May 2014

An Analysis of State Building: The Relationship between Pashtun 'Para-State' Institutions and Political Instability in Afghanistan

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An Analysis of State Building: The Relationship between
Pashtun ‘Para-State’ Institutions and Political Instability in Afghanistan

by

Rebecca Young Greven

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Government and International Affairs
College of Arts and Sciences
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Date of Approval:
February 25, 2014

Keywords: Soviet, Taliban, reforms, modernization, government

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Dedication

I am so very thankful for the opportunity to pursue this research and for all those who supported me along the way. I am first and foremost thankful for God’s grace during this long journey. Dominus Illuminatio Mea. I am extremely thankful for my husband Nick, who sustained and encouraged me during this process. I realize now that the sacrifice of pursuing a doctoral degree was not mine alone—but yours also. I could not have completed this program without you and cannot thank you enough for all that you have done. I also wish to thank my son Jake who is currently at university. I am grateful for your laughter, your love, and your ability to inspire me. You are truly the greatest gift we could have been given!

I am thankful to my parents who believed in my ability to achieve great things and covered me daily in prayer. I am thankful for those who provided random words of encouragement at just the right time. I am so thankful for Cambridge University Library where I spent months researching state building and Afghanistan. I am truly enlightened by the opportunity to study in such an amazing institution. I wish to thank Dr. Joseph Kickasola and Dr. Jeffry Morrison who in 2009 recommended me for the Government and International Affairs Doctoral Program. I cannot thank you enough for helping open doors for me. Lastly, I would like to thank the Department of Government and International Affairs at the University of South Florida. Thank you for allowing me to serve as a graduate teaching assistant and providing me the opportunity to grow under the guidance of your talented and esteemed professors.
Acknowledgments

I wish to acknowledge Dr. Bernd Reiter for his work in the completion of this dissertation. Thank you for your guidance, your patience, your feedback on my chapter submissions, and for your encouragement during my comprehensive exams and dissertation period. You pushed me to complete my dissertation and I am grateful to you for agreeing to chair my committee. I also thank Dr. Mark Amen, Dr. Earl Conteh-Morgan and Dr. David Jacobson for serving on my committee; providing thought provoking questions which I continue to ponder; helping me to clarify my dissertation argument; and for being outstanding scholars in your field. I would like to thank Dr. Susan Northcutt for taking the time to mentor me during the beginning stages of my dissertation—thank you for your words of wisdom. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge Dr. Liz Howard and Dr. Patricia Weeks for providing me with fantastic opportunities to discuss my work and helped lead me to the end of this journey. Seeing your success helped me visualize my own and I thank you both.
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Abstract

This study arose from the desire to research the effectiveness of state building policies in Afghanistan. In order to address this topic, I review state building literature and find that state building literature focuses largely on the processes of democratization instead of institution building. In the second part of this dissertation I conduct a comparative case study of Afghanistan during the Soviet and Taliban eras to study the relationship between Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions (PSI’s) and levels of political instability. I hypothesize that Pashtun PSI’s compete with central state institutions for popular support thus increasing political instability and reducing state institutional effectiveness. I then conduct process-tracing to study hypothesized causal mechanisms that link Pashtun PSI’s and political instability. I find that during the Soviet era, areas with Pashtun PSI’s exhibited higher levels of political instability than areas without the presence of Pashtun PSI’s. However, during the Taliban era, the results were negatively correlated and southern Afghanistan exhibited reduced levels of political instability. The causal mechanisms of ‘violence against the government’ and ‘support to the local populace’ were present in both cases although the introduction of the variables is different in both cases. This research is foundational in clarifying state building literature. Additionally, this study of Afghanistan moves academic literature towards establishing appropriate measures of effectiveness specific to institution building, which is imperative in assessing the success of future and past state building policies.
Chapter 1: Introduction: Problems of State Building Theory versus Practice: The Case of Afghanistan

Introduction

International conflicts over the past decade have highlighted the need to reassess academic research and scholarly notions of state building. State building operations in the latter half of the twentieth century ranged from the creation of occupational governments to United Nations supported transitional governments—with post-World War II state building considered the most successful exemplar (Ottaway 2002). In itself, the term state building alludes to the process of strengthening state institutions through governance (legislative and judicial branches of a government) and revenue creation (the states ability to collect taxes defines its ability to support itself). However, in practice, state building involves the transformation of aspects of the state not easily defined. The reconciliation of opposition groups, the expansion of state services to rural areas, and the state’s ability to provide security, are all state building issues that are not readily solved.

National reconciliation and reintegration is a major program of the United Nations. Academic research advocates the incorporation of opposition groups into newly formed governments in an attempt to create representative and stable government (Brahimi 2007). However, conflicts may arise from the process of reconciliation, which seeks to bring about peace. A December 2012 article in ‘Stars and Stripes’, a United States military newspaper, notes that between 2009 and 2012 the price for a black market AK-47 in Afghanistan more than
doubled due to demand.\footnote{1} In fact, the demand is driving dealers to go ‘door to door’ in villages asking if villagers have weapons they are willing to part with.\footnote{2} Violent conflict continues alongside attempts to rebuild the Afghan state. Current state building literature covers a broad swath of research fields hence accurately conducting state building policy analysis is difficult. An initial review of state building literature reveals how the inclusion of terms such as democratization; modernization; economic development; and peace building; obfuscate the core of state building theory. This confusion is achieved by using terms synonymously (state building as democratization as state building); by discussing state building through the western lens of free market reforms, elections, and modernity; or by discourses that reinforce theoretical generalizations which have little applicability in ‘ground truth’ state building missions.

The United States uses the variables security, governance, and development, as indicators of progress in Afghanistan (ICMCP 2011). However, I believe that these variables are not effectively connected to state building processes and therefore unsuitable for conducting significant state building analysis. If we delve further into the United States policies in Afghanistan, we see that established measures of effectiveness are based in descriptive measurements of perceived institutional accomplishments (counting ‘beans and bullets’) instead of measuring how institutions are gaining capacity to administer their people and territory. These descriptive measurements are insufficient for determining which policies create effective political institutions or militaries in post conflict states which as will be defined later is integral to state building.

\footnote{2} Druzin, Heath. “Fearing post-2014 environment, Afghans buy up weapons”
This dissertation investigates state building processes by focusing on the establishment of institutions and recommending ways through which scholars can assess the effectiveness of institutional formation through functional accomplishment. The dissertation is divided into two sections. The first section examines state building literature and delimits state building literature to an appropriate focus of institutions. In the second section of this dissertation, I conduct a comparative case study of Afghanistan analyzing the relationship between ‘para-state’ institutions and political instability. This research is a step in understanding the lacunae between the Afghan state and its population.

An Overview of the Literature

A review of scholarly state building literature highlights the conflation of terms associated with state building to include: democratization; transition to democracy; economic development; peace building; and nation building. This conflation of terms hinders the ability of political scientists and policy makers to formulate state building policies that increase political stability in weak states.

I conducted an extensive review of state building literature in order to understand how scholars assess and understand the concept. Some scholars identify state building as democratization (Barnes 2001; Bermeo 2003; Johnson 2006; Dupree 1968; Fukuyama 2005). Transition to democracy literature is another phrase used to describe state building due to the nature of state building operations (Collins 2002; Linz and Stepan 1996; Huntington 1991; O’Donnell et al., 1986; Waldner 1999). Peace building seems to be the new buzzword for state building (Brahimi 2007; Suhrke et al. 2002; Rubin 2006; Ponzio 2007; Paris 1997; Chopra 2001; Brinkerhoff 2005; Goodhand and Sedra 2007; Monshipouri 2003) and we cannot forget
international interventions, which place the need for conflict resolution at the center of the so-called international state building agenda (Chandler 2004; Chandler 2010).

Nation building is another area of study that overlaps with state building (Bendix 1996; Centlivres and Centlivres 2000; Dobbins et al. 2003; Dobbins et al. 2007; Ottaway 2002; Chandler 2004). State building is often understood as institution building or bureaucratic development (Fukuyama 2004b; Thier and Chopra 2002; Taylor and Botea 2008; Koehler and Zuercher 2007; Lister 2007). Economic development and reconstruction are other fields discussed (Byrd and Ward 2004; Ottaway 2003; del Castillo 2003; Flournoy 2002; Needler 1968) as well as stabilization (Cole et al 2009; Department of Defense 2010; Department of Defense 2012; Nixon and Ponzio 2007) and modernization (Cullather 2002; Hafizulla 1991; Huntington 1968). Lastly, state building as an overarching ‘umbrella’ of state-making usually incorporates two or more of the above fields of study and includes variables such as the rule of law; modernization; economic development; security; or stabilization in evaluating the success of state building (Weller and Wolff 2008; Rubin and Hamidzada 2007; Schwarz 2012). In light of the above discussion, the first part of this dissertation will critically review state building literature to clarify associated variables and identify appropriate measures of effectiveness.

**Discussing State Building**

What is state building? A review of the literature reveals a plethora of state building definitions and an underlying premise that state building is essentially institution building. Francis Fukuyama (2004) defines state building as the “creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones” (Fukuyama 2004, 17). The author argues that the international community should identify ways through which to transfer strong institutions into developing
David Lake (2010) analyzes state building in terms of legitimacy and three different models of state building.

According to Lake (2010), ‘statebuilding 1.0’ focused on creating ‘loyal and politically stable subordinate states’ and was used from 1890 through the end of the Cold War; ‘statebuilding 2.0’ focused on building ‘legitimate’ states and was employed after the fall of the Soviet Union; ‘statebuilding 3.0’ is believed to have grown out of the issues associated with state building in Iraq (Lake 2010). ‘Statebuilding 3.0’ focuses on building legitimacy for the state by providing security and social services to the population.

Seth Kaplan (2009) discusses state building in terms of national identity formation. The author’s argument is based in the idea that “states that lack a common identity and a cohesive society will never progress” (Kaplan 2009, 466). Lakhdar Brahimi (2007) discusses state building in terms of: ‘constitution-making’; ‘electoral processes’; ‘reintegration and national reconciliation’; and ‘rule of law’. Brahimi deliberately utilizes democratization functions and processes under the heading of state building. Lakhdar Brahimi is considered one of the most influential practitioners of state building at the United Nations. Therefore, if Brahimi’s conception of state building is based in democratization then it follows that state building policies he advocates will resemble the process of democratization. This type of elite misrepresentation of state building is problematic because it circumvents the foundational requirement of states—strong institutions—for the processes of democracy.

Reinhard Bendix (1996) states “the orderly exercise of a nationwide, public authority” is the purpose of nation building, which is a conflation of state building and nation building terms. Nation building is then examined in light of legitimacy and citizenship rights. This analysis provides a sociological perspective of state building, which is important in understanding state
authority and legitimacy but does not serve to clarify state building and nation building. The above discussion provides an example of how literature on state building (whether termed ‘state building’ or not) is essentially undisciplined. Some authors may advocate this approach to state building as a resource for policy makers arguing that too strict an understanding of the term may preclude the utility of the concept. However, creating mid-level state building theories does not exclude state building literature from being used by practitioners. This dissertation supports state building theory formation by conducting empirical research on the relationship between ‘para-state’ institutions and political instability in Afghanistan. Research findings from this study can therefore be generalized and tested in case studies outside of Afghanistan to determine the theory’s relevance in future state building policies. The key to bridging the gap between theory and practice is applied research.

Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005) argue that: “a general conceptual model is not itself a strategy but merely the starting point for constructing a strategy that fits a specific situation and is likely to influence a specific actor” (George and Bennett 2005, 270 emphasis in original). Therefore, generic knowledge is utilized to support the formation of strategies but specific knowledge is needed to ensure the success of these strategies (George and Bennett 2005, 272). The authors write:

Much scholarly theory and knowledge is cast in the form of probabilistic generalizations of a broad character. These are not without value for policymaking, but leave the policymaker with the difficult task of deciding whether the probabilistic relationship in question applies to the particular case at hand. Political scientists should therefore make a move from theory and knowledge cast in probabilistic terms to conditional generalizations of more limited scope (George and Bennett 2005, 273).
Policymakers also need knowledge about “causal processes and causal mechanisms” in order to turn theory into practice although this information is not often provided (George and Bennett 2005, 274). Case studies are invaluable to political science research because they provide that contextual knowledge needed to better understand causal processes and mechanisms. The following dissertation studies state building by focusing on ‘para-state’ institutions and the affect these institutions have on political instability through the use of violence against the state and provision of resources to the populace. The support ‘para-state’ institutions provide to the population is specifically important because it is this function the state ultimately needs to assume if it is to incorporate its population.

In current state building literature, state building is defined under the auspices of institution building but state building discourse usually addresses democratization or economic development. Rather than assist policymakers in their efforts to bring stability to troubled states, the literature provides unsubstantiated claims on democratic implementation, which may have little longevity after the withdrawal of international security forces. This dissertation research is timely because it addresses the difficulties of creating stability in transforming states and is therefore relevant to both scholars of international relations and comparative politics.

**Research Question and Unit of Analysis**

As stated above, this dissertation is separated into two parts: the first section critiques state building literature to assess the current condition of and theoretical approaches to state building. The second section analyzes the effectiveness of processes of state building (i.e. institution building) by comparing Afghanistan during two distinct time periods. The first period covers 1979 - 1989 during the communist Afghan regime and Soviet occupation. The second period
covers 1994 - October 2001 during the *Taliban* regime. As explained below, trust networks are those relationships that inhibit the state from garnering the loyalty of the state’s population by offering alternatives to state supported initiatives (Tilly 2003). There are several examples of institution building in Afghanistan—organizations that arose out of habitual actions and that incorporated the local populace to regional level administration. However, this type of state building is historically regionally and ethnically bound and thus partial and exclusionary. Therefore, a goal of state building should be to incorporate across regions and institutions those actors willing to participate in the strengthening of a unified state. During the Soviet period, attempts to expand national level governing institutions led to conflict between Pashtun rebels, non-Pashtun rebels, and government forces. Perhaps a more effective state building approach would have been to incorporate local or regional institutions into the national structure, which then would be representative of the citizens of the state.

The presence of trust networks, as well as their relationship to the state, is a primary factor in formulating successful state building policies that establish strong and incorporative state institutions. In order to increase scholarly knowledge regarding state building in regionally diverse states, I ask: why does southern Afghanistan exhibit more political instability than northern Afghanistan? I argue that Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions in the south vie with the central state and other PSI’s through violent action to increase their own regional political power, which is analyzed in the sphere of civil society, in the form of trust networks that connect to the state. Pashtun PSI political power is also increased and broadened through the provision of services to the local population, which is analyzed in the sphere of civil society, in the form of trust networks that connect to the local. These PSI’s create political instability in the southern region of Afghanistan because they interrupt the relationship between the local and state
diverting loyalty and reinforcing the existence of ‘para-state’ institutions. For this research, the types of services provided to the population by PSI’s may include political representation; security; educational opportunities; and local judicial systems.

My unit of analysis is the regional level of northern and southern Afghanistan delimited by Regional Command – East; Regional Command – South; and Regional Command – Southwest as identified in Figure 2 (see page 10). I utilize the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) Regional Command structure to establish the border between north and south Afghanistan because the regional structure effectively splits the state in half from Badakhshan province in the northeast to Farah province in the southwest. The regional command structure separates Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, into a separate regional command although it is located in Regional Command - East. In order to normalize data analysis between the north and south outside of the capital region – my empirical chapter analyzes political instability assessments including and excluding Kabul data. This allows the reader to determine whether the data has been skewed by the inclusion of political instability data from the capital region.
**Historical Relevancy**

There are several aspects of Afghanistan that make it a particularly interesting case for research. The first is its history. Ancient Afghanistan is associated with the conquests of notable leaders such as Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan. In its more recent history, Afghanistan is remembered as a buffer state between the Russian and British Empires. Its ability to repel the British through three Anglo-Afghan wars is a testament to its enduring will to survive. In more modern times, the ability of the Afghan mujahideen to wage an insurgency against the force of the Soviet Union (even if funded by external support) establishes Afghans as a resilient people that refuse to be dominated by foreign interveners. Afghanistan’s conflict ridden history raises questions about its historical institutions.
In researching Afghan history, one must recognize that the term *Afghan* originally described the Pashtun tribes living in present day Afghanistan and Pakistan (see Figure 5 on page 132). The large Tajik and Uzbek populations in the north migrated to Afghanistan during the Soviet expansion in South Asia (Ewans 2001, 92). This influx of non-Pashtuns occurred in the 1920’s while King Amanullah was monarch of Afghanistan. Therefore, the term used to discuss Afghans in the early nineteenth century is likely synonymous with the Pashtun population as opposed to the Tajik and Uzbek populations that arrived in mass in the following century. This is important because it impacts how Pashtuns view their historical position in Afghanistan, the Pashtun ‘right to rule’, and leads us to question how Pashtuns view other minority groups in the state.

Several factors strengthen the relationship between Afghanistan and the Pashtuns. The Afghan monarchy was Pashtun until the 1973 coup, which led King Zahir to abdicate the throne. In restructuring Afghanistan in 2001, the international community decided to emulate the existence of a Pashtun monarchy by selecting Hamid Karzai as the leader of the Afghan Interim Administration from 2001-2003. Karzai ran for President in 2004 and is currently serving his second term. One might ask why this is important? This is important because President Karzai belongs to the Popalzai tribe of the Durrani confederation, which ruled Afghanistan from 1747 – 1842 with a few years intermission in the early nineteenth century (Katzman 2013b). Therefore, in essence, the international community established a democracy based in the embodiment of an ethnicity that ruled Afghanistan for two centuries and a tribe that ruled for a century. This ‘royal’ relationship should not be overlooked by academics as we analyze the relationship between the Afghan political realm and the international community. Another Pashtun factor is linked to the trans-Durand line tribes, which have historically relied on support from the Pashtun - Afghan
government for support. The Durand Line is an international border that demarcates the territory between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The line was drawn by a British civil servant named Mortimer Durand in 1893 and was supposedly accepted by then Afghan monarch Abdur Rahman Khan. The line divides the Pashtun tribal lands in Afghanistan from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan.

In the 1950’s and 1960’s, following the formation of Pakistan, Afghanistan attempted to reclaim the Afghan tribal lands that fell on the Pakistani side of the Durand line—this is the issue of ‘Pashtunistan’. However, the British and Pakistani governments have historically and continue to evade Afghanistan’s claims to the territory. The Afghan claim is that Pashtunistan is original Afghan lands and should be annexed to Afghanistan. These issues bring to the forefront the deep historical relationship between Pashtuns and the Afghan state. Due to this relationship, I will explore the role of Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions in creating political instability in southern Afghanistan.

_Ethnic Saliency_

Afghanistan is of particular importance to state building research because of the configuration of ethnicities in the state, which are territorially salient. The major ethnic groups in Afghanistan are the Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara—although the exact percentages of each group is unknown. Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady (1995) states that the Pashtuns comprise approximately 50% of the state; Tajiks 26%; Uzbeks 8%; Hazaras 7%; and Aimaqs 6%. However, Carol J. Riphenburg (2005) writes that the Pashtuns comprise approximately 38% of the state with Tajiks comprising 25%; Hazaras 19%; and Uzbeks 6%. These are large discrepancies and the current administration of Afghanistan has no intention of clarifying demographic misconceptions.
An article published in *The Guardian* on January 3, 2013 disclosed that two specific questions were not being asked during the process of conducting Afghanistan’s census. These two questions are: “which ethnic group residents belong to, and what language they speak at home.” A “We don’t ask for ethnicity or language spoken, this is on purpose,’ said Laurent Zessler, head in Afghanistan of the UN Population Fund... ‘This country has so many issues to address between the political process, the economy and security, why complicate it?’” However, Afghanistan’s ethnic divisions are the ‘elephant in the room’ for any policymaker attempting to address institution building in the state. Figure 3 (on page 15) depicts the location of the trans-Durand Line Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan. Ethnic locational data and data provided from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) provides insight into Afghanistan’s current problems with political insecurity. Although the ethnic data is not exact—the story it tells is significant. There are a large number of trans-Durand tribes that are aligned with and supported by the Afghan government. A lack of support for the trans-Durand tribes led to threats against the Afghan monarchy in the last century. Security issues related to the provision of trans-Durand tribes increase the need to study political instability in the southern Pashtun regions and to acknowledge the impact of Pashtun organizations on Afghan state building.

In order to identify the region and occurrences of violence against international security forces across Afghanistan, I created an Afghanistan-ISAF Casualty Report Index from data provided by ISAF from January 2010 to November 2013. During this period, 992 casualties were reported by ISAF. I removed ‘non-battle related’ casualties from the total 992, which left 916 reported ISAF casualties. Of these casualties, 93% occurred in southern Afghanistan as

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4 Ibid.
described through the border between RC-East, RC-South, and RC-Southwest. Some have argued that the presence of ISAF in the south increases the opportunity and number of attacks against ISAF. However, ISAF troops are present in the south due to the relationship between the Pashtuns and insurgent safehaven located in trans-Durand line tribal areas in Pakistan. The Pashtun monarchy, the Pashtun south, and Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions create an institutional problem for state builders that may not be resolved in the short term. However, studying this relationship is the best option for supporting the Afghan state in the long term.

Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Dilemma of Hegemons

The Afghanistan – Pakistan relationship is problematic for the international community for many reasons. The Taliban (Pashtun insurgent organization) have used Pakistan as a safehaven from which to invade Afghanistan in the 1990’s, as well as planning and conducting attacks against the struggling Afghan security forces and ISAF in the 2000’s. A 2013 Congressional Research Services paper describes Pakistan’s support of the Haqqani Network, an insurgency group that conducts operations in Afghanistan, writing that Pakistan may be supporting the group in order to “develop leverage with Afghanistan to support Pakistan’s policies” (Katzman 2013, 47). Additionally, Pakistan’s interference in Afghanistan seeks to weaken the state rather than strengthen it—particularly in view of an increased Indian presence in Afghanistan.

Pakistan ultimately seeks to discredit Indian support of Afghanistan arguing that India is using its embassy and consulates to ‘recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents’ (Katzman 2013, 47). Unfortunately, Pakistan’s regional insecurity impacts Afghanistan’s domestic security by disrupting processes that could help with Afghan stability. Afghanistan and Pakistan are at rival ends to create military outposts along the current Durand line border. Several clashes have
occurred between Afghan security forces and Pakistani security forces along the border including a May 2013 clash, which brought about an outpouring of anti-Pakistani sentiment across Afghan social media sites.\textsuperscript{5} Anti-Pakistani sentiment is also reportedly “particularly strong among the Tajiks and other non-Pashtuns” (Katzman 2013, 47). This is likely a result of Pakistani recognition of the \textit{Taliban} government in the mid-1990’s.

\textbf{Figure 3: Trans-Durand Line Pashtun Tribal Areas.} Source data for map derived from National Geographic education. \url{http://education.nationalgeographic.com/education/maps/afghanistan-and-pakistan-ethnic-groups/?ar_a=1}. Used by permission. Copyright © 2014 Esri and its data providers. All rights reserved.

Border post construction is not the only problem with the Durand Line. Afghanistan continues to use its location as a Pashtun unifying political issue. However, the main issue with


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the Pashtunistan problem is that Pashtun tribes located on the Pakistani side of the border make up a large portion of the *Taliban* insurgency, which the international community through ISAF, is attempting to defeat. The majority of this research focuses on Afghanistan and the Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan. However, the Afghan-Pakistan relationship is fundamental in understanding the macro structural view of Afghanistan’s political situation. Therefore, no study should be conducted on Afghanistan without also addressing Pakistan.

The above three sections all highlight the issue of Pashtun ethnic relations with the state. Today, the international community seems to be avoiding the issue of ethnicity in Afghan society. However, ethnicity is a political factor and refusing to acknowledge the fact is not likely to increase modern state building success. Ultimately, the Afghan population—the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and others, are the ones that will live with the results of a failed state building attempt. The international community should not have the final word on how Afghanistan is institutionalized—Afghanistan should.

‘*Mega-theories’ of State building: Modernization, ‘New’ Institutionalism, and International Interventions’

Successful state building in Afghanistan has been a central concern of the international community for over three decades. Afghanistan was a ‘buffer state’ between the Russian and British Empires in the nineteenth century. Hence, both states were aware of the weakness of the central government and the strength of tribal and ethnic relations in the state. The December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops served as a ‘wake up call’ for the entire geopolitical region. Iran, Pakistan and China were threatened by the possibility of further Soviet

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6 Ibid.
expansion while the United States and the West were threatened by the expansion of communism. These fears led to the support of Afghan resistance organizations during the Soviet era in the 1980s. This period then led to an Afghan civil war; the rise of the Taliban regime; and ultimately state building missions in the twenty-first century.

Academically, state building theory has been based in modernization theory, which was developed in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Modernization theory is described as “the process of social change whereby less developed societies acquire characteristics common to more developed societies” (Lerner 1968, 386). The theory of modernization incorporates an analysis of state and societal transformation including changes in societal norms; the process of increasing state capacity through education and training; and the implementation of new political processes.

The ‘new’ institutionalism framework focuses on the “determining power of the state, not in terms of democratic institutions...but hegemonic relationships of power...” (Apter 2007, 24). Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor (1996) explain that ‘new’ institutionalism can be divided into three different approaches: historical institutionalism; rational choice institutionalism; and sociological institutionalism. I consider the ‘new’ institutionalism as an advanced form of modernization theory because it incorporates aspects of modernization but then moves towards better understanding how institutions were originally formed which inevitably impacts how change or transformation occurs. The ‘new’ institutionalism is important because it helps direct the researcher towards an effective framework for state building even though its size inhibits its scope.

International relations theory provides a framework for state building analysis under the taxonomy of ‘third party state building’ or ‘international interventions’ (Caplan 2004, 53). David Chandler (2005) identifies problems with international state building associated with the
formation of dependent states through the hierarchical ‘sharing’ of sovereignty between the intervener and the intervened. The increased number of international interventions is a concern due to situations such as in Kosovo where the sovereignty of the state is diminishing. Overall, these three ‘grand’ theories are prevalent in state building policy but they are not considered effective means for implementing state building.

The Replacement of Traditional Bonds: A Theoretical Framework for Analysis

In the following dissertation, I research ethnically based ‘para-state’ institutions (PSI’s) to help explain why Afghanistan continues to experience political instability – particularly in its southern region. Afghanistan has experienced over three decades of violent conflict and instability, which has reified traditional bonds that provide security and the basic needs of the population along ethnic and tribal lines. There are Pashtun PSI’s operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan to include the Afghan Taliban. These PSI’s establish state like institutions to increase the capacity and administration of their territorial regions. These institutions address issues including but not limited to: the military or security; education and training; health; finance; culture; and foreign affairs. The problem with PSI’s is that they arise from the government’s inability to fill the societal – state gap. PSI’s grow out of societies needs and therefore, local acceptance is likely high as long as the organization represents the desires of the local population. From a modern perspective, the strengthening of the national state comes at the expense of traditional bonds that have helped the population to survive during times of violent conflict. However, the dissolution of traditional bonds can increase political and social instability if the central state is unable to replace the services previously provided by the PSI. Reciprocally,
societal bonds or trust networks will arise from a states’ inability to provide resources to its population. Therefore, the reduction of traditional bonds should not be considered permanent.

For the purpose of this dissertation, I will use the work of Reinhard Bendix (1996) and Charles Tilly (2003) to analyze the problem of political instability in Afghanistan caused by the relationship between central state institutions and Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions. In addressing my research question, I argue that Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions create political instability by warring against the central state and competing for popular support by offering local services to the Afghan population. This ‘local’ state building hinders the implementation of central state building initiatives and should be studied to identify characteristics that make it successful at the local level.

Charles Tilly (2003) and Reinhard Bendix (1996) address the process of transitioning traditional bonds of kinship towards a modern relationship with the state. In Europe, this process occurred through the extension of citizenship to the lower classes. The transition of authority from the local to the central state occurred through the breaking of feudal bonds and the establishment of direct relations with the ‘center’. Tilly (2003) analyzes relational mechanisms to explain democratization and de-democratization. His work in *Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650-2000* focuses on relational mechanisms, which are described as those mechanisms that “transform interactions among persons, groups, and social sites, as when members of previously segregated religious communities begin to intermarry” (Tilly 2003, 17).

My research does not address the democratization of the state. Therefore, in order to use Tilly’s framework, I substitute democratization with state building with the understanding that these two processes are *not* the same. I believe that the arguments put forth by Tilly are an
appropriate framework for analyzing the form of state building occurring in Afghanistan through the actions of ‘para-state’ institutions, or in Tilly’s vernacular ‘trust networks’.

Trust networks are described as the “locus of interpersonal networks on which people rely when undertaking risky long-term enterprises such as marriage, long-distance trade, membership in crafts, investments of savings, and time-consuming specialized education” (Tilly 2003, 16). As stated above, these networks can encourage resistance to the institutionalization of state processes (Tilly 2003, 21). My conception of ‘para-state’ institutions is based on trust networks that provide resources to the population such as security and political representation. This is not to say that they cannot include marriage or education but that they may not. This is the first difference between Tilly’s construction of trust networks and my use of the concept. Based on Tilly’s framework, I argue that PSI’s in Afghanistan hinder political stability by “facilitating resistance to governmental initiatives and reducing the stakes of citizens in governmental performance” (Tilly 2003, 21).

According to Tilly, the “disintegration of existing segregated trust networks” is needed for the central state to become the arbiter of authority hence strengthening the ability of the state to provide political stability to the country (Tilly 2003, 19). An example of the dissolution of a trust network is the inability of an organization to provide for the protection of a ‘client’. This inability then prompts the client to withdrawal and seek protection elsewhere. For reasons I wish to explore, trust networks in Afghanistan seem to be overly resilient. By this I mean that they are not easily diminished and attempts to incorporate networks into the state bring about violence from other trust networks thus increasing political instability. This highlights a difference between Western and non-Western state institutionalization. In Europe, the incorporation of
trust networks or PSI’s reinforced the central state. In Afghanistan, incorporation is resisted and for seemingly long periods of time.

According to Tilly, the “creation of external guarantees for governmental commitments” is a means through which democratization can occur—or in my conception a precursor to state building (Tilly 2003, 20). This has not been the case in Afghanistan. If anything, external guarantees have increased instability as PSI’s have relied on ‘historical memory’ to associate governmental guarantees with external interference in internal affairs. Therefore, external guarantees increase political instability in Afghanistan and hinder state building.

Tilly writes that two mechanisms ‘reversed’ the results of trust networks: “mechanisms that undermined the capacity of existing segregated networks to protect people’s high-risk long-term enterprises and other mechanisms that made public political actors (e.g., trade unions) and governments themselves more attractive and/or reliable guarantors of those enterprises” (Tilly 2003, 21). I argue that a structural factor for Afghanistan, the presence of trans-Durand line tribes, creates an ever-present problem for PSI incorporation. Afghanistan has no power to govern Pashtun areas that are located in Pakistan. However, Pashtun PSI’s are able to provide resources to these areas through trust networks thus providing a function that the central state cannot practically provide without potentially damaging its international relations with Pakistan. Therefore, I believe that undermining PSI’s in southern Afghanistan is not likely to occur in the near term because Afghanistan is unable to replace PSI support to the trans-Durand tribes without becoming involved in Pakistani affairs in Pashtunistan.

Based on the above discussion, Tilly identifies two processes that support the democratization of states—the “dissolution of insulated trust networks”; and the “creation of politically connected trust networks” (Tilly 2003, 22). Tilly writes that the “history of trust-
bearing networks in a region” is significant in determining “the prospects for democracy and the processes by which democratic regimes formed, if they did. Both the structure (e.g., centralized or segmented) and the content (e.g., trade or kinship) of those networks mattered” (Tilly 2003, 33). In the utilization of this framework, I argue that the structure and content of trust networks in Afghanistan directly relate to the level of political instability experienced in the state.

The second framework I use in analyzing institution building in Afghanistan is Reinhard Bendix’s (1996) *Nation-Building & Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order*. Bendix’s work is useful in analyzing state building in light of existing trust networks in Afghanistan. His work allows readers to consider how state building might occur in situations where trust networks may not be readily broken. Bendix’s framework is based in the analysis that under medieval rule, or what I will call traditional rule, “governmental authority is as much linked to family as to property” (Bendix 1996, 128). The right of rule or right to exercise authority is held by individuals based on their position as a member of a family as opposed to an individual (Bendix 1996, 128). “In the medieval conception the ‘building block’ of the social order is the family of hereditary privilege, whose stability over time is the foundation of right and of authority...” (Bendix 1996, 128). However, a ‘modern’ state “presupposes that this link between governmental authority and inherited privilege in the hands of families of notables is broken” (Bendix 1996, 128).

Bendix identifies the fact that traditional ties were broken in the European experience which led to a reinforcing of the state. However, he provides an “alternative approach to tradition and modernity” which is helpful in analyzing Afghan PSI’s in Afghan state building. Bendix uses the term modernization, the ‘mega-theory’ of state building as described above, to analyze state building. In Bendix’s analysis of the process of modernization, he argues against
the idea that tradition is completely removed from the modern state. He uses the work of Weber to argue that tradition is found in modernity and writes:

the disjunctive characterization of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ by such abstract terms as ‘particularism’ and ‘universalism’ exaggerates and simplifies the evidence, as Max Weber pointed out in his discussion of the ideal type. At this abstract level it is quite probable that no society is without some elements from both ends of the continuum, leading some writer to use phrases such as ‘the modernity of tradition’ or ‘the tradition of the new’ (Bendix 1996, 391).

This is an important aspect of Bendix’s analysis of modernization because it allows for traditional structures to exist in the modern state. Bendix addresses the problem of cross-case generalizations stating a “decline of kinship ties and the concomitant rise of individualism were aspects of Western modernization” (Bendix 1996, 394). Bendix then argues that researchers make this path the ideal path to modernization and then utilize the model to make determinations on whether developing states will modernize (Bendix 1996, 394). “To be sure, no one is likely to say simply that these [developing] societies will develop; he states instead that they will not develop unless kinship ties decline” (Bendix 1996, 394).

There are at least three things wrong with this procedure: (a) it ignores the exaggerations and simplifications which went into the ideal type in the first place, and hence blinds us to the role which kinship ties and collectivism played in the modernization of Western Europe; (b) it also blinds us to the possible ways in which kinship ties and collectivism might be, or might be made, compatible with the modernization or other areas (tacitly we have misused the ideal type as a generalization); (c) it diverts attention from the very real possibility that modernization may never arrive at modernity, so that terms like
“development” or “transition” are misnomers when applied to societies whose future condition may not be markedly different from the present (Bendix 1996, 394-395).

Bendix’s framework for modernization will be applied to an analysis of state building in Afghanistan in the following three areas: an assessment of the role PSI’s play in state institutionalization; an assessment of the compatibility of PSI’s with the Afghan state; and an assessment of the roles provided by PSI’s to the Afghan population. Bendix argues that the traditional and modern are not ‘mutually exclusive’ but that “traditional social order” can exist, and often do exist in “modern” societies (Bendix 1996, 407).

For the purpose of this dissertation, I apply Tilly’s framework to analyze the effects of trust networks in the form of ‘para-state’ institutions on political stability in Afghanistan. I also apply Bendix’s ‘alternative approach’ to modernization to determine whether the presence of PSI’s in southern Afghanistan creates political stability or political instability at the national level. Bendix (1996) and Tilly (2003) both address the process through which the relationship between the local and national is established. The experience of Western and non-Western states are different and cannot be considered under the same evolutionary generalizations or sentimentalities of ‘ideal’ transformations. The process of state building in Afghanistan must be viewed through a historical perspective that avoids overly generalized assessments of state formation while better understanding how ‘para-state’ institutions have formed in the absence of a capable centralized state.

Concepts and Definitions
The independent variable for the comparative case study of Afghanistan is ‘para-state’ institutions. The Oxford American Desk Dictionary and Thesaurus defines institution as: “a
society or organization founded especially for a particular purpose”; “established law, practice, or custom”; synonyms include “tradition, habit, usage, routine” (Jewell 2002, 430). Stephen R. Barley and Pamela S. Tolbert (1997) as “shared rules and typifications that identify categories of social actors and their appropriate activities or relationships” (Barley and Tolbert 1997, 96, emphasis in original). Barley and Tolbert go on to write that variations in institutions depend “in part, on how long an institution has been in place and on how widely and deeply it is accepted by members of a collective” (Barley and Tolbert 1997, 97). Stephen D. Krasner (1988) writes that no common institution definition exists. Krasner writes:

Oran Young (1986) states that “social institutions are recognized practices consisting of easily identifiable roles coupled with collections of rules or conventions governing relations among occupants of these roles” (p. 107). Sidney Verba (1971) argues that institutions refer to “generally accepted regular procedures for handling a problem and to normatively sanctioned behavior patterns” (p. 300). Alford and Friedland (1985) are more expansive, stating that the “concept of ‘institution’ refers to a pattern of supraorganizational relations stable enough to be described—polity, family, economy, religion, culture” (p. 16). Finally, Stinchcombe (1968) says that an institution can be defined as “a structure in which powerful people are committed to some value or interest” (p. 107) (Krasner 1988, 72-73).

Krasner writes that based on the above review, there are “two interrelated characteristics that are central to an institutionalist perspective: the derivative character of individuals and the persistence of something—behavioral patterns, roles, rules, organizational charts, ceremonies—over time”; and that “something persists over time and that change is not instantaneous and costless” (Krasner 1988, 73).
For the purpose of this dissertation, I use Jonathan Turner’s (1997) definition of institutions which is “a complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organizing relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment” (Turner 1997, 6). Turner’s definition focuses on roles and social structures, which are important in analyzing PSI’s remembering that the institutions of import are those that fulfill the roles that would be normally assigned to the state such as security, basic services and leadership.

For the purpose of this study, ‘para-state’ institutions are defined as institutions that provide services to the population that a modern central state would likely provide. State services may include security; political representation; and education or training. PSI’s will be identified by the following characteristics: a group that has a medium to large range following within a specific territory; has a military capability (i.e. militia); has a political stance; may provides resources to the local population such as security, food or economic opportunity; is largely ethnically homogenous (although I focus on Pashtun PSI’s). The following three characteristics are not requirements but will provide insight into the formation of and type of PSI’s operating in southern Afghanistan: may be associated to a warlord or local regional leader and may be more or less developed; and may function with the help of external support. PSI’s are expected to be large and therefore only one to two PSI’s are expected to work inside a given territory. Instances where two or more PSI’s operate will likely produce increased violence against each other and the government. The minimum function that a PSI will fulfill is security and military training for a local population.
My dependent variable is political instability. Ismael Abu-Saad et al. (2000) conducted research on identity and political stability in ethnically diverse states. The authors argue that political instability is likely to occur “as individuals excluded from the corporate identity seek solidarity in other frameworks and organisations, and/or promote the development of a corporate national identity of their own” (Abu-Saad 2000, 58-59). In this definition, inclusion through the creation of national identity and citizenship are critical in determining whether political stability will occur.

Donald G. Morrison and Hugh M. Stevenson (1972) define political instability as “a condition in national political systems in which the institutionalized patterns of authority break down, and the expected compliance to political authorities is replaced by violence intended to change the personnel, policies, or sovereignty of the political authorities by injury to persons or property” (Morrison and Stevenson 1972, 84). The authors go on to say that an agreed upon definition of political instability does not exist and that terms such as “internal war, conflict behaviour, and civil strife are used to refer to the wide variety of events involving political violence which are identified in ordinary language as revolutions, revolts, rebellions, civil war, guerilla war, terrorism, irredentism, riots, subversion, conspiracy, coups d’état, etc” (Morrison and Stevenson 1972, 84). Ian Lustick (1979) describes political stability as “the continued operation of specific patterns of political behavior, apart from the illegal use of violence, accompanied by a general expectation among the attentive public that such patterns are likely to remain intact in the foreseeable future” (Lustick 1979, 326).

According to Claude Ake (1975), political stability is created through role expectations which is produced through societal ‘laws and conventions’. Ake states that individuals act
within the context of ‘shared expectations’, which create legitimate roles through which political interaction occurs (Ake 1975). These role expectations are culturally derived. Hence, it is necessary to specify that the role expectations that serve as the standard for judging whether a form of political behavior is irregular or regular is the most authoritative definition of role expectations that the society has—namely, its laws and conventions, and particularly the former. Regular exchanges do not violate the laws of the society, irregular exchanges do” (Ake 1975, 273).

Of significance, Ake writes “law and custom...constitute the system of sanctions that gives political structure its particular character. Once the group evolves a customary or legitimate way of doing things, this way tends to persist because of the inconvenience or the cost to the individual of going against it” (Ake 1975, 274).

Leon Hurwitz (1973) writes that authors equate political stability with the “absence of domestic civil conflict and violent behavior” (Hurwitz 1973, 449). However, political stability is too complex to associate only with political violence. Hurwitz provides a discussion on the various definitions that apply to political stability which include the longevity of the government; the perception of legitimacy; the “absence of structural change” (Hurwitz 1973, 457); and a fifth definition which attempts to ‘integrate and synthesize’ the other definitions of political stability and “necessitates greater reliance upon in-depth country studies in place of cross-national based upon aggregate data” (Hurwitz 1973, 458). For the purpose of this study, I define political instability as the presence of “domestic civil conflict and violent behavior” (Hurwitz 1973, 449) against the government or representatives of the government. This definition of political instability is appropriate as a minimal definition for this study (Gerring 2001).
Political stability will be measured and discussed along a continuum of ‘more stable’ to ‘less stable’ regions in Afghanistan. As discussed above, the Afghanistan-ISAF Casualty Report Index reports that from January 2010 to November 2013, 93% of ISAF casualties occurred in the south. This data indicates that the north is significantly more stable than the south in the realm of violent conflict against security forces representing the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Political stability will be operationalized through several indicators to include: the quantity and type of violence against Afghan government; the quantity and type of attacks that occur against foreign presence or surrogate representations of the Afghan government; an assessment of factionalism analyzed through two lenses: ‘para-state’ institution versus ‘para-state’ institution, and ‘para-state’ institution versus the state.

A temporal indicator is created to determine how stable a region is based on the number of incidences during a given time period. For the purpose of this study, there are two temporal indicator categories: monthly and annually. This category will help identify whether instability tends to occur during specific time periods. This study will also determine whether northern Afghanistan has consistently remained more politically stable than southern Afghanistan over the Soviet and Taliban eras.

**Significance of Study and Hypothesis**

The significance of this study is that it furthers state building literature by critiquing the current literature separating fields of study that unnecessarily overlap state building theory. This overlap obfuscates attempts to clarify scholarly state building discussions. It also allows researchers to avoid identifying state building specific measures of effectiveness, which are imperative in separating successful from unsuccessful state building policy. The comparative case study
approach to state building is important in identifying historical aspects of state institutional formation in Afghanistan in light of ethnic ‘para-state’ institutions. It also furthers the literature on state building by analyzing the effectiveness of PSI’s in state building during continued periods of conflict.

I hypothesize that the cause of Afghan political instability in the south is causally related to the presence of Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions which compete with the central state and other regional Pashtun PSI’s for political power and popular support. This competition prevents any single organization, to include the state, from becoming dominant without the use of violence against the other organizations. In addition, I hypothesize that ‘para-state’ institutions provide resources to the population, which increases local popular support and loyalty to the institution.

As will be discussed in Chapter 5, attempts to reconcile resistance groups in Afghanistan have consistently been unsuccessful. Louis Dupree (1997) describes interactions between Afghan villagers and the ‘outside world’ writing:

The village builds a ‘mud curtain’ around itself for protection against the outside world, which has often come to the village in the past. Sustained relations with the outside world have seldom been pleasant, for outsiders usually come to extract from, not bring anything into, the village. Items extracted include rent, taxes, conscripts for armies, women for the harems of the rich and powerful. The process, therefore, has generally been one way, away from the village. As a consequence, most villagers simply cannot believe that central governments, provincial governments, or individual local or foreign technicians want to introduce permanent reforms. Previous attempts have generally been of short duration and abortive, for once the ‘modernization’ teams leave, the villagers patch up the ‘mud curtain’ and revert to their old, group-reinforcing patterns. Most villages listed in government records of the developing world as ‘developed’ have never
been revisited or rechecked, and the ‘development’ exists only on paper (Dupree 1997, 249).

Dupree goes on to write that “villagers willingly accept any and all suggestions for technological change, because they realize that the sooner they accept the sooner the ‘developers’ will leave” (Dupree 1997, 249). He calls villagers ‘non-cooperative’ and argues that villagers can rarely be “persuaded to work for (to them) an abstract, distantly (for the benefit of the future generation) achieved common goal” (Dupree 1997, 250). These excerpts paint a grim portrait for would-be central state builders but a more positive picture for ‘para-state’ institutions, which can provide relatively quick results. A significance of this study is that it will analyze the process of PSI institutional development, which will be insightful when compared to the establishment of institutions at the national level. Of note, the Pashtuns are not the only ethnic groups that establish PSI’s in Afghanistan. However, non-Pashtun PSI’s, normally located in the north, are more readily consolidated into the central government and exhibit large support for the national military and political organizations. Pashtun PSI’s have been more reticent to support the central state but their consolidation into the central state is perceived as crucial for political stability because they are the largest minority group in Afghanistan.

**Research Design**

I will conduct a comparative case study of Afghanistan in order to test the hypothesis that Afghan political instability in the south is caused by Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions that build institutions that compete with the central state. This assertion is based in the Pashtun belief that they have the most to lose (e.g. governmental control and power) through the newly established democratic processes in Afghanistan. According to the Minorities at Risk database:
The Pashtun’s successes in the 2004 and 2005 elections have not changed the perception that their ethnic group is underrepresented in the federal government and specifically in Karzai’s cabinet. The Pashtuns’ primary grievances relate to this perceived lack of representation in the central government, and the continued presence of U.S. and other foreign forces in the country. Although there do not appear to be any specific cases of Pashtuns complaining about ethnically-based economic discrimination, the dire economic conditions in Afghanistan (e.g. 40% unemployment rate) have undoubtedly affected the population’s opinion of the government” (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).

The desire for increased representation and control of governmental institutions may encourage Pashtuns to support Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions, which seek to overthrow the Afghan government in order to establish a more Pashtun centric, non-inclusive Afghan state. Therefore, the most significant threat to Afghan state building is the Pashtun ‘para-state’ institution.

The relationship between Pashtun PSI’s and political instability can be analyzed geospatially by identifying locational PSI and political instability event data. In order to conduct this research study, I will utilize the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), which holds declassified government primary source documents and the Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) Event Database, which holds worldwide event data from 1979. The DNSA sources will be analyzed to determine the size; ethnicity; operating areas; military capability; political aspects; and external support for Pashtun PSI’s operating in Afghanistan. GDELT data will be used to assess the location and levels of political instability in Afghanistan during the Soviet era (1979-1989) and Taliban era (1994 – October 2001). Events used to analyze the types and levels of political stability in Afghanistan during the above periods include codes associated with: coerce (17 series); assault (18 series); fight (19 series); and the use of
unconventional mass violence (20 series). I restricted my political instability data to ensure that the events could not be considered overly ambiguous and therefore irrelevant.

**Case Study Research**

George and Bennett (2005) define case as “an instance of a class of events” where ‘class of events’ describes a “phenomenon of scientific interest, such as revolutions, types of governmental regimes, kinds of economic systems, or personality types that the investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing theory (or ‘generic knowledge’) regarding the causes of similarities or differences among instances (cases) of that class of events” (George and Bennett 2005, 17-18). Case study methods “include both within-case analysis of single cases and comparisons of a small number of cases” (George and Bennett 2005, 18).

George and Bennett identify four strengths associated with case studies. The first is ‘conceptual validity’. Conceptual validity is the researchers ability to “identify and measure the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the researcher intends to measure” (George and Bennett 2005, 19). Variables that social scientists study are often times difficult to measure. Researchers conduct “‘contextualized comparison,’ which ‘self-consciously seeks to address the issue of equivalence by searching for analytically equivalent phenomena—even if expressed in substantively different terms—across different contexts” (George and Bennett 2005, 19).

Case studies have a strong advantage in identifying new variables and hypotheses by studying ‘deviant or outlier cases’ and through fieldwork (George and Bennett 2005, 20). Additionally, case studies allow researchers to ‘explore causal mechanisms’. Within a case, researchers have the opportunity to analyze multiple intervening variables and ‘inductively
observe’ variables in action that may create unexpected outcomes (George and Bennett 2005, 21). Finally, case studies can ‘accommodate complex causal relations’ (George and Bennett 2005, 22).

The possibility of case selection bias and the fact that case studies can only give “tentative conclusions on how much gradations of a particular variable affect the outcome in a particular case or how much they generally contribute to the outcomes in a class or type of cases” are limitations of the case study method (George and Bennett 2005, 25). Quantitative methods have the ability to assess the “causal weight of variables” but case studies are strong at determining “whether and how a variable mattered to the outcome” (George and Bennett 2005, 25). Case studies are also criticized for issues with ‘degrees of freedom’. George and Bennett argue that the ‘degrees of freedom problem’ is a misapplication to qualitative research as qualitative researchers do not tend to aggregate variables but instead look at specific attributes of individual variables (George and Bennett 2005, 28-29). ‘Lack of representativeness’, ‘single-case research designs’ and the ‘potential lack of independence of cases’ are other critiques of qualitative research methods (George and Bennett 2005). However, these critiques are based in the process of quantitative methods, which qualitative methods do not strive to replicate.

Within-case analysis is defined as the “internal analysis of one or a few cases” (Seawright and Collier 2004, 312). According to the authors, there are two types of within-case analysis. The first type:

focuses on internal evidence about patterns of causation connected with an overall outcome distinctively associated with the particular case or cases. In such within-case analysis, scholars work with only one observation on the dependent variable…new evidence is introduced, but the number of observations…is not increased. The additional evidence added by such within-case analysis contributes to evaluating explanations of this single outcome on the basis of causal-process observations. In the second type of within-case analysis, researchers collect observations
on the dependent variable and all the independent variables for multiple (spatial or temporal) subunits of the original case. In this instance, the number of observations increases, and this can be seen as an important example of increasing the number of observations as a means of gaining inferential leverage (Seawright and Collier 2004, 313).

Within-case analysis is associated with process-tracing which “attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes”; congruence testing which attempts to assess the ability of a theory “to explain or predict the outcome in a particular case”; and counterfactual analysis which is a mental exercise of analyzing variables and outcomes (George and Bennett 2005, 6, 181, 167).

Process tracing is an important part of case study methods because it is associated with tracing causal mechanisms (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 1). According to Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, “studying causal mechanisms with process-tracing methods enables the researcher to make strong within-case inferences about the causal process whereby outcomes are produced, enabling us to update the degree of confidence we hold in the validity of a theorized causal mechanism” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 2).

Process-tracing methods are categorized into three realms: theory testing; theory building; and explaining outcomes (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 3). For the purpose of this study, I will focus on theory testing process tracing.

Theory-testing process-tracing deduces a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of a hypothesized causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within-case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made, however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 3).
The authors explain that in theory-testing process-tracing, a case is selected that exhibits the causal mechanism that has been hypothesized. “The researcher selects a single case where both X and Y are present, and the context allows the mechanism to operate. Here the goal is to evaluate whether evidence shows that the hypothesized causal mechanism linking X and Y was present and that it functioned as theorized” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 11). According to the authors, process-tracing is often misused by scholars who identify the X and Y variable but “black box” or leave out the causal mechanisms (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 33).

This type of scholarship is a valuable form of descriptive inference that describes a series of empirical events and provides valuable historical knowledge regarding what happened but tells us little about the underlying how and why an outcome occurred. The focus is on events instead of a theory-guided analysis of whether evidence suggests that a hypothesized causal mechanism is present (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 33).

In this case, my independent variable (X) is ‘para-state’ institutions and my dependent variable (Y) is political instability. My hypothesized causal mechanisms are violence against the government and services that are offered to the public. Beach and Pedersen write, “When conceptualizing the mechanism, each part should be seen as an individually insufficient but necessary part of the whole” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 50). In the below chart, violence against the government reduces the state’s ability to support the local population. This reduction of state services is then exploited by PSI’s that begin providing the local services thus reducing political stability in the region as the state is subverted by local ‘para-state’ institutions.

Daniel Little (1998) writes that a “central goal of social research is to identify the causal mechanisms that give rise to social outcomes” (Little 1998, 198). Little calls this ‘causal realism’ which means that “causal mechanisms are real, and can be investigated through the normal
empirical procedures of the social sciences” (Little 1998, 198). Little presents the microfoundations thesis, which states that “explanatory relationships at the societal level” must include two things: local situational knowledge, which leads to individual action; and “knowledge of the aggregative processes that lead from individual actions...to an explanatory social relationship...” (Little 1998, 203).

![Process-tracing table modified to include R. Young Greven’s independent and dependent variables and causal mechanisms. Derived from Beach and Pedersen 2013, “Theory-Centric process-tracing methods”, 35.](image)

Two things are needed for “good causal explanation”—the first requirement is “causal analysis that identifies some of the conditions that contributed to the occurrence of the explanandum” (Little 1998, 208). The second is that the explanation address “causal relations that attach to the type, not the token” (Little 1998, 208). Little’s discussion of causal relations reinforces the need for empirical studies that hypothesize about the antecedents of a particular social outcome. This dissertation accomplishes that task. My research provides contextual information surrounding individual action and my hypothesis addresses causal mechanisms related to a type of case—a state that exhibits ‘para-state’ institutions.
The above discussion explains the strengths and weaknesses of within-case methods and process tracing. In conducting the comparative case study, I assess two periods in Afghan history: the Soviet occupation and the Taliban regime. Following this analysis, I will conduct process tracing to determine whether the causal mechanisms of violence and support to local populace occur in the hypothesized sequence. The violence and support mechanisms are both present in the Afghan case but it is important to understand how these variables relate to create the political instability analyzed in this dissertation. This longitudinal study will address the following questions regarding ‘para-state’ institutions:

1. What types of PSI’s were created inside of Afghanistan during each case period?
2. What are the levels of political instability associated with Pashtun PSI’s?
3. How are PSI’s implemented?
4. How are PSI’s received locally?
5. What factors brought about the success or failure of the PSI?

Once I have completed this portion of my analysis, I will utilize the frameworks provided by Tilly (2003) and Bendix (1996) to determine the role of Pashtun PSI’s in creating political instability in the south. I will also address how traditional bonds can be used to create political stability as opposed to instability in the Afghan state.

Chapter Overview

The above chapter provides a detailed guide to the following dissertation. Chapter 2 dissects the conflation of state building ‘mislabeled’ research fields. The chapter provides a definition of state building and identifies several interconnecting themes in state building literature to include the relationship between state building literature and liberal normative ideals; the problem of
implementing Western bureaucratic institutions in non-Western states; and the contradictory effect of pursuing state legitimacy over state institutionalization. I argue that state building should be analyzed in light of the process of creating institutions instead of by institutional output.

In Chapter 3, I compare state building, nation building, and peace building. I argue that nation building focuses on how states create a national identity—not how states create political institutions. Peace building as state building is unproductive because it places the emphasis on creating peaceful situations instead of studying how states maintain peace through strong institutions. However, peace building is easier to deem as successful because all that is needed are peace agreements or negotiations. In this chapter I propose that the lack of local incorporation into state building is a major contributor to political instability and state building failure.

In Chapter 4, I provide an in-depth overview of ‘mega-theories’ that influence state building policy to include: modernization theory and the ‘new’ institutionalism. I also address international interventions also called third-party state building. I critique these theoretical frameworks concentrating on the implications of using expansive and overgeneralized theories in state building research. In addressing causal mechanisms for change in political and social institutions, scholars inevitably address every aspect of change thus diluting what could be considered important. The international intervention discussion is important because it describes the impact of internationally conceived state building policies on state power. State sovereignty is slowly being diminished through the implementation of shared sovereignty programs, which prevent states from making decisions without consultation at the international level. Therefore,
international interventions should be carefully studied in light of unintended consequences for the international community.

Chapter 5 provides an overview of the history of Afghanistan from the early nineteenth to the mid twentieth century. The chapter helps place in perspective the impact of foreign interference in Afghanistan and how that interference created the ‘anti-foreigner’ sentiment prevalent today. Additionally, the chapter discusses the role of the Pashtun (also spelled Pushtun) tribes in the formation of Afghanistan and the role of tribal resistance in the centralization of the state. As discussed above, the Pashtun monarchy links the southern tribes to the state and this chapter highlights how attempts by the monarchy to reform the state led to political instability and how those themes reoccur today.

Chapter 6 provides a comparative case study of two eras in Afghanistan: the Soviet era, and the *Taliban* era. Through a review of declassified government documents and event data, I assess the levels of political instability and overlay that data onto maps that depict operating areas of specific Pashtun PSI’s. Through this analysis I determine what variables could be applicable in determining the level of successful state building in northern and southern Afghanistan. I also conduct process-tracing to determine whether PSI’s commit violence against the state prior to implementing public services to the population or if there is another causal mechanism that could be intervening to change the outcome of the phenomena. Finally, I conclude with an overview of the dissertation and implications for future research on the topic. The field of state building will continue to grow as the well functioning of states becomes increasingly important for international security in the twenty-first century. Therefore, this research is timely and necessary to the future of success of the field.
Chapter 2: From Democratization to Capacity Building: Is State Building Still Relevant?

Introduction

State building is an idiom often used but rarely defined. If the events of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are any indication, there is a continued and increasing need for conceptual clarity and critical academic scholarship on the topic. The problem of state building is not the need for increased publication but for increased rigor and academic excellence in the field. A review of state building literature has identified the lack of a universal definition of the term; the conflation of state building with other fields of study; and an inability of scholars to identify characteristics specific to the concept—thus no measures of effectiveness can be identified to scientifically determine the suitability of implemented policies. The opportunity to pursue state building case studies is ever present in our modern world. This is the time to increase clarity in state building analysis and purpose to provide better scientific results to the international community so that the work of academia can positively impact the world.

This chapter is an integral part of this dissertation because it provides a much needed evaluation of state building literature. This chapter exposes the lack of conceptual clarity and understanding in state building literature and argues that state building is an area of research unto itself with separate and distinct areas to be studied. In current literature, state building is discussed in terms of democratization or transition to democracy; bureaucratization; or legitimacy building even though the majority of state building definitions concern institutions. Common terms used to describe state building are nation building and peace building, which will
be discussed in the next chapter. The interchangeability of terms is becoming normalized through scholarly practice. However, this dissertation pursues the clarification of the field as well as the appropriate utilization of the term in future research.

An in-depth critique of scholarly literature is required to create a state building typology that will be used to conduct a comparative case study on state building in Afghanistan. In the following chapter, I will establish a minimal definition of state building as described by John Gerring (2001); and critically review state building in light of this state building definition. This analysis will identify several interconnecting themes including: the relationship between state building and institutions; the association of state building literature to liberal normative ideals; and the problem of implementing Western bureaucratic institutions in non-Western states. The chapter will close with an assessment of the effect of pursuing state legitimacy over long-term state institutionalization.

Importance of Defining Terms

In his work, *Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework*, John Gerring (2001) describes the need to define terms in social science research. Gerring states that natural scientists find the lexicon of social science to be confusing and unstable terrain, an apparently orderless field of churning terms, definitions, and referents. Three problems, in particular, plague the social science lexicon: homonymy (multiple meanings for the same term), synonymy (different terms with the same, or overlapping, meanings), and instability (unpredictable changes in the foregoing). As a result, studies of the same subject appear to be talking about different things, and studies of different subjects appear to be talking about the same thing. Knowledge cumulation [sic] is impeded, and methodological fragmentation encouraged (Gerring 2001, 65).
The lack of clarity in state building literature makes it impossible to extrapolate and interpret key variables. Therefore, in order to analyze state building, we must disassemble the concept to better understand its composition and restructure it to identify the state areas it functions within.

Gerring (2001) states there are two types of questions that can be asked about “a term’s definition: (1) what does it mean generally? and (2) what should it mean here (in this particular context)?”—the former being the ‘general definition’ and the latter the ‘contextual definition’ (Gerring 2001, 69). Often times, scholars disregard the ‘general definition’ as ‘merely definitional’ and skip straight to the ‘contextual’ range where the ‘real work’ is done (Gerring 2001, 70). However, Gerring’s work aims to “make general definition more accessible and more helpful in the task of contextual definition, not to deprecate the latter” (Gerring 2001, 70). Of consequence, the author writes “concepts such as justice, democracy, power, and ideology” are ‘problematic’ because we have contextual definitions for them but we do not know what they mean:

To be sure, contextual definitions clarify meaning; but insofar as they clash with each other they are likely to cause confusion about the general concept. If empirical work on democracy employs different definitions of democracy, or if it occurs under different labels (eschewing the ambiguity of “democracy”), it becomes difficult to integrate this work into a single discussion. This is the sort of semantic confusion and disciplinary parochialism that we wish to avoid (Gerring 2001, 70).

Through the ‘defining’ process, the scholar must determine whether a minimal definition or an ideal-type definition is needed for the social science research. “A minimal definition refers to a definition that would apply to all usages of a term within a specified language region (when
a term is employed in a nonidiosyncratic manner)” (Gerring 2001, 78). An “ideal-type definition
aims for a collection of attributes that is maximal – that is, including all (nonidiosyncratic)
characteristics that help to define the concept in its purest, most “ideal” (and perhaps its most
extreme) form” (Gerring 2001, 80). The scholar must remember that the ‘ideal type’ form may
not be found in reality. Therefore, conducting research (or creating public policy) based on
ideal-type definitions may lead to disillusionment as researchers seek to create and implement
plans to establish the ‘island of Utopia’, which are in reality unattainable. This is not to say that
‘ideal-type definitions’ are inappropriate in social science research. However, I question the
utility of ‘ideal-type’ definitions of state building in view of current state building crises.

Bernd Reiter (2013) writes “language, even though it functions as a self-referencing
system, is connected to reality in important ways. Words refer to reality” (Reiter 2013, 8). The
importance of establishing definitions is to characterize and categorize what is being observed.
“Words allow us to make sense of an overly complex and chaotic world—a world that...might
not make any sense on its own and might not be well ordered” (Reiter 2013, 8). As Reiter
highlights, “We cannot think...about the world without using the very references we have
created...” (Reiter 2013, 8) which is why establishing a typology for state building is imperative.
Words can be used to refer to different realities. Therefore, the reality to which the word refers
must be clear to ensure an understanding of the analytical conditions the word is explaining. A
lack of ‘reality’ understanding can lead to academic redundancy or academic irrelevancy, which
is where much of state building research resides today.

Anthony Birch (2001) writes that the interdisciplinary aspect of politics enhances the
literature but can also add confusion to the field of study.

It is my belief that everyone concerned with the study and analysis of politics needs to
give more direct consideration than is normally given to the definition and understanding
of the basic concepts involved in this field of study. Many of these concepts are commonly used without definition because they are familiar to us from general usage and we think we know what they mean. But they have ambiguities that need to be cleared up and shades of meaning that need to be distinguished if they are to form the basis of significant generalizations (Birch 2001, 2).

Birch (2001) compares the work of historians and economists stating: “Students of history have little need to make a special study of concepts, for the academic discipline developed by historians makes little use of generalizations based on concepts” (Birch 2001, 3). For Birch, the political science student is positioned somewhere between history and economics and seeks “to go beyond the description of institutions and events in order to generalize about them” (Birch 2001, 4). The creation of models and typologies is important in formulating new understandings of phenomena. Increased knowledge in social science can only be expected when words and concepts are clearly communicated thus establishing a shared understanding. The current lack of a shared understanding of state building is reinforced through the use of differing definitions and analytical tools. The lack of clear definitions encourages researchers to analyze one phenomenon but draw conclusions about another. Any sort of “scientific progress” is undermined by this predominant lack of analytical precision. As a review of the state building literature demonstrates, over-generalizing processes that form the state is leading to unsuccessful policies and faulty theoretical arguments.

What is a State?

In order to discern a minimal definition for ‘state building’, one must first begin with a definition of the ‘state’. According to Max Weber (1946): “one can define the modern state sociologically
only in terms of the specific *means* peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of physical force” (Weber 1946, 78). Weber further characterizes the term writing: “a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory” (Weber 1946, 78). Theda Skocpol (1979) defines the state as “a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority. Any state first and fundamentally extracts resources from society and deploys these to create and support coercive and administrative organizations” (Skocpol 1979, 29). This links state formation and economic development as increased revenues help create a more robust state apparatus—poor states are unlikely to be strong states.

Ernest Gellner (1983) defines the state as an “institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of order (whatever else they may also be concerned with)” (Gellner 1983, 4). This definition identifies ‘institutions’, as a common referent of the state. Each of the above authors provides a ‘classic’ definition of the state, with overlapping themes of institutions and administration or order. For the purpose of this chapter, I define the state as an institution (or set of institutions) that is associated with a territory; wields the ‘legitimate use of physical force’; and is capable of establishing order. I begin this research with a definition of the state because a clear understanding of the state is foundational in forming an appropriate definition for state building.

**What is State Building?**

Francis Fukuyama (2004) defines state building as “the creation of new governmental institutions and the strengthening of existing ones” (Fukuyama 2004, 17). In his work, Fukuyama focuses on creating strong institutions in failed states to help solve bureaucratic
problems (Fukuyama 2004, 17). Fukuyama’s definition of state building is useful but the focus on economic development is unhelpful because it largely avoids the question of how lasting institutions can be created. Lakhdar Brahimi (2007) associates state building with “building effective systems and institutions of government” (Brahimi 2007, 5). Brahimi’s definition of state building is about ‘transforming’ states and he considers the term state building to be a ‘generic term’ used to describe actions that help achieve this ‘transformation’. (Brahimi 2007, 5) Again, the definition is helpful but becomes irrelevant because analyzing state building ‘generically’ only leads to conceptual confusion.

Sarah C. Paine (2010) defines state building as “the creation and strengthening of the civil and military institutions that comprise a government” (Paine 2010, 8). Paine states: “Highly industrialized countries have a wide array of such institutions, which go beyond the military and the three branches of government to include economic, educational, public health, public works, police, welfare, and many other types of institutions” (Paine 2010, 8). Paine’s definition of state building is appropriate because it focuses on institutions. However, the inclusion of all institutions significantly increases the size of state building efforts. The use of the term as an overarching practice of institutional formation may lead to an inability to focus solely on essential institutions of the state. Hence, diluting the impact of state building literature on policy.

Marina Ottaway (2003), on the other hand, does not use the term state building to describe the process of state ‘transformation’. Ottaway uses the phrase ‘democratic reconstruction model’ to describe state building but the areas incorporated into the ‘democratic reconstruction model’ are definitely state building focus areas:

- on the military side, demobilization of the former combatants, some provisions for their resettlement into civilian life, and the formation of a new national army (Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer, 1996); and on the political side, the structure of a democratic
system, including the drafting and approval of a constitution, the enactment of the necessary laws on political parties and elections, the registration of voters and finally the holding of multiparty elections (Post-Conflict Elections, 2000)” (Ottaway 2003, 316).

The military and political arenas of the state are reoccurring areas of discussion in state building literature although in current literature the importance of focusing on these two areas of institutional change is largely disregarded. Ottaway’s discussion above is unhelpful to the discussion of state building because it focuses on the function and actions of institutions as opposed to the process leading to the formation of institutions.

Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk (2009) define state building as the “strengthening of legitimate governmental institutions in countries emerging from civil conflict” (Paris and Sick 2009, 1). The authors exclude a ‘minimal definition’ of state building and use a contextual definition by only considering post conflict states. This reduces the applicability of the term and sets the research in opposition to literature that takes a broader view. David Lake (2010) argues: “Statebuilding refers, at its core, to militarized interventions by a foreign state or coalition with the explicit goal of creating a new regime, where the previous one has already collapsed, or of changing a regime that would otherwise fail” (Lake 2010, 259). Lake’s definition is reliant on military interventions and lacks the capacity to analyze state building through a broader lens. As with Paris and Sisk’s (2009) definition, the contextual definition stymies the applicability of the term. It limits the definition but not in a way that benefits the field.

John Heathershaw and Daniel Lambach (2008) define state building as “the reconstruction of the core structures and institutions of the western, Weberian state” (Heathershaw and Lambach 2008, 4). This definition only allows the establishment of a ‘western, Weberian state’, which identifies a problem in state building literature—the
implantation of liberal Western ideals into non-Western states. This topic will be further discussed in the following chapter. Bruce Jones et al. (2008) “define state building as purposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups (Jones et al. 2008, 14).

The incorporation of legitimacy as a socially constructed view of the state defines much of state building policy today as international interveners gauge policies by public opinion instead of increases in administrative competencies. However, the issue of ‘negotiating the mutual demands’ of state and society is a function of the institution that is created by state building. By this I mean that state building is a process that enables the state to establish institutions that provide security (force) and administration (order). The process of creating institutions is distinct from the functional performance of the institution. This type of ‘mission creep’ is detrimental to the field but unfortunately found in much of the literature.

David Waldner (1999) identifies this problem and writes “state building has multiple meanings, ranging from the initial differentiation of governmental functions from social institutions, to the centralization of power in absolutist states, to the proliferation and rationalization of state institutions” (Waldner 1999, 21). According to Waldner, state building is the “construction of institutional networks supplanting notables and linking the state to social classes and groups and the expansion of the state’s provision of public goods, particularly as the state assumes responsibility for establishing infrastructure, regulating the economy, and managing ties to the global economy” (Waldner 1999, 23). This view of state building (like Jones et al.’s) portrays primary and secondary effects occurring simultaneously. This is an example of the type of ambiguity created by the use of vague terms, as the definitions proposed
by Jones et al., Waldner, and others use similar terms with overlapping meanings and by thus doing inhibit scientific progress.

State building literature is a conglomeration of multiple terms to describe the process of establishing a state. State building is an interdisciplinary term and as such subject to each discipline's vernacular. Throughout this review, it is evident that definitions of state building are fundamentally concerned with institutions. A minimalist understanding of state building will include the institution of security because in modern analysis the security apparatus wields the legitimate use of force. Therefore, state building may be defined as the processes used to build the institution (or set of institutions) that holds the ‘legitimate use of physical force’ (see Weber’s definition of the state above). A ‘minimal definition’ is useful because it helps integrate interdisciplinary state building discussions into a ‘single discourse’ and universalizes the field.

The definition of state building should also include the ‘establishment of order’, which can be created through force or through political administration. As Fukuyama highlights, the formation of economic institutions must be accomplished to support the military and political institutions of the state. Therefore, for the purpose of this research, state building is defined as: the processes used to build a state’s institution or set of institutions (military, political and economic) that increase the state’s capability to wield the ‘legitimate use of physical force’; establish order; and seek economic means that support and sustain state functions.

Qualifying the definition by identifying core institutions of state building will refine the field and limits discussions to applicable state building areas. In other words, the process of building institutions is where state building literature should focus (understanding informal institutions is a part of this process). Legitimacy will develop through the access gained to government resources and the effective administration of domestic affairs.
State Building and Institution and Capacity Building

Sultan Barakat and Margaret Chard (2002) approach state building through the lens of institution and capacity building. The authors are extensively cited in the rest of the due to their efforts to clarify the ambiguities of ‘institutions’ and ‘capacity’; and because the method used to address definitional inaccuracies provides an exemplar for future state building analysis. Barakat and Chard (2002) state that there are two main definitions of institution: “An established law, custom, usage, practice, organization or other element in the political or social life of a people”; and “An establishment, organization or association instituted for the promotion of some object, especially one of public utility, religious, charitable etc. (Onions, 1965: 1018)” (Barakat and Chard 2002, 819). “It seems to be the existence of these two types of institution that has led to confusion in the discussion of both the theory and practice of institutions development” (Barakat and Chard 2002, 819). The significance lies in the fact that ‘development agencies’ focus on ‘role’ based organizations instead of engaging with traditional institutions to assist with aid development (Barakat and Chard 2002, 819). According to the authors, the term capacity also suffers from two meanings.

The aid community’s rational for ‘building’ or ‘developing’ institutions is based on the perception that poor communities and national governments are dysfunctional and failing to ensure the well-being of their people through lack or loss of ‘capacity’...In its original meaning ‘capacity’ refers to ‘ability to hold...a containing space, area or volume’ but it long ago acquired a figurative meaning of ‘Mental receiving power’ and ‘Active power of mind; talent’ and later a general meaning of ‘The power, ability or facility for anything in particular’ (Onions, 1965: 260). So there are two meanings, one concerned with the hold of matter, the other describing human attributes (Barakat and Chard 2002, 819-820).
As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, the author’s argue that lack of clarification in the use of terms creates confusion for the field (Barakat and Chard 2002, 820). Barakat and Chard go on to describe how certain terms that are ambiguous help to ‘fudge conflicting issues’ in politics (Barakat and Chard 2002, 820-822). This lack of ‘defined practice’ is at the core of this critical review of state building. No critically derived analysis of state building can be formed without removing ambiguity from the field.

According to the authors, the process of institutional development arose during decolonization because of concerns regarding a potential administrative vacuum (Barakat and Chard 2002, 823).

In most cases, a period of transitional government was negotiated, during which the colonial administration was converted into some kind of approximation of the domestic ‘liberal democratic’ institutional arrangements of the colonial power, and national administrators gradually took over the reigns of power. Capacity building, in the form of professional education, training and technical assistance, was provided to enhance their ability to govern. Post-independence, the international consensus of the UN and financial institutions...was that they [the state] required a further period of support. This ushered in a long period in the 1960s and 1970s when international aid focused on strengthening institutions of government and building the capacity of public servants (Barakat and Chard 2002, 823).

Functional boundaries of institution building were established during this period. These functional boundaries correspond to the definition of state building and are identified in three realms: the establishment of domestic institutions; the ability to manage institutions through education and training; and financial support to institutions from international donors. Value
neutral issues become a part of the state building history as scholars systematically incorporated liberal ideological views into state building. This scholarly expansion has not served to further the field but rather impede the progress of the field. Barakat and Chard provide an interesting assessment but not all states established institutions post-colonization as Samuel Huntington (1982) explains.

...in most European societies at least an embryonic national community and...a national state existed before the emergence of ideologies. So also did the need to conduct foreign relations and to protect the security of the national community and the state. National security bureaucracies, military forces, foreign offices, intelligence services, internal security and police systems were all in existence when ideologies emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although the ideologies undoubtedly had some implications for and posed some demands on these institutions, their proponents tended to recognize the prior claims of these institutions (Huntington 1982, 15).

Huntington explains that America was institutionalized after the establishment of what he calls the ‘American Creed’ defined as “liberal, democratic, individualistic, and egalitarian values” (Huntington 1982, 1). Therefore, America struggles with the realization of these values in the establishment and functions of institutions at home and abroad. Europe, on the other hand, was institutionalized prior to the establishment of these ideals hence is more concerned with the functioning of the institution over how the institution fits into the liberal ideological realm.

In many ways, the pursuit of ‘American Creed’ values in international state building counteracts the ability of state builders to achieve success by promoting unachievable goals in exchange for international support. Huntington’s discussion of American institutions is helpful in analyzing current state building operations because ideology has become an inculcated aspect of interventionist policy as will be discussed in the following chapter.
The Problem of Democratization as State Building

A reoccurring problem of state building literature is its inclusion of or association with democratization. Institution building and democratization are separate processes and their implementation should not be conflated. State building can occur in democratic and non-democratic states, which exemplifies the distinction between practices. The best way to understand institution building and democratization is to keep the two areas separated and analyze both as separate entities in order to better understand if and how the two interact. It is important to realize that states can be authoritarian and institutionalized as Eva Bellin discusses later in the chapter.

Brahimi provides a perfect example of democratization as state building in his paper presented at the 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government in June 2007:

statebuilding is unapologetically seen as the central objective of any peace operations...In this context and with this objective in mind, I propose to discuss some of the key activities that need to be undertaken: a) Constitution-making; b) Electoral processes; c) Reintegration and national reconciliation; d) Rule of law (Brahimi 2007, 4).

Thomas Carothers (2002) describes ‘five core assumptions’ that define the transition to democracy paradigm and core assumption four and five deal directly with state building through institutions. The fourth core assumption of transition is the belief that “underlying conditions in transitional countries— their economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, sociocultural traditions, or other ‘structural’ features— will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the transition process” (Carothers 2002, 8). This assumption is

7 See Chapter 4: Institutionalism
obviously false as institutional legacies can be connected to the formal and informal processes of the state (the informal processes often hold the ‘state’ together during crisis). Additionally, ‘structural’ factors of the state could be assessed as the state’s ‘institutional’ makeup.

The fifth core assumption of the transition paradigm states:
...the democratic transitions making up the third wave are being built on coherent, functioning states. The process of democratization is assumed to include some redesign of state institutions—such as the creation of new electoral institutions, parliamentary reform, and judicial reform—but as a modification of already functioning states...To the extent that democracy promoters did consider the possibility of state-building as part of the transition process, they assumed that democracy-building and state-building would be mutually reinforcing endeavors or even two sides of the same coin (Carothers 2002, 9, emphasis mine).

The ‘mutually reinforcing’ understanding of state building and democratization is a large reason for current analytical confusion in state building. To the democratizer, state building is seen as a process that will create a democratic state. To the state builder—democratization should not be considered a necessary part of the process but an ideological characteristic of the state. A transitioning state needs strong institutions whether it becomes authoritarian or democratic. The state must be able to function.

The common theme between state building and democratization is the need to create or transform state institutions. In her research on democratization, Nancy Bermeo (2003) writes that opportunities to disassemble “problematic military and political institutions” are available after a conflict (Bermeo 2003, 162). However, this is an extreme step that should only be taken if the state is determinedly better off with the dismemberment of institutions that previously managed the state. This action should not be decided on ideological premises as the
dismemberment of institutions severely weakens the state, which may not be able to recover within a delimited timeframe.

State building as democratization is problematic, because democracy is usually accompanied by liberal market reforms, which historically create domestic instability. Addressing state building through electoral processes; constitution-making; reintegration and reconciliation (R2); and rule of law processes shifts the focus from institution building to liberal political ideology, which in many cases was the focus of the conflict that created the need for state building. The fact that the ‘transition paradigm’, described by Carothers (2002), relies on functioning coherent states should warn of the need to disassociate state building and democratization. When these processes are implemented concurrently, they can create the same level of instability previously experienced by the state during conflict. State building is clearly not the process of democratization—it should not be ideologically driven. Therefore, state building should not include democratization in analysis that is considered specific to state building. The two processes should be analyzed separately so that causal mechanisms of each area can be understood. Only through this process can we understand the relationship between the two, if one exists.

*The Problem of State Building as Bureaucratization*

An appropriate way of defining state building is in terms of strengthening institutions and increasing state capability to conduct state functions. State building as bureaucratization could be considered the ‘first phase’ of state building. In other words, part of establishing institutions (based on the Western model of government) is the process of creating a bureaucratic state. In his classic treatment of this topic, S. N. Eisenstadt (1959) describes bureaucracy in two ways:
“The first...view defines bureaucracy mainly as a tool, or a mechanism created for the successful and efficient implementation of a certain goal or goals”; the second “view sees bureaucracy mainly as an instrument of power, of exercising control over people and over different spheres of life, and of continuous expansion of such power...(Eisenstadt 1959, 303). Both types of bureaucracy apply to state building from an administrative perspective.

Alexander Thier and Jarat Chopra (2002) describe state building through the identification of areas where institutions support the state. The emphasis on international organizational support in ‘transforming’ states infers an indoctrination of a Western typology of institutions:

The political, social and governmental environment of Afghanistan is presently a fragmentary array of institutions. These include national institutions (a Transitional Authority); local institutions (eg village, clan, mosque); regional institutions (eg province, party/faction, tribe/ethnic group, domestic NGOs); and international organizational institutions (eg UN political and humanitarian agencies, the World Bank, international NGOs, interested states and coalition forces, and an International Security Assistance Force)...As political authority is re-established, these institutions should be fashioned into a semi-cohesive framework, with basic delineation of powers and non-violent dispute resolution mechanisms (Thier and Chopra 2002, 894).

The authors analyze Afghanistan post-invasion hence the institutions discussed include the influence and interaction of international organizations already acting inside state borders. In modern state building operations—these additional international actors play a role in the formation of the state and have a substantial impact on state process. However, the inclusion of these international actors makes state building analysis more confusing because it is difficult to
determine whether domestic or international actors are making strides in institutional development. Sarah Lister (2007) writes:

...states are therefore not just influenced by institutions, they are multi-layered institutions, with different rule-systems operating at different levels and in different ways. This institutional multiplicity creates a situation in which different sets of rules of the game, often contradictory, coexist in the same territory (Crisis States Research Center 2005). So while policy-makers may see state-building as creating a ‘rule-based’ system, in fact it may be more helpful to think of ‘state-building initiatives as attempting to replace one type of rules with another, so that formal bureaucratic rules of a Weberian type take precedence over informal rules rooted in patronage and clientelism. In this way political power can be exercised in a progressively depersonalized, formalized and rationalized way, as considered appropriate for a ‘modern state’ (Lister 2007, 3).

These multi-layered institutions will be assessed in regards to the role they play in creating political stability. Eva Bellin (2004), describes Middle East exceptionalism based in strong institutions, which reinforce the functioning of the state:

The exceptionalism of the Middle East and North Africa lies not so much in absent prerequisites of democracy as in present conditions that foster robust authoritarianism and especially a robust and politically tenacious coercive apparatus...Access to abundant rent distinguishes the region and subsidizes most of the cost of these overdeveloped coercive apparatuses...the experience of the Middle East and North Africa draws attention to the persistent importance of structural factors, most importantly, the character of state institutions, in charting a country’s susceptibility to democratic transition (Bellin 2004, 152, emphasis mine).

Bellin’s research reinforces earlier statements regarding the need to disassociate democracy from state building in empirical research. Strong institutions serve as the backbone
of a state, whether democratic or not. Bellin asserts that “perhaps most important of all, the creation of impartial and effective state institutions must be present” if transition to democracy in the Middle East and North Africa will ever occur (Bellin 2004, 152).

The common theme of state building and bureaucratization is that in the Western typology, bureaucratization is an integral part of institution building. Indeed, as Bellin (2004) argues, strong institutions are the backbone of the state and bureaucratization is the means through which institutions administer the state. The problematic areas of bureaucratization are correspondingly related, as state conditions may not allow for the implementation of Western type institutions. Essentially, Western style bureaucratization relies on a technical and public works infrastructure that is not likely available in less developed states. Low rates of literacy and the lack of a shared common language are only two problems that war against state bureaucratization. The problem of bureaucratization is not that the transforming state does not understand how to manage its functions—it has likely been functioning for decades in a decentralized manner. Therefore, the problem is likely that international interveners do not understand the processes through which the transforming state functions. Interveners provide a ‘one size fits all’ model of institution building, which is overly inflexible and therefore unsuccessful.

This lack of success has driven the international community to establish ‘parallel institutions’ in transforming states in order to speed services to rural populations. ‘Parallel institutions’, while largely successful, can detract from the legitimacy of the state by stripping endogenous institutions of resources and technical expertise. Brain drain is another considerable problem in attempts to bureaucratize states as those members that become trained often find employment in other states. In this case, attempts to incorporate informal ‘traditional’
institutions into state structures may create a more inclusive civil service at the onset of state building thus increasing the strength of the state and decreasing incentives for emigration. Although bureaucratization is a part of institution building, it should not be the sole focus of state building.

The Problem of State Building as Legitimacy Building

Many authors discuss state building in light of the perceived legitimacy of the state. Beth Cole et al. (2009) write that legitimacy has several meanings to include:

- The degree to which the local population accepts and supports the mission, its mandate and its behavior over time
- The degree to which the local population accepts and supports the host nation government (which can include informal governance structures as well), and the manner in which the government attains power
- The extent to which regional neighbors and the international community accept the mission’s mandate and its actions and the host nation government and its actions (Cole et al. 2009, 3-15).

According to these definitions, legitimacy is a perspective—grounded in an agent’s view of what they believe to be good or lawful (Cole et al. 2009, 3-15 – 3-16). Schwarz (2012) writes:

...the meaning of the word ‘legitimacy’ is not restricted to that which is sanctioned by law....the word implies that an action is just or right irrespective of its legality and thus describes the subjective understanding of actors as to what is deemed politically legitimate (Schwarz 2012, 16).

The discussion thus far indicates that legitimacy is not an element of institution building but a result of successful institutionalization. As David Lake (2010) describes below, the focus
on civil-military relations to increase security and social welfare is one way that legitimacy in state building is currently being pursued.

Lake’s (2010) discussion of state building is structured as a general framework of historical United States led state building operations. Lake discusses models of state building labeled as ‘Statebuilding 1.0’, ‘Statebuilding 2.0’, and ‘Statebuilding 3.0’. According to Lake, the same types of actions continue to be conducted with every state building model: “Troops must be sent to restore order. Food and humanitarian aid must be provided. New states or regimes must be created to replace those that have collapsed or been overthrown” (Lake 2010, 258). ‘Statebuilding 1.0’ is associated with the “late 1890s, when the United States first began trying to reshape the foreign regime it encountered” (Lake 2010, 258). ‘Statebuilding 2.0’ is associated with the fall of Communism when the United States sought to build “legitimate states, a change facilitated by the absence of any peer competitor” (Lake 2010, 258).

Statebuilding 3.0 seeks to build legitimacy for new states by providing security and essential public services to their populations. Although still embraced as goals, democracy and economic reform have shifted far down the list of priorities. This model rests on social contract theory, and its core tenet that legitimacy follows from providing effectively for the basic needs of citizens (Lake 2010, 258).

Lake draws heavily from the United States Army’s Field Manual 3-24 on counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency operations focus on civil-military relationships and attempt to win local population support, competing with insurgent attempts for the same. Lake concludes that ‘statebuilding 3.1’ is needed because current United States state building policy has “tipped too far in the direction of social contract theory”—“a new statebuilding 3.1 is required that recaptures the emphasis on building loyal and democratic states central to earlier
models” (Lake 2010, 259). The author’s analysis of state building discusses legitimacy and democratization and contextually ties state building to militarized interventions. By using state building terminology, the author confuses elements of the process and further complicates the already conflated body of literature.

Tobias Debiel and Daniel Lambach (2009) argue that state building “emerged out of a growing unease with the ineffectiveness of aid in difficult environments, and out of the realization that political conditionalities had led to the marginalization of ‘poor performers’ [states]” (Debiel and Lambach, 2009, 22). The authors write that elites are reliant on local institutions to secure legitimacy and only legitimate institutions will be retained. However, this again focuses on the result of state building instead of the process of state building. “Societal and political orders are based on institutions, which mean rules, norms, and expectations in a specific setting. Sociopolitical order and its underlying institutions, however, can only be sustained as long as they are regarded as legitimate” (Debiel and Lambach 2009, 25). Therefore, the byproduct of informal institutions are discussed here as legitimacy and are reproduced through the institutional relationship with the local populace. Of note, the legitimacy of the formal institution is the same as the informal institution because the relationship with the population ultimately decides the fate of the institution. The reality of state building is that it:

- takes place in hybrid political and society orders where rival actors of different origin reproduce their power and influence, perform governance functions, or undermine state-building and post-war reconstruction efforts. Their spaces and options for action are shaped by formal and informal institutions, but also through the construction of social realities and the sources of legitimacy that derive from shared mental models—or the lack of these (Debiel and Lambach 2009, 27).
Debiel and Lambach provide a helpful discussion on how state building as legitimacy occurs at the local level. In the case of Afghanistan, local power brokers can affect Western state building efforts through informal institutions that were historically created during periods of crisis. In the end, if these informal institutions are stronger than formal state institutions—the consolidation of the administered space of the territorially bound state will not occur.

David Roberts (2008) writes that state building has the ability to increase state legitimacy by implementing social justice measures (Roberts 2008, 538). Roberts believes the current form of state building is:

vastly up-scaled, more expensive, more intrusive and more complex [and] has come to represent the practice in which domestic democratization is externally assisted to ensure conformity to international governance norms such as liberal democracy and neoliberal economic practices, whilst implanting rules and conditions for ‘best practice’ in national government (Roberts 2008, 538).

This form of state building “‘facilitates states’ connections to global governance regimes by harmonizing the rules of state behaviour with peace- and wealth-developing external bodies like the UN and World Bank and the global governance regimes for which they stand” (Roberts 2008, 258). This may create legitimacy or the lack of legitimacy through the issue of shared sovereignty. “The ‘basic problem’ within a state in the immediate aftermath of elections is to create, where absent, state institutional legitimacy in order to reduce the reasons a society might have for attacking the state” (Roberts 2008, 549).

Legitimacy in state building can also be created through individuals that participate in government. Michael Bhatia (2007) writes, “the question of the mujahideen [in Afghanistan] is a critical part of the contest for legitimacy, in terms of right to rule, conduct violence and retain
combatants” (Bhatia 2007, 91). This assertion directly relates to the central focus of this dissertation, which is determining the causal relationship between Pashtun PSI’s and political instability. As will be discussed further in Chapter 6, Pashtun PSI’s incorporated mujahideen into institutions that provided political representation and services to the population. The contest between the state and PSI’s continue in the present-day as Afghan PSI leaders continue to assert their power through processes that subvert the central state and encourages local loyalty.

Bhatia’s research questions the mujahideen’s ‘right to rule’. The author advocates for state building that focuses on law as the legitimate wielder of force (Weber’s definition of the state) as opposed to state building based in individuals or groups (Bhatia 2007, 101). This argument relates to Mahmood Mamdani’s (1996) research on ‘decentralized despotism’. Mamdani (1996) describes the British approach to indirect rule in South Africa highlighting the empowerment of local chiefs that ruled over local villages while being employed by the British to manage the territory. Mamdani argues that the process of indirect rule through the use of these chiefs allowed for local abuses against the population and a despotism that continued after the end of colonialism. Currently there is a concern regarding the utilization of mujahideen (or former PSI leaders) in the state or provincial governments because abuses that occurred under the mujahideen prior to 1996 would almost certainly occur post-9/11. The key to dealing with former mujahideen is to incorporate them—rewarding their ability to serve the local population and bring stability while restraining their ability to act outside the rule of law. In theory, this process increases local inclusion and legitimacy while decreasing the opportunity for ‘decentralized despotism’. It is my firm belief, that only an inclusive state building policy, even to include the incorporation of warlords, over an indeterminate period of time can lead to a politically stable state.
Seth Kaplan (2009) writes that legitimacy in state building is created through the creation of a common identity.

A legitimate political order...has to be [based on] some consensus about national identity, some agreement about the boundaries of the political community, and some collective understanding of national priorities. If the population within given political boundaries is so deeply divided within itself on ethnic or class [or, for that matter, religious or clan – SK] lines, or if the demands of a larger supranational community or compelling to some [significant] portion of it, then it is extremely difficult to develop a legitimate order. (Hudson, 1977: 389-390) (Kaplan 2009, 468).

According to Kaplan, the lack of a cohesive identity prevents states from creating “apolitical bureaucratic structures—including the civil service, police, and judiciary” (Kaplan 2009, 468). Kaplan’s discussion on state building and legitimacy is actually a discussion of nation building. Kaplan provides a perfect opportunity to identify how authors use terms incorrectly and then create new areas where terms can be further misidentified and confused. He lobbies for indigenous state building processes arguing: “by trying to impose a western-style blueprint for state building, it [the West] has perpetuated the most artificial aspects of post-colonial states, preventing them from developing real ties to their own citizens” (Kaplan 2009, 470). Kaplan’s work is confusing because terms used to communicate the argument lead the reader to question the author’s understanding of state building amidst other areas of study.

The common theme of state building and legitimacy building is based in the relationship between good institutional performance and the formation of legitimacy through functioning institutions. If the state is able to create strong institutions—legitimacy will likely be created through the actions of those institutions. Legitimacy building is inherently problematic because

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8 See Chapter 3: Nation Building
it seeks to remove powerful members of the state and fill the gap created by the removal of those actors. Warlords are respected during times of war when protection is a commodity. However, with the introduction of an international military, the warlord becomes disrespected as the strategic narrative shifts from local protection to national protection and the removal of human rights violators. The waters are quickly muddied when peace talks and constitutions begin to be created; previous alliances broken; and factions reestablished.

Legitimacy through the provision of social welfare is practically impossible at the beginning of state building operations. Rather than focusing on social welfare—state building should focus on strengthening existing institutions and creating new institutions based in cultural characteristics—the result of these actions should be an institutionalization that is domestically and internationally legitimate.

As for civil-military based state building, in my assessment, the use of military doctrine as a framework for state building is problematic for academia. The Counterinsurgency manual is based in strategic military plans and policies for civil-military relationship building. It should not be considered the foundational guidebook for state building. However, many issues in the manual are accepted as scientific because of the presentation of the information. For instance, if something is perceived as academic then it is more apt to be considered scientifically sound. I provide two excerpts from the Field Manual that helps clarify what types of issues are covered in counterinsurgency missions.

Long-term success in COIN [counterinsurgency] depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule. Achieving this condition requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as feasible...Over time, counterinsurgents aim to enable a country or regime to provide the security and rule of law that allow establishment of social services and growth of economic activity.
COIN thus involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines. Political and military leaders and planners should never underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover, they should recognize that the Armed Forces cannot succeed in COIN alone (Department of Army, Counterinsurgency Manual, 2006, 1-1).

As is clear from this excerpt, COIN focuses on all aspects of the state in order to gain militarily over the insurgency. It includes what the military calls PMESII (phoenetically pu-me-see)—the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure aspects of the state. Lake (2010) provides a perfect example of how the field manual has moved into academic scholarship through the incorporation of its analysis into scholarly work. Another excerpt explains how counterinsurgency operations attempt to implement and reinforce the transforming state.

The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful COIN operations. All efforts focus on supporting the local populace and HN [host nation] government. Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency. COIN participants come from many backgrounds. They include military personnel, diplomats, politicians, humanitarian aid workers, contractors, and local leaders. All must make decisions and solve problems in a complex and extremely challenging environment (Department of Army, Counterinsurgency Manual, 2006, 2-1).

As is apparent, much of the incorporation described in the manual occurs as international actors attempt to transform all aspects of the state simultaneously. As scholars, we must decide whether policies should be based on military strategy and must question the presumed overarching applicability of military field manuals in creating lasting sovereign states. In closing,
legitimacy should be considered in institution building but not solely in regards to specific outcomes. Legitimacy should be considered in the establishment of institutions by analyzing informal institutional characteristics of the state and cultural contexts through which decisions have historically been made. This will help guide institution building and incorporate the population into the process of state building providing a firmer foundation for legitimacy in the future.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter was to provide an in-depth critique of scholarly state building literature in order to create a state building typology for conducting state building analysis. This chapter is imperative to my dissertation because it establishes a foundational understanding of state building. Specifically, by deconstructing the streams of academic literature assessed to be state building, I have delimited the state building area of study and established a new basis from which to study the process. Through a review of the literature, I defined the state as an institution (or set of institutions) that has the ‘legitimate use of physical force”; is associated with a territory; and is capable of establishing order. I then defined state building as the processes used to build a state’s institution or set of institutions (military, political and economic) that increase the state’s capability to wield the ‘legitimate use of physical force”; establish order; and seek economic opportunities that support and sustain state functions. This definition closely resembles the definitions by Fukuyama, Paine, and Jones et al., among others. Although many definitions seem alike, the analytical usage of the definitions is where most authors diverge and the confusion begins.
I identified several interconnecting themes including: the relationship between state building and institutions; the association of state building literature to liberal normative ideals; and the problem of implementing Western bureaucratic institutions in non-Western states; and the contradictory effect of pursuing state legitimacy over state institutionalization. In addition, I identified the functional boundaries of state building as: the establishment of domestic institutions; the ability to manage institutions through education and training; and financial support to institutions (initially from international donors) moving to self-sustainment. State building should be viewed as the actual process of assessing, identifying and implementing operations to strengthen or create state institutions. The successful implementation of state building will lead to recognition of institutions as legitimate and to increased solidarity across the state.

The use of the term state building has become commonplace and used synonymously with democratization; transition to democracy; bureaucratization; and legitimacy building; which has reduced the term to irrelevancy. If state building does not describe a specific practice then the use of the term is merely a placeholder for a more precise term, which should be identified for academic clarity. However, I believe the term state building serves an important purpose in describing the creation of strengthening of state institutions although its familiarity has encouraged scholars and practitioners to lose sight of the term’s importance. Now is the perfect time to brush off the original purpose of state building and identify those practical functions that make state building relevant. New critical approaches to researching and analyzing state building methods are crucial in shaping the future of the field.
Chapter 3: State Building, Nation Building, Peace Building: The Ideology of UN

Interventions

In countries such as Afghanistan or Haiti, long-drawn conflict or prolonged political crises have significantly eroded or destroyed already weak state institutions, and whatever human resources once existed are scattered in exile around the world or in refugee camps in neighbouring countries. However, lessons from statebuilding in post-conflict environments indicate that significant pockets of capacity manage to survive even in these contexts, and government systems, however corrupt and inefficient, continue to exist - Lakhdar Brahimi 2007.

Introduction

As explained in the preceding chapter, a common problem in state building literature is its utilization of different terms to describe the process ascribed to the institutional transformation of weak or often post conflict states. By this I mean that increasingly, academics use the term state building to describe processes of democratization, bureaucratization, and development, which belong to distinctive academic fields of study. Another detrimental aspect of scholarly literature is the growing use of the terms nation building and peace building to describe processes included in state building.

This chapter addresses these issues by first critiquing the state building as nation building literature. Through this critique, I will explain how nation building has mistakenly been assigned the state building mission and how that mistake affects state building literature. In some instances I will use the term institution building as a substitute for the term state building in order to highlight the conceptual differences between the areas being discussed. This process will
uncover a question of motive and ideology—as the use of terms such as nation or peace seem less controversial than state as it relates to ‘state sovereignty’.

I will then analyze the relationship between state building and peace building literature. Initial findings indicate that peace building is rarely defined and largely used in collaboration with the term state building—sometimes interchangeably. The chapter closes with a discussion of the problems of ideologically driven state building advocated by the United Nations, which detracts from the legitimacy of the state by favoring democratic state formation over ‘pre-democratic’ state formation. As David Apter (1965) insightfully reminds us, pre-democratic states are different than antidemocratic states and should not be considered in opposition to democracy. This chapter helps clarify the field of state building and serves as a foundation for future state building research.

In the previous chapter, I defined state building as the processes used to build a state’s institution or set of institutions (military, political and economic) that increase the state’s capability to wield the ‘legitimate use of physical force’; establish order; and seek economic means that support and sustain state functions. The use of the term nation building for state building is a reoccurring event and unfortunately most commonly used by government affiliated scholars. The synonymous use of the terms has not been critiqued as problematic for the field but attempts have been made to socialize the use of the two terms as synonyms. The lack of academic rigor in defining social science terms is pervading the academic community and preventing the establishment of a common foundational literature on state building. In order to separate nation building from state building I will define the term and then critique the literature causing much of the confusion between these two fields of study.
What is a Nation?

Max Weber (1946) describes the term ‘nation’ as ambiguous and argues that the definition of nation “certainly cannot be stated in terms of empirical qualities common to those who count as members of the nation” because the term ‘nation’ is “not identical with the ‘people of the state’, that is, with the membership of a given polity” (Weber 1946, 172). Weber defines ‘nation’ as “a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own” (Weber 1946, 176). Weber argues that nation is associated with a ‘sphere of values’ because it “may exact from certain groups of men a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups” (Weber 1946, 172). A state may encompass many nations but represent the interests of no single nation. Therefore, the breakdown of the ‘nation-state’ has led to internal conflicts (and civil war) as nations seek self-determination at the state level.

The significance of the ‘nation’ is usually anchored in the superiority, or at least the irreplaceability, of the culture values that are to be preserved and developed only through the cultivation of the peculiarity of the group. It therefore goes without saying that the intellectuals...are to a specific degree predestined to propagate the ‘national idea’, just as those who wield power in the policy provide the idea of the state. By ‘intellectuals’ we understand a group of men who by virtue of their peculiarity have special access to certain achievements considered to be ‘culture values,’ and who therefore usurp the leadership of a ‘culture community’ (Weber 1946, 176).

Ernest Gellner (1983) takes a more inclusive approach to nations and writes:

Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations maketh man; nations are the artefacts [sic] of men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities. A mere category of persons...becomes a
nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that category from non-members (Gellner 1983, 7).

Benedict Anderson (2006) defines the nation as “an imagined political community” (Anderson 2006, 6). The community is imagined because even though members of the nation may never meet each other, they live ‘the image of their communion’ in their minds (Anderson 2006, 6). According to Anderson, the “nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them...has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations” (Anderson 2006, 7). The nation is “imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm” (Anderson 2006, 7). The nation is “imagined as a community, because...the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 2006, 7).

In his lecture, “What Is a Nation?”9 Ernest Renan (1882) describes the process of nation formation and writes that “the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things” (Renan 1882, 45). He critiques political theorists who believe nations derived from dynasties “representing an earlier conquest, one which was first of all accepted, and then forgotten by the mass of the people” (Renan 1882, 46). He decries the use of race or language as the foundation for nation formation writing: “The instinctive consciousness which presided over the construction of the map of Europe took no account of race, and the leading nations of Europe are nations of essentially mixed blood”

9 Translators note: “What Is a Nation” was a lecture delivered at the Sorbonne, 11 March 1882.
(Renan 1882, 49); and “Language invites people to unite, but it does not force them to do so” (Renan 1882, 50).

The nation, like the individual, is the culmination of a long past of endeavours, sacrifice, and devotion. Of all cults, that of the ancestors is the most legitimate, for the ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past, great men, glory (by which I understand genuine glory), this is the social capital upon which one bases a national idea. To have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present; to have performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more—these are the essential conditions for being a people. One loves in proportion to the sacrifices to which one has consented, and in proportion to the ills that one has suffered (Renan 1882, 52).

For Renan, the nation is a ‘spiritual principle’ that lies in the past and is manifested in the present. A nation has to consent to live together, has to desire to live together, and has to “perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form” (Renan 1882, 52). This can only be accomplished if individuals are willing to forget past misdeeds. “Forgetting...is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for [the principle of] nationality” (Renan 1882, 45).

The process of nation building expressed by Renan is not the process of nation formation in the modern era. Today, the international community encourages states to punish leaders of transitioning states—perhaps to the detriment of national cohesion. What Renan identified, that has been lost in the century since, is that people must believe they are all one on some level, in order to create a national identity. This process is distinct from the process of national cohesion that occurs through the ‘righting of past wrongs’. Huntington (1991) clarifies this idea in his discussion of how to treat authoritarian offices (post transition) in order to support the consolidation of new democratic regimes. Renan describes a process of renewal through
forgetting past offenses in order to create a new beginning. Renan’s process of nation building has not been used in the recent past although the process of ‘forgetting’ could in itself serve as a unifying factor for the population of the state. Eric Hobsbawm (1992), another classic, writes the nation is ‘political’ and referred to the ‘people and the state’ such as during the French Revolution (Hobsbawm 1992, 18). For Hobsbawm, the relationship between the people and state are found in the terms ‘nation-state’ and the ‘United Nations’ (Hobsbawm 1992, 18). Hobsbawm writes that the term nation was originally avoided in the United States in an attempt to deter

the centralizing and unitary implications of the term ‘nation’ against the rights of the federated states...The ‘nation’ so considered, was the body of citizens whose collective sovereignty constituted them a state which was their political expression. For, whatever else a nation was, the element of citizenship and mass participation or choice was never absent from it (Hobsbawm 1992, 18-19).

In essence, Hobsbawm’s understanding of the nation is more civil society than historically understood as obvious in comparison to the anthropological definitions of Anderson (2006) and Renan (1882). Hobsbawm incorporates the population but his association with the state is not supported because many nations may not be found in a territorially bound state—hence, the problem of analyzing nation building as state building.

Anthony Birch (2001) characterizes a nation territorially writing: “we might define a nation as a community or society of people who share a distinctive culture, live together in an identifiable territory in which they constitute a clear majority, and either govern themselves today or have done so in the not-too-distant past or have a credible claim to do so in the not-too-distant future” (Birch 2001, 18). This explanation is related to the ethnicity or race claim, which
is argued against by Renan. Birch goes on to set the stage for the comparison of the terms writing: “The term nation raises more problems than the term state. It refers to a community of people rather than to a set of institutions, but the definition of who constitutes a nation involves conceptual difficulties that, in turn, lead to practical problems” (Birch 2001, 14). Overall, the anthropological definitions of Gellner, Anderson and Renan are typologically similar and define the nation in the recognition of each other as members of the same group or community.

The above definitions establish the classical understanding of nation through the establishment of an imagined community. It is clear that the establishment of an ‘imagined community’ and the institutionalization of the state are two completely separate paths and should not be analytically considered as one. The nation is established through an emotional conviction that individuals living inside the borders of the state are all one people. This emotional bond cannot be created through external intervention and definitely cannot be forced upon groups that have experienced decades of conflict. The establishment of a nation, as Renan expertly explains, is a process mired in historical experiences and bound by a desire to forgive past wrongs. This emotional component of nation building cannot be duplicated by any outsider and in some states (consider the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) may take decades to occur, if it occurs at all.

As is evident by the above discussion, any use of the term nation building to describe state building is misleading and analytically incorrect. The following section critiques contemporary nation building literature identifying underlying themes of the literature and overlapping areas that exist between nation building and state building.

**Nation Building’s Mistaken Mission**

The most blatant misuse of the terms *nation building* and *state building* occur by Mark Berger (2006) and by James Dobbins et al., (2003) who both define the terms synonymously. In
Berger’s 2006 article “From Nation-Building to State-Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-State System and the Changing Global Order”, he writes:

Nation-building (or state-building) is being defined here as an externally driven, or facilitated, attempt to form or consolidate a stable, and sometimes democratic, government over an internationally recognized national territory against the backdrop of the establishment and consolidation of the UN and the universalisation of a system of sovereign nation-states. Nation-building and state-building can encompass formal military occupation, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, national reconstruction, foreign aid and the use of stabilisation forces under the auspices of the USA, Britain, France, NATO, the UN or another international or regional organisation (Berger 2006, 6).

Dobbins et al., (2003) write that nation-building, “as it is commonly referred to in the United States, involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors” (Dobbins et al. 2003, xvii). Dobbins et al., write the purpose of nation building operations is “to make violent societies peaceful, not to make poor ones prosperous, or authoritarian ones democratic” (Dobbins et al. 2003, xxiii).

Obviously, these scholars have confused institution building, nation building, and peace building. This experience emphasizes my argument that the lack of academic clarity surrounding institution building has led to a pervasive misunderstanding of actions taken to establish functioning states through institution building. Berger (2006) creates definitional confusion by first stating that nation building and state building are synonymous and then using the terms as separate entities. In addition, the title of his article- “From Nation Building to State Building” leads the reader to believe there is a path that lies between the two areas of study, which is not
described in the article. Berger’s definition of nation building is neither beneficial to the academic community nor helpful to the process defined.

According to the Dobbins et al., (2003), nation building requires the immediate implantation of the military; ‘a police contingent’; ‘humanitarian relief agencies’; ‘civil administrators’; ‘experts in finance, reconstruction, development, and democratization’ (Dobbins et al. 2003, 12). These experts are expected to converge on the state “at the same time, ready to operate at full strength from day one” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 12). The use of the term nation building inaccurately describes processes that are erroneously assigned to institution building. Any attempt to institution build—which is what Dobbins actually describes—through purely external means is a concerted step towards state dependency. This is due to the need for state institutions to represent the transforming state instead of the states participating in the intervention or the United Nations. Berger and Dobbins et al. provide only two examples of the widespread misleading social science research abounding with conflated terms, ambiguity, and conceptual disorder currently characterizing most contemporary Western scholarship in this field.

This type of scholarship, which is driven by Western ideology, is problematic because it emphasizes democracy over strong institutions and therefore largely unhelpful in establishing strong states. Any long-term transformation must have an institutional infrastructure able to manage and maintain continuing change.

Francis Fukuyama (2004) writes that the “frequency and intensity of U.S. and international nation-building efforts have increased since the end of the Cold War...[and] left a band of weak or failed states stretching from North Africa through the Balkans and the Middle East to South Asia” (Fukuyama 2004, 2). However, he goes on to write that only external
interveners could rebuild “indigenous state institutions” (Fukuyama 2004, 2). According to Fukuyama:

Nation-building encompasses two different types of activities, reconstruction and development...Reconstruction refers to the restoration of war-torn or damaged societies to their preconflict situation. Development...refers to the creation of new institutions and the promotion of sustained economic growth, events that transform the society open-endedly into something that it has not been previously (Fukuyama 2004, 4-5).

Of course, this description of nation building is problematic because it labels development as institution building, which we have already addressed in scholarship as being the premise of state building. Lakhdar Brahimi (2007) supports Fukuyama’s assertion writing:

The concept of “nation-building,” often used in reference to development efforts in post-conflict states, is misleading. As Francis Fukuyama points out, it reflects the specifically American experience of constructing a new order in a land of new settlement without deeply rooted peoples, culture and traditions...(Brahimi 2007, 5).

I argue that this understanding of nation building is historically unfounded in academic scholarship and that academia is allowing this obvious substitution of terms to avoid the perception that the West is helping create Western style states through institution building. As described earlier, nation building through external intervention or international actors cannot be achieved. International organizations have no ability to establish community ties and create symbols or even garner legitimacy in the establishment of a national community. The state, once strong enough to pursue nation building, is responsible for forging the idea of community.

Arjun Appadurai (1996) describes the establishment of imagined worlds with a focus on globalization but his work is pertinent to nation building. Appadurai writes that ‘mediascapes’
help us to create imagined lives that we pursue. Therefore, the media is an integral part in creating the imagined community. Verbal and non-verbal communication is a way through which the nation identifies who belongs and who does not belong. Today, the Scottish thistle and the English Tudor rose are two symbols that continue to reinforce the ‘imagined communities’ of these states. The establishment of these symbols occurred approximately five centuries ago, which adds credence to the belief that nations are created over long periods of time. As the above discussion explains, state building and nation building are separate processes and as such, researchers must strive to hold them analytically separate thereby avoiding conceptual ambiguity and analytical confusion.

Neil Englehart (2003) writes that nation building “involves bringing together disparate and antagonistic social groups in a common government” (Englehart 2003, 20). Jones et al., (2008) direct their understanding of nation building towards a national identity and state that this process is usually used to reinforce a ‘parallel state-building project’. The authors define nation building as:

Actions undertaken, usually by national actors, to forge a sense of common nationhood, usually in order to overcome ethnic, sectarian or communal differences; usually to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty; and usually to mobilize a population behind a parallel state-building project. May or may not contribute to peacebuilding. Confusingly equated with post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding in some recent scholarship and US political discourse (Jones et al. 2008, 13).

These latter definitions are more suitable for the process of nation building because they focus on the term nation. I agree with Weber that attempts to define nation are difficult. However, the issues described above are not mistakes due to ambiguity but are distinct and
successful attempts to assign conceptually different terms to historically established state processes. Brahimi (2007) provides insight into why this is occurring:

the very word ‘state’ is perceived as a negative reality by those who have suffered under repressive governments in the recent past. It is looked at with equal suspicion by NGOs and human rights organizations whose sympathies are firmly on the side of those who have been the victims of the state (Brahimi 2007, 5).

The term state building, if it were properly understood, would not be considered a threat to the people but a means to support the people through the management and administration of the state. It is the academic community’s responsibility to begin clarifying academic concepts and processes and to establish a generalizable framework for the effective measurement of state building policies.

In her article “Nation Building”, Marina Ottaway (2002) writes that a myth about nation building is that it ‘is about building a nation’. She writes that this myth is incorrect because “Nationhood, or a sense of common identity, by itself does not guarantee the viability of a state” (Ottaway 2002, 17). The “goal of nation building should not be to impose common identities on deeply divided peoples but to organize states that can administer their territories and allow people to live together despite differences” (Ottaway 2002, 17). In attempting to dispel myths about nation building, Ottaway creates more confusion. The administration of the territory of the state is a state function housed in institutional capability. Thus it is not an aspect of nation building. Ottaway goes on to write that “if organizing such a state within the old internationally recognized borders does not seem possible, the international community should admit that nation building may require the disintegration of old states and the formation of new ones” (Ottaway 2002, 17). Again, this process is not a nation building process. Additionally, the disintegration
of state boundaries may not lead to a successful new state—especially if the new state does not have the financial means to support itself. State building is more than just incorporating groups of people who want to live together. According to Ottaway, the transformation of West Germany and Japan was the “most successful nation-building exercise ever undertaken from the outside” (Ottaway 2002, 17). However, West Germany and Japan were both emotionally bound as communities prior to World War II. Therefore, nation building did not occur post-World War II but rather state building occurred ending in the re-institutionalization of the state.

A review of the literature shows a relatively common understanding of the term nation but the lack of a common understanding of nation building. The above review highlights the problems in scholarship obfuscating nation building and institution building. Nation building as a social science focus area should not address institution building outside an immediate relationship with the nation as described by Weber, Gellner, Anderson and Renan. Modern political discourse is increasingly confusing political processes associated with the state. This practice is establishing a pattern that, if continued, will prevent the effective examination and measurement of institution building in the future.

**Peace Building: Distinct from State Building?**

Peace building is a term that is increasingly used in the United Nations and academia to describe aspects of institution building. Scholarly articles may use the two terms interchangeably or may use the terms without defining them, which leads readers to believe the processes are one in the same or that state building is a subset of peace building. For instance, on the G7 Plus website, peace building and state building goals are outlined but without identifying which goals pertain
to which field. The propagation of the term peace building may be tied to the creation of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission established in 2005. Regardless of its roots, the use of the term without definition is expanding state building associated literature. Therefore, peace building must be clarified to determine the boundaries of the fields and any overlap. This section clarifies state building as peace building and identifies those authors through which the term is perpetuated.

In December 2005 the United Nations created the Peacebuilding Commission with a mandate to perform three functions:

- to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;
- to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;
- to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to postconflict recovery.\[11\]

The UN’s Peacebuilding Commission seems to encompass all aspects of state reconstruction—economic recovery; institutionalization, which is a state building function; peace

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implementation; negotiation; coordination; and sustainable development. An important observation is that in the UN mandate, institution building is discussed but not state building.

Bruce Jones et al., (2008) define peace building as: “Actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict and at least a modicum of political process” (Jones et al. 2008, 13). According to the authors, ‘state building is not peacebuilding’ although “state building is likely to be a central element of it in order to institutionalize peace” (Jones et al. 2008, 13). Scholarly discussions tend toward combining these two fields. Therefore, institution building is in danger of being incorporated into the field of peace building.

Brahimi (2007) writes that the Peacebuilding Commission was created to help address “gaps in knowledge and practice” of ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ (Brahimi 2007, 5).

If the PBC does become a mechanism to pull resources together, ensure support, and improve coordination in peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, it will no doubt deserve a great deal of credit. But much like rebuilding post-conflict states themselves, reforming the work of the United Nations in the area of post-conflict statebuilding will be a long and difficult task (Brahimi 2007, 5).

Brahimi’s statement uses peace building and state building separately but the reader is unable to determine what falls into which field of study.

Astri Suhrke et al., (2002) use the term peace building when analyzing post-2001 Afghanistan. The authors write, “‘peace building’ has a general but imprecise meaning. It is most usually understood as a set of transitional reconstruction activities undertaken in a postwar phase, designed to lay the foundation for longer-term developments such as democratization, economic development and social justice” (Suhrke et al. 2002, 876). The authors state that in the
1990s, the basic mission of peace building was to create institutions for reintegrating combatants (Suhrke et al. 2002, 877). In Afghanistan, peace building focused on preventing future conflict from occurring between “the victors” (Suhrke et al. 2002, 877). Clearly this is a discussion of institution building although it is described as peace building because of the reintegration of former combatants. In the definition of state building provided in the previous chapter, I separated institution building into three sections: military; political; and economic. Accordingly, reintegration processes fall under state building because reintegration is tied to political and military institutions. Essentially, any discussion of institutions in peace building literature should incorporate a discussion of state building to prevent state building from becoming subordinate to peace building literature and to prevent the conflation of state building with peace building. However, through this analysis it becomes obvious that peace building cannot occur without effective state building.

In “Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: constructing sovereignty for whose security?” Barnett Rubin (2006) writes that the United Nations now uses the term peace building for ‘recovery and reconstruction’ efforts occurring in Afghanistan (Rubin 2006, 175). The author states that “political sensitivities prevented the HLP [High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change] from using the term ‘state-building’” although the assertion is not further explained in the article (Rubin 2006, 176). Rubin describes ‘state formation’ in terms of coercion, capital and legitimacy but moves to a discussion of how peace building “attempts to use foreign resources...to build acceptable states in areas that pose a perceived threat to powerful actors” (Rubin 2006, 178).

The introduction of another term to the already conflated literature does not create more analytical clarity to the field. Instead, it provides another term to be analyzed for no apparent
reason. Additionally, peace building has an extremely normative connotation, which directs practitioners to implement idealistic programs that are largely doomed to failure. The international community is increasingly making any attempts to assist transforming states useless. It appears that the use of peace building instead of state building is an attempt to disassociate the processes of imperialism and colonization from current United Nations operations. Rubin returns to a discussion of state building writing:

The doctrines of the states and organizations engaged in this effort [international state building] often contradict the goal of state-building. Building a national state means creating a sovereign centre of political accountability, which is not necessarily the same as building an ally in the war on terror. Multilateral operations often consist of juxtaposing existing capacities—humanitarian aid, war fighting, peacekeeping, economic guidance and assistance, civil society support, democracy assistance—without a coherent strategy (Rubin 2006, 179).

Unfortunately, Rubin himself uses state building as a term that encompasses more than just institutions. Instead of clarifying peace building and state building in his article, Rubin contributes to the academic confusion. In order to explicitly attach state building to his article, Rubin concludes with several statements highlighting state institutions in the making of a ‘capable state’. Although the article is entitled “Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan”, the article does not articulate the difference between the two processes—similarly to Berger’s 2006 “From Nation Building to State Building” article. Ultimately, the process of institution building is not retreating but expanding as new crises arise. The current state of academic affairs is not capable of providing support to policy makers because it is unable to coherently create a universal understanding of how to successfully conduct institution building.
Richard Ponzio (2007) argues that peace building should focus on “democratic authority institutionalization” (Ponzio 2007, 256). According to Ponzio:

the notion of democratic peacebuilding is premised on a fundamental belief, rooted in empirical research, that building stable and democratic governing institutions is essential to assuage competing domestic interests and to consolidate peace by tackling the root causes of a conflict. At its core, democratic peacebuilding refers to a dynamic, long-term process of institutionalizing and expanding democratic authority within a weak state or territory to reduce the propensity toward violent conflict (Ponzio 2007, 257).

Here, democratic institutionalization is seen as a means to remove conflict and establish security. This analysis connects institution building and peace building but it does not provide any analytical tool for understanding how one relates to the other. This approach to state transformation is not helpful in theory or practice because it does not provide social scientists an effective method of measuring state building.

Jonathan Goodhand and Mark Sedra (2007) state that: “behind liberal peacebuilding is the goal of statebuilding, and the assumption that historical processes of state formation can be compressed into an accelerated transition process through external support” (Goodhand and Sedra 2007, 43-44). The author’s describe a ‘triple transition’ that occurs during peace building that encompasses the “security, political and socio-economic spheres” (Goodhand and Sedra 2007, 44). Peace building is often discussed along with state building but the relationship between the two fields is blurred in academic literature. This relationship must be clarified in order to prevent the synonymous use of terms and to outline how peace building and institution building relate in ultimately strengthening the state.

The discussion of peace building is useful to state building because of the overlapping reliance on institutions. Ultimately, the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission’s mandate is
supportive of institution building because its functions are required to implement state building processes. Peace building is not the ‘new’ conceptualization for state building therefore scholars must separate the two realms in order to maintain analytical boundaries. Unfortunately, peace building literature suffers the same ills as state building literature—the lack of a clear minimal definition to support social science research. Academic literature on state building is conflated and diluted due to the laxity through which academic research in the field has been conducted. The intent of this dissertation is to bring this important problem to light in order to seek new ways of addressing state building and begin the long process of elucidating the literature.

*United Nations Operations: Ideology and Intent*

United Nations peace building or institution building missions are inherently fraught with ideological implications for the transforming state. International policy makers may advocate for the inclusion of traditional methods of governing but this is rarely to the detriment of holding elections and implementing a new constitution. In his paper “State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries” Brahimi (2007) discusses state building as a process that incorporates several fields of study associated with the state including many aspects of state transformation. Interestingly, and possibly in opposition to what many scholars believe, Brahimi writes: “the UN is still struggling to develop the necessary concepts and capacities to assist statebuilding in a coherent and effective manner” (Brahimi 2007, 4). Charles Tilly (2003) addresses the problem of conducting state building in terms of circumstantial necessities. He explains that the search for specific universal criteria for state formation or state building “assumes existence of a single set of circumstances that, wherever and whenever repeated, produces similar outcomes” (Tilly 2003, 39). This ‘denies’ the ‘influence of accumulated culture’ in the formation of the
democratic state (Tilly 2003, 39). The fact is that state building theories are largely based on the European experience thus non-Western states are inculcated into Western ideology through internationally led state building efforts (Tilly 1975, 601). This may not be considered a problem from the perspective of Western scholars but it is an area to be addressed. Samuel Huntington explains a reason for the implementation of Western ideals onto foreign governments:

American efforts to make other people’s institutions conform to American values could be justified on the grounds that those values are universally valid and universally applicable, whether or not most people in other societies believe in them. For Americans not to believe in the universal validity of American values could, indeed, lead to a moral relativism: liberty and democracy are not inherently better than any other political values; they just happen to be those that for historical and cultural reasons prevail in the United States (Huntington 1982, 21).

Huntington’s analysis is important to understanding why liberal ideology is implanted on transforming states through state building policies. The American Creed, as described in Chapter 2, is a driving factor in support of ideologically bound state building but also a major cause for the lack of institutional sustainability in non-Western states.

Each United Nations peace building mission or institution building mission is an opportunity for Western style governments to be implemented. Perhaps the transforming state is capable of supporting Western type institutions but if the state is not—then the act of creating these institutions serves as a destabilizer for the state. Institution building research is bound in social science and as such seeks to be objective. However, is value neutral social science possible?
Weber (1904) writes that ‘value-judgments’ are not to be removed from “scientific discussion in general simply because in the last analysis they rest on certain ideals and are therefore ‘subjective’ in origin...the problem is rather: what is the meaning and purpose of the scientific criticism of ideals and value-judgments?” (Weber 1904, 52). He writes that scientific analysis can help determine the consequences or ‘costs’ of decisions but applying the “results of this analysis in the making of a decision...is not a task which science can undertake; it is rather the task of the acting, willing person: he weighs and chooses from among the values involved according to his own conscience and his personal view of the world” (Weber 1904, 52-53). By asking whether value neutral science is possible, we open our eyes to our own socially constructed belief systems that inform our biases surrounding the types of states that should be built.

Legitimacy as a successful characteristic of government will not be achieved through the implementation of incompatible governing institutions. Brahimi advocates for “truth commissions, international or national justice mechanisms, methods of compensation of reparation, social and psychological counseling projects, education, dialogue processes and support for civil society grassroots initiatives” in the process of state transformation (Brahimi 2007, 13). These requirements are believed to support legitimacy and provide justice for the population of the state. However, the results of these practices do not constitute or predict the future viability of the state. One needs only look at Egypt, Tunisia and Libya for confirmation of this fact. Brahimi states that the PBC should “advocate for a more coherent statebuilding approach that avoids the artificial distinctions often made between peacekeeping, recovery and development activities” (Brahimi 2007, 18). However, as previously discussed by Tilly, each institution building approach is different because each transforming state has different needs and
circumstances through which the transformation occurs. It is obvious that the generalizability of state building processes will not be easily achieved although it should still be a goal to attain if possible.

In “From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of Statebuilding in Afghanistan”, Barnett Rubin and Humayun Hamidzada (2007) describe current, real-world issues associated with institution building. Institution building is viewed through the lens of ‘security, governance, and development’ which is a construct used in the United States Army’s Field Manual 3-24. State building is not specifically defined but the authors explain that the Afghanistan Compact (created by the government of Afghanistan and the United Nations) is a “strategy for building an effective, accountable state in Afghanistan, with targets for improvements in security, governance, and development, including measures for reducing the narcotics economy and promoting regional cooperation” (Rubin and Hamidzada 2007, 10). According to Rubin and Hamidzada, the Afghanistan Compact is viewed as ‘a comprehensive model for statebuilding’. Several concerns are associated with state building in Afghanistan to include:

- Afghanistan has received inadequate resources in terms of both troops and funds...
- Both military and economic assistance will be acceptable to Afghans only if they support Afghan institutions and strengthen Afghan sovereignty.
- Afghanistan can be stable and secure only if it is well integrated into its region, both economically and politically...
- None of the problems of this destitute, devastated country can be addressed effectively without sustained, equitable economic growth. In addition to security,
this requires extensive investments in infrastructure, governance, and the justice system.

- A stable and secure Afghanistan requires a legitimate and capable state... (Rubin and Hamidzada 2007, 10-11).

These problems were identified five years after initial Afghan institution building began. Incorporating this broad range of issues into the idea of state building is unbeneﬁcial and confounds attempts to conduct scientiﬁc analysis on institution building. Edward Shils (1949) writes that Weber’s “powerful mind, which strove restlessly for clarity at levels where his contemporaries were satisfied with ambiguities and clichés, drove through to the fundamental problems of the relationship between general sociological concepts and propositions on the one hand, and concrete historical reality on the other” (Shils and Finch 1949, iv). I am calling for the same type of academic clarity in state building scholarship—clarity which removes ambiguities and a focus that assists policy makers in determining which decisions are most appropriate for their desired ends.

Conclusion

This chapter has taken a step towards clarifying state building literature as it applies to nation building and peace building. As with the previous chapter, deconstructing state building literature and separating it from nation building and peace building was required to establish a standard understanding of the state building process. In addition, it was necessary to address western biases associated with United Nations led state building missions in preparation for the empirical section of this dissertation which focuses on a non-western state—although
Afghanistan has been adopting western modes of bureaucracy and administration for over a century.

Nation building as a field is related to state transformation because it describes how states create a national identity. However, the process of nation building in the modern world can be considered largely post institutionalization. Therefore, the discussion of nation building as institution building is unhelpful. The work of Berger (2006) and Dobbins et al., (2003) provide good case study overviews but are theoretically lacking. Peace building is beneficial to the state building discussion because it focuses on aspects of security that are connected to state building. However, the use of the terms synonymously creates confusion as both fields incorporate more fields of study than is empirically possible to examine. The PBC, as discussed, is a useful organization because it brings together international actors that wish to support state transformation; remove conflict; and create stability. The problem is that much of the research is being conducted subjectively in an environment of ‘normative’ values that may not be attainable at the present time. As Apter (1965) argues, pre-democratic states are not equivalent to anti-democratic states. Democratization is a time consuming process that can be more successfully implemented after strong state institutions have been built.

State building is a complex problem that will not be solved this year or possibly this decade. However, as these two chapters have identified, a lackadaisical attitude has pervaded the fields of state building, nation building and peace building to the detriment of the social science community. Most state building operations begin with an internationally sponsored convention that includes elites from the transforming state. This convention usually establishes an interim democratic government; sets the timeline for elections; the deadline for constitution creation; and sets out specific goals for national reconciliation. I submit that this process has led to continuous
unsuccessful results that include the lack of local representation and ultimately the failure of state building missions. I propose that the key to state building is the incorporation of the local population into the process of institution building.

State building analysis should only consist of those actions needed to establish or re-establish a security apparatus for the state; establish governing institutions to manage and administer the state; and provide the economic ability to maintain these functions. There will be overlap but this overlap should be identified as such and then analyzed in terms that help to show the relationship between the overlapping areas and state building. The state is institutionalized and the state building mission accomplished through the process of identifying current state institutions; determining how to incorporate these institutions into national institutions; and then implementing processes through which to accomplish this goal. This can only be achieved if state building literature clarifies its focus area; utilizes appropriate social science methodologies; clearly conceptualizes its variables; and effectively reports its findings to the community.

I completed the first of these steps in Chapter 2 and 3 by providing a thorough critique of state building and associated scholarly literature. I also clearly defined state building as the processes used to build a state’s institution or set of institutions (military, political and economic) that increase the state’s capability to wield the ‘legitimate use of physical force’; establish order; and seek economic means that support and sustain state functions.

As I write this chapter, the United Nations is embarking on another peace building mission—establishing the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) in Mali. According to Dobbins et al.,

Since the end of the Cold War, the pace of U.S. military interventions has risen to about one every two years, while the frequency of new UN peacekeeping missions is up to nearly one every six months. The duration of these missions has also risen, with most
now lasting five to 10 years. The effect is thus cumulative: The United States finds itself overseeing three or four such interventions simultaneously, while the United Nations must manage up to two dozen different missions at the same time” (Dobbins et al. 2007, xvii).

The importance of this research cannot be understated as the results of this project directly impact the future of state building missions. I regularly sit in meetings discussing state building operations and have not yet found a senior government official that is actively seeking to break the status quo under which the United States currently works. Academics, especially political scientists, are keenly positioned to affect the decisions of policy makers. These decisions become international policies that have the ability to help millions of people globally. It is with this in mind that I pursue this research in the hopes that it will serve a greater purpose in the future.
Table 1: Approaches to State Building: A Typological Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparative Approaches</th>
<th>State Building / Bureaucratization</th>
<th>Democratization / Transition</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th>Nation Building</th>
<th>Peace Building</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus of process</td>
<td>Create / strengthen institutions; manage state functions for state survival/administration; based in historical memory (should be); incorporates persistent relationships</td>
<td>Removal of malefactors; constitution creation; establishment on elections; rule of law</td>
<td>Popular acceptance &amp; support for government / international acceptance of governing regime</td>
<td>Actions to create imagined political community</td>
<td>Institutionalizes peace through incorporation (Reintegration and Reconciliation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of process</td>
<td>Functional: implementation of processes to administer and manage the state</td>
<td>Ideological: Weberian state / Liberalism</td>
<td>Psychological: agent dependent</td>
<td>Ideological: nationalist</td>
<td>Functional &amp; Ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding of process</td>
<td>Negligible: nationalization of natural resources; International Dev; Market</td>
<td>Free Market</td>
<td>State Government</td>
<td>Internal Sources / nationalization of natural resources</td>
<td>International Aid &amp; United Nations Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of Stability</td>
<td>Military Power</td>
<td>Constitution / Elections / popular participation</td>
<td>Elections / Legal System / popular opinion</td>
<td>Incorporation of populace groups into state through mobilization</td>
<td>‘Peace Talks’ / Demilitarized Zones / Human Rights Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>‘Good Governance’</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>Loyalty to State / Allegiance to Country</td>
<td>International Legislation and Accords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit to Population</td>
<td>Basic Infrastructure / Security</td>
<td>Liberal Social Programs / Welfare State</td>
<td>Extensive Social Services / Distribution of Aid to population</td>
<td>Strengthens social bonds of the state; reinforces idea of state</td>
<td>Security / foundation for political, economic and social development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 compares typological approaches to state building based on an extensive review of state building literature. (Rebecca Young Greven 2013).
Chapter 4: Theoretical Foundations of State Building: Modernization Theory, ‘New’

Institutionalism, and International Interventions

Research about all of human politics anywhere on earth is as impractical as is research on modernization as such. Statements meant to apply to all societies at all times, Barrington Moore has warned, are likely to prove either trivial or false—and much the same goes for statements about all societies embarked upon modernization. The political scientist who insists that the world is his oyster is likely to suffer a bad case of indigestion - Dankwart Rustow 1968.

Introduction

State building literature can be associated with several underlying theoretical frameworks. Modernization theory is one such framework and has its historical roots in the 1950s and 1960s. According to the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, the social aspects of modernization theory focuses on “the process of social change whereby less developed societies acquire characteristics common to more developed societies” (Lerner 1968, 386). In the political realm, modernization refers to “the ensemble of structural and cultural changes in the political systems of modernizing societies” (Coleman 1968, 395). This literature was heavily criticized in the latter part of the twentieth century but its mark is still visible on current state building literature.

As is the case with modernization theory, the ‘new’ institutionalism is a theory with little universal consensus (Hall and Taylor 1996, 936; March and Olsen 1984, 734; Jepperson 1991, 83; Immergut 1998, 5). The ‘new’ institutionalism incorporates a broad view of institutions in
the political realm and has at least three theoretical approaches associated with it (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 936; Immergut 1998, 5; Thelen 1999, 369-370) although only historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism will be addressed in this chapter. Historical institutionalists believe that states use institutional structures to incorporate some ‘interests’ in the state while ‘demobilizing’ others (Hall and Taylor 1996, 936). Sociological institutionalism includes a cultural aspect of institutions with scholars arguing that organizations were not established in specific forms for purely efficient reasons but also because of ‘culturally-specific practices’ (Hall and Taylor 1996, 946; Koelble 1995, 232).

A review of ‘new’ institutionalism is important for this dissertation because the empirical section of this dissertation studies ‘para-state’ institutions and the causal relationship between these institutions and political instability in Afghanistan. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the prominence of ‘para-state’ institutions increased during the Soviet era in response to the establishment of a communist Afghan regime and Soviet invasion of the state. Therefore, by presenting an analysis of ‘new’ institutionalism, the reader and scholar are better equipped to analyze the aspects of institutions, which lead to violence against, or potentially incorporation in, the central state.12

Third party state building, also known as international interventions, is legitimized in the international realm and largely managed under the purview of the United Nations. According to Richard Caplan (2004), this type of state building has its roots in colonialism but is also used to strengthen so called weak or failing states (Caplan 2004, 53). David Chandler (2005) writes that the “interventionist desire to shape the political process and reconstruct state institutions, where states are perceived to be ‘failing’, is in marked contrast to the political norms and possibilities

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12 Five questions regarding Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions were presented in the Introduction chapter (pp. 39) of this dissertation. In Chapter 6 (pp. 204), I answer the five questions regarding the establishment of Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions and establish a typology for identification.
of the cold war period” (Chandler 2005, 307). According to Chandler, “A new normative framework has emerged which has placed international regulation of, and intervention in, the domestic affairs of states firmly on the agenda” (Chandler 2005, 307). This is supported by the number of international interventions that have arisen since 1995 to include: the United Nations’ interim administrations of Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES); Kosovo (UNMIK); East Timor (UNTAET); the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA); and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (Caplan 2004, 53). It is clear that interventionist or third party state building is here to stay.

Great insight can be gained by studying state building in Afghanistan from an international interventionist perspective. Culturally bound institutional formation is overshadowed by liberal international norms that may conflict with specific religious or cultural beliefs. State building policies are shaped in the realm between what should be done and what can be done based. This dissertation studies two historical Afghan periods—the Soviet era and the Taliban era—in order to study the causal relationship between ‘para-state’ institutions and political instability. However, this study also studies ‘para-state’ institutional formation and the acceptance of institutions by the local population. This type of empirical research is important because it helps international state builders determine what institutional forms are best suited for specific populations as well as the type of resources required by local populations.

The above theoretical frameworks are important in tracing the evolution of state building policy that has taken shape since its first application. No one-theory establishes the foundation for state building operations—instead multiple overlapping theories shape policy. In the following chapter I will provide an analysis and critique of modernization theory in order to
understand how the foundations of state building theory were established. I will then conduct an analysis of ‘new’ institutionalism theory focusing on the school of historical institutionalism and its relationship with the state. This theory is very important because it bridges modernization and international interventionist theory as well as establishes a substantial alternative theory to modernization in analyzing state building. I will then conduct an analysis of international interventionist theory in light of institutionalism and state building literature. This review will help us understand how interventionists attempt to create institutions and then how they attempt to incorporate those institutions into the international institutional structure.

*Modernization Theory*

As stated in the introduction, modernization theory literature is often discussed as falling into two separate categories: social and political. However, modernization discussions closely relate the social and political which makes it difficult to grasp the distinction. For the purpose of this section, I will focus primarily on political modernization. The intent of this critical review is to identify how processes of modernization can be related to state building in order to determine how effective the theoretical framework is in analyzing state transformation.

The term modernization arose during the post World War II years as an alternative to discussions using the terms Europeanization, Americanization and Westernization to describe the process of post war reconstruction (Lerner 1968, 387; Weiner 1966). Since its inception, the study of modernization as a theoretical framework has been ambiguous (Lerner 1968; Tipps 1973; Rustow 1968). Additionally, modernization theory prefers democracy (Apter 1965; Coleman 1968) and presents a normative idea of society, which is inherently Western (Eisenstadt
State building and modernization are related from a research perspective in the above areas as they both share these common characteristics.

On the political side, modernization is defined as “those activities, processes, institutions, and beliefs concerned with the making and execution of authoritative policy and the pursuit and attainment of collective goals” (Coleman 1968, 395). “The overall process of modernization refers to changes in all institutional spheres of a society resulting from man’s expanding knowledge of and control over his environment” (Coleman 1968, 395). Henry Bernstein (1971) writes that for most scholars of the field: “modernization is a total social process associated with (or subsuming) economic development in terms of the preconditions, concomitants, and consequences of the latter” and that the process is universal (Bernstein 1971, 141). Dankwart Rustow (1968) argues that there are three political processes that can be assessed as “political elements of modernization—the growth of authority, the formation of national identity, and the quest for political equality and participation” (Rustow 1968, 40). According to Dean C. Tipps (1973), “In their [modernization theorists] effort to achieve descriptive inclusiveness, however, they have relied upon conceptualizations of modernization which are both unparsimonious and vague” (Tipps 1973, 218).

As discussed in the previous chapters, the problem with defining concepts too generally, whether the subject is state building or modernization theory, is that the concepts fail to remain useful. The literature becomes confusing and irrelevant as researchers attempt to make sense of previous research projects failing to find foundational knowledge for future research. Additionally, modernization theory suffers from the sheer enormity of the theory, which covers huge areas of social and political processes. Instead of a useful mid-range theory, modernization theory is a form of ‘grand theory’ that replaces useful insight into the process of political and
societal change with a theory that is not empirically testable. However, modernization is related
to state building in that it deals with institutions on the political and societal levels.

For Samuel Huntington (1968), modernization is based in participation and mobilization.
Huntington writes “In much of the world today, equality of political participation is growing
much more rapidly than is the ‘art of associating together.’ The rates of mobilization and
participation are high; the rates of organization and institutionalization are low” (Huntington
1968, 386). According to Huntington, modernization leads to ‘political decay’ because current
institutions are unable or ill equipped to change in tandem with increased participation and
mobilization (Huntington 1968, 286). If modernization brings with it gains for society, then the
original institutional structure would not have the capacity to support these increased gains. The
original institution would have supported the status quo. Therefore, the breakdown of political
institutions that previously supported status quo institutions is a prerequisite for political stability.
The sooner decaying institutions are removed or re-created the better the chances of achieving
political stability in the short term. Therefore, rapid societal changes that increase participation
will lead to the dissolution of previously adequate institutions (Huntington 1968, 405).

James Coleman’s (1968) work is related to Huntington in that Coleman defines political
modernization through increased participation and ‘resource distribution’ (Coleman 1968, 397).
In addition, Coleman views modernization as increased ‘political capacity’ that allows for the
effective means of institutionalizing conflict resolution (Coleman 1968, 397). The problem with
modernization as a theoretical foundation for state building is that it is reliant on democratic
institutionalism, hence it preferences democracy over other forms of government. Coleman
(1968) writes that some modernization theoretical frameworks have used “Western democratic
institutions”, either ‘explicitly’ or ‘implicitly’, “as the empirical referents for a model of political modernity” (Coleman 1968, 398).

This infusion of the concept with an allegedly culture-bound element limits the utility of the concept as a cross-cultural analytical tool...Ethnocentrism aside, however, there are those who defend a democratic component in any model of political modernization either on ethical grounds or because it demonstrably enhances the integrative and adaptive capacity and the flexibility of a political system (Coleman 1968, 398).

Both Huntington and Coleman identify the Western liberal bias of modernization theory but both are subject to its call. Huntington has a political science framework for analyzing institutions focusing on political parties and bureaucracy but he ends up theorizing an inescapable societal change due to increased social mobility, which ultimately leads to conflict. He does not limit his argument to political change although he does not have a suitable framework for societal change. Therefore, Huntington takes for granted the development of ‘traditional societies’ towards the modern, Western standard.

Coleman does not do much better than Huntington. In his work he argues that an “evolutionary perspective liberates the concept of political development from its temporal (sixteenth century to the present day) and its cultural and areal (Western) constraints” (Coleman 1971, 74). The evolutionary perspective of development—defined as the “dialectic process reflecting a continuous interaction among differentiation, the drive for equality, and the integrative, responsive, adaptive capacity of the polity” (Coleman 1971, 100)—is a means through which Coleman analyzes modernization. However, equality is inherently a Western trait therefore, Coleman’s ‘evolutionary perspective’ is inherently Western because it includes Western ideals in its theoretical characteristics. Additionally, Coleman admits that:
The process of modernization...underscores the wide empirical variations in initial institutional patterns, in traditional-modern mixes, in structural configurations, and in sequence and timing. Although the limits of structural and sequential variability in successful modernization remain unclear, the concepts of differentiation, equality, and capacity are heuristically useful in our search for a clearer working conception of the political modernization process (Coleman 1971, 80).

In other words, modernization theory, especially in light of societal change, is not empirically testable and as such is not beneficial in analyzing institution building in transforming states. Both Huntington and Coleman contribute to the muddling of modernization theory by seeking to explain too much in a singular theory. They employ analytic tools intended for politics to explain societies and ultimately do not escape the Western bias of modernization they argue against.

In furthering the ethnocentric critique, Dean C. Tipps (1973) writes that in many states, “‘traditional societies’ appeared changeless only because they were defined in a manner that allowed no differences between traditions and recognized no significant change save that in the direction of the Western experience” (Tipps 1973, 213). The modernizing process should not be viewed on a continuum between traditional, on one end, and modern, on the other. The narrow approach to analyzing transformation in developing states inhibits a true understanding of the processes of modernization. The same problem occurs in the analysis of state building—although much of the problem of state building is the lack of analysis on the actual process of state building. Incorporating democratization on ‘ethical grounds’ gives primacy to Western normative ideals—a type of ideological colonialism is achieved through a constant inclusion of democratization into political transformation schemes. Additionally, because democratization is
not a necessary variable in the process of modernization it serves to expand and complicate focus areas for limited analytic gain.

Samuel Huntington (1991) is only one of many scholars that has researched the ‘waves of democratization’ and shown that large numbers of ‘democratic’ regimes do not persist due to issues that reside within the state. The issues that affect the persistence of democratic regimes will not be discussed in this chapter but the fact is that democratization does not equal equality and freedom. The fact that a state is not democratic does not make it ‘anti-democratic’ (Apter 1965). Many states, especially in the Middle East, have modernized without democratizing (Bellin 2004). However, modernization theory preferences democracy as an ‘evolutionary universal’ implying that all states are on a linear path to democratization (Coleman 1968, 395). Modernization theory and state building literature are similar in that scholars have attempted to prevent states from being perceived as modern if democratization is not practiced. This does nothing to help create political stability but rather serves to foment the problem of instability and insecurity.

David Apter (1965) writes that modernization “implies three conditions”: “a social system that can constantly innovate without falling apart”; “differentiated, flexible social structures”; and “a social framework to provide the skills and knowledge necessary for living in a technologically advanced world” (Apter 1965, 67). The reliance on social structures to assess the modernity of the state is problematic for modernization theory. The purpose of modernization theory is to establish a framework for understanding (or perhaps implementing) the movement of states and societies from traditional forms—which rest “on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority” (Weber 1968, 215)—to a modern or ‘rational’ and ‘legal based’ form.
Much of modernization theory and institutional theory discuss the political economy of the state. Apter argues the need to treat the political variable of the state as independent instead of the economic variable (Apter 1965, 223). For Apter, the “strategic instrument of the political variable is government” (Apter 1965, 223). The government helps to “shape society according to differing norms of participation, with the underlying purpose of realizing potentialities of human and social resources” (Apter 1965, 224). Modernization as a theoretical framework is applicable through Apter’s discussion of government if government is equivalent to political institutions. He relies heavily on government to shape society instead of allowing society to shape government. This model is reflective of the top-down centralized approaches to state building utilized in contemporary international interventions although this approach has largely been ineffective at achieving its societal transforming goal. Apter writes that in the modernizing process, government must balance “what society is” and “what it should become” (Apter 1965, 224).

Seymour Martin Lipset’s (1959) article “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy” shows the relationship between ‘modernity’ and democracy. Lipset identifies ‘economic development’ and ‘legitimacy’ as “structural characteristics of a society which sustain a democratic political system” (Lipset 1959, 71). In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I argued that democratization and state building are separate and distinct paths and as such should be analyzed independently. However, as with other modernization theorists, democracy, legitimacy and economic development return to the forefront to conflate the understanding of processes associated with transforming states.

Henry Bernstein (1971) provides an outline of the foundations of modernization theory. The five main parts of the framework are that modernization is a ‘theory of social change’; it
deals with ‘conceptualizing the modern’; the process is considered evolutionary; modernization is based in ‘achieving development’ and that it is situated in the role of elite groups (Bernstein 1971, 144-145). “It is these [elite] groups—political, bureaucratic, intellectual (and often military)—which are charged with the articulation of development goals and supervision of development strategies for their countries” (Bernstein 1971, 145). He goes on to say that the dynamics of modernization theory consist of mechanisms such as the introduction of a market economy, monetization, urbanization, industrialization, the spread of mass communications and of literacy, and so on, which are subsumed and related at the theoretical level in the differentiation-integration model of social change (Bernstein 1971, 150).

Bernstein’s work highlights the similar problem with modernization theory and state building theory. The lines between social change and political change are blurred making an actual assessment of each one impossible. Modernization literature preferences democratization and market reforms and state building literature does the same. In essence, modernization theoretical frameworks have been used to analyze state building because of the belief that state building is democratization. As previously argued, state building should solely focus on the formation state institutional structures that help to establish the foundation of the state or transform the foundation of the state. The wealth of the nation is an important feature in state building due to the monetary requirements to support state functions.

Dankwart Rustow (1968) analyzes modernization theory through its methods. The author discusses three problems associated with comparative politics and modernization research—specifically ‘scope’, ‘locale’, and ‘analysis of change’ (Rustow 1968, 37). In regards to scope, Rustow states that there has been an increased desire to study “political institutions in a broader
context of social structure, cultural orientation, and psychological dynamics” (Rustow 1968, 37). However, Rustow warns that interdisciplinary work on modernization can lead the political scientist away ‘further blurring’ scientific research on the topic (Rustow 1968, 38).

In regards to locale, Rustow writes that modernization, which originally focused on ‘United States, Europe, and Russia’ has been generalized to include the rest of the world (Rustow 1968, 42). This generalization over extends the applicability of modernization theories and impedes scientific progress. However, this is essentially what modernization theorists have attempted to do by generalizing empirical data to establish unilinear paths to modernization, which eventually fail to produce desired outcomes. In attempting to analyze modernization, Rustow advocates country studies because they “allow the scholar to immerse himself in the full economic, social, historical, and cultural context of a single political system” (Rustow 1968, 44). However, Rustow warns that country studies “may cast the researcher adrift far from any theoretical shore” (Rustow 1968, 44).

Lastly, Rustow discusses change writing, “Modernization, whatever else it may be, means social change” (Rustow 1968, 47). According to Rustow, the political scientist is unable to handle the analysis of change well because of the “prejudice against historical data, the complementary compulsion to be up to date, and the shortcomings of successive methods have all contributed to this unhappy result” (Rustow 1968, 47). In addition, change does not always lead to development—it can also lead to decay as noted by Samuel Huntington and Eisenstadt (Rustow 1968, 50) [see Eisenstadt, ‘Breakdowns of Modernisation’ 1964]. Fortunately, the creation of historical institutionalism, as will be discussed in the following section, has created a path for political scientists to analyze phenomenon through historical lens in order to better
understand how transformational paths develop and occur. As stated above, modernization theory and state building are related through the transformation of institutions.

The above discussion of modernization theory critiqued the literature and identified its relationship to state building through the lens of state transition away from tradition towards modernity in the political and social spheres. Ultimately, modernization theory as a theoretical framework is of limited benefit to state building because it is imprecise in its focus; overly inclusive which leads to everything being relevant; and ethnocentric and Western in its analysis, which inhibits it from being universally accepted as a means of analyzing transformation. As Bendix (1996) highlights in his discussion on alternative theories of modernization: an ideal path to modernity does not mean a typical case to modernity—nor does it mean the removal of things traditional from society or the state.

Modernization has been viewed as the means through which institutions are built. Little in academic literature has been discussed regarding traditional institutions and their roles in the political environment of the state. If anything, they have been largely disregarded due to the perception that they are undemocratic and institutionally irrelevant in light of modern institutional capabilities. However, institutional capacity and stability cannot be appropriately analyzed in light of output but instead in view of throughput. Empirical evidence suggests that the more domestic state actors are willing to participate in traditional institutions the more effective they are in achieving state goals regardless of level of modernity achieved. The responsibility is on the state to determine which transformational path it will pursue—traditional, modern or a intermingling of both. Researchers of institution building should seek to situate themselves inside the observed facts of transformation and through this process seek new ways to explain institutional outcomes (Reiter 2013, 5). This process will help us better understand
how institutions are created and transformed. While modernization theory provides a foundation in understanding institution building, the ‘new’ institutionalism provides a better theoretical discussion for understanding state building in transforming states.

The ‘New’ Institutionalism and its Impact on State Building

As discussed above, ‘new’ institutionalism theory is important for state building research because it focuses on the institution, which as I identified in previous chapters is the foundation of state building. The forms and functions of institutions should be analyzed to determine how they impact political and social transformation so that state builders—whether domestic or international—can be better able to establish successful state building policies. There has been some confusion regarding whether the ‘new’ institutionalism should be considered one framework or many frameworks (Peters 2005, 155; Immergut 1998, 5). B. Guy Peters (2005) writes “approaches to institutionalism stress the same fundamental analytic points, the most fundamental being that scholars can achieve greater analytic leverage by beginning with institutions rather than with individuals” (Peters 2005, 155). Ellen Immergut (1998) writes that the core of the ‘new’ institutionalism is concerned with the problem of determining individual preferences due to the “institutional contexts in which these preferences are voiced” (Immergut 1998, 25). James March and Johan Olsen (1984) write that the ‘new’ institutionalism “emphasizes the relative autonomy of political institutions, possibilities for inefficiency in history, and the importance of symbolic action to an understanding of politics” (March and Olsen 1984, 734).

In analyzing institutions, Theda Skocpol (1995) writes, “Institutions may be formal organizations or informal networks” (Skocpol 1995, 105) which is helpful in opening the
analytical realm to include both types of institutions. If institutions can be ‘informal networks’ then they function outside of the Weberian framework. This helps the researcher establish an alternate perspective of institutions thus better situating themselves in the data (Reiter 2013). According to Stephen Krasner (1984), “It is necessary to understand both how institutions reproduce themselves through time and what historical conditions gave rise to them in the first place” (Krasner 1984, 225). As previously stated, an aspect of my research studies how ‘para-state’ institutions arose in Afghanistan during the Soviet and Taliban eras and the type of services these institutions provided to the population. In order to understand how to build institutions, the policymaker must have insight into how institutions have previously been built. This may be through communication or through actual organizations (as provided by Skocpol) but to attempt to state build without this knowledge is folly. This is a key purpose for including an overview of the ‘new’ institutionalism theory—it is better equipped than modernization theory to handle state building analysis.

Robert Dahl (1963) describes two ways in which institutions are related to ideas. Both of these approaches are based in a reductionist view of institutions where institutions represent aggregated behavior (March and Olsen 1984, 735). Institutional policy is the aggregated outcome of individual interactions (March and Olsen 1984, 736). The two approaches are the rationalist approach and the ‘materialist’ approach (Dahl 1963, 107). As suggested, the rationalist approach is based in reasoning while the ‘materialist’ approach is based in the pursuit of ‘material interests’ (Dahl 1963, 108). According to this approach, people who benefit from ‘social and economic institutions’ “use their power to protect these institutions” (Dahl 1963, 108). Dahl argues that the material approach is strong because it is based in ‘common sense’ and ‘ordinary experience’ (Dahl 1963, 109). However, he concludes that the relationship between
institutions and ideas is “imperfectly understood and a matter of sharp controversy” (Dahl 1963, 110). In many ways, there has been two ways of analyzing institutions: from the constraints that institutions place on individuals; and the aggregation of individual decisions directing the institution. I believe that a more appropriate analysis of institutions is through the utilization of both perspectives— institutions can constrain behavior but individuals can also establish institutions or change institutional progression through decision-making and interactions (see Granovetter (1985); Berger and Luckmann (1966); and Giddens (1984)). The process is complex but ignoring one to the benefit of the other is an incomplete way to analyze institutional formation and growth.

David Apter (2007) was cited heavily in the modernization section. However, Apter also wrote on ‘institutionalism’, which I argue is the evolved form of modernization theory. Apter (2007) writes that the ‘new’ institutionalism framework is “less ethnocentric and more comparative” than modernization theory but is a ‘conceptually thinner’ theory than modernization theory (Apter 2007, 26). According to Apter, the ‘new’ institutionalism needs: both greater emphasis on general theory in order to comprehend and compare diversities of custom and practice, and more attention to the inner workings of social and political life from the perspective of those who engage in it. The new institutionalism is in that sense pitched in mid-air between descriptive comparison and an overgeneralized concept of the state, a state without institutional content, and a lack of concern with the way people perceive and then act on their perceptions (Apter 2007, 28).

This assessment is compatible with Reiter’s (2013) call for situatedness in analysis and Rustow’s (1968) warning against overgeneralizing theories in order to prevent against irrelevance. This statement confirms the requirement for qualitative research in institutionalism
through which contextual data can be analyzed in a meaningful manner to determine causal explanations for institutional outcomes. The next section describes the three main approaches to ‘new’ institutionalism and explains how each is applied to the theory.

Approaches to ‘New’ Institutionalism

The ‘new’ institutionalism can be divided into historical institutionalism; rational choice institutionalism; and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 936; Immergut 1998, 5; Thelen 1999, 369-370). This dissertation does not address rational choice institutionalism therefore the following section will provides a discussion of historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism as they apply to state building. As stated in the introduction, historical institutionalists believe that institutions are used as an incorporating mechanism for the state (Hall and Taylor 1996, 936). The historical institutionalist views the state not as a ‘neutral broker’ but as “a complex of institutions capable of structuring the character and outcomes of group conflict” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 937). In addition, historical institutionalists reject the tendency to “view the social, psychological or cultural traits of individuals as the parameters driving much of the system’s operation” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 936).

Historical institutionalists define institutions as “the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 937) although Skocpol’s (1995) definition of institutions includes informal networks which are important for an analysis of trust networks. Historical institutionalism analyzes “the relationship between institutions and individual behaviour” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938) which is applicable for state building because the state
seeks to shape individual behavior through institutional formation, which reinforces state–citizen interaction and incorporation.

Sociological institutionalists argue that “Individual decisions are a product not only of institutional setting” but of their “embeddedness” in “cultural and organizational” settings that define the idea of “‘self-interest’ and ‘utility’” (Koelble 1995, 232). Hall and Taylor write that sociological institutionalism arose out of ‘organization theory’ (Hall and Taylor 1996, 946).

the new institutionalists in sociology began to argue that many of the institutional forms and procedures used by modern organizations were not adopted simply because they were most efficient for the tasks at hand...Instead, they argued that many of these forms and procedures should be seen as culturally-specific practices, akin to the myths and ceremonies devised by many societies, and assimilated into organizations...Thus, they argued, even the most seemingly bureaucratic of practices have to be explained in cultural terms (Hall and Taylor 1996, 946).

According to Stephen R. Barley and Pamela S. Tolbert (1997), “institutional theory highlights cultural influences on decision making and formal structures” (Barley and Tolbert 1997, 93). The cultural focus of sociological institutionalism is helpful in analyzing institutions in Afghanistan because as with any state, Afghanistan has a mix of influences that direct its institutional development whether they are religious, ethnic, tribal, or secular. A benefit to the ‘new’ institutionalism is the ability of researchers to use multiple approaches to create a more inclusive analysis of institutions in the context of state building (Thelen 1999). The work of Mark Granovetter (1985), Anthony Giddens (1984) and Peter L. Bergman and Thomas Luckmann (1966) bring the agent back into the institution building discussion without denying the role of structure.
Granovetter (1985), writing on what has been referred to as the ‘new institutional economics’ asserts: “It has long been the majority view among sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and historians that such [economic] behavior was heavily embedded in social relations in premarket societies but became much more autonomous with modernization” (Granovetter 1985, 482). In this view, the economy is a separate sphere of ‘modern society’ so that economic decisions are not constrained by ‘social or kinship obligations’ but instead by rational actors seeking ‘individual gain’ (Granovetter 1985, 482). However, Granovetter writes that only a few economists “accepted this conception of a break in embeddedness with modernization; most of them assert instead that embeddedness in earlier societies was not substantially greater than low levels found in modern markets” (Granovetter 1985, 482). Granovetter then takes a middle ground approach to analyzing economic behavior highlighting the fact that ‘over- and undersocialized conceptions’ of behavior are polar extremes of sociological theory that prevent the researcher from considering important parts of each theory (Granovetter 1985, 483). Granovetter is really critiquing the assumption that individuals are all ‘rational actors’, not constrained by social structures, which provide ‘sociability, approval, status, and power’ (Granovetter 1985, 506). In regards to situatedness, Granovetter writes “What looks to the analyst like nonrational behavior may be quite sensible when situational constraints, especially those of embeddedness, are fully appreciated” (Granovetter 1985, 506). Hence, Granovetter views economic research that disregards societal structures as incomplete and offers the incorporation of structuralism to help inform economic research. This reinforces the inclusion of sociological institutionalism in state building consideration as policymakers are better equipped to create state building policies when cultural norms (a potential reason for ‘non-rational’ behavior) are taken into consideration.
Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration provides an argument for analysis that considers the institution and the agent. Giddens seeks to resolve and reform “the endemic problem in social theory and methodology of structure vis-à-vis agency, of constraints vis-à-vis enablements, of macro- and micro-levels” (Bertilsson 1984, 343).

The theory of structuration...argues that structures exist only ‘virtually’ in their instantiation, i.e. in actually being brought out by actors as the ‘rules and resources’ which permit action. A recurrent theme in Giddens’s work is that of the duality of structures. By this he means that rules and resources both constrain and enable action. The mobilization of (social) action necessitates a ‘pre-structured’ reality, yet this structure exists and is made knowledgeable to actors only in its instantiation as action (Bertilsson 1984, 343).

Giddens makes three specific points or ‘guidelines’ about the “overall orientation of social research”. First, he writes that social research has a “cultural, ethnographic or ‘anthropological’ aspect to it” (Giddens 1984, 284), which is indicative of sociological institutionalist dogma. Secondly, he incorporates the agent into the analysis of institutions writing:

...it is important in social research to be sensitive to the complex skills which actors have in co-ordinating the contexts of their day-to-day behaviour...Social life may very often be predictable in its course...But its predictability is in many of its aspects ‘made to happen’ by social actors; it does not happen in spite of the reasons they have for their conduct (Giddens 1984, 285).

Thirdly, Giddens writes that in social research the analyst must be “sensitive to the time-space constitution of social life” (Giddens 1984, 286). In Giddens’ work, the ‘time-space relation’, which includes history and geography, cannot be removed from ‘social analysis’
(Giddens 1984, 286). The empirical chapter of this dissertation achieves an aspect of the inclusiveness Giddens argues for by incorporating a geo-spatial analysis of the relationship between Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions and political instability. This geo-spatial analysis of institutions, when overlapped with political instability data over time, helps identify patterns of violence as defined in the introductory chapter. Therefore, Giddens’ work is important for this dissertation because it helps shape how data is analyzed as well as the type of future research that can be conducted based on this foundational study. In addition, it encourages researchers to incorporate agency into the structural analysis of institutions. The inclusion of agency and ‘time-space relations’ on institution building is imperative to obtaining a greater understanding of institutions in non-western and post-conflict states.

While not considered the ‘new’ institutionalism, I include Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s (1966) work on institutionalization because it is foundationally important for understanding state building. In their work, the authors describe how reality is constructed through social interaction writing that the narrowing of choices through ‘habitualized actions’ is the foundation of institution formation (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 71). The authors describe institution formation through a vignette of two men stranded on an island. Daily, man A attempts to build a raft out of matchsticks and man B watches him attempt to build his raft (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 74). Through this daily interaction, ‘reciprocal typifications’ are created—man B believes that man A will attempt to build his raft and man A believes that man B will watch him attempt to build his raft (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 74-75). An important key to this assessment is a ‘continuing social situation’ where the actions of each man occur and are ‘habitualized’ (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 75).
The authors then describe how an institution is reified through the incorporation of history through the use of a parent and child vignette. In this instance, $A$ and $B$ are parents and $C$ is a child. According to the authors, the:

habitualizations and typifications undertaken in the common life of $A$ and $B$, formations that until this point still had the quality of *ad hoc* conceptions of two individuals, now become historical institutions...This means that the institutions that have now been crystallized...are experienced as existing over and beyond the individuals who ‘happen to’ embody them at the moment...the institutions are now experienced as possessing a reality of their own, a reality that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 76).

Berger and Luckmann describe how institutions are formed through the interactions of individuals that come to understand or expect certain behavior from other actors. These actions are then reified over time as new actors are introduced to the social situations. In regards to state building, Berger and Luckmann help researchers address the formation of institutions and provide insight into how future institution building may become formalized over time through generations.

The work of Berger and Luckmann, Giddens, and Granovetter help situate the researcher in the phenomena of state building through the consideration of both macro- and micro-theoretical frameworks. In addition, the inclusion of history and sociology as important aspects of state building establishes an interdisciplinary requirement for conducting state building research. Understanding how current institutions came into being over at least a generational period will help researchers better understand agent interactions with the state and state interactions with society.
The above section discusses approaches to the ‘new’ institutionalism. Historical institutionalism is an appropriate framework for state building analysis because it assists the researcher in identifying how specific types of institutions were formed and the impact these institutions have on the population over time. Historical institutionalism will be incorporated into this dissertation through an analysis of questions asked in the introductory chapter directed towards the institutional development and functions of Afghan ‘para-state’ institutions. Sociological institutionalism is pertinent to state building in Afghanistan because it incorporates cultural aspects of institutions which often times shape how institutions perform functions in light of religious, ethnic, and other identity associated factors.

Giddens’ structuration theory is beneficial to Afghan state building analysis because it considers time-space aspects of social life as well as agency. This dissertation research does not address the agency aspect of institution building outside of a small acknowledgement of elite decision-making. However, future analysis would benefit from incorporating an agency perspective of Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions and in Afghanistan. In addition, Berger and Luckmann (1966) establish the basic foundational understanding of how institutions are created and ‘institutionalized’ over time. Ultimately, the promise of state building is to establish functioning state institutions that provide security and order over a specific territory. The ‘new’ institutionalism framework, while not perfect, provides researchers with a point from which to begin.

The following section discusses state building through the act of international interventions. State building encompasses more than internal change. It also incorporates the influences of international actors or third party state builders that participate in the
in institutionalization of the state. These influences are important in analyzing how the transforming state will function post-intervention.

*International Interventions and Third-Party State Building*

State building is significantly affected by international interventions. It is not just an internal process but state building is tied to the international community through international donors and relationships with international organizations. The discussion of third-party state building is closely related to peace building as discussed in Chapter 3. However, the intent in this section is to conduct an analysis of international interventions theory in light of institutionalism and state building literature. As stated above, this review will help us understand how interventionists attempt to create institutions and how they attempt to incorporate those institutions into the international institutional structure.

State building through international interventions is an aspect of state building that must be discussed because it highlights the motives of international partners in state building. Robert Caplan (2004) separates state building into ‘third party’ state building and ‘indigenous’ state building (Caplan 2004, 53). According to Caplan, this practice has its roots in colonialism when colonial powers attempted to strengthen indigenous institutions prior to transferring sovereignty back to the ‘local authorities’ (Caplan 2004, 53). Berit Bliesemann de Guevara (2008) describes the contradictions that arise in the context of international state building. The first issue is that state building is often discussed in light of the ‘international community’ which ‘insinuates certain unity and coherence’ that may not be present (Bliesemann 2008, 352). International actors vary in “their institutional backgrounds, financing, human resources, mandates, areas of expertise, accountability, experiences, moral ideas, degree of legitimacy and so forth”
Bliesemann 2008, 352). These differences influence state building policy “as much or more as does the local context of the intervened country” (Bliesemann 2008, 352).

Bliesemann de Guevara describes the process of competition and compromise that occurs in the international arena through the process of international state building. The author highlights the fact that donors compete against each other in determining how much aid will be donated vying for the ability to determine policies for the ‘intervened in’ state (Bliesemann 2008, 352). Therefore, there is a foundation for stronger states to provide more aid and then take more responsibility in determining how the reforming state develops politically, economically, and socially. In the international arena, aid can equal increased control, which reinforces powerful state hegemony in the international context.

However, problems of state building are still associated with the belief that state building models are universal. Bliesemann writes: “When general models are transformed into concrete strategies and programmes, i.e., when ideas become practices, major conflicts between different objectives or principles may arise” (Bliesemann 2008, 353). This relates to both international and domestic realms of state building. In the international realm, varying belief systems of international actors can create conflict in policy implementation. Therefore, like-minded states are more apt to work together and further their ideological stances through interventions. The problem of legitimacy is a second major issue identified by Bliesemann.

...the state builders simultaneous activities in different arenas, and thus the various logics they follow and bonds that constrain them, are a major reason why the generation of legitimacy is difficult, especially in the long run. Statebuilders have to take their domestic as well as the intervened societies’ demands into account, and often these are quite contrary. But even when...statebuilders manage to monopolise powers and build
modern institutions in non-western states, the chances that these institutions become locally accepted are low (Bliesemann 2008, 363).

I have previously discussed the fact that legitimacy is a by-product of effective institution building. However, in this context, legitimacy is important to the discussion of international interventions theory and state building because if international actors are not seen as legitimate their actions can produce situations far more detrimental than those previously experienced. This therefore provides the impetus for understanding institutional development and persistence in transforming states and reinforces the timeliness and necessity of this research.

As discussed in previous chapters, the issue of parallel institutions is problematic for international state building theory. Lakhdar Brahimi (2007) advocates for a ‘light footprint’ approach to institutionalization which means that international organizations such as the United Nations should seek to avoid ‘parallel institutions’ that are capable of instantaneously implementing institutional bureaucratization at the expense of weak indigenous institutions that lack capacity (training and technical knowledge) (Brahimi 2007, 4). In furthering this argument, Jonathan Goodhand and Mark Sedra (2007) write that in Afghanistan:

They [donors] have tended to ‘import’ state capacity and create parallel structures staffed by trusted officials, international advisors and foreign sub-contractors. Rather than firing incompetent staff, technocrats have tended to sideline them by working with their trusted circle of advisors. This strategy of capacity enhancement rather than capacity-building has led to the creation of a dual structure within the Afghan state (Goodhand and Sedra 2007, 52).

The creation of parallel institutions as a formula for conducting state building is and continues to be a problem for state builders. By conducting critical empirical research, the
The academic community may be able to find alternative ways to attain institution building goals without de-legitimizing the transforming state in the process.

The issue of regional stability with international interventions should also be addressed. In the case of Afghanistan, we see that Pakistan’s inability to control the Afghanistan-Pakistan border creates an enabling response for the Taliban insurgency. Some could theorize that this inability to control the border is a calculated risk by Pakistan to control Afghanistan’s internal security situation. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977) discuss the power model of international regime change, which I find is applicable to regionalism as well as competitive state building as discussed by Bliesemann de Guavera (2008). The authors write that in international relations, “powerful states make the rules” (Keohane and Nye 1977, 42).

According to Keohane and Nye, the “principal focus of the [realist] theory—and the segment of it that provides its explanatory power—centers on competition among states. It is competition among autonomous actors that provides the basic driving force of world politics” (Keohane and Nye 1977, 43). Keohane and Nye (1977) write that the ‘basic dynamic’ of regime change is “that as the power of states changes (that is, as the structure changes), the rules that comprise international regimes will change accordingly” (Keohane and Nye 1977, 43). Therefore, the process of intervention affects not only the intervening state but also the states surrounding the intervening state as the region attempts to balance power through actions that stabilize or destabilize the transforming state. This theoretical framework is extremely important for analyzing any third party state building operation. Perpetual instability can be created through neighboring states that do not desire stability in the region. If this is not effectively dealt with in the international community, the international state building mission is likely doomed to fail.
Robert Keohane (2002) has also written on institutional theory in international relations, which bridges institutionalism and international relations. In his book chapter titled “Institutional Theory In International Relations”, Keohane writes: “Institutional theory accepts three basic realist assumptions: (1) states are the primary actors in world politics; (2) they can be analyzed as if they were rational; and (3) they are not altruistic but rather, are broadly ‘self-interested’” (Keohane 2002, 154-155). Keohane writes that institutional theory “treats information as a variable that can be affected by human actions and that is embedded in institutions” (Keohane 2002, 155). Therefore, states have a vested interest in “creating and using institutions to improve the quality of information—both what they receive and the credibility of what they send” (Keohane 2002, 155). Keohane analyzes methodological problems of institutional theory and writes that the theory “acknowledges that institutional configurations reflect underlying power structures” (Keohane 2002, 157). The question arises of how to incorporate that power structure into the state. This is an aspect of state building that is not readily solved but hearkens back to Michael Bhatia’s (2007) discussion of the use of warlords in governing areas of the state in Afghanistan. The process of state building includes policy formation that attempts to incorporate warlords for the benefit of the state while managing the amount of power wielded by these same warlords.13

David Chandler has written extensively on international interventions. In his 2004 article “The Problems of ‘Nation-Building’: Imposing Bureaucratic ‘Rule from Above’”, Chandler writes that “State-building practices are increasingly informed by the assumption that democracy is good for Western states but tutelage is better for non-Western states variously judged to be ‘under stress’, at ‘risk of failure’ or in post-conflict ‘recovery’” (Chandler 2004, 311). Therefore, 

13 See Chapter 2 discussion of Legitimacy and State Building (pp. 60).
the future of international state building creates a dependency relationship with Western states continuing to rule non-Western states through interventionist practices. Chandler writes:

> For certain theorists, whether of liberal internationalist or neoconservative beliefs, it seems obvious that international bureaucrats can develop better laws than the people who live in post-conflict countries or their representatives. After all, they argue, these domestic elites caused the misrule that forced the internationals to take over, and the people did themselves few favours by voting such elites in or accepting their rule (Chandler 2004, 578).

This excerpt portrays a derogative view of domestic state builders although these state builders may be the most effective. Chapter 6 studies Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions and the effect these institutions have on political instability. Throughout the empirical chapter, it is obvious that domestic institutions appear more successful at garnering local support when compared to central state institutions during the Soviet and Taliban eras. International actors may be able to fund state building missions but may lack the historic and cultural knowledge needed to build lasting institutions—thus making international interventions unsuccessful.

Chapter 5 describes Afghanistan’s history and how regional state actors came to be viewed negatively due to international interference in domestic affairs of the state. This ‘anti-
farangi’ or anti-foreigner sentiment can be detected today in Afghan state policies that attempt to separate the Afghan government from foreign actors operating in Afghanistan. On one hand, the Afghan government needs the support of the international community but on the other hand, the Afghan population, specifically in rural areas, may be less apt to support a foreign presence in the state.
In his 2010 book, *International Statebuilding: The rise of post-liberal governance*, Chandler describes how an international hierarchy is effectively being established through international interventions. According to Chandler:

under the guise of universalizing western liberal frameworks of democracy and the market—the needs and interests of those subject to intervention are often ignored, resulting in the maintenance of inequalities and conflicts and undermining the asserted goals of external interveners (Chandler 2010, 23).

A hierarchy is created through the relationship of those states capable of intervening and those states intervened in—specifically if the intervened in states are incapable of protecting themselves from the interventions. Chandler describes how the post-liberal paradigm has taken autonomy and used it to become an impetus for intervention. In essence, Chandler describes the ‘liberal classical paradigm’ of state autonomy as being based in ‘freedom and non-intervention’. The ‘post-liberal paradigm’ calls for intervention due to “the persistence of political, economic and social divisions resulting from the lack of appropriate institutions able to temper and frame civil society performance” (Francesca 2012, 167-168). If Chandler is correct, the international community is moving towards a new type of colonialism where international states (likely Western) intervene in weaker or developing states in order to assist in their transformation.

International interventions have become the means through which states are supported or transformed. This action may occur through a United Nations mission or through individual state action. Few states are capable of conducting international interventions unilaterally. However, France’s intervention in Mali and Russia’s intervention in the Crimea are current examples of how strong states have the capability to significantly reshape developing or smaller states within a relatively short time frame. Analyzing international state building policy helps
researchers study the success of internationally funded and directed state building policy in light of domestic institution building (such as will be studied in Chapter 6).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has reviewed three large theoretical frameworks associated with state building. Modernization literature is closely related to state building literature although this relationship does not support the achievement of state building goals. By this, I mean that modernization theory and current state building literature preference democracy, hence ideologically driven; and largely unsuccessful in determining how states effectively transform. However, modernization theory is foundational in understanding how processes of state building came to be analyzed. Therefore, the review is essential although I will not use this framework for my research.

The ‘new’ institutionalism is in some ways an evolved form or more precise form of modernization theory. David Apter has written on both modernization theory and institutionalism and his work was instrumental in understanding how these two theories work together to create a more specific means through which to analyze state building. In particular, historical institutionalism, with its focus on institutional formation is valuable in determining how institutions are created and are transformed through time and contextual space.

The above discussion of international interventions helped explain problems of parallel institutions and warned of a potential global hierarchical structure being created by the process of international interventions. Keohane and Nye’s (1977) power model of international regime change highlights an important analytical tool that can be used to determine how states make decisions in order to bring balance back into international structures once changes have occurred.
Institutions play a major role in global and domestic politics. As such, there are numerous frameworks that may be applicable for state building analysis. The above review has helped to clarify the focus of three distinct frameworks and helped forge a path towards identifying the best framework for use in institution formation in transitioning states.
Chapter 5: The Making of Afghanistan: Pashtuns, Reforms, and Empires

The proud Pushtuns in their mountains met the forward policies [of the British] with ferocious guerrilla warfare, and smiled with contempt at the periodic withdrawals. In the end, the British administration contented itself with a policy of containment and reprisal - Leon Poullada and Leila Poullada 1995.

...There is reason to fear that the societies into which the nation [Afghanistan] is divided, possess within themselves a principle of repulsion and disunion, too strong to be overcome, except by such a force as, while it united the whole into one solid body, would crush the features of every one of the parts - Mountstuart Elphinstone, 1815.

Introduction

Afghanistan is an ideal case for analyzing state building because of its current and recent past experiences with the process. Most recently, Afghanistan has been the core focus of international state building through the United Nations. However, Afghanistan was also the focus of state building operations two centuries ago under the Afghan monarchy; a century ago under British protection; four decades ago during the Communist era; and a decade ago under the Taliban regime. In order to situate the Afghan state in its current environment, it is important to acknowledge its historical formation. Afghanistan’s history can be separated into three specific state building categories: the Pashtuns; the ‘buffer state’; and the reforms. The Pashtun

Footnote 14: For the purpose of this research, I will use the term Pashtun, although Pushtun and Pathan are often used—Pathan serving to identify Pashtuns that live in Pakistan.
category describes the creation of the Afghan state and the problem of the trans-Durand line tribal lands or Pashtunistan. The ‘buffer state’ category addresses the role of the British and Russian empires in Afghanistan and the anti-foreign sentiment in Afghanistan that continues from this exposure. The reforms category describes how Afghanistan’s political, social, and economic transformations created a more conservative state with modern technology.

Afghanistan’s history is full of opportunities that could have directed it to a different path—decision points that could have change the course of events that led to September 11, 2001. Unfortunately, it is impossible to rewind a century and change the past. The best option is to better understand Afghanistan’s history in order to create more informed state building policies in the future. This chapter will accomplish this task by reviewing the history of Afghanistan and applying a few of the theoretical frameworks discussed in previous chapters. Of note, the majority of Afghanistan’s written history is found in journals and letters of British soldiers and political officers that worked in South Asia during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Therefore, I recognize that a largely British account of events is echoed in this chapter.

The Pashtuns

The creation of the Afghan State

The formation of the Afghan state was almost by accident. Ahmed Khan was the head bodyguard for the Shah of Persia in the mid-eighteenth century. The Shah of Persia was killed and upon his death Ahmed Khan fled from Persia to Kandahar. He reportedly arrived in Kandahar with the ‘best fighting force in the region’ and the Persian Shah’s treasure including the legendary Koh-i-Noor diamond (Ewans 2001, 23). Khan was elected Shah of Afghanistan through a jirga (tribal meeting) consisting of Abdali sub-tribes (ethnically Pashtun) (Ewans 2001,
Ahmed Khan’s new name eventually became Ahmed Shah Durrani and he began Afghanistan’s Durrani Empire.

The election of Shah Durrani by the *jirga* resembles what reportedly occurred during the Soviet era in Afghanistan—the establishment of ‘arms’ based leadership. According to Western reporters, “young men with automatic weapons” began to wield authority over tribal elders in “areas hard hit by the war”. Only those tribal leaders that participated in armed conflict against the Soviets maintained their influence (CIA Report 2 1984). This may have been the same type of ‘security based’ leadership bestowed upon Shah Durrani over two centuries earlier. According to Martin Ewans (2001), Ahmed Shah Durrani was aware that Pashtun loyalty would be created through ‘opportunities for warfare and plunder’ and he kept the Pashtun involved in both during his reign as Shah (Ewans 2001, 23).

Geographically, the Afghanistan of the mid-eighteenth century covered a significantly larger area than it does today. In 1748, Shah Durrani began expanding his empire by conquering Kabul and Ghazni. He also pushed east towards Delhi located in British India but his conquest of the city was unsuccessful (Ewans 2001, 23). In 1750, Shah Durrani conquered Herat in present-day western Afghanistan and went on to conquer Meshed and Nishapur in present-day Iran (Ewans 2001, 23). On his return to Kandahar, Shah Durrani sent an army to occupy the north of present-day Afghanistan from Maimana to Badakhshan and Bamian in central Afghanistan (Ewans 2001, 25). In 1751, he captured Lahore in present-day Pakistan and gained the western Punjab and Kashmir (Ewans 2001, 25).

At his death in 1772, Shah Durrani’s kingdom ranged from the Amu Darya (river) in the north to the Arabian Sea in the south; from Meshed in Persia to Delhi in the east as depicted in the below map (Ewans 2001, 25). Under Shah Durrani’s leadership, the Pashtun tribes amassed
wealth and territory while maintaining their independence (Ewans 2001, 26). By the end of the nineteenth century, the British, through their processes of territorial annexation, decreased the size of the Afghan state by approximately half its size under Shah Durrani.

In 1772, Shah Durrani died and his son, Timur Shah succeeded him to the throne (Ewans 2001, 26). Timur Shah’s rule was relatively peaceful. However, a series of revolts occurred that left the Sind and Amu Darya area ‘virtually independent’ (Ewans 2001, 27). In 1783, an official of the East India Company, George Forster, traveled overland from Bengal to London. Forster observed a separation between the Pashtun tribes and the monarchy under Timur’s reign. According to Forster’s journal, when not constrained by the Afghan government, the Pashtun tribes:
disperse into societies, and are guided by the ruder principles of the feudal systems. Conformably to this system, the different chieftains usually reside in fortified villages, where they exercise an acknowledged, though a moderate, sway over their vassals, and yield a careless obedience to the orders of government. Rarely any appeal is made to the head of state, except in cases which may involve a common danger; when I have seen the authority of the Shah interposed with success (Ewans 2001, 28).

The period of wealth accumulation under Shah Durrani brought about increased opportunities to institutionalize methods of rule and order. However, during the twenty-five year period of Shah Durrani’s rule, the Pashtuns did not change their roles or their views of leadership. Afghans returned to traditional tribal lifestyles following Shah Durrani’s death only to unify in the case of ‘common threats’. This is interesting because state building theory argues that over periods of time—the institutionalization of change will occur. This assumption does not apply to Aghan state formation. However, one thing that was solidified was the Pashtun’s ‘right to rule’. The original Afghans were Pashtun, and the Durrani Empire, which lasted from 1747-1862, was the foundation of the state.

The Trans-Durand Line Tribal Lands a.k.a. ‘Pashtunistan’

The issue of Pashtunistan arose during the reign of Abdur Rahman Khan from 1880-1901. As described in Chapter 1, the Durand Line is the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan drawn by Mortimer Durand in 1893. Leon and Leila Poullada (1995) write that the “Afghan case on Pushtunistan rests on historical, demographic, cultural, and legal grounds” (Poullada and Poullada 1995, 83).
According to the authors:

experts agree that, as an international border, the line is a monstrosity. It bisects the Kunar river basin and the large Mohmand tribe; the Khyber Pass Afridis are left with a bolt-hole into Afghanistan; it cuts across the territory of the turbulent Waziris; it fails to conform to the ethnic, geographic, or even military realities of the situation; and it split Pushtun villages and even families (Poullada and Poullada 1995, 83).

Most scholars argue that Abdur Rahman Khan did not believe the Durand Line was an actual international demarcation but rather a line indicating spheres of influence between British India and Afghanistan (Poullada and Poullada 1995; Fletcher 1965; Goodson 2001; Griffiths 1981). Additionally, scholars claim that Rahman Khan signed the treaty under duress. The British delayed a shipment of arms transiting India for Afghanistan in response to the Amir’s wavering over the signing of the treaty (Poullada and Poullada 1995, 87). The Durand Line may not have been such a significant issue if the state of Pakistan had not been created out of Western British India—which was previously ruled by Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s stance regarding Pashtunistan is that any claims Afghanistan may have to the trans-Durand region are ‘ancient history’ (Poullada and Poullada 1995, 91). “According to Pakistan, the Pushtuns in its territory are better off than they would be if they were either independent or attached to backward Afghanistan” (Poullada and Poullada 1995, 92). Additionally, the issue of Pashtunistan is brushed off as an attempt to annex territory located in Pakistan and gain access to the southern ocean (Poullada and Poullada 1995, 92). Of course, Pakistan’s membership in the British Commonwealth plays to its favor in retaining the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
However, the areas of the NWFP and FATA are largely administered by the state and the areas have lobbied for autonomous rule, which indicates the absence of any Pakistani identity.

There have been many historical opportunities to clarify the meaning of the Durand Line. The “subsequent treaties of 1905, 1919, and 1921” all rely on the “validity of the previous treaties” (Poullada and Poullada 1995, 89). Essentially, the treaties state, “the Afghans accepted the obligations of previous Afghan rulers. Thus the 1919 treaty states: ‘The Afghan government accepts the frontiers accepted by the late Amir [Habibullah] in the 1905 treaty’” (Poullada and Poullada 1995, 90). Avoiding opportunities to renegotiate the Durand Line reinforced the status quo.

The relationship between the trans-Durand tribes and the Afghan state was not significantly altered during this period because Afghanistan historically provided support to those tribes located in Pakistan. At the conclusion of the Third Anglo-Afghan War, which will be discussed more in following sections, Amir Amanullah (r. 1920-1929)\textsuperscript{15} was required to refrain from administering support to the tribes in the British sphere of influence. In 1924, the “Mangal and Jaji tribes of the Khost region rose in revolt” against Amanullah “led by local mullahs [Muslim learned in Islamic law]” (Ewans 2001, 94). The Amir was unable to quell the uprising without Pashtun tribal support and ultimately requested the use of British aircraft to attack the tribes on the outskirts of Kabul (Ewans 2001, 94). The use of foreign military assistance to stop the tribal revolt increased anti-foreign sentiment and severely damaged Amir Amanullah’s reputation.

This event occurred almost a century ago but reveals the deep trust networks that reside in Afghan and Pakistan Pashtunistan. Charles Tilly (2003) defines trust networks as being

\textsuperscript{15} Dates provided are the period of Afghan rule identified as reign as identified by Louis Dupree (1997) \textit{Afghanistan}. 
rooted in kinship and personal ties or relationships. He argues that these ties must be broken for a modern state to be established. However, as should be apparent through this overview, the Pashtun trust networks are not diminishing. Decades of war have strengthened these ties and increased the resourcefulness of the Afghan population outside the central state.

Today, the Durand Line is a point of contention because of its porosity and the international norms that enable the insurgents to cross into Afghanistan to conduct operations and then return to the safety of Pakistan—the same as occurred during the Soviet era. In the most recent Congressional Research Service report titled “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy”, Kenneth Katzman (2013) writes:

reports on Afghanistan’s stability repeatedly identify Afghan militant safe haven in Pakistan as among the largest threats to Afghan stability after 2014. Pakistan’s goal is that Afghanistan, at the very least, not align with rival India, and, at best, provide Pakistan strategic depth against India...Pakistan’s goal in allowing some groups, such as the Haqqani Network, relative safehaven may be to develop leverage with Afghanistan to support Pakistan’s policies (Katzman 2013, 47).

This section has described the problem of the Durand Line in historical and modern terms. Pashtunistan will likely never be annexed to Afghanistan and attempting to close the Afghan-Pakistan border creates hardships on families seeking support from relations on the other side of the line. This is an enduring issue for Afghanistan as the Afghan state is weakened by the lack of Afghan-Pakistan border integrity but also powerless to annex Pashtunistan.

The role of the Pashtuns in Afghan state formation is important to address. Scholars agree that the Pashtun tribes cannot be considered a unified group due to differing tribal affiliations. However, for a period under Ahmed Shah Durrani, they were a somewhat unified group and when faced with a common threat they tend to re-unify. Issues that affect the current
state building discourse in Afghanistan are embedded in the perceived lack of societal change away from tribal enclaves following the twenty-five years of leadership under Ahmed Shah Durrani and trans-Durand line administration in the modern era. Even though Shah Durrani reigned over two centuries ago, the legacy of this period influences modern Afghanistan. Additionally, the ‘trans-Durand’ line tribes will continue to be a political issue in Afghanistan as long as the territory belongs to Pakistan. These international and domestic policy issues are just two of the distinct situations that embody the modern Afghan puzzle.

_Between Two Empires: Afghanistan in the Middle_

Afghanistan became the playing field of the ‘Great Game’ in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A historical review of the period highlights Russia’s ability to instigate British responses consistently through the period. Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901) viewed Russia as the more threatening aggressor between the two competitors. However, the British conducted the three large-scale incursions into Afghan territory, which would come to be known as the First (1839-1842), Second (1878-1880), and Third (1919) Anglo-Afghan Wars. The following section will describe the relationship between the British Empire, the Russian Empire and Afghanistan. The section will close with a discussion of the formation of anti-foreign sentiment and its role in international relations today.

**British Interference and the First Anglo-Afghan War**

British attempts to control Afghanistan were consistent throughout the nineteenth century. Dost Mohammad Khan (r. 1819-1839, 1843-1863) ruled Afghanistan in the early part of the century and as an Amir, was open to negotiate with the Russians for assistance in gaining control
of Peshawar (located in present-day Pakistan), which was held at the time by the Sikhs (Dupree 1997, 371). In response, the British sought to overthrow Dost Mohammad Khan from the Afghan monarchy and reinstate Shah Shuja—the Amir that had reigned from 1803-1809 and was friendly to the British. A letter from the British in 1838 directed Amir Dost Mohammad Khan to do the following:

- You must desist from all correspondence with Persia and Russia; you must never receive agents from [them] or have aught to do with him without our sanction; you must dismiss Captain Vickovitch [a Russian envoy] with courtesy; you must surrender all claims to Peshawar on your own account, as that chiefship belongs to Majaraja Runjeet Sing; you must also respect the independence of Candahar and of Peshawar, and co-operate in arrangements to unite your family...(Dupree 1997, 371).

For the British, the issue of state sovereignty was of no concern outside of their interests. British insecurity was likely based in their position in British India and the enormous wealth that was being created by their venture. A hostile Russian Empire on the border of the British Empire would have significantly deterred their progress. Therefore, they sought to restrain Afghanistan—instead of allowing Afghanistan to conduct sovereign state affairs as an equal in the region.

Ultimately, the British sought an alliance with the Sikhs and invaded Afghanistan in 1839. The Army of the Indus was to be a combined Sikh – British force but the Sikh leader reneged and the British invaded Afghanistan alone. Interestingly, newspapers in Britain and India, vehemently opposed the invasion to include such dignitaries as Mountstuart Elphinstone and the Duke of Wellington, but to no avail (Dupree 1997, 377). The Army of the Indus, on its own, reached Kandahar in April 1839 and Kabul in August 1839 (Dupree 1997, 378). Amir Dost Mohammad Khan fled to the northern provinces, seeking supporters for his cause but was unable
to garner support from the Uzbek that inhabited the area (Dupree 1997, 378). The British installed Shah Shuja on the Afghan throne and maintained a garrison in Afghanistan but it became obvious that Shah Shuja’s power base was too limited to maintain control without British support (Dupree 1997, 379). Eventually, the double government of the Afghan and British became noticeable during this period and led to the massacre of the retreating Army of the Indus in 1842.

According to Dupree (1997), a ‘double government came into being’ following the First Anglo-Afghan War:

To secure the kingdom of Shah Shuja, the British occupied and fortified, for varying periods of time, several areas: Qandahar, Ghazni, Jalalabad, Charikar, Bamiyan, Kalat-i-Ghilzai...Shah Shuja ruled, but seldom attempted to gain the confidence of his people, even his closest relatives. His tax-collectors actively collected taxes; his executioners actively executed his enemies, both real and potential. The British, however, held the purse strings and the guns, so many Afghans came to Macnaghten [British Envoy and Minister to Shah Shuja’s Court] and his representatives for decisions which should normally have been in the province of the Amir. Macnaghten lavishly dispensed cash subsidies to various tribal chiefs, hoping to gain their loyalty. When [Lord] Auckland [Governor-General of India] drastically cut the funds available for such chicaneries, loyalty withered in direct proportion to the diminished grants (Dupree 1997, 381).

Soon thereafter, tribal revolts against the British ‘began early and lasted long’ (Dupree 1997, 381). ‘Anti-farangi’

sentiment was growing in Afghanistan and Shah Shuja’s rule ended in April 1842 with his assassination at the hands of Afghans (Dupree 1997, 381). It would be

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16 “Farangi literally means Frank or foreigner in Persia. The Afghans, however, use the term haraji for foreigner in general, and reserve farangi (a pejorative term) for the British alone” (Dupree 1997, 378).
difficult to disassociate practices of state building in the mid-nineteenth century and state building in the twentieth and twenty-first century. The relationship between weapons and wealth comes to the forefront as described in the previous Pashtun section. Cash and guns helped to keep the loyalty of the tribes during this period but this practice does not gain true loyalty. The Afghan will seek to gain as much as possible and then return to his tribal enclave at the end of the day—the same as during the reign of Timur Shah. This is not a critique of the Pashtun but rather a critique of policies that use wealth and weapons as a means to build stability.

In response to the British presence in Afghanistan following the First Anglo-Afghan War, the ‘Tsarist Russians’ began moving into Central Asia because they viewed the British presence in Afghanistan as a “threat to their interests” (Dupree 1997, 404). By 1869, the Russian realm of vassalage reached the Amu Darya (river), the present-day northern border of Afghanistan (Dupree 1997, 404). The British response to these advances was to establish a “Forward Policy” in the region. The policy included the occupation of Quetta; gaining “control of the Afghan area by subsidizing the Amir in Kabul”; and keeping the Russians out by creating a “permanent British Mission in Kabul” (Dupree 1997, 404). In Dost Mohammad’s reign, the main political pressure was from the British to the east. During the reign of his son, Sher Ali (r. 1863-1866, 1869-1879) the pressure from Russia in the north intensified and he was forced to seek an alliance with the British in order to avoid Russia’s advances south of the Amu Darya.

**Russian Interference and the Second Anglo-Afghan War**

Sher Ali Khan became a pawn in the ‘Great Game’ when in 1878, the Russians sent a ‘diplomatic mission’ to Kabul without the permission of Amir Sher Ali who failed to prevent the mission from arriving in Kabul (Dupree 1997, 408). In response, the British demanded that they
be allowed to establish a mission in Kabul to “counter the Russian mission” (Dupree 1997, 408). The Amir wavered and did not respond immediately to British demands. In response, the British invaded Afghanistan in November 1878, thus beginning the Second Anglo-Afghan War (Dupree 1997, 408). Sher Ali pleaded with the Russians to provide support for Afghanistan against the British but the Russians refused.

During this period, the Russians and British had been negotiating a withdrawal of the Russian mission apparently without Afghan participation (Dupree 1997, 408-409). This lack of Afghan participation exemplifies how international actors can make decisions that affect other states with no consideration for the input from the ‘would be’ affected state. The British needed a state that was strong enough to repel an invasion from Russia. However, instead of building the state—the British weakened it through multiple invasions and the de-legitimization of the government. The Russians dabbled in Afghanistan to test the seriousness of the British in the region. When approached by Sher Ali for assistance, the Russians argued that the Amir should “make peace with Britain” and repeatedly blocked his attempts to reach St. Petersburg, Russia to meet with the Tsar (Dupree 1997, 409). Sadly, in the end, Sher Ali, said to be ‘broken in spirit’, fell ill and died in February 1879 near Balkh in the north of present-day Afghanistan (Dupree 1997, 409).

David Chandler (2004) argues that international actors view their policies as superior to domestic policies of weaker states. The treatment of Afghanistan during this period exemplifies this belief. International interventions over a century ago are the same as today—the international intervener implements whatever policies it desires with little consideration for what will occur to the intervened in state through its interference. In the case of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the British were the aggressors but they received significant gains through the
Treaty of Gandamak, which ended the war in 1879. The treaty allowed the British to control the foreign affairs of Afghanistan and allowed for “English-born representatives” to “reside in Kabul and other areas, under the protection of the Afghans” (Dupree 1997, 409). The new Amir also ceded areas of Afghanistan to the British and “agreed to the extension of British control to Khyber and Michni Passes” in return for £60,000 to be paid to the Afghan Amir annually with “loose guarantees for assistance in the event of foreign aggression” (Dupree 1997, 409).

Unsurprisingly, in September 1879, “mutinous Afghan soldiers...and elements of the Kabul population” killed the British resident assigned to Kabul, Sir Louis Cavagnari (Dupree 1997, 409).

Following this event, General Frederick Roberts [of the British Army], moved on Kabul, fighting the Amir’s troops along the way. On the day General Roberts reached Kabul, the new Amir abdicated the throne. General Roberts took the Amirship and ruled “with an iron hand” instituting “a reign of terror remembered to this day” (Dupree 1997, 409).

The Winds of Change: Afghan Response and the Third Anglo-Afghan War

Abdur Rahman was a new type of Afghan Amir—unwilling to leave the future of his country to the whims of a foreign influence. He had been in exile in Russian Turkestan for twelve years before claiming the Afghan throne in 1880 (Adamec 1967, 14). According to Ludwig Adamec (1967), when Abdur Rahman Khan seized the Afghan throne, the original desire of the British was to withdraw their troops from southeastern Afghanistan. The British offered the whole of British occupied Afghanistan to Abdur Rahman, except for Herat, which had been ceded to Persia, and Kandahar, which was to become independent with British

Abdur Rahman did not accept the idea of a divided country under his rule. When an Afghan tribal army defeated the British at the Battle of Maywand in July 1880, he took the opportunity to unite Kandahar with the rest of Afghanistan. By the end of 1881, Abdur Rahman had unified the state territorially (Adamec 1967, 16).

As stated earlier, Abdur Rahman believed Russia to be more aggressive than Britain in her foreign policy (Adamec 1967, 24). According to Adamec, Abdur Rahman understood well what he needed to do to promote the balance of power:

Britain saw Russian intentions as a threat to her overseas possessions and a dangerous disturbance of the international balance of power. To contain Russian expansion, Britain had an interest in the existence of strong Islamic states along Russia’s southern borders. Therefore, the Islamic states, trying to preserve their independence, had a community of interest with Great Britain and should seek her alliance. But since Britain was also an absorbing power which might respond to Russian aggression by helping herself to a portion of the land of the Islamic states, a “middle course” policy was required: an alliance with Britain, but not one that would lead to integration; hostility to Russia, but not to an extent as would result in provoking aggression; preservation of an equilibrium which would permit Afghanistan to remain independent if not neutral (Adamec 1967, 24).

Abdur Rahman’s foreign policy approach was based in three ‘pillars’: “assertion of national independence”; “insistence on isolationism”; and “promotion of a balance of power” (Adamec 1967, 17). He used large portions of his income and his £60,000 British subsidy to strengthen Afghan defenses through the purchase of arms (Adamec 1967, 19). This increase in Afghan military power concerned British officials who “feared that an irredentist Afghanistan
would one day use these arms to force Britain to make territorial concessions” (Adamec 1967, 19).

In regards to isolationism, Abdur Rahman resisted the “friendly embrace” of Britain in order to retain his independence (Adamec 1967, 20). He avoided receiving a British envoy in Kabul for two years. When the Envoy finally arrived he was kept separated from the population in order to prevent him from collecting ‘news and intelligence’ about the state (Adamec 1967, 21). Abdur Rahman was a new type of Afghan Amir—capable of participating in the “Great Game”. He understood that wealth and weapons were the language of empires and that in order to be strong enough to repel aggression—he needed both. He understood the need to balance the requirements of both empires and he actively sought to isolate the state in order to prevent the two empires from using Afghanistan as a pawn for their own purposes. Abdur Rahman’s response to the ‘Great Game’ led to Amir Amanullah’s declaration of Afghan independence 20 years later.

Amanullah was crowned Amir of Afghanistan in February 1919 following the assassination of his father, Amir Habibullah (Ewans 2001, 87). One of Amanullah’s first acts was to declare to the British Viceroy that Afghanistan was “independent and free” (Ewans 2001, 87). In May 1919, reports reached British India that Amanullah declared, “the time had come for a jihad against the British” (Ewans 2001, 87). Afghan troops were deployed east towards the Khyber Pass and thus began the Third Anglo-Afghan War (Ewans 2001, 87).

During the Third Anglo-Afghan War, neither the Afghans nor the British were able to gain a ‘decisive victory’ (Ewans 2001, 89). Hostilities lasted less than a month and Afghanistan and the British Viceroy sought to conduct a truce (Ewans 2001, 90). The Afghans were invited to Rawalpindi where a truce that heavily favored the British was signed (Ewans 2001, 90). The
The Afghans and ‘Anti-Farangi’ Sentiment

The Afghans dislike of foreigners was created over a period of consistent pressure from the east and the north and consistent attempts to manipulate and rule the population and state. Following the First Anglo-Afghan War, Pashtun tribes massacred retreating British troops as described below (Tanner 2002).

The Ghilzai Pushtun and their allies, fired up against the farangi, refused to listen to pleas from the Durrani Sardar Mohammad Akbar to permit the British to pass through their country unmolested as stipulated in the January 1, 1842, treaty...A bare outline cannot adequately express the horror, nor the details flesh out the bones of the disaster. Fate and history combined to immortalize a lowly assistant surgeon of the East India Company. Dr. William Brydon was the only European to reach Jalalabad of the 16,500 forces (a total of 4,500 fighting men...the remaining 12,000 were families and camp-followers) (Dupree 1997, 388-389).

Following the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the British representative was murdered in Kabul. General Roberts took the Amirship in Kabul but the Afghans rose up against the British. Under the leadership of a Pashtun, “a large Afghan lashkar (tribal army) moved on Kabul” (Dupree 1997, 410). Dupree (1997) writes that two factors prevented the massacre of the British
as in the First Anglo-Afghan War: “the generalship of Roberts and the quality of his subordinates” and “the inability (once again) of the tribal khans to maintain a sustained, unified front” (Dupree 1997, 410). According to Dupree (1997), the tribal army moved to Ghazni, “which became the center of the anti-foreign resistance, and the movement became known as the ‘Ghazni’ or ‘National Party’” (Dupree 1997, 410).

The above review describes a fraction of the foreign interference experienced by the Afghan government in the mid-nineteenth century. Britain took a direct approach towards controlling Afghanistan by ousting Amirs and emplacing puppet regimes. The Russians took a more measured approach to Afghanistan. They stirred up British responses to their activities in Afghanistan while being careful to avoid British military action.

Over the past several decades, Afghanistan has experienced a continuation of anti-

sentiment centered on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the United States led invasion of Afghanistan. The Afghan historical memory is based in distrust of foreign influence and for good reasons. Therefore, a state building question must be addressed: if Afghans do not want foreign assistance in creating institutions—why is the international community providing this support? The answer lies in the relationship between the elites and the population. Elites often want reforms that are associated with state building while the population wants to retain traditional ties.

Reforming the Afghan State: Exercise in Futility?

Olivier Roy (1986) explains well the Afghan situation. Roy writes: “In Afghanistan...it is not modernization...which brings problems, but modernity, the hypothesis which holds that modernization must necessarily involve a ‘cultural revolution’, a transformation of the way of
thinking and the adoption of new social paradigms” (Roy 1986, 16). According to Roy (1986), ‘tradition’ became the opposition to the state in its attempts to establish a modern, educated state based in “imaginations of the West” (Roy 1986, 16). The implementation of reforms in Afghanistan may not be as contentious if they did not involve the removal of traditional kinship ties and attempts to mandate reliance on the state.

On every occasion, even when the state is acting with the best intentions, its edicts are seen as tyrannical, because they remove from the peasant [Afghan villager] overall responsibility of the conduct of his affairs. The intellectual explains the peasant’s unwillingness to accept reforms as a consequence of his alienation, while the peasant actually feels alienated because the state is intent upon relating him to the process of production (Roy 1986, 29).

This quote graphically describes the process of modernization—Afghans do not want to become the means of production for the state, which is inevitably what occurs during economic development or industrialization.

Political, Social and Technological Reforms in Retrospect

The implementation of political reforms can create instability by reducing tribal and religious authority while increasing the state’s central authority. Prior to the Second Anglo-Afghan War, Sher Ali Khan (r. 1863-66; 1869-79) agreed to work with the British in return for protection from Russian aggression and assurances regarding the lineage of the Afghan throne (Dupree 1997, 404). During this period, Sher Ali implemented several reforms that helped institutionalize the state. He created a “national army, instituted a system for collecting land revenues in cash (previously one half in kind, one half cash), founded a Council of Elders to
advise him on affairs of state, began a postal system, and published the first newspaper in Afghanistan...in 1873” (Dupree 1997, 405). Thus, political reforms leading to a modern state were being conducted in Afghanistan during the mid-late nineteenth century. Afghanistan’s exposure to British influence is one possible explanation to the establishment of these reforms but the population’s view on these reforms is unclear.

According to Arnold Fletcher (1965), Abdur Rahman (r. 1880-1901) asserted control over Afghanistan by “an impartial use of bribery, murder, torture, and treachery” (Fletcher 1965, 145). He strengthened the army and paid soldiers with regularity (Fletcher 1965, 145), which helped increase loyalty to the state. In addition, he “attempted to give Afghanistan an internal administrative structure” (Fletcher 1965, 149). During Abdur Rahman’s reign:

The political power of tribal and ethnic community leaders was weakened...tribal stratification among Pushtuns...was formally instituted...peasantry throughout the country, but especially in non-Pushtun regions, was subjected to high taxation and economic exploitation...The rise of government oppression produced alienation and resignation among large segments of the tribal and ethnic populations, giving rise to the development of smaller, community-based, parallel power structure which enabled them to avoid costly contacts with state authorities (Shahrani 1990, 45).

Abdur Rahman’s political reforms spilled into social reforms as described above. In May 1901, Abdur Rahman became ill and died October 01, 1901 (Fletcher 1965, 153). He warned against “placing too much authority in the hands of the council of khans [rulers] and maliks [leader of a town], until such time as its members were sufficiently educated”. Abdur Rahman believed that at that time, Afghanistan would have reached the ability to govern itself by its own people (Fletcher 1965, 153). Abdur Rahman understood the anti-foreign sentiment of the state and “resisted the introduction of modern technology mainly because he feared it might result in
the influx of large numbers of foreigners into his country” (Adamec 1967, 23). In the end, Abdur Rahman Khan, the ‘Iron Amir’, is considered one of the “most capable rulers in the history of Asia” (Fletcher 1965; Rubin 1995).

Amir Amanullah, Abdur Rahman’s grandson, is known as the ‘Reformer’ in Afghan history. He implemented a large number of institutional reforms including a written constitution—the first in Afghan history (Ewans 2001, 93). As his grandfather had done before him, Amanullah attempted to address the relationship between religion and state (Ewans 2001, 93). He pursued legal structure reform, “creating an independent judiciary, a system of courts and a secular penal code” (Ewans 2001, 93). Under Amanullah’s reign, Afghanistan used its wealth to create communication lines and expanded the road network in the country (Adamec 1974, 85). Amanullah emphasized education and created “secondary and other schools, including some for girls” (Ewans 2001, 93). He additionally, sent young students abroad to attend institutes of higher learning (Ewans 2001, 93).

He [Amanullah] introduced secular and vocational curricula and brought in teaching staff from France, Germany and India. He enacted provisions to enhance the legal rights of women and issued decrees abolishing domestic slavery and forced labour. On the financial side...He instituted a government budget, reorganized the tax system and established a customs tariff. He collected taxes in cash where previously they had been levied in kind, and set up a livestock census and a land survey for tax purposes. He introduced identity cards (with limited success) and enforced conscription by means of a lottery system. He abolished a host of titles and sinecures, curtailed stipends and campaigned actively against corruption and nepotism (Ewans 2001, 93). (See also Karak 1974; Adamec 1974; Goodson 2001)
In 1924, a *loya jirga* (tribal meeting) was held to discuss Amanullah’s reforms. The *jirga* insisted that some reforms be tempered to include “those relating to the rights and status of women and the concept of equality of citizenship, irrespective of religious faith” (Ewans 2001, 94). Some of Amanullah’s reforms such as the abolishment of slavery were extremely popular (Adamec 1974). However, reforms that encroached on ‘traditional ways’ were considered “to be in violation of Islamic law” (Adamec 1974, 86).

Amanullah went on a ‘Grand Tour’ in 1927 in order to discuss international opportunities to develop Afghanistan (Ewans 2001, 94). The Amir visited “India, Egypt, Italy, France, Germany, Britain, the Soviet Union, Turkey and Iran” (Ewans 2001, 94). During these visits, Amanullah worked extremely hard seeking to “obtain equipment, finance and technical assistance” for Afghanistan (Ewans 2001, 94). After returning to Kabul from his tour, Amanullah held a *loya jirga* with “some thousand tribal leaders, whom he humiliated by insisting that they should appear with beards and hair cut, and dressed in black coats, waistcoats and trousers, shirts and ties, black boots and homburg hats” (Ewans 2001, 95). He announced new ‘social measures’ that included “monogamy for government employees, a minimum age limit for marriage, the further education of women, the abolition of *purdah* [separation of men and women; veiling of women] and the wearing of western dress in public throughout Kabul” (Ewans 2001, 95).

These social reforms were not popular and the population began to rebel under the mandatory reforms. Amanullah wanted to transform his state into a modern, industrialized country. Ultimately, Amanullah’s social reforms and the manner through which he forced implementation led to his exile in 1929. The time period of reform implementation is a difficult factor to measure because each state transforms and develops at different rates. If reforms occur
too quickly the state can collapse but reforms can be avoided if the implementation process is not timely. Scholars are more prepared to answer these types of questions when they have conducted historical analysis to determine what reforms have been implemented and the population’s reactions to these reforms. According to Adamec (1974), Amanullah was at the height of his popularity at the end of the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919. He was considered a ‘national hero’ but just ten years later he was overthrown and fled the country in 1929 leaving it in name to Inayatullah Khan, Amanullah’s brother (Adamec 1974; Shah 1933).

As described above, a significant amount of political and social reforms occurred or were attempted during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to Hasan Kakar (1974) “modern Afghanistan began to emerge” under the second reign of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan (r. 1819-39; 1842-63) and his son Amir Sher Ali Khan (r. 1863-66; 1869-79) (Kakar 1974, 13). Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901) unified much of present-day Afghanistan during his reign centralizing state power; establishing a strong army; and implementing religious reforms to reduce the influence of religious leaders (Kakar 1974, 17). Amir Habibullah (r. 1901-1919), Abdur Rahman’s son, began industrializing the state by implementing public works projects such as building new roads and bridges as well as installing telephone lines that connected the capital to the provinces (Kakar 1974, 22). Amir Amanullah (r. 1919-1929) implemented major industrial projects; social reforms for the population; and created a constitution in 1923. These examples provide insight into the modernization process of Afghanistan. However, how do these reforms fit into the overall state building agenda? The below section will address this question and focus Afghanistan’s historical state building mission to theoretical frameworks for analysis.
M. Nazif Shahrani (1990) writes that even though the Western state building model has been seen as unsuccessful, “its appeal remains largely intact among both politicians and social scientists” (Shahrani 1990, 41). The author argues that the “efficacy of state is taken for granted” and therefore state building failures are “not systematically investigated” (Shahrani 1990, 41).

For instance, in Afghanistan, the problems of unifying the state and building a strong central government are explained in relation to the “difficult topography, the cultural and linguistic diversity of its peoples, and the presence of competing tribal, local and regional identities and loyalties” (Shahrani 1990, 42). Therefore, problems are “safely externalized by blaming the geographical structure of the country and the alleged inherent conflictive and fragmentary character of Afghan society” (Shahrani 1990, 42). However, important aspects of Afghan history are overlooked including:

(1) the nature of the state and its historical manifestations in the country—i.e. its political ideology, its political economy and the basis of its support structure; and (2) the particular attitudes, policies and practices of the state-building agents, the governments of Afghanistan, towards the people of Afghanistan or Afghan society (Shahrani 1990, 42).

Shahrani believes the problem with Afghanistan’s instability is the “government’s inability or unwillingness to try to establish an organic relationship with its citizens based on just and equitable treatment” (Shahrani 1990, 48). In this study, I address regional issues but also attempt to create a foundational understanding of the role of political instability and how it is created in the state. The amount of empirical research conducted on Afghanistan is not significant and as such, foundational understanding of how factors interact is lacking.
In regards to modernization theory, James Coleman writes that modernization is defined as “those activities, processes, institutions, and beliefs concerned with the making and execution of authoritative policy and the pursuit and attainment of collective goals” (Coleman 1968, 395). As Ernest Gellner (1983) explains, tribal institutions are ‘para-states’ and if the level of their modernization is based on the attainment of goals then the tribes in Afghanistan could be considered modern. However, the definition of modernization expands taking on a purely Western conception of state development as described above by Olivier Roy (1986). As previously critiqued, modernization theory is overly generalized and too broad to be effective in conducting state building research. One exception is the work of Reinhard Bendix (1996) who acknowledges the mix of traditional and modern relationships throughout “modern” societies today.

Kinship ties, religious beliefs, linguistic affiliations, territorial communalism, and others are typical forms of association in a traditional social order. None of these ties or associations have disappeared even in the most highly industrialized societies; to this day the relative decline of ‘traditional’ and the relative ascendance of ‘modern’ solidarities remain or recur as social and political issues” (Bendix 1996, 407).

Bendix (1996) and Tilly (2003) both address external support as a key indicator of social change. Bendix argues that since the modernization of England and France, “every subsequent process of modernization has combined intrinsic changes with responses to extrinsic stimuli” (Bendix 1997, 408). The assumption that foreign pressures bring about social change will be addressed in the following chapter.

In following the alternative modernization framework, which includes aspects of tradition, I include Dean C. Tipps (1973) who argues that traditional societies were defined in such a way
to preclude any acknowledgement of change outside of change towards the Western model. This chapter has addressed many political, social and technological changes that occurred in Afghanistan from the 1830’s to 1929. The Reforms section of this chapter apprised the reader of changes that occurred during the twentieth century that increased the state’s ability to strengthen and support itself. The implementation of modern military technology; constitutional reforms; judicial systems; and infrastructure; were pursued by the Afghan monarchy. These measures moved Afghanistan into the modern era. However, pressures from external and internal actors destabilized Afghanistan’s institutions leaving it severely weakened.

Conclusion

Afghanistan is a complex state with a long history of foreign intervention due to its strategic location. The Pashtuns have played an integral part in the formation of the state. They also are part of a contentious problem associated with the trans-Durand tribes. Afghanistan’s role as a buffer state shaped the state but also helped create a legacy of distrustful Afghans. This is a hurdle not easily cleared but with persistence and good will there is still hope for a successful state building mission.

As was discussed in the chapter, many reforms have been achieved over the past two centuries and many more are to be achieved in the future. These changes have occurred during periods of concurrent reinforcement of the traditional bonds in tribal society. This alternative approach to modernity highlights the work of Bendix (1996) and others who seek to remove the Western view of state building in more traditional states and to use value neutral means to assess change in societies. Afghanistan’s history is closely tied to state building literature because it has been in the process of institution building for centuries. Trial and error, and the ruin created
by external aggression, has inhibited Afghanistan’s progress towards strong central state institutionalization. These experiences are why state building research conducted on Afghanistan is ideal for increasing the academic communities knowledge of state building and identifying successful application of state building policies through time and space.
Chapter 6: Pashtun ‘Para-State’ Institutions and their Effect on Political Stability in Afghanistan

If this gets out of hand, all of the UN work could be for nothing. It looks like Afghanistan was first destroyed by the Communists, then by the Fundamentalists, and now we might be destroyed by the Mullahs – Abdul Haq 1994

Introduction

The Saur Revolution, or April Revolution, of 1978 changed the face of Afghan politics forever. It swept in a Communist regime in Afghanistan led by the ‘pro-Soviet’ Khalq party (DoS Report 1 1978). The Revolution brought to the forefront the existence of opposition political parties, particularly those parties with leaders in exile, and began an international discourse on how to contain communism in the region; unify disparate Afghan factions; and attempt to build an opposition led state strong enough to resist regional aggression while retaining friendly ties with the West. The passing of time proved the containment of Communism to be the easiest of achievements.

From 1979-1989, Afghan factions fought a war against Soviet led aggression and a Communist Afghan regime. The period from 1994-2001 ushered in the era of the Taliban—a Pashtun political group made up of jihadis17 (‘Holy Warriors’) and talibs (‘students’) from Pakistani madrassas. This new organization would unify approximately 85 percent of the state within a two-year period (DoS Report 1 1998).

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17 Jihadi is a term used to describe Muslims that fought against the Soviets during the Afghan-Soviet War (1979-1989).
This dissertation focuses on the question of why southern Afghanistan exhibits higher levels of political instability than northern Afghanistan. I hypothesize that southern Afghanistan is more politically unstable than northern Afghanistan due to the presence of Pashtun ‘para state’ institutions, which fight against the central state and provide resources to the local population. These ‘para-state’ institutions (PSI’s) compete with the central state for regional power and popular support. I focus specifically on Pashtun PSI’s for several reasons: Pashtuns are the largest ethnicity in the state—although their exact numbers are unknown; Pashtuns have “traditionally wielded the greatest amount of political power” (CIA Report 1 1979); and because southern Afghanistan is prominently Pashtun. Therefore, research on the relationship between the Afghan state and the Pashtun is important in addressing the requirements for future state building.

The previous chapters have established a foundational understanding of state building as defined by the processes used to build a state’s institution or set of institutions (military, political and economic) that increase the state’s capability to wield the ‘legitimate use of physical force’; establish order; and seek economic means that support and sustain state functions. Therefore, analysis on how a state’s institutions are formed is of particular importance in creating state building policies. Many states have weak central institutions but strong local institutions. In this case, the strong local institutions should be analyzed to determine their impact on the local and central administration of the state. This chapter helps to identify these locally based processes of state building and their regional impact on Afghanistan.

Additionally, Chapter 4 described state building associated ‘mega-theories’ that have been used to conduct state building analysis for decades. These theories have been critiqued as overly general or conceptually unclear. However, the theories provide a basis for understanding
what occurs when a state begins to transition away from traditional forms of government and society. Essentially, these theories help us understand change. As will be seen in this chapter, modern forms of government and administration often occur in ways that are unexpected—such as the implementation of social support through local institutions. This type of change should be considered modern even if it occurs through unconventional means. Afghanistan is an ideal case for analyzing what Bendix calls the “modernity of tradition.”

In this chapter, I conduct a comparative case study of Soviet era political instability and Taliban era political instability in order to determine whether the presence of Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions, or PSI’s, are present in areas that exhibit greater levels of political instability. I then use process tracing to test the hypothesis that PSI’s create political instability by first conducting violence against the government and then supporting the local populace through local institution building that ranges from security; political representation; and the creation of economic opportunity. I believe that this line of research will highlight the issue of ‘trust networks’, as described in Chapter 1, as a precursor to successful state building. Additionally, a potentially new causal mechanism arises through this research—the concept of ‘good will’ or the ‘willingness to accept leadership’ as will be discussed in the conclusion of this chapter.

Afghanistan is an important case for conducting state building research because the state has been the focus of state building for over two centuries. Afghan rulers, the British, the Russians, and now the international community seek to strengthen Afghan institutions. Regional differences between the non-Pashtun north and the Pashtun south create a state that is rife with insecurity. Pashtuns have historically ruled Afghanistan even though a combined majority of the state is non-Pashtun. This relationship has created imbalanced representation of the population at the national level and increased political instability across the state. The relationship between
Pashtun PSI’s and political instability is foundational in understanding how Afghanistan can decrease its political instability and increase the effectiveness of its state building policy.

**Afghanistan as an Ideal Case**

Max Weber (1946) discusses ‘ideal’ type cases and writes that in order to understand whether a case is an ‘ideal’ case, the researcher must create an ideal case through which to compare the case being studied. Weber describes the ideal type as a “mental construct for the scrutiny and systematic characterization of individual concrete patterns which are significant in their uniqueness, such as Christianity, capitalism, etc.” (Weber 1946, 100).

An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (*Gedankenbild*). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual case, the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality... (Weber 1946, 90).

Based on Weber’s definition of an ideal case, I believe that Afghanistan is ideal for several reasons: Afghanistan has a large number of ‘para state’ institutions vying for popular support and power; it exhibits prominent differences in regional political stability; its territory is ethnically salient; and its resistance to state building and state centralizing policies that date back centuries. As a mental construct, it would be difficult to envision a case more like an ideal case than Afghanistan and therefore it is best suited for this research.
**Methodology**

The basis of this empirical work is to determine if a relationship exists between political instability in the south and Pashtun PSI’s. My definition of ‘para-state’ institutions includes Jonathan Turner’s (1997) definition of institution as “a complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organizing relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment” (Turner 1997, 6). As defined in Chapter 1, my definition of ‘para-state’ institutions includes the provision of basic necessities to the population and fills the need of keeping local or regionally society together. In the preliminary phases of PSI development, I hypothesize that PSI’s largely provide security and political representation to the local population. Services to the population are expected to increase but only after some level of success has been gained in the realm of security. I identify PSI’s as: a group with a medium to large following within a specific territory; a group that includes a military capability; a group that is politically oriented; a group that provide resources to the local population at varying levels and degrees across time; and is largely ethnically homogenous. Throughout the chapter, I include data from declassified government documents regarding how the PSI is organized and how resources are provided to the population of Afghanistan.

I define political instability as the presence of “domestic civil conflict and violent behavior” against the government or representatives of the government (Hurwitz 1973, 449). Political instability is operationalized through several indicators to include: the quantity of violence against government personnel or buildings; the type of violence against government personnel or buildings; the quantity of attacks that occur against a foreign presence in the
country; the type of attacks that occur against a foreign presence; and the amount of factional violence that occurs between: PSI’s and other PSI’s, and PSI’s and the state. A temporal indicator is established to determine how stable a region is based on the number of incidences during a given time period. The two temporal indicators are: monthly and annually. This category will help identify whether instability occurs during specific time periods.

![Figure 6: Process-tracing table with variables and causal mechanisms modified to R. Young Greven’s hypothesis. Derived from Beach and Pedersen “Theory-Centric process-tracing methods”, 2013, 35.](image)

I conduct process tracing to determine whether the causal mechanisms of ‘violence against the government’ and ‘support to local populace’ link PSI’s and political instability. I also address the following five questions to further understand the existence of PSI’s and their role in creating political instability in states.

1. What types of PSI’s were created inside of Afghanistan during each case period?
2. What are the levels of political instability associated with Pashtun PSI’s?
3. How were the PSI’s implemented?
4. How were PSI’s received locally?
5. What factors brought about the success or failure of the PSI?
Data and Analysis


I then identify levels of political instability based in conflict across Afghanistan from the same time periods. In order to conduct my research, I minimally needed data that provided time periods of conflict; locational data; actors involved; type of attacks; and preferably data that had not been aggregated based on time period. I reviewed the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) database but it focuses on the “causes and human consequences of terrorism in the United States and around the world”. The International Studies Compendium Project provides an online collection of datasets but the majority provided data that was extraneous to my focus. The Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala Universitet holds the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. The dataset covers 1946 – 2012 where “at least one party is the government of a state”. This dataset covered my time period but not the type of data I required. The Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) was established by the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) and may have provided the type of data I needed to conduct my research. However, access to the

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18 This information was found on the START website located at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. Accessed on December 10, 2013.
19 This information was found on the Department of Peace and Conflict Research website located at: http://www.pcr.uu.se. Accessed on December 10, 2013.
database has been discontinued. Therefore, I used the Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) Event Database to conduct my research.

GDELT is maintained by the University of Texas at Dallas and covers global events from 1979 to present. GDELT “is an initiative to construct a catalog of human societal-scale behavior and beliefs across all countries of the world over the last two centuries down to the city level globally, to make all of this data freely available for open research, and to provide daily updates to create the first ‘realtime social sciences earth observatory’.”

A benefit of the GDELT historical dataset is that the program does not aggregate events that occurred on the same day in the same region. Therefore, the data is more representative of what actually occurred in the area being studied.

GDELT uses Conflict and Mediation Event Observations Event and Actor (CAMEO) codes to identify its data. The CAMEO framework is “designed both for automated coding and for the detailed coding of sub-state actors” (Schrodt 2012). GDELT may provide “geographic, class, ethnic, religious, and type classes” data in the Actor Code field if the data can be identified (Leetaru and Schrodt 2013). Table 2 (see page 164) identifies Actor 1 codes used in conducting this dissertation research. CAMEO data identifies actor codes up to the tertiary level. An example of this type of coding may be AFGREBMOS, which indicates an Afghan Rebel Muslim. However, primary codes are sufficient for incorporation into this research. GDELT captures data on Actor 1 which is the primary actor, Actor 2 which is the actor the event was conducted against, and the event that occurred, among approximately 50 other fields of data (Leetaru and Schrodt 2013).

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20 This information was found on the GDELT Event Database website located at http://gdelt.utdallas.edu. Accessed on December 11, 2013.
Table 2: CAMEO ACTOR 1 Codes used in data identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTOR CODE</th>
<th>DEFINED</th>
<th>ACTOR CODE</th>
<th>DEFINED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFG</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>OPP</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Police Force</td>
<td>pus</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRM</td>
<td>Criminal</td>
<td>PAK</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDU</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>RAD</td>
<td>Radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELI</td>
<td>Elite</td>
<td>REB</td>
<td>Rebel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOV</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>REF</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INS</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
<td>REL</td>
<td>Religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MED</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>Separatist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIL</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>SUN</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>UAF</td>
<td>Unidentified Armed Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The GDELT database provides the names of actors as well as codes. Therefore, in identifying some codes, I first examined the code and then the name of the actor. This assisted my analysis by helping to determine whether I wanted to incorporate or exclude the data. For instance, as will be discussed in this chapter, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is the leader of the *Hezb-I-Islami Hekmatyar* party (HiG), an organization that I classify as a Pashtun ‘para-state’ institution. GDELT coded Hekmatyar as AFGELI indicating he was an Afghan Elite. Hekmatyar served in the Afghan government following the fall of the Communist regime in 1992. However, his role as the leader of HiG and his actions to prevent the unification of resistance groups during the 1980s led me to incorporate this actor code (AFGELI) if the act under investigation was directed against the Afghan government (AFG).

I also included data that had a ‘blank’ Actor 1 field if the data was conducted against the Afghan government. This allowed for the opportunity to include data that was ambiguous. The GDELT Codebook states “One of the two actor field may be blank in complex or single-actor situations or may contain only minimal detail for actors such as ‘unidentified gunmen’” (Leetaru and Schrodt 2013). Therefore, utilizing ‘blank’ Actor 1 fields with events conducted against
the Afghan government is in line with my defined research intent. I also included ‘blank’ Actor 2 data if Actor 1 was identified as REB, SEP, OPP, or similar codes that could be PSI associated. I believe the established parameters, as described below, ensure that included data is relevant to the Political Instability Indicator for this research.

Table 3: CAMEO ACTOR 2 Codes used in data identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTOR CODE</th>
<th>DEFINED</th>
<th>ACTOR CODE</th>
<th>DEFINED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFG</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>JOR</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>JUD</td>
<td>Judicial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALQ</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>LAB</td>
<td>Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUS</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>che</td>
<td>Chechen</td>
<td>MIL</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Police Force</td>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRM</td>
<td>Criminal</td>
<td>OPP</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVL</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>PAK</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEU</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>PHL</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDU</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>PTY</td>
<td>Political Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGY</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>pus</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELI</td>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>RAD</td>
<td>Radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>REB</td>
<td>Rebel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBR</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>REF</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOV</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>REL</td>
<td>Religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haz</td>
<td>Hazara</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCR</td>
<td>UN High Commission</td>
<td>SAU</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLH</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>Separatist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRI</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>SHI</td>
<td>Shi’a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
<td>SPY</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDN</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>SUN</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental</td>
<td>TJK</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMG</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>TUR</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Militarized Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INS</td>
<td>Insurgent</td>
<td>UAF</td>
<td>Unidentified Armed Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Red Cross</td>
<td>UNO</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRN</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>UZB</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 identifies the Actor 2 codes used in this research. As with Actor 1, I used the Actor 2 Name field to determine whether to include or discard actor data. Notice that Actor 2
Codes include both state and non-state actors, which is useful in analyzing the recipient of the event. CAMEO data is organized into “four primary classifications: Verbal Cooperation, Material Cooperation, Verbal Conflict, and Material Conflict” (Leetaru and Schrodt 2013). I am interested in the fourth category and therefore included data with a 4 (Material Conflict) code in the QuadClass field. In addition, I restricted my data further, as per my definition of political stability, to the below event codes inside the Material Conflict classification.

Using the above parameters, I extracted events that occurred between 1979 – 1989 and 1994 – 2001 (ending in October when the United States invaded Afghanistan). I then analyzed actor data to determine whether a resistance group conducted the event and whether the event was conducted against the government or a representative of the Afghan government. By overlaying this data onto a map of Pashtun ‘para-state’ institution operating areas, I am able to determine whether more political stability is found in areas with Pashtun PSI’s or whether, as I hypothesize, levels of political instability are greater in areas with Pashtun PSI’s.

*Table 4: CAMEO Event Codes used in data identification extracted from Schrodt 2012.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Root</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>SubCode</th>
<th>Defined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>170</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coerce, not specified below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>171</td>
<td></td>
<td>Seize or damage property, not specified below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1711</td>
<td></td>
<td>Confiscate Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1712</td>
<td></td>
<td>Destroy Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>172</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impose administrative sanctions, not specified below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1721</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impose restrictions on political freedoms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1722</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ban political parties or politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1723</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impose curfew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1724</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impose state of emergency or martial law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>173</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arrest, detain, or charge with legal action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>174</td>
<td></td>
<td>Expel or deport individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>175</td>
<td></td>
<td>Use tactics of violent repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>176</td>
<td></td>
<td>Attack cybernetically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>SubCode</td>
<td>Defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>180</td>
<td></td>
<td>use unconventional violence, not specified below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Abduct, hijack, or take hostage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Physically assault, not specified below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1821</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sexually assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1822</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Torture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1823</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kill by physical assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct suicide, car, or other non-military bombing, not specified below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Carry out suicide bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Carry out vehicular bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1833</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Carry out roadside bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1834</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Carry out location bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Use as human shield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Attempt to assassinate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assassinate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>190</td>
<td></td>
<td>Use conventional military force, not specified below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Impose blockade, restrict movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Occupy territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>193</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fight with small arms and light weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>194</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fight with artillery and tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>195</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employ aerial weapons, not specified below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employ precision-guided aerial munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employ remotely piloted aerial munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Violate ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td>Use unconventional mass violence, not specified below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Engage in mass expulsion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Engage in mass killings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Engage in ethnic cleansing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Use weapons of mass destruction, not specified below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2041</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Use chemical, biological, or radiological weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2042</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Detonate nuclear weapons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 1970, the Afghan Prime Minister, Nur Ahmed Etemadi met with Vice President Spiro Agnew. In a discussion on Afghanistan’s state of internal affairs, the Prime Minister stated “development brings in its wake problems, particularly increasing expectations and the unrest of youth” (DoS Report 1 1970). “Afghan society was divided; many want unrealistic overnight changes and yet at same time many doubt wisdom of current policy of social, political and economic development” (DoS Report 1 1970). In regards to parties, Etemadi stated that Afghanistan had no political parties but in effect had “216 parties” (DoS Report 1 1970). The reference to parties is indicative of the many ethnic and tribal factions, which is crucial in identifying Pashtun PSI’s. This is the backdrop of Afghan politics and the point at which I begin my research.

The Saur Revolution in 1978 and the establishment of the Communist regime in Afghanistan brought the rise of Afghan resistance parties to the world stage. The United States and West were concerned about the spread of Communism and were interested in supporting resistance organizations in exile or in the state. In June 1978, a Department of State cable reported that a “coalition of eight opposition political parties” had approached an Embassy official seeking support (DoS Report 2 1978). The eight parties are identified as: “Muslim Brotherhood; Pro-Peking Marxist Sholay-I-Jawid (Eternal Flame) Party; Pro-Estern [sic] National Front Party; Muslim Dawn Party; Socialist Voice of the People Party; and Pro-Western National Unity Party” (DoS Report 2 1978). These parties made up the Afghan Social Democratic Party (ASDP) (DoS Report 2 1978). While these parties were some of the first to organize and make contact with the United States for support, their future influence seems negligible. Of the eight parties, only Sholay-I-Jawid remained in later declassified government documents.
A 1981, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report entitled “Afghanistan: The Politics of the Resistance Movement” stated “Many insurgents—probably the majority—belong to independent bands representing a village, valley, tribe, clan, or family and feel little identity with a national movement. These bands are fighting to preserve Islam and tradition from outside interference, just as Afghan rebels have done for centuries” (CIA Report 1 1981, 1). The report goes on to assess that group cooperation is “between equals” “with neither commander willing to surrender his independence in a common cause” (CIA Report 1 1981, 1). This statement highlights the problem of state building in Afghanistan. If PSI leaders are unwilling to compromise on issues of government then the state will be incapable of increasing its authority and administrative capability. Only through compromise can these things be achieved.

From Late 1978 to early 1979, the National Front for the Salvation of the Homeland included: Harakat-i-Inqilab (Revolutionary Islamic Movement); Jamiat-i-Islami-Afghanistan (Islamic League of Afghanistan); Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli (Afghan National Liberation Front) and Mahaz-i-Milli (National Islamic Front)— Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (Islamic Party Hekmatyar) and Hezb-i-Islami Khalis (Islamic Party Khalis) would not participate (CIA Report 1 1984).

From March 1980-March 1981, the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan included: Hezb-i-Islami Khalis (Islamic Party Kahlis); Jamiat-i-Islami-Afghanistan (Islamic League of Afghanistan); Harakat-i-Inqilab (Revolutionary Islamic Movement); Mahaz-i-Milli (National Islamic Front); Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli (Afghan National Liberation Front)— Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (Islamic Party Hekmatyar) would not participate (CIA Report 1 1984). From May 1981 to August 1981, The (Moderate) Islamic Alliance included: Mahaz-i-Milli (National Islamic Front); Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli (Afghan National Liberation Front); Harakat-i-Inqilab (Revolutionary Islamic Movement) but Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (Islamic Party Hekmatyar);
Hezb-i-Islami Khalis (Islamic Party Khalis); and Jamiat-i-Islami-Afghanistan (Islamic League of Afghanistan) would not participate (CIA Report 1 1984). Finally, in September 1981 the Alliance of Islamic Freedom Fighters of Afghanistan was formed and included: Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (Islamic Party Hekmatyar); Hezb-i-Islami Khalis (Islamic Party Khalis); Jamiat-i-Islami-Afghanistan (Islamic League of Afghanistan); Harakat-i-Inqilab (Revolutionary Islamic Movement;) and Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli (Afghan National Liberation Front)—excluding the Mahaz-i-Milli (National Islamic Front) (CIA Report 1 1984).  

Notice that all but one of the above listed PSI’s are ethnically Pashtun and that their ability to create alliances lasts in most cases only a few months. The CIA assessed that the lack of unity between PSI’s was due to: ‘poor communications’; “ethnic, cultural, political, and religious differences”; as well as “mountainous terrain, great distances, and hostile troops between district commanders and their various headquarters” (CIA Report 2 1984). Case study research is helpful in identifying new variables that affect the case outcomes. In this instance, a lack of the ‘willingness to accept leadership’ or ‘good will’ variable may be increasing political instability by inhibiting state building attempts since no organization is willing to support another in unifying a central state of Afghanistan.

The Groups

Through a review of declassified government documents I identified approximately twenty PSI’s from the Soviet era. Unfortunately, many of the organizations did not have enough reporting to determine their size or operating areas. However, organizations that met the majority of requirements to be categorized as a PSI are outlined below.

21 Of note, Jamiat-i-Islami-Afghanistan is a Tajik PSI and therefore not included in current analysis.
*Hezb-i-Islami* (Islamic Party) is said to be the “oldest, best organized, most dedicated and efficient of the Peshawar-based political parties” (CIA Report 1 1981, 5). The organization began as an anti-monarchy student movement at Kabul University in 1969 (CIA Report 1 1981). The group was formed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar but split into two organizations in the 1970’s. Hekmatyar’s organization came to be called *Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar*.

During the Soviet era, *Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar*, or HiG (the G represents Gulbuddin) reportedly had 27 “autonomous provincial organizations in Afghanistan” and as many offices in Pakistan—“24 in Peshawar and three in Quetta” (CIA Report 1 1981, 5). HiG is divided into committees that serve specific functions to include: “politics, military operations, culture, education, and refugees” (CIA Report 1 1981, 5). As an established movement, HiG has a strong outreach among the population but the strength of the organization is difficult to assess although the majority of its operations are assessed to occur in the Paktia and Nangarhar provinces (CIA Report 1 1981).

Hekmatyar’s followers have been criticized for their “gangster-like tactics” and for extorting “donations” from villagers, although the scope of this criticism and how broadly it applies is unknown (CIA Report 1 1981, 1). Hekmatyar’s organization has the best ‘propaganda apparatus’ of the resistance groups and the organization’s press releases are regularly published in the Pakistani media (CIA Report 1 1981).

*Hezb-i-Islami Khalis* (Islamic Party—Khalis) or HiK, is the break away group from the original *Hezb-i-Islami* party under Hekmatyar. Mohammad Younus Khalis leads the organization and has a contingent of approximately 800 fighters (CIA Report 1 1981). Khalis was a magazine editor and religious teacher in Kabul. In 1974, Khalis was exiled to Pakistan after a book was published criticizing the former Afghan president and royal family member,
Mohammad Daoud. Jalaluddin Haqqani leads the military arm although Khalis is reportedly admired by “men of almost all political parties and is the closest thing in the Afghan insurgency to being the traditional tribal role model—the warrior-poet” (CIA Report 1 1981). Khalis’ reputation as a ‘warrior-poet’ likely increases the group’s popularity among the population and his reputation for speaking out against the Afghan regime may provide the group increased legitimacy. HiK operates out of Nangarhar and Paktia provinces, which are the same provinces where HiG has a strong presence (CIA Report 1 1981). HiK’s offices in Peshawar are reported to be disorganized and unprofessional (CIA Report 1 1981). There is little data to suggest the organization provides significant support to the local population other than representation and security.

*Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami* (Revolutionary Islamic Movement) is led by Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammad and is believed to have begun as an attempt to unify HiG and the Tajik organization *Jamiat-i-Islami-Afghanistan* (CIA Report 1 1981). The organization has a “rudimentary political structure” but reportedly has strong rural support (CIA Report 1 1981, 9). The organization’s support is based on Nabi Mohammad’s reputation as a “staunch protector of Afghan tradition and religious belief, rather than actual control of military operations” (CIA Report 1 1981, 9). The CIA reports that the Pakistani Government intervened in the organization to help unify it, which exemplifies Pakistan’s desire for a united resistance in the face of expanding Soviet influence (CIA Report 1 1981). The group is considered to be weak and its military strength assessed to be ‘thin’ (CIA Report 1 1981). Support to the population could not be assessed due to the lack of data.

*Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami* (National Islamic Front) is assessed to be a moderate Pashtun organization led by Pir Syed Ahmad Gailani (CIA Report 1 1981). Gailani is descended from
the Prophet Mohammad and thus has a large Sufi Muslim following (CIA Report 1 1981). He is considered “extremely westernized” and therefore looked upon with suspicion by fundamentalists (CIA Report 1 1981). *Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami* does not reportedly have a permanent military arm but a Department of State report from December 1986 mentions local commanders in the south belonging to the organization (CIA Report 1 1981, DoS Report 1 1986). This could be an example of local commanders in Afghanistan pledging allegiance to *Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami* but conducting military operations without direct guidance from Gailani (CIA Report 1 1981).

*Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan* (Afghan National Liberation Front) is led by Pir Sibhatullah Mojaddedi who claims “direct descent from Umar, the second Caliph of Islam (CIA Report 1 1981, 10). This organization is not considered militarily important in comparison with the other resistance organizations (CIA Report 1 1981). Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait support the organization financially (CIA Report 1 1981). The organization is run by family members and is reported to have taken credit for military victories conducted by other groups (CIA Report 1 1981). *Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan* is one of the seven resistance organizations acknowledged by Pakistan and headquartered in Peshawar, Pakistan (DoS DEC 1986). The significance of both *Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan* and *Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami* is that both organizations were created by elites in exile. These elites appeared to be better equipped to represent more liberal Afghans in exile and hence the basis for their support. However, as is evident through this analysis, the PSI’s with significant ties to Afghanistan such as HiG and HiK have larger military presence and are more apt to gain the support of local Afghans than those PSI’s that are potentially in the fray for political opportunism.
Ittihadia-Islami Barai Azadi Afghanistan (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan) was first identified in CIA reporting dated June 1984. The organization is one of the Peshawar based resistance organizations recognized by the Pakistani government and is led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. According to the report, the organization is Pashtun based and operates in Eastern Afghanistan—mainly in Kabul City, but also in Paktia (CIA Report 2 1984, DoS Report 1 1986). Conflicts between Ittihadia-Islami forces and other groups are discussed in government reporting (CIA Report 2 1984) which reveals power struggles that occur between PSI’s in overlapping territories.

One weakness in the identification of Pashtun PSI’s based in Afghan resistance groups is that it does not highlight the differences between regional commanders in Afghanistan and exiled leadership in Peshawar. For example, Jalaluddin Haqqani is the military commander for HiK—therefore his actions are associated with the HiK PSI and not associated with Haqqani as a potential PSI leader disassociated from HiK. For the purpose of this dissertation, I retain the cohesiveness of PSI identification even though future research may dictate that differences between political and military arms of PSI’s be explored.

There are several tribal confederations that can be classified as PSI’s. I categorize tribes and tribal organizations as ‘para-state’ institutions because as Ernest Gellner explains, “tribalism...is an alternative to the state” (Gellner 1983, 442). Gellner (1983) characterizes tribes in the Middle East as a “local mutual-aid association, whose members jointly help maintain order internally and defend the unit externally” (Gellner 1983, 438). Based on this understanding, tribes or tribal confederations identified in declassified government documents are identified as PSI’s in this analysis.
The Durrani-Pashtun tribes are located in “southwestern Afghanistan from Farah Province to the Pakistani border east of the Qandahar” (CIA Report 1 1981). Azizullah Wasifi, former Minister of Agriculture, is the leader of the coalition and former Afghan Army Major Ismatullah Achikzai serves as the military commander of the collective group (CIA Report 1 1981). However, according to the CIA report, many insurgent groups in the coalition do not acknowledge Achikzai’s leadership (CIA Report 1 1981). Achikzai reportedly “operates three training and resupply camps in Pakistan” which would provide needed support to locals participating in the resistance (CIA Report 1 1981). Declassified government documents do not provide much data on the Durrani-Pashtun Confederation but the form of the organization directs us to certain assumptions. The formation of the Durrani-Pashtun Confederation is based on tribal ties and hence indigenous to Afghan society. Additionally, the Durrani tribe is a unifier when Afghan groups are threatened. The confederation would have local support because of its position in society and would provide resources to the population as a measure of its integration into society. Therefore, tribes are a perfect PSI model because tribes are ‘para-states’ in and of themselves.

The Central Tribal Confederation consists of Pashtuns located in Kunduz, Samangan, Bamian, Ghazni, Logar, and Kabul Provinces (CIA Report 1 1981). This organization is believed to have formed in response to the lack of progress made by the Peshawar resistance groups (CIA Report 1 1981). The Quetta-Kandahar Group is another tribal based organization recognized as conducting operations in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces (CIA Report 1 1981). A 1986 Department of State report identifies the Kandahar Local Resistance Council as a new opposition organization. The group “includes the seven Peshawar-based organizations (most have active fronts in the area), parties not included in the alliance...and independent groups”
(DoS Report 1 1986). The organization has undertaken new “political and military” functions although no ‘dominant’ leader has been identified (DoS Report 1 1986). As with the Durrani-Pashtun Confederation PSI, the Central Tribal Confederation and the Quetta-Kandahar Group are ideally organized to serve as a PSI. Their success is guaranteed due to kinship ties that seek to protect their own interests in specific territories.

The above review identified organizations that I classify as Pashtun PSI’s. Many questions were answered regarding the establishment of these organizations and how these organizations were locally received. Table 5 at the end of the chapter provides a brief overview of the Pashtun PSI’s discussed above. The following section will address questions regarding the relationship between Pashtun PSI’s and levels of political instability in Afghanistan.

**Mapping Soviet Era PSI’s and Political Instability**

The presence of Pashtun PSI’s in southern Afghanistan is not unsurprising. Afghanistan is a tribal society with ethnically homogenous regions across the state. However, the relationship between Pashtun PSI’s and political instability has yet to be determined. The ISAF - Casualty Report Index described in Chapter 1 described higher levels of casualties in southern Afghanistan than in northern Afghanistan. From this information, I hypothesized that political instability in the south is a historical phenomena related to Pashtun PSI relationships with the central state. Based on this assumption, I plotted Pashtun PSI’s to geographically depict their operating areas. This map depicts only those PSI’s that had associated locational data in governmental reporting. Therefore, *Harakat-i-Inqilab* is not depicted because the organization’s operating area is described as “thinly spread” across Afghanistan. *Mahaz-i-Milli* (National Islamic Front) is also not depicted because its operating area is southern Afghanistan, which is
too vague to accurately depict geographically. *Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli* (Afghan National Liberation Front) is reportedly less military important than other PSI’s and operating areas for the group were not identified. However, I included their data in this research because Pakistan acknowledged these three groups as main resistance organizations although I am unable to determine their relationship to regional political instability.

![Figure 7: Pashtun ‘Para-state’ Institutions in Afghanistan – 1979-1989](image)


Figure 7 depicts the location of PSI operating areas in Afghanistan during the Soviet era. After identifying the operating areas for Pashtun PSI’s, I plotted the political instability data extracted from GDELT. Figure 8 portrays provincial levels of political instability in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989.
Initial analysis indicates that Pashtun PSI operating areas have higher levels of political instability (PI) than areas without Pashtun PSI’s. The following section provides an analysis of specific PSI’s and their relationship to PI in Afghanistan. During the Soviet era, areas that exhibit the presence of Pashtun PSI’s also exhibit higher levels of political instability than areas without the presence of Pashtun PSI’s. As discussed previously, the significance of Pashtun PSI’s is that they are ‘trust networks’. As such, these organizations facilitate resistance to the government and also create an environment where the central state moves towards irrelevancy (Tilly 2003). My conception of ‘trust network’ formation is established on the reciprocal interaction between the Pashtun PSI and the population. The PSI first establishes itself as an organization wielding the use of force (military action) against the government or foreign
intervener. The success of the PSI is likely to directly impact the desire of the population to support the organization. Through this participatory support, the PSI expands its influence due to increased numbers of recruits available to perform military action against the government or foreign intervener. The PSI begins providing resources to the population in the form of security; military training; political representation and may increase its provisions to include other types of resources. Trust networks are established through this reciprocal relationship. The process-tracing section of this chapter will address in greater detail the timing and implementation of support to the population. For the purposes of this dissertation, the formation of these trust networks is inferred through the presence of PSI’s operating in specific areas. Understanding the presence and functions of these organizations is imperative to creating successful state building policies.

*Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (HiG) and Hezb-i-Islami Khalis (HiK)*

Figure 9 depicts the operating area for HiG and HiK in Nangarhar and Paktia provinces. From 1979-1989, Nangarhar province experienced 111 events, 63 of which were events coded as “use of conventional military force, not specified below” (code 190). Paktia province experienced 64 events with 45 of these also coded as 190. The majority of events in Nangarhar occurred in 1996 while events in Paktia occurred more evenly across the ten-year period as depicted below. As is evident, areas associated with *Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar* (HiG) and *Hezb-i-Islami Khalis* (HiK) both have high levels of political instability. Nangarhar province and Paktia province experienced a combined 175 (PI) events even though I restricted the data to display solely material conflict and events that occurred against the government and other PSI’s. Only Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, had more PI events than Nangarhar and Paktia combined.
Figure 9: Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (HiG) and Hezb-i-Islami Khalis (HiK) PSI operating areas with 1979-1989 PI data. Created by R. Young Greven. Used by permission. Copyright © 2014 Esri and its data providers. All rights reserved.

Figure 10: Nangarhar and Paktia province levels of political instability from 1979-1989. Created by R. Young Greven with source data from Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) Event Database – University of Texas at Dallas (Leetaru and Shrodt, 2013).
In addition to event code 190, the provinces also had large numbers of events coded “fight with small arms and light weapons” (code 193); “arrest, detain, or charge with legal action” (code 173); and “fight with artillery and tanks” (code 194). In Nangarhar province, 97 events were directed against the Afghan government; 13 events were conducted against foreign actors; and one was unknown. Of the events directed against the government, 79 of the 97 had a root event code of 19 categorized as FIGHT. In Paktia, 57 events were directed against the Afghan government; 6 against foreign actors and one against a faction associated with AFGREF. Of the 57 events against the government, 49 events had the root code 19—the same as Nangarhar province. Based on this data, PI is greater in areas controlled by HiG and HiK than in other regions across Afghanistan (see Figure 9 and Figure 10 above).

HiG and HiK are both assessed to be ‘trust networks’ based on my definition of the term because they provide basic resources, if only security, military training, and political representation, to those areas where these PSI’s operate. HiG reportedly operated 27
“autonomous provincial organizations” in Afghanistan although the location of these offices was not provided. As a PSI, HiG successfully oversaw the bureaucratic functions of “politics; military operations; culture; education and refugees” in areas where it operated (CIA Report 1981, 5). The strong organizational structure and focus of HiG provides a significant threat to any centralized Afghan state as its actions directly compete with the purview of the national state.

According to declassified government sources, HiK’s ability to provide resources to the population is “disorganized and unprofessional” (CIA Report 1981). This may preclude the organization from providing a significant range of resources to the population but my conception of support to the population can be fulfilled through the provision of security and military training in an area. HiK provides an additional resource to the population because it is one of the PSI’s recognized by Pakistan and as such garnered international representation and support.

An analysis of HiG and HiK raise questions regarding popular support for the organizations. Both organizations function in the same operating areas. HiG has a stronger bureaucratic structure than HiK but HiK may have a stronger military calling due to its leadership—Younus Khalis and Jalaluddin Haqqani. State building would benefit from the identification of PSI demographics to learn what types of individuals serve in both organizations. An initial examination may suggest single military aged men seeking to resist foreign interference participate in HiK. This could be hypothesized because of the types of resources given to the population. Likewise, it could be hypothesized that the supporters of HiG may be more politically active such as men with families or refugees who wish to repatriate. Unfortunately, an analysis of the demographics of these organizations is outside the realm of this initial research but could be considered for future research.
**Ittihadia-Islami (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan)**

Figure 12 depicts the operating areas for *Ittihadia-Islami* along with PI data. Data gleaned from declassified government documents does not provide adequate insight into the formation of the group or its leader. The group’s operating areas are reported as Kabul City and Paktia province, which have very high levels of PI as compared to the rest of Afghanistan. If levels of PI are related to the territorially associated PSI then the group is one of the most active in the country.

![Figure 12: Ittihadia-Islami (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan) PSI operating areas with 1979-1989 PI data. Created by R. Young Greven. Used by permission. Copyright © 2014 Esri and its data providers. All rights reserved.](image)

Over the period 1979-1989, Kabul experienced almost 900 events with 533 events coded as “conventional military force” (code 190); 87 events of “occupied territory” (code 192); and the “use of unconventional violence” (code 180) was identified 47 times. Levels of PI in Kabul depict a spike in 1988—although an analysis of monthly events does not correlate the withdrawal
of Soviet troops in May 1988 to the overall increase throughout the year. Out of a total of 899 events in Kabul, 760 were directed against the Afghan state; 114 against foreign representatives; 16 events were against other factions; and nine were undetermined. (See Figure 13 and Figure 14 below)

Figure 13: Kabul and Paktia political instability data from 1979-1989. Created by R. Young Greven with source data from Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) Event Database – University of Texas at Dallas (Leetaru and Shrodt, 2013).

Figure 14: Kabul political instability data based in event codes for 1979-1989. Created by R. Young Greven with source data from Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) Event Database – University of Texas at Dallas (Leetaru and Schrod 2013).
Declassified government documents do not provide information on *Ittihadia-Islami* support to the population outside the realm of political representation. The organization was identified in a 1984 CIA report although it was not considered one of the first Pashtun PSI’s discussed in early 1980 reporting. As is apparent in Table 5 at the end of the chapter, not much information is known about the organization other than it became one of the resistance organizations recognized by Pakistan during the Soviet occupation.

**Central Tribal Confederation**

Figure 15 depicts the overlap between political instability levels and the Central Tribal Confederation. The Central Tribal Confederation operating areas exhibit mid-range levels of political instability in northern Afghanistan whereas southern Afghanistan exhibits much higher levels of political instability across the region.

![Figure 15: Central Tribal Confederation PSI operating areas with 1979-1989 PI data. See Figure 8 and 9 for source data. Used by permission. Copyright © 2014 Esri and its data providers. All rights reserved.](image-url)
Little data was available to determine who operates near or in Zabul province. However, this area could be associated to *Harakat-i-Inqilab* (Revolutionary Islamic Movement) or *Mahaz-i-Milli* (National Islamic Front) as both are assessed to have military forces in southern Afghanistan although exact locations were not specified.

Declassified government documents do not describe tribal support provided to the population. However, as described by Gellner (1983) above, tribes are ‘para-states’ and as such likely provide security and basic provisions including political representation at the national level. Therefore, I classify the Central Tribal Confederation; the Durrani-Pashtun Tribal Confederation; the Quetta-Kandahar Group; and the Kandahar Local Resistance Group as exhibiting ‘trust network’ characteristics because these groups generally provide resources to the population.

![Figure 16: Samangan, Kunduz, Logar, and Ghazni province levels of political instability from 1979-1989. Created by R. Young Greven with source data from Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) Event Database – University of Texas at Dallas (Leetaru and Shrodt, 2013).](image)

Levels of political instability in Central Tribal regions are high based on activity in Kabul Province. Figure 16 depicts levels of PI in Samangan, Kunduz, Logar, and Ghazni provinces. Kabul data is provided above under *Ittiahdia-Islami*. In Samangan province, 19 events were
directed against the Afghan government and 3 events against foreign presence. In Ghazni province, 16 events were against the Afghan government while 6 were against foreign presence. In Kunduz province and Logar province 36 and 30 events were against the Afghan government respectively while 3 and 5 events were directed against foreign presence. The majority of events in all provinces were “use conventional military force, not specified below” code 190.

*Durrani-Pashtun Confederation*

Figure 17 depicts levels of political instability in Nimruz, Helmand, and Kandahar provinces assessed to be associated with the Durrani-Pashtun Confederation. Interestingly, the greatest amount of political instability is located in Helmand and Kandahar with relatively low levels of political instability associated with Farah and Nimruz provinces.

![Figure 17: Durrani-Pashtun Confederation PSI operating areas with 1979-1989 political instability data. See Figure 8 and 9 for source data. Used by permission. Copyright © 2014 Esri and its data providers. All rights reserved.](image)
Two other PSI’s operate in the Helmand and Kandahar provinces—specifically the Quetta-Kandahar Group and the Kandahar Local Resistance Group. I believe it is likely that there is overlapping support for these three PSI’s in the area and that members of one organization may participate in other organizations.

Kandahar province exhibits the greatest amount of political instability through the Soviet era as depicted in Figure 18. This could be indicative of the colocation of the Quetta-Kandahar Group and Kandahar Local Resistance Council, which would combine several resistance groups and create a potentially greater presence of combatants in the province. Another reason for the increased political instability may be related to an increased presence of Afghan or Soviet troops in comparison with Nimruz and Helmand provinces. PI events are mainly coded 190 with the majority of attacks against the Afghan government. Helmand province events include: 34 against the state; 2 against factions; and 6 events against foreign presence. Kandahar province events include: 65 against the Afghan government; 11 against foreign presence; and 3 against other factions. Sixteen events, the total of all events that occurred in Nimruz province, were directed against the Afghan government.
**Quetta-Kandahar Group**

The Quetta-Kandahar Group is located in Helmand and Kandahar provinces. The geostrategic location of Kandahar province is likely associated with its high levels of political instability. Afghans were able to conduct attacks in Kandahar but then seek safehaven in Pakistan during the Soviet era which, increased Afghan operational capability during the conflict. However, this type of “hit and run” tactics would have been available to any group operating in the south due to transit ways that connect Quetta, Pakistan and Kandahar, Afghanistan.

![Figure 19: Quetta-Kandahar Group PSI operating areas with 1979-1989 political instability data. Created by R. Young Greven. See Figure 8 and 9 for source data. Used by permission. Copyright © 2014 Esri and its data providers. All rights reserved.](image)

The Quetta-Kandahar Group is a tribal based organization as such, little information is found in government documents to determine how the organization was established. However, in relationship to the whole of Afghanistan, levels of political instability in Helmand and Kandahar are higher at a combined 122 events over the ten-year period.
**Kandahar Local Resistance Council**

The Kandahar Local Resistance Council operates out of Kandahar province and has the support of local military commanders (DoS Report 1 1986). Declassified governmental documents do not provide great insight into the organization. However, in relation to political instability, the area where the group operates is associated with higher levels as with all other Pashtun PSI’s discussed above.

![Provincial Political Instability and Pashtun PSI’s](image)

Figure 20: Kandahar Local Resistance Council PSI operating areas with 1979-1989 political instability data. Created by R. Young Greven. See Figure 8 and 9 for source data. Used by permission. Copyright © 2014 Esri and its data providers. All rights reserved.

**Political Instability Data: What’s the Story?**

The above section highlights the fact that Pashtun PSI’s are prevalent and often overlapping in areas with elevated levels of political instability in Afghanistan. During the Soviet era, southern Afghanistan determinedly exhibited higher levels of political instability than northern Afghanistan.
Figure 21 depicts greater levels of political instability in southern Afghanistan in contrast with northern Afghanistan in all event codes except “Engage in Mass Killing” (code 202). One
incident of event 202 was identified in Herat over the ten-year period. The prevalent event code in Afghanistan during this time was code 190 – “use conventional military force, not specified below” which is indicative of the amount of fighting reported in the state during this specific time period.

The argument could be made that the inclusion of Kabul Province into the southern Afghanistan region significantly skews the data towards a more politically unstable south. Therefore, Figure 22 depicts regional levels of political instability excluding Kabul provincial data. Again, southern Afghanistan shows higher levels of political instability than northern Afghanistan. After removing Kabul provincial data, I found that northern Afghanistan exhibited higher levels of “seizure or damage to property” (code 171) and “imposing administrative sanctions” (code 172) by 1 and 2 events, respectively.


In 1994, a new Pashtun PSI came to the forefront—namely the _Taliban_. A 1994 Department of State message reported that in November there was fighting between _mujahideen_ groups and the _Taliban_ in Kandahar province (DoS Report 1 1994). Their introduction onto the Afghan stage brought with it questions about who provided support to the group and who the group supported (DoS Report 1 1994). The presence of the _Taliban_ occurred at the same time that a Pakistani convoy with supplies was attempting to cross the border in Afghanistan (DoS Report 1 1994). The _Taliban_ stopped the convoy at the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan and made several demands of Pakistan to include: the release of “Afghan transit goods being held” in Karachi; and the establishment of an Afghan – Pakistan agreement regarding “transit trade” (DoS Report 1 1994). The group became national heroes almost instantaneously.
The Taliban is comprised of Islamic students from madrassas located in Quetta and Peshawar, Pakistan. However, the group also includes seasoned jihadis from Soviet era Pashtun PSI’s—specifically Hezb-i-Islami Khalis (HiK), Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami, and Ittihadia-Islami (DoS Report 1 1994). In 1994, Embassy officials reported that the Taliban claimed to be “acting as Rabbani [leader of Jamiat-i-Islami; President of Afghanistan 1992-1996] or Sayaaf [leader of Ittahadia-Islami]... although why Rabbani would need surrogates beyond powerful Commander Naqib [Jamiat-i-Islami Commander] is open to question” (DoS Report 1 1994).

In an October 1994 interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the Taliban’s spokesman identified the mission of the group as the removal of “Wahabi and Salifi...influence from the area” and the purpose of opening transit routes in the state (DoS Report 1 1994). As such, a Department of State document dated 28 November 1994 stated:

The uncontroversial, conservative values espoused by the traditionalist, Mullah-led group (freeing the roads from bandits, restoring law and order and respect for traditional religious norms, etc.) have made it difficult for both factional and neutral Afghan activists to publicly express their reservations about the popular movement’s patrons and possible ulterior motives (DoS Report 2 1994).

By February 1995, President Burhanuddin Rabbani’s economic advisor, Ashraf Shah, stated “only three significant military forces remained in Afghanistan: The Taliban, Dostom’s Jombesh [Uzbek party], and ‘the Government,’ by which Shah meant the forces of Rabbani, Masud and Ismail Khan (in Western Afghanistan)” (DoS Report 2 1995). Of note, Berhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmed Shah Masud, and Ismail Khan, all belong to Jamiat-i-Islami, a Tajik PSI with operating areas in northern and western Afghanistan. Rabbani served as President of Afghanistan from 1992 – 1996 when the Taliban seized Kabul.
The Taliban era provides an interesting case for state building analysis because of their quick rise to power—the group gained control of Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, Ghazni, Wardak, and Paktika provinces between November 1994 to February 1995 (DoS Report 2 1995); and their large popular support throughout the state—or perceived support as intimated by the Department of State excerpt above. However, levels of political instability need to be examined to determine how broad a base of support the Taliban gained during this period and how this time period compares with the Soviet Era. The Taliban PSI seems to be an example of a ‘trust network’ that experienced instantaneous growth and acceptance, which is why the group is important for state building research. According to the above report, Pashtun PSI’s during the Taliban era either disintegrated or were subsumed into the Taliban. In a perfect state building scenario, this would occur during central state building operations. Therefore, studying political instability and popular support during the Taliban era provides insight into how Afghanistan as a whole, builds institutions.

**Mapping Taliban PSI’s and Political Instability**

The significant decrease of identified PSI’s outside of Afghan tribal structures creates a unique opportunity to analyze rates of violence in Afghanistan along with the spread of Taliban support. Taliban operating areas should have higher levels of political instability if my hypothesis that Pashtun PSI’s create political instability by competing with the state and other PSI’s for political power and popular support. If levels of political instability do not increase with the expansion of the Taliban then it is possible that the Taliban ‘trust network’ is an ideal exemplar for state institutionalization. However, it is important to assess the levels of political instability in the
non-Pashtun areas of Afghanistan as well as Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, to determine whether the group had a unifying capability outside of Pashtun territorial lands.

In total, levels of political instability between 1979-1989 are approximately one third the level of political instability that occurred between 1994-2001. Therefore, I increased the ranges of political instability on the map but largely retained the lower level map colors in order to facilitate easier comparisons between the two periods.

As is evident, patterns of political instability significantly increased across the state during the Taliban era. However, levels of political instability in southern Afghanistan remained relatively constant and in some cases, such as in Paktia, Paktika, and Zabul provinces, levels of
political instability dropped. Table 6 and Table 7 at the end of the chapter provide political instability data by province for 1979-1989 and 1994-2001 respectively.

*Taliban* progression throughout Afghanistan occurred within a two-year period. By the end of November 1994, the *Taliban* controlled Kandahar province. Political instability data from 1994 identifies 7 PI events occurring in Kandahar with three PI events occurring in the month of November. The November events likely relate to the Taliban presence but seven events is not a large amount of political instability in relation to the whole of Afghanistan.

![Figure 24: Political instability data for Kandahar from 1979-1989 and 1994-2001. Created by R. Young Greven with source data from Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) Event Database – University of Texas at Dallas (Lectaru and Schrodt 2013).](image)

Political instability rates for Kandahar for the latter part of the Soviet era are approximately twice as high as political instability levels from 1994-1998. However, in 1999 there is an increase in political instability, which may be associated with discontent among the tribes. By February 1995, the *Taliban* were in control of Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Ghazni, Wardak, and Paktika provinces in southern Afghanistan (DoS Report 2 1995). A review of the six provinces show that between November 1994 and February 1995, Wardak was the only province to show an increase in political instability with 12 events occurring in February 1995. Two events occurred in Paktika in February 1995 and one in Helmand in the same month. According to the United States Department of State, the group enjoyed “open admiration of most
Afghans for taking action against extortionist party commanders and unresponsive party leadership” and therefore gained ground without a fight (DoS Report 2 1994).

In September 1995, the Taliban took control of Herat and declared a “three-day holiday” (DoS Report 4 1995). Political instability data shows that there were ten events in September 1995 all between September 3 and September 5. The increase in political instability indicates resistance to the Taliban, which is likely because Herat is not a Pashtun dominated area and because Ismael Khan, of the Jamiat-i-Islami party—controlled Herat during this time. As one analyzes the political instability map data above, it is obvious that political instability levels increase significantly in relation to non-Pashtun areas of the state during the Taliban era. For example, after the fall of Herat to the Taliban, the following two years had the highest number of political instability, 32 events in 1996 and 28 events in 1996. Figure 25 depicts the high levels of instability that occurred after the province fell to the Taliban.

In September 1996, the Taliban took control of Kabul (DoS Report 3 1996). Figure 26 depicts PI levels for Kabul across the Soviet and Taliban eras. As is evident, levels of political instability grew rapidly during the Taliban period in non-Pashtun dominated areas of the state—
Kabul being representative of a large Tajik led government during the mid-1990s. The below section compares the two cases and discusses the implications for my hypothesis and future research.

![Kabul](image)

**Figure 26**: Political instability data for Kabul from 1979-1989 and 1994-2001. Created by R. Young Greven with source data from Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) Event Database – University of Texas at Dallas (Leetaru and Schrodt 2013).

**Assessment of Findings: Soviet Era versus Taliban Era**

The purpose of this dissertation was to research and test the hypothesis that Pashtun PSI’s create political instability through violence against the state and other factions and by providing resources to the population thus surrogating itself as the state. The Soviet era cases confirmed my hypothesis because the case exhibited several Pashtun PSI’s that provided resources to the population and conducted operations against the state apparatus and foreign presence. Operating areas associated with Pashtun PSI’s in the south exhibited higher levels of political instability than areas without Pashtun PSI presence.

The *Taliban* era case highlighted the incorporation of Pashtun PSI’s into the *Taliban* PSI thus reducing the number of Pashtun PSI’s in southern Afghanistan. In addition, the level of political instability in the south reduced in comparison to political instability in the north.
Another aspect of the research was to determine levels of political stability across the two cases. The Soviet era case had 2,233 political instability events during the 1979-1989 period while the Taliban era case had 6,166 political instability events from 1994 to October 2001. However, the types of events that occurred during these two periods are similar. Figure 27 and Figure 28 depict an increase in the types of events that occurred during the Taliban era but the majority of attacks were still conventional military in nature.

Figure 27: Political instability data for Afghanistan during Soviet era 1979-1989. Created by R. Young Greven with source data from Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) Event Database – University of Texas at Dallas (Leetaru and Schrodt 2013).

Figure 28: Political instability data for Afghanistan during Taliban era 1994-2001. Created by R. Young Greven with source data from Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) Event Database – University of Texas at Dallas (Leetaru and Schrodt 2013).
In analyzing levels of political instability in Afghanistan under the Taliban, it is interesting to note that from 1994-1998, the total level of PI events equals 3,248 while PI events from 1999-2001 equal 2,918. These figures indicate increasing domestic instability, which may have been caused by several issues—to include the presence of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. However, a May 2000 Department of State report states the Taliban was facing “growing domestic opposition” which would have likely manifested itself in political instability (DoS Report 1 2000). According to the report, the increase in Taliban opposition is a result of the Taliban’s “politics on property, its harsh version of Islam, security, conscription, and lack of administration” (DoS Report 1 2000).

The Taliban era presents a separate pattern of state building methodology in contrast to Soviet era state building operations. The Taliban came into Afghanistan offering to assist the people with opening roads; removing oppressive military commanders; and representing the people of Afghanistan—at least Pashtuns—therefore my conception of ‘trust network’ applies to this group. The Taliban provided security; military training; an economic system through poppy harvesting; a judicial system and rule of law through Pashtunwali (Pashtun code of conduct)—essentially all aspects of a state were found in the Taliban PSI. However, the Taliban were unsuccessful at incorporating the north into their government and ultimately began losing southern support due to harsh political measures.

The movement of the Taliban PSI across the south was relatively peaceful until the Taliban entered northern Afghanistan and Kabul and encountered resistance from the non-Pashtun population of the state. During the Taliban era, a new baseline of PI was created which was significantly higher than the baseline of PI during the Soviet era. However, the processes of PSI expansion during both periods appear to be the same: violence against the government and
other PSI’s and the provision of resources to the population. The following section focuses on process-tracing seeks to increase state building knowledge by determining the role of causal mechanisms that assisted Pashtun PSI success during the Soviet and Taliban eras.

_Process Tracing: Political Instability and Support to the Population_

For the purpose of this dissertation, I hypothesize that southern Afghanistan is more politically unstable than northern Afghanistan due to the presence of Pashtun ‘para state’ institutions, which fight against the central state and other PSI’s increasing political insecurity; and by providing resources to the local populace which hinders state incorporation of the population. I assessed that Pashtun PSI’s work to create political instability to prevent the institutionalization of a strong central state. During the Soviet era, there are a large number of Pashtun PSI’s and political instability correlates geographically to PSI operating areas. Therefore, a relationship between the dependent and independent variable is present. During the Taliban era case, political instability in Taliban operating areas is lower (hence political stability is greater) in the south.

I hypothesized that violence conducted against the government ($n_1$) and the offer of resources to the local population ($n_2$) were causal mechanisms that created political instability in the state. Soviet era political instability confirms this hypothesis because PSI’s focused on warring against the Communist Afghan regime and Soviet occupiers. There was no need for Pashtun PSI’s to provide resources to the population until the threat of Communism arrived in the state. The Taliban era did not confirm the hypothesis but exhibited opposite results—the provision of resources or support to the population occurred prior to violence against the government. Therefore, the causal mechanisms displayed in Figure 6 (on page 161) would
depict support to the population as \( n_1 \) and violence as \( n_2 \) for the *Taliban* era. A reliable determination on the timing and levels of support provided to the population by Pashtun PSI’s during the Soviet era was not possible. Declassified government documents did not adequately address this type of data in reporting and the data may not have been reported. The Soviets closed the borders to foreigners that would have collected data, which significantly reduced the amount of reporting surrounding the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Future research should be conducted on the causal relationship between Pashtun PSI’s and political instability to include interview data from Afghans that lived in Afghanistan during the Soviet era.

**Pashtun PSI’s: Typology, Origins, and Implications**

There are several different types of PSI’s that were created in Afghanistan during the Soviet and *Taliban* eras. There are three types PSI’s found in Afghanistan: Type 1 category PSI’s are based in tribal structures (e.g. Central Tribal Confederation and the Durrani-Pashtun Confederation); Type 2 category PSI’s are “westernized” PSI’s led by elites that seem disconnected from the physical population of Afghanistan (e.g. *Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami* and *Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan*); and Type 3 category PSI’s have a significant military presence inside Afghanistan and are politically connected at the international level (e.g. *Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar* (HiG) and *Hezb-i-Islami Khalis* (HiK)). I believe that Type 3 PSI’s create the greatest problems for centralized state building. Levels of political instability in the southwestern part of Afghanistan are mid-range even though there are three Type 1 PSI’s operating out of the geographical location. This level of political instability is significantly less than levels of political instability in Nangarhar and Paktia, which is home to 2 Type 3 PSI’s—*Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar* (HiG) and *Hezb-i-Islami Khalis* (HiK). Additionally, leaders of tribal based PSI’s appear to be less likely to
seek international recognition, which may indicate the lack of concern with increased power and greater focus on local administration and autonomy. Type 2 PSI’s consisted of groups whose political activism brought attention to the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan but would likely have had little ability to dramatically influence the war occurring in the state. I believe the Taliban PSI is a Type 3 PSI, although international recognition was gained prior to acts of violence against the government through the Pakistani convoy incident in 1994.

The levels of political instability associated with Pashtun PSI’s are discussed in depth in the previous sections and therefore I will not review that information here. However, it is important to note that in Afghanistan, the institutionalization of stability does not occur quickly and therefore, even the Taliban, with their ability to unify the southern portion of the state, was subject to discontent and high levels of political instability across Afghanistan.

PSI’s were implemented in Afghanistan through various means. Some PSI’s began as university based organizations (*Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar* (HiG)); others began as political organizations abroad; while the Taliban began as a madrassa (Islamic religious school) student movement in Pakistan. It is difficult to tell the significance of the origins of PSI’s although the Type 3 PSI’s began as student movements and were more likely to build politically relevant ‘trust networks’ with the Afghan population. Of note, Type 3 PSI’s that began as student movements based in Islam were less likely to negotiate during the Soviet and Taliban eras which may be associated with deep-rooted ideological beliefs that prevent the organization from working with other PSI’s in Afghanistan.

Type 2 PSI’s led by prominent Afghans with religious credentials, such as Pir Syed Ahmad Gailani and Pir Sibhatullah Mojaddedi, were able to gain credibility in the international political arena but there is insufficient data in government sources to determine how these
organizations resonated with the ‘average’ Afghan living in war torn Afghanistan. I found little information to describe how Pashtun PSI’s were received locally outside of Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar and the Taliban. Government sources described the “gangster-like tactics” of HiG commandos as they forced villagers to provide them with “donations” (CIA Report 1 1981). However, the occurrence of this type of activity is not discussed so I am unable to determine whether this is an ongoing issue. Government sources provide extensive detail regarding local support for the Taliban in southern Afghanistan writing that the level of popular support held by the Taliban encouraged all Afghans to support the group for fear that reproach would bring about reprisal. The Taliban effectively established a ‘trust network’ that incorporated the population of southern Afghanistan and previously established Pashtun PSI’s. This ‘trust network’ was created by the implementation of protection against corrupt practices of the mujahideen and the promise of economic benefit through the opening of roads and transportation in the state.

During the Soviet era, no single Pashtun PSI experienced extreme success or failure—although Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HiG leader) was adept at promoting himself as the most important of the resistance leaders. Eventually, all of the Pakistani recognized resistance organizations based in Peshawar, Pakistan shared in the post-Communist era interim administration of Afghanistan. Tribal based PSI participation in government formation occurred through the loya jirga (tribal meetings). Therefore, no one PSI was successful in unifying the others and no one PSI was successful in destroying the others. A consistent critique of the resistance groups during the Soviet era was the inability of the groups to unify themselves for the benefit of Afghanistan. This inability to negotiate weakened the resistance groups and prevented the ‘willingness to accept leadership’ from occurring thus reinforcing an Afghan state with divided loyalties and sub-national ‘para-state’ institutions.
The *Taliban* PSI is exceptional in that it successfully unified the Afghan population in the south and incorporated other Pashtun PSI’s into its infrastructure. As described above, the *Taliban* entered Afghanistan on a religious and ethnically based platform. The group sought to remove “Wahabi and Salifi...influence from the area” and to open transit routes in Afghanistan (DoS Report 1 1994). Afghans instantaneously received the benefit of *Taliban* presence. The PSI came to the forefront of Afghan politics at a time when corruption was rife and the abuse of the population was pervasive. The group implemented the rule of law instead of taking advantage of the population, which occurred due to a lack of governance during the post-Soviet era. The group unified PSI’s under the *Taliban* banner and garnered the support of the population.

**Trust Networks and Political Instability: An Analysis of Tilly and Bendix**

My approach to this research was based in Tilly’s (2003) ‘trust networks’ and Bendix’s (1996) alternative approaches to analyzing modernization. Tilly (2003) argues that state-societal bonds occur and are strengthened through the reduction of kinship bonds. Tilly’s framework focuses on democratization although I substitute democratization for state building because I believe that state building should be conducted prior to democratization. For Tilly, trust networks or the “interpersonal networks on which people rely” hinder the state from implementing initiatives that focus on increasing state – societal bonds (Tilly 2003, 16). It is not until the population *needs* the state that the primacy of the state grows.

During the Soviet era and under the Communist Afghan government, the state became the enemy of the people as Afghan and Soviet armies attempted to rid the countryside of resistance forces. The Soviets and Afghan Army attacked the Afghan people through “reprisal
attacks, indiscriminate air and artillery bombardments, use of antipersonnel mines and booby-trapped toys, arbitrary killings, and torture” (DoS Report 1 1986). Attempts at state building during the Soviet era focused on education, property redistribution, and the increase of women’s rights (DoS Report 1 1986; DoS Report 2 1979). However, the implementation of harsh policies on the one hand, and social policy on the other, was not enough to weaken trust networks. In fact, the Afghan Communist regime policies likely reinforced the need for trust networks for the population.

The Taliban took the opposite approach in their attempt to incorporate Afghan society into the central state. The group became a part of the ‘trust bearing networks’ of the Pashtun in the south. The population relied on them to establish security and fight against corruption (DoS Report 2 1997). Additionally, Mullah Mohammad Omar, the leader of the Taliban, was “proclaimed ‘Amir Ul-Momineed’ (Leader of the Faithful) by a gathering of Afghan Ulema in Kandahar in April” 1996, which served to solidify his position as a religious ruler with the right to rule (DoS Report 4 1996). The title of ‘Amir Ul-Momineed’ is the title of the Caliph in Islam—therefore, we see attempts to blend ethnic and religious identities to ensure the legitimacy of rule.

During the Taliban era, this approach seemed to work as Mullah Mohammad Omar’s legitimacy reportedly resided on ‘four pillars’:

(1) his reputation as a pious Muslim; (2) his role as an effective (if relatively unknown) commander during the Afghan-Soviet war of the 1980’s; (3) his opposition to the corrupt mujahideen commanders who ruled Kandahar area after the April 1992 fall of the communist regime; and (4) his success in guiding the Taliban to the domination of up to 85 percent or so of the country, including all of the major cities (DoS Report 1 1998).
Omar’s ability to position himself between the Pashtun people as a representative of their interests, and the state allowed him to gain at least the tacit support of a majority of the population and control of the central state. The Soviet era provides an example of how a foreign presence based outside of trust networks attempted to unify the state through social engineering. These attempts resulted in failed state building. The Taliban era case provides an example of a unified southern portion of the state although overall political instability increased significantly—specifically in the northern under Taliban control. Therefore, the Taliban case demonstrates how a singular Pashtun PSI decreased political instability in southern Afghanistan by working as part of the Pashtun trust networks—as opposed to breaking down trust networks.

Tilly (2003) argues that two mechanisms ‘reversed’ the result of trust networks: “mechanisms that undermined the capacity of existing segregated networks to protect people’s high-risk long-term enterprises and other mechanisms that made public political actors (e.g., trade unions) and governments themselves more attractive and/or reliable guarantors of those enterprises” (Tilly 2003, 21). These two mechanisms do not apply to the Afghan cases because during both the Soviet and Taliban era the population is able to find other trust networks through which to find support. Pashtuns that fled Afghanistan relied on ethnic and tribal supports in Pakistan. “Cross-border tribal ties, combined with the tendency to travel in extended family units, have enabled the refugees to survive without much government support...Most refugees eventually register with government agencies in order to establish eligibility for relief supplies, including UN aid administered by the Pakistani Government” (NFAC Report 1 1980). Therefore, Afghans did not heavily rely on state resources for support during the Soviet era. Under the Taliban, the gap between state and society began to close because a trust network came into control of the state. However, the Taliban missed the opportunity to unify a central state by
being exclusionary; becoming oppressive in their implementation of Islamic law; and not effectively administering the state (DoS Report 1 2000).

Tilly (2003) argues that two processes support increased political stability (through democratization)—the “dissolution of insulated trust networks”; and the “creation of politically connected trust networks” (Tilly 2003, 22). The first process leads to the belief that state apparatuses can fill gaps created by dissolved trust networks. Based on this research, I do not believe this assessment is correct. A state apparatus can only fill a trust network gap if the state is able to provide for the citizenry and this occurs incrementally—not through large-scale operations. Therefore, localized dissolutions—such as occurred under the Taliban—may create opportunities for state based trust to be built but only under special circumstance such as experienced under high levels of political instability. The second process focuses on political trust networks, and in Afghanistan there seems to be no other trust network except political trust networks. Even those organizations that appear apolitical choose to fight for groups that will increase their ability to be autonomous and ‘left alone’. Therefore, Afghanistan is a case where trust networks and political trust networks are synonymous.

Another aspect of Tilly’s framework focuses on “external guarantees for governmental commitments” (Tilly 2003, 20). The Soviet era case showed that external guarantees increase political instability, which prevents centralized state building. Attempts to bring Afghanistan under the Communist regime, funded largely by the Soviet Union, created a mass exodus and a strong insurgency. According to a 1982 CIA report, the refugees in Pakistan are mainly Pashtun and have reportedly been “received as brothers by the Pakistani Pushtuns of the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, and as Muslim brothers in need by all Pakistanis” (CIA
The embracing of Afghan Pashtuns refers back to the power of trust networks and the regularity of local support outside of any centralizing feature of the state.

The Taliban repeatedly disavowed any external support for their movement even though the group carried “brand new weapons (‘still in their grease’ according to some sources)” (DoS Report 1 1994). Taliban representatives in 1995 denied any support from foreign governments but acknowledged support from Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan and Pakistani religious organizations (DoS Report 3 1995). A 1996 report stated that the Taliban was able to “offer salaries ‘three times’ that which commanders could pay” (DoS Report 6 1995). This could not be accomplished without the significant external support. In 1995, the Taliban reported that their financial backing was from taxes collected from local merchants. However, merchants stated that they had not paid any taxes to the Taliban (DoS Report 6 1995). Declassified government documents from 1997 show that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) provided support to the Taliban but it is unclear whether Afghans are aware of this support (DoS Report 1 1997).

Why was it so imperative to keep foreign backing a secret? It is obvious that the Taliban learned to disguise any foreign support because of the history of Afghan ‘anti-farangi’ sentiment. The Afghan population would have viewed the Taliban as a pawn of a foreign power if the group had admitted foreign backing. Therefore, the group denied external support and managed to maintain an Afghan identity. In applying Tilly’s framework on external guarantees, I found that the theory does not apply to the Soviet era or Taliban era cases in Afghanistan but that external guarantees polarizes the Afghan state and Afghan population because Afghans do not want external interference in the state.
Bendix’s (1996) framework for state building allows for the incorporation of the traditional with the modern. The author writes that in the European experience of modern state building, traditional ties were broken which allowed the formation of a civil society based in citizenship. However, he argues that establishment of a modern state does not mean the complete removal of traditional bonds. Bendix (1996) writes that “it is quite probable that no society is without some elements from both ends of the continuum, leading some writer to use phrases such as ‘the modernity of tradition’ or ‘the tradition of new’ (Bendix 1996, 391).

Bendix’s alternative approach to state building, which blends the traditional with the modern is applicable to Afghanistan. Pashtun PSI’s are characterized by the services they provide to the population. Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (HiG) reportedly had committees that dealt with “politics, military operations, culture, education, and refugees” (CIA Report 1 1981, 5), which is a modern bureaucratic construct. The problem with Pashtun PSI’s during the Soviet era is that the services and organizations were temporary. However, the institutions created were modern which indicates that Bendix’s alternative hypothesis of state building is applicable to Afghanistan’s Soviet era case. A United States Government briefing book states:

The ambivalence of the process of politicization in Afghanistan is obvious. On one hand it gives a new look to traditional segmentation, but on the other hand it introduces political references (for instance to a specific ideology, which [in] fact is very alien to traditional society) and new structures. Field commanders have created a local administration (distinct from the Peshawar bureaucracy) using prerogatives of the former central State: there are Committees dealing with Finance, Health, Culture, etc..(sic) They collect taxes and might establish their own judicial power. The notion of State-structure is no more seen as alien to the society; the communist State in Kabul is challenged by an
elusive Islamic State. But these new state structures do not have a head. Mujahidin have reinvented administration and bureaucracy but not the State (USG Report 1 1989, 96).

The blend of modern and traditional is a characteristic of Afghanistan. It is the same as rural populations using cellular and satellite technologies. This new amalgamation of traditional and modern characterizes a major part of the globalizing world. There is an obvious lag between internally realized state building (e.g. institution building) and externally created state building policies. Concurrently, there is an overly ambitious philosophical debate surrounding state building, which focuses on rights based civil society that is barely attained by the most modern and socially minded states in West. State building theory becomes irrelevant when it is so ‘out of touch’ that it no longer has any practical application.

It is important to acknowledge the fact that Afghanistan is an amalgamation of the traditional and the modern. The modern and the traditional are integrated into the lives of the Afghan population and create for them an identity of their own. The existence of Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions in Afghanistan helped to establish a modern understanding of administration across the state as resistance leaders gained international recognition for their attempts to turn back Soviet advances; and their domestic attempts to provide resources to Afghans in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. I have argued that Pashtun PSI’s increased political instability in Afghanistan and this hypothesis is supported by political instability data during the Soviet era. However, the Taliban PSI had exhibited the opposite effect on Pashtun dominated areas of Afghanistan decreasing political instability and redistributing causal mechanisms that link Pashtun PSI’s and political instability.
Conclusion

The above chapter analyzed the role of Pashtun PSI’s on political stability in southern
Afghanistan. I find that during the Soviet era, Pashtun PSI’s are prevalent and increase political
instability in the south. However, during the Taliban era, Pashtun PSI’s are incorporated into the
Taliban PSI structure and political instability decreases in the south under their rule. Several
factors could explain the success of the Taliban—first, the Taliban came onto the international
stage at a time when mujahideen commanders in the south were oppressing the local population
and taking advantage of the chaos created by the Soviet invasion and Afghan civil war. Second,
the Taliban stood up against corruption and helped to create economic opportunities by ensuring
that markets were full (DoS Report 3 1997) and that roads were open for transport free from tolls
(DoS Report 2 1994). Third, the Taliban represented Islamic values and were well resourced,
which helped increase support of the PSI for mutual benefit (DoS Report 6 1995). It is unclear
whether these variables alone ensured the popularity of the Taliban. However, future research
should be conducted on state building processes that increased the success of the Taliban PSI.

An immediate research implication of the Taliban era is to further study whether the
establishment of a single ‘para-state’ institution that serves the population will reduce the level of
violence in a given area—specifically if the area is larger than a single province. For instance,
violence may be expected to continue in the periphery of areas where overlapping jurisdictions
are disputed by the state and the PSI. However, ultimately, the core regions of PSI control
should exhibit lower levels of political instability. There has yet to be one single administration
that has held the allegiance of the whole of Afghanistan—even the Afghan monarchy
experienced problems with ethnic divisions across the state. However, the Taliban era may
provide key insight into how the whole of Afghanistan can be effectively institutionalized which is essential to state building theory and practice.

There are weaknesses to this study. I only had access to government documents that had been declassified and many of the documents had been heavily excised. Therefore, valuable data was likely removed which could have led to different conclusions. Additionally, GDELT data may not have accurately identified groups that participated in material conflict against the state and other groups. The GDELT database is beginning to provide source URL’s in event data records. If access to source URL’s was available for the period studied then much of the data’s ambiguity could have been reduced. Another weakness is the lack of specific data on Pashtun PSI’s during the Soviet era regarding the type and timing of resources that were provided to the Afghan population from 1979-1989. The lack of timing data is specifically important because I was unable to determine whether violence against the government occurred prior to, following or concurrently with resource distribution. However, I believe this research is a starting point from which to begin more in-depth studies on state building in Afghanistan.

State building in any state with high levels of political instability is bound to be difficult. Levels of political instability must be reduced and processes implemented to incorporate the state. Additionally, the state must be willing to accept new leadership and the authority of the state. I close this chapter with an excerpt I found particularly thought provoking regarding the role of exiled elites and power. Regardless of all the sacrifices experienced by those in Afghanistan—ultimately, the international community and state elites that determine who should rule and how. In some sense, this seems contrary to how things should occur—but nonetheless how they occur:

Even if the Alliance [Peshawar Resistance Organization] takes Kabul and remains united, it will not be able to administer the country. The only possible compromise would be if the new State in Kabul, whatever it is, makes room for the field commanders, thus
restraining the ambitions of the thousands of foreign based intellectuals, but creating a bitterness among the latter that could be used by foreign countries to challenge any State power in Kabul (USG Report 1 1989).

The above chapter has researched the relationship between Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions and political instability. Although my hypothesis was not confirmed across both cases, valuable insight into the process of state building was achieved. Future research will build on this initial study and move towards a better understanding of how state building policies in ethnically diverse states can be effectively implemented in the future.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Para-State’ Institutions</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Ethnically homogenous</th>
<th>Operating Area</th>
<th>Local Leader association?</th>
<th>External support?</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Hizb-i-Islami Hekmatyar</em> (Islamic Party- Hekmatyar)</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Strong in limited area</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Paktia, Nangarhar</td>
<td>Gulbuddin Hekmatyar</td>
<td>Libya, Iran, Muslim Brotherhood</td>
<td>Extreme Fundamentalist; anti-monarchist; theocratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Hizb-i-Islami Khalis</em> (Islamic Party-Khalis)</td>
<td>Approx. 800 members</td>
<td>Strong in limited area</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Paktia</td>
<td>Haqqani and Younnus Khalis</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Theocratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Harakat-i-Islah</em> (Revolutionary Islamic Movement)</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Thin</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Paktia</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Willing to cooperate with secular groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mahaz-i-Milli</em> (National Islamic Front)</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Paktia</td>
<td>Mohammad Nabi</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Believes in secularized, Western-oriented democratic institutions;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli</em> (Afghan National Liberation Front)</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Less important militarily</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Paktia</td>
<td>Mohammad</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia, Kuwait</td>
<td>Islamic Republic under restored monarchy;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ittihadia-Islami</em> (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan)</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Paktia, Kabul</td>
<td>Abdul Rasool Sayyaf</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>3 supply and training camps in Pakistan run by Military Cdr Ismatullah Achikzai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Durrani-Pushtun Tribes</em></td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Paktia</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Anti-exile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Central Tribal Confederation</em></td>
<td>800 men</td>
<td>Thin</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Paktia</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Anti-exile</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Quetta-Kandahar Group</em> (National Islamic Union)</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Thin</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Kandahar, Helmand</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Proroyalist</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Kandahar Local Resistance Council</em></td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Various / Paktia</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Includes 7 Peshawar groups, parties not in alliance, independent groups, and important local commanders, No individual dominant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6: Political Instability Data by Province for the Soviet Era from 1979-1989.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Badakshan</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Badghis</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghlan</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Balkh</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bamian</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
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Chapter 7: Conclusion: State Building in Afghanistan: Findings and Pontifications

State Building, Misused Surrogates, and Structuration Theory

The process of conducting this research has led to the identification of many overlapping ideas about state building. Some scholars view state building as a process of democratization while others view it as legitimacy building. Some define state building as nation building while others use the term peace building to describe post conflict state building. Therefore, from the beginning, I acknowledged the need to first identify the meaning and original focus of the field in order to conduct this research.

I found that state building definitions are generally based upon a foundation of institutions but that most authors use contextual, instead of minimal, definitions for their research. Contextual definitions are perfectly acceptable for conducting research but the lack of a minimal definition in state building prevents state building studies from having cross case implications and thus building upon previous state building research. The common trend is to use contextual definitions to conduct “within-case” studies and use “mega-theories” to conduct “cross-case” studies. The dearth of theoretical framework development indicates the need to de-contextualize the definition of state building in order to establish an appropriate mid-level path for conducting “cross-case” comparative studies. Research opportunities are often lost by the consistent reliance on micro- or macro- level theoretical frameworks, which overlook the option of mid-level theoretical analysis such as through Gidden’s (1984) structuration approach.
This dissertation looks to a mid-range theory of state building found in a ‘new’ institutionalism approach that addresses the local and national while maintaining a minimal definition of state building that can be applied to cases of state building outside of Afghanistan. This allows for research to be collected and then compared across many states regardless of ideological stance (democratic or authoritarian) or reason for state building (new state, post conflict, ‘industrializing’, etc.). This dissertation adds to the state building field by providing empirical data to the academic community that can be used in future state building research. This work can be replicated and expounded upon through the manipulation of event analysis in GDELT to gain a better understanding of the types of events that occurred during the Soviet and Taliban eras and the effect they have on political stability. This is the type of research state building scholars should be conducting—research that can be shared and replicated. The days of defaulting to ‘mega-theories’ in state building policy formation or using contextual definitions to study specific cases are over.

Unfortunately, much of the confusion surrounding state building was created by the academic community’s tacit acceptance of the misuse of terms. An example is the use of democratization as a surrogate for state building, although the terms focus on different processes. Studying democratization as state building places an ideological perspective on institution building, which reduces state building’s purview to solely democratic forms of government. Additionally, it excludes a large body of institutionally strong states that could be researched to identify how the formation of institutions is linked to the population in non-democratic states. State building is also confused with nation building and peace building in scholarly literature. Nation building is associated with the creation of a ‘mentally unified’ group of people or as Benedict Anderson (1996) describes it—an ‘imagined community’. I was particularly drawn to
Ernest Renan’s (1882) discussion on nationhood as it described how social unification is created—not through the punishment of past wrongs but through the process of *forgetting* past wrongs. Clearly, in some cases, the past should not be forgotten and guarantees must be made to prevent atrocities from occurring again. In reality, my admiration for Renan’s understanding of nation is based in the emphasis it places on the groups of individuals involved. For all of the theoretical frameworks and all of the policies created to address the problem of civil conflict—none that I have read direct the involved groups to forget past wrongs and come together to create a new future. I find value in this proposal regardless of its applicability.

Peace building is one of those nuanced fields because it is closely related to state building—strong institutions such as the military must be available to implement security and potentially peace agreements—but its focus is on peace. I want to avoid the possibility of state building becoming subordinate to peace building both academically and in policy. This dissertation argues that there is benefit to the analysis of institution building as a minimal policy prescription. Additionally, state building can occur domestically without international support or through internationally supported operations. The hope is that the outcome of state building operations is the same in both types of missions—the creation of a stable and secures state that can function to the benefit of its population.

The political aspects of state building affiliated terms should also be considered when dissecting the literature. I created a ‘stop-light’ chart to depict how I view some basic processes associated with each term. The colors are related to the level of difficulty assigned to the implementation of each process. Nation building is the most difficult to conduct because the process centers on the population of the territory. If groups do not wish to associate themselves
with other groups in the state then nation building will not occur. State building is implemented with medium difficulty because institutions usually existed prior to renewed state building efforts.

| Nation Building | - Most difficult to attempt to implement  
|                 | - Rarely conducted through external mechanisms  
|                 | - Deals with formation of ‘imagined community’  
|                 | - Success likely depends on forgetting past wrongs |

| State Building | - Usually has already occurred in some form historically  
|               | - Deals with institutions  
|               | - Success likely depends on revenue collection |

| Peace Building | - Perception of success may be most readily created  
|               | - Deals with peace implementation  
|               | - Success may depend on externally derived support  
|               | - May occur through an invitation from parties |

Figure 29: Stop light chart depicting comparative levels of difficulty in process implementation. R. Young Greven 2014.

Historical institutions are important for implementing state building programs because they help fill gaps that would be created through their dissolution. One of the worst state building policy decisions in the recent past was the policy to dissolve the Iraqi military. This policy instantaneously destroyed a well-armed, well-trained, modern military and created a well-armed, well-trained modern insurgency labeled as the “Former Regime Elements” or FRE. The implication of the policy had been poorly derived and poorly considered and the United States began fighting an organization it could have potentially incorporated into the transforming state of Iraq. The impetus behind the decision was based in a fear regarding the allegiance of Ba’ath party members in the military, which suggests that the interweaving of ideology and functional institution building is likely incompatible. Retaining state institutions when possible eases the
transition towards newly transformed institutions and maintains the professional skills needed to continue the security and administration of the state.

Peace building is identified as the easiest process to implement because of the willingness of groups to participate at the point when peace building begins. The invitation for interlocutors to broker peace deals signifies that participants of the conflict are already willing to theoretically lay down arms. Additionally, any step, even a cease-fire, can be boasted as peace building progress to the international community. I believe this makes peace building missions attractive to the international community because there will likely be success and it has a positive connotation—the international community is doing something beneficial for the state. However, lasting peace building cannot occur without successful state building, which makes these two processes inextricably linked.

State Building: How is it Applicable?

For the purpose of this dissertation, I established a minimal definition of state building defined as the processes used to build a state’s institution or set of institutions (military, political and economic) that increase the state’s capability to wield the ‘legitimate use of physical force’; establish order; and seek economic means that support and sustain state functions. My definition of state building focuses on institutions with a narrow field of political institutions; military institutions; and economic institutions which allows me the ability to generalize across cases but also focus on those institutions that must be present in order to establish and maintain security and stability.

Economic institutions are included because of the need to create revenue to fund the actions of the state. Unfortunately, economic institutional reforms can be a tricky field to
analyze due to the inherent problems associated with liberal market reforms—the type normally advocated by the international community. However, in the case of some states with extreme political instability, the utilization of state wealth outside of the free market may help calm the transition. Nationalizing a state’s natural resources is a means through which to increase revenues and recently had a positive effect on the Russian state under Vladimir Putin’s purview. Free market reforms often remove state safety nets and may create extreme social instability. Ultimately, a state building definition that includes economic institutionalization is more difficult to transmit into state building policy but is unavoidable as any policy that does not include revenue collection and management is incomplete and therefore irrelevant.

My conception of state building is important to state building research because it maintains a non-ideological stance leaving room for varying types of institution building to occur. Unfortunately, the international community, as well as academia, have migrated the definition of state building towards democratic institutions, liberal market reforms, and constitutional, representative government. I do not dispute the fact that these ideological conceptions are important and can build considerable wealth and potentially stability for states. However, democratization does not equate to political stability and if anything can create increased instability in the short to medium term (Huntington 1991, Linz and Stepan 1996), which can put the fledgling democratic government at risk. Therefore, buffering state building from ideologically driven policies is beneficial in localizing how states function institutionally outside the realm of who leads state institutions or how are individuals who lead state institutions selected.

In my empirical study I focused on ‘para-state’ institutions because these institutions reside in the gap between central Afghan institutions and the population. Afghanistan has had
central state institutions for centuries. However, these central institutions have not been successful in connecting state with society. I believe that studying the relationship between subnational institutions and local populations can help create a theoretical framework for assisting central states building similar relationships.

I addressed the “mega-theories” of state building because these theories become the default theoretical frameworks in state building research. In my assessment, the international community has taken strides to avoid enforcing many aspects of modernization theory that would have been encouraged three decades ago. For instance, President Hamid Karzai is a Pashtun of the Durrani tribe whose lineage hearkens back to the formation of the Afghan state. This provides cultural legitimacy, at least in the eyes of the Pashtun population. Additionally, in the 2004 Afghan Constitution, Afghanistan retained the use of the loya jirga (tribal meeting) in conducting affairs of state. The loya jirga is intended to be representative of the population of the state. However, the utilization of the loya jirga as a historical method of governance may not help incorporate disparate Afghan groups into the central state but may reify the ethnic composition of Afghanistan thus creating the insecurity it seeks to remove.

Finally, in conducting this research, I ensured that my cases studied ‘para-state’ institutions with associated military type forces because I believe that Afghanistan cannot increase political stability without effectively creating a national security apparatus. When possible, I addressed the use of bureaucratic institutions in PSI administration, which identified the use of modern institutional organization in sub-national institutions. Finally I advocate the use of a mid-range theory in conducting state building research. State building policy cannot be accurately studied from the micro- or macro- level but must consider both in order to better examine the means through which institutions are created.
Findings and Implications for Future Research

I began my empirical research in Chapter 5 with an overview of Afghan history. For my empirical work, I focused on the Pashtun ethnicity because the group is the largest and most powerful in the state. The Pashtun have ruled Afghanistan for centuries and this historical relationship between state and Pashtun ethnicity is foundational in identifying a continued view of the Pashtun ‘right to rule’. Afghanistan’s ‘buffer state’ period shaped its foreign policy and helped to solidify an anti-foreigner sentiment in the state. This is played out through various international policies today such as President Hamid Karzai’s unwillingness to keep foreign troops in Afghanistan through 2014. However, President Karzai’s actions come as no surprise to those who have read this dissertation. Karzai knows well that political stability cannot be established in the presence of foreign troops. Therefore, in order to take a different path to creating stability, and potentially open the door to a power-sharing agreement with the Taliban, Karzai needs the United States and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) to withdrawal. This type of foreign policy analysis can only be applied if scholars study the history of states and previous attempts of state building.

In my empirical chapter I asked: why does southern Afghanistan exhibit more political instability than northern Afghanistan? I hypothesize that southern Afghanistan exhibits higher levels of political instability than northern Afghanistan due to the presence of Pashtun ‘para state’ institutions (PSI’s). These Pashtun PSI’s build ‘trust networks’ with the local population by warring against foreign interference in the central state and providing resources and services to the local population. This action increases political instability in the state while reinforcing the

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relationship between the local population and the Pashtun PSI. This reinforcing of ‘para-state’ institutions in Afghanistan hinders the states ability to implement state centric initiatives and encourages resistance to the state.

For this research I conducted case studies of the causal relationship between Pashtun PSI’s and political instability in Afghanistan during two eras: the Soviet era from 1979-1989; and the Taliban era from 1994 – October 2001. During the Soviet era, Afghanistan exhibited higher levels of political instability in southern Afghanistan in areas where Pashtun PSI’s were present. Specific data regarding the levels of resources provided to the population was not available for all Pashtun PSI’s. During the Taliban era, the Taliban subsumed or incorporated other Pashtun PSI’s into their organization, which significantly reduced the number of PSI’s in southern Afghanistan. Political instability in the south was lower during the Taliban era than during the Soviet era but the amount of political instability across Afghanistan increased three fold with the greatest amount of political instability occurring in the north.

The reduction of political instability in southern Afghanistan during the Taliban era is important for state building policymakers because it suggests that successful state building arises from local traditions and habits. Even during the Soviet era, the population of Afghanistan supported Pashtun PSI’s although levels of political instability were greater in areas that exhibited the presence of Pashtun PSI’s. The reduction of the number of Pashtun PSI’s during the Taliban era also may indicate that once a PSI has established authority over a specific area—political instability will decrease. However, these findings also bring to the forefront questions regarding how states should incorporate these ‘para-state’ institutions.

One question that should be addressed is: how far can the control of violence be extended in a state such as Afghanistan? The Taliban era case exemplifies a reduction of political
instability in southern Afghanistan but an increase of political instability in northern Afghanistan as the Taliban encroached on non-Pashtun areas of the state. The Taliban era government ruled Afghanistan from 1996-2001 but the PSI leadership remained in Kandahar where it was able to retain its southern Afghanistan power base. This exemplifies why the Taliban was not able to incorporate northern Afghanistan into its central government—it did not represent the whole of Afghanistan. The ability of a PSI to incorporate the population of a state and reduce violence is a fundamental aspect of state building. If the whole of the state cannot be incorporated, only a shell of a state is created and the cycle of political instability is likely to recur.

Another question that emerges is: how does the international community deal with and accept non-democratic, or even anti-democratic local states? In Afghanistan today, former warlords are running for the office of president and serving in high governmental positions. President Hamid Karzai has appointed many former mujahideen commanders to serve as provincial governors in an attempt to incorporate the rural populations of Afghanistan into the central state. This process may be effective in some situations but it may be also empowering ‘decentralized despots’. It is obvious that the incorporation of former combatants into the state helps increase state stability. However, the process of maintaining the presence of warlords in government can create instability as those who suffered under the hand of warlords see the continued presence in state institutions. On the other hand, often times no other leader has the ability to incorporate large portions of society into the local state which makes the use of former warlords invaluable to international state builders. Interestingly, it could also be said that the international community empowers warlords and then seeks to remove them from the ‘spotlight’ when their services are no longer needed.
For instance, during the Soviet era in Afghanistan, the practice of empowering PSI leaders was accepted because the west needed to contain the spread of communism in South Asia. A way to bring attention to the cause of the Afghan resistance was to bring PSI leaders to the international stage and encourage the international community to support them with weapons, military training and financial support. However, this conferring of international power and finances onto certain PSI leaders and organizations created instability in Afghanistan because PSI groups became unevenly supported by international states and because PSI leaders used their new found power and finances to war against each other and the Afghan regime after the Soviets withdrew. In addition, the support and recognition given to PSI leaders during the 1980’s has carried many of them through four decades allowing these same PSI leaders to run for and serve in political office in 2014.

Mahmood Mamdani (1996) addresses this issue in his book *Citizen and Subject.* Mamdani (1996) discusses how the British increased the authority and power of local and tribal leaders by empowering them to administer native villages and districts in the state (Mamdani 1996, 53). As with the case of Afghanistan, the power given to local leaders was greater than was experienced prior to colonialism and therefore, abuses were allowed to occur against the native population with little means for the population to protect itself. Eventually, the British left South Africa but the local despots remained and the power wielded by these individuals prevented attempts to inclusively democratize the state.

Based on this discussion, the incorporation of PSI leaders or warlords must be addressed in a meaningful way to ensure the local population does not suffer abuses under the hand of local despots. However, this creates problems when international actors seek to reshape states in the liberal democratic model—specifically if the local population is not liberal or democratically
minded. In the case of South Africa, Mamdani (1996) argues that deracialization and
detribalization was key to democratization (Mamdani 1996, 288). Mamdani writes:

In the absence of the detribalization of rural power...deracialization could not be joined to
democratization. In an urban-centered reform, the rural contaminated the urban. The
tribal logic of Native Authorities [administration system] easily overwhelmed the
democratic logic of civil society. An electoral reform that does not affect the
appointment of the Native Authority and its chiefs—which leaves rural areas out of
consideration as so many protectorates—is precisely about the reemergence of a
decentralized despotism! (Mamdani 1996, 289)

Mamdani’s work is applicable to Afghanistan because the retention of former PSI leaders
in Afghan politics today indicates a continued presence in some form of the ‘para-state’
institutions created during the Soviet era. PSI leaders are aware that the Afghan state cannot
provide services to its population and the Afghan state is aware that it needs the support of
former PSI leaders to incorporate the local population into the state. By administering a specific
territory or province, the former PSI leader is able to gain political power and potentially the
loyalty of the populace in return for protection and services. However, the state is potentially
disadvantaged through the use of the PSI leader because the PSI leader is in a position to take
credit for the success of any state sponsored initiative that provides resources or services to the
population. Therefore, the utilization of former PSI leaders as provincial governors or leaders in
rural Afghanistan reinforces the authority of the PSI leader instead of the institutions of the
central state. Hence, if the international community is to work with states that are undemocratic
or anti-democratic, steps and processes should be set in place to increase the central state’s
presence in areas while simultaneously minimizing individual power bases that reinforce
previous patterns of power and authority.
In Closing

This dissertation research was based on a desire to better understand current state building operations occurring in present-day Afghanistan. I realized early on that it was impossible to accurately study present Afghan state building without studying historical state building attempts. By conducting this study, I identified the presence of ‘trust networks’ in Afghanistan as manifested through Pashtun PSI’s. I then studied the relationship between Pashtun ‘para-state’ institutions and political instability in the presence of foreign intervention.

I am curious whether federated state building processes would have increased political stability in present-day Afghanistan thus strengthening and potentially reinforcing state institutions. I cannot say that state building in Afghanistan has been largely unsuccessful. However, the level to which state building has been successful must be studied in order to understand the policies that were implemented and the result of these policies. The success of state building can only be determined by studying specific factors in institution implementation based on the habitualization of actions that effectively address the needs of the state. These actions include: routinized territorial security; routinized management of the state; and a process to create revenue for state funding. These three actions are overly general and may be difficult to assess. However, these three actions, similar to the government identified variables of ‘governance, security, and development’ state an important aspect in the realm of institutions—the habitualization of relationships and actions. This is the Pavlovian theory of state development.

I desired a means to assess the Afghan’s perspective of the situation in Afghanistan and so I looked at levels of asylum applications to the United States. According to the Brookings
Institute, Afghan asylum applications are on the rise—there were 36,247 applications received in 2011 and 36,634 received in 2012. This number is considerably higher than the 9,971 applications received in 2007. It appears that Afghans have lost faith in their country’s ability to provide them with security. But what will they do? Perhaps the answer is nothing, the Afghans will do nothing but continue their day-to-day routines of attempting to create some sort of normalcy in their war torn state. Perhaps they will flee again to Pakistan and Iran and live as refugees. Perhaps they will fight again if the Taliban return and experience another civil war.

Whatever happens next, I hope that one day Afghanistan will be able to heal itself—to be a state that no longer experiences war but has the opportunity to experience peace. If this does not happen, then I believe the separation of Afghanistan into northern Afghanistan and southern Afghanistan may be a necessary step. Several factors lead me to assess the Pashtun south is not compatible with the non-Pashtun north. The first factor is that the Pashtun have historically dominated over and discriminated against the non-Pashtuns. However, the balance of power has shifted and with it increased economic opportunity for all ethnicities. The non-Pashtuns are not likely to suffer the same discrimination as previously experienced. After studying the Taliban era case, it seems probable that the south would accept the return of the Taliban PSI once foreign troops withdrawal, which will almost instantaneously start a civil war in Afghanistan. Over the past several years, non-Pashtun elites have repeatedly cried for the defense of Afghanistan against the return of the Taliban. I am sure that if the time comes, this call will be answered.

Regionally, Afghanistan is in a particularly difficult position because Pakistan provides the Taliban safehaven as it did for al-Qaeda. If Afghanistan were rid of the threat from the Taliban, then perhaps the story would be different. However, the regional fate of Afghanistan is yet to be determined is directly tied to Pakistan whose political insecurity is a major impediment
to Afghanistan’s domestic security. This study has increased the conceptual clarity and applicability of state building theory; conducted an empirical case study that is repeatable and serves as a foundational study in state building analysis; increased knowledge on the formation of ‘trust networks’; identified the ‘modernity of tradition’ in Afghanistan; and lastly identified two additional variables that should be studied to determine the successfulness of state building policy. This dissertation adds to the state building field and will hopefully help lead the community into greater success in policy formation in the near future.
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