016. I was curious to know if the use of the term increased or decreased across time. I repeated the search limiting the time span to ten-year increments and found 27 publications during the first ten-year period beginning January 1971 through December 1980. The next ten-year period, beginning in January 1981 until December 1990 saw 28 publications, and from January 1991 through December 2000, 114 items were published, next from January 2001 through December 2010, a total of 745 items were published. The last time period brings the search to the present time and covers only slightly more than five years (January 2011 until February 2016) and yields 510 publications. It is not unreasonable to conclude the numbers reveal wide spread use of the phrase social justice, in the context of education, is a relatively recent phenomenon.

It is interesting to note the use or penetration of the phrase “social justice” in education literature across time. Curious about social justice as the subject matter of publications, I conducted a second search in ERIC. In order to capture literature in which social justice was the subject I used the term “social justice” as an exact subject descriptor. The search produced 5,057 hits. I discovered that during the years 1935 to 1994 only four citations were returned. In the
ten-year period from 1995 until 2004, ERIC returned 167 titles. In the ten years, from 2005 until 2014 Eric returned 4,489 titles. It seems the vast majority of publications occur in the last decade or so. The results of these searches suggest the term social justice is relatively new to education literature.

In addition to its wide use within education, the literature provides evidence that competing perspectives on social justice exist. For example, the term social justice is used as: a rational for the redistribution of wealth (Bell, 2007; Hursh, 2009), as a pedagogy (Adams, 2007; Lemley, 2014), as a type of teacher education (Cochran-Smith, Barnatt, Lahann, Shakman, & Terrell, 2009; Ritchie, An, Cone, & Bullock, 2013), as a rational for education’s emphasis on the “nature and ordering of social relations” (Gewirtz, 1998, p. 471), and as a rational for social change (Lugg & Shoho, 2006; Russo, 2004). Morwenna Griffiths uses the term to describe the subject and methodology of her work in education (North, 2008: Griffiths, 2009). Carusi (2014) states, “Social justice stands as an abbreviation for both the resistance to hegemony and a localized agency” (p. 12). Boyles, Carusi, and Attick (2009) state education scholars like Ravitch, Finn, and Hirsch argue for a just society through assimilation. Gregory R. Meece, who is a director of a charter school that won the 2010 National Blue Ribbon, in Newark, New Jersey, wrote in an op-ed that cultural literacy and core knowledge create social justice (Meece, 2011).

The various understandings and applications of social justice make it difficult to attribute a value and purpose to the concept. Michael Novak (2000) writes, “It [social justice] is allowed to float in the air as if everyone will recognize an instance of it when it appears” (p. 11). Scholars admit there is ambiguity associated with conceptualizing the term social justice, not to mention, agreeing on a clear definition (Boyles, Carusi, & Attick, 2009; Cochran-Smith, 2010; Gewirtz, 1998; Grant & Agosto, 2008; Hytten & Bettez, 2011; North, 2006; North 2008;
Williamson, Rhodes, & Dunson, 2007; Zollers, Albert, & Cochran-Smith, 2000). There have been efforts to catalogue the various meanings of social justice in education and some have attempted to define it (Bell, 2007; Boyles, Carusi, & Attick, 2009; Cochran-Smith, 2010; Gewertz, 1998; Grant & Agosto, 2008; Hytten & Bettez, 2011; North, 2006, 2008; Williamson, Rhodes, & Dunson, 2007; Zollers, Albert, & Cochran-Smith, 2000).

Concepts like social justice cause problems because they are ambiguous. The multiple meanings and varied use of the term social justice, in the field of education, can lead to confusion, contention, and misunderstanding among scholars and students. What I saw as an acceptance among scholars in teacher education of a term that references a variety of meanings seems problematic to me. This may be due my training in law. While working on my Juris Doctorate I learned to appreciate the importance of clarity in language. It is difficult to achieve a “meeting of the minds” when the parties use ambiguous terms. Moreover, this lack of clarity might have led to concerns about academic freedom and other First Amendment in teacher education. The concept social justice is used frequently in the field of education and it is not clear what it means exactly. For example, two education scholars state social justice can mean anything from creating culturally responsive schools to leaving no child behind (Hytten & Bettez, 2011). Conceptual confusion causes problems in both theoretical analysis and empirical analysis. Collier, Hidalgo and Maciuceanu (2006) argue the inconsistent application of concepts affects the cumulation of findings and coherence of research.

Conceptual confusion may occur for a variety of reasons. For example, applying a concept inconsistently is one problem that leads to confusion. Consequently, when a concept is associated with different meanings and uses, its application can become disputed. Debates over a concept’s meaning and use can show that the ambiguity associated with a particular concept is
due to the fact that users are actually referring to more than one concept. Where this is the case, scholarly debate over the correct meaning of a concept may lead to the untangling of confusing and/or ambiguous meanings. Therefore, academic debate over a concept’s application is a good thing because it leads to a shared understanding of the concept and results in precision and clarity in language.

However, clarity might not be gained when the meaning of a concept is contested for different reasons. That is when certain users prefer one meaning to another and vigorously defend that meaning against all others who argue for a different meaning. W. B. Gallie (1956) theorized that these kinds of concepts are unique. He argues when the use and meaning of these kinds of concepts are examined, one finds no clearly definable general use that is universally accepted as the correct or standard use (Gallie, 1956a, p. 168). Gallie contends that for certain concepts the disputes are perfectly genuine.

Gallie (1956) argues the various disputants’ positions are “sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence” and that the dispute is not resolvable through argument of any kind (p. 169). Gallie coined the term essentially contested concepts to refer to these kinds of concepts. Gallie also conceived seven criteria or conditions to identify the concepts that fit into the special class of essentially contested concepts. Gallie states not every essentially contested concept will satisfy all seven conditions. He formally defines essentially contested concepts as those that meet the following five conditions: appraisiveness, internal complexity, various describability, openness, and reciprocal recognition. Gallie’s seven criteria have been reviewed, critiqued and modified over the years. Additionally, scholars suggest essentially contested concepts can be contested at multiple levels (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009). Boas and Gans-Morse
(2009), specifically, argue that in addition to a concept’s meaning, use, and valence these concepts can also be contested at a terminological level.

Gallie (1956) suggests the following concepts “art,” “democracy,” and “of the Christian tradition” can be categorized as essentially contested concepts (p. 168). This is because in instances where these kinds of concepts are used different users maintain that the special function the term fulfills on that party’s behalf or that party’s “interpretation, is the correct or proper or primary, or the only important, function [of the] term in question” (Gallie, 1956, p. 168). Jeremy Waldron (2002) makes the point that, for Gallie, “essentially” is not just an intensifier. Waldron explains that “essentially” refers where the disagreement or indeterminacy occurs. The idea is that the contestation occurs at the core of the concept. Waldron (2002) writes that “essentially contested” means more than “very hotly contested, with no resolution in sight” (p. 140).

Relevant to this proposed study, Gallie (1956) suggests social justice belongs to this special class of essentially contested concepts. At one point in Gallie’s paper he states social justice, like art, democracy and the Christian way of life, is an essentially contested concept. Although, he does not apply his seven conditions of essentially contested concepts to the concept of social justice in his paper. Gallie states he can conceive of only two ways people describe social justice. He writes one group will argue social justice rests on the idea of individual merit and exchange; whereas, the other group will argue social justice rests on an ideal of co-operation where all who co-operate are entitled to the necessities of life through the redistribution of property (Gallie, 1956a, p. 187).

In sum, it is clear social justice is a concept widely used in teacher education, is subject to varied meanings and use, which are in dispute. So is social justice, in the context of education, an
essentially contested concept as theorized by Gallie? Two scholars from the United Kingdom, Troyna and Vincent (1995) seem to think so. One of the things they examine in their study is how the phrase social justice is operationalized in local policy discourses within the British education system. Troyna and Vincent (1995) state they “see ‘social justice’ as an ‘essentially contested concept’” (p. 151). They do not, however, analyze the concept using Gallie’s framework. The authors simply refer to social justice as an essentially contested concept with reference to Gallie. Troyna and Vincent write social justice is often used as a synonym for equal opportunities or equity in political, educational, and academic discourse. As detailed in the following chapter, the concept social justice, in the context of education, has not been evaluated using Gallie’s framework.

**Statement of the Problem**

The controversy over NCATE’s use of the term social justice in its accreditation standard is empirical evidence the term is contested in teacher education. It is interesting that NCATE did not attempt to define social justice. Nor did NCATE engage in any kind of debate about the merits of social justice as a value to guide teacher dispositions. NCATE officials, in response to public criticism, simply removed the phrase social justice from their accrediting standards. Also interesting is the fact that the statements made by the representatives from the various organizations opposing the re-authorization of NCATE did not attach any specific meaning to the phrase social justice either. Moreover, there is evidence in the education literature that different people use the term social justice differently.

Given these facts it is important to understand the various perspectives regarding the meaning of the phrase. Therefore, a systematic analysis of the various applications of the concept social justice in teacher education is warranted. Gallie’s framework can be used to identify and
clarify the various perspectives stakeholders may have regarding teacher training and social justice. The results of this kind of analysis promises to shed light on why NCATE refused to engage in a debate over the term social justice.

**Purpose of the Study**

Scholars have used Gallie’s (1956) approach as an analytic framework to shed light on important problems relevant to the understanding and analysis of concepts in other fields (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009; Choi & Majumdar, 2012; Collier et al., 2006; Daly, 2012). The purpose of this study is to embark on a systematic analysis of social justice, as it relates to teacher education, using Gallie’s framework. Scholarly articles from teacher education journals will be analyzed to identify any differences in the meaning and use of the phrase social justice. The qualitative content analysis will be directed by the criteria in Gallie’s framework. This content analysis will provide a better understanding of how the concept, social justice, is operationalized and the multidimensional nature of the concept in the context of teacher education. It promises to help explain the ways in which the term is subject to controversy. Additionally, this study will test Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) theory that these kinds of concepts may be contested at levels other than meaning, use, and normative valence. Specifically, Boas and Gans-Morse argue that these kinds of concepts can be contested at a terminological level.

Examination of the various uses and meaning of the term social justice as it relates to teacher education is an interesting and worthwhile exercise. Gallie’s (1956) framework can be used to unpack structures of meaning and examine the various ways people understand a concept resulting in increased understanding. Gallie’s (1956) framework has been used to describe and explain complex concepts (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009; Choi & Majumdar, 2014; Collier et al., 2006; Daly, 2012). For example, Daly (2012) uses Gallie’s approach as a framework in her
study of the multidimensional features of the concept of philanthropy. Daly (2012) states, Gallie’s approach can help scholars “understand the different facets of a concept beyond defining criteria alone and to appreciate particular usages of a concept by different scholars and in different fields of study” (p. 538). This type of analysis may show why agreement on a universal definition for social justice is so difficult and why different people understand it differently.

Collier et al. (2006) also argue that Gallie’s (1956) approach is a useful tool for helping scholars’ reason about complex concepts. It should be noted that both Collier et al. (2006) and Daly (2012) contend that Gallie’s approach is not useful to establish the “best” use and/or meaning of a concept. However, Gallie’s framework does provide a structure for reasoned discourse about complex concepts. Gallie argued that various uses of a concept might each prove rational and legitimate given a particular context. Collier et al. (2006) state Gallie’s motivation for developing a tool to analyze complex and contested concepts was to “construct a more coherent and rational foundation for the discussion of complex concepts” (p. 213).

Additionally, Collier et al. argue Gallie’s framework is useful to provide “a realistic account of a complex concept and their dynamic patterns of change” (p. 214). Additionally, by using this framework to analyze the concept of social justice in teacher education, the findings of this study will allow for some conclusions to be drawn about the merits of the framework.

More specifically, this study will be guided by the following questions:

**Research Questions**

1. Using Gallie’s framework, how is the concept of social justice applied in teacher education literature and what evidence can be found to support the classification of social justice as an essentially contested concept in the context of teacher education?
2. In what ways do the data from this study support Boas and Gans-Morse’s (2009) theory that essentially contested concepts have multiple levels of contestation?

To address these questions, a directed qualitative content analysis of teacher education literature will be conducted using Gallie’s (1956) criteria. This content analysis will provide a better understanding of how the concept social justice is operationalized in the field of teacher education and the ways in which the term was subject to controversy. Details of the content analysis, as well as, other information important to the research design for this study are explained in chapter three.

**Importance of the Study**

The concept social justice, as used in teacher education literature, has not been systematically examined as an essentially contested concept. This study will examine social justice, in the context of education, using the approach formulated by Gallie. Such an examination promises to provide clarity regarding the contested nature of the term social justice in teacher education. Clear and precise language is necessary to free and open debate in institutions of higher learning as well as the public at large. This is especially true in fields where academic research, social science theories, and faculty members inform policy makers. Collier et al. (2006) write theorists can benefit from understanding the source of contestedness. Analysis of the various uses and meaning of a concept allows researchers to look critically at the evolving debates so that inconsistencies and ambiguities can be revealed. Moreover, Waldron (2002) makes the argument that “the contestation between rival conceptions deepens and enriches all sides’ understanding of the area of value that the contested concept marks out” (p. 152).
Additionally, at the NACIQI (2006) hearing, the following charges were made, the term social justice is “vague,” “susceptible to politicized interpretation,” “necessarily fraught with contested ideological significance” (p. 259), “ripe with possibilities for mischief” (p.257), and ultimately “you cannot have a term like ‘social justice’ without it resulting in the evaluation of students candidates’ political beliefs” (p. 279). Given the issues of academic freedom and students’ First Amendment rights, it is important to examine the various ways of understanding social justice as it relates to teacher education programs. Results of this analysis may aid in understanding the various charges made by the NAS, FIRE, and ACTA, as well as, the reasons NCATE decided to drop the phrase. It will be interesting and informative to see how the phrase social justice is currently operationalized in the literature on teacher education. Moreover, this study will test the theory proposed by Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) that essentially contested concepts can be contested at the terminological level.

This study is explained in the following chapters. Chapter two begins with a brief discussion of the history of the term social justice. Next, a review of education literature dealing with the concept social justice is presented. It should be noted that this discussion is not an exhaustive review of all possible applications, definitions, or theoretical frameworks associated with the concept of social justice in education. It is a review of existing scholarly efforts that attempt to explain social justice in education. It is presented to demonstrate “that there is no one clearly definable general use...which can be set up as the correct or standard use” (Gallie, 1956a, p.168). Chapter two also includes an overview of Gallie’s framework and then offers a brief discussion of each of his seven conditions or criteria.

Chapter three describes the research design for this study. This chapter includes information about qualitative content analysis, data collection, and coding. Chapter three also
includes a discussion of the limitations and implications associated with this study. Chapter four presents the findings of the qualitative analysis directed by Gallie’s (1956) seven criteria. Chapter five provides a discussion of the findings, as well as, a reiteration of the limitations of this study and suggestions for further research.
CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

This literature review is organized in four parts. The first section offers a brief history of the term social justice. The second section provides an overview of various articles and book chapters, within scholarly literature, examining social justice in the context of education. The third section details an overview of W. B. Gallie’s essentially contested concepts. This section examines various scholarly interpretations of Gallie’s intent as well as scholars’ analyses of Gallie’s contribution in general. The fourth section explains each of the seven conditions or criteria of an essentially contested concept as conceived by W. B. Gallie. This section also discusses various scholars’ critiques of Gallie’s criteria. At the end of this chapter a brief discussion explaining why a systematic analysis of the concept social justice is warranted and why this type of analysis promises to provide insight into the meaning and use of the phrase social justice in teacher education.

History of the Concept Social Justice

Modern conceptions of social justice are the result of various forces. Over time economic, social, religious, and political forces have all influenced changes to the concept’s meaning and use. However, its original meaning was quite different from contemporary understandings. The Jesuit Luigi Taparelli d’ Azeglio first used the term in 1840. The term was conceived in reaction to the Risorgimento. The Risorgimento refers to the fifty-year period (1820 – 1870) of political activism and cultural nationalism focusing on a unified Italy after the
defeat of Napoleon in 1815 (Knowles, 2013). Taparelli, a prominent Catholic political writer, discussed the concept of social justice in his five volume, *Saggio teoretico di dritto natural appoggiato sul fatto* (*A theoretical Treatise on Natural Law Resting on Fact*). In it he writes that the idea of “social justice” springs from what is right. The principle focus of this work was to develop a theory of society that was both conservative and Catholic. Taparelli’s sociopolitical treatise was developed during a time of conflict and social upheaval in Italy (Burke, 2011, pp. 34-35; Paulhaus, 1987; Shields, 1941, p. 26).

For Taparelli, the inequality found in life is not in conflict with the notion of equality because at the abstract level all men start as equal. He argues the inequality found in society is attributable to the individual qualities bestowed by nature. His theory recognizes the inequality between men and he applies two principles to social existence. First, man has a duty to work for the good of others and in so doing he should not take any action to obstruct the good of another. Second, the other has a duty to work toward his own good without interference and he should not create any obstacle to the good of another.

Taparelli’s social justice is not concerned with the equalizing of proportions in the common good. Taparelli’s social justice deals with the constitutional arrangements of a society. His theory has to do with the relationships between men in a society. It examines the rights of man and how people come to be governed. In other words, he examines, at the societal level, the relationship between authority and liberty, order and freedom. Taparelli argues a person’s actions are just where they are appropriate given the various rights of others with whom he or she is dealing. Taparelli writes that inequality is inherent in individuals even though they are equal in their nature. Taparelli provides his theories of society to defend the idea that social justice requires the acceptance of inequality (Burke, 2011, pp. 36-42).
Another philosopher and a contemporary of Taparelli was Antonio Rosmini-Serbati. Taparelli and Rosmini differed in fundamental ways. Taparelli was a conservative Jesuit who believed in preserving certain aspects of authoritarian rule. Rosmini, also a Catholic priest, ascribed to a classical liberal philosophy. Rosmini authored *La Constituzione secondo la Giustizia Sociale (The Constitution according to Social Justice)*. Rosmini published this particular piece in 1848 and it is this publication that drew attention to the term, social justice, though it was Taparelli who first coined the phrase in 1840 (Burke, 2011, pp. 42-44)

Rosmini’s purpose in writing his *The Constitution According to Social Justice* was to offer an alternative to the French model of a constitutional society that seemed to be a result of the French Revolution. Rosmini pointed out the French model was unstable and therefore led to one revolution after the other. He believed the instability was due to the fact that the French ideal “suffers from two radical vices: it does not guarantee political justice, and it does not protect all property equally” (Burke, 2011, p. 48). In *The Constitution According to Social Justice*, Rosmini defines two requirements for social justice. First, citizens have the right to sue the government and second that voting power be proportionate to the taxes the citizen pays. It should be remembered that at this point in history the only taxes people paid were those assessed on their property. Rosmini argued that only those harmed by taxes should have a right or say in the size and scope of taxation (Mingardi, 2004). Rosmini believed a citizen’s voting power should be proportionate to the taxes they paid (Burke, 2011, pp. 50-51; Mingardi, 2004).

In summary, Rosmini argued all the rights of an individual can be reduce to liberty rights and property rights. Laws should protect individual liberty and property. Moreover, he argues government has a duty to ensure that the wealth of the nation increases and that society has two basic needs: justice and material well-being. Therefore, government should be organized in a
way that provides justice and also promotes the material well-being of its citizens (Burke, 2011, pp. 47-49).

Although Taparelli and Rosmini had their disagreements, their conception of social justice did not conflict with ideas of justice in the broad or general sense. For both men, the concept of social justice fit within the conception of justice in general. Both men believed that individuals are equal in nature. Equality in nature, however, did not mean equality in society. They both believed that social justice resulted in unequal positions in society. In their view a person’s position and wealth is the result of the different qualities and the will inherent in each person. It is important to note that during this time European society was patriarchal and therefore males held primary social and economic power. They believed these individual differences were given by nature. Therefore, the resulting inequality did not in conflict with historical concepts of justice at the time (Burke, 2011).

Rosmini and Taparelli lived during a tumultuous time in Italy. Both men were alive in 1848, the year sometimes referred to as “the spring of nations” or “the year of revolution” due to the wave of revolutions that rolled over Europe. During the ensuing years Europe witnessed economic, social and political problems. Poor harvests produced inflation and industrialization caused the exploitation of workers and destroyed the need for the handwork of artisans. The agricultural failures in Europe were soon followed by an industrial depression causing widespread unemployment. These conditions produced increasing downward mobility and an increase in poverty in Europe. The expanding revolutionary feeling was a product of the ideas of natural rights, equality and the rejection of the feudal system and resulted in changes in the way people saw their relationship to government and society. It was also at this time that the Communist league commissioned Marx and Engels to write the Communist Manifesto, in which
they propose the idea of abolishing private property and the market in order to secure a classless society in which people are equal (Burke, 2011; Weyland, 2009).

The previous discussion detailed the earliest use of the phrase social justice in the Catholic Church, however and it is worth noting that outside the Catholic Church, during the early to mid-nineteenth century, the phrase social justice was not often used and in general referred to an extension of ordinary or general justice similar to criminal justice or commutative justice (Burke, 2011; Hayek, 1976; Shields, 1941). Shields (1941) provides several other examples in which the term social justice was used in the Catholic Church. In 1851 it was used by the *La Civilta Cattolica* to argue that the abolition of the excess of state centralism results in social justice. In 1882, it was used by a French Catholic in a speech about the complex rights and duties that form the moral bonds of community. Burke (2011) argues that the modern understandings of social justice were influenced by developments in the Protestant tradition, as well as, the Catholic tradition.

According to Burke (2011) Christian Socialists were particularly interested in justice as it relates to social order and labor. This focus may have been the result of the extreme economic hardship in England. All of Western Europe was suffering due to extreme economic conditions. There were pervasive wheat and potato crop failures causing food prices rise sharply. This meant there was little money to buy other goods. An industrial depression followed which resulted in massive unemployment and poverty. However, the Christian Socialists saw the plight of the common man as the result of individualized labor and competition and not primarily due to the extreme economic conditions. In their mind there was always someone willing to do a job for lower wages. Eventually wages would be so low it would be impossible to live on such wages. They believed the entire system of organized labor was unjust and called for a more
Christian and cooperative system. They were unwilling to resort to revolution or violence but did try to organize workers into cooperative associations and advocated for worker owned businesses (Burke, 2011, pp. 50-55).

It should be noted that the early Christian socialist movement’s popularity was short lived in England and by the late 1860 it was all but extinct. However, Burke (2011) argues it was the members of the Christian socialism movement that first conceived of the equalizing aspects or characteristics of the modern interpretations of the concept social justice. Although these early Christian Socialists made little, if any, use of the term social justice, they are important because of their conception of justice as fairness, that is fairness in the organization of society, specifically fairness in the organization of labor. As Burke states: “It was among the members of this group that the earliest expression of the idea of ‘social justice’ in English, which is also the earliest in its current equalizing sense, seems to have developed” (Burke, 2011, p. 52; 50-55).

Toward the end of the nineteenth century Christian socialist movements were resurrected in the form of organizations like the Socialist Quaker Society, Roman Catholic Socialist Society, and the Christian Social Union. In 1893, the Christian Socialists composed the major force in the British Labour Party. This movement reached across the Atlantic influencing the American Socialist Party. Additionally, the influence of Marxism and communism contributed to changes in the underlying philosophy of this movement (Burke, 2011; Handy, 1952). Around the turn of the century the term social justice had come into common usage outside the Catholic Church (Shields, 1941, pp. 26-27). Shields (1941) writes, “Social justice was early accepted as a slogan by religious groups of many denominations…For the next few decades that passion [social justice] was to dominate American Protestantism more and more” (p. 60).
Burke (2011) argues, as time went on, the Christian Socialist conception of social justice gathered strength and was transformed from justice as a process, which is ordinary justice, to justice as a material, which was new. Burke explains it this way, “…[social justice] changed from being a quality of actions for which people can be accountable, like the ordinary concept of justice, to a quality of impersonal states of affairs which can occur without anyone having done anything to produce them” (2011, p. 58). For example, in 1919, the International Labor Organization (ILO) was formed “promote social progress and overcome social and economic conflicts” using the means of dialogue and cooperation” (Rodgers, Lee, Swepston, & Van Daele, 2009, p. 2). This organization was born of the European political currents specifically social democracy, Christian democracy, and social liberalism. It was created in reaction to World War I and the European revolutions. The ILO Constitution was part of the Treaty of Versailles. The founding document for this organization cites the harsh conditions and hardship of working people, as well as, the destitution of large numbers of people as the antecedent to unrest endangering peace and harmony. The organization calls for the immediate improvement in these conditions. It calls for social justice to establish universal and lasting peace (Rodgers et al., 2009, pp. 2-6).

Another figure that influenced modern notions of social justice is Leonard T. Hobhouse. Hobhouse makes two contributions to the idea of social justice. In 1922, Hobhouse, wrote, The Elements of Social Justice. Hobhouse’s book was produced to defend measures like the old-age pension in early twentieth century England. In his book, Hobhouse further developed the line of thought begun by John Stuart Mill in his treatise Utilitarianism. Hobhouse argues privation is morally equivalent to deservedness with regard to distributive justice. He argues the common good is found where there is harmony and harmony results when basic needs are met. The
obvious problem with this theory is that needs are not objective (Burke, 2011, pp. 61-62; Shields, 1941).

Hobhouse’s second contribution to modern notions of social justice comes from his thoughts on property. Hobhouse distinguishes between property resulting from individual effort and property resulting from society. Property resulting from the contribution of society should be subject to redistribution. However, it has proved to be an impossible task to tease apart the levels of contribution by the various players in the production of property because everything produced is due to a contribution of both society and individual will (Burke, 2011, pp. 61-62; Shields, 1941).

Also connected to the understanding of modern conceptions of social justice is the reign of the Roman Catholic Pope Pius XI whose reign began in 1922 and lasted until 1939. In 1931, Pius XI writes his encyclical *Quadragesimo anno*, referred to as “The Social Justice Encyclical” (Shields, 1941, p. 46). The encyclical was published to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of Leo XIII’s encyclical *Rerum novarum* published in 1891. *Quadragesimo anno* uses the phrase social justice eight times and is credited with moving the phrase social justice into the common vocabulary (Burke, 2011; Novak, 2009; Rhonheimer, 2014).

Burke (2011) writes that both the conservative conception of social justice as understood by Taparelli and the classical liberal conception of social justice developed by Rosmini were forgotten. Different conceptions of social justice developed in reaction to a changing world. The Depression was a major focus in the 1932 Presidential election and in a campaign speech in 1932 speech Roosevelt embraces the idea of social justice (Roosevelt, 1392). He promises social justice through social action. Burke (2011) states a more progressive conception of social justice can be seen in Roosevelt’s New Deal programs.
Contemporary Theories of Social Justice

Other more contemporary scholars have also influenced contemporary understandings of social justice. It is not possible to discuss every contribution in the evolution of the concept of social justice. Therefore, only some are discussed. First, John Rawls and Robert Nozick were chosen because they represent two very different ways to think about justice and a brief review of their ideas is helpful to understand contemporary ideas about social justice and the contested nature of the concept. Second, critical feminist political theorist, Nancy Fraser, and socialist feminist theorist Iris Marion Young’s ideas are also briefly presented because they are specifically referenced in various education articles discussing social justice. For example, sociology of education scholar, Sharon Gewirtz relies heavily on the socialist feminist theorist Iris Marion Young’s work *Justice and the Politics of Difference.*

A brief discussion of John Rawls’s theory of justice is discussed first. In 1971, Rawls, a modern liberal philosopher, published his book, *A Theory of Justice.* Rawls proposes an ideal theory of justice to describe a just arrangement of political and social institutions in liberal societies. Rawls (1999) refers to social justice as “the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties, and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation” (p. 6). He considers justice as fairness. According to Wenar (2014) Rawls theory presupposes a bounded society. Meaning he is discussing the society of one nation into which its members are born and which has enough resources to meet each member’s basic needs. Rawls embraces the central classical liberal ideas that all citizens are free and equal. Furthermore, he states social cooperation is needed to live a decent life and the members of a society are not neutral regarding the way in which the benefits and burdens are distributed. Next, he argues people do not deserve to be born with any particular
characteristics (sex, race, intellect, etc.) nor do they deserve to be born into a particular environment (wealth, poverty, etc.). Consequently, the benefits of society should not favor or disfavor a citizen because of these factors (Rawls, 1999; Wenar, 2014).

Rawls’s (1991) theory has two guiding principles of justice. First, is “the equal basic liberties principle” this principle states “each person has an equal claim” to the broadest set of “equal basic liberties” that is “compatible” with the same claim by all others (p. 53). The second principle deals with social and economic inequalities and it has two parts. According to Wenar (2014) the first part is the “fair equality of opportunity principle” and is concerned with equality of opportunity (section 4.3). This principle states people with the same aptitude must be given the same educational and economic opportunities regardless of the environment into which they are born (e.g. wealth or poverty). The second part of the second principle is “the difference principle” and it addresses the distribution of wealth. Rawls argues resources must be distributed so that any inequality ultimately is for the common good and must specifically be to the greatest advantage of the poor. In summary, Rawls theory starts from a position of fundamental equality. Since all citizens are fundamentally equal, the benefits of social and economic cooperation should be distributed equally among them unless an unequal distribution is to everyone’s advantage. His theory holds that for any inequality to be just it must ultimately improve the lives of everyone with special attention given to those who are the worst off (Rawls, 1999; Wenar, 2014).

Robert Nozick, an American libertarian political philosopher, proposes his theory of justice in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. In his critique of Rawls, Nozick holds that the term “distributive justice” is not neutral. It presupposes some type of central distribution center and Nozick contends that there is no person or group entitled to control all the resources and decide
who gets what. Nozick states, “What each person gets, he gets from others who give to him in exchange for something, or as a gift” (p. 85). He argues that in free societies, different people control different resources, and it is from the voluntary exchanges and actions of these people that new holdings are created. He prefers a more neutral term and uses the phrase “justice in holdings” (Nozick, 2006, p.85).

Nozick (1974) refers to the portion distributed to a person as “holdings.” For Nozick, the principle of justice in holdings is comprised of three issues. First, “the original acquisition,” this refers to how “unheld” things become held (Nozick, 1974, p. 150). Next, is the “transfer of holdings” under this topic is the process and rules regarding transfer, gifting and divestiture of things, as well as, the concept of fraud (Nozick, 1974, p. 150). Third, is the principle of “rectification of injustice in holdings” or “violations of the first two principles” (Nozick, 1974, p. 152). In general, Nozick argues that a person is entitled to his holdings if they were acquired by the principles of justice in acquisition, transfer, or rectification. If each person’s holdings are just then it can be said the entire set of holdings or the distribution of holdings is just. Other patterns of distribution, such as the one Rawls suggests with his difference principle, are unjust. Nozick rejects the idea of patterned distributions because the pattern cannot be maintained without significant restriction to an individual’s freedom. Nozick, broadly speaking, would say that if the rules and processes governing the competition are just then the society is just (Nozick, 1974; Nozick, 2006).

The next theorist to be discussed is Iris Marion Young (1990). Young, a feminist political philosopher, explains her views on justice in her book, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Young states contemporary theories of justice “tend to restrict the meaning of social justice to the morally proper distribution of benefits and burdens among society’s members” (p.
15). She rejects this understanding of social justice because it over-focuses on material things like income, wealth, or jobs. She argues for a broader understanding of social justice. Young argues “Justice should refer not only to distribution, but also to the institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of individual capacities and collective communication and cooperation” (p. 39). She argues social structure and institutional context determine distributive patterns. In unjust societies things like power, the division of labor, and culture must be analyzed and changed in order to realize social justice. Young argues social group differences must be recognized and affirmed rather than suppressed.

Accordingly, issues of domination and oppression are central to Young’s (1990) theory of justice. Young’s view of equalizing educational opportunity has three main points. First, she rejects the idea that equalizing educational resources among children is sufficient because oppression will still exist. Young identifies five faces of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. Her second point requires the elimination of all oppression. According to Eisenberg (2006) Young believes “Eliminating oppression requires establishing a politics that welcomes difference by dismantling and reforming structures, processes, concepts, and categories that sustain difference-blind, impartial, neutral, universal, politics” (p. 8). The third, and final point requires a restructuring of the division of labor and decision-making so that disadvantaged social groups can contribute without losing their particularities (Eisenberg, 2006; Young, 1990, pp. 1-64).

Last, Nancy Fraser, a critical theorist, asks whether redistribution and recognition constitute two distinct theories of justice. She continues the examination of the relationship between redistribution and recognition. Fraser examines Young’s theories and believes that Young is too dismissive of the distributive paradigm and that Young is mistaken in her belief
that the elimination of oppression and recognition of difference should be the gravitational center of justice. Fraser disagrees with the idea that recognition should be prioritized over distribution. Fraser argues Young’s critique of the distributive paradigm cannot be taken at face value because redistribution is implicit in Young’s theory, even though Young does not specifically acknowledge this fact. Fraser argues recognition alone will not solve the problem of inequality and argues that identity politics threaten to replace the necessary distributive paradigm of justice. Fraser acknowledges the persistent tensions between cultural recognition and distributive economic policies and argues that both redistribution and recognition are required. This is because, in her view, redistribution secures the objective condition of an individual and recognition safeguards the individual’s position. Fraser’s ideal is participatory parity in public life. (Fraser, 2006; Iser, 2013).

Due to time and space it is not possible to provide a comprehensive examination of the phrase social justice. In this section only a brief overview of the history of the meaning and use of the term social justice is discussed. Additionally, summaries of the theories of Rawls, Nozick, Young, and Fraser are presented. The purpose of this section is to show the dynamic nature of the concept and the various forces that influenced contemporary understandings of social justice. The next section discusses the way the term social justice is operationalized in education. Scholarly works are examined in order to understand the way the education field understands and uses the phrase social justice with a specific focus on its use and meaning in teacher education.

**Social Justice as a Concept in Education and Teacher Education**

In chapter one, it was noted that use of the term social justice appears to be growing in education literature and that education professionals invoke the phrase social justice in a variety of ways. This section reviews scholarship on the concept social justice and its application in
education. For example, Zajada, Majhanovich and Rust (2006) discuss the epistemology of social justice in education. Hytten and Bettez (2011) examine what it means to have a social justice orientation in the field of education. They identify five different genres of social justice education literature. Other education scholars suggest conceptions of social justice fall into one of two camps, either the assimilationalist/individualist camp or the cultural integrity/collectivist camp. Scholars, like Lee Ann Bell (2007), attempt to provide a definition for social justice. Gewirtz (1998) aims to map out a way to think about social justice in education with the purpose of initiating a debate to inform education policy research. Expanding on the work of Gewirtz North (2006, 2008) develops a conceptual framework for thinking about social justice. Below is a detailed examination of this scholarship.

Zajada et al. (2006) discuss the epistemology of social justice in their paper. They credit Taparelli and Rosmini with the introduction of the term social justice. They also mention Plato’s idea “that an ideal state [rests] on four virtues: wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice” (p. 1). They discuss the conception of justice offered by Thomas Aquinas. This conception of justice holds that justice amounts to the principled conduct of individuals or a “rightness” of mind whereby a person does what he ought to do given a certain set of circumstances. Third, they identify the ideas put forth by Immanuel Kant as influencing conceptions of social justice. According to Zajada et al. Kant argued “actions are morally right if they are motivated by duty without regard to any personal motive, or self interest” (p. 9).

Zajada et al. (2006) also note John Stuart Mill’s theory of Utilitarianism and the anthropomorphic approach to the conception of a society. They write that at the end of the nineteenth century social reformers used the phrase to appeal to the ruling classes to administer to the uprooted farm laborers who constituted the urban poor. The authors remind the reader that
all justice by definition is social. However, they note there is a shift in the meaning of social justice when we talk about contemporary conceptions of social justice. The term social justice took on new meaning over and above traditional notions of justice. Zajda et al. state the shift in meaning occurred when “social” no longer referred to something that developed or emerged from the rule-abiding behavior of free individuals, but instead refers to an abstract ideal or utopian goal. The difference is that social no longer means the aggregate of the rule-abiding behavior of free individuals but instead some abstract ideal imposed from above (pp. 10-11).

The authors write contemporary conceptions of social justice are often associated with Rawls. However, according to Zajda et al. (2006) scholars like Maxine Green say Rawls theory of justice is not universal. Greene argues Rawls’ theory positions each person as an individual and Greene’s understanding of social justice is more equity and community based. Zajada et al. write social justice scholars like Greene, Apple, Levin, Carnoy, and Giroux fall on the left side of the political spectrum. However, Zajda et al. also state: “people of other political persuasions have also claimed a social justice ideal” (p. 12). These people argue social justice is realized by the individual effort of self-governing free citizens who do not need to turn to the government in order to get things done (Zajda et al., 2006, pp. 11-12).

Zajda et al. (2006) argue people cooperate in a society when they feel it is “in their own self-interest [to] accept the current norms of morality as the price of membership in the community” (p. 3). The authors describe social justice as an ideal construct referring to “the overall fairness of a society in its divisions and distributions of rewards and burdens” (p. 13). Key to achieving social justice is to have most participants in the society feel the society works in a fair way. In the context of education, the authors ask “how can education contribute to the creation of a more equitable, respectful, and just society for everyone?” (p. 13).
Zajda et al. (2006) argue there are three important issues to note when addressing the link between social justice and education. First, social justice does not have a monocultural linear definition. Therefore, to accept a culturally and ideologically diverse world, there can be no single definition. Second, the idea that social justice is attainable in any society at any time may be false. For example, they state some scholars believe social justice cannot exist in capitalist society. Third, there is an “ambivalent nexus between the state, social justice, and social stratification” (p. 14). This is because the more inequality that exists, the less social justice exists. Moreover, given the “unequal distribution of economic, social and political capital” that exists globally, it is difficult “to address differences and oppressions in schools and society globally” (p. 14). The authors argue that education for social justice is transformational. It is not a “functionalist and vocationalist-oriented” type of education. Instead it is a type of education that declares students and teachers are equal participants in the process of schooling. It prepares children to be global citizens (Zajda et al., 2006).

Other scholars have also examined the concept social justice in education. Hytten and Bettez (2011) review social justice education literature in order to understand what social justice in education is all about and why it is important. Hytten and Bettez argue social justice issues are not new to education. They reference the historical education figure, George Counts, who “called for teachers to build a new social order” (p. 8). Moreover, the authors argue John Dewey, the work of critical pedagogues, and multicultural scholars spearheaded social justice issues in education. They write that although there is much talk about social justice it is not clear what is meant or how the idea of social justice is supposed to influence program development, curricula, practicum opportunities, educational philosophy, social vision, and activist work. Hytten and Bettez suggest that social justice has no single essential meaning, that it is historically
constituted, and embodies conflicting and divergent ideas. They point out that education scholars claiming a social justice orientation draw upon various discourses and theories within education. These discourses include democratic education, critical pedagogy, multiculturalism, feminism, queer theory, anti-oppressive education, cultural studies, post colonialism, globalization, and critical race theory.

Hytten and Bettez (2011) discuss some of the definitions for social justice found in the literature. First, they discuss Lee Ann Bell’s ideas about social justice. Bell (2007) writes social justice is a process and a goal. She writes the goal of social justice “is full and equal participation of all groups in a society that is mutually shaped to meet their needs” (p. 1). Bells’ (2007) conception of social justice includes the following ends: an equitable division of resources, that all persons are physically and psychologically secure, that people are self-determined and have a sense of their own agency, and that people possess a sense of social responsibility toward others, their society, and the broader world. In addition to these goals, Bell (2007) argues the process for attaining these goals must be democratic, inclusive, and collaborative. She argues the goal of social justice education ought to enable people to develop the tools necessary to understand oppression, their own socialization within oppressive systems, to develop a sense of agency and the ability to change oppressive behaviors in themselves, in their institutions and in their communities (Bell, 2007, p. 2).

Hytten and Bettez (2011) cite Hackman (2005) who writes, “social justice education encourages students to take an active role in their own education and supports teachers creating empowering, democratic, and critical education environments” (p. 103). She insists social justice requires the examination of systems of power and oppression, with an emphasis on social change and student advocacy. Hackman lists the following five key components of a social
justice approach to education: tools for content mastery, tools for critical analysis, tools for action and social change, tools for personal reflection, and multicultural group dynamics.

Another social justice education scholar, Peter Murrell (2006) states social justice means “recognizing and eradicating all forms of oppression and differential treatment extant in the practices and policies of institutions, as well as a fealty to participatory democracy as a means of this action” (p. 81). He adds that it is the knowledge of structural inequality in the social, historical, and political context of school that enables teacher candidates from mainstream backgrounds to create learning environments for diverse student population (Hackman, 2005; Hytten & Bettez, 2011; Murrell, 2006).

Hytten and Bettez (2011) acknowledge the difficulty in sorting through the social justice literature in education because there are so many different discourses and theoretical movements that claim a social justice vision. They found it useful to divide the various applications of the term social justice in the literature into five strands or genres. Hytten and Bettez argue at times these strands “blend together,” are “interpenetrating” and “overlapping” (p. 10). However, the authors state even though there may be some overlap and interconnectedness among the various social justice discourses this is not always the case. The five genres or strands Hytten and Bettez identify are: 1) philosophical/conceptual, 2) practical, 3) ethnographic/narrative, 4) theoretically specific, and 5) democratically grounded. The authors did not provide the reader with information regarding the methodology they used to decide what literature would be included in their study. They do state they sifted through a wide range of literature. The authors contend there is a need to find common ground among these various discourses to shore up what is meant by the concept. This effort is needed, they argue, to bring about a more powerful and influential
vision of social justice to challenge the “problematic growth of conservative, neoliberal, and many would argue, unjust, movements in education” (Hytten & Bettez, 2011, p. 9).

The first genre or strand of literature discussed in Hytten and Bettez (2011) is the “philosophical/conceptual” strand (p. 10). This strand contains writings concerned with teasing out what justice means in the abstract, philosophical and/or theoretical terms. Writings in this strand address philosophical and political theory, and discuss social relations and theories of oppression. The authors discuss Rizvi’s (2002) argument that there are three philosophical traditions for thinking about social justice in education: liberal individualism, market individualism, and social democratic. Liberal individualism is informed by the philosophers like John Rawls and his idea of justice as fairness. A second philosophical tradition is market individualism it is informed by philosophers like Robert Nozick. This tradition suggests justice is found where the process is fair and people are entitled in relation to their efforts. Third, socialist democratic tradition is largely drawn from the philosophy of Karl Marx. This tradition emphasizes a collectivist view of society and considers justice in relation to the needs of various people (Hytten & Bettez, 2011).

Additionally, Hytten and Bettez (2011) state the feminist philosopher, Iris Marion Young, is often cited in education literature. Therefore, Hytten and Bettez add a fourth philosophical tradition. Hytten and Bettez write this tradition is “concerned with the meaning that contemporary leftist social movements…have for understanding justice” (p. 10). They explain Young’s approach to justice entails the idea that systemic and structural inequities must be addressed and distributive justice alone will not address the inequality associated with systemic and structural inequality. Young argues oppression is embedded in the unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, and institutional rules of society (Hytten & Bettez, 2011).
The second genre of literature identified by Hytten and Bettez (2011) is label the “practical strand” (p. 12). This genre contains writings that are practical or experiential. These writings discuss the conditions or competencies that ought to be present in just schools or teacher education programs. Writings in this strand argue that just schools and just teachers promote things like: high expectations for all students, inclusion and equity in schools and classrooms, reciprocal community relationships, global perspectives, collaboration at various levels to support and defend public education, culturally responsive teachers, openness to change, and reflectiveness in teachers. These writings provide specific examples of what schools have done to create equality of educational opportunity (Hytten & Bettez, 2011, pp. 12-14).

Hytten and Bettez (2011) label the third genre of social justice literature the “ethnographic/narrative” strand (p. 14). This group of writings offers portraits of injustice. These writings “tend to be passionate and evocative” (p. 14). Authors like Jonathan Kozol fit in this category. Kozol’s (1991; 2005) work documents the inequalities that exist in the public education system. He tells the stories of children and teachers in schools. He provides evidence showing the different experiences children encounter in the public school system due to the differences in their socioeconomic status. His writing targets issues of racial segregation, social and institutional poverty, and the neglect by those in power. Authors like Angela Valenzuela (2002, 2010) also fit in this category. Valenzuela describes student’s experiences and examines school rules and events in a large inner city school in Houston, Texas. She argues assimilationist policies contribute to the underachievement of Mexican students. This strand of literature also includes reflective autobiographical and narrative works. The goal of this type of writing is to develop a personal understanding related to difference and discrimination (Hytten & Bettez, 2011, pp. 14-16).
The fourth genre of social justice literature identified by Hytten and Bettez (2011) is labeled “theoretically specific” (p. 16). Literature in this strand “involves theoretical positions that are connected to specific leftist and/or radical movements within academia” (p. 16). Hytten and Bettez list the following as having an overt connection to education: critical pedagogy, Whiteness studies, anti-oppressive education, and multiculturalism. Other theoretical positions found in education are less directly connected to education because they are borrowed from fields like women’s studies, sociology, and ethnic studies. The variety of theoretical positions in this strand can result in different interpretations of social justice (Hytten & Bettez, 2011, pp. 16-19).

The last category or genre identified by Hytten and Bettez (2011) use to classify social justice education literature is entitled “democratically grounded” (p. 19). This category contains writings arguing that education should promote the knowledge and skills needed for thoughtful citizenship. The authors group ideas like educating students to value the “open flow of ideas regardless of their popularity; have faith in their capacity to work collectively to create a better world,” (p. 19) to be concerned for the welfare of others, to use critical reflection to analyze social problems and policies, to be personally responsible, to be “active in the community and local government and engage in collective efforts at social change”(p. 19), and to “look for root causes of social problems and aim to disrupt privileging systems rather than celebrating charity and volunteerism as the primary means to social change” (p. 20).

Hytten and Bettez (2011) acknowledge, however, these are not the only ways social justice language is used in education literature. Additionally, they make the point that the categories are not mutually exclusive. They state their contribution provides an entry point into the literature and helps frame the goals associated with social justice in education. The authors
contend there is a gap in the education literature regarding social justice in education. They write that despite the voluminous writing on social justice in education there is no genuine dialogue among its various advocates. The authors argue such a dialogue could help scholars “better acknowledge challenges and reflect on the complexities of education for social justice” and thereby fortify the concept in education (p. 21). The authors note the goal, of this kind of dialogue, is not to find consensus regarding what social justice means but to build bridges, make connections and develop alliances which will help to “more effectively center a social justice agenda in schools and society” (p. 21).

Boyles, Carusi and Attick (2009) also examine the term social justice in education. Their paper provides historical and critical interpretations of social justice in education. They state, “The term social justice seems to be in the ears and on the lips of educators who set as their task the fostering of a more democratic society through classroom practices” (p. 30). They write educators define social justice differently and then act on those definitions resulting in the production of contradictory efforts in the name of social justice. These authors present a brief history of the nexus between social justice and education. They intend to trace the roots of the concept social justice in education. Their goal is to reveal points of contestation over competing definitions and explore various ideological assumptions.

Boyles et al. (2009) begin with a brief discussion of classical ideas of ordinary justice. Similar to Burke (2011) and others they connect the first use of the term social justice to the Jesuit Priest, Luigi Taparelli in the mid 1800s. Boyles et al. discuss Taparelli’s theory regarding the organization of society, his Roman Catholic understanding of the common good, and the relationships between its various members. They credit Taparelli with introducing the idea that society formed from the unified efforts of small groups of individuals upwards to society at
large. The authors eventually state that Taparelli’s work had no real influence on education in the United States. They state that social justice was never linked to justice in classical thought or Medieval thought.

Boyles et al. (2009) write justice maintained its biblical grounding and the colonial Protestants carried this conception of justice to North America. These authors begin their analysis of social justice with a discussion of notions of distributive justice and the idea of the common school. The argument the authors make is that the education of children was associated with the common good and the effort to protect the common good led to the creation of the common school. The public’s acceptance of the premise that tax supported education of local children benefits the common good is based on a theory of distributive justice. The rationale being that all the members of the community benefit from the distribution of a free education to the children of the community.

Whether or not the early forms of the common school were effective in eliminating social inequity and uniting diverse populations of students through common education is debatable. Boyles et al. (2009) argue that rather than reducing social and economic inequality the common school created a structure that maintains social inequality through things like standardized curricula and tracking. Progressive educators like John Dewy were critical of schooling practices. According to Boyles et al. Dewey rejected the idea of teaching “isolated curricular information” in favor of the idea that “the chief responsibility of schools was to involve students in ongoing inquiry into real social issues” (p. 34). Dewey believed the school had a role in molding young people into socially aware human beings who would actively reduce social injustice. Boyles et al. argue current ideas about social justice education have roots in Dewey’s philosophy of education (Boyles et al., 2009, pp. 34-35).
In addition to the influence of John Dewey, Boyles et al. (2009) argue social reconstructionists like George Counts and Harold Rugg play a role in modern ideas about social justice in education. Although pedagogically different, both Rugg and Counts saw the economic and social disparities between rich and poor as problematic. They saw this disparity as a barrier to opportunity for the poor and as a potential threat to democracy. Counts, an admitted socialist, argued for radical educational reforms that would replace notions of individualism with a collectivist ideology. Counts argued education should promote social change. And Rugg argued, “all curricula were social studies and all subject matter related directly to societal problems” (Boyles et al., 2009, p. 34). For Rugg the teacher’s role was to facilitate the critical examination of social injustice so that students and teachers would go on to take an active role in ameliorating social problems (Boyles et al., 2009, pp. 35-36).

Not only were those who focused on economic inequality important to modern conceptions of social justice in education, so too, were the early African-American activists who fought to acquire educational equity for African-American children. W. E. B. Du Bois and Booker T. Washington were both instrumental in this fight. Washington focused on the equal access to education so that African-American children could acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to compete in an industrialized society. Washington argued a strong work ethic and moral character would ultimately lead to equal standing in society. Du Bois held a different view. Du Bois argued a just and democratic society recognizes each person’s abilities and experiences. According to Du Bois democracy is eroded when certain groups can be excluded due to innate characteristics that have nothing to do with intelligence. Du Bois was an advocate for immediate full and equal rights for African Americans (Boyles et al., 2009, p. 36).
Boyles et al. (2009) also cite the significance of events such as the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling *Brown v. Board of Education* as influencing conceptions of social justice in education. The ruling that racially segregated schools are unjust and inherently unequal and therefore have no place in public education can be understood as an attempt to rectify the unequal distribution of education that occurred as a result of segregation. Boyles et al. explain the ruling in *Brown* is an example of distributive justice. They argue if a “true sense of social justice was realized” then each person would have influence over the structural systems that dispense benefits like education (p. 37). Boyles et al. question conceptions of social justice based on distributive justice alone. The authors argue if social justice is grounded in distributive justice then people with divergent views can all claim a social justice perspective. The authors’ arguments suggest that the root of social justice in education is found in the struggle for social and economic equality among different groups (Boyles et al., 2009).

Boyles et al. (2009) note the struggle for social and economic equality continues today. However, people have different ideas about the role education plays in the struggle. The authors argue scholars like, Diane Ravitch, Mortimer Alder, Chester Finn, Jr., Hertling, E. D. Hirsch, and Ruenzel see efforts geared toward assimilation as necessary to ensure children have a fair chance to attain equal social and economic status. The education scholars referenced above place their emphasis on a core knowledge curriculum and education philosophies that ultimately develops a shared cultural literacy. Boyles et al. argue this group works to maintain the current educational philosophies that maintain the status quo of the severely unbalanced power structures in the United States. Next, the authors argue a second group of scholars composed of the critical theorists, progressivists, and liberals see social justice as requiring the eradication of the very power structures the first group seeks to maintain.
Boyles et al. (2009) contend that the two camps have different senses of social justice. For instance, the authors argue those in the core cultural literacy camp (Adler, Finn, Hirsch, Ravitch, etc.) are satisfied when all children have equal access to the same education materials. The authors argue this group understands social justice as a form of distributive justice. The authors state distributive justice is often conflated with social justice in contemporary writing. The authors argue social justice is not simply a form of distributive justice. They argue viewing social justice along a distributive paradigm misses a core component of the essence of social justice. They write the essence of social justice is concerned with the virtues, actions, and ideas, within a society and these are hard to quantify and distribute but, nonetheless, comprise the “‘good social justice seeks to attain’” (p. 38). Boyles et al. (2009) and others (Applebaum, 2009; Cochran-Smith, 2010; Eisenberg, 2006; Gewirtz, 2006; Griffiths, 2008; Hytten & Bettez, 2011; Kelly, 2012; North, 2006; Sikes & Vincent, 1998; Troyna & Vincent, 1995) invoke Young’s theory of social justice to explain that oppression falls outside the distributive paradigm. They note the missing component in distributive notions of social justice is the freedom from oppression.

However, Boyles et al. (2009) offer no adequate explanation of how freedom from oppression is achieved or measured. The authors discuss ideas of recognition and “secured self-respect” (Boyles et al., 2009, p. 39). The authors note problems with these ideas because a school cannot control recognition among students nor the level of a person’s self-respect. The school can only foster an environment where these things may or may not take place. In conclusion, the authors argue social justice educators must overcome the limiting notions of distributive justice in order to bring about a democratic education for social change (Boyles et al., 2009).
Boyles et al. (2009) mention Ravitch as belonging to the assimilationist camp. Ravitch (1990, 2001) advocates for the idea public schools should teach a common culture and holds a pluralist view of multiculturalism. Diane Ravitch takes a pluralist as opposed to a particularistic view of multiculturalism. Ravitch (1990) argues that including American Indian, Mexican American, Chinese American, Japanese American, and African American information is not a problem as long as it is not used to highlight the differences between groups. Ravitch (1990) writes it is important to examine and understand that groups competed, fought, suffered, and “ultimately learned to live together in relative peace and even achieve a sense of common nationhood” (p. 340). The message is that “everyone, regardless of their race, religion, gender, ethnicity, or family origin can achieve self-fulfillment, honor, and dignity in a society if they aim high and work hard” (Ravitch, 1990, p. 340). Ravitch criticizes the idea that “the war on so-called Eurocentrism” will foster self-esteem among children who are not of European descent. She posits the school curriculum plays a minor role in the construction of a child’s self-esteem in comparison to the influences of family, community, mass media, and society (p. 341). She writes the pluralist sees American culture as belonging to all Americans and each generation contributes to it. The particularist denies a common culture exists and they ascribe to a brand of history in which people are either descendants of victims or oppressors (Ravitch, 1990, pp. 341-342).

Williamson, Rhodes and Dunson (2007) authored a book chapter entitled, *A Selected History of Social Justice in Education*. They begin their chapter by noting that politicians, teachers, parents, and educational reformers “are locked in a heated debate regarding the definition of social justice in education” (p. 195). Some believe the goal of social justice in education is to change the social order while others intend social justice in education to enable
students to fit in and climb the socioeconomic ladder. They also point to a second point of contention among those concerned with social justice in education and that is what is the proper unit of measurement to assess student achievement. Is the proper unit of measurement a group or an individual student when thinking about social justice and education?

Like Boyles et al. (2009), Williamson et al. (2007) hold there are basically two main social justice orientations. One perspective holds equality and economic mobility is achieved through assimilation. This assimilation fosters feelings of unity under the banner of “Americanization.” The authors label this the assimilation/individualist camp. The other view holds that differences in language and culture should be honored and it is through this honoring or “appreciation of difference” that discrimination and inequity will be alleviated. The authors label this the cultural integrity/collectivist camp. Williamson et al. (2007) divide education professionals along similar lines in their discussion of the way different people apply the social justice concept in education. The authors write the battle between the belief in assimilation and a belief in respect for cultural and linguistic differences has a long history and was present at the start of the common school. Williamson et al. (2007) find the assimilationist/individualist camp to be a flawed social justice perspective because it rests on the idea of a past unified American populous. They argue that in the past White children were segregated in schools from other groups on the basis of socially constructed racial categories (e.g. white and non-white). As time went on other groups were granted or denied access to schools based on a socially constructed racial hierarchy informed by the developing science of individual and group differences.

Two other scholars who examine social justice in education literature are Grant and Agosto (2008). Their book chapter provides “teacher educators with an overview of the concepts of social justice and teacher capacity” (p. 175). According to Grant and Agosto,
teacher capacity refers to “an amalgam of teachers’ knowledge, skills, and dispositions” (p. 175), as well as, teachers’ views of “self” meaning the teachers’ “belief about their role in classroom activity, and the persona they adopt in the classroom” (p. 181). Grant and Agosto (2008) note some education scholars contend “social justice is a contested and normative concept” and that theoreticians and policy makers use the term differently (p. 177). Grant and Agosto (2008) provide a brief explanation of the history of social justice. They discuss the fact Taparelli coined the term but move quickly to John Stuart Mill and utilitarianism. They make the point that some argue it was Mill that empowered the anthropomorphic approach to society and social questions on which modern scholars rely. Over time it was realized Mill’s idea about “the greatest good for the greatest number” could be abused and lead to the “tyranny of the majority” as was the case in Nazi Germany. They also cite the claim made by Rawls in his book, *A Theory of Justice*, that justice is the first virtue of social institutions (Grant & Agosto, 2009, pp. 174-177).

It should be noted that the idea that social justice is a moral virtue has been criticized. Most notably by Friedrich Hayek (1976) who argues social justice is a mirage. Hayek’s argument is centered on the idea that when most people talk about social justice they are referring to impersonal states of affairs like inequality of income, high unemployment or lack of a living wage (Novak, 2000). Hayek argues that towards the end of the nineteenth century social policy involved appeals to the conscience of the ruling classes for the welfare of the underclasses. Progressives and good people focused on social policy and a concern for the underprivileged and the recognition that they were all members of the same society. This concern evolved into the idea that society is responsible for the material position of all its members and should ensure each member receives the share he or she is owed. This idea suggests the processes of society should be directed toward specific results and that society has a
conscious mind capable of being directed by moral principles. Hayek finds fault in this anthropomorphic view of society and argues a society is not a being and cannot have virtues because a virtue can only be ascribed to the reflective and deliberate acts of an individual (Hayek, 1976).

In addition to Rawls’ theory of justice, Grant and Agosto (2009) find particular events also significantly influence contemporary conceptions of social justice. Like Boyles et al. (2009) and Williams et al. (2007), Grant and Agosto (2008) argue the quest for justice, found in the struggle and concern for equality during the aftermath of the Brown v. Board of Education ruling and the Civil Rights Movement, became a major force in shaping the philosophy and implementation of modern conceptions of social justice. Grant and Agosto (2008) write that it was the changes in social relations based on explicit moves to include previously marginalized groups and Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness which have influenced the way people think and implement ideas of social justice in education. They cite programs like the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), Head Start, Teacher Corps, the reauthorization of ESEA in the form of No Child Left Behind all focus on aspects of equality and fairness.

In addition to these types of broad policy based education programs some scholars see other connections between social justice and education. However they do not all see social justice the same way. For example, scholars have varying ideas about how teachers and teaching relate to social justice. Grant and Agosto (2008) discuss the perspectives of the following theorists. They write Giroux emphasizes critical thinking about what knowledge is and how knowledge is produced; Kumashiro emphasizes anti-oppressive education and a more global view; Barry says it is generally understood to be about equal opportunities and also about the treatment of all kinds on inequality; D. M. Smith contends social justice is concerned with a fair
distribution of outcomes, as well as, the relational reasons for the differences in outcomes;
Cochran-Smith emphasizes the import of knowledge about culture and racism as the focal point
for teacher education programs; Neito views social justice as both an ideology and a pedagogy
and is concerned with institutions and individuals. According to Grant and Agosto Smith makes
the point that use of the term social justice as opposed to justice in general signifies an emphasis
on the relational aspects of the concept. It concerns what happens socially among people within
a society (Grant & Agosto, 2008, pp. 177-181, 187).

Also relevant to conceptions of social justice in education, according to Grant and Agosto
(2008), are the political theorists Iris Marion Young and Nancy Fraser. Recall that Young argues
social justice is achieved where institutional domination and oppression are eliminated and
individuals are able to develop and exercise their capacity, express their experiences, and
participate and determine their actions. Grant and Agosto also discuss the ideas presented by
Nancy Fraser. They write Fraser argues social justice includes both economic redistribution and
cultural recognition.

In addition to their discussion of the various conceptions of social justice, Grant and
Agosto conducted a review of scholarly articles to examine what journal articles say about
teacher education. The 39 articles Grant and Agosto (2008) reviewed were published from 1991
until 2005 in four teacher education journals and used the term “social justice” in the title and the
abstract. Grant and Agosto were interested in ascertaining the extent to which social justice is
associated with teacher education in the United States. They state that few articles using the
term social justice were published before the 1990s. It is stated in the article that it was in the
1990s that “the highly popularized war over the meaning of terms like multiculturalism” caused
some scholars to switch to the term social justice because term social justice was not a popular
term in academia, media, or popular culture outlets yet (p. 187; see also North, 2008, p. 1183). It was thought the term social justice had not suffered the kind of attack that better-known terms, like multiculturalism, had endured.

The 39 articles Grant and Agosto (2008) reviewed evidenced a variety of ways to understand social justice as it relates to teacher capacity. Interestingly, their review of the literature revealed only one of the journal articles offered a specific definition of the phrase social justice. Grant and Agosto did see similarities within a particular group of articles written by certain authors who see social justice as central to their scholarship. Grant and Agosto state this particular group of authors saw “social justice as an ethic, concern, sense, or orientation” (p. 187). Additionally, Grant and Agosto argue when social justice is imbedded in “teacher capacity it should include the characteristics Nieto…[advocates:]…critical pedagogy, community and collaboration, reflection, social (critical) consciousness, social change and change agents, culture and identity, analysis of power” (p. 188). These are the same themes or characteristics Grant and Agosto found emerging from their review of the literature.

Grant and Agosto (2008) conclude that the theoretical framing of social justice “lacks craftsmanship” (p. 195). They argue it is often limited to one or more of the following concepts: equality, equal opportunity, and sometimes equity. They write these concepts are generally not put in context, rarely distinguished from one another, and it is rarely acknowledged that these concepts can have different significance in matters relating to education policy and procedures. Grant and Agosto note there were no articles discussing the assessment of social justice in teacher education programs (p. 195). Moreover, the authors write they found very little discussion about connecting “social justice and teacher capacity to the good of society, unless the discussions connect to the political economy and social cohesion” (p. 195).
One article Grant and Agosto (2008) examined and is worth mentioning in detail is Zollers, Albert, and Cochran-Smith (2000). Zollers et al. studied 14 teacher educators’ and three administrators’ perspectives on the meaning of social justice. This study found that a general commitment to teach for social justice existed but individuals differed in their understanding of the concept. For example, the participants had various beliefs about fairness, equity, and an individual’s responsibility to advocate for social justice. The participants also differed over what the point of reference should be for differential treatment. For example, an issue arose regarding whether differentiation should be determined at the individual student level or the group level.

Some thought social justice required treating each individual according to his or her needs rather than on the basis of their membership in a particular group. Participants questioned how long the special treatment should last, what amount of special treatment is fair, does special treatment stigmatize the receiving child as different, and the possibility that treating people differently causes problems because you are in effect exaggerating differences. The issue of determining the point of reference is very important. Williamson et al. (2007) address this issue when they ask if the academic achievement of individuals or groups should be the unit of analysis to assess the effectiveness of social justice education.

Ultimately, Zollers et al. (2000) state they found “three categories of divergence around the meaning of social justice” (p. 1). First, individuals differed over fairness and equity. Second, individuals differed over their understanding of what causes social injustice or where the responsibility for social injustice lay. Some felt individuals were responsible for social injustice in that one person can or cannot take advantage of another. Others locate the roots of injustice in societal institutions. Third, the authors’ noted divergent views regarding how to alleviate or combat social injustice. Some felt the individual had to create social justice by monitoring their
responses and actions toward others. Other individuals felt individuals must band together and agitate for systematic change.

Another scholar, Sharon Gewirtz (1998), states the concept social justice is under-theorized in education policy. Her goal is to initiate productive debate about what social justice ought to mean and to inform the work of education policy researchers. She states her purpose is not to determine the proper definition for social justice in education but to begin to” map the territory to initiate productive debate” (p. 469). However, she does state her preference for the approach of socialist feminist theorist, Iris Marion Young (p.469). Gewirtz outlines a variety of approaches to social justice and compares them to Young’s approach and then discusses Fraser’s criticism of Young’s approach (Gewirtz, 1998).

According to Gewirtz (1998), conceptualizations of social justice fall along two dimensions, a distributional dimension or relational dimension. Gewirtz states the distributive dimension of justice deals with how goods are distributed in society and generally relies on the conventional conception of justice attributed to Rawls. The conventional understanding has to do with the ways major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determines the allocation of advantages from social co-operation (Rawls, 1999, p. 6). Gewirtz states many people think of distributive justice as synonymous with social justice. Additionally, there are generally two accepted perspectives of distributive justice. One perspective holds the view that social justice means equality of opportunity. A second perspective holds social justice requires equality of outcome. Gewirtz discusses a third perspective the equality of condition. Equality of condition involves equal living conditions for all members of society, including non-citizens. Equality of condition requires the equalization of wealth, power, and privilege. The idea of equality of condition means people are free from oppressive relationships and
incorporates both the distributional dimension of social justice and the relational dimension

The second dimension of justice, according to Gewirtz (1998), is the relational dimension
and refers to the nature and ordering of social relationships. Its focus is the distribution of power
among people. Relational justice concerns the practices and procedures used to govern: the
organizations of a political system, the economic structure, social institutions, families, and
personal relationships. This means it is about the formal and informal rules governing how
members of a society treat each other at a societal level and at a personal level. Gewirtz agrees
with Fraser that the relational dimension of justice requires a type of cultural justice and
economic justice. Cultural justice is concerned with cultural autonomy, recognition, and respect.
Economic justice would include a reorganization of labor and “subjecting investment to
democratic decision making” (Gewirtz, 1998, p. 471). Gewirtz suggests thinking of
distributional justice as individualistic and focused on individuals receiving what is right.
Relational justice, on the other hand, is non-atomistic and focused on the interconnectedness of
individuals in a society and not on how much each individual receives (p. 471). However,
Gewirtz writes it is important to understand that these two dimensions are not really separate but
intimately connected.

Gewirtz (1998) writes that that relational conceptions of justice include justice as
mutuality and justice as recognition. With regard to justice as mutuality, Gewirtz discusses ideas
like communitarianism, as seen through the eyes of neo-Fabians. Space and time do not permit
an extensive analysis of the neo-Fabian movement and it is beyond the scope of this study.
However, in order to understand Gewirtz’s position, a limited amount of information is presented
in this literature review. Neo-Fabian communitarianism, like the Fabian communitarianism,
deals with the idea that a good society is interconnected via a system of duties and obligations. However, according to Gewirtz, the neo-Fabians can be distinguished from Fabians by the fact they are less paternalistic and accept greater responsibility for themselves using some measure of a market economy. A neo-Fabian society advocates for “some” redistribution of resources ensuring no poverty, childrearing is a shared responsibility, and there is a “restructuring of power relations in society” (Gewirtz, 1998, pp. 473, 473-474).

Gewirtz (1998) also discusses communitarianism from a post-modernist prospective. She states there are two types of postmodern thought: affirmative and skeptical. Skeptical postmodernism emphasizes fragmentation, meaningless, absence of moral parameters, and dismisses social and political projects because there “is no truth.” On the other hand, those with an affirmative postmodernist view are open to social and political projects. Gewirtz writes that affirmative postmodernism adopts the idea of “mutuality” to overcome the fragmentation, disintegration and chaos associated with the skeptical postmodernism. Gewirtz discusses the feminist idea of justice as recognition as a solution to the postmodern problem of how to act ethically when universal morals have been abandoned. She notes the difficulty in trying to balance the ideas of difference and solidarity (Gewirtz, 1998, pp. 474-475).

To overcome this difficulty Gewirtz (1998) draws on the work of socialist feminism to argue that differences can be recognized but that does not preclude the recognition of the similarities between groups of people rooted in the common experiences. She discusses the idea of “an openness to unassimilated others” or the “ethics of otherness” (p. 475). After explaining the two perspectives of postmodernism, she argues these perspectives fall short. This is because they fail to address a conception of social justice that can serve to inform or underpin the collective action of marginalized groups. However, Gewirtz argues Young’s idea that justice is
freedom from oppression can serve to inform collective political action. Gewirtz discusses Young’s proposition that in addition to the distribution of resources social justice must address oppression. Young’s theory states there are five types of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence (Gewirtz, 1998, pp. 475-477).

Gewirtz (1998) notes Nancy Fraser’s criticism of Young’s theory of justice as recognition and freedom from oppression. The criticism stems from the idea that recognition promotes group differentiation, whereas, redistribution serves to “dedifferentiate” groups (p. 478). Therefore, justice as recognition and justice as redistribution have different ends so the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution are contradictory. For example, groups who base cohesion in culture or ethnicity desire different ends from the groups who base their cohesion on socioeconomic status. The goal of an ethnic group may be cultural affirmation, however, achieving this goal does not solve economically rooted problems. The end result being recognition works against redistribution. Fraser argues justice as recognition can be acknowledged only in so far as it does not affect redistribution goals (Gewirtz, 1998, pp. 478-482).

in education. She offers a conceptual framework for social justice in education. It consists of three interrelated spheres. Each sphere is composed of two concepts in tension with each other.

The first sphere deals with the concepts recognition and redistribution. The tension that resides in this sphere is the one identified by Fraser in her critique of Young’s perspective and recounted in the Gewirtz (1998) paper. As stated previously the tension between recognition and redistribution is the result of the differential emphasis placed on equality as difference versus equality as sameness. Next, North identifies the second sphere containing the tension between macro- and micro-level processes in education. She argues socio-economic and institutional procedures, and other macro systems and processes like those focused on education policy development reside at the macro-level. Whereas, issues that are central to the internal life of individual schools make up the micro level. Examples of micro-level processes are classroom social interactions, the relationships between members of the staff, and the relationships between staff and students. The tension within this sphere concerns who holds power and at what level. Third, North identifies a tension between knowledge and action debates. The knowledge side holds that social justice requires every student master literacy and numeracy, achieve good grades, obtain full-time employment, et cetera. However, those on the action side believe social justice requires more than the acquisition of knowledge. For these people, education should promote taking action in order to create social change. This means students and teachers must actively transform social injustice and not just study it. For example, McDonald and Zeichner (2009) argue that social justice teacher education should focuses on activism as opposed to things like cultural diversity. The tension in this sphere develops due to concern over which side gets attention, the knowledge side or the action side.
Two scholars, Troya & Vincent (1995), label social justice an essentially contested concept as conceived by Gallie, however, the impetus of their article is an examination the discourses of social justice in education in the context of the British education system. One of the points they make is that political scientists, sociologists and philosophers have noted the manipulative power of certain terms. They cite the work of Michael Apple and his theory of “slogan systems,” Murray Edleman’s analysis of “condensation symbols,” and W. B. Gallie’s notion of “essentially contested concepts” (p. 149). They make the point that there are “key phrases or concepts which tend to be found in policy discourse and which derive their potency, emotional impact and seductive qualities from their intrinsic, or ‘essential ‘ability to defy stipulative definition” (p. 149). The authors state that they “see ‘social justice’ as an ‘essentially contested concept’” (p. 151). However, no definitive analysis of social justice using Gallie’s framework is presented in their article. They do state, however, that social justice is often used as a synonym for equal opportunities or equity in political, educational, and academic discourse.

This section of chapter two provides evidence of some of the various understandings of social justice in the context of education. All of the articles reference some kind of distributive aspect of social justice. Yet, perspectives on the distributive aspects of social justice vary. For instance, some people believe social justice is served when children have equal access to the same core content allowing them to develop cultural literacy and assimilate into society (e.g. Boyles et al., 2009’ pp. 37-38; Hirsch, 1999; Ravitch, 2001; Ruenzel, 1996). Whereas, others believe social justice requires more, for example some argue for equality of condition (Lynch & Baker, 2005), others argue for the necessity of honoring cultural difference (see Hytten & Bettez, 2011). Both Boyles et al. (2009) and Williamson et al. (2007) reference the distinction between the assimilationists/individualist perspective and the cultural integrity/collectivist group on social

Elements from the theories of justice and philosophies proposed by Rawls, Nozick, Fraser and Young can be seen as underpinning either the integrity/collectivist camp or the assimilationist/individualist camp. However, a bright line distinction between these two camps may not be completely accurate. It is possible that some scholars may value cultural literacy and the redistribution of resources to low-income children. However, broadly speaking it could be argued distinctions between conceptions of social justice may fall along the following lines. For example, scholars who embrace multiculturalism, recognition, and freedom from oppression can be grouped together and placed within the cultural integrity/collectivist camp. For that matter, those who discuss equity, equality of condition and collectivism could also be placed in the cultural integrity/collectivist camp. Scholars in the integrity/collectivist camp may underpin their understanding of social justice to the theories of Rawls, Young and/or Nancy Fraser.

On the other hand, scholars who emphasize cultural literacy, pluralism and/or assimilation will argue this kind of education fosters a sense of belonging to a common culture. Additionally, cultural literacy scholars argue that providing students with access to the same core knowledge results in a cultural literacy from which a person can build further knowledge and this is a way to improve children’s life chances (Hirsch, 1988). Scholars who prioritize individualism, merit, pluralist multiculturalism, and just processes can be grouped together in the assimilationist/individualist camp and they may underpin their understanding of social justice with the theories of Rawls or Nozick.

Rizvi (2002) does not adhere to a binary distinction between social justice perspectives. Rizvi would say people underpinning their social justice perspective on Nozick fit into a
“market-individualist camp” (p. 48). In contrast, Rizvi would say those who hold a Rawlsian view of justice will have a different idea of social justice as it relates to education. These are the scholars who, like Rawls, value equal individual freedom for all, as well as, an equal distribution of primary goods for all unless an unequal distribution of goods ultimately benefits the least advantaged. According to Rizvi those who think this way are labeled “liberal-individualists” (p. 48). This group sees the state as having the responsibility to implement policies and programs to ensure equal access to participate in society. A last group is composed of those who advocate for fundamental changes to the social and economic structures of society. Rizvi (2002) identifies this group “social democratic” (p. 48). This group argues that recognition of the marginalized and disenfranchised is not enough; they argue social justice requires the freedom from oppression. An assumption of this conceptualization is that the freedom from oppression does not occur in free market capitalist economies. Zajda et al. (2006) specifically state there are those who assert that social justice is not possible in a society with a capitalist economy. Gewirtz (1998), Young (1990), and Fraser (2006) all promote the idea of social and economic change in order to create a more cooperative and socially just society. Young (1990), Gewirtz (1998), Bell (2007) and North (2006, 2008) all see freedom from oppression as a critical component of social justice.

Additionally, the authors discussed in this section of chapter two have attempted to synthesize the literature and make sense of social justice in education. For example, North (2008) suggests a conceptual framework of social justice consisting of three spheres: redistribution/recognition, knowledge/action, and macro/micro levels. Hytten and Bettez (2011) find five common strands or genres of social justice literature in education. Interestingly, even within the various broad understandings of social justice, there are differences. For example,
generally people will agree that fairness is a crucial component of social justice. But as Zollers et al. (2012) point out, individual perspectives regarding what is fair differ. For example, one person believes that an equitable distribution of resources is fair, whereas, another will say it is not fair because past issues of inequality are not redressed (Zollers et al. 2012, pp. 5-7). Many of the authors note the blurred lines and interdependence of the various meanings and uses of social justice in education.

Analyzing social justice using Gallie’s framework, a set of criteria specifically tooled for concept analysis, may help identify how the term is operationalized in teacher education literature as well as whether or not it can be identified as an essentially contested concept as conceived by Gallie. This analysis may also identify some of the connections and challenges that make the concept social justice so complex. In the following section of this chapter a discussion of Gallie’s (1956) framework is provided. This discussion includes information regarding others scholars’ evaluation of Gallie’s framework as a mechanism to systematically analyze concepts. It also includes detailed discussions of each of Gallie’s seven conditions.

**Gallie’s Theory of Essentially Contested Concepts**

In 1956, W. B. Gallie, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Queen’s University, Belfast, presented a paper at the Aristotelian Society meeting in London. He was interested in describing a particular kind of concept. It is the kind of concept that is used differently by different people. In other words, application of this type of concept gives rise to disagreements regarding its use and meaning. Gallie writes, “there are concepts which are essentially contested, concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users” (p. 169).
Gallie (1956) developed an approach to study these concepts and the associated disputes regarding their proper use and meaning. He writes certain concepts like “work of art,” “democracy,” and “Christian tradition” mean different things to different groups of people (pp. 167, 168). Gallie suggests these kinds of concepts are unique. He argues that for these unique concepts, each contestant’s argument is genuine and the resulting debates are not resolvable by argument of any kind. In order to illustrate the kind of concepts and contests he was talking about Gallie presents the following example. Assuming the disputants agree to the same understanding of the general use of the words involved. If someone makes the statement that a particular painting is painted with oils then that statement may be contested on the basis that the picture is actually painted with acrylics or tempera. However, if a statement is made that this painting is “a work of art” then this statement is libel to be contested due to different understandings about what constitutes a “work of art.” Gallie explains “different schools or movements of artists and critics” will understand “work of art” differently (p. 168). Gallie states this kind of concept does not have a “clearly definable general use…which can be set up as the correct standard use” (p. 168). The interested parties, or disputants, continue to defend their position by presenting evidence and rationalizations to support their position (Gallie, 1956).

Gallie (1956) argues acknowledging that a particular concept is an essentially contested concept implies the recognition of rival uses of the concept by different people. Meaning one party (A) recognizes another party (B) uses the referent in a way the first party (A) repudiates, but understands the opposing party’s (B’s) use is “logically possible” and “humanly ‘likely’” (p. 193). Recognition of the rival uses of a referent requires disputants understand their opponents’ position(s) and to constantly assess their own interpretation of the concept. Gallie states that to do less subjects them to the mistake of underestimating the value of their opponents’ position.
Gallie (1956) argues that recognition of the opposition’s arguments creates the very desirable effect of a “marked raising of the level of quality of arguments in the disputes among contestant parties” (p. 193). Thus, bettering the debate among contestants. Gallie argues progress in the meaning and use of the disputed concept due to improved academic debate is “a justification of the continued competition for support and acknowledgement between the various contesting parties” (p. 198). Collier et al. (2006) cite scholars like, Newton Garver, Christine Swanton, and Norman Care as supporting Gallie’s theory that competition over a concept’s use and meaning may improve the quality of debate among disputants (p. 221). Additionally, Gallie (1956) argues two other possible potential positive outcomes of the debates over essentially contested concepts. First, that the benefit of the insight derived from the debate may induce more agreement regarding the application of these concepts. Alternatively, if more agreement cannot be had then, at a minimum, the insight from these debates can show the rationality of a specific continued use or change in use.

Gallie (1956) suggests thinking of this competition as similar to the competition that occurs within the scientific community when rival hypotheses are investigated. He contends debates over contested concepts contribute to the clarity and progress of the concept. However, he also acknowledged the fact that competition between rivals may “…have the effect of utterly frustrating the kind of activity and achievement which it was the job of this concept… to appraise…” (Gallie, 1956, p.179). This may be especially true where rival contestants believe the stakes are high and feel compelled to demonstrate that their interpretation and use of the concept is the better or correct use.

Commenting on Gallie’s theory, Jeremy Waldron (2002) explains the critical characteristic of an essentially contested concept is this quality of internal conflict and not the
intensity of contestation. He says for a concept to be considered essentially contested it requires more than the fact the concept is “very hotly contested with no resolution in sight” (p. 149). Waldron states the crux of Gallie’s theory is that the disagreement or indeterminacy is located in the core of the concept. Gallie was interested in studying these kinds of concepts and saw this effort as important to both philosophy and the social sciences.

Gallie’s seven key conditions for identifying essentially contest concepts are: 1. appraisiveness, 2. internal complexity, 3. various describability, 4. openness, 5. aggressive and defensive use, 6. original exemplar, and 7. progressive competition (Collier et al., 2006; Gallie, 1956a). There is some discussion in the literature regarding whether Gallie, in his 1956 paper, was proposing a framework for the analysis of contested concepts or a hypothesis explaining contested concepts. Unfortunately, Gallie’s intention is not clear. At one point, Gallie (1956) expresses his idea as an “explanatory hypothesis” (p. 168) presented to explain a particular group of concepts. However, at other points in his paper his words can be interpreted to mean he is offering a framework for analysis of these kinds of concepts. For example, he refers to the seven criteria in his paper as “the conditions of essential contestedness” (p. 171). Moreover, he writes that he is proposing a method of “rigid schematisation” for analyzing contested concepts (p. 168). Other scholars note this ambiguity as well (Collier et al., 2006).

Collier et al. (2006) identify the significance of Gallie’s ideas as an explanatory hypothesis. They point out that Gallie’s ideas about appraisiveness, internal complexity, and diverse describability may help to explain the disagreement or debate associated with these kinds of concepts. They note two scholars, Baldwin (1997) and Clarke (1979) who treat Gallie’s ideas as a hypothesis. Collier et al. (2006), however, argue that considering Gallie’s criteria as an explanatory hypothesis “may be misleading because it implies Gallie’s approach is either right or
wrong” (p. 215). Moreover, they argue that to think of Gallie’s ideas as a hypothesis may create the belief that all seven of Gallie’s conditions must be satisfied for a concept to be considered essentially contested.

Collier et al. (2006) argue it is better to think of Gallie’s seven criteria as “a set of interrelated criteria that serve to illuminate important problems in understanding and analyzing concepts” (p. 215). Collier et al. (2006) state Gallie’s criteria “provides a major set of tools for understanding and analyzing concepts” (p. 212). They conclude that even though there may be some inconsistencies in Gallie’s seven criteria, it is best to consider Gallie’s contribution as a framework. Another scholar who sees Gallie’s criteria as a framework is Howard Doughty. Doughty (2014) suggests Gallie developed his framework to address those concepts that are innately controversial. He states Gallie “sets the stage for the project of clarification without the necessity of evisceration” (p. 11). For Doughty, Gallie was concerned with clarifying meaning. Doughty argues, “Without clear concepts, however, scholars are apt to talk past each other, and policy makers find it difficult to distinguish between alternative policies” (p. 6). Other scholars who value Gallie’s contribution are also inclined to treat Gallie’s seven conditions as a framework (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009; Bromisza-Habashi, 2010; Choi & Majumdar, 2014; Daly, 2012; Miles, 2012; Waldron, 2002).

Treating Gallie’s contribution as a framework provides a useful method to analyze contested concepts. In this study Gallie’s criteria functions as a framework for concept analysis. A detailed analysis of each condition or criteria is presented later in this paper. Scholars differ in their assessment of Gallie’s seven criteria. Collier et al. (2006), suggest using Gallie’s criteria as a framework and state that not all of the 7 conditions need to be met in order to classify a concept as essentially contested. Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) note only the first four criteria are
necessary to show a concept is contestable. Those four criteria are: **appraisiveness, internal complexity, various describability, and openness**. They explain the condition **aggressive and defensive use** is simply restating the fact that these concepts are contested and therefore the center of scholarly debate. Moreover, they write that Gallie’s requirement of an **original exemplar** and the **progressive competition** describe additional aspects of the scholarly debate over meaning and use of the concept. However, to say the concept is in fact contested means some evidence of the contest or debate is needed. Other scholars question the usefulness of one or more of Gallie’s conditions. These critiques are presented later in the literature review.

The idea that these kinds of concepts are unique because they have some internal conflict gives rise to the major criticism of Gallie’s theory. Critics argue that to accept the idea that a concept has an inherent conflict supports radical conceptual relativism (Clarke, 1979; Gray, 1977). Barry Clarke (1979) rejects the idea of essentially contested concepts. He argues, “…the very idea of an essentially contested concept is incoherent” (p. 123). Clarke examines the argument that essentially contested concepts have an internal conflict. Clarke argues in the case where a word can be used, in different contexts, to express two or more meanings there are only two options. Either the source of the conflict is “within the concept” or in “some underlying non-conceptual disagreement between the contestants” (Clarke, 1979, p. 123). If one accepts the idea that concepts have an internal conflict of ideas then one must accept the problem of radical relativism. If radical relativism is accepted, then no use or meaning of a concept can be viewed any better than another. Clarke argues that a distinction must be drawn between “contestable” and “contested” (p. 124). He argues that to accept a concept is contestable requires the acceptance of radically relativity. Alternatively, he argues the contest refers to a “state of affairs” and not a property of the concept. He argues for the realization that the contest resides in
a state of affairs. Therefore, the significance is in the contest not the concept. He argues these contests are really social disputes and therefore it is misleading to say a concept can be essentially contested.

Gray (1977) also rejects the idea that some concepts have an internal conflict. This is because to say a concept has an internal conflict is to say that one person’s use of the concept cannot be privileged over another. If it is accepted that concepts have an incommensurable quality then there is always good reason for contesting the propriety of any use of the concept. Although, Gray (1977) does not accept the idea of essentially contested concepts at face value. He provides an interesting viewpoint on the idea of essentially contested concepts. He argues the study of essentially contested concepts is simply the study a particular dimension of social change. He states, “To identify a concept as essentially contested is to say a great deal about the society in which its users live” (p. 337). Gray argues that in societies where important concepts concerning social and political thought are essentially contested it shows that society provides an environment embracing profound diversity and moral individualism. Although Gray rejects the idea that concepts have an indeterminate nature, he sees the utility in analyzing these concepts as a means to discern the ideas and arguments of the various sides. Gray concludes the disputes are ultimately ideological disputes and occur outside the concept and not within it.

The issue of conceptual relativity is irrelevant if Gallie’s framework is used as Collier et al. (2006) suggest and as others (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009; Choi & Majumdar, 2014; Daly, 2012) have used it. These scholars use Gallie’s approach as a means of providing a realistic account of the various applications of a concept and its patterns of change. It could be argued that these scholars share Gray’s idea that the examination of these concepts provides information about social disputes and social change. These scholars do not apply Gallie’s framework with the
prescriptive goal of determining unambiguous meaning. It should be noted that this study uses Gallie’s framework in a similar fashion.

Another scholar who rejects the idea that concepts contain “inner tensions” is Christine Swanton (1985, p. 811). Although she rejects the idea of a concept having inner tensions, she is not willing to completely throw out Gallie’s idea of essential contestedness. She differentiates the concept from the possible conceptions of that concept. She argues that the various disputants have different conceptions of the same ideal. Swanton argues even though there may be a variety of ways to describe a concept, it is possible to show certain meanings to be better than others. She argues that rational debate can show some meanings to be better than others.

However, this does not mean it is possible to show one meaning is the best meaning. In her view, this kind of debate should be motivated by the desire to achieve coherence among the following elements. First, the “relevant judgments acceptable to the ‘many and the wise’ and which at least presumptively reveal something of the nature of the ideal under investigation” (p. 825). Second, is the desire for coherence among “rival conceptions of the ideal under investigation” (p. 825). The last element deals with the careful consideration of the various background theories that have as their purpose the goal of understanding the needs and interests of those vested in the ideal. Thereby, discovering the purpose, as well as, the strengths and weaknesses of the various judgments and conceptions (p. 825).

Gallie (1956) discusses the importance of understanding the debates over concepts from all sides. He suggests that examining the arguments of the various disputants enables the rational and intellectual assessment of the changes in use and meaning of these concepts. Gallie writes, “It is for this reason that we can distinguish more or less intellectually respectable conversions from those of a more purely emotional, or yet those of a wholly sinister kind” (p. 190).
Moreover, these scholarly debates allow disputants to examine and understand various rival arguments. Gallie (1956) and Swanton (1985) appear to be arguing similar points. The point being that, given all possible uses and meanings, it is possible to judge some meanings and uses as better than others. However, Swanton does state that rational debate and examination of these concepts does not mean the best meaning can be determined. Swanton asserts the best meaning and use cannot be determined because humans are not able to operate from an all-knowing and neutral capacity.

Scholars (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009; Boromisza-Habashi, 2010; Choi & Majumdar, 2014; Collier et al., 2006, Daly, 2012) value Gallie’s framework as a tool to analyze and describe various applications of a concept rather than determining its correct or best use. In this sense, Gallie’s framework may unpack conceptual structures of meaning and reveal any differences in the definitions of concepts, and/or the uses in various fields. For example, Siobhan Daly (2012) used Gallie’s criteria as an analytical framework in her study of philanthropy as a concept. She argues that approaches like Gallie’s help scholars understand the various facets or characteristics of a concept over and above simply defining criteria. Daly (2011) designed her study using the following method. She conducted a search of the ISI Web of Science for articles with "philanthropy" in the title.

Her search returned 253 articles. She eliminated articles on corporate philanthropy, historical articles, and conferences papers resulting in a total of 76 peer reviewed journal articles. Daly (2011) also examined 50 articles classified as opinion pieces, commentary, or profiles from newspapers, magazines, or other journals. Additionally, she searched three nonprofit journals producing three additional articles. All the items in her data source were published from January 1980 until May 2011. Daly bolstered her search by reading particular articles of interest that
were referenced in her data source. She states no further coding was necessary as her “focus was on garnering insights into general usage patterns and patterns of articulation and meaning” (p. 538).

Daly (2011) finds philanthropy to be an essentially contested concept. She writes that the classification of philanthropy as an essentially contested concept serves as a frame of reference for scholars in their study of the concept. She notes the “clustered nature” of the concept (p. 552). She cautions scholars about the danger of the concept becoming confused because conceptions of philanthropy are susceptible to change due to social, economic, and political circumstances. She argues it is important for scholars to employ conscious thinking about the definition, treatment, and rationale for a particular use of a concept. It is in this way that continued progress in analysis and understanding will be achieved.

Another scholar, David Boromisza-Habashi (2010) suggests that Gallie’s framework is useful to analyze concepts when contestation can be empirically established as opposed to a test for identifying a concept as contested. The way to understand the meaning of an essentially contested concept requires the examination of the ways it is used and the rationales on which users rely. Boromisza-Habashi argues certain concepts are essentially contested because users use them “according to diverse interpretive norms” (p. 277). He considers Gallie’s criteria as “the collection of seven ‘components’ of essential contestation” (p. 277). Like Clarke (1979) and Gray (1977), Boromisza-Habashi rejects the idea that the conflict is located within the concept; he contends the conflict resides in the contestants.

In another study, Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) discuss the history of the term neoliberalism and use Gallie’s framework to analyze and explain the use of the concept by scholars within the discipline of political economy. Boas and Gans-Morse conducted a content
analysis of 148 journal articles published from 1990 until 2004. The articles were coded using an open coding method to determine the various applications of the term neoliberalism in the literature. As stated previously, Boas and Gans-Morse argue that only four of Gallie’s criteria need to be satisfied to show a concept is essentially contestable. They analyzed the concept neoliberalism using these four criteria (appraisiveness, internal complexity, various describability, and openness) and show neoliberalism to be an essentially contested concept according to Gallie’s framework. Their content analysis revealed three interesting issues related to the use of the term neoliberalism in the literature. First, it demonstrated the term neoliberalism is often undefined in the literature. Second, it is employed unevenly along ideological divides. Third, it is used to characterize a broad variety of phenomenon. Based on their findings, Boas and Gans-Morse suggest expanding Gallie’s framework to include an additional level of contestation (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009).

Boas and Gans-Morse state they agree that the concepts Gallie is concerned with can be contested at three levels. First, the concept’s intension can be contested. A concept’s intension refers to its general meaning. Next is the concept’s extension, in other words, the range of cases to which the concept applies can be contested. Third, the normative valence of these concepts can be contested. A concept’s normative valence refers to “the range of ‘speech-acts,’ such as denunciation or praise, that the word can be used to perform” (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009, p. 154). However, Boas and Gans-Morse argue for a new level of contestation. They argue there is a fourth level of contestation, terminological contestation.

Terminological contestation refers to the fact that scholars may use or choose not to use a particular term in their debate. They explain concepts are abstract ideas or mental images and people choose to use different words or terms to denote the same abstract idea. The authors
suggest certain concepts that are comprised of underlying concepts unified along a centralized theme are subject to terminological contestation. In their study they found neoliberalism refer to a set of concepts in which the central characteristic was the “free-market” (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009).

Additionally, Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) found when scholars used the referent neoliberalism it had a negative connotation. Scholars who had a more positive view of free markets rarely used the term neoliberalism. Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) state terminological contestation is a problem because it results in the absence of debate. A contested concept that is not debated by scholars is reduced to a term that may have rhetorical value but will lack analytical value. Boas and Gans-Morse argue for a term to have analytical value to social scientists it needs a common substantive meaning.

Ruben (2010) offers another perspective on Gallie’s ideas and framework. Ruben suggests some of the conflict and confusion associated with Gallie and the application of his framework can be attributed to a misunderstanding of Gallie. He distinguishes between the “nature of concepts” and the “application of the concept” (pp. 258-259). Ruben writes that some scholars have taken Gallie’s work in a direction Gallie never intended. He argues that Gallie was not interested in the nature of concepts in the same way a contemporary philosopher of language understands the topic.

Ruben (2010) suggests Gallie’s true interest lay in examining how rival contestants applied the concept. Ruben argues Gallie was interested in disputes from the point of view of normative reason. According to Ruben Gallie was interested in identifying and studying the various applications of these concepts by different groups. Ruben explains that Gallie was interested in the contestants’ rational or supporting arguments, as well as, which of the
contestants is more justified in their claims. It is from this type of analysis, Ruben says, that “we gain normative purchase” and it allows objective evaluation of the outcome of power struggles (p. 258). Ricciardi (2001) also provides interesting insight into the use of Gallie’s framework. Ricciardi writes that Gallie believed in the importance of “historical understanding” because it is important to the “‘proper’ understanding” of a concept (p 4). Ricciardi argues Gallie believed “following a story” to be the primary mode of understanding in human affairs (p. 4).

Additionally, as noted earlier, scholars have debated whether or not all seven of Gallie’s criteria or conditions are necessary. Gallie suggests, in his paper, that a perfect alignment of all seven conditions may not be necessary to show that a concept is an essentially contested concept. However, he does refer to the first five conditions as necessary for essential contestedness (p. 182). Some scholars contend that certain of Gallie’s criteria are untenable. For example, Gellner (1967), Swanton (1985) and Freeden (1998) reject Gallie’s proposition that disputants derive their various meanings from a single original exemplar. Collier et al. (2006) contend Gallie’s framework should be judged on its over-all utility and not whether all of Gallie’s conditions are met. It is best to think of the seven conditions as a constellation of features that characterize essentially contested concepts and not as a checklist of individual requirements (Collier et al., 2006).

Gallie’s framework was chosen as the framework to study the concept social justice in teacher education scholarship for a few reasons. First, unlike the analyses of social justice in education by Gewirtz (1998) and North (2006, 2008), Gallie offers a framework not tied to a particular ideological lens. A conceptual framework that assumes a particular philosophy, like the feminist political theorist Iris Marion Young or Critical Feminist Nancy Fraser, limits the study of social justice by making assumptions about its results. For example, from such a
framework, a researcher might dismiss the application of social justice to free market economies. Second, in spite of the criticisms discussed earlier in this section, Gallie’s framework has been evaluated by other scholars and found to be a useful tool for content analysis and for evaluating the debates regarding the application of complex and multifaceted concepts (Collier et al., 2006; Daly, 20012; Ruben, 2010). Third, the purpose of this study is to understand how social justice is understood and applied in scholarship in teacher education. Gallie’s framework has been found to be particularly useful when the researcher’s goal is to unpack the features of a complicated multidimensional concept, to explore the diversity of meanings, and to examine the changes in meaning and use across time (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009; Collier et al., 2006; Choi & Majumdar, 2014; Daly, 2012).

**Review of Gallie’s Seven Conditions**

Over the years various scholars have reviewed and commented on Gallie’s framework and his theory of essentially contested concepts. Each of Gallie’s seven conditions is reviewed and presented below.

1. **Appraisiveness.** According to Gallie (1956), this condition requires that the concept “signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievement” (p. 171). Gallie states the referent designating the concept is an “achievement word” (Gallie, 1956b, p. 109). These concepts are intertwined with normative valence, thus value-laden debates occur over the proper application of the concept (Choi & Majumdar, 2014). Collier et al. (2006) add three extensions to the idea of appraisiveness. They suggest that in addition to normative assessment these concepts can also be descriptive. To explain the descriptive extension, Collier et al. discuss an argument made by W. E. Connolly. According to Collier et al. (2006), Connolly argues these concepts are appraisive and descriptive. For example, labeling a system a democracy does two things; first, it
ascribes a value to that system and so it is appraisive. Second, it describes something or tells what something is. In the case of democracy the word “democracy” describes the political system in place. The next extension to be considered with regard to the condition of appraisiveness is that the valuation associated with the concept need not be positive. In other words, the value ascribed to a concept can be either positive or negative depending on the user. The third extension concerns the fact that the appraisive character may be unclear for certain concepts and therefore dependent on theoretical or empirical context (Collier et al., 2006).

2. **Internal complexity.** Internal complexity refers to the requirement that the achievement signified by the concept must be “of an internally complex character, for all that its worth is attributed to it as a whole” (Gallie, 1956a, pp. 171-2). In other words, essentially contested concepts have many features or facets and when people use the concept’s referent they are referring to the conceptual whole. Collier et al. (2006) point out that internal complexity may be due to the fact that multiple concepts are entangled obscuring the interpretation and application of the concept. In this instance disaggregation of the concepts provides the fix. Collier et al. (2006) state that disaggregation can make some concepts more analytically useful.

However, they say disaggregation is not always appropriate. This is because, for some concepts, the component features are integral to the concept as a whole. For example, Choi & Majumdar (2014) studied “social entrepreneurship” and found it met Gallie’s criteria for essentially contested concepts. However, their results showed social entrepreneurship to be a conglomerate of sub-concepts integral to the main concept. They argue the sub-concepts are the defining properties of the larger concept, in this case, social entrepreneurship. Boromisza-Habashi (2010) supports Gallie’s contention that essentially contested concepts are one concept and any evaluation of the concept’s referent must be applied to the concept as a coherent whole.
It is this complexity within the concept that gives rise to Gallie’s third criteria, variously describable also referred to as diverse describability in the literature (Collier et al., 2006; Daly, 2012).

3. **Various describability.** Gallie is saying various users can and will prioritize different aspects or facets of the whole. The result of various individuals ranking the concept’s features creates rival descriptions of the concept and rival applications of the concept. Daly (2012) explains, “Different scholars may award different levels of importance to different features of a concept” (p. 539). This condition also requires there be “nothing absurd or contradictory in the existence of alternative meanings” (Collier et al., 2006, p. 217).

4. **Open in character.** This means the concept is open in its meaning. Gallie (1956) writes, “The accredited achievement must be of a kind that admits of considerable modification in the light of changing circumstances; and such modification cannot be prescribed or predicted in advance” (p. 172). Collier et al. (2009) argue Gallie means the concept “is subject to periodic revision according to context” (p. 238). Although, the condition of openness is generally accepted by scholars some scholars place limitations on this criterion (Collier et al., 2006). For example, Gray (1978) criticizes Gallie’s condition of openness. Gray (1978) argues that “technical concepts-taxonomic concepts” in established academic frameworks are not subject to openness (p.392). Gray argues to claim differently is to claim there are conceptual frameworks, which are rationally incommensurable.

Another scholar, Alasdair MacIntyre (1973) argues that in large areas of social inquiry temporary or provisional settlement of conceptual disputes are not possible. This is due to the “open texture” of social science concepts. Therefore, MacIntyre argues it is not reasonable to frame generalizations about social life. However, Norman Care (1973) sees this issue
differently. He writes that for certain social science concepts a “temporary closure” or “practical closure” is achieved; whereby, the debate is settled, at least for a time (p. 14). Care argues that it is practical closure that makes social science concepts generalizable to social life.

Michael Freeden (1998) offers another view of Gallie’s criterion of openness. Freeden introduces the idea of decontestation. Freeden argues that concepts can be decontested, as well as, contested. Decontestation occurs when people, with similar ideologies, begin to agree on the meaning and application of a concept. The agreement is motivated by the fact that it facilitates the ability to achieve a desired social, political or scholarly end. Collier et al. (2006) write, “Decontestation of a concept within a given political discourse or ideology replaces openness with closure” (p. 238).

5. Reciprocal recognition. Gallie (1956) explains essentially contested concepts must be used both aggressively and defensively. He states, “different persons or parties adhere to different views of the correct use of some concepts” and the persons or parties recognize their use of the concept is contested by other users (p. 172). Gallie argues further, “to use an essentially contested concept means to use it against other uses and to recognize that one’s own use of it has to be maintained against other users” (p. 172). Each party has some appreciation of the other party’s claim to the concept. Boromisza-Habashi (2010) refers to this element of Gallie’s framework as “competitive use” (p. 278).

Kenneth Smith (2002) argues that concepts that are considered essentially contested are actually mutually contested and not essentially contested. He is careful not to dismiss entirely the idea that some concepts may be essentially contested. Gallie also refers to this distinction in his paper. The critical distinction it seems turns on where the actual contest is thought to occur. For essentially contested concepts, the contest is located in the achievement aspects of the
concept, whereas, for a mutually contested concept the dispute occurs in the standard general use of the concept. Smith illustrates this idea using “social class” as the contested concept. He notes there are a variety of ways scholars define and use the concept social class. He provides, among others, the following examples of ways to define social class: Marxist (relations to the means of production, ownership, and control); Weberian (life chances – what one has to sell in the marketplace and the accompanying lifestyle); and OPCS (occupation, income, consumption) (Smith, 2002, p. 336). For mutually contested concepts “disputants may recognize and accept that they are using similar concepts in different ways, involving ‘mutually contested concepts,’ rather than essentially contested concepts” (Collier et al., p. 219).

Some scholars do not see reciprocal recognition as a critical element in Gallie’s framework (Freeden, 1998; Collier et al., 2009). Freeden (1998) writes it is possible for users to have no awareness, or limited awareness of the contested nature of a concept. Additionally, Collier et al. (2006) write, analysts routinely use concepts in a way that may be different from another’s usage but never formulate their particular use in opposition to the other’s use. The condition of reciprocal recognition is not always pertinent to an analysis using Gallie’s framework (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009; Freeden, 1998; Collier et al., 2006).

6. **Original exemplar.** The original exemplar refers to Gallie’s (1956) proposition that essentially contested concepts can be traced to an original instance. This condition requires all disputants acknowledge the authority of the original exemplar (Gallie, 1956a). Although, there is some agreement on Gallie’s idea of an original exemplar scholars admit there is “considerable confusion and controversy” associated with this particular criteria (Collier et al., 2006, p. 239). Nevertheless, Collier et al. (2006) argue that identifying some type of common core that anchors
the contest is helpful. Confusion and controversy over this particular criterion stems from Gallie’s conception and treatment of the original exemplar in his paper.

Gallie (1956) is guilty of using inconsistent language in his paper. At one point in his paper Gallie refers to “an original exemplar” (p. 180). However, Gallie also refers to the exemplar as “…of a long tradition (perhaps a number of historically independent but sufficiently similar traditions)…” (p. 186). Collier et al. (2006) deal with this inconsistency by dividing Gallie’s treatment of the original exemplar into two camps, a broad version and a narrow version. In the narrow version, each disputant anchors the concept’s meaning in a specific instance from the past. In contrast, the broad version of the original exemplar can be thought of as a family of related instances composing a common core.

Some scholars take issue with Gallie’s requirement of a single original exemplar. Gellner (1967), for example, argues the “the present functioning of a concept is logically independent of its history” (p. 50). Gellner writes, although, some essentially contested concepts may derive from an original exemplar, the true test is the present working usage of the concept in spite of its past. Gellner suggests Gallie’s original exemplar stems from a commonality between contestants and this commonality is loosely based on a shared ideal as opposed to the idea of an original exemplar.

Gray (1977) argues if the essence of the concept is contested then the original instance would be contested as well. Gray explicitly rejects Gallie’s idea of the existence of an original exemplar to which all parties agree. As stated earlier, Gray suggests that to believe certain concepts have a quality or feature that is contestable makes these concepts vulnerable to the charge of conceptual relativism or conceptual skepticism. The issue for Gray turns on the fact that if the original instance was an essentially contested concept then one definition cannot be
privileged over another. If this is so then there is no reason to dispute the way the referent is used because all applications are acceptable. He does admit these contested concepts have some type of common core of meaning. However, he asks if it is the concept that is disputed or the various historical uses that are actually being disputed. However, as noted earlier, Gray sees value in studying these kinds of concepts for what they can tell us about patterns of thought and the ways of life of specific social groups.

Collier et al. (2006) suggest that understanding Gallie’s requirement of an original exemplar in the broad sense may provide some insight. The broad version holds that the nature of the exemplar is internally complex and variously describable. Understanding the original exemplar in the broad version allows for the argument that over time different parties will weight different aspects of the concept differently. In the broad understanding the original exemplar can be more than a single instance. It can be a set or family of instances provided there is a certain level of commonality or shared features among the independent instances composing the set. Collier et al. (2006) suggest dropping the word “original” from this feature of Gallie’s framework. They suggest the better alternative is to simply use the term exemplar.

Some question the utility of Gallie’s condition of an original exemplar whether it is understood in the broad sense or the narrow sense. They argue Gallie’s idea of the exemplar is circular. Meaning if the exemplar (whether it is an individual instance or a group of related instances or traditions) is internally complex, diversely describable and open, it follows that it is most likely essentially contested and therefore it is unlikely the parties to a dispute will acknowledge its authority (MacIntyre, 1973; Gray, 1977; Swanton, 1985; Ruben, 2010). Swanton (1985) makes the argument that if an exemplar can be found that all parties accept as the authority then the contest is over. Michael Freedén (1998) states the very idea of an
exemplar is inimical to a theory of essentially contested concepts. John Kekes (1977) also disputes the reliance on a historical original exemplar (Collier et al., 2006).

Ruben (2010) attempts to solve the problem by refining Gallie’s framework in relation to the original exemplar. He refines the idea of the original exemplar with his two-part theory consisting of the idea of “true succession” and the idea of “tradition.” He sees essential contestedness as stemming from these factors. Ruben argues a person or group has true succession if their belief and practices are qualitatively similar to an earlier person or group. For Ruben, the requisite building block for true succession and tradition are people or groups of people. He writes, “Groups or people belong to or make up traditions and groups or people are true successors of one another” (p. 263). Ruben acknowledges that, in reality, tradition and true succession are “messy things” but for theoretical purposes it is helpful to think of them as ideal constructs.

In an ideal situation true succession results in the passing from one to another similar beliefs and practices from the past to the future. In true succession the practices and beliefs passed down through time are qualitatively similar, but the qualitative similarity comes in degrees. Ruben (2010) refers to this as degrees of faithfulness to the original beliefs and practices. Ruben argues that over time these beliefs and practices are subject to weakening and fading. Across time and people, each group or person may experience different degrees of change based on which features they consider most important. He suggests later groups may be true successors and faithful, not to the original group, but to groups that may have splintered off from the original group.

Therefore, over time the amount of qualitative similarity varies depending on which features of the original exemplar are retained across time. The result is that some groups are
more similar and some are less similar, however, they all claim to be true successors and each group argues it retains the proper understanding and application of a concept against the others. It is possible that each group or person believes they are the true successors to the original set of beliefs and practices. The differences stem from prioritizing different features of the original. The more similar the person’s or a group’s practices and beliefs are to the exemplar the easier it is to make the case they belong to the same tradition. The difficulty occurs when groups or persons have asymmetrical beliefs and practices yet state they are part of the same tradition. In this case the opposing sides disagree about what they believe to be the most important features of the beliefs and practices of the exemplar. Thus, the dispute is irresolvable (Ruben, 2010).

7. Progressive Competition.

Gallie (1956) argued, "continuous competition for acknowledgement as between the contestant users of the concept, enables the original exemplar’s achievement to be sustained and/or developed in optimum fashion" (p. 180). Collier et al. (2006) suggest that given the problems with the original exemplar Gallie’s words are ambiguous. Daly (2012) points out “the nature of the competition envisaged is between scholars advocating for their interpretation of a concept” (p. 541). Boromisza-Habishi (2010) says the competition amounts to an attempt to win over others regarding the concepts “meaning-in-use” (p. 278). Scholars contend that Gallie’s idea of progressive competition can be interpreted either broadly or narrowly (Choi & Majumdar, 2014; Collier et al., 2006; Daly, 2012).

The narrow understanding of progressive competition represents the idea that the competition leads to a more “complete” agreement about the original exemplar. In other words, the competition allows the achievement within the original exemplar to be sustained and to be perfected. The broader understanding omits reference to the original exemplar. This broader
understanding of progressive competition holds that, even though, the continuous debate cannot provide a determination of the “best use” of a concept, it can provide insight into the rationality of a given individual’s or group’s use or the change in use (Collier et al., 2006). This broader interpretation reflects an important objective of Gallie’s work. Gallie’s goal was to improve the quality of arguments used in debates over a contested concepts use, and meaning (Choi & Majumdar, 2014; Collier et al., 2006).

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, the concept of social justice has its origins in several traditions. For example the term was conceived in the Catholic Church in the 1840s to describe a just ordering of society. This conception of social justice still fit under the umbrella of ordinary justice. However, 1863 John Stuart Mill’s *Utilitarianism* is credited with the idea that society is an entity capable of action (Burke, 2011; Grant & Agosto, 2008; Novak, 2000). A new class of poor and low-income wage earners was developing as a result of the change from a feudal system to the industrial age. According to Burke (2011) the concept of justice as fairness was first seen in the Christian Socialist movements. Education scholars, however, note that contemporary use of the concept particularly in education is more informed by the writings on justice by Rawls, Young, Fraser, and Nozick. Although Nozick is mentioned as an influencing contemporary conceptions of social justice in the education literature evidence that education scholars underpin their conceptions of social justice on his theories was not found.

In addition, literature on the use of social justice in education reveals diverse applications and meanings. Several themes are represented in the social justice education literature. Ideas related to the conception of social justice in education as equating to some variant of distributive justice are present. For example Boyles et al. (2009) describe a group of scholars (Adler, Finn,
Hertling, Ravitch, Ruenzel) who advocate for a shared cultural literacy. This understanding of social justice holds that enabling the development of a cultural literacy allows children from marginalized groups to assimilate into society with the idea that it helps equalize the starting positions among children in competition for higher education and jobs. Boyles et al. (2009) write that scholars like Hirsch “claim they have a ‘social justice agenda’” (p. 38). Others understand the distributive aspects of social justice to require the redistribution of resources in the form of compensatory programs for needy children. Other conceptions of social justice entail more aggressive forms of redistribution and suggest the need for the equality of condition.

Another conception of social justice holds that thinking of social justice as coextensive with distributive justice wrong. They advocate for the recognition of cultural differences and different resources for different groups. Still others focus on institutional and structural oppression and argue for teacher and student activism centered on the goal of changing the social systems, processes, and institutions in the United States. Given the advocacy for these different approaches to social justice in education, it is important to examine how the concept is applied in scholarship on teacher education.

An analysis using Gallie’s approach promises to help scholars understand the diversity of definitions and the disputants’ rationales. Explication of these factors promises to help scholars reason about the various applications of the term social justice in teacher education. It is possible that the content analysis will show the term social justice is not contested in the context of teacher education. In this case, the term may not be an essentially contested concept. Alternatively, it may be evidence that a case of terminological contestation exists. The content analysis and application of Gallie’s framework promises to show how education professionals
and stakeholders understand and use the term social justice in teacher education. Therefore, this study is guided by the following research questions:

1. Using Gallie’s framework, how is the concept of social justice applied in teacher education literature and what evidence can be found to support the classification of social justice as an essentially contested concept in the context of teacher education?

2. In what ways do the data from this study support Boas and Gans-Morse’s (2009) theory that essentially contested concepts have multiple levels of contestation?

A qualitative content analysis, directed by Gallie’s (1956) seven criteria, of the scholarly literature was conducted to determine how the phrase social justice is applied in the context of teacher education. The next chapter addresses the research design, as well as, the implications and limitations of this study. This chapter describes in detail the data gathering and research methods used for this study. Chapter three begins with a brief discussion about the different approaches to qualitative content analysis. The chapter also addresses issues relevant to coding in a qualitative content analysis. The chapter ends with a discussion of the limitations and implications of this type of study.
CHAPTER THREE

Research Methods

In brief, the term social justice has been the subject of public debate as evidenced by the NCATE reauthorization controversy. Three organizations, NAS, FIRE, and ACTA, actively opposed NCATE’s use the term social justice in its professional standards. Scholars like K. C. Johnson (2005) and Robert Hunsaker (2011) have stated they see use of the phrase social justice in education as problematic. Additionally, the literature review in chapter two, provides evidence that the phrase social justice is, in fact, understood in various ways within the field of education. Scholars like Gewirtz (1998), North (2006, 2008), Hytten and Bettez (2011), and Grant and Agosto (2008) have examined the uses and meanings of social justice in education in an attempt to understand its various applications. Broadly speaking several authors have divided those concerned with social justice into two camps the assimilationist/individualist camp and the multiculturalist/collectivist camp (Boyles et al., 200; Williamson et al., 2007). Hytten and Bettez (2011) identify five genres. Rizvi (2002) writes there are three main traditions relevant to the analysis of social justice. These traditions include: liberal individualism, market individualism, and social democratic (p. 48). The fact that the term social justice is frequently used in education and has a variety of uses and meanings makes it ripe for analysis.

The treatment of social justice in the education is very interesting. My interest in the concept was initially triggered as a graduate student and I encountered the term in scholarly writing and in my courses. I found it difficult to understand precisely what the term meant as I
moved from one source to another and for me this was problematic. Additionally, when I read the critiques of social justice raised in NCATE’s reauthorization hearing in 2006 I wanted to learn more about the term’s use and meaning, as well as, why NCATE chose to drop social justice from their professional standards. Additional reading lead to the realization that the concept is complex and multidimensional and that it is understood in a variety of ways in the field of education. I was interested to understand the ways social justice is understood and applied in teacher education. In order to avoid the problem of confirmation bias, I chose to use Gallie’s (1956) framework. I have a preference for clear and precise language which may be due to the training I received in law school.

This study furthers contributes to these efforts by using Gallie’s framework to analyze the concept of social justice in the field of teacher education. As discussed in the previous chapter, Gallie’s framework is a sound way to analyze the concept social justice because it helps scholars reason about complex concepts (Collier et al., 2006). It will show whether or not the term is contested in the field of teacher education. If it is contested the framework will help identify the diversity of definitions and the disputants’ rationales. Daly (2012) states analysis using Gallie’s framework is useful to unpack the conceptual structures of meaning and it is useful to examine the diversity in the definition of a concept. It should be noted that the intent of the study is not to ultimately uncover the best or correct meaning of the term social justice as it relates to teacher education, but to see if and in what ways various scholars might understand the term differently. Additionally, this study may provide evidence the concept social justice is terminologically contested, supporting Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) theory that essentially contested concepts can be contested at this level. Overall, the analysis can help scholars understand the
multidimensional nature of a concept over and above simply a set of defining criteria. This study is therefore guided by the following questions:

1. Using Gallie’s framework, how is the concept of social justice applied in teacher education literature and what evidence can be found to support the classification of social justice as an essentially contested concept in the context of teacher education?

2. In what ways do the data from this study support the Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) theory that essentially contested concepts have multiple levels of contestation?

To answer these questions, this study involved a qualitative content analysis of the text of academic journal articles from the field of teacher education. It should be stated that social justice is used in other published and non-published documents such as Colleges of Education’s mission statements, conference papers, books, and textbooks. However, peer reviewed journal articles from the field of teacher education were chosen as the data source for this study because such publications are much more likely to contain information regarding the use and meaning of the term social justice in the context of teacher education, are vetted by experts in the area, and are written to a scholarly audience. Peer reviewed journal articles are important in a discipline because they “inform scholars about the history of the field, ongoing changes and emerging concepts, and current problems and issues” (Grant & Agosto, 2008, p. 186). Grant and Agosto state journal articles serve as curriculum material for graduate students and undergraduate students and publishing in these venues is essential for the tenure and promotion of professors. Additionally, articles published in peer-reviewed journals are representative of good scholarship in the field.

This chapter consists of the following sections. The first section describes the methods used in this study. This section provides general information about qualitative content analysis,
as well as, more specific information about the particular approach used in this study. The second section of chapter three provides details about the inclusion/exclusion criteria employed to compile the data source, as well as, specific information about the data source. The third section provides details about the coding process and data analysis. This section also contains information about the qualitative data analysis software program used in this study. The fourth section discusses trustworthiness.

**Qualitative Content Analysis**

Efforts to analyze the content of some material requires an understanding of what is meant by the word “content.” Content can be conveyed via text, works of art, images, maps, sounds, signs, symbols, even numerical symbols in the form of data (Krippendorff, 2013). A content analysis provides a systematic way to decipher meaning from content such as the various ways a word or phrase is applied and understood. Content analysis is an accepted and widely used technique to analyze text (Elo & Kyngas, 2008; Graneheim & Lundman, 2003; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Krippendorff, 2013; Mayring, 2000; Sandelowski, 2000, 2010; Schreier, 2014; Vaismoradi, Turunen & Bondas, 2013; Wallen & Fraenkel, 2000). Content analysis is used in both quantitative research and qualitative research (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). Qualitative content analysis was developed to explore the meanings associated with the physical manifestation of the communication (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). Qualitative content analysis is often used in nursing and education research (Graneheim & Lundman, 2003). According to Weber (1990), “There is no simple right way to do content analysis. Instead, investigators must judge what methods are most appropriate for their substantive problems” (p. 13).

There are three identifiable approaches to qualitative content analysis: conventional, directed, or summative (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). All of these approaches adhere to a
naturalistic research model (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Conventional content analysis is generally used in studies where the objective is to describe a phenomenon. This type of content analysis is chosen when existing theory or research literature on the phenomenon of interest is limited. Data are collected primarily through interviews using an open-ended question format. Researchers employ an open coding technique allowing themes or categories to flow from the data. Preconceived categories are not used in this kind of content analysis. The strength of the conventional content analysis is the ability to examine direct information from study participants and its ability to allow new insights to emerge. A potential weakness in this type of study is the inability to develop a complete understanding of the context and this can result in missing key themes or categories. A second challenge is that it can easily be confused with other qualitative methods like grounded theory method or phenomenology (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, pp. 1279-1281).

A second approach to qualitative content analysis is the directed approach. This approach employs a more structured process than the conventional approach. It is used when theory or prior research exists about a particular phenomenon and further refinement of the theory or description is constructive. The existing theory or framework helps focus the research question. Hsieh and Shannon (2005) write a goal of the “directed approach to content analysis is to validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory” (p. 121). Initial coding categories and operational definitions are constructed from prior research or existing theory. Hatch (2002) and Hsieh and Shannon (2005) write that coding can begin immediately using the predetermined codes. Depending on the type and breadth of the categories the researcher may decide to create subcategories. Zhang and Wildemuth (2009) state that after the initial coding the researcher immerses him or herself in the data and allows themes to emerge from the data.
The discussion of the findings is guided by existing theory or prior research and evidence is reported by offering rich description and showing codes with examples from the data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, pp. 1281-1283).

The directed approach has certain limitations. First, researchers approach the data with a certain amount of bias and may be more likely to find evidence of support rather than nonsupport. Second, over emphasis on theory can blind researchers to other contextual features or dimensions in the data (Hatch, 2002; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Another challenge inherent in this approach concerns research using participant interviews. For example, theory related probe questions might give participants certain cues that may make the participant answer in a certain way to please the researcher. These limitations are related to trustworthiness (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, pp. 1281-1283).

The third approach is summative qualitative content analysis. This approach is concerned with identifying and quantifying certain words or content to understand the contextual use of the words or content. Data analysis begins with word searches either by hand or by computer. Word frequency counts are calculated. These counts are used to determine patterns in the data. This approach examines why and how the word is used as well as what it means. Summative content analysis examines both manifest and latent content. Manifest content is the appearance of a particular word or content in the text. Latent content involves the process of the interpretation of content. For example, in a study examining the use of the word “death” the researcher can identify alternative terms for death and include these alternative words in their analysis. This approach provides an unobtrusive and nonreactive way to study the phenomenon of interest. A weakness inherent in this approach is that the findings may not take into consideration the broader meanings present in the data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).
This study employed a directed content analysis approach to analyze the data. In addition, to avoid certain limitations of this approach, I kept a detail research journal throughout the data coding and analysis process. Watt (2007) writes that although guidelines for qualitative inquiry exist “the emphasis on interpretation and emergent design” means there is no precise way to proceed (p. 82). According to Watt every project is unique and it is ultimately up to the individual researcher to determine what works best. According to Ortlipp (2008) the research journal documents the researcher’s processes and practices. It provides a trail showing the methodology the researcher used and how the analysis was shaped. For example, I took detailed and specific notes about my coding decisions and processes so that I would have documentation of the exact procedure I followed. The research journal can also help the researcher examine personal assumptions and goals and helps the researcher clarify individual belief systems.

At times during the research process I made notes daily and at other times I may have only made notes once or twice a week. For example, at the beginning stages of the research process when I was working on operational definitions, creating nodes in NVivo, and converting PDF documents to Word documents, a wrote in my journal on a weekly basis. However, later in the process during coding I would often record my reflections and decision making daily. My notes included ensuring I had an accurate audit trail, allowed me to check my developing perceptions, and test personal biases. Making notes during the research process is the beginning of the analysis process and recording memos and notations aids in the examination of data. For example, I was sensitive to the critique of indoctrination and violations of students’ First Amendment rights. I noted, in my journal, the relevance of certain articles to this particular theme. For example both the Applebaum (2009) and the Campbell (2013) article contained relevant information and detailed discussions of issues related to indoctrination. During the
process of reading the data source documents I noted the variety in scholars’ definitions and the fact scholars did appear to prioritize different aspects of the concept in their work. Additionally, I noted that the same text was often coded to both the condition internal complexity and the condition various describability causing me to wonder about the interrelationship between these two conditions. It was also documented in my research journal that terms like neoliberal, neoconservative, and the market were expressed as concepts that impede social justice. Also noted was the fact that scholars call for social change but there was not specific information about the particulars of the required social change.

In this study Gallie’s seven criteria are used to guide the initial coding of the data source. I intentionally did not use the literature to guide coding in order to avoid confirmation bias. Two of Gallie’s conditions or criteria—internal complexity and various describability—are directly related to research question one. Identifying the different aspects or features of the term social justice in the literature, as well as, how these aspects or facets are prioritized promises to shed light on both how the term social justice is understood and applied in teacher education. Additionally, they are two of the criteria necessary for determining whether or not social justice can be identified as an essentially contested concept.

As discussed in chapter two, Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) state that only four of Gallie’s conditions (appraisiveness, internal complexity, various describability, and openness) are required to identify an essentially contestable concept. Gallie (1956) also states these four criteria or conditions are the most important and necessary characteristics for identifying an essentially contested concept. The condition of reciprocal recognition is also important to show the concept is in fact contested and not just contestable. Other scholars agree that not all of Gallie’s seven criteria need to be met for a concept to be considered essentially contested.
Boas and Gans-Morse write that the criteria of *reciprocal recognition* “simply restates the definition of contestedness” (2009, p. 153) and that the sixth and seventh conditions, *original exemplar* and *progressive competition*, actually describe characteristics of the scholarly debate over a concept that is contested.

For the purposes of this study I consider the four criteria (*appraisiveness, internally complex, variously describable, and open*) as the threshold criteria for determining whether social justice is an essentially contestable concept in teacher education according to Gallie’s framework (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009, Collier et al., 2006, Gallie, 1956a). However, if the condition of reciprocal recognition is also satisfied then evidence exists showing social justice to be essentially contested in the field of teacher education. However, to gain further information and insight this study examined social justice in the context of teacher education using all seven of Gallie’s conditions. This is because analysis using Gallie’s framework is beneficial over and above its ability to identify a concept as essentially contested. A very important advantage of Gallie’s framework is its usefulness to scholarly debate and conceptual clarity.

As noted earlier, the Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) study showed the application of the concept neoliberalism to be problematic. They found the term neoliberalism to be rarely defined, asymmetrically applied along ideological divides, and used to characterize a broad range of phenomenon. Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) hypothesized the term neoliberalism represents an essentially contested concept. To demonstrate this was the case they analyzed neoliberalism using Gallie’s framework. The authors determined the literature examined in their study provided evidence that the term neoliberalism met the following four criteria in Gallie’s framework: *appraisiveness, internal complexity, various describability, and openness*. Additionally, Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) extend Gallie’s framework and argue that concepts...
fitting Gallie’s criteria can be contested at a new level. They argue that, in addition to meaning, use, and valence the terminology used to describe these concepts can be contested.

To recapitulate, in this proposed study, data from this content analysis will be analyzed to identify how the concept of social justice is applied to determine whether or not the concept, social justice, meets Gallie’s (1956) criteria for essentially contested concepts in the context of teacher education. Additionally, this study will also test Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) hypothesis that concepts meeting Gallie’s criteria can be contested at a terminological level. The analysis using Gallie’s framework and the Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) extension is to gain insight into general usage patterns and patterns of articulation and meaning of the term social justice in teacher education (Collier et al., 2006; Daly, 2012).

**Data Sources and Selection Criteria**

One of the major concerns in designing a content analysis is determining the textual data source. Researchers using a qualitative method may purposefully gather data from theoretically relevant sites, persons, or archival material (Boas & Gans-Morse 2009; Daly, 2012; Krippendorff, 2013; Merriam, 2009). This technique aims at selecting textual units that contribute to answering the research questions. Krippendorff (2013) states, “Most researchers adopt some kind of relevance criteria for defining the population from which they sample” (p. 121). Some scholars use the term criterion-based selection (Merriam, 2009, p. 77). The criterion used to collect data is described next.

As explained earlier in this chapter, the data source included peer-reviewed articles from education journals representative of ways the term social justice is applied in teacher education. In addition to these texts, the data source also included my research journal. The following purposeful sampling procedure was followed in order to capture articles suitable for inclusion in
the data source for this study. I accessed the Education Resources Information Center (ERIC) via the University of South Florida library in July 2015. “ERIC is considered to be the primary data base for education literature” (Penn State University Library, 2015, np). I limited the search to include only peer-reviewed journals and then selected the advanced search option. I used the following search technique. I conducted a search for articles that had the words “social justice” in the title, as well as, “social justice” and “teacher education” in the abstract. This search returned 102 titles. Next, I read the abstracts of these articles to determine which articles were relevant to the research questions. An article was determined relevant if it discussed both teacher education and social justice in the body of the article. A list of the articles included in the data source can be found in Appendix C. Details about the academic journals represented in the data source, the number of articles from that journal, and the dates the articles were published are shown in Table 4 in Appendix D. All of the 102 articles were deemed relevant and included in the data source. The data source included four articles from journals that focus on education leadership. These articles focused on teacher professional development and in-service training and therefore were deemed relevant to this study. For example, Pinto, Portelli, Rottmann, Pashby, Barrett and Mujuwamariya (2012) discusses the new teacher induction programs and Cochran-Smith et al., examines teacher educators’ understanding of social justice.

Data Analysis and Coding

Initially I searched the keywords assigned by ERIC to each article with the idea that I would find some evidence of the sub-concepts or facets of social justice as it is applied in teacher education. I kept track of these keywords using an excel spread sheet and found the most commonly used key words had to do with multicultural education and attitudes. I did not think it would be informative to pursue these areas as aspects of social justice and decided it did not
make sense to pursue this line of inquiry. Instead I decided to let the text speak for itself. I was more interested in the information that is revealed after the coding and analysis of two of Gallie’s conditions -- internally complexity and variously describability. My thinking was that text coded to these two conditions would contain evidence of the aspects scholars associated with the concept social justice in teacher education. The following information guided my coding process and data analysis.

Hatch (2002) writes that qualitative data analysis is a systemic search for meaning. Analyzing qualitative data is a process that allows researchers to share what has been learned. The qualitative researcher must organize and interrogate the data so that patterns, themes, relationships, and explanations, as well as, critiques can be developed (p. 148). Hatch writes this process involves synthesis, interpretation, categorization, hypothesizing, comparisons, and pattern finding. In directed qualitative content analysis both inductive and deductive reasoning are used. First, the main coding categories and the operational definitions are created from existing theory and/or research (Elo & Kyngas, 2007; Hsieh & Shannon, 2006; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). In this study, the operational definitions were created using Gallie’s (1956) criteria and the relevant research of later scholars who have evaluated and refined Gallie’s criteria (Collier et al., 2006; Choi & Majumdar, 2014; Daly, 2012). The initial coding categories for this study and their operational definitions are presented in Table 1 in Appendix A. Although, the analysis begins with a deductive step, the researcher may become aware of the fact that other important categories or themes are present in the data. In this case other categories and subcategories can be created (Hatch, 2002; Hsieh & Shannon, 2006). For example, text within the initial coding categories can be examined and using an inductive process like open coding themes present in the data are revealed (Hatch, 2002; Hsieh & Shannon, 2006).
In the proposed study, each document was read as a whole and considered one text unit for the purposes of understanding the context of each author(s)’ words. It is important to read the document as a whole in order to preserve the context in which the author(s) uses the term social justice. Given that the data source was voluminous, it seemed prudent to use a Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) software package. A QDA software package helps organize, analyze, and find insights in qualitative data. The software package employed in this study was NVivo created by QSR International. The articles compiled for the data source were uploaded into the NVivo program. Problems occurred with certain PDF documents necessitating the conversion of these documents into Microsoft Word documents. Next, I created a memo file for the research journal to memorialize the methods employed and to keep a record of decision-making and criteria I used during the coding process and to note my thoughts, musings, speculations, and hunches (Hatch, 2002; Merriam, 2009).

Next, using the coding categories and operational definitions in Table 1, I commenced creating separate coding files for each of the seven criteria in Gallie’s framework. These files are referred to as nodes in the NVivo program. Using the NVivo software program I created the following nodes: appraisiveness, internal complexity, various describability, openness, reciprocal recognition, exemplar, progressive competition. Zhang and Wildemuth (2009) state the expressions of the phenomenon of interest may be in the form of a word, phrase, paragraph, or entire document. Additionally, Hsieh and Shannon (2005) state when using a directed approach, it is appropriate to commence coding immediately with the predetermined codes.

The identification of relevant text is a deductive process guided by the operational definitions describing each coding category. Once text was identified as meeting the operational definition of a coding category it was highlighted within the NVivo program. The highlighted
word or words become “text chunks.” These text-chunks are placed in the corresponding node. Once all the articles in the data source were coded I ran node summary reports in NVivo for each node. The Node summary report contains all the text coded to that node. The NVivo program allows the researcher to easily move from the text-chunk in the node summary report to the same text-chunk in the original article allowing the researcher to view text-chunks in context. This is an important feature if questions arise about the relevance of a particular text-chunk.

Node summary reports were read through a minimum or two times. During this process of re-reading the coded text, the operational definitions were continuously consulted to ensure text was coded correctly. Notes were made in my research journal about my observations, impressions and questions. Notations were also made in the margins of the print copies of the node summary reports where the text seemed particularly relevant to satisfying the operational definition for coding category. A second and sometimes third reading of the node summary reports allowed for the identification of text-chunks that could best serve as evidence that Gallie’s criteria had been satisfied. Occasionally I would return to the original data source document in its entirety to ensure I fully understood the text. During review of the node summary reports text-chunks were highlighted as evidence to be pulled from the data in the form of quotations.

While reading the data source documents I noticed that I was very often coding the same text to both the internal complexity and various describability nodes. This is because when scholars describe social justice they are identifying the aspects of the concept. I waited until coding was completed and realized these to nodes contained virtually identical text. Gallie (1956) and Collier et al. (2006) treat these conditions together in their discussion of democracy as an essentially contested concept. Therefore, I felt confident it made sense to also treat these
conditions together and I combined the nodes into a new node for the purposes of identifying the aspects of social justice present in the data source.

I used a system of open coding to identify the different aspects of social justice in the data source. Open coding employs inductive reasoning and was used because it would allow the different aspects or features of social justice emerge from the text. The process begins with reading through the data and jotting down notations relevant to the identification of the aspects of social justice. My intent was to identify recurring themes or patterns across the data. During the initial reading of the node summary report I was as expansive as possible to ensure I captured everything that might be useful. Next, I read through the data a second time to ensure I did not miss any aspect. I analyzed my notations looking for themes in the data then I created a coding category for each theme I identified. I reviewed the various categories and created a child-node for each of the aspects of social justice I identified. Next, I went through the data in the relevant node summary report and coded the text to the appropriate child-node. The final list of aspects, including a brief description of the decision criteria used for each aspect, is presented in Table 2 located in Appendix B (Merriam, 2009, pp. 178-193).

**Trustworthiness**

Another consideration important when conducting a qualitative content analysis is trustworthiness. The four criteria important to show trustworthiness are credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability (Guba, 1981; Guba & Lincoln, 1982). Credibility refers to the idea that the study produces findings that are “plausible” (Guba, 1981, p. 83) or “believable” (Guba & Lincoln, 1982, p. 246). In this study extended and intense exposure with source material provides a trustworthiness check. According to Wesley (2004a), researchers have referred to this as “‘immersing, ‘marinating’ or ‘soaking’ oneself in the texts, in order to
absorb’ their meaning” (p. 141). This is a trustworthiness check because it is more likely to produce valid or credible interpretations of their contents (Creswell, 2003; Wesley, 2004a).

Transferability is also a concern in qualitative research. Trustworthiness includes the question of whether or not results can be transferred to other setting or groups. Qualitative researchers refer to this notion as transferability. However, it is not like the generalizability sought in quantitative studies. In a qualitative study, the burden of showing how one set of findings can be applied to another context rests with the investigator (Wesley, 2004a). Naturalists do not believe in “truth statements that have general applicability” instead they believe “all social/behavior phenomenon are context bound” (Guba, 1981, p. 86). Researchers must be content with the idea their findings are descriptive of a certain context. Therefore, Guba (1981) states purposive sampling is called for because it is “intended to maximize the range of information uncovered” (p. 86). Additionally, Guba (1981) recommends collecting “‘thick’ descriptive data” and to include thick rich description in the study. Two ways to facilitate transferability is to provide future researchers with detailed information about data collection and the process of analysis.

In this study, the journal articles were carefully read and coded using the predetermined criteria of Gallie’s framework. Next, the node summary reports were read through two or more times. This study is detailed and transparent in its description of the procedures, and processes followed. For example, this study also provides detailed information about data collection and the process of analysis in an effort to make it transparent. Moreover, a research journal was kept which provides an audit trail. Additionally, the reader is provided with representative quotations from the data source demonstrating the satisfaction of Gallie’s criteria. (Graneheim & Lundham,
Providing quotations to support the findings meets the requirements of this trustworthiness check (Creswell, 2003).

The trustworthy check of dependability is also addressed in this study. Guba and Lincoln (1982) write this refers to the stability of the findings given the fact that qualitative designs are emergent and that a second researcher, using the same data, may chose a different course (p. 247). This study uses established procedures and techniques. This study uses the directed approach to qualitative content analysis and was guided by Gallie’s (1956) framework. Gallie’s framework is an accepted approach to concept analysis. Additionally, this study relies on the research conducted by Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) who argue essentially contested concepts can be terminologically contested.

The last aspect of trustworthiness in social science research has to do with impartiality or confirmability (Guba, 1981). This refers to the idea that research should produce impartial knowledge about the world. Qualitative studies always contain some measure of subjectivity. Qualitative studies require the reader to ask, “Can these findings be confirmed by another individual, independent of the original researcher’s predispositions?” (Wesley, 2004a, p.136). If the answer to this question is yes, then the qualitative study is thought to have “confirmability” (Wesley, 2004a, pp. 134-136). Lincoln and Guba (1982) suggest “practicing reflexivity to uncover one’s underlying epistemological assumptions, reasons for formulating the study in a particular way, and implicit assumptions, biases, or prejudices about the context or problem” (p. 248). The research journal contains reflective and evaluative commentary. Keeping a self-reflective journal requires the researcher to engage in reflexivity by allowing the researcher examines his or her assumptions and goals and to clarify his or her belief systems (Ortlipp, 2008, p.695). Additionally, the research journal enables the researcher to record initial impressions and
patterns that may begin to emerge in the data. It allows the researcher to monitor his or her developing constructions as well as decision-making. Bias is often a problem in qualitative research. Qualitative content analysis involves some degree of interpretation and so some personal bias is always present in qualitative research. A research journal was used in this study in order to show how the findings can be traced back to the data. Additionally, in this study the problem of bias is mediated by the fact the content analysis is descriptive and exploratory. The focus of this study is not theory development therefore the researcher is not a stakeholder.
CHAPTER FOUR

Findings

This study is interested in increasing the knowledge and understanding of how social justice is conceptualized and applied in the context of teacher education and to determine if there is evidence to support its classification as an essentially contested concept (Gallie, 1956a) and if it is contested at a terminological level. The study is guided by the following questions: first, using Gallie’s framework, how is the concept of social justice applied in teacher education literature and what evidence can be found to support the classification of social justice as an essentially contested concept in the context of teacher education; secondly, in what ways do the data from this study support Boas and Gans-Morse’s (2009) theory that essentially contested concepts have multiple levels of contestation?

The study employed a directed qualitative content analysis guided by Gallie’s (1956) framework for essentially contested concepts. Gallie’s framework was chosen, not only as a tool to analyze adversarial discourses, but also for its potential to aid in the progressive clarification of a concept. Gallie’s framework consists of seven conditions (appraisiveness, internal complexity, various describability, openness, reciprocal recognition, exemplar, and progressive competition). Collier et al. (2006) argue it is best to think of these seven conditions as a set of interrelated criteria to understand and analyze concepts. They note that not all seven of Gallie’s conditions are always useful or necessary in every analysis. According to Gallie (1956) satisfaction of appraisiveness, internal complexity, various describability, openness are critical to
the identification of a concept as essentially contestable. The satisfaction of one or more of Gallie’s other criteria provides further evidence the concept is contested (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009; Collier et al., 2006). If social justice is indeed an essentially contested concept, as defined by this framework, then it should satisfy, at a minimum, these four criteria or conditions. Although, only four criteria are critical to the identification of a concept as essentially contestable, this study examined the data using all seven of Gallie’s criteria because of their potential to provide useful information about the use and meaning of social justice in teacher education. This chapter describes the findings resulting from the application of Gallie’s (1956) framework to the data. It should be remembered that the data contain, not only the specific meaning and application social justice by particular article’s author(s) but also the meaning and application of the concept by other scholars whom these authors cite and discuss in their articles. In addition to determining if social justice, in the context of teacher education, satisfies Gallie’s (1956) conditions for an essentially contested concept, the purpose of this study was to identify how the term is understood and applied in teacher education literature, and whether or not evidence could be found to support the thesis that essentially contested concepts may be contested at a terminological level. A brief discussion of the findings for each of Gallie’s seven conditions follows.

**Appraisiveness**

This condition requires the concept “be appraisive in the sense that it signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievement” (Gallie, 1956, p. 171). In other words, the referent is an “achievement word” (Gallie, 1956a, p. 109; Collier et al., 2006, p. 216). Scholars argue that appraisiveness can mean the concept can have a negative and/or positive value (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009; Collier et al., 2006). For example, Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) found
neoliberalism transformed from a positive concept, coined by the German Freiberg School and associated with a moderate form of classical liberalism, to a normatively negative concept referring to radical economic reforms like those in Pinochet’s Chile. Both conditions reflect judgments of something that “ought” to be or “ought not” to be. The judgments about a concept “concern the phenomena entailed in the concept and/or the consequences of these phenomena” (Collier et al., 2006, p. 241). Additionally, the appraisive nature of a concept may be unclear because the normative valence may depend on a particular theoretical framework or the context in which it is applied (Collier et al., 2006, pp. 216, 237).

This study found all 102 journal articles contain text fitting the operational definition for appraisiveness used in this study. Considering each article, in the data source, as a single unit all but one of the 102 articles examined present an overall positive view of the concept social justice in the context of teacher education. This may have to do with the fact that general conceptions of social justice are rooted in concepts like fairness and justice. Furthermore, the data show authors associate social justice with positive things like human rights, the common good, fairness, equality, respect, and inclusion. Examples of these associations are provided below.

Broad and very general statements referring to the benefit of social justice were found in the data. For example, an experienced teacher who participated in a study by Bender-Slack (2009) stated, “‘All have a responsibility to promote social justice in all settings’” (p. 268). Collopy, Bowman, and Taylor (2012) write, “acts of social justice contribute to the gradual transformation of social institutions for the common good” (p. 4). Fennimore (2014) writes, “Social justice is the valuing of human rights and the dignity of every single person” (p. 202). In Sands (2007), social justice is discussed as the “ultimate goal of multiculturalism” and the author further states that social justice provides the moral underpinning for multiculturalism (p. 46).
Cochran-Smith et al. (1999) write that social justice has been part of Boston College’s institutional mission and state it is “based on respect for the ‘freedom, right and power of individuals and communities to create a different life for themselves’” (p. 233). In a later article, Cochran-Smith et al. (2009b) see the over-arching goal of teaching for social justice as promoting students’ learning and life chances. The data shows scholars use the term social justice in an appraisive manner and this use is demonstrated in the preceding statements.

These statements equate social justice with things like human rights, dignity, the common good, individual freedom and power. In addition to the various statements presented in the paragraph above, Clayton et al. (2009) writes words like equity, social responsibility, and equality are interchangeable with social justice (2009, p. 316). Other aspects of social justice, which are also appraisive, like fairness, equality, respect, inclusion, are discussed in more detail in the findings for internal complexity and various describability.

Interestingly, the data also show social justice is not only an appraisive term but it is also a descriptive term. It is similar to the way the terms like democracy or philanthropy are applied. Democracy not only describes a political system but it also ascribes value to a political system. Similarly, where an act of giving or service between two parties is labeled philanthropic, the term not only describes the act but also attaches a positive value to it (Daly, 2011). Likewise, social justice not only describes a population’s social arrangement; it also ascribes a value to it. For example, social justice connotes a just society and ascribes a positive value to the society. A socially just society is a good society.

Given this understanding of social justice, the descriptive attributes of the term can be seen in instances where authors argue that teacher education programs should have a social justice agenda/focus (e.g. Applebaum, 2009; Cochran-Smith et al., 1999; Cochran_Smith et al.,

Additionally, of some interest, is the fact that 11 articles contain text addressing and discussing the various perspectives of the critics of the application of the phrase social justice in teacher education. These 11 articles show education scholars are aware that some people hold a negative view of the meaning of social justice as it is applied in teacher education. These articles write social justice is associated with the following critiques: the instructor’s or student-teacher’s definition of social justice is too radical and/or too focused on identity politics; it is emotionally laden and infected with political beliefs rather than legitimate scholarship; it specifically promotes progressive political action; a social justice lens may obscure a focus on content; colleagues, students, parents, and administrators may oppose the particular application of social
justice; its meaning is highly variable and subject to personal interpretation; it is a form of indoctrination; it is too vague and therefore meaningless; it has no single essential meaning; it is “touchy-feely” with a focus on being nice to children and building self-esteem and cultural identity; and there is a lack of attention to underlying assumptions and historical traditions (see Agarwal Epstein, Oppenheim, Oyler, & Sonu, 2010; Applebaum, 2009; Bieler, 2012; Brandes & Kelly, 2000; Campbell, 2013; Cochran-Smith et al. 2009; Enterline, Cocran-Smith, Ludlow, & Mitescu, 2008; Hytten & Bettez, 2011; Marshall & Ward, 2004; Philpott & Dagenais, 2012). Certain authors (Applebaum, 2009; Bieler, 2012; Campbell, 2013; Heybach, 2009; Tinkler et al., 2014; Villegas, 2007) specifically discuss the 2005 NCATE controversy and the charges leveled by those opposed to the inclusion of social justice as an example disposition in NCATE’s professional standards.

Additionally, two articles contain text that is not so easily categorized as having a positive or negative valence. First, Philpott & Dagenais (2012) found certain first year teachers cease implementing social justice into their practice. The authors state they do not know why some teachers abandon a social justice perspective in their practice but suggest it may be because it becomes too complicated in the context of a school. However, it is also possible that the teacher(s) in question no longer value(s) or prioritize(s) the social justice perspective.

Also interesting is Bree Picower’s (2011) article, “Resisting Compliance: Learning to teach for Social Justice in a Neoliberal Context.” Picower writes about social justice education and sees current educational policies and school environments as hostile to teachers who hold a social justice perspective. In Picower’s article, a significant component of social justice education is critical pedagogy. She identifies a strategy for implementing social justice teaching and education where it is not accepted. Picower (2011) discusses the strategy of “camouflage”
Social justice teachers can camouflage the introduction of critical pedagogy into their practice and substitute materials of their choosing for the mandated materials by sneaking them into their classrooms. The camouflage is necessary to prevent rousing the concerns of the administration.

Picower’s (2011) article suggests this form of social justice education is highly valued by the teacher who will conceal it in order to bring it into his or her classroom, and yet, not valued or negatively valued by those from which it is to be hidden. Similar to Picower (2011), Agarwal et al. (2010) also write about teachers’ willingness to “push the core curriculum aside to make room for discussions about social inequality and injustice” in allegiance to social justice via a commitment to a social reconstructionist approach to the curriculum (p. 244).

As mentioned earlier, only one scholar (Campbell, 2013) attaches a somewhat negative connotation to the term social justice as it is applied in the context of teacher education. It is important to remember that the condition of appraisiveness includes both positive and negative valuations attached to a concept Collier et al. (2006). Campbell makes the argument that social justice education has a definite political agenda and the effort to position its agenda as a moral or ethical endeavor is a problem. More is said about Campbell’s paper later in this chapter. Based on the evidence presented above it is reasonable to conclude that, for the purposes of this study, Gallie’s condition of appraisiveness is met.

**Internal complexity and Various Describability**

Gallie’s second condition, internal complexity, is satisfied where the valued achievement the concept represents is comprised of different facets or aspects. If a concept is multifaceted, then there is a real possibility that different people will prioritize or rank the various aspects of a concept differently. It is these differential rankings that give rise to users understanding and
applying a concept differently. Gallie’s third condition, various describability, is satisfied when evidence can be found showing that different users of the concept rank the various aspects of the concept in different orders. An important part of this study is developing an understanding of the multidimensional nature and the application of the term social justice in teacher education. The conditions of internal complexity and various describability, are particularly salient to achieving this goal.

In this study, text-chunks describing the concept social justice also contain information relevant to the specific aspects of the concept social justice. After coding was completed I examined the coded text and found almost all the text-chunks coded to the internal complexity node were also coded to the various describability node. This result was not surprising. Gallie (1956) combines these two conditions in his analysis of democracy as an essentially contested concept. Other scholars (Collier et al., 2006; Daly, 2011) have also treated these two conditions together in their analyses. Based on the fact other scholars treat these conditions together I made the decision to do the same for the purpose of identifying the various aspects of social justice.

I created a new node entitled internal complexity-various describability (IC-VD) by merging the internal complexity and various describability nodes. A node summary report was printed containing all the text coded to the IC-VD node. This text was examined in order to identify the different features or aspects of social justice. This examination involved reading through the text in the IC-VD node three times using a system of open coding. Open coding employs inductive reasoning and was used because it would allow the different themes or aspects of social justice emerge from the text.

During the first reading of the IC-VD node summary report the different features of social justice were identified and recorded. The summary report was read a second time to
determine if any new features could be identified. The identified features were reviewed and analyzed. Features sharing a common theme were grouped together. For example, text focused on issues like: inclusion of multiple perspectives, cultural sensitivity, awareness of past domination and oppression of social groups, marginalization, ableism, racism, discrimination, English language learners, and marginalization due to poverty; these were grouped together because they share aspects of recognition.

A node for each of the identified aspect of social justice was created under the IC-VD node. In NVivo the IC-VD node is labeled the parent node and any sub-nodes are referred to as child-nodes. For example, I created a child-node labeled “recognition aspects” and placed it under the parent-node labeled IC-VD. The IC-VD node was read a third time and text was coded to the appropriate child-node. After coding was completed I reviewed all the child-nodes and determined certain child-nodes were so closely related, it seemed appropriate to combine them. I did this in two instances.

First, with regard to the text coded to the distributive aspect child-node and text coded to the equity aspect child-node, it became clear that both dealt with distributive aspects of justice. It made sense to merge these two nodes because they had the same core theme. I merged them into a new child-node labeled distributive/equity aspect. Second, I merged the teacher accountability aspect and teacher’s duty to provide a rich learning environment aspect into one node labeled teacher accountability aspect. In effect the teacher’s duty to provide a rich learning environment is part of a teacher’s practice for which they are accountable. This accountability requires teachers to reflect on their practice to ensure students are learning. Therefore, it made sense to combine these two features into one node labeled teacher accountability aspect.
The fairness node, however, presented a new problem. The word fair and its variations (fairness, fairly) have different meanings and applications in the data. First, “fair” can be used to connote equal treatment meaning providing each person the same resources, curriculum or instruction. It can also refer to the realization that all people are equal members of the human race. Fairness is also used in the context of an allocation of resources or goods based on need, in other words, different amounts for different people. It became apparent the fairness node contained data that in fact had two distinct orientations an equity orientation or an equality orientation. To address this problem I decided to review the text chunks coded to the fairness node and to code them to either the distributive/equity node or the equality node.

The equality node contains text that deals with applications of equality in the classical sense, for example, ideas about all children being equal regardless of his or her membership in a particular social group or text using the word equality in the context of sameness. Whereas, the text coded to the distributive/equity aspect node has distinct equity orientation. Here equity is tied to the provision of different things for different people. The decision of where to place a particular piece of text turned on the conceptual orientation associated with the word “fair” in the context of the surrounding text. Examples of my coding decisions with explanation follow.

In the following text chunk, “I think social justice is ensuring that all people are treated fairly and equally regardless of race, religion, age, sex, class etc.” (Bender-Slack, 2009, p. 268) use of the word “fairly” connotes more than sameness because this sentence is from a section of the article discussing fairness from an equity orientation. In this case the text is coded to the distributive/equity node. Another example shows the distinction more clearly. In this example, the word fair in the context of “social justice means treating each student fairly, based on his or
her needs” (Bender-Slack, 2009, p. 268) clearly reflects an equity orientation and was coded to the distributive/equity node.

In certain other cases the meaning of fairness was not entirely clear without the surrounding textual context. For example, “Allison was drawn to ideals that highlight fairness, inclusion, voice, and participation” (Agarwal et al., 2010, p. 243). In this quote fairness is distinct from inclusion, voice, and participation. Yet, standing on its own it is not clear if in this case the concept of fairness has an equity or equality orientation. The context becomes clear upon further reading of the text in which the text chunk appears. In this case Allison is concerned about creating safe spaces in her classroom meaning spaces in which multiple perspectives and diversity are valued. In this case I coded this fairness text chunk to the equality node. In a few cases authors discussed the fact that understandings of the concept of fairness are different and can have an either an equity orientation or equality orientation. In these cases the text chunk was coded to both the distributive/equity node and the fairness/equality node (for example, see Cochran-Smith et al, 1999; Hytten & Bettez, 2011). After re-coding the text in the fairness aspect child-node to either the distributive/equity aspect node or the equality aspect child-node, I relabeled the equality aspect child-node the fairness/equality aspect child-node.

This study found evidence of different identifiable aspects in the text contained in the data source. The data revealed 13 aspects of social justice in the data source. The array of aspects identified is evidence of the internal complexity of the concept. Table 3 lists the aspects of social justice identified in the data source and the number and the proportion of total articles that mention each particular aspect.
Table 3
Aspects of Social Justice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
<th>Percentage of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recognition</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>83.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Change</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>74.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributive/Equity</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>59.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Consciousness/Critical Inquiry</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>57.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching is political</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Accountability</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness/Equality</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Participation/Citizenship</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Building</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral and Ethical</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Attitudes and Beliefs</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings detailed in Table 3 show the multidimensional character of social justice captured in the data. These findings provide evidence showing the potential for the concept social justice to be variously describable because different scholars can rank the aspects of social justice differently.

In fact text was identified in the data source showing education scholars acknowledge diversity in the various understandings of social justice in the field of education. This acknowledgement is evidenced in the following text quotes from the data source: “The phrase social justice has proliferated in teacher education in recent years and is an umbrella term encompassing a large range of practices and perspectives…” (Agarwal et al., 2010, p. 238); “Social justice is a complicated and knotty concept which educators and their students must constantly question” (Landorf & Nevin, 2007, p. 716); “The concept of social justice is a complex concept, defined according to the different theoretical and philosophical perspectives of the authors who have developed it” (Pereira, 2013, p. 163); “Marshall and Oliva (2006) describe
social justice as being connected to, and enraptured in, a number of concepts...” (Carr, 2008, p. 119); “Under a broad umbrella of socialist, Marxist, collectivist, and other leftist political orientations, the theoretical foundations of social justice represent a complex range of differing contemporary bodies of knowledge and schools of thought...” (Campbell, 2013, p. 222); “Arthur Wise, NCATE president at the time, conceded that the term was ‘susceptible to a variety of definitions’” (Bieler, 2012, p. 85). One article from the data source acknowledges there is little consensus about what the phrase, social justice, actually means with the result being “a plethora of uses and broadly-defined applications” and notes social justice has been identified as a buzzword in teacher education literature due to its imprecise nature and the lack of evidence showing the usefulness of the term in teacher education (Sands, 2007, p. 45). That being said, this data source author (Sands, 2007) makes the point that at its core social justice is about fairness. However, the concept of fairness is also multifaceted. Sands argues culturally responsive teaching leads to better understanding among different peoples and therefore to a more just and equitable society.

Evidence that social justice is recognized, in teacher education literature, as a complex and confusing concept is interesting because it demonstrates the lack of consensus regarding the concept’s meaning among scholars in the field. Data from one article (Agosto, 2010) is interesting because, although the article does not explicitly define social justice, it suggests how teacher educators may think about social justice and the features of the concept. Text from this article states teacher educators increasingly deal with concepts related to social justice like privilege, domination, anti-oppressive education, and equity. Text from the article also argued there is no definitive statement explaining what social justice entails. However, it was suggested the dominant ideology in the United States includes values associated with justice like fairness,
equality, and equal opportunity (Agosto, 2010). Interestingly, the concepts of justice, fairness, equality and equal opportunity are also multifaceted and contested.

The data showed some authors deliberately refrain from offering a single definition of social justice (Brandes & Kelly, 2000). For example, one article stated it is impossible to explicitly define social justice and that attempting to define social justice is like “nailing jello to the wall” (Sandretto et al., 2007, p.308). This article argues the concept social justice is composed of various qualities drawn from various discourses. These discourses include, but are not limited to, the following: fairness, affirmative action, equality, equality of opportunity, equity, attitudes, values, self-determination, voice, ethic of care, relationships, identity, and responsibility. This article does not advocate “distilling multiple conceptualizations of social justice from particular contexts into one grand narrative of social justice” (Sandretto et al., 2007).

Additional data was found corroborating the idea that different understandings of social justice exist in the field of education. For example, data was found arguing that theoretical positions from other disciplines like sociology, women’s studies, and ethnic studies are used to underpin conceptions of social justice in education. Text from this article states conceptions of social justice cut across all these movements yet each movement has “a different primary ideological home; thus the meaning of social justice may be interpreted differently within each of them and their central priorities vary” (Hytten and Bettez, 2011, p. 16). For example, one document states that any or all of the following constitute social justice education: culturally relevant teaching, teaching against the grain, teaching for diversity, multicultural education, anti-oppressive education; improving the life chances of all children, addressing issues of privilege and power (Philpott & Dagenais, 2012).
The data source also included a study that analyzed over 500 documents pertaining to the conceptual frameworks of teacher education programs. This study showed “innumerable rationales for social justice education” (Howell, Thomas, & Kaputska, 2010, p. 467). After review of these various rationales for social justice teacher education the authors find only three categories emerged. The first rationale is a values-based rationale. This rationale emphasizes humanistic values and dispositions. Second, is a multicultural/diversity based rationale which focuses on diversity issues. Third, is a structural-critique rationale focusing on issues associated with critiquing the barriers and structural inequalities found in society.

Text from the data source was also found showing that some scholars are opposed to the idea of determining one accepted definition for the term. For example, one scholar expresses her opposition to a concrete definition of social justice because such a definition would “tame its insurgent nature” (Heybach, 2009, p. 239). Similarly, another scholar states that a “cookie-cutter definition” of social justice does not exist in teacher education and that finding such a definition may not be a worthy goal (McDonald, 2007, p. 2075). This is because developing a vision of social justice is a “negotiated process that occurs among faculty” at particular institutions (McDonald, 2007, p. 2075).

The data also reveal a variety of more specific descriptions of social justice in the context of teacher education. These descriptions range from the general and/or broad to the more specific. One example of a general description that highlights the all-encompassing nature of social justice found in teacher education is exemplified in the following sentence, “One professional educational organization’s definition of social justice, for example, argues that it is at once a goal, a theory, a stance, a pedagogy, a process, a framework, and a process (sic) (Conference on English Education, 2009)” (Bieler, 2009, p. 86). Text from other data source
documents acknowledge variation in understandings of social justice in teacher education, for example: “Though varied and abundant, scholarship in social justice teacher education remains limited in its capacity to provide descriptive accounts of the nature and extent of these agendas in teacher preparation” (Clayton et al., 2009, p. 307). Another data source document states, “Despite its widespread appeal, the term social justice is used with great variation in teacher education, and the concept has been rightly argued as being ambiguous and undertheorized” (Cochran-Smith et al., 2009a, p. 238). This data source article (Cochran-Smith et al., 2009a) argues that despite the variation, certain themes are central to social justice. These themes include a notion of distributive justice and calls to challenge the inequities in schools and society a concurring opinion is found in the data source article by Philpott and Dagenais (2012). Philpott and Dagenais (2012) argue social justice discourses share the fact that they all recognize the disparities in educational opportunities, resources, achievement, and long-term outcomes among minority and low-income students and their white middle-class peers. Even though these descriptions of social justice are broad and suggest the concept is understood in a variety of ways it should be noted that recognition was found to be the dominant feature of social justice in teacher education.

However, as stated above, not all education scholars interpret social justice so broadly. Examples of specific definitions of social justice were also identified in the data source. One data source article, (Lee, 2011) in particular, was selected for discussion in the findings because it provides specific information about several education scholars’ understandings of social justice. Text was identified in this article showing social justice to be both a product and a process. This means that social justice understood as a process refers to the problem of determining how to achieve social justice. Whereas, social justice understood as a product refers
to the end result after the processes focused on achieving a just society take place. For this scholar, the product/process features of social justice are reciprocal meaning goals influence processes and processes influence goals.

The data source article by Lee, 2011 also contains text describing the following social justice perspectives from the field of education. These perspectives prioritize different aspects of social justice. For example, one perspective prioritizes the equitable distribution of resources and requires all members of society be physically and psychological safe and secure. Another perspective prioritizes the idea that that teaching for social justice requires people must have particular beliefs that emphasize ethical values, care and respect. A similar perspective holds that advocating for moral responsibility is the way to create schools that are just. A fifth perspective on social justice prioritizes the idea that everyone in the society who is affected by a decision should have a say in the decision. A sixth perspective focuses on the fact that everyone in a society should be able to fully develop their intellectual, emotional, expressive, and social capacities (Lee, 2011).

Other text, from the data source, evidences the fact that scholars view social justice as a philosophy, an approach, and actions that embody “treating all people with fairness, respect, generosity, and dignity” (Atwater et al., 2013, p. 1298). These authors comment that it is the commitment to take action against oppression and inequality that makes social justice a powerful term. This is an instance in which the data shows that some scholars prioritize action in their description of social justice. The aspect of action was present in the text from other documents as well. For example, 57 of the data source articles mention action as an aspect of social justice.

Another data source document described a study of studied 22 teachers committed to social justice (Bender-Slack, 2009). Text from this document revealed evidence of the following
themes present in the teachers’ conceptions of social justice: respect for others in the context of the classroom, maximizing the welfare of the community through individual action, fair and equal treatment of others, equal opportunities, recognition and appreciation of difference. This data source author specifically notes the lack of focus on “action” among the teachers in her study. This author argues that in addition to these qualities, the definition of social justice must be expanded to include action. The article argues that social justice should include political and community action.

Of some interest is the fact that scholars in the data source commented on certain applications of the term social justice in education. For example authors from the data source commented that some education scholars misapply the term social justice. For example, text was identified demonstrating the acknowledgment that social justice is often “conflated with the pursuit of educational equity and/or equality of opportunity” (North, 2008, p. 1183). Another text states people “often confuse or interchangeably use teaching for social justice with multicultural education, diversity, equity and so forth” (Lee, 2011, p. 2). The data source also contained a study examining the use of the term social justice in teacher education program accreditation documents. In this paper the authors write they ”did not consider words used interchangeably with social justice in the literature, such as equity, social responsibility, and equality” (Clayton et al., 2009, p. 316).

Further evidence of various describability is also found in the Campbell (2013) article from the data source. In this article the author distinguishes between a body of scholarship focusing on moral and ethical teaching and a body of scholarship focusing on social justice teaching. The article states these two groups think about justice differently. In one group are scholars who hold an individual virtue-based understanding of justice and fairness. This group
focuses on the moral and ethical aspects of teaching. The other group focuses on the political nature of justice. This group holds that the inequalities in society result from racism, sexism, classism, ableism and other forms of oppression that disadvantage certain groups and privilege the status quo. The text in this article states social justice education scholars “emphasize the political nature of social justice” and “employ the language of power, bias, equity, privilege, oppression, and democratic schooling while compelling the critique of societal structures processes and institutions” (Campbell, 2013, p. 217).

Text from this article states that some teacher education institutions calling for a disposition towards social justice are simply referring to a set of desirable dispositions like caring, treating individuals equally and fairly, and having compassion for the underprivileged. Education professionals who hold this understanding of social justice may self-identify as a social justice-educators based on his or her belief in the primacy of enhancing the intellectual and emotional well being of minority and underprivileged students, as well as, protecting their dignity and autonomy (Campbell, 2013). This understanding does not include the critical political orientation prescribed by some social justice scholars. This author (Campbell, 2013) describes this understanding of social justice as a “loose use of social justice” (p. 228) or “Watered-down, imprecise, or de-radicalized uses of ‘social justice’” (p.234).

Whereas social justice scholars who focus on the political nature of justice and argue the inequalities in society are due to oppression and disadvantage can be identified as having a different understanding of the concept. Campbell (2013) points out the use of the term social justice by people who mean it differently is problematic because it seriously misrepresents both those who actually view the moral dimensions of teaching as an ethical practice and the social justice scholars and practitioners who hold a more political view of what social justice teaching
entails. Campbell’s discussion is evidence of the various describability of the term social justice in teacher education.

Other examples were found in the data supporting the idea that different conceptions of social justice exist that were similar to the distinction made by Campbell (2011). For example, one researcher (McDonald, 2007) conducted a qualitative study, examining two social justice teacher education programs. She found most of the faculty held the belief that social justice required addressing and attending to the needs of individual learners and where necessary provide these individual learners with different resources and opportunities. Additionally, this study also identified faculty holding conceptions of social justice that consider addressing issues of structural inequality and emphasizing the political nature of teaching as being outside the mainstream of the teacher education. Viewing social justice as meeting the needs of individual learners and the idea that addressing or focusing on issues of structural inequality and emphasizing the political nature of teaching appears to corroborate the idea that “looser,” “imprecise” or “watered-down” conceptions of social justice identified in the Campbell (2013) article do exist. However, it should be noted, McDonald’s (2007) study examined only two social justice education programs and it is therefore not possible to conclude this finding to be representative of all education programs with a focus on social justice.

The data source also contained text suggesting that stronger conception of social justice also exist in the literature. For example, the data source article Hoffman-Kipp (2003) describes the social justice perspective of a pre-service teacher from a social justice education program. This pre-service teacher is concerned with being fair but feels well-behaved quiet children who may not understand English get ignored because the unruly children take her attention. She initially expresses the fact she feels she is being unfair to the well-behaved children who do not
know English. The author finds fault with this conception because the student teacher is focused on fairness, skill building, and completing the lesson and prioritizes her pedagogical concern for balance yet misses the cultural implications immigrant children may be having in her classroom. The scholar writing the article argues the pre-service teacher should focus more on power and status. This article suggests the loose understanding of social justice in which the teacher fairly allocates his or her time and attention across all students is not enough. Hoffman-Kipp argues a stronger conception of social justice, one that includes a focus on power and status, is necessary.

Additionally, findings in the study by Pinto et al. (2012) suggest looser conceptions of social justice and stronger conceptions of social justice exist. Pinto et al. studied 41 school administrators’ perceptions regarding the role of equity, diversity and social justice in new teacher induction. The authors found the administrators prioritized issues like classroom management, pedagogy, individual learning styles, special needs, and differentiated instruction over systemic issues like racism, sexism, and classism. Evidence that both strong and loose conceptions of social justice exist is important because it shows people understand and describe social justice differently. These examples provide evidence of the concept’s various describability.

The data provides sufficient evidence to conclude both the conditions of internal complexity and various describability are satisfied. Examination of the data resulted in the identification of 13 aspects of social justice. The aspects are identified in Table 3 above. The array of different aspects shows the concept social justice to be internally complex. The different rankings of the aspects of social justice result in various describability. Specific examples of scholars’ prioritizing different aspects of social justice are found in the data source document authored by Lee (2011) paper. Additionally, the data provides evidence that both loose and
strong conceptions of social justice exist in the context of teacher education. Given the evidence provided it can be concluded that both Gallie’s (1956) conditions of internal complexity and various describability have been satisfied.

**Openness**

This condition in Gallie’s framework rests on the fact the accredited achievement is one that allows for modification due to changing circumstances and these changes or modifications are unpredictable. This means the concept’s “meaning is subject to periodic revision according to context” (Collier et al., 2006. p. 238). Gallie writes, for example, artistic achievement is open in character because it is not possible at any one particular point in time to predict or prescribe which new development or current art form will or will not have artistic worth at a future point in history (Gallie, 1956, p. 182).

One technique used to assess openness is to examine the concept over time. Changes in a concept’s meaning are easily identifiable from a historical perspective. The data source was examined to discern whether or not any systematic changes in the meaning and use of the term social justice in education could be identified across time. However, a historical analysis of the data source did not prove productive. This is likely due to the fact that direct use of the term social justice, in the context of teacher education, is a relatively recent phenomenon. Secondly, the articles in the data source cover a time span of approximately 16 years with the oldest article being published in 1998 and the most recent article being published in 2014.

A review of the 6 oldest articles and the 6 most recent did not produce information that would support the idea that the meaning and use of the term social justice had changed significantly over the sixteen years covered by the data source. Themes of equality, equity, oppression, individual and institutional responsibility, fairness, privilege, race, social
reconstruction, and activism were present in both the older and the more recent articles. It did not appear that the meaning and use of the term had changed in any discernable or significant way during the 16 years represented in the data source.

Although evidence satisfying the condition of openness cannot be identified in the data source using the technique of historical analysis, there is evidence of its open character in the data. For instance, one article from the data source states teacher education programs should create space for discussions “to help teachers see teaching for social justice as a journey, not a finished product” (Agarwal et al., 2010, p. 245). This particular document argues that teaching for social justice is dependent on the teacher’s conception of social justice, the teacher’s commitment to social justice, and the particularities of specific classroom and schools. The text in this document argues teaching for social justice is context specific and need not fit into any one particular model (Agarwal et al., 2010). Clearly the understanding of social justice held by the scholars who authored this text allows for modification due to changing circumstances.

Additional quotes from the data source are presented to support the finding that education scholars consider the concept open, for example: “Social justice is a constantly changing phenomenon and can never be assumed to be complete” (Reynolds & Brown, 2010, p. 413); “Definitions of work for social justice are, by nature, constantly partial and emerging” (Thomas, 2007, p. 2); “Social justice in education takes many different shapes” (Borrero, 2009. P. 222); “Each of the HSJTEP instructors apparently brought a different understanding of what it means to teach with a focus on social justice” (Brandes & Kelly, 2000, p. 89); “Other social justice scholars have similarly made the point that a clear and rigorously grounded description of social justice that honors its conceptual integrity has so far eluded the field more generally (Campbell, 2013, p. 222); “a social justice teacher identity is negotiated (Wenger, 1998) with respect to lived
experiences and culturally-informed reflections on those experiences” (Farnsworth, 2010, p. 1482); “First, the idea that the definition [for social justice] is ‘working’ means that it is open to interpretation and connotes a level of praxis (action and reflection on the world in order to change it)” (Katsarou et al., 2010, p. 139); “However, as Sturman also emphasized, the meaning of social justice is neither incontrovertible nor static” (North, 2008, p. 1184); “This research was guided by my understanding that teaching for social justice is complex, fluid, and situated, and by my curiosity about the ways teachers might change their minds while learning to teach” (Lee, 2011, p. 27); “Social justice has no ‘fixed or predictable meanings’ (Bogatch, 2002)” (Marshall & Ward, 2004, p. 533); “…we do not believe that the infusion of social justice can be reduced to curricular material or pedagogical methods…” (Oikonomidoy, Brock, Obenchain, & Pennington, 2013, p. 238). Additionally, as mentioned above, McDonald (2007) suggests determining a concrete definition for social justice may not be a worthy goal because developing a vision of social justice is a “negotiated process that occurs among faculty” at particular institutions (p. 2075).

Clearly these statements demonstrate that education scholars consider the concept open. This data supporting the condition of openness may also point to a problem with the concept social justice in the context of teacher education. A concept that is constantly changing, never complete, partial and emerging, and changes depending on each teacher’s particular conception and commitment seems somewhat problematic. However, it is important to note the data also showed that certain social justice scholars are engaged in efforts to decontest the concept. For example, the following scholars from the data source discuss ways social justice ought to be conceived in the context of teacher education Cochran-Smith (1999), Cochran-Smith et al. (2009a), Cochran-Smith et al. (2009b), Heybach (2009), Hoffman-Kipp (2003), North (2008).
Reciprocal Recognition

This condition requires that the contesting parties have some appreciation of the different criteria the other parties claim to be using in their application of the concept. Moreover, the contesting parties recognize the use and meaning they ascribe to the concept is contested by others. Therefore, in order to maintain a particular use and meaning the users will defend their particular application. Some scholars reject the idea that this condition is required to identify a concept as essentially contested (Collier et al., 2006). Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) write this condition simply restates the definition of contestedness and the fact that a debate about the meaning and use of a concept exists. The data provide evidence of the contested character of the term and that scholars acknowledge the concept’s contested character.

Text from the data source provides evidence that education scholars recognized different perspectives on social justice exist in education. Evidence of this acknowledgement can be seen in the following quotes from the data source: “It perhaps hardly needs to be stated that social justice is a complex and contested idea and/or set of practices in education…” (Boylan, 2009, p. 427); “we initially expected that creating a forum for conversation would lead to eventual agreement of some kind, we found instead that there was considerable disagreement around almost every aspect of social justice” (Cochran-Smith et al., 1999, p. 244); “Educational scholars…disagree about the primary attributes and historical legacies of education for social justice…” (North, 2008, p. 1184); “The term social justice can be a contested and contentious concept, often loosely defined or not defined at all by some educational researchers and theorist…” (Sandretto et al., 2007, p. 307), “Of course, the concept of social justice is highly contested and open to contradictory interpretations” (Heybach, 2009, p. 239). Other authors from the data source also acknowledge the contested nature of the term social justice in teacher

Additional evidence was also found showing scholars recognize some scholars use the term, social justice, in a superficial sense. Several data source documents make the point that if social justice means different things to different people and if education professionals commonly use it there exists the real possibility that in some cases the use is superficial. However, even though some education scholars may use the term superficially, the data source authors defend the use of the term, and in their papers, these authors attribute a real meaning to the term social justice (Kaputksa et al., 2009; McDonald, 2007; Sands, 2007).

This condition requires each party have some appreciation for the criteria the other party is using when they apply the concept. The data source provided evidence that scholars do have appreciation for the criteria inherent in other perspectives. Text evidencing an appreciation for the fact different perspectives on social justice exist was found in 49 of the 102 articles. For example, evidence that education scholars recognize and appreciate that different users of the term use different criteria in their understanding of social justice can be seen in text from a data source document describing a study of teacher educators’ understanding of social justice. This study found the various members of the group had very different understandings of the term social justice, as well as, the sources of injustice in schools and society (Cochran-Smith, 1999).

Additionally, these educators had different ideas regarding an educator’s obligations to change the unjust systems (Cochran-Smith, 1999). The authors of this data source article conclude, “Collaborative efforts to seek social justice in teaching and teacher education will always involve tensions and contradictions” (Cochran-Smith, 1999, p. 249). A quote from another data source document also demonstrates scholars’ recognition of the differences in the
meaning and use of the term. For example, one data source article (Hytten & Bettez, 2011) states widely disparate understandings of social justice exist in education. This article states these understandings range “from creating a vision of culturally responsive schools to leaving no child behind” (p. 8). However, evidence was not found in the data source showing arguments for a social justice perspective that includes the no child left behind standards and accountability or market based school choice reforms or individualism per se. Instead evidence was found showing social justice scholars position there understanding of social justice in opposition to standardization and accountability based reforms and market-driven reforms (e.g. Agarwal et al. 2010; Bieler, 2012; Bradley, 2011; Brandes & Kelly, 2000; Cochran-Smith, 2004; Hill & Boxley, 2007; Jaramilo, 2010; Katsarou et al. 2010; Kaur, 2012; Mullen, 2008; Picower, 2011; Pinto et al., 2012; Rodgers, 2006, 2013; Thomas, 2007). This is interesting and may be evidence the concept is becoming decontested in the context of teacher education showing that the debate over the concept is progressive. It could also be evidence of terminological contestation in that people who value individualism, and/or see standards and accountability, assimilation, and school choice as vehicles to achieve equality, fairness, and a more just society do not use the term social justice in their arguments.

Other examples of reciprocal recognition were also found in the data source. For example, text from a document in the data source discusses various understandings of social justice. One perspective is described in the following quote: “For many, social justice means simply ensuring that laws for individual rights are observed so that access to educational services available to children… [in legally protected groups]” (Marshall & Ward, 2004, p. 534). Another perspective is predicated on the motivation to “improve the social contract” by creating a “greater good for all individuals” in this perspective “social justice can mean “finding ways to
‘fix’ those with inequitable access (because of their poverty, language, gender, and so on)” (Marshall & Ward, 2004, p. 534). According to the authors this perspective is informed by “White Anglo-Saxon Western assumptions about what is valuable and who has deficits” (Marshall & Ward, 2004, p. 534).

A third perspective recognized in this data source document is labeled “critical humanist social justice” (Marshall & Ward, 2004, p. 534). This perspective subscribes to the social reproduction theory and holds existing institutions reproduce inequitable patterns and outcomes. Holders of this perspective demand radical change (Marshall & Ward, 2004, p. 534). A fourth perspective, informed by the philosophy of John Rawls, rests on the idea that justice is fairness. This perspective requires a form of social cooperation in which the division of advantages is such that it would entice the willing cooperation of everyone. According to the authors this fourth perspective requires a total restructuring of schools (Marshall & Ward, 2004, p. 534). Last, is a global perspective based on “the assumption that the political economies of modern and post-modern states have created global environmental problems whose burden falls on those with the least racial and economic power” (Marshall & Ward, 2004, p. 534). Educators with this perspective are seen as using soci-ecological justice to underpin their perspective. For this group the social justice “challenge is found within global systems and not just the test scores or achievement gap at their site” (Marshall & Ward, 2004, p. 534).

Although text was found in this data source document demonstrating a recognition of different uses and meaning of the term social justice the authors defend a particular understanding of social justice. The authors state that education leaders must acquire “deeper knowledge of the systemic patterns within schooling and society that create inequities” (Marshall & Ward, 2004, p. 531). Furthermore, these data source scholars argue for school leadership “to
be democratic, inclusive of diversity, and actively engaged in searching for interventionist methods that ameliorate harms, professors, policymakers, and practitioners must know and care about social justice” (Marshall & Ward, 2004, p. 531). The authors argue education leadership must be more than a science, it needs to be “an activist, interventionist craft” (Marshall & Ward, 2004, p. 531). The authors of this text also argue for an understanding that social justice is a basic goal of education (Marshall & Ward, 2004). The preceding text demonstrates Gallie’s definition of aggressive and defensive use of the term.

Following are examples demonstrating education scholars recognize the different criteria used by people holding different perspectives from the data. Text from one document identifies two opposing views of social justice in education: individualistic or communitarian (Landorf & Nevin, 2007). Relevantly, this is the same division Gallie (1956) identifies in his paper. Another document from the data source describes three philosophical traditions of “social justice: liberal individualism, market individualism, and social democratic” (Hytten & Bettez, 2011, p. 11). In addition to these different philosophical positions scholars note different justice orientations underpinning the various perspectives on social justice.

In one particular data source document the author documents three possible social justice perspectives. The first social justice model is based on distributive justice. In this model resources and opportunities are shifted to the disadvantaged. This redistributive model is further divided into two groups the “simple equality” and the “complex equality” group. The simple equality group grounds its understanding on liberal democratic principles and sees all individuals as having the same basic needs, whereas, the complex equality group is grounded on social democratic principles. The complex equality group makes an equity argument that advocates the distribution of different social goods for different groups of people (Mills, 2013).
The second social justice model or perspective identified in this data source document relies on conceptions of retributive justice. This model protects the person’s property and opportunities on the bases that these benefits are the rewards of skill and work and any attempt to unfairly take these resources should be penalized. In this model it is the protection of people, their resources, and their opportunities that is valued. A third social justice model is based on justice as recognition. In this model people should be recognized as they name themselves. All people are entitled to the provision of the requisite means allowing them to exercise their capabilities and determine their actions (Mills, 2013). Text was also identified showing scholars have noted the tension between redistributive perspectives of social justice and the recognition perspectives of social justice (Cochran-Smith et al., 2009a; Enterline, et al., 2008; McInerney, 2007; North, 2008; Pereira, 2013).

Recognition of different perspectives on social justice was also found in a data source article authored by Wang (2013). This article also advocates for a particular understanding of social justice providing evidence of aggressive and defensive use of the term. Wang writes Western concepts like rights, democracy, freedom, autonomy, and privatization are based upon a consciousness of the individual. Generally, Western conceptions of social justice are based upon the idea that individual persons, each with individual rights, join together to form a collective that is most beneficial to the majority in the collective. Wang argues when an individual or a group is considered an entity in itself then the achievement of social justice, that being the social equality and welfare of all, is not necessarily attained. Wang argues that social movements for group rights may be no better than social movements for individual rights. This is because social groups self-identify and become exclusive. These social groups become embroiled in oppositional struggles. What is good for one is not necessarily good for another and what is
good locally may not be good nationally or globally. In Wang’s view, the group supplants the self and so social movements for group rights are misguided from this social justice perspective.

Additionally, the data source document by Brandes & Kelly (2000) describes two different ways people think about social justice in teacher education. The first way is labeled the anti-oppression model. Social justice in this model is concerned with challenging racism, sexism, cultural imperialism, homophobia, heterosexism, and class inequality. A second way to think about social justice deals with developing the habit of cultivating critical questions about the world (p. 89). The document acknowledges the reciprocal recognition or tension exists between these two views of social justice. The authors recognize some people may not agree with the underlying assumptions of the anti-oppression model. They also recognize that the critical questioning model may result in differing opinions about the causes and solutions for inequality.

Additionally, text from this document (Brandes & Kelly, 2000) provides an example of scholars’ aggressive and defensive use of a concept. This is because, although these scholars claim to see some benefit in developing the habit of critical questioning due to the fact it creates safe spaces for students to ask questions about why there is inequality and the different solutions proposed to solve the problem of inequality. They also state, “the emphasis placed on material inequalities and suffering in the anti-oppression approach remind many of us that posing critical questions is never enough” (p. 89).

Another data source document identifies a particular form of social justice, racial social justice. This text also provides an example of the appreciation for the criteria in different conceptions of social justice as well as aggressive and defensive use of the term as defined by Gallie. Racial social justice is described in the Moule (2005) document and this scholar
recognizes that different perspectives on social justice exist. This scholar argues the addition of the word “racial” raises the stakes for people of color. This type of social justice requires the unmasking of racism in all its forms. She states, it is enough for her white colleagues to work toward social justice by acknowledging and taking a stand against overt racism (p. 25). However, she writes that as a woman of color, this type of individual action is not enough. She argues social change is required as part of her professional responsibility as a scholar and member of the faculty. Text from this document shows the author recognizes that differing perceptions lead to “dissimilar levels of commitment and divergent ways to work towards goals of our social justice perspective” in the teacher education faculty at her program (p. 25). She writes, although, the education faculty at her school disagree on the definitions of social justice they “put on a face of unity” for the student teachers and stand behind the social justice statements in the program literature (p. 37).

Another instance in which authors recognized differences in the way parties apply the term considers the idea that both a “richer” and “weaker” conception of social justice exist within the field of teacher education (Pinto et al., 2012, p. 8). This distinction was also identified in the condition of various describability. Text from a data source document authored by Pinto et al. (2012) was identified stating that both weaker and richer understandings of social justice exist in education. Text from this document shows these scholars recognize that school administrators who equated equity with the idea teachers employ a variety of assessment tools, respect multiple intelligences, maintain a good report between the children, encourage differentiated lessons, believe concepts like multiple intelligence, and require respect for different viewpoints hold a weaker version of social justice. The weaker version deals with ideas of fairness, equality and respect in the classroom and focuses on technical issues like classroom
management, use of multiple assessment tools, differentiated lessons, and curriculum policy knowledge. Text from this article shows these authors (Pinto et al, 2012) believe people who hold the weaker view miss the broader application of social justice.

The richer application of social justice described in the Pinto et al. (2012) document focuses on race, class, gender, and discusses societal issues of systemic injustice, marginalization, and privilege. The richer view holds that social justice is a means for critical transformation. Educators ascribing to the richer view of social justice necessarily counteract the hidden curriculum and inspire their students to take action for social change. These authors argue this richer understanding of social justice should be part of the essential knowledge teachers possess (Pinto et al, 2012, pp. 9-13). This preference for one view over the other is provides another example of aggressive and defensive use as defined by Gallie.

Another document from the data source appears to recognize a similar distinction in social justice perspective in teacher education. Instead of using the descriptors richer and weaker they discuss the fact that a “soft approach” to social justice exists, as well as, a more critical activist approach focused on larger social reforms (Philpott & Dagenais, 2012, p. 89). Text in this document was identified as stating that a danger exists that new teachers imbued with the understanding that social justice requires the dismantling of systemic societal inequalities will inevitably “bump up against the varied and controversial discourses of social justice and social responsibility” in schools (Philpott & Dagenais, 2012, p. 89). In order to fit in, these new teachers will let go of conceptions of social justice as activism. They will succumb to the “touchy-feely” or “softer approach” to social justice (Philpott & Dagenais, 2012, p. 88). The following quote: “This study highlights the gaps between the widely held views of social justice in academia and the views of social justice that circulate broadly in schools”, shows these
scholars recognize their social justice perspective is different from perspectives held in schools (Philpott & Dagenais, 2012, p. 89).

Additional text was identified in another data source document (Picower, 2007) as advocating for a version of social justice that includes the critical examination of power and privilege because they give rise to social inequality and oppression. This document describes what occurred in a social justice support group for new teachers. The author recognizes that other social justice perspectives exist with the following language, “Kelly explains how her lack of ownership of her classroom that she shared with a more senior teacher who did not share her [social justice] perspective served as an obstacle for her to teach toward the criteria that we developed in CIP [Social Justice Critical Inquiry Project]” (Picower, 2007, p. 16); and “The participants [student teachers] often expressed discomfort with ‘outing’ themselves as social justice educators within the context of their schools” (Picower, 2007, p. 9). Again text is identified showing a difference in the conceptions of social justice held in schools and the conceptions held in academia. Text from this document cautions that there is a danger the term social justice may be coopted or abandoned. This education scholar defends her perspective on social justice and argues that pre-service teachers must critically examine oppression on institutional, cultural, and individual levels to find opportunities for action that will result in social change.

Interestingly, another data source document (Atwater et al., 2013) describes a study examining 20 Black science teacher educators’ commitment to multicultural education, equity, and social justice. One teacher educator stated he did not focus as much as he thought he would on equity and diversity because he believes there is more to science than equity and diversity. He argues, although equity and diversity are important, there are things students have to learn
like content and pedagogical structures. This teacher educator supports and adheres to the philosophy that all children can learn and argues this particular philosophy is full of equity and diversity implications. This faculty member explained his colleagues criticized him for not focusing more on equity and diversity.

The education scholars who authored this paper state that this teacher educator “does not see his role in science teacher preparation as one about equity and social justice” (Atwater et al., 2013, p. 1308). It appears the authors hold a different perspective from the above mentioned teacher educator and the authors defend their particular understanding of social justice. It is worth remembering that after the NCATE controversy and the removal of social justice from the NCATE standards, Arthur Wise, President of NCATE, wrote that NCATE’s diversity standard as well as the requirement that “teacher candidates teach consistently with the ideals of fairness and the belief that all children can learn” contain elements of the ideal of social justice (Wise, 2007, par 7). It may be that this particular science teacher educator holds a view of social justice similar to the conception of social justice Dr. Wise professed. Wise’s statement seems closely aligned with what the science teacher educator seemed to be saying.

Perhaps the most public example of the contested nature of social justice in education is found in the six articles discussing NCATE’s removal of the term social justice from their professional standards (Applebaum, 2009; Bieler. 2012; Campbell, 2013; Heybach, 2009; Tinkler et al., 2014; Villegas, 2007). Keep in mind the removal was due to pressure from groups opposing the way the term social justice was being used in teacher education. This controversy centered on the use of social justice as an example of an appropriate disposition for teacher candidates on which the teacher candidates could be evaluated and judged by the faculty of his or her teacher education program. Critics of the application of the term social justice to teacher
dispositions argued that there exists a real possibility that use of the term by some teacher education programs may subject students to a political litmus test or to the ideological indoctrination of the cultural and political left in violation of the pre-service teachers’ First Amendment rights.

Although, no article specifically argued for ideological tests per se, there was evidence that certain scholars may not be opposed to the idea of selecting candidates and faculty based on social justice beliefs. The Mills (2009) study suggests that instead of trying to enlighten or change pre-service teachers who hold the wrong ideas, it may be better to pick the right people in the first place (p. 286). Cochran-Smith et al. (1999) also discuss the importance of choosing faculty and students who hold the correct ideas (p. 244).

Text from two other data source documents (Applebaum, 2009, Heybach, 2009) also exemplifies reciprocal recognition with regard to the debate over the meaning of social justice in teacher education. The following quote: “I hope to liberate social justice from the narrow definition its opponents have projected upon it as a mere ideology and indoctrination” demonstrates recognition of the critics’ perspective that social justice teacher education is indoctrination (Heybach, 2009, p. 234). The documents produced by these two scholars both recognize the existence of this negative perspective on social justice. However, they reject it defend their preferred use and understanding of social justice.

For example, the Heybach (2009) document also uses the term social justice in an aggressive and defensive manner. This data source author defends the term social justice and argues for her conception of the term. She describes two modes of social justice: one internal and one external. The external mode “is to expose and alter the institutions which perpetuate systemic oppression” (p. 239). This external mode is grounded in both Marxist and Freirean
critiques. The internal mode has to do with helping people see “oppressive patterns that affect themselves and by extension, all human beings” (p. 239). The aim of the internal mode is personal emancipation. Overall, Heybach (2009) argues social justice should be seen as the set of values and aims constituting democratic education. This author defends her use of social justice and asserts that to most people “social justice is positive and connotes values associated with the Judeo-Christian tradition” (p. 241).

The data source article by Applebaum (2009) admits social justice involves a bias but argues this does not mean students are subject to the imposition of a particular worldview or indoctrination. Text from this article also demonstrated that from this scholar’s perspective privileged students can, and sometimes should, be silenced in the classroom. This teacher educator writes, “Moreover, no matter how much they feel silenced, the sometimes warranted silencing of certain privileged students does not make these students systematically marginalized” (p. 402). In contrast, text from another data source article argues today’s social justice educators’ harbor “political hostility and resistance to the policies and values associated with more centrist neoliberal and conservative worldviews that create what they portray as the dominant of an oppressive mainstream society” (Campbell, 2013, p. 222).

Text acknowledging the perspective that social justice teacher education is a form of indoctrination was also found in another article from the data source (Campbell, 2013). Campbell’s article identifies several definitions of indoctrination: “the teaching (of) an ideology as if it were the only possible one with any claim to rationality” (p. 230); the teaching of a set of beliefs or point of view in a way that portrays the idea that what is taught is “so true and important to individual or social well-being that, by contrast, all possible alternatives are false and dangerous” (p. 230); “the willful and intentional act of teachers to get students to hold
beliefs in such a way that they are unlikely to question the truth of such beliefs in the face of opposing evidence or counter arguments” (p. 230); teachers who do not tolerate dissent in the classroom, or answer students’ objections in an intimidating or overly partisan manner, or a lack of impartiality or objectivity in the presentation of rival theories (p. 232).

The following examples of text from the Campbell (2013) show recognition of the perspective that views social justice teacher education as indoctrination: “By its own definition, social justice education is not politically neutral, but politically driven” (p. 229); social justice “advocates and critics recognize its narrow political focus as being representative of values, beliefs, assumptions, causes, and objectives associated with ‘leftist,’ and often radical ‘leftist,’ perspectives that tend not to reflect more mainstream public expectations in free democracies” (p. 229); “Those who support and defend social justice...portray it as a principled and necessary counter balance to what they describe as systemic social injustice” (p. 229); “For those who do not share [social justice] worldviews or their activist solutions for addressing problems in society, social justice doctrine is perceived as one-sided and oppressive of anyone who challenges its assumptions of morality” (p. 229); “…given the social justice educator’s self-appointed mission to ‘change’ student beliefs, political perspectives, and ‘cherished assumptions and world views…students have ‘no right’ (p.123) to resist the teachings of social justice” (p. 231). Text from this article also expresses the idea that social justice educators exist “who regularly report, with some disdain and great alarm, that many students are resistant to their teachings” (p. 231). Campbell (2013) argues for some teacher educators “social justice is a cause to fight for” and for this group the struggle against contrary worldviews is central to their teaching (p. 231). Students who oppose this ideology are “judged to be wrong and in need of political correction” (p. 232).
Campbell (2013) offers the following critique “it [social justice education] seems to violate its own principle to never accept any idea uncritically by compelling students and teachers alike to embrace its tenets without genuine, open-minded, and impartial debate or critique” (p. 232). Text from this article also states social justice teacher education “ignores student autonomy and seems willing to sacrifice basic principles of freedom, fairness, and empathy towards all students in the pursuit of what is represented as a higher social mission” (Campbell, 2013, p. 232). Text in this article suggests a presumption of indoctrination where something controversial is being taught and a method is used that imparts “a singular perspective on the content with the deliberate aim and result of inculcating in others the unquestioning acceptance of the beliefs, values, and assumptions associated with that perspective” (p. 230). This scholar argues this kind of practice amounts to a violation of ethical teaching.

The data showed this indoctrination perspective is also recognized in the Cochran-Smith et al. (2009b). Text from this article showed these authors reject the indoctrination perspective. These authors studied 12 master's level teaching candidates from their teacher education program at Boston College. The authors state; “While the respondents in this study said that social justice was ‘all around them’ in their program, none alluded to the emphasis as indoctrination…many were attracted to the program because of this emphasis” (p. 359). Additionally, “participants described a range of ways social justice was presented in their courses, none of their comments referred to an anti-Western, or anti-American stance as some critics have argued” (p. 359). Curious about the extent to which the idea that social justice teacher education is associated with indoctrination I conducted a text search for the word indoctrinate and its variants. Only 15 articles were returned and of those only six mention the critique that social justice teacher education amounts to indoctrination (Brandes & Kelly, 2000;
Campbell, 2013; Cochran-Smith et al., 1999; Heybach, 2009; Landorf & Nevin, 2007; Olson & Craig, 2012; Villegas, 2007). However, four of these six articles caution against the process of indoctrination (Cochran-Smith et al., 1999; Landorf & Nevin, 2007; Olson & Craig, 2012). The data also show advocates of social justice teacher education do not deny the political nature of their teaching (Bender-Slack, 2009; Berta-Avila & William-White, 2010; Boylan, 2009; Bradley, 2011; Carr, 2008; Carr & Pluim, Cochran-Smith et al., 1999; Cochran-Smith et al. 2009a; Cochran-Smith, 2009b; Enterline et al., 2008; Fennimore, 2014; Howell et al., 2010; Jackson, 2010; Heybach, 2009; Kaputska et al. 2009; Katsarou & Picower, 2010; Kelly & Brandes, 2010; Kroll, 2013; Lynn & Smith-Maddox, 2007; McDonald, 2005; McDonald, 2007, McIrney, 2007; Moore, 2008; Pereira, 2013; Philpott & Dagenais, 2012; Picower, 2007; Picower, 2011; Reynolds & Brown, 2010; Rodgers, 2006; Tinkler et al., 2014; Okpokodu, 2007; Okpokodu, 2010; Okpokodu, 2010a; van Wyck, 2006).

Related to the political nature of social justice in teacher education and the perspective that social justice education involves indoctrination, the data show some social justice teacher educators do argue teacher education requires changing teacher attitudes and beliefs. These teacher educators require teacher candidates to question their ideas about race, class, culture, privilege, and structural inequalities and Western culture and traditions. The goal of these efforts is to effect personal, as well as, social change (e. g. Borreto, 2009; Campbell, 2013; Fredrick, Cave, & Perencevich, 2010; Kelly & Brandes, 2010; Kraehe & Brown, 2011; Larrabee & Morehead, 2010; Lazar, 2013; Mills, 2013; Olsen & Craig, 2012; Rodgers, 2006; Pereira, 2013; Ukpokodu, 2007, 2010).

Evidence was found in another document pertaining to reciprocal recognition. It specifically references the fact different people may apply the term social justice differently. In
this data source document the authors (Cochran-Smith et al., 2009b) bring up an interesting issue associated with the use of the term social justice in teacher education. These scholars note that what is labeled “social justice teaching” by some is, in fact, labeled “just good teaching” by others. This fact highlights the ambiguity problem associated with the application of the term social justice in education. However, these scholars distinguish their understanding of “social justice teaching” from “just good teaching.” From the perspective of these authors social justice teaching includes the practices and strategies that “many people would label good teaching” (p. 374). In addition, however, it rejects the idea that “learning and schooling are neutral and value-free activities that are not – and should not be – connected to larger political or ideological commitments” (p. 374). These authors specifically argue for the understanding that teaching for social justice is “‘an activity with political dimensions…[in which] all educators [are] responsible for challenging inequities in the social order and working with others to establish a more just society’” (p. 352).

It is clear that the condition of reciprocal recognition is met. There is sufficient evidence showing that education scholars are aware of contrasting views of social justice. It is interesting that scholars note the existence of a “loose” (Campbell, 2013) use of the phrase social justice or a narrow (Heybach, 2009) conception of social justice yet no arguments supporting these conceptions were found in the data source. Similarly, the Pinto et al. (2012) article identified “richer” and “weaker” versions of social justice. Pinto et al. are critical of the weaker versions of social justice and suggest that social change is critical to a proper conception of social justice in teacher education.

The discussion above identifies various authors who aggressively and defensively use their understanding of social justice in teacher education. There are authors who specifically
defend social justice against the claim that it is ambiguous, value-laden, and ideological (e.g. Applebaum, 2009; Heybach, 2009; Cochran-Smith, et al. 2009b). The Landorf and Nevin (2007) data source document details the conflict between individuals based on their justice orientation. They distinguish between individualistic orientations and communitarian orientation. However, in their article they attempt to find a way to reconcile these perspectives. Similarly, Mills (2013) discusses scholars’ differences in justice orientations. She discusses three possible justice perspectives informing social justice: redistributive, retributive, and recognition. It is clear from Mills discussion that she advocates for or defends the social democratic versions of redistributive justice and recognition perspectives of social justice in teacher education. Some scholars recognize the tension between redistribution and recognition (e.g. Cochran-Smith, et al., 2009a; Enterline, et al., 2008; McInerney, 2007; North, 2008; Pereira, 2013). Wang (2013) critiques conceptions of social justice that advocate for group rights or identity politics.

Exemplar

Gallie’s idea of including the condition of an exemplar is predicated on the idea that it assures the contestants are all using and meaning the same concept. However, overtime this condition of Gallie’s framework has created considerable confusion. The narrow version of this condition requires that the meaning of the concept be anchored in a specific historical instance. As discussed previously, in chapter two, the narrow understanding of the exemplar is problematic. Critics of the narrow version of the exemplar say this interpretation is contrary to the idea of essential contestability because if all the contestants agree to anchor their understanding to the same specifically defined historical instance then there is no contest. On the other hand, the broad version holds the exemplar may be based on a number of historically independent but significantly similar traditions. In the broad version the exemplar is internally
complex, variously describable, open and may involve various traditions (Collier et al., 2006, p. 239). This study uses the broader version of Gallie’s condition of exemplar.

Meeting this condition is somewhat problematic in this study because the data source contains articles published over a short period of only 16 years (1998-2014). Only four of 102 articles in the data source make any significant reference to the history of the term social justice in education. However, text was identified explaining the appearance of the term in education literature: “Given the recent highly publicized war over the meaning of terms like multiculturalism... educational researchers such as Griffiths (1998) intentionally use social justice to describe the subject and methodology of their work” (North, 2008, p. 1183). North reports the switch was due to the fact that the term social justice was not used much in academia or media and therefore did not elicit the attention and controversy of other better-known terms (p. 1183).

Text from a second data source article (Hytten & Bettez, 2011) provides information about social justice in education. These scholars state the concept of social justice is actually not new to education. This document states, “there is a long history in the United States of educators who foreground social justice issues in their work and who argue passionately for their centrality to schooling in a democratic society” (p. 8). This document contains text that directly connects the term social justice to the movements of progressive educators like Dewey, social reconstructionist like Counts, multicultural education, and critical pedagogy. The ultimate goal of these efforts was “to create educational environments that empower historically marginalized people, that challenge inequitable social arrangements and institutions, and that offer strategies and visions for creating a more just world” (p. 8). This article also discusses the various
philosophical and justice traditions underpinning education scholars’ understandings of the concept.

Text from a third data source document argues that before the twentieth century the concept of social justice was a form of ordinary justice. This education scholar writes that in the twentieth century the concept changed and became “aligned with philosophical viewpoints more reflective of ‘socialistic’ and ‘revolutionary’ orientations” (Campbell, 2013, p. 222). Data from a fourth document (Wang, 2013) was also coded to the exemplar node. Text from this article provides evidence that, “Social justice has different meanings for different people, and often hosts internal contradictions” (p. 490). The following statement was coded to the exemplar node “Zajda, Majhanovich, and Rust (2006) trace the epistemology of social justice back to Plato, Thomas Aquinas, and Kant philosophically, and locate its direct source in social reformers’ efforts to attend to the needs of uprooted peasants at the end of the 19th century” (Wang, 2013, p. 490). The author of this data source document states conceptions of social justice generally “refer to an egalitarian society based on principles of equality, solidarity”, values human rights, and recognizes the dignity of all persons (p. 490).

Assuming all the contestants agree the exemplar for social justice is the construction of a just society then the conception regarding what makes a society just is key. A person’s conception of justice depends on the philosophical tradition they follow. One data source document (Hytten & Bettez, 2011) explicitly discusses various philosophical justice orientations mentioned in social justice education literature. For example, this document mentions the following philosophers Rawls, Fraser, Young, and Nozick. Furthermore, the findings for the condition of reciprocal recognition also show some variety in the philosophical traditions cited by education scholars. The various philosophical traditions are similar in that they have justice
as their end. However, they are also sufficiently distinct from each other. An argument can be made that these justice orientations likely evolved through a process of true succession and tradition described by Ruben (2010).

Ruben (2010), discussed in chapter two, argues that over time the beliefs and practices of people are subject to weakening and fading. Across time and people, each group or person may experience different degrees of change based on which features of a multifaceted concept they consider most important. He suggests later groups may be true successors and faithful, not to the original group, but to groups that may have splintered off from the original group. The difficulty occurs when groups or persons have asymmetrical beliefs and practices yet state they are part of the same tradition. In this case the opposing sides disagree about what they believe to be the most important features of the beliefs and practices of the exemplar. Thus, the dispute is irresolvable (Ruben, 2010).

It can be argued that if social justice is a type of justice and the concept of justice is essentially contested then the exemplar for social justice is internally complex, variously describable, open and may involve various traditions. This appears to satisfy the broad version of Gallie’s condition of an exemplar. The broad version of this condition holds the exemplar may be based on “a number of historically independent but sufficiently similar traditions” (Gallie, 1956, p.186).

Progressive Competition

Gallie (1956) argues the “continuous competition for acknowledgement as between contestant users of the concept, enables the original exemplar’s achievement to be sustained or developed in optimum fashion” (p. 180). It was Gallie’s (1956) idea that the examination of the arguments for or against a particular meaning or use provides insight into the rationale for that
particular use or application of the concept producing conceptual clarity. It was thought this examination improves the quality of scholarly and philosophical debate. However, it is also possible that poor arguments are offered muddying the debate and resulting in regressive competition (Collier et al., 2006). Therefore, continuous debate does not necessarily result in the substantive clarification of a concept (Choi & Majumdar, 2014; Daly, 2011). Some scholars suggest this condition is not necessarily required to identify a concept as essentially contested (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009; Collier et al., 2006).

This condition takes notice of the reasoning or conscious thinking associated with the arguments supporting a specific continued use or change(s) in use. Critics of Gallie contend agreement about these kinds of concepts cannot occur because these kinds of concepts involve normative judgments on the part of the users and this makes agreement impossible (Choi & Majumdar, 2014). The applicable understanding of progressive competition used in this study holds that even though the continuous debate cannot provide a determination of the “best use” of a concept, it can provide insight into the rationality of a given individual’s or group’s use or change in use (Collier et al., 2006; Swanton, 1985).

Scholars included in the data source made specific attempts to further the debate over the concept of social justice as it is applied in education (e.g. Applebaum, 2009; Campbell, 2013; Cochran-Smith et al., 1999; Cochran-Smith et al. 2009b; Heybach, 2009; Hytten & Bettez, 2011; Kaputska et al., 2009; McDonald, 2007; North, 2008; Sandretto et. al., 2007, Wang, 2013). These efforts focus on the examination of the concept in order to understand more about its various applications in education or to clarify the concept or at least aspects of the concept. For example, text from one document states: “the concept [social justice] along with its various
meanings was continuously brought into deliberations and used as a way of contesting or forwarding competing agendas” (Cochran-Smith et al., 1999, p. 242).

To be sure, the data shows some confusion exists with regard to the way social justice is used in teacher education. Text was identified showing that the scholarly debate has not resulted in the production of a universal definition for social justice in teacher education. For example, text was identified showing the following scholarly opinion: “To complicate matters further for new teachers, those who seek information on social justice…discover the educational discourses on this issue are opaque and sometimes contradictory” (Philpott & Dagenais, 2012, p. 87).

Another data source document analyzing the application of the term social justice in education schools’ conceptual frameworks found areas of agreement, as well as, areas of disagreement and silence regarding the use and meaning of social justice (Howell et al., 2010).

Data was found demonstrating rationales for the different understandings of social justice. For example, data coded to reciprocal recognition and various describability identified text showing the different philosophical traditions that appear in the literature. References to the theories of Rawls, Fraser, Young, and Nozick were found in the data. In some cases these theories ground scholars’ conceptions of social justice. The authors in the data source did not always explicitly mention the particular justice orientation used to underpin their particular understanding of social justice. However, some did and below are examples from the data source of these different orientations utilized.

Guyton (2000), for example, relies on the definition of justice put forth by Rawls. For Guyton, social justice means social institutions provide the fair distribution of rights: “liberties, self-respect, power, opportunities, income and wealth” (p. 108). She sees education as a social institution and education as a right not a privilege. Therefore, from her social justice perspective,
she argues that teacher education must support the idea that education is right. Guyton states teacher education for social justice is more than multicultural education; it requires social reconstruction. She argues teachers must educate students to reconstruct society for justice. She advocates for the construction of democratic classrooms in which students have a voice and are respectful to other students. It is in these classrooms that knowledge will be constructed not transferred. Guyton states education is a moral enterprise and social justice is its goal.

Other scholars in the data source base their social justice perspective on the work of Iris Marion Young and/or Nancy Fraser. Examples of scholars who discuss Young’s philosophy in relation to social justice and education include: Hytten & Bettez, (2011), Lee (2011), and McDonald (2005, 2007, 2008). As mentioned earlier, Young prioritizes social relationship, the empowerment of minority groups and challenges the distributive aspects of justice saying they obscure structural inequalities. Young argues oppression is embedded in policies, procedures, and institutions. She discounts the idea that oppression is primarily the result of individual actions. Similar to Young, the critical democracy theorists argue social justice requires inclusion and empowerment and must pay special attention to the marginalized (Pinto et al., 2012).

Other authors (e.g. Bates, 2006; Cochran-Smith et al., 2009; Enterline et al., 2008; Farnsworth, 2010; Kaur, 2012 Mills, 2009; Mills, 2013; North, 2008; Reynolds & Brown, 2010; Sandretto et al., 2007) invoke Nancy Fraser’s philosophical perspective on social justice. As mentioned in chapter two, Fraser argues there are three main aspects to social justice: redistributive, recognition, and representation. Broadly speaking the distributional aspect refers to how economic rewards are distributed. Fraser argues public resources should be directed towards the least advantaged. The second aspect deals with the recognition of culture and the redress of misrecognition. This second aspect concerns the exclusion of individuals based on
qualities related to wealth, gender, sexuality, geographic location, religion, or any other quality that preserves the relative relations between culturally defined groups. The third aspect deals with representation or the opportunity for all to participate as peers (Bates, 2006, pp. 280-282).

Additionally, the Reynolds and Brown (2010) document provides another example of a theory of social justice pinned to Fraser’s philosophy. Their paper highlights the distributional aspects of the concept social justice. Reynolds and Brown argue in a socially just society all people have equal worth and opportunity and there is no room for “prejudice or discrimination based on race, class, gender, sexual orientation, physical ability, or any other factor” (p. 406). They cite Johnson’s definition of social justice that prioritizes the “‘fair, equitable, and impartial’” distributions “‘of resources, opportunities and benefits of society to all its members regardless of position, place, or other exclusionary criteria deemed unfair’” (p. 406). Other education reform movements, like critical theory, anti-oppression pedagogy, anti-racist pedagogy, and multicultural education appear to use similar justice orientations. References to a particular philosophical tradition are important because they ground scholars’ conceptions of social justice and show the reasoning or conscious thinking behind a person’s particular understanding of social justice.

I was interested to know if any of these theories of justice were dominant in the literature. Using the NVivo data analysis software I conducted a text search of the entire data source for each of the theorists’ names mentioned above. Next, I checked each hit to ensure it was, in fact, a reference to the particular theorist of interest and not something or someone else. This search produced a total of 24 articles. Of these 24 articles seven reference Young alone, four referenced Fraser alone, three referenced Rawls alone, four referenced Young and Fraser, three referenced Young and Rawls, one referenced Fraser and Rawls, and two referenced Fraser,
Rawls and Young. Young was mentioned alone or in concert with another theorist in 16 of the 24 articles. This information coupled with the fact that recognition was the dominant social justice aspect found in the data source may be an indication that Young’s theories regarding justice are dominant in teacher education literature. However, it would be premature to make such a conclusion at this point. This is because the data show a relatively limited number of data source documents specifically express a particular philosophical orientation. Additionally, several documents discuss these philosophical traditions in articles examining various existing conceptions of social justice and not as a philosophy underpinning their particular perspective (Hyttten and Bettez, 2011; McDonald, 2007; North, 2008; Sandretto et al., 2007). Furthermore, other philosophical or theoretical orientations were not included in the search.

I found the text from one data source document particularly interesting and relevant to the condition of progressive competition. The authors of this text admit the “widespread appeal” of the term and the “great variation in how the term ‘social justice’ is used in teacher education” (Cochran-Smith et al., 2009b, p. 350). Additionally, text from this document states: “critics have rightly argued that the concept is ambiguous and undertheorized” (Cochran-Smith et al., 2009b, p. 350). This document makes the argument that social justice, in teacher education, has four dominant central tenets. Of particular interest to me was the fact that the central tenets these scholars identify are reflected in the aspects of social justice identified by this study.

For example, the first agreed upon central tenet of social justice, in teacher education, identified by these scholars (Cochran-Smith et al., 2009b) concerns the existence of an implicit or explicit reliance on distributive justice. This study found that 61 of the 102 (59.80%) articles referenced the distributive/equity aspect of social justice. Second, Cochran-Smith et al. (2009b) state it is understood “that the bottom line of teaching is enhancing students’ learning and their
life chances by challenging the inequities of school and society” (p. 350). These authors explain that when teaching is thought of as challenging inequities, it necessarily “links teachers’ classroom practices with larger social responsibilities” (p. 375). This central idea of social justice teacher education, presented by Cochran-Smith et al. (2009b), is also reflected in the aspects of social justice identified in this study. For example, with regard to “enhancing student learning and life chances” this study found 46 of the 102 (45.10%) articles referred to the aspect of teacher accountability. Additionally, with regard to the idea that teachers should challenge the inequalities of school and society, this study found 57 of the 102 (55.88%) referred to action aspects, 76 or the 102 (74.51%) articles referred to social change aspects, and 47 of the 102 (46.08%) articles referred the idea the teaching is political. The authors also state that critiquing universalist views of knowledge that do not appreciate the “knowledge traditions and experiences of marginalized groups” is consistent with social justice teaching practice (p. 351). This study found that 85 of the 102 (83.33%) articles referenced recognition aspects of social justice.

A third central tenet of social justice in teacher education is the “recognition of significant disparities in the distribution of educational opportunities, resources, achievement, and positive outcomes between minority or low-income students and their white middle-class counterparts” (Cochran-Smith et al., 2009b, p. 350). This study found 59 of the 102 articles (57.84 %) made references to the critical consciousness/ critical inquiry aspects of social justice, 32 of the 102 (31.37) articles refer to teacher attitudes and beliefs, and 41 of the 102 (40.20%) articles referred to the fairness/equality aspects of social justice. A fourth central idea integral to social justice is the teacher “can and should be both educators and advocates who are committed to the democratic ideal and diminishing existing inequalities in schools and society by helping to
redistribute educational opportunities” (Cochran-Smith et al., 2009b, p. 350). The democratic ideal is not explained in Cochran-Smith et al. (2009b). However, it seems safe to assume Cochran-Smith et al. (2009b) are likely referencing issues similar to the ones identified in this study and reflected in the aspects of democratic participation/citizenship which was found in 39 of 102 (38.24%) articles, responsibility was found in 27 of 102 (26.47%) articles, community building aspects found in 35 of the 102 (34.31%) articles, and the fairness/equality aspect found in 41 of 102 (40.20%) articles.

Another document from the data source also provides evidence of progressive competition. In this document the scholar (North, 2008) conducted “a critical examination of the current literature on social justice education” (p. 1184). Although, this document points out that social justice education “has been associated with different beliefs practices and policies across time” (p. 1183). The author identifies six interrelated concepts constituting social justice in education. The concepts are: redistribution, recognition, macro processes (processes outside school), micro processes (processes within schools), knowledge, and action. These concepts and the supporting text offered by North (2008) in this data source document are similar to the aspects identified by the content analysis in this study.

For example, this content analysis also identified recognition aspects and distributive/equity aspects of social justice in the data source. Next, this data source scholar (North, 2008) identifies the concept of macro processes these are the power and social relations outside the school (e.g. macroeconomic policies, transnational forces, community based youth organizations, society-wide policies, socio-cultural norms, dominant beliefs on educational institutions, and media). According to North micro-processes include relations among the staff and between staff and students. Important at the micro-level are classroom social interactions
and the exchange of knowledge. The macro processes influence the micro processes or internal school life of schools preventing social and institutional change. This data source scholar notes that education scholars seeking social change must be aware that different skills are needed for political participation at the macro and micro levels. The article states, “Educational scholars seeking social transformation need to use a both/and approach by examining and advocating for citizens’ political participation at micro and macro levels within and beyond U. S. borders” (North, 2008, p. 1193). These ideas share a similarity to some of the aspects of social justice identified by the content analysis conducted in this study; for example, teaching is political, social change, community building, teacher attitudes and beliefs, and democratic participation/citizenship.

The fifth concept identified in this data source document is knowledge. Knowledge refers to the intellectual development of students. It also refers to developing critical consciousness, education for social change, education for good citizenship, education for democratic citizenship (North, 2008). However, knowledge is not enough and a sixth concept entitled action is also deemed critical to social justice education. The action concept deals with the idea that developing a critical consciousness and enlightenment is not enough and so political action is required (North, 2008, pp. 1194-1195). The content analysis, conducted by this study, identified social justice aspects similar to this data source scholar’s knowledge and action concepts. For example, the aspects of social change, critical consciousness/critical inquiry, democratic participation/citizenship, community building, teacher accountability, teaching is political, and responsibility all share characteristics with the various items North places within the knowledge concept.
Other documents from the data source that debate the meaning or different perspectives on social justice also contain data relevant to progressive competition. For example, the Applebaum (2009) document specifically addresses the perspective that social justice is a “code word for political and social indoctrination” (p. 378). This author states: “the accusation is to be welcomed in that it opens up a space to critically reflect on the goals of social justice education and whether such initiatives are effective” (p. 378). However, this data source scholar offers a caveat with regard to a debate about social justice. This scholar argues that the perception of social justice as an ideology is dangerous in education because classrooms can reflect and reproduce the power structure and social relations of the wider society. The claim that social justice amounts to the imposition of a left-leaning ideology justifies privileged students’ resistance to considering “the culture of power” (Applebaum, 2009, p. 378).

This data source scholar argues: “Academic neutrality does not necessarily equal ‘balance’ but rather can function to normalize dominance, especially when the dominant status quo is not acknowledged” (Applebaum, 2009, p. 384). This scholar argues social justice education is warranted because some children suffer as a result of systemic injustice. This scholar relies on the rationale that although social justice is somewhat ideological it does not involve imposition because it promotes rather than arrests a certain type of criticality (Applebaum, 2009, p. 379). It requires asking questions like: who made the situation as it is; who is served by the status quo; why are certain constructions of reality validated by the dominant culture; why are other constructions of reality marginalized and dismissed (Applebaum, 2009, p. 397).

This data source scholar is concerned with educating the privileged student about their “taken for granted” dominant beliefs and privileges and learning about the idea of systemic
injustice even if the student disagrees with the idea. This scholar concludes: “Social justice education is both biased and ideological but not in a pejorative sense. It has as an ‘agenda’ – social justice – and does not retreat or cover up its partisanship (Applebaum, 2009, p. 402). However, this scholar argues social justice education does not amount to indoctrination because it is not about “‘pounding the pulpit’” and social justice educators, like all educators, must be careful not to abuse their power in the classroom. It appears that the concept of social justice education is settled in her mind and a debate over the goals and effectiveness of social justice is the next step.

Additionally, other data provides evidence of progressive competition. Data from the Campbell (2013) document, discussed earlier in section on reciprocal recognition, demonstrates a scholar furthering the understanding of social justice in education by distinguishing social justice teacher education scholarship from the scholarship associated with moral and ethical teaching. This document (Campbell, 2013) compares and contrasts social justice education literature with education literature on moral and ethical teaching. As discussed in reciprocal recognition, she argues, traditionally, the moral and ethical dimension of teaching finds its foundation on virtuous conduct relating to qualities like fairness, compassion, care, honesty, courage, constancy, diligence, integrity, personal responsibility, and practical wisdom that characterize the work of teachers in their accountable position of public service and duty (p. 216). She writes that people in the education world who hold a loose or weak understanding of the concept social justice may self-identify as a social justice educator when they are dedicated to respecting and protecting the dignity and autonomy of minority and/or underprivileged students, as well as, dedicated to enhancing the intellectual well-being of these children (p. 228).
However, this scholar (Campbell, 2013) makes the point that, at a micro or classroom level, this loose understanding and application of the concept social justice is not different from what is found in the research on ethical teaching. In fact, she writes, the behavior of individual teachers who hold this weak view of social justice likely mirrors the teacher behavior described in the empirical studies on ethical and moral classrooms. However, Campbell states honoring the critical integrity of social justice theory requires more. Campbell argues education scholars writing about social justice emphasize “the political nature of social justice and use the language of power, bias, equity, privilege, oppression, and democratic schooling, while compelling the critique of societal structures, systems, processes, and institution” (p. 217). Therefore, this scholar argues social justice theory requires a leftist political orientation. Campbell (2013) argues further that a problem occurs when social justice education scholars adopt the language of morals and ethics without engaging the existing research and literature on the moral and ethical dimensions of teaching. She sees these two areas of ethical teaching and teaching for social justice as separate and distinct.

Evidence from the data source shows scholars have claimed to identify the central tenets of social justice teacher education and/or explain or show the rationality behind a particular use of the concept in teacher education literature. The data from the data source reflects efforts to clarify the meaning of social justice. It is interesting that the aspects of social justice identified by the content analysis in this study are very similar to the central ideas identified in both the Cochran-Smith et al. (2009b) and North (2008) data source. An argument can be made that evidence exists showing the concept is attaining a common meaning in teacher education. This evidence satisfies Gallie’s condition for progressive competition.
Terminological contestation

In order to uncover evidence of terminological contestation I examined the keywords assigned to each article by the Education Resources Information Center (ERIC) with the intension of finding some evidence of the sub-concepts or facets of social justice as it is applied in teacher education. I kept track of these keywords using an excel spread sheet and found the most commonly used key words had to do with multicultural education and attitudes. I did not think it would be informative to pursue multicultural education and attitudes as aspects of social justice to uncover evidence of terminological contestation. Two of the aspects of social justice, identified by the content analysis this study, the recognition aspect and the teacher attitudes and beliefs aspect are similar to the key words multiculturalism and attitudes. I decided this line of inquiry would not be helpful in identifying whether or not social justice is terminologically contested.

However, in the course of reading the data source documents, I began to take note of instances in the literature where education scholars advancing a social justice perspective in teacher education position concepts like standardized testing, neoliberalism, neo-conservatism, capitalism, individualism, the free-market as ideologies opposed to or impeding social justice. I did text search queries for the following terms: standardized testing, neoliberal, neoconservative, individualism, and market the search returned 32 relevant documents. References to these concepts varied. For example in a discussion about how dominant societal norms oppress certain identities (LGBTQ students) the author argues oppression is transformed into policies that are presented as protecting students. This author uses neoliberalism in the following sentence, “In other words, the notion of risk management is an emerging neoliberal discourse that fails to question who is being protected from whom” (Jackson, 2010). Other authors use these concepts
in a more substantive manner. For example, a data source document argues that it is necessary for education scholars to make an effort to clarify what they mean by a social justice orientation in order to “find places where the beliefs, theories, and tools” of the various social justice discourses are similar so that these similarities can be identified to create a more powerful and influential vision of educating for social justice in order to “challenge the problematic growth of conservative, neoliberal, and many would argue unjust, movements in education” (Hytten & Bettez, 2011, p. 9).

Other text was also identified in the data source demonstrating the fact that some scholars consider neoliberalism, neo-conservatism, and capitalism as concepts that are antithetical to social justice. For example, a data source document states that the neoliberal ideologies that dominate educational discourse seriously undermine “educational responses to issues of equity and social justice” (Kaur, 2012, p. 485). Another example is found in the Pereira (2013) document which states the hegemony of neo-liberal ideals and its emphasis on individualism puts the social project of equal opportunity and the sharing of benefits promised by the welfare state at risk (164). Another data source scholar writes, “…our prospective teachers’ own awareness of social justice issues in education can be limited and often shows an acceptance of neo-liberal ideology” (Boylan, 2009, p. 434).

The Jenlink (2010) document provides another example of this perception of concepts like neoliberalism and neo-conservative. This data source scholar argues that neo-liberal, neo-conservative, and authoritarian policies in education have affected teacher preparation. The effect has been that contemporary teacher education is focused on “practiced-based activities, and an emphasis on courses that narrowly focus on prescribed teaching skills and competencies rather than social activism, critical literacies, and concerns for social justice” (Jenlink, 2010, p.
This author states neo-liberal and neo-conservative politics have dangerous implication for education. However, it should be noted, he also writes that regardless of these dangerous implications debates about social justice teacher education should not be reduced to an ideological discourse but must consider the substantive nature of social justice.

In another document from the data source, a scholar discusses the effect power, at the macro-level, specifically transnational forces, has on social justice. This scholar (North, 2008) writes that the market forces of global capitalism affect social relationships “eroding social protections and worsening the life chances of billions” (p. 1190). Moreover, she reports some scholars advocate for the dismantling of the “U. S. Empire” (North, 2008, p. 1190). Other data source scholars write that neo-liberal ideology “results in the application of business models to schooling” (Pinto, 2012, p. 4). The business model changes the focus of schooling from “equity and social justice to a focus on individual ability and effort” (Pinto et al., 2012, pp. 4). Another data source author argues that the influence of neo-liberal ideology (constrained curriculum, standards, a focus on employability, accountability) on contemporary education has marginalized those “interested in critical pedagogy and social justice educational work” (Carr, 2008, p. 119).

A similar negative view of standardized testing is expressed in another data source document. Mullen (2008) states, “standardized testing contradicts alternative assessments for at-risk students; further on a curricular level, standardization subverts ‘culturally relevant curriculum in socially just pedagogies’; moreover, management models challenge ‘socially just school leadership’” (p. 139). The reference to standardized testing and accountability is interesting because other articles (Cochran-Smith et al., 2009a; Poplin & Rivera, 2005) reconcile accountability measures like standardized testing and social justice.
Assuming social justice education scholars have as their goal a just society and system of education and that social justice discourses in education share the fact that they recognize the gaps in educational opportunities, resources, achievement, and long-term outcomes among minority and low-income students and their white middle-class peers. Assuming further that all these issues are relevant to the assessment of whether or not a society’s education system is just or not. Then it can be argued that proponents of education reforms like school choice also recognize the existence of issues like the disparity of educational opportunity and the achievement gap mentioned above. Those who favor school choice argue it is a way to remedy these issues. School choice is a reform measure focused on student achievement and the equalizing of educational opportunity. However, references to school choice were not found in the text coded to Gallie’s seven conditions in conjunction with the concept social justice. In order to insure I did not miss any relevant text mentioning school choice I conducted a text search in NVivo, of the articles in the data source, for the words “school choice.” This search revealed that the idea of choice is mentioned in two articles (Bates, 2006; Heybach, 2009). However, in these articles choice is treated as antithetical to social justice. Some scholars attribute this reform measure to neoliberals or neo-conservatives (Apple, 2005; Hursh, 2007; Molnar, Farrell, Johnson, & Sapp, 1996).

Also interesting is the fact that scholars mentioned in the literature review (Williamson et al., 2007) identified an assimilation/individualist camp in the social justice education literature. However, discussions of assimilation as a social justice reform were not found in the data. To ensure I did not miss any instances in which assimilation was discussed as a social justice reform. I used NVivo’s text search function to search the data source for the word “assimilate”
and its variants. The search returned 15 articles using the word assimilate or a variant of that word.

Only 12 of these articles used the word to mean bringing students into conformity with a dominant culture. In these articles, only passing references to assimilation were expressed and on the whole these expressions were negative and not necessarily associated with social justice. For example, “Valenzuela shows how assimilationist policies and practices contribute to the underachievement of Mexican students” (Hytten & Bettez, 2011, p. 15). Additionally, another data source document discusses the development of an assessment tool to measure teacher candidates’ ability to teach for social justice. These authors write if a respondent strongly agreed with the idea that assimilation into American society was an important goal in working with immigrant children the respondent received a lower score than a respondent who strongly disagreed (Cochran-Smith et al., 2009a). Furthermore, the data for the condition of internal complexity shows that 85 of the 102 data source articles reference the recognition aspect of social justice. This finding in conjunction with the text search appears to indicate there was no real association between social justice and assimilation in the data source expect for positioning assimilation as contrary to social justice.

Evidence was found in the data showing scholars did recognize individualist perspectives of social justice do exist. For example, data source document by Hytten and Bettz (2011) mentions the existence of a social justice perspective based on the “market individualist” philosophy and the work of Nozick (p. 11). Second, data source authors Landorf and Nevin (2007) acknowledge that an individualist perspective on social justice exists, as well as, the communitarian or collectivist perspective on social justice. A third data source document acknowledges a social justice perspective based on the protection of people, their resources and
opportunities on the grounds these things are the result of a person’s skill and hard work (Mills, 2013). Although evidence was found in the data source that the individualist perspective on social justice exists no data was found showing data source scholars relied on these individualist social justice perspectives to underpin their conceptions of social justice teacher education.

Relevant to this point a data source author describes her examination and analysis two teacher education programs committed to social justice. She found teacher educators tend to “focus on a conception of justice that emphasizes the needs of individuals without necessarily recognizing how individual experience may be shaped by issues of oppression” (McDonald, 2007, p. 2076). Although this data source scholar writes that she found some evidence of an understanding of inequality due to structural issues like racism and race and the view that teaching is a political act these views were not dominant. This social justice scholar argues if teachers are to improve educational opportunities for minority students, low-income students, and English language learners, it is likely teacher educators need to instruct teachers about the broader social structures and how they impact the lives of the children they will be teaching. This author relies on the philosophical ideas presented in Young’s *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (1990).

It is interesting that there was no aggressive or defensive argument for the assimilationist/individualist social justice perspective in the data source. This finding may be evidence that scholars who hold the assimilationist/individualist perspective of social justice chose other terminology to describe a just society and education system. Such choices would result in the asymmetrical use of the term by different groups of people. Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) found the term neoliberalism was used asymmetrically based on the ideological
grounding of the users. This asymmetrical usage also might be the case with social justice so it is worth considering Boas and Gans-Morse’s (2009) analysis.

In their study of the concept neoliberalism, Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) found the term neoliberal changed from a term that had a positive normative valence to one that had a negative normative valence. They found evidence that the use of the term “neoliberal” was contestable because it satisfied Gallie’s conditions of appraisiveness, internal complexity, various describability, and openness. Additionally, they found the term, neoliberal, referred to a “variety of concepts whose unifying characteristic is the free market” (p. 154). Furthermore, Boas and Gans-Morse found only critics of the free market used the term neoliberal. However, scholars who favored the idea of a free-market economy did not use the term but referred “to ‘orthodox policies’ or other synonyms invoking the mainstream nature of these [free market] reforms” (p. 154).

It is possible the term social justice is terminologically contested in teacher education. Education scholars who value a communitarian or collectivist view of social organization may ascribe a positive normative valence to the term social justice. These scholars will use the term, social justice, to describe a variety of concepts or education reforms whose centralizing characteristic is a communitarian/collectivist view of social organization. On the other hand, scholars who do not value a communitarian or collectivist form of social organization may not use the term because of its association with communitarian/collectivist values.

**Conclusion**

This chapter details the findings of the qualitative content analysis using Gallie’s (1956) framework. Gallie states essentially contested concepts must comply with the following four conditions: appraisiveness, internal complexity, various describability, and openness. However,
these alone are not enough Gallie suggests the satisfaction of further conditions. He argues reciprocal recognition shows users hold different views about what the concept means. Next, the condition of an exemplar ensures the users are all referring to the same concept. Last, the condition of progressive competition refers to the probability that the continuous debate will result in sustaining or developing the valued achievement of the concept. Gallie and other scholars note that not all essentially contested concepts will satisfy all seven conditions of the framework. In this study it can be argued that sufficient evidence was found to satisfy all seven of Gallie’s framework.

The last section of this chapter also addresses the possibility that social justice may be terminologically contested. Scholars cited in chapter two argue education scholars belonged to either the assimilation/individualist camp or the cultural integrity/collectivist camp. However, the data did not contain evidence of an assimilation/individualist camp. Moreover, I noted the positioning of concepts like standardized testing, neoliberalism, neo-conservatism, capitalism, individualism, and the free-market as ideologies opposed to social justice. Informed by the theory that essentially contested concepts can be terminological contested (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009) I continued to examine the data using the text-search feature of NVivo. It was revealed that 32 of the 102 articles treat the ideas mentioned above as opposing social justice in education. This may reflect the possibility that the concept might be terminologically contested. The next chapter contains a discussion of the findings, recommendations, and a conclusion.
CHAPTER FIVE

Discussion, Recommendations, Conclusion

This study sought to gain insight into the meaning and application of the concept social justice within the field of teacher education. My background in law, my understanding of economic policy (Hazlitt, 2008; Sowell, 2007), and my interest in education discourses exploring the frame of individualism/collectivism informed my researcher’s lens. The meaning and application of social justice has been a source of public conflict, leading the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE, and now Council for the Accreditation of Educator Preparation) to eliminate social justice as a disposition in its standards. This study sought to answer two specific questions:

1. Using Gallie’s framework, how is the concept of social justice applied in teacher education literature and what evidence can be found to support the classification of social justice as an essentially contested concept in the context of teacher education?

2. In what ways do the data from this study support the Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) theory that essentially contested concepts have multiple levels of contestation?

In this chapter, I describe the overall results of Research Question 1 and 2, how these results compare to those found in the literature, and the implications of these findings for teacher educators and scholars interested in applying social justice in this field. I argue that there is diversity in the use and meaning of the term in teacher education and that the concept social justice is an essentially contested concept in teacher education. Essentially contested concepts
are concepts that do not have a clearly definable general use that can be set up as the correct use because rational people hold different perspectives on the concept. A potential benefit of using Gallie’s (1956) framework is that the insight derived from the analysis may induce more agreement on the meaning and application of social justice and/or show the rationality of the different perspectives. Since a universally accepted definition of social justice is not possible, I recommend teacher educators note and accept the complexity of the term.

Based on my findings I recommend teacher educators using the term, social justice, in their writing explicitly define the concept. Additionally, I recommend teacher educators using the term in their courses make the effort to expose students to the various perspectives on social justice as well as the philosophical and/or theoretical rationales for the particular perspectives. The findings also support the idea that teacher educators allow students to define the concept in multiple ways. Given the issues of academic freedom and students’ First Amendment rights, it is important to present and examine the various ways of understanding social justice as it relates to teacher education programs and education in general. It should be understood that where a concept is controversial no position should be regarded as certain (Hare, 2007). Moreover, as Gray (1977) argues, the fact that an important concept like social justice is contested is evidence that this society embraces profound diversity and moral individualism. To require commitment to a particular view of social justice is not appropriate in teacher education. It is anathema to the idea of liberal education and “shows a lack of respect for other people and their opinions” (Hare, 2007, p. 4).

Additionally, I argue teacher educators interested in using the term, social justice, to describe a particular type of teacher education reform explicitly define what they mean by the referent social justice and the parameters of the reform measure. For example, it is important to
know the unit of measurement so that social justice teacher education can be evaluated as a reform measure. A shared understanding of the meaning of the term as a descriptor results in precision and clarity. It also benefits theoretical and empirical analysis of the reform measure. As Doughty (2014) argues, “Without clear concepts, however, scholars are apt to talk past each other, and policy makers find it difficult to distinguish between alternative policies” (p. 6). Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) argue for a term to have analytical value to social scientists it needs a common substantive meaning. Lastly, I argue NCATE was correct in eliminating social justice as a disposition in its standards. In this chapter, I discuss the findings and implications of this study to support these recommendations and conclusions.

Discussion

Research question one.

Gallie’s (1956) framework proved a useful tool to analyze the ways the concept social justice is applied in teacher education. This study found social justice, in the context of teacher education, to be an essentially contested concept as described by Gallie (1956). The data provide evidence sufficient to meet the conditions of appraisiveness, internal complexity, various describability, openness, and reciprocal recognition. According to Gallie (1956) these conditions formally define an essentially contested concept. Gallie’s framework includes two other conditions: exemplar and progressive competition. There is considerable controversy over the significance of the condition of an exemplar (Collier et al., 2006). This is because if all parties cite the same exemplar then the one true meaning of a concept is set and there is no contest. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume any exemplar associated with an essentially contested concept, as defined by Gallie (1956) will have some inherent quality that makes it contested. Therefore, the various users of the concept are unlikely to agree to the same
understanding of the exemplar. The exemplar is likely appraisive, variously describable, internally complex, and open. The following discussion compares the findings from this study using Gallie’s framework (question 1) with the existing literature on social justice in teacher education.

The data provided sufficient evidence to satisfy Gallie’s (1956) first condition of appraisiveness. The data demonstrated the term social justice has a positive normative valence among social justice education scholars. In general the education scholars in the data source use the term to connote a valued achievement. Scholars from the data source associated social justice with concepts like human rights, the common good, fairness, equality, respect, and inclusion. Additionally, scholars from the data source use the term, social justice, to describe various elements of teacher education. For example, evidence was found showing data source scholars use the term to describe the focus for teacher education programs, a goal, a process, a philosophy, a theory of education, and as an orientation or perspective. Evidence was also found in the data source showing scholars acknowledge that there are critics of the term who associate the term with things like: having no essential meaning thus making it a meaningless term, being “touchy-feely” and emphasizing things like self-esteem and cultural identity instead of literacy and numeracy, a buzzword in education, and/or as a form of ideological indoctrination in education programs. These critiques were not new or significant and were also identified in the literature review. Additionally, the positive normative valence of social justice was also identified in the review of the literature.

In addition to the condition of appraisiveness, evidence was found in the data source showing social justice teacher education scholars consider the concept to be open. Statements were found in the text establishing that data source scholars understand the term to be fluid,
complex, situated, not fixed or predictable, and open to interpretation and context. One scholar argues “cookie-cutter” definitions of social justice do not exist in education and that social justice is a “negotiated process that occurs among faculty” at particular institutions (McDonald, 2007, p. 2075). Another data source scholar sees the teacher’s social justice identity as negotiated “with respect to lived experiences and culturally-informed reflections on those experiences” (Farnsworth, 2010, 1482). Text from the data source was also identified showing that a clear and grounded description of social justice has so far eluded the field (Campbell, 2013). These findings also coincide with the literature reviewed in chapter two.

In chapter two scholars like Burke (2011) Boyles et al. (2009), Williamson et al. (2007), Gewirtz (1998) discuss how the concept social justice changed due to changing circumstances. The earliest uses of the term were in relation to procedural justice then it was associated with distributive justice and more recently due to the work of scholars like Fraser (2006) and Young (1990) it also includes ideas linked to the freedom from oppression and recognition. Scholars from both the literature review and data source note the fact the term social justice connotes something different from conceptions of justice as a virtue. Virtuous behavior requires the reflective and deliberate action of an individual to do what is right. And a social system is not capable of reflecting on what is right and wrong and then deliberately take action to do the right thing. Contemporary conceptions refer to states of affairs which occur without anyone in particular having done anything to cause them. Social justice refers to a regulative principle (Burke, 2011; Campbell, 2013; Grant & Agosto, 2008).

Next, the findings from the content analysis provided evidence sufficient to satisfy the conditions of internal complexity and various describability. Examination of the text in the data source articles allowed this study to unpack the concept social justice in the context of teacher
education. Data analysis exposed the aspects of social justice as it is applied in teacher education. This study identified 13 aspects of social justice in teacher education. These aspects are: recognition, social change, distributive/equity, critical consciousness/critical inquiry, action, teaching is political, teacher accountability, fairness/equality, democratic participation, citizenship, community building, moral and ethical, teacher attitudes and beliefs, and responsibility. These 13 aspects show the concept to be internally complex. Complicating matters further is the fact that certain aspects of social justice like fairness and equality may be contested in their own right. Gallie surmised that users of complex multifaceted concepts would prioritize different aspects of the concept resulting in different uses and meanings.

Moreover, evidence from the data source was found showing education scholars do use the term differently making it variously describable. Data source scholars noted that different theoretical and philosophical orientations influence conceptions of social justice in teacher education. Examples were found showing data source scholars refer to social justice as: an umbrella term (Agarwal et al., 2010; Campbell, 2013); a catchphrase (North, 2008); impossible to explicitly define (Sandretto, 2007); having innumerable rationales (Howell et al., 2010); and as having a meaning derived through a negotiated process occurring among faculty at a particular institution (McDonald, 2007).

Additionally, some scholars offer broad descriptions of social justice and others offer more specific definitions. For example, a data source scholar states she opposes any concrete definition because it would “tame its insurgent nature” (Heybach, 2009, p. 239). Additionally, evidence was noted that some data source scholars use the term social justice as a synonym for equity, social responsibility, and equality (Clayton et al., 2009). Another data source scholar (North, 2008) takes issue with scholarly uses of the term where its meaning is merged with other
equality concepts. This scholar writes social justice is often “conflated with the pursuit of educational equity or equality of opportunity” (North, 2008, p. 1183).

Other variations in the way the term was described were also found in the data source. Data source authors described conceptions of social justice as: “richer” or “weaker” (Pinto et al., 2012); “soft approach” as opposed to a more critical activist approach (Philpott & Dagenais, 89); “loose” understanding as opposed to a more politically motivated understanding (Campbell, 2013). For example, text from the data source showed that when some educators use the term social justice they intend it to refer to the primacy of enhancing children’s intellectual and emotional well being, their dignity, and their autonomy using a set of desirable teacher dispositions like caring, treating individuals equally and fairly, and having compassion for the underprivileged the author of this article labeled this a “loose” understanding of social justice (Campbell, 2013). Additionally, data showed scholars found certain educators use the term to mean addressing and attending to the needs of individual learners with different resources and opportunities this understanding of social justice was considered a “weaker” version of social justice (e.g. Pinto et al., 2012). Evidence was not identified in the data source defending the “soft,” “loose,” or “weak” conceptions of social justice even though scholars suggested they exist.

These data source scholars argue the “weaker,” “soft,” and “loose” versions of social justice do not focus on structural critiques regarding the culture and economic organization nor do they focus on the political nature of teaching. In contrast, the data source also contained evidence showing other education scholars have a more formulated understanding of social justice. This group focuses on the political nature of teaching, structural critiques, the language of power, and social change (e.g. Campbell, 2013; Cochran-Smith et al., 2009b; Picower, 2011;
Pinto et al., 2012). One author from the data source argues some social justice educators harbor “political hostility and resistance to the policies and values associated with more centrist neoliberal and conservative worldviews that create what they portray as the dominant of an oppressive mainstream society” (Campbell, 2013, p. 222).

Interestingly, evidence in the literature review also points to the fact that people had different conceptions of social justice with regard to the structure and organization of society. According to Shields (1941), conceptions of a just order in society varied and included the following: the idea that charity was the way to provide the comforts of life to the disadvantaged; others argued private virtue was not enough; others argued all existing property should be used to support all existing people; others provided various laundry lists of demands. The idea that charity or private virtue amount to a just order in society was not expressly stated in the data source, in contrast, two documents from the data source specifically distinguish social justice from charity (Collopy, Bowman, & Taylor, 2012; Tinkler et al., 2014). The idea that social justice requires a more communitarian social order was seen in the data source.

In this study virtually all of the text coded to the various describability node was also coded to the internal complexity node. This is because text describing the concept also contains information about the aspects of the concept. In this study the conditions internal complexity and various describability were merged in order to identify the aspects of social justice in the data source. The same text was used for both the purposes of identifying the different aspects of social justice and also for showing that different users rank the aspects differently. It may be useful for future researchers to consider collapsing these two conditions, before the initial coding process, preventing the creation of two codes containing the same data. Once the researcher has coded all the data describing the concept of interest then further analysis of that data will allow
for the identification of the individual aspects, as well as, allow for the identification of any variability in the ranking of the concept’s aspects.

The next condition is Gallie’s condition of reciprocal recognition. This condition documents that different groups recognize uses of the concept different from their own. This condition also requires instances in which rival meanings are used aggressively and defensively (Gallie, 1956a; Collier et al., 2006). The content analysis provided evidence that the condition of reciprocal recognition was satisfied. The data contained evidence that scholars recognize the contested nature of social justice in teacher education. (e.g. Heybach, 2009; Sandretto, 2007; Marshall & Ward, 2004). Furthermore, evidence was found in the data source showing education scholars disagree about the various aspects of social justice (Cochran-Smith et al., 1999). The following text is from the data source: “Educational scholars…disagree about the primary attributes and historical legacies of education for social justice…” (North, 2008, p. 1184). The literature also evidenced the fact scholars disagree about the aspects of social justice (Zollers et al., 2000).

Moreover, the data contained text demonstrating education scholars recognize the fact that the term is used in a superficial manner in some instances yet data source scholars defend the relevance of the term and endeavor to show it is not a meaningless or superficial term in education (e.g. Cochran-Smith et al., 2009b; McDonald, 2007; Hytten & Bettez, 2011, Pinto et al., 2012; Ukpokodu, 2007). Furthermore, text from the data source was identified showing education scholars recognize the existence of the perspective that social justice means ensuring equal access to education and the protection of individual rights, whereas, other education scholars hold the perspective social justice requires radical social change because the social institutions and processes reproduce the inequitable social structure (Marshall & Ward, 2004).
Analysis of text in the data source documents reveals education scholars recognize the existence of different understandings of the term social justice. The literature review also identified the fact that social justice perspective varied. Recall that in the literature review the assimilationist/individualist and cultural integrity/collectivist perspectives were identified (Williamson et al., 2007). Three other perspective were also identified in the literature review the market individualist, liberal individualist, and social democratic camp (Rizvi, 2002). The data showed scholars identify additional different camps, for example: the distributive justice perspective, the retributive justice perspective, and the justice as recognition perspective (Mills, 2013); a communitarian view of social justice or an individualistic view of social justice (Landorf & Nevin, 2007); humanistic values and dispositions based rationale, multicultural/diversity based rationales, and structural-critique rationales (Howell et al., 2010); the anti-oppression model of social justice and the critical inquiry model of social justice (Brandes & Kelly, 2000). Text was also identified showing scholars acknowledge the tension that exists between social justice perspectives that prioritize the aspect of recognition over the aspect of redistribution (North, 2008). An argument could be made that two of Rizvi’s distinctions are similar to Mills’ (2013) distinctions; for example, market individualism is similar to retributive justice, liberal individualism is similar to the distributive justice perspective. However, it is less clear if Rizvi’s social democratic perspective is completely aligned with Mills’ recognition perspective. Additionally, the other perspectives also share certain similarities; for example, the anti-oppression model of social justice, justice as recognition, and the multicultural/diversity rationales seem similar. Education scholars talk about and suggest the following social justice perspectives exist: assimilationist/individualist, market individualist, retributive justice, and individualist. However, evidence was not found in the data source to
show that social justice education scholars hold these perspectives. The fact that these perspectives may not exist in the literature is interesting.

Additionally, this analysis revealed data source scholars talk about “richer” and “weaker” understandings of social justice or a “soft approach” to social justice, or a “loose” understanding of social justice. This distinction is also mentioned in the discussion of the condition of various desirability this is because it is relevant to the way scholars prioritize aspects of the concept social justice. It is also relevant to reciprocal recognition because it shows scholars recognize uses different from their own. For example, the Pinto et al. (2012) document discusses the fact school administrators had a weak or narrow understanding of social justice. This is because these administrators’ conception of social justice focused things like: fairness, equality, respect in the classroom, and technical issues like classroom management. Pinto et al. (2012) argue a broader or richer version of social justice exists which inspires students to take action for social change. This richer version focuses on race, class, gender, systemic injustice, marginalization, and privilege. Text from this data source document provides a clear example of aggressive use of social justice when the authors argue the richer or broad view of social justice should be an essential part of teacher education.

Of some interest is the fact that data source scholars recognize a weaker or loose use of social justice but no data source document defended or advocated for the weaker or loose version of social justice in teacher education. It is possible that these “weaker” perspectives may actually be examples of people who belong to the assimilationist/individualist camp identified by authors like Boyles et al. (2009) and Williamson et al. (2007). However, there is not enough information available to assess whether or not those scholars identified in the data source holding the weaker understanding of social justice also ascribe to the idea of assimilation or the idea and
value of a common culture. Additionally, it may be that people who ascribe to the richer variant of social justice belong to one of the camps that prioritize communitarianism like the cultural integrity/collectivist, or anti-oppression, or social democratic, or recognition or communitarian camp.

Another example of reciprocal recognition found in the data deals with education scholars’ recognition of the perspective that social justice is a form of ideological indoctrination. Text from the data source document demonstrates this perspective is recognized. For example, a data source scholar aggressively and defensively argues against the perspective that social justice teacher education is a form of indoctrination. This data source scholar states: “I hope to liberate social justice from the narrow definition its opponents have projected upon it as a mere ideology and indoctrination” (Heybach, 2009, p. 234). A data source did contain text examining social justice as indoctrination and detects potential problem areas associated with social justice teacher education (Campbell, 2013). Another data source scholar admits there is a particular ideology associated with social justice teacher education but does not see it as a problem (Applebaum, 2009). These issues were also identified in the literature review. The examples presented above show evidence exists in the data demonstrating education scholars recognize different conceptions of social justice exist and that scholars do engage in debates over the proper use and meaning of the term.

According to Gallie (1956) appraisiveness, internal complexity, various describability, and reciprocal recognition “[establish] the formally defining characteristics of contestedness” (p. 180). In this study each of these conditions has been satisfied. Yet, Gallie designed his framework with seven conditions. Gallie (1956) states it is not necessary to satisfy all seven of the conditions in the framework. Collier et al. (2006) state all seven of Gallie’s criteria “may or
may not be met even for concepts widely recognized as contested” (p. 215). However, it is useful to analyze a concept using all seven of Gallie’s conditions to determine if these other conditions are helpful in understanding the meaning and use of the concept in teacher education. The remaining conditions are the exemplar and progressive competition.

Gallie (1956) included the condition of the exemplar in his framework to ensure all parties are indeed referring to the same concept. The purpose of the exemplar is to anchor the concept (Collier et al., 2006). The exemplar can be “a number of historically independent but sufficiently similar traditions” (Gallie, 1956a, p. 186). The term social justice is relatively new in education discourse. However, examples of text from the data source were found arguing the ideas that the term social justice represents have a long history in education. For example, one data source document identifies the achievement or goal of social justice to be the same as the goals of progressive educators like Dewey and social reconstructionist which was the creation of a more just world (Hytten & Bettez, 2011). Moreover, as seen in the condition of appraisiveness, the data source contains text showing education scholars see the achievement of social justice to be include things like human rights, dignity, the common good, individual freedom and power. Ultimately its end is the creation of a more just society. I would argue it is this conception of the achievement of a just society that equates to an exemplar. However, people hold different views about the means necessary to create a more just society, as well as, what a just society looks like at the end. These differences result from a person’s particular philosophical and justice orientation or tradition.

These philosophical and justice traditions inform the rationale supporting a person’s conception of social justice. It is the identification of the rationales and conscious thinking that Gallie’s condition of progressive competition identify. This condition is meant to show the
competition over the correct meaning and use of the term enables the development or clarification of the term. The data showed education scholars acknowledged the various philosophies of Rawls, Fraser, Young and Nozick. However, not every data source author discusses his or her particular philosophical orientation. Data source scholars also noted conceptions of social justice vary depending on the specific theoretical position a scholar assumes. Some theoretical positions are linked to education, for example, critical pedagogy, Whiteness studies, anti-oppressive education, and multiculturalism; whereas, others emerge from other fields like women’s studies, sociology, or ethnic studies (Hytten & Bettez, 2011).

Satisfaction of the condition of progressive competition requires evidence of the probability or plausibility that continuous competition results in the clarification of the concept. In an effort to clarify the concept in teacher education, a document (Cochran-Smith et al., 2009b) from the data source argues there are four central ideas associated with social justice in teacher education. The first central idea is the implicit reliance on distributive justice. The second central tenet is that the point of teaching is to improve children’s life chances by challenging the inequities of school and society. The third idea consists of recognizing the significant differences in educational opportunities, resources, achievement and positive outcomes between white middle-class children and minority and low-income children. Last, the teacher should be both an educator and an advocate committed to the democratic ideal and to diminishing inequity in schools and society by redistributing educational opportunities.

These four central tenets of social justice teacher education are particularly interesting because the aspects of social justice identified by my study line up closely with these four central tenets of social justice. Additionally, the aspects of social justice identified in this study also align with the six concepts of social justice identified by the data source document authored by
North (2008). North identifies the following six sub-concepts of social justice: redistribution, recognition, macro-processes, micro-processes, knowledge, and action. It is not difficult to see that North’s six sub-concepts can be found in the central tenets proffered by Cochran-Smith et al. (2009b).

It is be premature to argue the four central tenets of social justice teacher education, proposed in the data source document by Cochran-Smith et al. (2009b), are universally accepted by all teacher educators. However, it is evidence that social justice teacher education scholars like Cochran-Smith et al. (2009b) and North (2008) are working to clarify the concept. An argument can be made that the content analysis conducted in this study corroborates the findings of these data source scholars. This may be additional evidence there is progressive movement regarding the clarification of the term, social justice in teacher education. As time goes on and social justice teacher educators continue to debate the meaning and use of the concept a consensus may build providing a clear definition of what social justice teacher education actually means.

**Research question two.**

Question two asks in what ways the data from this study support the theory that essentially contested concepts can be contested at levels other than meaning, use, and valence. Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) conducted a study examining the use and meaning of the term “neoliberalism” in academic literature. Examination of the literature showed the concept neoliberalism to satisfy Gallie’s four most important conditions (appraisiveness, internal complexity, various describability, and openness) making it a contestable concept. However, the literature did not provide evidence of a scholarly debate over the use and meaning of the term. The authors argue this lack of debate is due to the fact the concept is terminologically contested.
The authors examined the relevant literature and found when scholars refer to neoliberalism, these references have a unifying theme of the free-market economy. Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) argued scholars who hold a negative view of the free-market use the term neoliberal and those who hold a positive view of the free-market do not use the term. Those with a positive view of the free-market use other terms in academic discourses related to the free market. This different usage results in the asymmetrical use of the term along ideological lines. According to Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) if terminological contestation exists then debate over the concept is frustrated. When this occurs the contested term will have rhetorical value but will lack analytical value to social scientists. For analytical value a term needs a common substantive meaning.

The data source contained text that acknowledged the existence of a perspective that social justice means meeting the needs of individual learners (e.g. McDonald, 2007; Pinto et al., 2012). Text from data source documents also acknowledged the existence of social justice perspectives prioritizing the individual over the collective; for example, market individualism supported by Nozick’s work (Hytten & Bettez, 2011); retributive justice (Mills, 2013); individualistic perspectives (Landorf & Nevin, 2007). However, the data did not contain examples of text where this perspective was used as a rationale to support scholars’ social justice arguments. This finding was interesting and may indicate that social justice may be terminologically contested in teacher education.

It may be that scholars who value a communitarian/collectivist form of social arrangement may use the term social justice to describe a particular kind of teacher education reform. Whereas, scholars who ascribe to what social justice scholars see as the assimilationist/individualist camp or market individualist camp may chose other words to describe the reform measures they view as ensuring things like a just social order, fairness, and
equality of educational opportunity. However, it is not possible to conclude this is the case based on the findings from this study. Further study is required to determine whether or not the term social justice is terminologically contested in the field of teacher education.

It would be interesting to know if scholars who value the idea of students achieving cultural literacy or advocate social mobility via assimilation use the term social justice in their writing. The findings from this study suggest that social justice scholars reject this view. More work should be done to determine whether or not there is asymmetrical use of the term social justice in teacher education. It would also be interesting to know if use of the term varies according to whether or not a scholar values an economic structure based on the free market as opposed to a communitarian/collectivist economic structure. Zajda et al. (2006) state some scholars argue social justice is not be possible in a capitalist society.

Limitations

Although this study examined 102 scholarly articles it cannot be considered sufficient to represent the entire scope of existing literature on social justice and teacher education. For instance, this study does not include books, book chapters, or conference papers. Additionally, this study does not contain information about the ways teacher educators use or discuss written material in their courses. Moreover, this study does not examine the debates associated with the ways other scholars use and define social justice outside of teacher education.

Another potential limitation has to do with the data selection. Requiring the inclusion of social justice in the title of the journal article may have eliminated articles in which the author discussed social justice but simply did not include the term in the title. A search of the ERIC database for peer reviewed journal articles in which “social justice” and “teacher education” are in the abstract with no additional requirement that “social justice” be in the title results in 359
articles. Therefore, this expanded number may suggest that information contained in the
literature is not represented in the data source used in this study. Subsequently, the data source
may have over represented articles by social justice education scholars who share particular
understandings of social justice and why the data source did not reveal support for the
assimilation/individualist camp. It may also explain why certain concepts like neoliberalism,
capitalism, and the market were viewed as antithetical to social justice.

Recommendations

Gallie’s framework was used in this study to analyze the concept social justice in the
context of teacher education. The results of this study show the concept is a complex and
multifaceted concept. Users of the concept prioritize different aspects of the concept; this leads
to different understandings of the concept and inconsistent application of the concept. This
makes debates over the merits of the concept, in the context of teacher education, quite difficult.

For example, the critique that social justice teacher education amounts to ideological
indoctrination may be meaningless if it is raised against users who understand social justice to
mean meeting individual learners’ needs or the idea that schools should promote a pluralistic
cultural literacy so students can assimilate into mainstream culture. On the other hand, where a
perspective of the term social justice is presented to teacher candidates and other perspectives are
diminished or not presented at all then the critique that it is indoctrination may require further
investigation. The problem is that for certain controversial concepts rational people can hold
legitimate opposing views. Recall the statement from Hare (2007): “What counts as social
justice is typically controversial, and reasonable people who are equally well informed and
committed to justice will disagree” (p. 4).
If a teacher education program presents a singular perspective on social organization, culture, and economic structure as being the morally, socially, culturally, politically correct perspective and limits or does not present and discuss other perspectives, it could be a problem (Campbell, 2013). This is the point Hunsaker (2011) makes when he argues that to have one agenda or viewpoint in the academy is anathema to liberal education and academic freedom. Teacher educators should help teacher candidates understand the legitimacy of the conflicting arguments over controversial topics.

Another important matter relevant to the use of the term social justice in teacher education concerns the fact that it is used to describe a particular type of teacher education reform. Scholars argue for social justice teacher education in order to achieve goals like equity, freedom from oppression, social change, equality, improving students’ life chances, and fairness. A data source document states: “despite the widespread presence of the term ‘social justice’ in scholarship, there is less evidence of if and how teacher education programs utilize the concept” (Kaputska et al., 2009, p. 490). Additionally, the term does not have a universally accepted definition in the field of education.

The findings in this study suggest that it would be beneficial for teacher educators interested in social justice teacher education, as a reform measure, to formulate the parameters for this reform measure. Additionally, if the social justice teacher education criteria include the call for action and advocating for social change then the required action and the proposed social change needs to be defined. For example, social change could refer to an effort to reduce preconceived notions of race, gender, culture, etc., or it could mean inculcating in the members of society the idea that in return for your membership in the society there is a requirement to voluntarily give back to the community some of one’s time, talent, or treasure. It could also
mean advocating for the demise of the free-market system and replacing it with a more communitarian or socialistic economic system. If teacher educators want teachers to advocate and take action for social change, it is important to have a clear picture of what these changes are and the social and economic effects of these changes. These details should be laid out so that they can be analyzed and assessed.

Additionally, it is important to define the unit of measurement for evaluation of social justice teacher education, the individual or the group? For example, suppose achievement scores are equalized by group, is social justice achieved even though there are children still struggling within each group? It is not clear from the data how the call for social justice teaching achieves these ends. Missing from the data is evidence of exactly how or why social justice teacher education makes education better than say an emphasis on the moral and ethical teaching discussed by Campbell (2013). No empirical evidence was found in the data source showing social justice in fact improves student achievement or outcomes. Kaputska et al. (2009) state: “At best, research on the impact of a social justice approach is ‘inconsistent and inconclusive’ (Hollins & Guzman, 2005, p. 479)” (p. 490). At this point in time the lack of a universal definition and/or criterion for social justice teacher education makes empirical analysis of social justice teacher education difficult, which in turn, makes it hard to assess whether or not social justice teacher education is effective in achieving its goals.

Another area worthy of study concerns the dramatic increase in the use of the phrase in education. In chapter one the results of a search of the ERIC database reveal term the social justice was used in the title of 55 publications from January 1971 until December 1990. The next ten years saw an increase in the use of the term with 114 publications using the term. Interestingly, the following ten years, from January 2001 through December 2010, 745 items
were published with social justice in the title. It would be interesting to know what was happening in the field of education to cause the sharp increase in the use of this term. The increased attention to this term would be understandable if it were clearly defined, understood, and associated with empirical evidence that it improves student achievement. The use of the term does not appear to be dropping-off either in the last five years and approximately two months 510 items were listed in the ERIC database.

Further study is warranted regarding the 13 aspects of social justice identified in this study. It is interesting that recognition was the most frequently identified aspect found in the literature. North (2008) acknowledges social justice may have been used to replace more controversial terms like multicultural education in the 1990s. The relationship between social justice in teacher education and multicultural education requires further study. Other aspects found in this study are also interesting. For example, social change was the second most identified aspect. More research is needed to understand exactly what kinds of social change are associated with social justice. In the data source social change is associated with the injustice of things like privilege, domination, and oppression. Another question relevant to social change concerns the focus of that change. For example, at what level is the social change to occur: the individual level, the school, the local level, the national level, or at a global level. It is also interesting that responsibility was the least frequently referenced aspect of social justice. Further study is needed to understand the relationship between social justice and personal responsibility for one’s self, others, and one’s community.

Moreover, it would be interesting to know the evolution of the concept in teacher education. For example, further examination of the concept using the nonprobability sampling technique of snowball sampling could provide answers to how the term entered the field of
education and how it has changed over time in the context of education. This type of sampling procedure would allow the researcher to specifically trace the use of the concept through time and among scholars. It would also be interesting to examine and understand social justice, as it is understood in other disciplines. For example, it would be good for teacher educators who call for political action to induce socio-economic changes to understand the ramifications of those changes from the body of knowledge in disciplines like economics and political science. Some social justice educators view social justice as a moral or ethic and it would be interesting to understand the interrelationship between this view of social justice and the existing body of knowledge in the field of ethics, the philosophy of religion, and moral theory.

Conclusion

Gallie’s (1956) rationale for creating his framework was to “construct a more coherent and rational foundation for the discussion of complex concepts” (p. 213). Other scholars have successfully used Gallie’s framework to analyze concepts like democracy (Collier et al., 2006), social entrepreneurship (Choi & Majumdar, 2014), and philanthropy (Daly, 2011). Gallie’s framework was used to guide a content analysis of scholarly writing about social justice in the field of teacher education. The framework was chosen for its ability to help scholars analyze complex and contested concepts. Analysis using the seven conditions in Gallie’s framework proved useful in the explication of social justice in the context of teacher education. This study adds to the understanding of the various applications of the term social justice, in the context of teacher education, as well as the rationales supporting those applications. The results of this study may help scholars reason about the various applications of the concept social justice in teacher education. It was not the intent of this study to uncover the best or correct meaning of social justice in the context of teacher education.
It was promised that the results of this study might shed light on why NCATE refused to engage in a debate of the term social justice. The president of NCATE, Dr. Wise, testified, “the term [social justice] is susceptible to a variety of definitions” and “the phrase has acquired some new meanings, evidently connected to a radical social agenda” (NACIQI, 2006, p. 255). The results of this study show that NCATE’s decision to drop the term social justice from their professional standards was understandable and reasonable. Scholars have stated social justice in education has “no single essential meaning” (Hytten & Bettez, 2011, p. 9) and its theoretical framing “lacks craftsmanship” (Grant & Agosto, p. 195). Scholars acknowledge the literature on social justice relies on various philosophies, discourses and theories within education to underpin their particular understanding. (Boyles et al., 2009; Gewirtz, 1998; Grant & Agosto, 2008, Hytten & Bettez, 2011, North, 2008; Sandretto et al., 2007; Williamson et al., 2007; Zollers et al., 2000). It is suggested that agreement on a definition of the term, in the context of teacher education, would be helpful to the field.
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Appendices
Appendix A

Table 1: Initial Coding Categories and Operational Definitions

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<th>Category</th>
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<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appraisiveness</td>
<td>Signifies or accredits some valued achievement, reflects judgments of something that “ought” to be or “ought” not to be these judgments concern the phenomenon entailed in the concept and/or the consequences of these phenomenon, e.g. democracy may be valued for itself or because it has valued consequences.</td>
<td>Collier et al., 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gallie, 1956a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal complexity</td>
<td>The valued achievement is complex and comprised of different facets or aspects yet these facet remain part of the same concept.</td>
<td>Collier et al., 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Choi &amp; Majumdar, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gallie, 1956a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Daly, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various describability</td>
<td>The different facets or aspects of the concept are prioritized differently or stressed to different degrees.</td>
<td>Collier et al., 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Choi &amp; Majumdar, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gallie, 1956a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>The accredited achievement allows for modification due to changing circumstances, but revisions cannot be predicted in advance.</td>
<td>Collier et al., 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Choi &amp; Majumdar, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gallie, 1956a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocal recognition</td>
<td>Each party has some appreciation of the different criteria in the light of which the other parties claim to be applying the concept in question.</td>
<td>Gallie, 1956a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Choi &amp; Majumdar, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collier et al., 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemplar</td>
<td>Broad version of Gallie’s original exemplar--A number of historically independent but sufficiently similar traditions. Multiple paradigmatic examples – that anchors the concept and the contest.</td>
<td>Gallie, 1956a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collier et al., 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive competition</td>
<td>Broad interpretation of Gallie’s condition. Demonstrations of the rationality of a specific continued use or change of use.</td>
<td>Gallie, 1956a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collier et al., 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B

Table 2: List and Description of Aspects of Social Justice

1. **Recognition Aspects** – awareness of past domination and oppression of social groups, marginalization, ableism, racism, discrimination, bilingual education, marginalization due to poverty, inclusion of multiple perspectives, and cultural consciousness.

2. **Social Change Aspects** – references to the need for social change due to the injustice of privilege, domination, oppression, references to the need to challenge existing social structures, processes, and systems, at the local level, national level, and/or global level, references to changing schooling and school systems.

3. **Distributive/Equity Aspects** – references to a need to redistribute resources and opportunities, or references specifically to equity in which different people or groups should receive different resources in order to equalize opportunities and/or outcomes.

4. **Critical Consciousness/Critical Inquiry Aspects** – references to the need to develop a critical consciousness, asking who benefits and who is oppressed and marginalized, references to questioning Western norms and narratives, references to developing an awareness of unjust social structures, systems, and processes in society, references to the implementation of a critical pedagogy.

5. **Action Aspects** – references to teachers taking action or becoming activists in one or more of the following classrooms, schools, neighborhood, community, and/or larger social movements.

6. **Teaching is Political Aspects** – references to teaching as a political activity, references to teachers as political agents who can challenge/change structural inequalities of schools, schooling, and the larger society.
7. **Fairness/Equality Aspects** – references to being fair, fairness, references to equality in the sense of sameness, references to rules and processes being the same for everyone, references to the fact all humans are equal and entitled to equal rights.

8. **Democratic Participation/Citizenship Aspects** – references schooling as a public good associated with a democratic society, references to democratic citizenship or democratic participation, references to rights as citizens.

9. **Community Building Aspects** – references to building classroom community through classroom management and encouraging students to look out for each other, teaching students to treat each other with respect.

10. **Moral and Ethical Aspects** - language linking social justice to morals or ethics.

11. **Teacher Attitudes/Beliefs** – references to the need to change teacher candidates beliefs/attitudes about culture, race, ethnicity, socio-economic class, gender, structural and institutional process, references to teacher beliefs being a critical to teaching for social justice, references to personal transformation as a way to achieve social justice.

12. **Teacher Accountability Aspects** – references to teacher’s duty to ensure the success of all students, ensuring students are learning and reach a level of proficiency in academic subjects, references to teachers holding high expectations for all students, references to teachers reflecting on their practice to understand why some students may be having difficulty, references to the teacher’s duty to be aware of student’s individual needs including cultural sensitivity, provide rich learning opportunities for all students.

13. **Responsibility Aspects** – references to personal or individual responsibility for actions, references to a responsibility to others or one’s community.
Appendix C

List of Data Source Articles


## Appendix D

Table 4: Descriptive Characteristics of Data Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal Title</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
<th>Publication Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Action in Teacher Education</em></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2012</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education</em></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2007</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>AILACTE Journal</em></td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>American Journal of Education</em></td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Canadian Journal of Educational Admin and Policy</em></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2012</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>College Quarterly</em></td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Contemporary Issues in Early Childhood</em></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2014</td>
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<td><em>Critical Studies in Education</em></td>
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<td><em>Democracy &amp; Education</em></td>
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<td><em>Disability &amp; Society</em></td>
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<td><em>Educational Forum</em></td>
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<td><em>Educational Studies</em></td>
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<td><em>Equity &amp; Excellence in Education</em></td>
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<td><em>Exceptionality Education Canada</em></td>
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<td><em>International Journal of Educational Reform</em></td>
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<td><em>International Journal of Progressive Education</em></td>
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<td><em>Issues in Teacher Education</em></td>
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<td><em>Journal of Aesthetic Education</em></td>
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<td><em>Journal of Early Childhood Teacher Education</em></td>
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<td><em>Journal of Educational Administration</em></td>
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<td><em>Journal of Interactive Online Learning</em></td>
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<td><em>Journal of Leadership in Education</em></td>
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<td><em>Journal of Mathematics Teacher Education</em></td>
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<td><em>Journal of School Leadership</em></td>
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<td><em>Journal of Science Teacher Education</em></td>
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<td><em>Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies</em></td>
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<td><em>National Society for the Study of Education Yearbook</em></td>
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<td><em>Physical Educator</em></td>
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<td><em>Policy Futures in Education</em></td>
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<td><em>Professional Educator</em></td>
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<td>Research in Science Education</td>
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<td>Scholar-Practitioner Quarterly</td>
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<td>South African Journal of Higher Education</td>
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<td>Teachers and Teaching- Theory and Practice</td>
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<td>Teaching Education</td>
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<td>Theory into Practice</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Review Issues and Ideas in Public Education</td>
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