2011

Elections and Tensions and Constitutions! Oh, My! A Process-Oriented Analysis of Bolivian Democratization from 1993 to 2009

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Elections and Tensions and Constitutions! Oh, My!

A Process-Oriented Analysis of Bolivian Democratization from 1993 to 2009

By

Laurel K. Dwyer

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in Political Science
Department of Government and International Affairs
College of Arts and Sciences

and

Master of Arts
in Latin American, Caribbean, and Latino Studies
Institute for the Study of Latin America and the Caribbean
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Date of Approval:
October 24, 2011

Keywords: Democracy, Bolivia, Comparative Politics, Democratic Theory, Political Transformation, Contentious Politics, Protest, Latin America, Trust Networks

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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this thesis to those underrepresented and underprivileged in Latin America. From Zapatista *communiqués* from Mexico to *contra-TLC* (anti-free trade) graffiti in Costa Rica and from *indígena* autonomy in tropical Ecuador to Peruvian *obrero* strikes, I have been there with you. You have shared with me your homes and your struggles. I have watched you organize and make your frustrated demands known in unique ways, as democracy is often not quite as democratic as we students would like to believe. Today, as I type this, a grassroots movement is organizing in the United States – Occupy Wall Street – and demanding what you have been struggling to achieve for decades: opportunity and a voice. It is the first of its kind in many years here. We live in a world increasingly controlled by the economically privileged, and the global justice protests of the 1990s seem a little closer to home as the worldwide recession continues to deepen and we Americans begin to awaken. Democratic governance has become increasingly popular over time, but it is up to the people to create it in their own image. Democracy is not a one-size-fits-all model, and I owe an incredible debt to the people who struggle in Latin America for showing me this.

*En solidaridad.*
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Firstly, I would like to acknowledge the strength and patience shown to be by my thesis committee members: Harry E. Vanden, Ph.D., Bernd Reiter, Ph.D., and Peter Funke, Ph.D. Their careers focus on the study of Latin America, social movements, and democracy, and I have been greatly enriched under their tutelage. Secondly, I would like to thank my friends and family for their support and understanding through these last few tough years (This includes you, Kiki Caruson, Ph.D.!). We weathered some extreme difficulties, and their unwavering belief in me and my capabilities kept me going when I was in doubt. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the institutions from which the majority of my data was gathered: Bolivia’s Corte Nacional Electoral, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, and Centro Estudios de la Realidad Económica y Social, Latinobarómetro Corporation, International Monetary Fund, Political Database of the Americas, United Nations Development Programme, and The World Bank Group. Without their efforts at the systematic collection and distribution of reliable data, a great many of valuable problems and questions may go unnoticed, and poor students like me would never graduate.
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ABSTRACT

Many Latin American countries which underwent democratic regime transformations within the last thirty years have seemingly stalled. Unable to meet the demands of their citizens, which grow increasingly restless and confrontational, they have become subjected to a series of economic and political crises. Contemporary democratic theorists are at a loss to explain why this region has failed to deepen over time. The purpose of this paper is threefold: it questions the analytic utility of contemporary liberal and representative models, it argues for the inclusion of an alternative process-oriented model provided by Charles Tilly (2007), and tests this model through a partial application to Bolivia from 1993-2009 in hopes of elucidating a clearer state of democratization than contemporary models offer.

The analysis portion focuses on the incorporation of networks of trust into public politics, and determines what effect(s) this had on Bolivian democracy during the time period under review. It is hypothesized that an increase in the integration of interpersonal trust networks with public politics will result in democratization, which is measured through changes in demand incorporation, protection, equality, and state-society accountability. A diachronic analytical narrative is constructed to identify the mechanisms and signs associated with the emergence and incorporation of trust networks into public politics and then evaluated in terms of state-society transformation. The findings suggest that new trust networks were created following the political restructuring
done during the Sánchez de Lozada presidency, deepened over the next four presidencies, and integrated in their fullest capacity during the first part of Evo Morales’s term. This process affected the contemporary representative and structural nature of the state itself, and shows positive changes in demand incorporation, protection, equality, and state-society accountability. Finally, it is concluded that when compared with popular measures of democracy, this model has more explanatory power, and Bolivia did democratize within the period of analysis.
CHAPTER ONE: THE ANALYTIC CHALLENGE

Introduction

For as long as there have existed communal groupings of individuals, there have existed debates over who should and can make binding decisions upon the rest. In particular, throughout Western history and to the present-day, philosophers and statesmen from Plato and Aristotle, through Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke, to Madison and Hamilton, de Tocqueville, and Habermas, have spent their lives defining what key attributes they believed are needed for a healthy and robust functioning community – and how best to achieve this particular community in reality. Stability and security of the status quo has oft been considered of import alongside discussion of betterment of the individual and his/her community, and differing periods in history have hosted more robust deliberation than others. These discussions reached a critical point in the aftermath of World War Two when “three decades of barbarism” produced an identity crisis in the political science discipline as the ideals of equality, rationality, and modern liberalism itself were challenged (Katznelson 2003, xv). As traditional epistemological methods were questioned, discussion of old concepts was renewed in a more
“institutional and historical, normative and behavioral” manner (Katzenelson 2003, 2-3),¹ and “democracy” became “the appraisive political concept par excellence” (Gallie 1956).

Fifty years later, while there can be little doubt that democracy retains its salience as both concept and model to be emulated, there exists as little consensus on what it is, who it includes (or should include), when it is most feasible, and how to achieve it as ever. As Vanden and Prevost agree, “Although democracy in the abstract has few detractors, there is no unanimity of opinion on exactly which forms of political participation are essential for democracy or precisely which political institutions best allow the demos to have a say in the governmental process” (1993, 7). On the eve of the twenty-first century, an increasing number of countries throughout the world were undergoing transitions from authoritarian to democratic systems of government, and many (Western) political scientists and sociologists were optimistic about democracy’s future as the dominant form of governmental modeling. Democracy has long been associated with a greater degree of peaceful international relations (between democracies), guaranteed individual freedoms, a plurality of governmentally represented interests, and deemed the most “appropriate” by the majority of powerful contemporary international actors.² However, the extent of the “triumph” of democracy over socialism and authoritarianism as heralding the “end of ideology”³ is premature, as the first two

¹ In America, the emerging methodology was decidedly more empirical and less normative than in Europe. For example, compare discussions found in Katzenelson (2003) and Wolin (1969) to Dahl (1969) and Easton (1967).
² This is a Western-biased viewpoint, and discussion questioning these inherent associations will only briefly be introduced as they arise within the context of Latin American culture. Roots of these positions lie in the theoretical works of John Locke, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, and Alexis de Tocqueville.
³ See Fukuyama (1992), and more specifically, “liberal democracy” (Diamond 1996).
waves\(^4\) of democratic transitions from authoritarian regimes were followed by sweeping reversals, and there are signs that the third is stalling. This may especially be the case in many countries throughout Central and South America, in the region referred to as Latin America,\(^5\) as the emergent democracies of the 1980s and 90s are presently being challenged for perceived social, economic, and political failures by massive portions of their populations.

Current comparative democratic analysis\(^6\) tends to cluster around a few methods which either provide the reader with a democratic “ideal type” against which countries may be measured and compared, identifies conditions under which democracies are more or less likely to endure, stabilize, or consolidate, or characterizes a “subtype” of democracy which explains why certain countries democratize and realize their systems in slightly different ways than others. These methodologies have historically identified and analyzed “waves” of democratization, explained transitions between authoritarian and democratic forms of government, and demonstrated important interactions within and relationships between social, economic, and political factors. However, the increasing number of modern democratic countries experiencing crippling popular uprisings, crises of legitimacy, legislative deadlock, political instability, and electoral and economic

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\(^4\) Samuel Huntington (1991) charted three “waves” of democratization since the 1820s which were followed (at least in the first two cases) by counter-waves of democratic reversals. The first wave lasted from the 1820s until 1926, the second from 1942 to 1962, and the third began in the mid-1970s and is ongoing (Huntington 1991, 12). The first reverse wave began in 1922 and lasted until the end of World War II, while the second covered the years from 1960 to 1975 (Huntington 1991, 12).

\(^5\) I acknowledge that referring to Latin America as a “region” belies the complexities of the individual cultures and states (Nef 1994, 404). However, this analysis deals specifically with similarities of the region with reference to democracy, political economy, and political maneuvering that trend together – especially in the existing literature. Therefore, following the majority of the literature, Belize, French Guiana, Guyana, Haiti, Puerto Rico, Suriname, and other Caribbean Islands will not be considered in the “region” as defined. The countries included are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

\(^6\) To be discussed more in depth in the sections that follow
stagnation, particularly in Latin America, demonstrate a need for a “thicker” model of democracy based more on the process of democratization than on the outcome of democracy. Contemporary theorizing within the region has proven unable to account for, or even openly acknowledge the possibility of, varying degrees and types of democratization. The region, especially among the Andean corridor, is undoubtedly experiencing a stressful period of expansions and contractions of democratization; yet how is this best analyzed? Liberal analyses emphasizing governmental guaranteed rights and universal suffrage may be the most prevalent, but in these models Latin American democracies are generally relegated to a sort of “democratic purgatory” where they will remain “illiberal” (Smith and Ziegler 2008), “delegative,” (O’Donnell 1994) “semi-” (Mainwaring and Hagopian 2005), or of “low intensity” (Gills and Rocamora 1992), until somehow they reach the upper echelon of “ideal” democracy.

In the analysis that follows, the utility of democracy as both ideological concept and analytical construct will be questioned through a diachronic exploratory case study of contemporary democratization in Bolivia – arguably one of the most politically volatile democracies in Latin America, yet stable in a formally democratic manner. Here it is argued that contemporary models of democracy do not adequately capture the democratic realities faced by developing countries, especially in Latin America. Either too narrow or too broad, most contemporary democratic analyses do not facilitate comparison between recent and older cases of democratization, do not allow for other conceptions of

---

7 Larry Diamond, for example, considers it “remarkable that Latin American democracies have survived at all considering the enormous stresses they have experienced over the past decade” (1996, 29).
8 See for example, Peeler (2004) and discussions in the edited volumes by Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro Leongómez (2006a) and Diamond, Plattner and Abente Brun (2008)
9 These views of democracy are also expressed in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1995) and Diamond (1996).
10 This will be discussed in depth in the rest of this paper, but see especially the edited volumes by Crabtree and Whitehead (2001, 2008), Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro Leongómez (2006a), Munck (2007a), and Mainwaring and Scully (2010a).
democratic manifestation and comparison, or cannot account for anomalous trends among particular nations or regions that are not “performing” as expected.

Because this thesis theory-tests a model developed by Charles Tilly (2007), a particular numerical index or subtype of democratization as a dependent variable will not be assumed at the outset, and my case was selected particularly for its lack of visible “progress” within most of the traditional models of democracy. Instead, the analysis employs a process-oriented methodology through an analytical narrative to test the ability of constitutive mechanisms and signs of the integration of interpersonal trust networks into public politics (the independent variable) to construct a more nuanced view of democratization (the dependent variable). Democratization, in this case, will be measured through overall observed changes in the breadth, equality, protection, and mutual accountability of citizen-state interaction through demand articulation and response. Specifically, the research question presented is: Is Bolivia currently undergoing a process of democratization or de-democratization? The methodology will be identified and discussed at length below.

In the following section, Democracy as a Mountain, contemporary conceptions of democracy will be discussed as an ideology and as an analytical construct through the metaphor of a mountain. This will help to differentiate between different types of democratic analysis and demonstrate why a more integrated and dynamic approach is needed to compare between and among all democracies, and not just those which best fit a specific ideal of choice. Existing popular models are then presented, in an introductory literature review, and placed within the extended metaphor to elucidate strengths and weaknesses in their application. Afterwards, an alternative method of analysis based
upon Charles Tilly’s *Democracy*, published in 2007, will be offered and presented as the theoretical framework for the rest of the work. As it is a process-oriented approach focusing on mechanisms and processes that interact to produce democratization and de-democratization, it is theorized that when applied to Bolivia during the years 1993-2009, a greater understanding of Bolivian democracy (as a dynamic process) will emerge that does not label it as a sort of “semi-” or stagnated case, but instead offers a more complete picture of where it is located within its own history of political transformation and growth. The overall methodology, reasoning behind the selection of Bolivia as a case study, and chapter outline will conclude Chapter One along with an acknowledgement of the research limitations found herein.

**Democracy as a Mountain**

In 1942, Joseph Schumpeter published a book, entitled *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, that would indirectly influence a generation of democratic theorists. In it, almost as a byproduct of the political economic analysis that he was undertaking, he defined democracy as an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter [1942] 1950, 269). Ideologically, he wanted to disaggregate democracy from capitalism and explore the dynamics between the latter two, and narrowly defined democracy as a “theory of competitive leadership,” where the “role of

---

11 I will note here that my view of a process-oriented approach does not follow the typology given by Tilly (2007, 9). Although he views himself within this group of analysts, he feels as if they rely too much on checklist oriented analysis over the identification of crucially interacting variables that form causal mechanisms and processes (Tilly 2007, 10). I have modified his typology to avoid confusion in this paper.
the people is to produce a government, or else an intermediate body which in turn will produce a national executive or government” (Schumpeter [1942] 1950, 268, 284). This “role” of the participant is the starting point for our differentiation between conceptions of democracy.

**Democratic Ideology: Selecting a Mountain**

Much as democracy became a popular research referent following World War Two, participation followed in its wake (Pateman 1970, 1). At odds are reinterpretations of the Classical works of democracy (See f.n. 2) which fundamentally disagree on the role that participation should play within a democratic system. Those following a more classically liberal “American” version, as influenced by John Locke, Baron de Montesquieu, Jeremy Bentham, and James Mill and envisioned in the *Federalist Papers* and the United States Constitution, maintain that democracy ensures good government through the competitive selection and election of representatives. These representatives should be educated citizens who will work to “protect” the interests of the masses, who will vote them out of office should they fail. It is the job of the political party system to effectively negotiate and channel citizen interests as well as offer a coherent party ideology. The average voter does not need to be particularly informed or active; they need only to be concerned with their private affairs and choose between competing images presented to them when needed. Theories in this vein vary in the weight assigned

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13 This remains the most widespread view of democracy, especially for empirical analysis, and was further popularized by Sartori (1962), Schumpeter ([1942] 1950), and Dahl (1982).
electoral participation, institutions, and political and civil rights, but overall, they maintain an emphasis on a rotation of elected elites through an open, equal, and fair process that involves all citizens of a state.

On the other hand, a more “participatory” version, influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill, and envisioned on smaller governmental scales such as in Switzerland and Porto Alegre, Brazil, views democracy in a wider context where participation is not only a means to an end, but an end itself as it promotes education, self-awareness, and active political learning. There is an implied belief in the “desirability and necessity of widespread popular participation” (Vanden and Prevost 1993, 9). For these theorists, the more active any member of society is in his political environment, the more he learns, recreates his identity (through social learning and communication), and contributes meaningfully to the entire system. Thus, political decision-making should not only be left up to the elites, but should be open to all active and able individuals. The more facets of life that involve open deliberation and participatory decision-making, the smoother the entire system will run. According to this view, we are social beings, create ourselves through social interactions, and should view politics as an ongoing process of social learning and mutual creation. “The process of decisionmaking…is as important as the actual immediate decision made,” and the ongoing and everyday political learning, development, and involvement of the population

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14 Institutions are here defined as “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior” (Huntington [1968] 2006, 12). See also O’Donnell (1994, 57). In most of our discussion, institutions retain a political connotation, although it is important not to assume that this may be the case in reality, as the line between social and political is not so easily identified.

at large are primary over minimally formal electoral activities (Vanden and Prevost 1993, 14).

As “ideal” types, purely liberal or participatory democracies are generally relegated to the theoretical realm, but as we will discuss later, they have heavily influenced analyses and explanations of real existing democracies as well and are becoming increasingly entrenched in popular discourse.\(^\text{16}\) In particular, larger numbers of disenfranchised citizens are becoming educated and demanding governmental implementation of these ideals. Put in metaphorical terms, they are the *mountains*\(^\text{17}\) of which democratizing regimes and populations aspire to summit. Sometimes they exist in theory and legend; other times they are a function of one’s personal experience or through the diffusion of the experiences of others. While theoretically open to all for climbing, the democratic experience found at the summit will be different for each expedition, and mountain selection (liberal, participatory, or otherwise) will influence expectations along the way.

It is useful to think of democracy and democratization in terms of mountains and mountaineering (the verb associated with mountain climbing) because it assists in illustrating the complexities involved between different aspects of defining, constructing, maintaining, and deepening democracy. It also demonstrates, through metaphor, how differing theoretical models emphasize various aspects of democracy in their measures. In both mountaineering and democracy, the action being performed is defined by the participants and their actions, as well as factors exogenous and endogamous to the

\(^{16}\) Lijphart, for example, explores this “majoritarianism-consensus contrast” in his *Patterns of Democracy* (1999, 1).

\(^{17}\) For simplicity, only the first usage of each term will be italicized. Please refer to Table 1.1 for a summary of metaphorical terms and equivalents.
system. However, the choice of when to engage in movement and where the movement is to occur are not necessarily open to everyone. Different models of comparative democracy emphasize different constituents, procedures, institutions, and outcomes, and through an ongoing metaphor of comparative democratic theorizing and democratization, it will become clearer how some models are more restrictive in their analyses than others.

**Democratic Government: Mountaineering**

Table 1.1, found below, summarizes the metaphorical terms which will be applied to contemporary democratic analyses. However, to first expand upon and explain the metaphor, theoretical forms of ideal governments can be seen as ‘mountains.’\(^{18}\) Which mountain one aspires to climb will be dependent on a number of factors, such as location, resources, physical ability, climate and time of the year, available guides, equipment possessed by individuals and available to the party as a whole, other possible members to the party, and known routes and maps. Similarities exist in both democratic realities as well as how they are interpreted by analysts. Which path a nation takes when democratizing is characterized by location, resources, structural and elite openness, political climate – both national and international, personal influences of technocrats and other members of the political elite, definition and incorporation of the citizenry, available outside assistance, and known institutional and procedural requirements. Different democratic analyses emphasize different parts and paths of this journey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metaphorical Term</th>
<th>Political Equivalency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Mountain</em></td>
<td>Ideal form of government desired or transition aspired to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Location</em></td>
<td>Historical, political, cultural, and economic conditioning which determine the form of democracy sought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Resources</em></td>
<td>The available economic, cultural, social, and political resources upon which the state and party can draw that also affect the location, equipment, and route of the expedition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ability</em></td>
<td>The individual historical, political, cultural, social, and economic situations of the party members which determine their ability to embark and continue on the journey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Climate</em></td>
<td>Regional and within-state support, or lack thereof, for a democratic transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Summit</em></td>
<td>Personal and group achievement of the desired goal. Party views as well as exogenous factors will determine the length of time spent here.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Expedition</em></td>
<td>State journey towards democratization. In a fully realized manner, this would include the entire, ongoing story of the journey (successes as well as failures on the way) and of the people who make it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Party</em></td>
<td>The body of citizens, and elites, involved in the political journey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guide</em></td>
<td>The expert(s) who makes the rules and guides the ongoing transition. This would include international institutions and consultants, as well as other state models, political leadership, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Route</em></td>
<td>The particular requirements to be met along the way in order for the state in question to reach its idealized form of democracy. This is an undefined and almost certain infinite concept as present conditions will affect future deviations. Therefore, we will distinguish between the <em>anticipated</em> and <em>actual</em> routes taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Equipment</em></td>
<td>The preconditions needed to ensure a successful transition (based on prior experience and guide recommendation). This varies between and among theorists and analysts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Map/Guidebook</em></td>
<td>Constitution (current or desired) as well as an understanding of other “successful” democratic transitions following the same route</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Setbacks</em></td>
<td>External factors which mitigate the outcome. This could include the conditions of the international political economy, particular socio-cultural traditions, internal or external conflict, international pressures, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s definitions and concept
Transitions and Preconditions: Maps and Basic Equipment. Before a state embarks upon its democratizing endeavor, certain preconditions are commonly held to be necessary. These can be compared to the equipment needed for a mountaineering expedition and are also the basic necessities needed once on the mountain. Samuel Huntington (1991) and Przeworski et al. (1996) are well known theorists of this “transitions” literature, which emphasizes particular factors leading to successful transitions and/or democratic endurance. They employ a Schumpeterian definition of democracy, based on the presence of competitive elections between elites for political office in which the “bulk of the population can participate” (Huntington 1992, 580) and where the “opposition has some chance of winning and taking office” (Przeworski et al. 1996, 39). Huntington identifies the factors associated with (third wave) democratic transitions as “deepening” authoritarian crises of legitimacy (usually seen against failed economic growth and decreasing standards of living), rapid global economic expansion and growth (with its associated improvement of living standards and levels of education), increased religious support of democratic institutions, policy changes of external global actors, and a demonstration effect observed within regions (1991 13). In their analysis, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi identify national affluence, positive economic performance with “moderate” inflation, “declining” income inequality, international climate (regional diffusion), and parliamentary institutions as associated with a higher probability of a successful and continued democratic transition (1996 39-44).

Therefore, analysts in this branch of democratic comparison tend to focus primarily on the map needed for the expedition. They identify the mountain under consideration (a minimal representative democracy which falls into the liberal theory
above in its simplest manifestation), identify which map will be most appropriate to facilitate a transition, and select which equipment will be needed to ensure continued progress along the way. As useful as this is, it only tells part of the story for a particular expedition (one climbing the minimalist representative democratic mountain), and does not provide insight into how these things may be achieved or created or indicate if any of these conditions may be more important than any others.

**Procedures and Guidelines: Equipment and Guidebooks.** Another trend in democratic analysis emphasizes identifying specific procedures that are required for democracy to be present. Some definitions are more expansive than others, but all begin at Schumpeter and work outwards (Whitehead 2002, 10). The work of Robert Dahl (1982, 2005) and Schmitter and Karl (1991) are two good examples of this trend. In *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control*, Dahl identifies seven fundamental institutions that characterize “modern democratic countries” (1982, 10-11). These include constitutionally vested control of governmental decision-making in elected officials, free, frequent, and fair elections of said officials, near-universal suffrage and the right to run for office (barring age restrictions), the protections of free speech and ideological expression, the freedom of information dissemination and of the press, and the freedom of organizing (especially interest groups and political parties) (Dahl 1982, 10-11). He maintains that “democratic” countries are those in which the “political institutions most closely approximate these criteria” (Dahl 1982, 11).

Schmitter and Karl, on the other hand, in an attempt to expand a few deficiencies in other democratic analyses, add two additional conditions of democracy to Dahl’s seven (1991). They add minimal constraint on elected officials’ decision-making power from
unelected officials (thusly discrediting some military-sponsored democracies and other purely electoral democracies), and the existence of a polity able to act unconstrained by any other “overarching political system” (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 81). While they acknowledge that this emphasis on “operative guidelines” may not “tell us much about how it [democracy] actually functions,” they believe that it was the correct method of separating what “is…and is not” a democracy (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 82-83). The specifics should be left up to the actually existing conditions, themselves.

This procedural method of defining and measuring democracy remains popular with current political analysts, and continues influence many indexes that serve as common measures of democracy or democratization (like that of Freedom House, Inc.). Schmitter and Karl argue that further discussion on the actual functioning of democracy should start from this point (1991). However, this list-oriented approach remains inadequate for a comparative agenda (Whitehead 2002, Tilly 2007). It presents itself as a checklist where an aggregated number will reveal a magic democratic number, and when these theories are placed within our extended metaphor, they reveal little more than those in the transitions vein. Their procedural approach is predicated upon equipping themselves for a particular journey on a particular mountain which, in turn, is dependent on particular conditions. It assumes that if one follows the guidelines and recommendations in the book, one should reach the summit in due time. While it is true that all expeditions will need a particular checklist of equipment in order to ensure that the journey runs smoothly, each mountain has its own unique challenges, which may or may not require different methods and equipment. Specifically, procedures derived from the United States of America’s experience may not be the most appropriate for nations
not following a liberal democratic path. This form of democratic analysis will only reveal the guidelines and equipment list for a particular mountain, and even then, it is limited in its ability to identify the routes along the way.

Consolidation and Institutions: Routes and Summits. A third approach to comparative democratic analyses is grouped around democratic consolidation and institutions. This body of literature concerns itself with identifying particular combinations of institutions and procedures which create a range of democracies. They recognize, at the outset, a particular desired product of democracy (to be consolidated, governable, legitimate, etc.) and identify particular, or a combination of, institutions and procedures linked to this desired outcome. Thus, Mainwaring and Scully argue that “building democracies is about the process of building democratic institutions: norms, rules, and organizations that shape how actors behave,” and they maintain that a strong institutionalized party system is the most effective way for ensuring political negotiation and bargaining among all levels of government (1995, 27). It is a “necessary, although insufficient condition for consolidating democracy and governing effectively” (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 27).

Linz and Stepan also focus their work on democratic consolidation and identify five interacting “arenas” which must be present for democracy to be consolidated: a “free and lively civil society,” a “political society” which is “relatively autonomous and valued,” a strong law system to enforce free association and citizen freedom, a “usable” bureaucracy, and an “institutionalized political economy” (1996, 7). Their approach is “path-dependent,” but does not presuppose particular interaction between the five arenas, just that it exists (Linz and Stepan 1996, xiv). Furthermore, they expand their analysis
beyond these arenas and explore a number of other variables which are intimately connected to them.

Finally, Diamond, Plattner, Chu, and Tien (1997) gather examples and summarize contemporary consolidation literature. This study is valuable for its synthesis of almost all of the theories mentioned thus far and their contributions to the consolidation literature. Larry Diamond, Samuel Huntington, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Robert Dahl, Philippe Schmitter, and Adam Przeworski et al. (the same work as discussed above but reprinted) are all contributors in the volume. While they have not abandoned their earlier foci, they all have something to say about a consolidation “endpoint” of analysis, and the volume says much in regards to case studies and practical applications of the literature.

Because of the consolidation literature’s emphasis on the present institutions, interactions between them and other sectors of the state and society, and their relation to the actual governing ability of the state, it is more analytically useful than previous models. Building on earlier research, this model not only identifies the mountain being climbed, but includes an emphasis on maps, guidebooks, party members, equipment, and routes. This literature, unlike that discussed before, acknowledges that the particular route taken will be dependent on the comparative advantage of one guide over another and associated resource costs, the size and capability of the party overall, the resources available, the necessary equipment, and complications (both expected and not) along the way. It is more inclusive than earlier models, but remains fixated on liberal representative democracy and the institutions which best develop and consolidate it (Diamond 1999). As such, explanations of democratic strength, legitimacy, and
governance in Latin America emphasize “crises” (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro Leongómez 2006), “tensions” (Crabtree and Whitehead 2008), “struggles” (Diamond, Plattner, and Abente Brun 2008), and “delegative” (O’Donnell 1994) features, which perpetuates an inchoate view of underperforming democracies.

**Differing Subtypes: More Mountains.** A final prevalent method of contemporary democratic analysis is the argument for and identification of new subtypes. Largely, these discussions concentrate on what “ought” to exist,19 what exists but falls collectively short of another model,20 or what may or may not be emerging.21 In particular, this trend has been so prolific that Collier and Levitsky examine hundreds of subtypes, popularly in use, which they believe to do more to obscure than to clarify democracy (1997). However, they do find two broad trends within the “democracy with adjectives” literature: some scholars “attempt to increase analytical differentiation” to describe numerous forms of democracy believed to be in actual existence, while other researchers focus on “conceptual validity” which refines existing types into narrower subtypes (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 430). Within our extended metaphor, this focus on democratic subtyping serves to identify new mountains and different routes up the most popular ones.

Another good overview of differing popular subtypes of democracy can be found in David Held’s *Models of Democracy* (2006). He identifies ten models, with associated variants, which stretch in time from the ancient Athenian city-state to modern global

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19 For example, Held’s *cosmopolitan* (1995) or Gutman and Thompson’s *deliberative* democracies (1996)
20 For example, see discussion in O’Donnell’s *delegative* democracy (1994) and Collier and Levitsky (1997)
21 For example, Lievesley’s *radical* democracy as seen in recent demands by popular uprisings in Latin America (1999).
interactions. The already discussed liberal versus participatory dichotomy is identified and expanded with other related subtypes, such as protective, plural, direct, and deliberative. Unlike Collier and Levitsky’s attempt to narrow the entire trend of “democracy with adjectives,” Held focuses on offering the reader the most popular models being currently employed in analyses. Some subtypes reflect back upon the popular post-World War Two discussion, but overall, the renewed emphasis on typology does little to expand our view of the process of democratization itself, by relying, as its predecessors, on particular narrow foci. The two reviews and associated research presented overall illuminate the plethora of democratic subtypes currently in circulation, but seem to do more to overpopulate the analytic field than enable conversation across different democratic trajectories.

Democratization: The Expedition

The Need for a Dynamic Approach

To summarize the theoretical discussion thus far, metaphorically, democratic transitioning and growth is similar to mountaineering. In order to climb a mountain, one must be at a particular level of physical fitness, have some experience or training (or else a really good guide), have a mountain in mind, have done research on the mountain climbing conditions, gear needed, and guides available, have the resources available to purchase the gear and time to embark on the journey, and know who else is going to be in your party. The same can be said of democratic transitions. A state must be in a
particular position of readiness, have previous experience with partial democracy, or else ongoing internal support, have a particular model of democracy in mind for implementation, know what regional and international support exists for the transition as well as what difficult decisions may have to be made on the way, have a basic level of political, economic, cultural, and social support for the transition, and constitutionally guarantee who will participate, and at what level, politically in the new democracy. However, while the analytical models that we have discussed to this point all deal with certain aspects of this, none deal with the expedition as a whole – as an ongoing and dynamic process that may have as many reversals as gains. Democracy is treated as an outcome to be achieved, a failure to be explained, or else lost in a democratic purgatory of not-quite-there-yet limbo. Very few, if any, of the above approaches treat democracy as a continued multifaceted process of construction and reconstruction that varies with each state and culture; fewer have focused on a theory of democratization, explaining gains and losses from within the process itself – the tale of the expedition.

Transition, procedural, and consolidation theories have been important in developing a body of literature explaining existing democracies, but they are increasingly unable to deal with realities in still developing regions, where only minimally formal procedures may be present. Latin America, in particular, has shown resilience to complete democratic breakdown in the midst of ongoing economic, social, political, and cultural challenges, yet seems disinclined to continue to tow the liberal line as well.

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22 Be it economic, cultural, political, or ideological, a state cannot just implement top-down democratization without having some sort of plan for its implementation at the outset. Some basic preconditions are necessary.

23 See Whitehead (2001) and Mainwaring and Scully (2010a) for additional discussion.

24 See, for example, Karl (1990), Diamond (1996), Lowenthal (1997), Peeler (2004), and Mainwaring and Hagopian (2005).
Therefore, what is needed is a more comprehensive model for analyzing tough-case democracies – a guidebook that can be used by all expeditions and not just those on a particular mountain – which focuses on the micro-processes associated with the macro-process of democratization, rather the goal of democracy itself. This, then, would enable states at any stage of democratic transition to be compared and areas of opportunity for democratic improvement identified relative to their own situations. Democratic indexes may still be employed in analyses, but they are less important when comparing among underperforming democracies than between them and the traditional models. All democracies have room for improvement, and analysis should not stop at the “top” or be only relevant in transitioning cases.

Charles Tilly and Democratization

Democratization, as a dynamic and uncertain process, has been noted among precondition, procedural, and consolidation theorists. However, most analyses continue to stress a static conception of democracy associated with institutions and procedures and emphasizing particular successes, failures, or stagnation. The usefulness of these theories is limited by their scope, which reveals little about countries experiencing political transformation that do not register change along the measures that these theories state are the most important. In the words of theorist Charles Tilly, “it makes no sense simply to describe an ideal political system called democracy and then try to specify conditions under which that system could emerge and survive” (2007, xi). Instead, the

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25 Theoretically, even authoritarian states could be included in the comparison as to their readiness to democratize if fundamental constitutive processes and mechanisms are identified and accepted.

26 For example, see Karl (1990, 1), Diamond (1999, xii), Hagopian and Mainwaring (2005), and Mayorga (2005, 150)
emphasis should be placed on “closely related processes, moving in opposite directions, [which] produce both democratization and de-democratization” (Tilly 2007, xi).27 In particular, Tilly believes that popular struggle is the catalyst for democratization, and it is the ongoing interaction between citizens and their governments (as well as interactions with major political actors outside of the state) that determine how and why democratization and de-democratization occur.28

For Tilly the simplest gauge of democracy is the “extent to which the state behaves in conformity with the expressed demands of its citizens,” which is, in turn, measured by assessing the “degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected, and mutually binding consultation” (2007, 13-14). In particular, democracy is denoted by how wide a range of citizen demands from equally differing groups experience translation into state behavior, are protected, and commit both citizen and state to action (Tilly 2007, 59). In an ideal analysis, personal observations and data collection would develop an aggregated index from these four dimensions of democracy (each being equal) for each case under review and applied over time. A net increase in this measure (change over time) would signify democratization, while a decrease, de-democratization. Tilly, however, is not concerned with this particular measure, as he is more concerned with identifying the mechanisms and processes which cause changes among these measures.29 As such, he acknowledges his taken liberties and substitutes Freedom House scores of civil and political liberties as

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27 Processes are defined as “combinations and sequences of mechanisms that produce some specified outcome” and mechanisms are defined as “events that produce the same immediate effects over a wide range of circumstances” (Tilly 2007, 22-23).
28 This view is also held by Van Cott (2000) and Rodríguez Veltzé (2008) with reference specifically to Bolivia.
29 Mechanisms are defined as “events that produce the same immediate effects over a wide range of circumstances” and processes are “combinations and sequences of mechanisms that produce some specified outcome” (Tilly 2007, 22, 23).
proxies for democracy, using them to roughly estimate time periods for waves of democratization among countries around the world upon which his theory is constructed (Tilly 2007, 59-61).

Through a lengthy comparative historical analysis of many countries over many time periods, Tilly argues that the fundamental processes promoting democratization are those that “alter relations between state-citizen interactions and 1) interpersonal trust networks, 2) categorical inequalities, and 3) autonomous power centers” (2007, 50). Although these may not be sufficient to explain democracy in all cases over all time periods, they are necessary in conditioning it as a process (Tilly 2007, 72). Therefore, “for democratization to occur in any regime, changes must occur in three areas: trust networks, categorical inequality, and autonomous power centers,” and the degree of democratization will depend upon the change in the interaction of these three variables and public politics (Tilly 2007, 74). Specifically, an increase in the integration of trust networks into public politics, the insulation of public politics from categorical inequalities, and a decrease of the autonomy of major power centers from public politics promote democratization (Tilly 2007, 23).

*Trust networks* are defined as “ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others” and promote democratization when they integrate into the state and “motivate their members to engage in mutually binding consultation – the contingent consent of citizens to programs proposed or enacted by the state” (Tilly 2007, 74). In other words, when strongly-tied interpersonal connections between groups of people, within which people set valued,
significant, long-term resources and engagements at risk to the maneuverings of others, are integrated into public politics and work towards a wider, more equal, more protective, and accountable government, democratization occurs. *Categorical inequality* refers to the “organization of social life around boundaries separating whole sets of people who differ collectively in their life chances” and democratization is enhanced when not only inequality itself is reduced, in any of its forms, but also when politics is “buffered” from the operation of such categories (Tilly 2007, 75). Democratization occurs here when the boundaries which separate social sectors of society and influence their collective life chances are insulated from public politics and reduced in general levels of inequality. *Autonomous power centers* are collectivities which “act outside the control of public politics and…regular citizen-state interactions,” and emphasize the altering (or defense) of existing distributions of resources, activities, and people within the regime (Tilly 2007, 76). A decrease of political power maneuvering of autonomous centers vis-à-vis the state facilitates democratization. All three must interact in a specific manner for initial democratic transition to occur, and the ongoing process can be sped up or slowed down by state capacity and systemic shocks (such as wars and economic crashes).

Three main arguments have been brought against Tilly’s theory of democratization: 1) it is analytically cumbersome, 2) has internal validity issues, and 3) does nothing to simplify the debate surrounding democracy.\(^{30}\) In response to these arguments, firstly, it is indeed analytically cumbersome. Tilly himself acknowledges this as he provides guidelines on how to construct an index to more accurately measure democratization and admits to not nearly being as rigorous as he should in the

\(^{30}\) For the first and third critiques, see Boniface (2008). For the second, please refer to Cleary (2008) and Rueschemeyer (2008).
construction of his theory (2007, 59-61). However, he wanted to tease out recurrent mechanisms and processes across space and time; his goal was theory generation, not theory testing. Tests, such as those within this paper, should aim to refine the grand theory and operationalize it in a more easily-replicable manner. Secondly, again, it is the duty of one who tests a theory to determine its validity – how well it measures what it purports to measure. This is generally not the aim of theory generation analyses. Tilly provides case studies from a lifetime of experience as justification for his observations, and a theory-tester can more adequately determine if the processes interact in the manner so believed. Lastly, Tilly’s theory may not simplify the debate ipso facto, yet it offers a unique way of evaluating democracy as a process that may illuminate what is occurring from within the construction process. In cases where political dissatisfaction and transformation are visible, this theory offers a new method of analysis which looks at state-citizen interactions and how they affect regime democratization.

Methodology

Bolivia as an Exploratory Case

In this analysis of democratization, Bolivia is examined in a diachronic (longitudinal and historical) exploratory case study. The overall goal is to test the utility of Tilly’s theory in elucidating the contemporary state of democratization in Bolivia, as contemporary multivariate models have failed to adequately account for recent political transformation. The research question under consideration is: Is Bolivia currently undergoing a process of democratization or de-democratization? As such, democratization is the dependent variable, and will be measured through changing
patterns of broad, equal, protected, and mutually binding consultation between the Bolivian government and the people. Analytic emphasis will be placed on the interpretation of changes in the incorporation of citizen demand into the political structure.

In particular, democratization will be measured ordinally based on how state behavior is influenced by changes in the breadth of demand, the changing equality of those demands vis-à-vis entrenched interests, how protected the population is when making those demands, and the ability of those demands, once translated into state action, to be mutually binding on both state and society. An index is created from an aggregation of observations during the given timeline allotting zero points for maintenance of the status quo and no noticeable change, one point for a slight increase, and two points for a more modest increase. One point is deducted for a slight decrease, and two points for a significant decrease. This yields an index ranging from -8 to 8 of democratic transformation with negative movement associated with de-democratization and positive movement as democratization. While it is a rough estimate, it should serve to show general patterns of movement enough for model testing. The four subcomponents of demand articulation associated in Tilly’s ideal measure of democracy will be analyzed over time to elicit the accompanying change in contemporary Bolivian democratization and compared to Freedom House and Polity IV data for utility evaluation.

The main independent variable under consideration is the process of trust network integration into public politics. As Tilly believes that popular struggle is the catalyst for democratization, and it is the ongoing interaction between citizens and their governments
(as well as interactions with major political actors outside of the state) that determine how and why democratization and de-democratization occur, this analysis will primarily evaluate the relationship between interpersonal networks of trust and the state in channeling citizen demand and affecting governmental behavior. Again, trust networks are defined as “ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others” and promote democratization when they involve themselves politically and facilitate both claims making and program adherence (Tilly 2007, 74). Public politics refers to “personal or interpersonal transactions which visibly engage state power and performance between states and citizens” (Tilly 2007, 12). An overall increase in the integration of trust networks into public politics, according to this model, should facilitate democratization by expanding the breadth, equality, protection, and mutually binding nature of citizen demand on the state.

The integration of interpersonal networks of trust into public politics will be measured through the identification of mechanisms which facilitate their destruction, creation, and claims making, as well as signs which are present when these networks of popular sectors give legitimacy to the system. Mechanisms focused on in this analysis will include the dissolution of existing segregated trust networks, an enlargement of sectors of the population which lack access to networks for risky (both interpersonal and in relation to the state) activities, the appearance of new opportunities and threats that existing networks cannot absorb, the creation of external guarantees for governmental commitments, and the increase of state resources for the protection of risk (Tilly 2007,
Signs include: the public creation of associations, communities, political parties, or unions which have only existed underground; pursuing kinship, friendship, security, and other risky endeavors within such organizations; relying on political agencies for long-term security and vital services; participating in governmental registration of identities, births, deaths, and census activities; and the shift of state behavior away from coercive actions against collective claims-making towards those of support of the collective wills of the people – including the introduction and use of elections, referenda, lobbying, interest groups, social movements, and public mobilizations. An ordinal system of measurement will be used to indicate, by time period, if there was no change, a slight decrease, a moderate decrease, a slight increase, or a moderate increase. No numerical values will be associated with the observations, as general increases and decreases are of the most import for their effects on democratization.

Bolivia was selected as an exploratory case study of a new democratic model because of its persistent failure to perform within existing liberal and representative ones – and the models’ inabilities to adequately explain recent political transformation in Bolivia. According to John Gerring, a “deviant” or “anomalous” case is one which should conform to a particular model, but does not – it displays a “surprising value” relative to a particular modeling of “causal relations” (Gerring 2007, 105-106). Bolivia is chosen specifically because of its continued underperformance in popular multivariate models of liberal and representative democracy. In particular, “relative deviantness of a case is likely to change whenever the general model is altered” (Gerring 2007, 106). Therefore, the persistent underperformance of Bolivian democracy relative to contemporary models of representative and liberal democratic expectations was used as a
selection criterion to explore Bolivia within a new model of democratization in hopes of removing its underperforming stigma and revealing a more nuanced view of recent political transformations. This failure to demonstrate expected democratic results given certain causal and constituent expectations will be explained in greater detail in Chapter Two, but generally, as a region, Latin America has been noted for its “distinctiveness” in comparison with older, industrialized, and more economically secure democracies (Munck 2007b, 3). Democracy is the dominant form of government within the region, but the Andean countries,\textsuperscript{31} in particular have been recalcitrant in their ability to democratically conform to perceived models. This sub-region, by far, has been the leader in electoral volatility (Madrid 2005), unsanctioned presidential turnover (Hochstetler 2006; Valenzuela 2008), and drastic constitutional revisions within the last thirty years.\textsuperscript{32} They have largely remained formally democratic, notwithstanding severe crises in governability.

Described as a “land with immense problems and few simple solutions,” Bolivia’s history is a “microcosm” of the ongoing problems which characterize Latin America in general – economic underdevelopment, social and economic inequality, political instability, ethnic and regional factionalism, authoritarian rule, and outside international intervention (Morales 1992, 2). In particular, it suffers from protracted conflict in its state-society relations, and its “model” implementation of neoliberal democratic reforms backed by international financial institutions in the 1980s had unexpected political results. Initially, the reforms led to inflation stabilization, a short period of economic growth, and the incorporation of representative political measures aimed at more

\textsuperscript{31} Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela

\textsuperscript{32} See also the edited volume by Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro Leongómez (2006a) for general discussion on the “crisis” of the Andean region.
effectively channeling citizen interest and reducing the oversized state. However, deeper unresolved ethnic, economic, and political tensions were exacerbated by the reforms and subsequent changes in state-society relations over the last fifteen years suggest there is more to Bolivia’s democratization process than contemporary models suggest (Crabtree and Whitehead 2001, 2008; UNDP 2004; Ribando 2007).

Selection criteria worth noting are: 1) generally available and reliable political and economic data for the selected time period, 2) a stable elite-“pacted” democratic system until 2005, 3) sweeping structural adjustment reforms urged by the international community and implemented just before and during the selected time period, 4) high and low levels of mass protest activity which characterize Bolivian politics in general but have recently intensified, 5) the general public dissatisfaction with and subsequent collapse of the traditional electoral system in 2005, 6) demonstrable political decision-making from the “top” as well as from the “bottom,” 7) the recent creation and ratification of a new Constitution and accompanying structural changes to the political system, and 8) consistent underperformance in contemporary liberal and representative models of democracy, including Freedom House and Polity IV. As Tilly’s model is predicated on state-society relation, particularly the expansion, equal incorporation, protection, and conformation of state behavior to citizen demands, Bolivia provides an excellent case of legislative and societal reactions to study.

This study will use a combination of documents, archival records, and secondary interviews as evidence, which will be analyzed over time in a manner to elucidate a clearer measure of Bolivian democracy in the new model. In particular, the data will be diachronically (historically and longitudinally) placed within an analytical narrative for
the time period under consideration. Both Charles Tilly (2007, 59-61) and Laurence Whitehead (2002, 247-251) employ this method in their analyses and justify their usage of this method, which keeps measurement principles in mind while analyzing a broad history of data, yet does not rely on precise numbering or cross-comparisons with other cases at this time. The years of the study include those from the beginning of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s term in 1993 until the passage of the new Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia (Political Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, CPE) in February of 2009. This time period was selected for four main reasons: 1) the particular legislation passed and its accompanying effects, 2) the availability and nature of the data available, 3) the dramatic change in the political structure of democracy during this time period, 4) and Bolivia’s poor performance along the majority of variables associated with more traditional models and measures of democracy.

Chapter Overview

Chapter Two will provide a literature review of prevalent comparative democratic analysis for Latin America and Bolivia. Emphasis will be placed on the difficulty of the models to provide a view of the region’s democracies as other than in an incomplete, illiberal, inchoate, malformed, underperforming, and struggling manner. Links will be provided back to the general theoretical discussion and the extended metaphor given in this chapter. Chapter Three contains a historical overview of Bolivia up to the period of analysis and emphasizes the roles that inequality, power, and trust have played in state-society structuring traditionally. In Chapter Four, the independent variable will be
reintroduced, defined, discussed, and linked to measures as identified by the model. An analytic narrative will follow based on each presidential term and accompanying state-societal interactions for the time period selected. It will include evidentiary support to assess the particular relationships and strengths in relation to the particular hypothesis being tested. Chapter Five, will synthesize the findings and cohere the argument into a contemporary view of Bolivian democratization. Again, the research question being asked is to what degree is Bolivia democratizing or de-democratizing? Democratization is associated with the increased integration of trust networks into public politics which is hypothesized to broaden, equalize, protect, and mutually bind state-society interactions (Tilly 2007, 23). In particular, the process-oriented analysis will link the society, the state, historical structures and relations, and contemporary social-political restructuring in a manner elucidating the strengths and weaknesses of the hypothesized relationship. Explanatory power will then be evaluated through a comparison of findings associated with Tilly’s model with more available and accepted measures of democracy (Freedom House and Polity IV in particular). The concluding chapter will briefly summarize the argument and work as presented.

Limitations of the Research

As admitted by Tilly himself, his measurement standards are “ambitious,” as they require an intimate working knowledge of historical and present conditions of each given democracy to which they purport to apply. For this reason he substitutes Freedom House measures for a more preferred richer investigation into the particular breadth, equality,
protected, and mutually bounded nature of state-citizen relations that characterize
democracy. The degree to which these expand and contract, as the state behaves in
accordance with citizen demand, constitute democratization. This is an ambitious
measure indeed, and the present analysis may fall equally short of the analytic rigor
required by an ideal inquiry into Bolivian democratization. However, the identification
of each variable along with its measurement criteria have been introduced and will be
elaborated further in the analysis that follows.

Secondly, as the model being used is largely path-dependent, critics identify
weaknesses in its replicability and the validity (how well the measure matches reality) of
its variables (Rueschemeyer 2008). There has not been much popular support of this
model since its publication, although there is a widening argument for the use of process-
oriented approaches in general, and validity can only be established through repetition
and a widened number of applications. In this manner, this study is designed to test and
refine one particular independent variable of democratization and strengthen Tilly’s
contribution to democratization theory.

Thirdly, the reliability and validity of the particular data used can be questioned.
Readily available data from Bolivia has only become accessible since 1996, and there are
many dangers associated with what is readily accessible. For example, weaknesses exist
in substituting poll data for actual attitudes or behavioral trends, many popular
measures of democracy have an implicit liberal bias upon which they are based, and

33 See especially Smith (2009) for an analysis of intervening variables present between stated poll attitudes
and actualized behavior
34 In that they assume a particular form as the best model and create the index off of that model, or they
presuppose a level of civil liberties that may not be present in particular non-Western cultural values that
reduces their democratic measure ipso facto.
there is no large consensus on which data is best used to represent which phenomena.\footnote{Indeed, the edited volume by Gerardo L. Munck explores the many different theories and methods involved in comparative studies of democratization (2007a).} In general, “comparative politics is scandalously data-poor, and the problem is not limited to democratization research” (Coppedge 2007, 122). The availability of the data and measures publicly available to include in this analysis are limited in both time and scope so a longer timeframe of analysis was impractical given the time constraints and personal resources of the researcher. However, it is a crucial time period for Bolivian state-societal interaction and maximizes variance on state-society restructuring. It is the purpose of this analysis to determine the exact nature of this restructure with reference to democratization.

Lastly, there are particular language barriers that are present in either, or both, the data used and the author’s translations. Although the researcher is equipped with an excellent working knowledge of Spanish, and some Quichua (a dialect of Quechua, spoken in a large portion of Bolivia), there are many regionally specific nuances that may not be grasped. Primarily English bibliographic sources were used in the preparation of this manuscript, as the analysis rests on how Bolivian democratization is measured in literature currently available to the researcher (as both timeframe and funds available prohibited field research). However, works of interdisciplinary Bolivian scholars were consulted, publically available data from Bolivia from institutions located or working within the country was obtained, and much effort was made to as accurately portray the current events from the view of the participants as possible. Of particular importance are the Spanish primary sources of social conflict data obtained from the Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Económica y Social (Laserna and Villarroel 2008), the election data
obtained from Bolivia’s Corte Nacional Electoral (http://www.cne.org.bo), and the statistical data obtained from Bolivia’s Instituto Nacional de Estadística (http://www.ine.gob.bo). Any faulty logic or interpretations herein presented, as well as misunderstandings and misrepresentations, are the sole responsibility of the author.
CHAPTER TWO: DEMOCRATIZATION LITERATURE REVIEW

Latin America

Heavily involved in the third wave of democratization, by the mid-2000s only Cuba was decidedly authoritarian in Latin America (compared to all but three countries in the region in 1978), with democracies and semi-democracies existing in the remaining eighteen countries (Mainwaring and Hagopian 2005). The region was emerging from a nearly forty-year battle between civilian and military-led governments for control of state resources, and people were increasingly becoming less tolerant of repressive governmental situations. The failures of import substitution industrialization models had given authoritarian leaders motive to take the political-economic state reins, yet financial bailout policies offered by the international financial institutions increasingly attached policy recommendations that required a reduction in the bureaucratic size and centralization of the state (Harris 2008). These policies, collectively mounting international debt, increasing economic uncertainty and stagnated growth, high or hyperinflation, and a population that was becoming more educated and politically demanding influenced the turn towards the formal dimensions of democratization and liberal decentralization (Jelin and Hershberg 1996b; Gwynne 1999). Furthermore, the “deepening legitimacy problems” of the authoritarian regimes (in response to the economic problems, rising education levels and standards of living), a rights-based
international discourse which gained momentum in the 1970s and 1980s (beginning with the commissions on peace and justice in Paraguay and Brazil in 1970 and covering rights for women, against torture, and other inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, on economic, social, and cultural rights, for development, and for children), the fall of the Soviet Union, and “demonstration effects” of earlier transitioning countries also aided the Latin American third wave (Huntington 1991; UNDP 2000). Therefore, since the 1980s, democracy gradually returned to (or was implemented for the first time in) the region, political parties have since become the primary vehicles for channeling electoral concerns and platforms, and “mass publics have held local and national governments more accountable than at any time in the past” (Mainwaring and Hagopian 2005, 2). After the period of (re-)democratization was accomplished, political power was generally turned over peacefully between elections, and democratic institutions seemed to be deepening into the early 2000s. However, mass protests against governmental decisions and public dissatisfaction with democracy itself increased with continued economic difficulties, and third wave analyses of the early 1990s did not measure well against third wave realities of the late 2000s.36

Third Wave Analyses...

Although Latin America has largely been the study of comparative political analyses since the 1950s and 1960s, by the turn of the century earlier researchers of political change, economic development, and regional dependence on international

36 The literature review discussed below will largely focus on popular models of comparative democratic analyses and their evolution. For more nuanced discussion on discursive and hegemonic shifts, with allusions to how this exacerbated internal conflicts plaguing Latin America in the new millennium, see Yashar (1998, 1999, 2007), Postero (2007), Nelson and Dorsey (2007), Bomberry (2008), and Haarstad (2009).
capitalism of the region largely turned their foci to democratization (Munck 2007b). Essentially similar in culture, history, religion, economics, industry, majority language, and international relations, by the year 2000, the countries of Latin America varied enormously on how democracy was being implemented, how well it was deepening, and the abilities of the countries to respond to popular demand. Scholars frequented the area comparing institutional strength, economics, civil society, political parties, governmental performance, public opinions, political cultures, and governmental viability. The underlying belief was that democracies had to be constructed properly to stabilize and deepen (UNDP 2004). This was associated with a strong representative system and governmental institutions (O’Donnell 1994; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999; Mayorga 2004, 2005; Boniface 2010), low corruption (Seligson 2002, 2006a), an enforced code of law (Lowenthal 1997, Goldstein 2003), a civilian-controlled military (Lowenthal 1997), moderate economic growth (Przeworski et al. 1996), and the guarantee of personal freedoms. A consolidated outcome was not guaranteed, but it was more likely if these things were present.

Similar to the discussion in Chapter One, mainstream Latin American democratic analysis between 1980 and 2000 largely emphasized transitions and preconditions, guidelines and procedures, consolidation, and all of the related interconnections therein (Munck 2007b). Researchers focusing on transitions and preconditions stressed the importance of earlier historical trends in mass public politics (Malloy and Gamarra 1988; Collier and Collier 1991; Lechner 1991; Yashar 1997), individual national situations (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; O’Donnell 1994), and economics (Diamond 37 Additionally, these characteristics are all mentioned by Hakim and Lowenthal (1991), Linz and Stepan (1996, xiv), Diamond et al. (1997), and Diamond (1999) in their respective analyses.

37
and Linz 1989; Przeworski et al. 1996) on the transitions. Those concentrating on
democratic guidelines and procedures focused on representative procedures (Mainwaring
and Scully 1995; Carey 1997; Carroll and Søberg Shugart 2007; Mainwaring, Brinks, and
Pérez-Liñán 2007) and a checklist of difficulties needing to be overcome in the region for
democracy to be successful (Hakim and Lowenthal 1991; Lowenthal 1997). Finally,
Latin American consolidation comparativists emphasized challenges needing to be faced
for democratic consolidation within the region, but unlike the proceduralists, they largely
emphasized problematic interrelationships between society, economics, and politics and
the ability of non-consolidated democracies to endure in the region (Linz and Stepan
1996; Boeninger 1997; Diamond 1999; Blair 2000; Crabtree and Whitehead 2001; Philip
2003; UNDP 2004; Smith 2005).

As the new millennium progressed, however, the consolidation of many Latin
American democracies seemed to falter. In South America in particular, internationally
and governmentally promised economic opportunities either never materialized or were
not redistributed among the population at large, inchoate political parties failed to
represent their constituencies to any noticeable degree, and the separation of powers in
government proved largely dysfunctional (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro
Leongómez 2006). Mass protests of indigenous, lower class workers and peasants, and
the urban poor increasingly challenged existing political decision-making processes and
demanded attention to immediate economic, political, and social concerns (Vanden 2003,
2007; Van Cott 2005; Johnston and Almeida 2006; Prashad and Ballvé 2006; Almeida
2007).38  This “crisis of representation” was particularly acute in the Andean region

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38 Compare to Huntington’s “contractive factors” associated with waves of de-democratization: weakness of “democratic values” among the political elites, economic hardships which invigorate social conflict and
where in ten years, between 1993 and 2003, electoral volatility rose and poll results on political satisfaction emphasizing current institutions and parties plummeted.\textsuperscript{39}

Furthermore, popularly elected presidents were directly challenged in 80% of the Spanish-speaking South American countries and forced out of office in 60% (Hochstetler 2006). Constitutions were amended or replaced between 1990 and 1999 in fourteen of the region’s countries, and analysts struggled to account for the ongoing difficulties in the region (Van Cott 2000).

Within the terms of the extended mountaineering metaphor, prior to the governmental crises of the early millennium, Latin American analysts emphasized that the particular democratic route taken was dependent on the guide available and the comparative advantage of one guide over another, the size, composition, and capability of the party, the resources available for equipment and technical teaching, and the climate at the time of departure. However, they overlooked complications (both expected and not) along the way. Institutionalization,\textsuperscript{40} political economy, governmental decentralization, political parties, and social involvement (civil society) were emphasized, but state capacity, political opportunity structures, political-cultural-social dynamics, actually existing social relations, levels of general technical knowledge, and a long tradition of facilitate authoritarian tendencies, “social and political polarization,” continued elite maneuverings against leftist and underprivileged groups, a lack of state ability to control terrorist and insurgent activity, nondemocratic foreign intervention, and a reverse “snowball” effect facilitating cascading reversals (1991, 13-18).

\textsuperscript{39}The volatility data covers voting trends from the five Andean countries from their democratic transitions through the latest election to 2003 and compare them to new party voting; the survey data mentioned covers 1996-2003 for the same countries with comparisons with an average for “twelve other Latin American countries” (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro Leongómez 2006b, 17-19). The failed Presidencies that follow are all dated 1993 and later: Argentina (2001), Bolivia (2003), Ecuador (1997 and 2000), Paraguay (1999), Peru (2000), and Venezuela (1993). This information is from Hochstetler (2006), but can also be found in Valenzuela (2008).

\textsuperscript{40}Defined following Huntington as the “process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability” ([1968] 2006, 12)
institutionalized marginalization were generally discounted. The theorists related
general accounts of particular expeditions, but did not tell the stories as they unfolded on
the mountain in real time, and continued to overlook other paths or mountains open to
exploration.

**Versus Third Wave Realities**

As researchers found their democratic predictions for Latin America lacking in
explanatory, let alone predictive and prescriptive power, three main trends in analysis
emerged and characterize the bulk of the literature to the present (which are discussed
below). The first trend remains fixed on the failures of political institutions and tries to
explain why these are not succeeding in deepening Latin American democracy.
Metaphorically returning to the discussion in Chapter One, these are analysts which focus
on expeditions on only one mountain. The second creates new democratic typologies to
describe the multiplicity of political, cultural, and social interactions emerging which
refocused on the earlier liberal versus participatory democracy discussion. They identify
new mountains to climb. The last concentrates on changing methodological tactics, and
redefining democracy as an ongoing process – one that constantly invents and reinvents
itself – and therefore involves complex new measures of democratization and democratic
governance. These theorists evaluate the expedition itself from within, and because they
tell the story in the same manner; the method can be applied on every mountain.

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41 This is, of course, a generalization relating to a particular form of dominant comparative political
analysis. There exist more nuanced accounts of dynamic and proactive processes of Latin American
democratization dominating other traditions, such as social movement theory and social action research,
political anthropology, subaltern philosophy, and interpretivist/discursive analysis. See Van Cott (2000)
for a good overview on sociological and political scientific views of the period from a political
anthropologist.
Democratic Struggles: As Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro Leongómez argue, “understanding what has gone wrong [emphasis added] with democracy in Latin America...has become one of the outstanding intellectual challenges of our day” (2006b, 1). Their analysis focuses on the “crisis” of Andean representative democracy and claims to look “beyond [the] programmatic and ideological convergence between voters and their representatives” that was assumed in earlier procedural theories (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro Leongómez 2006b, 2-3). Instead, their larger edited volume questions the particular kinds of relationships that form amongst voters and parties, or elected leaders, and explores issues of ethnicity, representative dilemmas, decentralization policies, and popular movements (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro Leongómez 2006a). However, the same underlying bias that liberal representative democracy is the best and only legitimate form of democratic government remains in the majority of the contributions. In searching for what has gone wrong, they portray a standard against which they measure and offer suggestions for the region’s democracies designed to bring them back into the fold.

Peter Smith also emphasizes a narrow conception of democracy based on participation, competition, and accountability and explores the relationship between elections and rights (2005, 7). This relationship, he maintains, represents the necessary procedural and substantive components of democracy and also determines “variations in the content and degree of democratic political practice” (Smith 2005, 11). Smith, like Larry Diamond (1999), recognizes that “intermediate” types of democracy exist alongside “illiberal” forms, which violate either electoral rights (competitive oligarchies and semi-democracies) or basic freedoms/rights (illiberal democracies) (Smith 2005, 10-

\[42\] The piece by Deborah J. Yashar (2006) is a noted exception.
11). His analysis of Latin American democracies examines historical influences, political institutions, procedures, power blocks, global contexts, public opinion, freedoms and rights, state capacities, and social equalities, and concludes that “transformation of the present-day illiberal democracy into a truly liberal democracy would require” a greater protection of rights and the extension of these rights to all sectors of society (Smith 2005, 310). Although he looks at interconnections largely ignored in earlier democratic analyses, he remains firmly attached to liberal democracy as the model of choice, against which Latin America remains “illiberal.”

Similarly, analyses focusing primarily on electoral volatility (Madrid 2005), representative crises (Mainwaring 2008; Boniface 2010), improperly functioning institutions (Abente Brun 2008; Valenzuela 2008), democratic “setbacks” (Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005), and plebiscitary trends (Mayorga 2004, 2006; Conaghan 2008; Schamis 2008) in Latin America continue to search for and identify what has run afoul within these democracies. Generally, a more satisfying and broad approach is taken in these analyses (in comparison to the literature in the last section) with the sort of data included, the methodologies of the analyses (i.e. an increased use of public opinion polling and emphasis on governance and governmental legitimacy in the eyes of the people), or interrelationships present, but they remain influenced by explaining deviance from a perceived democratic norm.43

Democratic Alternatives: Another trend in contemporary Latin American democratic analysis offers a more cautiously optimistic view of democracy. Instead of presenting or theorizing on what has gone wrong, these analysts admit that other ways to conceive...
democracy may be possible. Recycling the theoretical discussion between liberal and participatory democracy post-World War Two, these theorists view the breakdown of representative democracy as a possible opening of a path to the construction of a more participatory, inclusive, or “radical” democracy (Lievesley 1999; Postero 2010). Early discussions with reference to Latin America and alternative forms of democracy began following the initial waves of mass protests in Venezuela in 1989 and Mexico and Argentina in the mid-1990s. These discussions focused on the particular dynamics that exist between Latin America and international political economy (Gills and Rocamora 1992), the state, society, and democracy (Jelin and Hershberg 1996a; Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1997), politics, culture, and democracy (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998), and direct democracy (Barczak 2001). More recent discussions interlink the increasing waves of mass political protest with new challenges and opportunities for unique democratic formation and deepening.

In his discussion on “building democracy” in Latin America, John Peeler focuses on summarizing regional democratization to the present in terms already discussed above. However, in his last section, he makes observations and possible prescriptions on “deepening democracy” that reflect a more radical vision (2004, 196). In particular, he acknowledges that liberal democracy has proven to be hollow for many countries of the region, as they utilize the “formal machinery,” yet “citizens are powerless to change the pervasive, extreme economic and social inequalities that have long been characteristic of Latin America” (Peeler 2004, 203-204). Centuries of indigenous marginalization,

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44 See Held (2006) for a good discussion of the differences between ideal models.
45 See also the arguments made by Gills and Rocamora (1992). Peeler sees opportunity coming from new political spaces which have opened up in Latin American politics, while Gills and Rocamora stress that Latin America “low intensity democracies” are being perpetuated by a narrow conception of “élite”
social stratification, political rent seeking, and patron-client relationships have proven resilient to change, but he acknowledges the possibility of other, more participatory and radical forms of democracy which may be currently under construction in the region to better reflect the needs of the people. He believes that people continually adapt and change to their respective situations and believes that Latin America countries are in a unique position to “deepen democracy” and create a democratic form more reflective of their own needs and desires. In particular, these democracies may “domesticate” capitalism by democratizing economic decision-making, breaking existing social, economic, and political stratifications, ensuring that all citizens have access to the “benefits of liberty and political participation,” and “truly” holding governments accountable to the people (Peeler 2004, 207-208).

Leonardo Avritzer takes a slightly different view of the liberal versus participatory debate and argues that in Latin America, the liberal model cannot be translated, especially in relation to its dichotomy between institutionalization (the reduction of politics to government) and mass mobilization (2002). Instead, in Latin America, institutionalization joins collective mass mobilization at the public level to create “participatory publics” and begin structural democratic change at the local level (Avritzer 2002, 165-166). This change includes a widening of political deliberation and decision-making spaces, the recognition of difference which becomes part of the whole, and the distribution of public goods, and challenges traditional forms of elite exclusionary practices. His form of democracy, therefore, emphasizes the importance of public politics at the “street” level in “participatory publics” active in affecting democracy forced on nations through United States (US), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank mandates (Gills and Rocamora 1992, 501).
governmental maneuverings to block or exclude the voices of the masses. However, he notes that this form of democracy is better suited to democratization through reaction more than creation, as most formal channels remain blocked in reality to the transformation of state-society relations from the bottom (Avritzer 2002, 169).

Other good comparisons between political transformations in existing democracies and the interrelationships with social movements and the marginalized masses include works by Deborah Yashar (1999), Donna Lee Van Cott (2000, 2005a), Richard Harris (2003), Harry Vanden (2003, 2004, 2007), Nancy Postero (2007, 2010), and Stahler-Sholk, Vanden, and Kuecker (2008). These studies all focus on the ability of marginalized groups to appropriate contemporary discourse and use it against hegemonic conceptions of democracy to effect political change. Van Cott and Postero focus primarily on the indigenous political appropriation of new opportunities and spaces resulting in recent structural changes in Colombian and Bolivian constitutions (focusing on pluricultural/multicultural democracy), while Harris, Vanden, and Stahler-Sholk, Vanden, and Keucker link popular uprisings in Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru over more than twenty years to ongoing political transformations and a more inclusionary theory of democracy. Countless other studies have emerged within the last fifteen to twenty years focusing on social movements and Latin America, but this is just a simple overview of the most recent trend linking Latin American democratic analysis with increasing mass political participation.

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46 See for example, Eckstein (2001), Petras and Veltmeyer (2005), Johnston and Almeida (2006), Prashad and Ballvé (2006), and Harris and Nef (2008), for good overviews and representative compilations.
Democracy as a Process: Finally, a last trend which has emerged to address recent political transformations among Latin American democracies is a more process-oriented method of analysis which brings state capacity, political opportunity structures, political-cultural-social dynamics, and public perception into the equation. Rather than viewing democracies against a perceived static model, these process-oriented theorists recognize that history, individual state capacity, the perception of the people, the state of the economy, inequality, and corruption all matter when it comes to how Latin American democracies are implemented and function (Mainwaring and Scully 2010b). These analyses maintain that “successful democratic governance” entails delivering citizen-demanded goods and rights as well as performing within the rules of the law (Mainwaring and Scully 2010b). The power of a democracy is viewed in terms of the people, and political opportunity structures vary between states (Mazzuca 2007; Munck 2007c).

The edited volume by Mainwaring and Scully in particular offers good arguments for comparative democratic analyses involving change over time (2010a). The contributors emphasize political policy in economic, social, and state capacity areas (Mainwaring, Scully, and Vargas Cullell 2010), evaluate recent judicial and socio-economic reforms (Brinks 2010; Foxley 2010; Huber and Stephens 2010), and demonstrate weaknesses in using standard linear regression analysis for evaluating variable relationships with democratization (Rodríguez 2010). Moreover, Mainwaring,

47 Terry Lynn Karl (1990) and Larry Diamond (1999) both identified this need for democratization theorists before it became more necessary, but neither analyst truly offered an alternative (mainly because data was unavailable at the time and political transformations were still in their early stages). Furthermore, Tilly uses this methodological approach to identify the causal mechanisms and processes associated with democratization, as he felt that theorists were relying too heavily upon a checklist of perceived variables instead of variable interactions (2007).
Scully, and Cullell (2010) develop a particularly rich measurement of democratic governance that captures change over time within citizen views, level of democracy (Freedom House substitutes), economic growth, rule of law, corruption, inflation, job creation, poverty, education, and citizen security. Although these models and analyses are not as straightforward as the prescriptive models applied to the region in the 1980s and 1990s, they are more effective at evaluating how well modern Latin American democracies are responding to the demands of the people, and how this, in turn, affects future claims making.

Thus far, as identified, the general trends of Latin American democratic analysis have paralleled the failures and transformations in the region, with South America and the Andean region leading in analyses. On average, out of recently transitioning blocks of countries, the region has had the deepest economic inequalities to overcome, the largest number of failed presidencies, the highest rate of electoral volatility, the most recent constitutional changes, the most politically active indigenous groups (Guatemala notwithstanding), and a large number of mass political protests. Most of these nations have remained formally democratic despite their challenges, but have stalled in the deepening and strengthening process. Bolivia, perhaps most of all, exemplifies these challenges facing the region, and the discussion will now address contemporary politics as well as the current state of Bolivian democratic analysis.
Contemporary analyses of Bolivian democracy tend to cluster around perceived failures, limited successes, and ongoing tensions, and all of them focus on the relationship between state and society. Other factors, such as history, the economy, and culture are taken into account in varying degrees, but very few offer an analysis of Bolivian democracy against something other than an institutional yardstick or a one-variable emphasis. For example, proponents of a limited representative democracy tend to emphasize perceived failures of democracy demonstrated by declining popular confidence in representative institutions and democracy in general, the collapse of the elite-pacted party system, the rise of populist and plebian democracy, the enduring strength of regionalism, and the persistent weakness of institutions needed to ensure governmental legitimacy, an effective rule of law, and the channeling of popular demands. On the other hand, limited successes of Bolivian democracy are believed to exist in the increased salience of indigenous representation and political identity, the invigoration of civil society from the reforms passed in the 1990s, other structural political reforms including party reformation and referenda accommodation, the election of Juan “Evo” Morales Ayma as the nation’s first indigenous President by majority primary vote, and the ratification of a new Constitution in 2009. Finally, other general analyses focus on ongoing struggles in Bolivia which limit further democratic deepening.

48 I refer, specifically, to perceived failures and limited successes as no analyst has identified any resounding successes or failures, as the ongoing process of transformation in Bolivia tends to move forward and backward rapidly and at varying degrees.
49 Donna Lee Van Cott’s analysis (2000) of the constitutional changes in 1994 and their importance for Bolivian democratization is a noted exception. She also takes issue with the liberal from of democratization present in contemporary analyses and reconstructs an alternative model built on a multicultural incorporation of different communities instead of a homogenization of individuals.
in general, including the continued failure of economic growth and reduction of poverty and inequality, lack of viable alternatives to Bolivia’s historically monoproduct-oriented export economy, a deepened cycle of policy – protest – negotiation between state and society which continually paralyzes governmental activity, heightened regional tensions, uneven development and tensions between the economic and political models, and the control over and distribution of state and natural resources. These trends will each be discussed in more depth below.  

**Perceived Failures**

Many of the analysts which view Bolivian democratization in a negative manner either have an ideal form of democracy in mind, against which current institutions or events are measured, or use commonly available statistical opinion poll data to demonstrate perceived problems by the populations themselves. In particular, problematic areas for Bolivian democratization have been identified with the rise of populist and plebian democracy – associated negatively with a tyranny-of-the-majority type of mob democracy (Barr 2005; Barrios Suvelza 2008), the enduring strength of regionalism – as perpetuating racial and class cleavages (Barragán 2008; Roca 2008), and the overall weakness of institutions needed to ensure governmental legitimacy, an effective rule of law and the channeling of popular demands – generally associated with a consolidated democracy (Domingo 2001; Rodríguez Veltzé 2001; Sánchez de Lozada 2001; Sánchez de Lozada and Valenzuela 2001; Assies and Salman 2003; Barr 2005;

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I would like to remind the reader that only analyses primarily dealing with democracy are identified. Other relationships between social movements, economic policy, political transformation, and civil society may be brought into the analysis that follows, but are not of primary importance as Bolivian democratization studies.
In most of these analyses, liberal representative democracy is considered the standard, and the failure of economic growth, when addressed, is seen more as the result of incomplete institutional transformation than a possible inherent contradiction between liberal and participatory democracy as discussed above. Democratization is promoted as something that should occur from the top-down.

Furthermore, failures of democracy are also revealed through identifying and tracking trends in declining popular confidence in representative institutions (Gamarra and Malloy 1995; Goldstein 2003; Barr 2005; Hagopian 2005; Seligson 2006a; Salman 2007; Mainwaring 2008), falling opinions of democracy as a desired form of government (Salman 2007), and rising levels of electoral volatility leading to the collapse of the more stable pacted party system (Madrid 2005; Mainwaring 2008). For these analysts, the crisis of representation seen in Bolivia in the 1990s and culminating in 2005 can be clearly traced, and the blame is commonly attributed to institutional failures to clearly channel, respond to, and keep pace with popular demand. This makes Bolivia a classic case of political change occurring before the system was capable of responding to it, and exacerbates a long history of uneven political development (Crabtree and Whitehead 2008). The lack of complete systemic failure in this case is attributed to the historical legacy of state ability to manage between a variety of competing interests upon it (Lazar 2004; Gray Molina 2008a; Roca 2008).
Limited Successes

Cautiously optimistic, the limited successes of Bolivian democracy are believed to lie in the increased salience of indigenous representation and political identity – which broadens participation (Yashar 1999; Van Cott 2000; Madrid 2002; Albro 2006; Hylton and Thomson 2007; Lepori 2008), the invigoration of civil society from the reforms passed in the 1990s – believed to pressure representative channels and incorporate society into a discursive democratic learning process (Medeiros 2001; Kohl 2002, 2003; García Linera 2004; Olivera 2004; Kohl and Farthing 2006; Dangl 2007; Hylton and Thomson 2007), other structural political reforms including party reformation and referenda accommodation – seen to increase horizontal accountability in governmental decision-making (Van Cott 2000; Mayorga 2005; Kohl 2006; Kohl and Farthing 2006; Breuer 2008; Postero 2010), overall resilience of Bolivian democratic accommodation – which bolsters the likelihood that democratic institutions will deepen over time (Domingo 2005; Gray Molina 2008a; Tapia 2008; Rodríguez Veltzé 2008), and the majority election of Evo Morales and subsequent ratification of a new Constitution in 2009 – which represents an important step in overcoming inherited structural obstacles (Postero 2010; Morales 2012). These analysts study democracy and its interrelations with politics, economics, and culture, but emphasize discourse and change over longer periods (decades and centuries rather than election periods) of time than the previous group. Furthermore, marginalized and subaltern populations tend to be the unit of analysis over democratic states, freedoms guaranteed by government, or entire national populations. Within the terminology of our metaphor, these analyses are apt to give thick descriptions
of expeditions and possible route deviations over thin comparisons of guidebooks or personal accounts on one mountain as the first group offers.

**Ongoing Tensions**

A final general area of Bolivian democratic analysis focuses on ongoing struggles in Bolivia which limit democratic deepening (Crabtree and Whitehead 2001), including the continued failure of economic growth and reduction of poverty and inequality (Gray Molina 2001; Morales 2001; Domingo 2005; Mayorga 2005), a general lack of a viable alternative to a monoproduct export economy (Wanderley 2008), a deepened policy – protest – negotiation cycle of state-society relations which continually impedes governmental activity (Mayorga 2005; UNDP 2005; Van Cott 2008), persistent regional ethnic, class, and urban-rural cleavages – which determine main governmental grievances and demands (Roper 2003; Bomberry 2008; Hochstetler and Friedman 2008; Roca 2008; von der Heydt-Coca 2009), uneven development and tensions between the economic and political models – which focus mainly on the tensions between neoliberalism and participatory democracy and harken back to persistent inequality and poverty mentioned above (Ruiz-Mier 2001; Kohl 2002; Assies 2004; Peeler 2004; Weyland 2004; Domingo 2005; Kohl and Farthing 2006; Postero 2007; von der Heydt-Coca 2009), and control over and distribution of state and natural resources (Muñoz 2001; Dangl 2007; Arze Vargas 2008; Barragán 2008). Historically, these tensions have been persistent and pervasive. There is little argument that regional and class elites have capitalized on favorable contemporary economic and political restructuring and are threatened by increasing mass demands for a more equitable distribution of state resources. What remains unique to Bolivia is the fluidity of identity politics and the manner in which
varying groups of people organize to place pressure upon the state. The elites may have weakened traditional workers’ unions, restructured the corporate inclusion of the masses, and decentralized some political powers to the regions and municipalities, but peasant unions, neighborhood associations, trade syndicates, and indigenous groups are increasingly occupying newly opened political space and coming together to effect change in the system. These analysts question how deep the tensions run and whether or not they may be overcome by recent challenges. They tell the story of the expedition in real time, without as much regard to the particular summit as the previous two groups.

Summary

To summarize the discussion of the literature going into the main analysis of this paper, Latin America is a unique region of the world for comparative democratic analysis. The majority of the states within the region underwent democratic transitions between 1979 and 2000 and followed liberal models imported by the industrialized nations and the international financial institutions (IFIs). These nations began transforming their state-led economic policies, reducing state expenditures and social welfare spending, and decreasing the size of their bureaucracies. Those that were already democracies at this time mainly deepened their involvement in the global capitalist economy as well and tried to stimulate their own economies.

However, the “lost decade” of economic growth in the 1980s, followed by political-economic neoliberal restructuring, and coupled with a changing international discourse of gender and indigenous rights, heralded an awakening of traditionally
marginalized populations. Latin American civil society began questioning the policies of the state and their role within it. Impoverished people demanded jobs, security, food and water. Indigenous groups demanded autonomy, land, and the protection of their traditional *usos y costumbres* (customs, traditions, and laws). Women’s groups fought for equality in economic and educational opportunity, protection from domestic violence, and better healthcare. Many Latin American states had a difficult time responding to these demands as traditional political parties proved out of touch with the masses and too linked to cronyism, clientelism, patronism, and corruption.

This situation of (re-)democratization followed by deepening mass dissatisfaction with contemporary parties, and seemingly unrepresentative political systems in general, shifted democratic theorizing in Latin America from transitions, procedures, democratic consolidations, and typologies to a more nuanced approach taking into account interrelations between citizen, society, and the state. Mass public politics grew in analytic importance and democracy as an ongoing process became more important as analysts tried to account for democracy longitudinally in the region. Recent scholars have therefore focused more on state-society interactions and the functions of protest and popular opinion within Latin American democracies, yet many still emphasize the perceived failings and difficulties of the region.

Most democratic analyses of Bolivia focus on its inabilities, ongoing tensions, and difficulties. They assume a particular standard of democracy and theorize it has not come to fruition. Those that take a more optimistic approach emphasize civil society and the changes that it has wrought in the government to broaden participation and representation. However, few alternative methodologies of democratization are offered
that would allow a clearer picture of Bolivian democracy compared to other states than the prevailing measures of institutionalization, representation, civil liberties, and political rights.51 For Bolivia, its institutions are weak and fragmented, and its state capacity remains low. The rule of law is also weak and its enforcement remains piecemeal. However, very few of these models acknowledge any gains in democratization from acknowledged electoral and party restructuring, increased participation of the masses in political institutions, a more representative Congress, and a new Constitution drafted through constituent assembly.

What is needed is a new methodology, one that looks at the entire process and identifies areas of movement which are effecting change that may not necessarily be the most common. Further, what is sought is a theory of movement based from within the constantly evolving nature of state-society relations. The following chapter opens with continued discussion on Tilly’s view of the roles of interpersonal networks of trust, categorical inequalities, and autonomous power centers for democratization. A brief history of Bolivia is given as it relates to these three areas and leads into the main time period of analysis – 1993-2009. Tilly’s model of democratization is based on the mechanisms and processes of state-society interaction which work together to create change in levels of democracy, regardless of the particular regime type at the start. It can be applied to totalitarian states as easily as to already democratic states, and seeks to measure how the people are interacting with each other and their state. It is hoped that deeper exploration into Bolivian networks of trust and public politics will reveal a clearer view of the inner workings of its democracy from a more interactive vantage.

51 Again, Donna Lee Van Cott’s analysis (2000) is an exception, but she only looks at democratization through constitutional change and the forces which work together to achieve this. It will only apply to certain states in certain periods and not in all cases.
CHAPTER THREE: BOLIVIA IN OVERVIEW

A Brief History of Bolivian Tensions

In order to understand the contemporary social, economic, and political climate in Bolivia important for the main analysis of this paper, one must first understand the legacies of “unresolved tensions” and “struggle” which characterize this country (Morales 1992; Crabtree and Whitehead 2008). While a thorough historical overview from pre-colonial to modern times is unnecessary, the political transformation currently underway in Bolivia is directly related to certain tensions endemic to the nation. Coincidentally, these also relate to the processes that Charles Tilly believes lead to democratization when they are incorporated into or insulated from public politics – trust, inequality, and power. As will be presented in the historical overview of Bolivia that follows, pervasive inequality and factional power struggles have characterized geopolitical and sociopolitical relationships for centuries and continue into the present. However, interpersonal networks of trust among the general population – seen through emerging diverse sectors of the population who put themselves at risk of violence or personal loss to make collective claims on the government – are largely a modern occurrence, emerging primarily in the early 1900s, and are the most likely to affect changes in contemporary state conformity to citizen demand.
Land, People, and Social Identity

Geographically, Bolivia is a landlocked state (having lost its costal access in 1879) containing both frigid mountain ranges over 21,000 feet of elevation in the west and largely inaccessible dense tropical jungle regions to the east (Morales 1992, 1, 4). Traversing between the two areas is treacherous and by 2002, only 6.7% of the roads in Bolivia were paved (World Bank). The high plains of the *altiplano* are situated between two sections of the Andes (the *Cordilleras Occidental* and *Oriental*), and at 12,000 feet of elevation have historically been the indigenous Aymara and Quechua centers of population. Mining (gold, silver, antimony, and a number of other minerals), smelting, root crops, and llama herding are the primary economic activities (Klein 1992). Between the highlands and the lowlands exists the upper and lower valleys which are the main centers of temperate and semi-tropical agricultural products such as corn, a variety of fruits, coffee, cacao, yucca, and coca (used by the indigenous as a natural stimulant, but also the primary ingredient in cocaine production) (Morales 1992, 10). Quechua migrants from the *altiplano* are the largest ethnic group of this area, and overall they identify more with highland geopolitical identities than with lowland (Morales 1992). The tropical eastern lowland areas are sparsely populated, compared to the highlands, but are home to the majority of Bolivia’s hydrocarbons (natural gas and petroleum), large tracts of farmland for cattle, cotton, sugar, and soya, and tropical hardwoods. The population of this area is primarily of European descent with a minority of urban mestizos and scattered tropical indigenous communities (Postero 2007; Roca 2008). Of Bolivia’s nine departments, La Paz, Oruro, and Potosi are considered highland, Cochabamba and Chuquisaca are valley, and Tarija (which is also half valley), Santa
Cruz, Beni, and Pando are lowland. The first five are also affiliated with the western part of the country, while the last four form the crescent-shaped eastern, or *media luna* region.

Demographically, contemporary Bolivia is young, indigenous, and very unequal, with 58.6% of its population under the age of 25 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística [INE] 2001). Nearly two-thirds of the population identified with an indigenous ethnicity on the 2001 census, and over a third is fully bilingual in Spanish and an indigenous language (INE 2001). Quechua and Aymara are the two primary *originario* (highland indigenous) groupings (with a combined 55.9%), but Article 5 of the new Constitution officially recognizes 36 languages in addition to Spanish (INE 2001). However, it is also a very unequal state, where in 2002, the richest 10% of the population shared 47.1% of the total income earned, while the poorest shared 0.31% (World Bank). Its gini inequality coefficient (60.24) and infant mortality rate (56 deaths per 1,000 live births) are the worst in the region, and the gini coefficient was the highest in the world for 2002 (World Bank). Furthermore, of the rural population (37.6%), 91% are considered poor and over half in abject poverty (INE 2001; Klein 2006). However, thanks to education reform in the 1950s, by 2001, 86.7% of the population aged 15 and above were literate (World Bank).

With the arrival of the Spanish in the 1530s an elitist system of social, economic, and political stratification structured Bolivian society, in which the indigenous have remained at the bottom to the present. European descendants (*criollos*) were at the top, followed by *mestizos* (of light skinned European-indigenous descent), *cholos* (urban indigenous), *mulattos* (of dark skinned African-indigenous or African-European descent),

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52 According to the 2001 Census, 58.8% of the total population is monolingual, but this includes both monolingual in Spanish as well as an indigenous language (INE).
and the native *indio* (indigenous) populations. Overall, *indio* was a term reserved mainly for those who lived in rural areas, paid tribute, were uneducated, and provided labor to the landowners (Dunkerley 1984, 23; Postero 2007, 10) – a story exemplified famously by Eduardo Galeano’s description of the Potosí mines ([1971] 2009). Exploited for their labor, the Bolivian indigenous provided Spain, the elite ruling class, and finally the state, with the silver, rubber, nuts, tin, oil, soya and gas that through the centuries have determined the area’s monoproductive economy. Immigrants into the cities became *cholos* and *mestizos* over time as they disassociated themselves with their *indio* roots by speaking Spanish and wearing Western style of dress (Morales 1992). In this way, one’s “racial” identity is self-defined through dress, language, and area of inhabitation rather than by birth or ethnic affiliation, and contains a social component which largely determines one’s societal standing.

**Early History (1532-1930)**

During Bolivia’s early history, it economically relied on exports of a primary product which fluctuated with global demand, and global cycles of supply and demand were accompanied by periods of prosperity and deep recession (Wanderley 2008). As the fluctuating economy determined economic opportunities, gains, and losses, regional political hegemony shifted as well. Therefore, this period of Bolivian history is one characterized by shifting autonomous centers of regional authority and political oligarchy, but overall resulted in a weak political system of strong regional and oligarchic competition.

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53 This is not to assume that labor exploitation did not exist prior to the Spanish arrival, as the indigenous of the region were under the rule of various empires (Tiahuanacu, Waru, Aymaran, and Incan) since the first century A.D. (Klein 1992).
Strong geopolitical identity and power in Bolivia today dates back the incorporation of European land tenure rights where the early Spanish were granted, by the Crown, land in the new colony which included the indigenous populations on it. Serving both the Crown and themselves, they fought for the complete control of their lands and resources and used their “right” to indigenous labor to extract primary products from the land (Klein 1992, 37; Morales 1992, 36). Silver extraction fueled the Bolivian economy from the 1500s until the 1650s and made Potosí the economic hub of the territory. Rural indigenous migrated into the mining cities at this time and created a subclass of *cholos* mentioned above. However, declining silver supply in existing mines, increasing supply in Mexican mines, a dwindling (due to disease) and increasingly agitated (for being exploited) rural labor population, and an influx of new Spanish immigrants with fewer opportunities than the entrenched elites, provoked a recession that lasted a century until mine restructuring allowed for a more modest and continued growth rate (Klein 1992).

During this recession, local indigenous agricultural centers grew and between the late-1700s and the mid-1800s tax revenues rose from 25% to 60% of governmental income (Klein 1992, 105). Dependent on this income, the government (free from Spanish rule since 1825) was forced to protect the community lands, and official legislation did not challenge this position until the 1860s. Indigenous abuses abounded, however, and indigenous uprisings grew increasingly common in the 1700s, resulting in political and administrative restructuring in 1782 to consolidate and centralize power in eight primary territories which largely determine the nine departments of contemporary Bolivia (Morales 1992, 37). This, when coupled with hubs of economic power, resulted
in very strong regional affiliations and a history of caudillo (regional political strongmen) circulation of state power (for they are far more interested in managing their own affairs and keeping them out of centralized governmental control) (Roca 2008). Through today, Bolivia remains poorly institutionalized as local and regional elites have fought since 1825 to “decentralize state power and devolve public investment” (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 36)\(^5\).

Silver production boomed once again starting in the 1860s (from prior reorganization and new capital investments), which, along with rubber tapping in the late 1800s, sustained Bolivia through the loss of its nitrate deposits to Chile (along with its Pacific access) in the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) (Klein 1992, 143-150). However, declining prices a few decades later in silver coincided with a rise in tin demand. As a byproduct of the Bolivian silver mining facilitated by infrastructural transportation investment, tin production became the new primary export of Bolivia, and shifted regional hegemony to La Paz and Oruro (Morales 1992, 6). Accompanying this economic shift was a political shift, where the caudillo-led government was replaced by an oligarchic regime where “the fundamental stabilization and maturation of Bolivian politics after 1880 [until 1934]…derived from basic changes within the Bolivian economy” (Klein 1992; 2006, 144). During this time, landowning and mining elites (silver and tin) dominated politics, and when the silver mining elite solidified into the Conservative political party concerned with political and economic modernization, it interacted mainly in Congress with the tin-dominated Liberal party and generally switched power between governments peacefully (Gamarra and Malloy 1995; Klein

\(^5\) See also Roca (2008), specifically for whom the central issue is regional elite power over elite power in general.
However, government was largely a commodity to be distributed between elite factions and “ambitious” middle class followers, and who was in charge largely depended on who had the resources (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 401).

**State-Society Restructuring (1930-1964)**

“Sensitive to international fluctuations in demand and price, the tin industry followed a boom and bust cycle that threatened government stability and resources” (Morales 1992, 51). In 1929 with the Wall Street crash, the tin market crashed and with it the strong oligarchic two party system as a third Republican Party gained control of the government in 1920 (Morales 1992, 51). A new multiparty system emerged, and when the Republican Party passed unpopular policies that led to popular uprisings of indigenous, workers and miners and subsequent repressions, the new Nationalist Party gained power in 1925 (Morales 1992, 52-53). However, economic depression, unpopular policies, popular uprisings, military repressions, and frequent transfers of power prevented stable policies from being enacted in Bolivia during this depression, and when Bolivia entered the Chaco War in 1932 (in hopes of gaining territory and resources), the political situation went from bad to worse.

In the early 1900s, indigenous, and later campesino (rural peasant), rebellions were common, and the Chaco War brought together indigenous and mestizos in greater numbers than ever before. The loss of land and resources and the immense number of deaths (mostly indigenous on the front lines), due in large part to the mismanagement of the ruling elites, disillusioned a younger generation of cholos, non-military whites, and military reformers, and revealed the gross social injustices of the existing socio-political
This younger generation, inspired by the works of Peruvian ideologue José Carlos Mariátegui, saw the “passivity and backwardness” of the Indian as the direct result of land seizure and cultural destruction by the ancestors of the incompetent white elites (Klein 1992, 197). They viewed the “indigenous peasantry and miners as allies for political change” (Postero 2007, 37) and built a broad “political coalition of veterans, unionized labor, organized peasant syndicates, and student groups,” joined by mobilizing lowland and highland indigenous, and demanded a restructuring of the existing social, political, and economic system (Morales 1992, 57).

Meanwhile, the maneuvering of the oligarchic elites during the Chaco War, economic recession, and changing popular identity following the War led to the formation of new political parties, including the middle-class dominated Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Movement, MNR), Marxist Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left, PIR), and radical Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Revolutionary Workers’ Party, POR) (Morales 1992, 63-64). Military intervention in politics was frequent at this point, as class conflict and political struggle weakened the ability of a stable political coalition and oligarchic elites of one faction or another allied with the military to preserve their interests (Morales 1992, 63-64). However, economic deals made with the United States during World War II radicalized party politics as the depressed economy was forced to accept a $5 million loan package in exchange for favorable tin sales and oil amends for the 1937 Standard Oil seizure (Morales 1992, 66). As traditional political parties lost middle- and upper-class support, and the MNR widened its appeal among the popular sectors, the 1951 elections were polarized between supporters of the status quo and opponents (Morales 1992, 71).
Although the MNR was only a remote contender in the run-off presidential vote in Congress, the President resigned, leaving the election in the hands of the military commander, who annulled the results and led directly to the open revolt of the popular urban-backed MNR in the 1952 Revolution (Morales 1992, 72-73).

Once the MNR gained political control, its restructuring of the existing state-society relationship included universal suffrage, nationalization of the mining industry, agricultural and educational reform, and infrastructure modernization (Klein 1992). This broke the traditional political oligarchy of the landed highland elite and mine owners won support from the masses. However, realizing that its main base of power – the army, labor movement, and peasants – needed to be coopted into the system to reduce the chances of a coup, the Revolutionary government reorganized the three groups. Military power was decentralized to worker and peasant militias, and the Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Workers’ Confederation, COB) and Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (National Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia, CNTCB) were formed to give “general voice” politically to the workers and peasants (Morales 1992, 81-82). In particular, these organizations were created to channel the political demands of the *cholo* (urban indigenous) and *campesino* (rural peasant) populations and held considerable power in the governmental decision-making process (Dunkerley 1984; Klein 1992, 2006).

Motivated by the ideology that social exclusion and lack of education had resulted in the passivity and backwardness of the *indio*, the suffrage, agrarian, and education reforms were all designed to incorporate the indigenous masses into the political system. It was believed that more economic and political opportunities were available if one
spoke Spanish and identified as a *mestizo* (mixed-blood) affiliated with a union, neighborhood, or working organization rather than as an Indian (Postero 2007, 11). Therefore, the government launched a comprehensive *mestizaje* (racial mixing) program designed to realign indigenous identity, forcefully incorporate the indigenous masses into mainstream *mestizo* society, and restructure the state-society relationship to effectively channel popular demand through manageable corporate channels based on rigid party and class lines (Van Cott 2000, 126-127). However, in doing so, the COB was granted “semisovereign status within the state,” and its direct and unmediated interactions with the state would become institutionalized and precedent for future “class, sector, and regional organizational” claims making on the state (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 210). From the 1950s onward, “a consequence of increasing pressures for popular participation and discontinuous state development [due to regional elite competition and economics of boom and bust] has been the state’s delegation of spheres of authority and dimensions of power” in an indirect form of rule that continues the colonial tradition of mediation between competing multiplicities through the creation of new ones (Gray Molina 2008a, 112).

Due to its location and small domestic market, the development of a domestic manufacturing base like other Latin American countries during this time period was not feasible for the new revolutionary government, and early attempts to diversify the economy (nationalizing the mines, land reform in the highlands, and the opening of the eastern lowland regions for agricultural development) required massive amounts of governmental spending (Klein 1992, 238). This resulted in economic turmoil, currency devaluation, high levels of inflation, and increased need to borrow money internationally
to pay for imported food, as agricultural productivity declined (Klein 2006, 218). As a result, United States’ (US) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) sponsored loan packages were solidified in an orthodox “Stabilization Plan” which required an accompanying severe cutback in governmental spending (Klein 1992, 242-243). The COB led an ongoing series of strikes and mobilizations against the governmental policies, yet Bolivia was dependent on the funds from the United States for the continuation of its state-led programs. As the United States was politically against allowing concessions to socialist labor parties, the MNR alienated the COB, who had gained significant power by this time. When factions within the MNR emerged over the role of labor in governmental decision-making, the military was re-centralized and its autonomy returned (Klein 1992, 244). When the party officially split, the factions grasping for political control did not fare well against the reinvigorated military, whose charismatic leader (who also happened to be the current vice president) allied with the peasantry against the labor unions and took control in 1964.


Deepening the tradition of Bolivian politics of pitting one faction against another to keep political challengers weak and supporters mollified, the military governments that took control of Bolivia from 1964-1982 allied with disgruntled eastern regional elites and indigenous peasantry against the ousted MNR and labor unions (Gray Molina 2008a, 112; Roca 2008). Seeking to stabilize the political environment to attract foreign investment and capital, the military took a protectorate role toward middle- and upper-class capitalist interests and undertook intensive “modernization” efforts designed to
depoliticize mass politics and incorporate them into the political system only in a limited and “controlled” manner (Klein 1992, 257). In particular, between 1971 and 1979 the military continued to use international funding through state-led programs designed to “develop” the eastern regions and encourage migration, which reduced demands from the eastern indigenous and elite landowners alike, refocused their attentions on incoming waves of relocating highlanders, and suppressed state demands from the unions and campesinos through force (Dunkerley 1984; Klein 1992, 2006; Kohl and Farthing 2006; Postero 2007; Roca 2008). However, this only served to reawaken regional tensions and factionalism.

For example, in pressuring the revolutionary government for greater development and resource allocation in the 1950s, the eastern region, and Santa Cruz in particular, was the focus of MNR accusations of separatist intentions. Seeing greater opportunity for economic development and opportunity with the military, than with the MNR-union alliance, the lowland European-descended elites and relocated mestizo peasants lent support to the military in 1964 (Roca 2008). They were not disappointed, and state-led development between 1964 and 1982 led to increased regional participation in governmental decision-making and acceptance of neo-capitalist development in the east (Barragán 2008; Roca 2008). In the west, on the other hand, Quechua, Aymara, and mestizo populations predominate who had historically been well organized in peasant and workers’ unions – the urban mining and rural coca sectors being the most powerful (Roca 2008). They were incorporated heavily into the corporatist state structure following the Revolution to channel their demands on the system and enjoyed significant power in governmental decision-making prior to the repression of the military governments (Klein
However, once these class-based channels of claims making were blocked and the unions violently suppressed, old forms of ethnic identity reemerged and new networks formed to reassert indigenousness as a meaningful organizational frame. Highland indigenous demands of communal lands and rights, however, were very different from lowland indigenous demands of individual land titling, and regional tensions between highland (*colla*) indigenous and lowland (*camba*) indigenous were inflamed (Postero 2007).

The economy during military rule largely revolved around minerals, hydrocarbons, sugar, cotton, and coca and boomed in the early 1970s (Klein 2006, 232-233). Investments in infrastructure were made and La Paz and Santa Cruz were modernized. With the ongoing suppression of the unions and international human rights discourse focusing more on indigenous rights, indigenousness became more salient in political organization and led to the Katarista (named for the historical Aymaran leader Tupaj Katari) and Indianist movements of the 1970s and 1980s (Van Cott 2000; Postero 2007). The Kataristas sought greater autonomy within the government for traditional indigenous groups, while the Indianists took a more racial and militant separatist approach (Hylton and Thomson 2007). However, a cyclical economic bust hit in the late 1970s, and as economic recession was accompanied by a devalued national currency, lower real wages, and increasingly intense mass public protests, these indigenous movements allied with general mass protests against governmental corruption and failure to fulfill economic promises. Negotiations over open political elections were discussed as early as 1977, but would not occur until 1982.

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55 Corporatism is defined as a “system of social and political organization in which the state controls, limits, sometimes monopolizes, even *creates* the interest-group life or “civil society” that swirls about it” (Wiarda 2003, 28).
Democratic transition in Bolivia was achieved more in a conciliatory manner as the struggle between state and society became too protracted and strained to produce any other political alternative (Dunkerley 1984, 249-251; Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 157). The early stage of democracy was built upon a “pacted” form of elite coalitional government, where traditionally rigid and hierarchical political parties functioned mainly as mechanisms for distributing patronage spoils to supporters (Gamarra and Malloy 1995). Congressional representation rarely favored one party over another, as seats were proportionally allocated, and Article 90 of the 1967 Bolivian Constitution gave the selection of the President to the divided Congress in the absence of a mass majority vote – which would not occur until 2005 (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 411). Largely divorced from the associational organization of civil society (thanks to the repressive efforts of the military governments), the political parties frequently fought for the political spoils amongst themselves and were pressured more by regional demands from civic committee leaders than by demands from the masses (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, Gamarra and Malloy 1995). Early democratic governance, therefore, was largely a trial by error negotiation between elite party factions and how well they distributed state patronage (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, Gamarra and Malloy 1995; Domingo 2001, 2005; Lazar 2004).

This was painfully apparent in 1982, when the newly elected civilian president, Hernán Siles Zuazo, could accomplish little against competing factional political elites and powerfully channeled corporatist unions but watch economic growth plummet and

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56 In fact, the Bolivian state was largely one of the largest employers from the 1950s until the 1990s and the only stable one when recessions hit (Dunkerley 1984; Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 216). The failure to distribute the spoils of office to loyal party members was often viewed as a betrayal by members and facilitated high electoral volatility and few solid programmic parties (Gamarra and Malloy 1995; Domingo 2001, 2005; Lazar 2004; Madrid 2005).
inflation rise to epic levels of almost 2,000% per annum (Klein 1992, 272). Conceding to popular pressure, new elections were called a year early in 1985. Brokering a pact with Hugo Banzer Suárez and the Acción Democrática y Nacionalista (Democratic and Nationalist Action, ADN) – who actually won more votes in the 1985 elections – Victor Paz Estenssoro’s government (1985-1989) was concerned first and foremost with stabilizing the economy (Gamarra 1996). Due to the political infighting of the previous Siles government, little institutional consolidation or economic stabilization occurred, and the MNR-ADN pact allowed Paz Estenssoro to implement sweeping orthodox austerity measures which stabilized the economy (Malloy and Gamarra 1988; Gamarra 1996). His Nueva Política Económica (New Economic Policy, NPE), implemented through executive decree #21060, devalued the national currency, eliminated wage and price controls, reigned in government spending, and established a uniformed and free-floating exchange rate (Klein 1992, 275). With inflation reduced and politics stabilizing, Paz Estenssoro then began major tax reforms, the reduction of state bureaucracy, and the dismantling of the mining workers’ union (Corporación Minera de Bolivia, COMIBOL) and the state-led capitalist system in general (Klein 1992, 275).

The next government was led by Jaime Paz Zamora of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary Left, MIR) and largely served to deepen the NPE. However, charges of corruption associated with cocaine trafficking and misappropriation of state funds hampered any true reform, and the chief architect of the reforms in the first place, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada of the MNR, ran on a presidential ticket with Aymara leader Victor Hugo Cárdenas of the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari (Tupac Katari Revolutionary Movement, MRTK) and made
pacts with the Unidad Civica Solidaridad (Solidarity Civic Union, UCS) and the Movimiento Bolivia Libre (Free Bolivia Movement, MBL) to secure his congressional presidential appointment (Gamarra 1996; Van Cott 2000). Within this period, as the NPE policies were implemented and deepened, the traditional mining and manufacturing labor sectors power of the COB were reduced, and coca farmers (cocaleros) rose to prominence in the organization. Over the next four years, as Sánchez de Lozada’s Plan de Todos (Plan for All) designed to restructure the economy along liberal open market lines to attract investment, foster job creation, ensure economic stability, combat corruption, and foster a top-down style of democratization was implemented, social movements would begin to realign themselves as they did in the 1930s, and this is where the main analysis of this paper begins (Gamarra 1996, 81; Van Cott 2000). However, a quick overview of this history as it applies to trust, inequality, and power relationships within state-society structuring will conclude this chapter and structure the upcoming narrative.

**Trust, Inequality, and Power**

According to Charles Tilly, three political processes are fundamental to the democratic transformation of state-society relations: the “integration between interpersonal networks of trust and public politics,” the “insulation from public politics of the major categorical inequalities around which citizens organize their daily lives,” and the degree of “autonomy of major power centers such as warlords, patron-client chains, armies, and religious institutions with respect to public politics” (Tilly 2007, 23). They
are also described as connections between trust networks and public politics, social relations among public political participants, and the available forms of participation in public politics as defined by who actually holds political power in the state (Tilly 2007, 80). According to this theory, these three variables interact with each other to broaden popular participation and claims making upon the state, facilitate the equality of citizen demand and political groupings, ensure citizen and demand protection by law and from the state, and mutually bind state and society together through open consultation and mutual respect for the law.

General patterns of inequality reduction and power dispersal associated with democratization are difficult to locate within the historical overview of Bolivia given. Until the Revolution in 1952, the closed social, political, and economic system inherited from colonial Spain protected and perpetuated existing social inequalities. Political power was largely determined by economic cycles of booms and busts and the value of Bolivia’s natural resources on the open global market. Little of this wealth, however, was redistributed back into society. When programs were developed to reduce one categorical inequality, such as racial discrimination through educational reform of the MNR following the Revolution, existing indigenous identity networks were replaced new ones built upon class-based segregation. Instead of reducing social and categorical inequality, the government replaced one form with another. Further military maneuverings against the unions and strong international support for indigenous autonomy between 1964 and 1982 allowed for possibility of increased equality for those once again identifying as indigenous, but the political system remained closed to actual incorporation up until 1993.
The reduction of autonomous power centers vis-à-vis the state also did not occur over the brief history of Bolivia presented. Prior to the Revolution, all political access was determined by the military, oligarchic, or regional faction to which one belonged, and afterwards, the state created and institutionalized new competing autonomous power centers to incorporate labor and peasant interests rather than upsetting the existing competitive structure. The authoritarian period weakened the autonomous power of organized labor, but once again strengthened regional blocks. These trends of social exclusion, persistent inequality, and strength of competing blocks of autonomous political power centers persist into the present day and prove incredibly resilient to change. However, social mobilizations awakened in the early 1900s due to new social realities facing the Bolivian population were important in challenging the existing exclusivity of state-society relations. Political maneuverings of the political elites during this time allowed for student, miners, and laborers to come together, form bonds between their separate groups, and place demands on the government. As their mobilizations became more public, and the repression more severe, a new political party emerged willing to incorporate their demands into its platform. Thus, the MNR linked interpersonal networks of trust with public politics in a deeper manner and began Bolivia’s democratization process. This network incorporation has also reemerged between social movements and political parties in 1993 and 2005 and between social movements and their government as well. Therefore, if democratization is to be found in Bolivia, it will be through a deeper analysis of this relationship (trust networks) over the other two (inequality and autonomous power centers).
CHAPTER FOUR: BOLIVIA AND TRUST NETWORKS

Interpersonal Networks of Trust

For Charles Tilly, trust can be either an attitude or a relationship, and for him, the relationship is what is important for democratization. Trust “consists of placing valued outcomes at risk to others’ malfeasance, mistakes, or failures” and ongoing social engagement in behaviors and practices reliant upon linked groups of like-minded individuals pursuing risky activities, which may or may not result in a benefit to the participants, is key to social learning processes which open spaces for democratization (Tilly 2007, 81). In particular, when these networks of trust become integrated into public politics, it matters less that people are involved in civic associations, and more that they seek recognition and protection from the state for these associations that they created (Tilly 2007, 89). The more socially networked groups of people organize and petition the government for inclusion into or recognition from the system, the greater the potential for associated changes in state conformity to expressed citizen demand. Furthermore, the greater direct citizen participation in public institutions, often channeled through established trust networks, the deeper the integration of these networks into the political system and the more transparent and accountable the system becomes (Avritzer 2002, 2009).
However, that is not to assume that any broad incorporation of large sectors of closely tied individuals into the political system works towards expanding democracy. In fact, the main difference between Tilly’s societal network incorporation into public politics initiated from the bottom-up and corporatist creation and direction of civil society from the top-down is crucial in understanding why risk is so important for his model of democratization. For Tilly, risk is necessary for understanding why people engage in group activities and form networks of trust – they are motivated to assemble and collectively pursue activities with common goals in order to increase their individual chances of success (Tilly 2007, 87). The risk of the unknown brings people together and facilitates the framing process associated with collective identity and trust network formation (Tarrow 1998). However, state created and directed civil society is designed to eliminate the possibility of disruptive network formation, limit risky activity of the masses (with reference to the state), and channel societal identifications away from unsanctioned political participation (Wiarda 2003, 28). It is the opposite of broad and equitable association associated with Tilly’s democracy, and is connected more with the perpetuation of inequalities and powerful autonomous power centers competing for control of the state spoils. Corporate structuring of civil society may create an enforceable relationship of state-society accountability and a moderate guarantee of state protection of demand articulation, but the state does not rely on citizen creation of trust networks. Instead, it creates and enforces them itself, eliminating a large portion of risk to the state and within network participation.

As identified in earlier sections, Tilly’s model of democratization is dependent on interaction with three independent variables. However, Bolivian politics has not shown
much, if any, change in categorical inequality and factional power centers which compete with the state for power. If anything, these have slightly worsened over the time period under consideration. Therefore, if any meaningful movement of democratization is to be found, it will be within the relationship of trust networks to public politics and its effect on broadening, equalizing, gaining protection for, and mutually binding state and society behavior.

In the analytical narratives that follow, the identification of mechanisms facilitating the destruction, creation, and claims making of trust networks as well as signs of their incorporation into public politics will be tracked and used to provide ten total areas of movement opportunity for the independent variable over each presidential or combination of presidential periods analyzed. **Mechanisms,** again, are defined as “events that produce the same immediate effects over a wide range of circumstances” (Tilly 2007, 22). In this analysis, these will include the dissolution of existing segregated trust networks, an enlargement of sectors of the population which lack access to networks for risky (both interpersonal and in relation to the state) endeavors, the appearance of new opportunities and threats that existing networks cannot absorb, the creation of external guarantees for governmental commitments, and the increase of state resources for the protection of risk (Tilly 2007, 197). Signs that networks are being integrated into public politics will include: the public creation of associations, communities, political parties, or unions which have only existed underground; pursuing kinship, friendship, security, and other risky endeavors within such organizations; relying on political agencies for long-term security and vital services; participating in governmental registration of identities, births, deaths, and census activities; and the shift of state behavior away from coercive
actions against collective claims-making towards those of support of the collective wills of the people – including the introduction and use of elections, referenda, lobbying, interest groups, social movements, and public mobilizations (Tilly 2007, 90). Trust network integration findings are summarized in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 found at the end of this chapter and related to democratization in the chapter that follows.

Analytical Narratives

Chronology

Figure 4.3 below includes a chronology of important events to be emphasized in this analysis. Of particular import will be elections, referenda, recalls, public opinions, protest events and trends, presidential interruptions and turnovers, and legislative policies.

| 1993-1997 | Presidency of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (33.8% of the popular vote) with Victor Hugo Cárdenas as the first indigenous vice president; implementation of Plan de Todos policies emphasizing democratic constitutional and ethnic reform, decentralization, privatization, and modernization; experiences an average of 13.1 new social conflicts per month |
| 1997-2001 | Presidency of Hugo Banzer Suárez (22.3% of the vote with a 28.8% abstention rate); implementation of coca eradication plan and Plan Dignidad to curb corruption, overhaul the judicial system, and attack poverty; strikes and roadblocks by coca growers and worker-peasant unions arose in response to coca eradication, a faltering economy, privatization, and massive job layoffs; experiences as average of 28.4 new social conflicts per month |
| 1998 | Congress defeats proposals to legalize more direct methods of democratization, including referenda and plebiscites and the ability to directly elect the 50% of the congressional deputies on party tickets |
1999    Lowest economic growth rate in a decade; passage of the Political Party law which attempts to better regulate party politics (June); political maneuvering to privatize water and sanitation services (Law 2029) including the sale of Cochabamba’s water service to international consortium Aguas del Tunari and Bechtel (September-October); formation of the Coordinadora (Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida, Coalition in Defense of Water and Life) and the beginning of protests against the privatization of Cochabamba’s water supply (November-December)

2000    The continuation and intensification of “Water War” protests in Cochabamba and on the altiplano results in the imposition of martial law and the expulsion of Aguas del Tunari (January-April); continued peasant and cocalero roadblocks cordon off La Paz and stretches of the Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway, and the Coordinadora calls for a Constituent Assembly to reform the constitution (September-October)

2001    The Coordinadora forms the Coordinadora de Mobilizaciones Única Nacional (Coalition for National Mobilizations, COMUNAL) to organize and unify differing protesting sectors of society; ongoing protests and clashes between peasants, indigenous, unions, and governmental and elite departmental police agents (June-September); Banzer resigns a year early due to illness and Vice President Jorge Quiroga Ramírez takes control (August)

2001-2002 President Jorge Quiroga continues the main political and economic policies of the Banzer presidency; his term is affected by a global economic crisis and deepening recession; landless peasant protests deepen; official governmental cancellation of the Cochabamba water privatization project with Bechtel; experiences an average of 29.6 new social conflicts per month

2002    Penal code modification criminalizing many forms of protest (repealed due to popular pressure in 2003) and governmental prohibition of coca grown in the Chapare region; protests shift in general from water rights to coca rights led by Evo Morales (who is ousted from Congress in January and runs for the presidency gaining 20.9% of the vote in June); municipal water company of Cochabamba finalizes water contract between it and the government and begins integrating community participation into the decision-making processes

2002-2003 Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s second presidency (22.5% of the vote); experiences an average of 35.7 new social conflicts per month; inherits a much different state than the one he left plagued by inefficient economic handling and a failures to deepen prior policies

2003    “Black February” protests over proposed income tax increase urged by the IMF and declared by Sánchez de Lozada (then withdrawn); more bloodshed during “Red October” “Gas War” protests over a proposed export of gas from Chilean ports culminate in Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation; Vice President Carlos Mesa Gisbert takes over

2003-2005 Presidency of Carlos Mesa Gisbert; experiences an average of 52.4 new social conflicts per month
2004  President Mesa signs a gas deal with Argentina (April) and holds a referendum in July in response to protests where 80 percent of voters approved the abrogation of the existing Hydrocarbon Law passed under Sánchez de Lozada (Law 1689) and the creation of a new one with greater state involvement (July); mass protests continue over the high price of oil and for regional autonomy in Santa Cruz and El Alto (December-January)

2005  Congress passes a new Hydrocarbon Law raising taxes on gas and oil (for new areas), and Mesa tries to resign but is refused by Congress (March); continued protests force Mesa to resign (again) citing the “ungovernability” of the country (June); Supreme Court President Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé takes over as interim president and calls elections (he experiences an average of 34 new social conflicts per month); Morales wins the elections by a historic 53.7% majority;

2006-2010  Morales becomes Bolivia’s first indigenous President; makes a constituent assembly and a new constitution a priority for his term; experiences an average of 40.4 new social conflicts per month

2006  Nationalization of Bolivia’s Hydrocarbons and Energy sector (May); Constituent Assembly elections to rewrite the constitution (July); national referendum on departmental autonomy is passed in the media luna region and defeated in the remaining five departments (July); clashes continue between regional and class rivals (October); land reform is passed by a narrow margin allowing land expropriation and redistribution to the landless poor (November)

2007  Violent clashes in Sucre and Cochabamba between pro- and anti-Morales supporters (January); Constituent Assembly passes draft of new constitutional charter despite boycott of opposition delegates (December)

2008  National referendums on the new constitution and departmental autonomy are held (June); a national recall referendum supports Morales but replaces two oppositional departmental prefects leading to rioting (August); anti-governmental protests continue in Pando, and Morales expels the US Ambassador (September); Bolivia prevents the entry of US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents (November)

2009  National referendum approves new constitutional charter with 61.4% in favor and over 95% casting valid ballots (January), and it is signed into law (February)

Figure 4.1: Chronology of Important Bolivian Events 1993-2009

Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada

The first presidential term of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and indigenous vice president Victor Hugo Cárdenas resulted in the passage of a number of political reforms which fundamentally altered existing state-society relations. The Plan de Todos (Plan for All) was designed to restructure the economy along neoliberal open market lines to attract investment, foster job creation, ensure economic stability, combat corruption, and foster a top-down style of democratization (Gamarra 1996, 81; Van Cott 2000, 146-148). The most important reforms included the Laws of Capitalization, Constitutional Reform, Popular Participation, Civic Associations and Indigenous Peoples, and Educational Reform in 1994, the Law of Administrative Decentralization in 1995, and the Agrarian Reform and Hydrocarbon Laws in 1996. For this analysis, the Laws of Capitalization, Constitutional Reform, Popular Participation, and Educational Reform had the most impact on interpersonal networks of trust and public politics as they facilitated public reliance on political agencies for long-term security and vital services, dissolved existing segregated trust networks (and therefore opening spaces for the creation of new ones), strengthened trust networks between indigenous groups and the state through the incorporation of political and educational demands, fashioned an (theoretically) accountable municipal system of developmental and political participation, and raised the quality of education facilitating access, benefits, and participation.

The Law of Capitalization allowed for the sale of state-run enterprises (with 50% remaining in Bolivian hands) dating to the Revolution, and was designed to provide more resources, especially for the provision of the pension system, for the state (Gamarra 1996, 81; Morales 2001, 54; Kohl 2004, 898). However, what resulted was massive worker
layoffs, further emasculation of the corporate workers’ associations begun under the economic restructuring under Paz Estenssoro, the enlargement of the obrero (worker) sector of the population lacking network access to the government, and exacerbated threats to existing networks which the political situation could not absorb. This is demonstrated through the rise in protests of public employees (10.6%), teachers and students (16.7%), workers (25.2%), unaffiliated and heterogeneous groupings of citizenry “in general” (12%), and cocaleros and campesinos (4.9%) expressly rejecting recent laws passed (31.1%), demanding further reform (9%), rejecting state support of international business at the expense of other groups (9.2%), and expressing economic demands (28.7%) (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 47-48). This culminated on April 18, 1995 in a declaration of a state of siege in April for 180 days, but was largely supported in public opinion polls as people wanted stability and safety (Gamarra 1996, 95-96; Muñoz-Pogossian 2008, 101-102).

The Law of Constitutional Reform amended the constitution to include indigenous demands of pluriethnic recognition, judicial reform, a narrower congressional procedure for the election of the President if no majority is received in first round voting, and the mixing of representation in the lower house through a proportional representation (plurinominal) and the direct election of representatives from single member districts (uninominal) [refined in 1996] (Gamarra 1996; Van Cott 2000, 143; Domingo 2001, 150; Muñoz-Pogossian 2008, 98). The indigenous inclusions in modifications to Articles 1 and 171 are the most important indicators for strengthening trust networks between indigenous associational demands and the government (Van Cott 2000, 176). However, the presidential electoral reform was designed to dissuade political deadlock (as occurred
in Paz Zamora’s largely ineffective term) and facilitate the strengthening of state capacity, while the congressional reforms were designed to increase the representation of the general populace (Gamarra 1996). If election results are any indicator, between 1993 and 1997, voter turnout remained steady around 71-72%, but the votes as a percentage of the voting age population rose from 50% to 64.5%.\footnote{All election results located within this body of analysis will reflect data from Bolivia’s Corte Nacional Electoral electronic homepage located at http://www.cne.org.bo and the Political Database of the Americas available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Bolivia/bolivia.html. The PDBA obtained its figures directly from CNE, and as the CNE website ceased functioning in September of 2011, data that was compiled and used by the researcher includes original data from both sources. It has been checked against other sources for accuracy and will attributed to the CNE.} Regardless of an increased drive to register voters between 1996 and 1997, the almost 15% increase is indicative of a higher number of people involving themselves in the electoral institution (Van Cott 2000, 188). Bolivian voting may be compulsory, but it is rarely enforced and not well-tracked until new electronic systems were put into place for the 2009 elections.

The Law of Popular Participation (LPP) was designed to “articulate civil society to government at the community level” and conferred state decision-making, oversight, and developmental funding to 311 population and community-based municipalities with their own mayors and elected councils (Gamarra 1996,84-85; Van Cott 2000, 154-157). However, in granting greater leverage of decision-making to the community-level, the entrenched departmental elites protested a perceived waning of political power, especially in Tarija (Gamarra 1996, 96). This marks the beginning of a reinvigorated rift between the traditional regional conflicts between the media luna region and the rest of Bolivia, which will culminate in 2008 with the constitutional reform proceedings. The LPP was largely created in secret, although representatives from existing unions and organizations were consulted, and pushed through Congress with Sánchez de Lozada’s
majority. This initially upset the masses and increased protests against governmental reforms (31% of the total protests during Sánchez de Lozada’s term as stated above).

Over time, the LPP has resulted in increased indigenous and peasant political representation in local politics (23.5% of the municipalities elected a majority of indigenous and campesino members in 1995 [Van Cott 2000, 188]), greater citizen participation in decision-making and oversight, eliminated the need for a non-governmental organization to act as an intermediary for the acquisition of national and international development funds, and a redistribution of resources from urban to rural areas (Van Cott 2000; Gray Molina 2001; Medeiros 2001; Kohl 2003). These, in turn, have fostered support for governmental institutions (fiscal and political), publically created new associations and networks for political incorporation, incorporated existing, but excluded, indigenous community and municipal trust networks into public politics, and allowed for the petitioning of the state for new contracts and obligations. Moreover, the Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Unitary Syndicated Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers, CSUTCB) recognized that grassroots groups ordinarily at odds with the unions now gained equal political status and moved to “radicalize popular participation to the extreme” and build new networks to contest unfair existing practices (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 133). Its overall “success,” has been debated, however, as women have lost representation with the increased weight of indigenous traditions, racist and class cleavages continue to dominate politics, and
partisan conflicts are exacerbated as mayors are removed before their terms are up due to changing political whims of the councils.\textsuperscript{58}

Finally, the Law of Educational Reform was passed in 1995 and sought to strengthen Bolivia’s school system, facilitate greater participation by those involved, and incorporate linguistic and education rights for indigenous peoples (Gamarra 1996, 84; Van Cott 2000, 177; Ruiz-Mier 2001, 127). Furthermore, it fostered the solidification of trust networks between state and society by linking “municipal, provincial, departmental, and national citizens’ groups with the national education secretary” (Gamarra 1996, 84). Implemented with a 7-year timeframe, the literacy rate between 1993 and 2001 jumped nearly 7%, and educational persistence in the completion of primary school rose from 77.2% in 1998 to 83.6% in 2007.\textsuperscript{59} The indigenous have been especially receptive to educational opportunities in their native languages and increased oversight, although the teachers feared the loss of job security and salaries and were claimants in 11% of the protests during Sánchez de Loada’s term in office (Albó 1996, 19; Van Cott 2000, 199; Kohl and Farthing 2006, 99; Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 47).

In summary, many of the laws passed within the Sánchez de Lozada term involved the mechanisms and signs associated with fostering networks of trust. The continuation of the neoliberal restructuring of the state seen in the Law of Capitalization, coca eradication efforts, and the Hydrocarbons law exacerbated threats to existing networks which the political situation could not absorb, weakened deteriorating corporate obrero (worker) networks, and enlarged the unrepresented sectors. However, the pension

\textsuperscript{58} See, for example, Van Cott (187-188, 2000); Kohl (2002), Hiskey and Seligson (2003), Roper (2003), Kohl and Farthing (2006), Seligson (2006b), and Postero (2007) for deeper discussion on these continued issues in Bolivia.

\textsuperscript{59} All demographic data, unless otherwise noted, can be obtained from the World Bank Group’s online publicly accessible database at http://data.worldbank.org/
system was reformed and increased state resources for the protection of economic risk associated with removal from the labor force due to age and infirmity. Furthermore, the constitutional reforms, LPP, and education reform collectively facilitated public reliance on state institutions for long-term security and vital services, opened spaces for the creation of new indigenous and community based networks, strengthened existing linkages between indigenous groups and the state through the incorporation of long standing political and educational demands, enlarged the number of opportunities available for direct public participation and oversight, and raised the quality of education facilitating future access, benefits, and participation. Sánchez de Lozada did not shy away from using coercive state means against protesters, however, and this would intensify under the presidency of Hugo Banzer Suárez.

**Hugo Banzer Suárez and Jorge Quiroga Ramirez**

In 1997, Banzer (ADN) was elected by the Congress as the President following a run off with the MNR representative. He received 22.3% of the popular vote, although abstention was high at 28.8% in a country where voting is compulsory (CNE; Van Cott 2000, 206). Due to the resulting lack of congressional seats, Banzer pacted with the MIR, UCS, and CONDEPA (Conciencia de Patria, Conscience of the Fatherland party) and allied against the MNR and MBL (Movimiento Bolivia Libre, Free Bolivia Movement party) representatives (Van Cott 2000, 206). However, political infighting largely paralyzed his government in the first eighteen months, the economy worsened as global crises in Russia and Asia expanded outward, and most of his first half term in office was spent drafting the judicial, economic, and other political reforms which would

Although his Plan Dignidad (Dignity Plan) was officially based on opportunity, institutionality, dignity, and equality, Banzer emphasized coca eradication, judicial reform, departmental strengthening, and the battling of corruption charges within his government (Van Cott 2000; Assies and Salman 2005; Muñoz-Pogossian 2008; Morales 2010). These did little to create or strengthen interpersonal networks of trust (as he largely ignored municipal demands, the newly enshrined multiethnic discourse, and campesino land rights) and congressional rejection of democratic oversight mechanisms (such as referenda and the direct election of congressional deputies) deepened political mistrust (Van Cott 2000, 218). However, judicial reform was an important step towards an expanded ability for the people to petition the state for the enforcement of private contracts and laws, external guarantees for governmental commitment, and an increase in state resources for the protection of risk (one of the eight signs and two mechanisms associated with the deepening trust networks). Reform highlights were the creation of a Constitutional Tribunal to adjudicate rights enshrined in the constitution and a People’s Defender to address and mediate between state-society grievances (Van Cott 2000, 207-210). An additional clause existed for the harmonization of indigenous and state law codes, but Banzer largely ignored it and turned his energies to coca eradication, regional elites, and the deepening economic crisis.

Upset over the amplified efforts at coca eradication under the “zero coca” policy without the alternative cultivation options guaranteed by Law 1008 and the hostile governmental channels that farmers are forced to navigate, Banzer’s intensive
criminalization of coca and militarized eradication program greatly exacerbated tensions between the government and the *cocaleros* (Assies 2003; Dangl 2007, 45; Muñoz-Pogossian 2008, 108). Traditionally, the coca unions were the strongest in the Chapare region following the land distribution programs of the 1960s and 80s. Like the peasant unions, the coca workers’ unions acted as local governments in the absence of a strong state, and often provided social services and mediated conflict between member societies (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 156-157). However, the US-led forced eradication of the crop, seen as an inherent indigenous symbol, became increasingly unpopular as differing regimes showed differing levels of commitment, and the LPP allowed the unions to expand their trust networks and gain additional political rights.

Out of the *campesino* federations of Cochabamba came the Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Assembly for the Sovereignty of the Peoples, ASP), which secured 11 mayorships and 47 municipal council seats in the 1995 municipal elections (Assies and Salman 2005, 283). In order to run in the 1997 elections, it allied with the Izquierda Unida (United Left, IU) as an existing party, and Juan “Evo” Morales Ayma, an influential *cocalero* leader, was elected to Congress (Assies and Salman 2005, 284). Following a leadership dispute in 1998, with radical separatist Indianist leader, Felipe Quispe of the CSUTCB, and ASP leadership, Morales realigned himself and the Instrumento Político para la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples, IPSP) with the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Towards Socialism, MAS) party and had a strong showing in the 1999 municipal elections (Van Cott 2003; Dangle 2007, 49). Both Morales and Quispe would be
instrumental in leading protests that would join urban worker and neighborhood organizations and challenge the existing state-society relations as never before.

In 1999, economic growth per capita plummeted to -1.64% and only 14% of the general population believed that the economy would strengthen in the future (World Bank; Latinobarómetro 1999-2000). Protests erupted, in primarily urban centers (70%), with an average of 28.4 new events per month during Banzer’s term (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 50). Marches and demonstrations (36.9%), hunger strikes (18%), temporary labor strikes (12.4%), and road blockades (13.3%) represented the majority of the protest methods amongst public employees (12.4%), teachers and students (14.5%), citizenry in general (14.1%), workers (10.5%), popular urban sectors (7.5%), campesinos (5%), unaffiliated protesters (18.5%), and the cocaleros (3%) (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 50-51, 87). Claims were mainly directed against the state (54.8%) and focused on the economy (35.6%), political demands (25.1%) including a rejection of state policies (16.1%) and the demand for reform of existing policies (8.9%), and compliance with state laws (7.7%) (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 51).

Specifically, protest under the Banzer presidency culminated in 2000 with the “Water War” and October protests. Banzer’s political maneuvering to privatize and sell Cochabamba’s water and sanitation systems to Aguas del Tunari led by an international water consortium called Bechtel in September and October of 1999 led to the creation and solidification of new organizational networks to channel public outrage (Olivera and Lewis 2004). Led by Oscar Olivera, the Coordinadora (Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida, Coalition in Defense of Water and Life) united disgruntled irrigation communities.

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60 It is worth noting that although cocalero protests represent a small portion of the overall number, the total number of cocalero protest events, 41, is the highest of any presidential term between 1970 and 2008 (Laserna and Villarroel 2008).
farmers, factory union leaders, environmental groups, teachers, blue-collar factory workers, ordinary citizens, and unemployed public employees to claim space in the decision-making process and “give real content to democracy” (Olivera 2004, 28-29). Using a town-meeting style of decision-making, the *Coordinadora* facilitated mass organization and political learning; trust networks were built through solidarity and a shared feeling of governmental betrayal.

In January of 2000 strikes and blockades in Cochabamba began; the police were called in by February and the *cocaleros* mobilized in support (Olivera 2004, 35). In March, the *Coordinadora* called a popular referendum (the country’s first) and gathered over 50,000 votes to expel *Aguas del Tunari* but the government had no intention of negotiating, especially outside of official channels (Assies 2003; Olivera 2004, 36). Town meetings, the distribution of communiques, and assemblies were held to deliberate the policies and conditions of the people as well as articulate demands. In April, Olivera was jailed a state of emergency soon followed (Olivera 2004, 38-42; Perreault 2006, 158). The escalation of force, matched by an equal escalation of protests ended in the announcement of the cancellation of the water contract and an impending creation of one with the municipal water organization (Perreault 2006). These protests and overall experience taught the populace two important lessons: there is strength in numbers, and democracy can work at a popular level.

Meanwhile, the *cocaleros* initially cooperated with voluntary coca eradication and governmental assistance with alternative growing strategies. However, Banzer’s “amplified” militarization strategy fueled tensions, and roadblocks began in April of 1998. Governmental repression of the Water War protests escalated the violence on all
fronts (Assies and Salman 2005, 284). In September, a teacher’s march from Oruro to La Paz (180 miles) was joined by students and pensioners when it reached the city (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 168). Then, in October, road blockades paralyzed the country as _cocaleros_ led by Morales and indigenous led by Quispe joined the _campesinos_, teachers, and workers and mobilized en mass again to make their various demands heard (Farthing and Kohl 2001). The government gave in to the _cocaleros_ and the _campesinos_, promising a better dialogue and acknowledging that the “discontented sectors do not feel listened to, attended to, or represented” by the existing system (Farthing and Kohl 2001, 11; Whitehead 2001, 14).

By August of 2001, Banzer’s health has deteriorated to the point where he had to resign the presidency to his Vice President, Jorge Quiroga Ramirez. In the midst of a continuing recession, Quiroga continued to deepen neoliberal policies and used force to repress continuing protests (Olivera 2004, 146). In particular, regional elites pressured the government into negotiations which resulted in loan forgiveness and land grants in protected parks and reserves (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 170). This infuriated the lowland Movimiento Sin Tierra (Landless Peasant Movement, MST) and led to increased landless, _campesino_, and _cocalero_ protests accompanied by brutal repression (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 170). Quiroga’s presidency was characterized by an average new social conflict rate of 29.6 new events per month and peaking in November and July (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 53). Claims against the state fell to 47.6% and claims against local departments rose to 17.2% (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 55). Most actors, forms of protest, and demands reflect the Banzer period. One other point of note for Quiroga’s brief term was his plan to export Bolivia’s gas through Chile for sale to the US. The
purchase of the gas, in its raw form from Bolivia would be low compared to what it would be sold for in the US. This decision would have serious consequences for the state in the coming years as Bolivia’s animosity towards Chile dating back to the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) has not lessened with time, and this policy program would only salt old wounds (Dangl 2007, 121).

To summarize the Banzer-Quiroga period of governance, neoliberal policies deepened along with an economic crisis and militarized coca eradication. Governmental decisions to strengthen departmental elites combined with the prior restructuring to confuse emerging municipal actors, but new networks of alliance were formed as Cochabamba’s water and sanitation system was privatized as well as the LPP deepened. While mass confidence in institutions was falling, confidence in its own (mass popular) political ability was growing (Olivera 2004). As solidarity was forged among traditionally segregated groupings, a new “multitude” identity awoke (García Linera 2004). If the policies, municipal elections, and resulting protests are evaluated with respect to our signs and mechanisms of trust networks, it is clear that the indigenous and marginalized sectors gained a foothold in public politics through political parties, new risky endeavors were pursued in collective protest activities in Cochabamba and other sites of protest, the national census recorded a 91.4% citizen registration of births (important as a sign of trust network integration as citizens participate in state programs to register births and census initiatives), and judicial reform opened new areas for the addressing of human rights abuses and the mediation of state-society conflict as well as created external guarantees (theoretically) for governmental commitments and the protection of risky endeavors (INE 2001). The privatization of Cochabamba’s water also
enlarged population lacking access to networks for risky activities, as it removed them from the traditional rotational caretaking system that the inhabitants had communally fashioned.

During this period, conflict participants shifted from emphasizing the middle sectors, workers, citizenry in general, and cocaleros during Sánchez de Lozada’s term to a growing importance for unaffiliated groupings not so easily defined by the traditional labels and overall reduction of a general working identity (18.5% for Banzer and 15.5% for Quiroga for “other” and popular sector protest replacing worker affiliations during Quiroga’s term) (Laserna and Villarroel 2008). The deepening economic crisis and harsh governmental repression also hint at the appearance of new opportunities and threats that existing networks cannot absorb. This will come to fruition with Sánchez de Lozada’s second term.

**Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, Carlos Mesa Gisbert, and Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé**

In January of 2002, before the end of Mesa’s term, the Ethics Commission of the Chamber of Deputies voted to expel Evo Morales from Congress due to his anti-governmental actions in protest activities (Lewis 2004; Assies and Salman 2005). Meant to weaken the cocalero movement, it instead, galvanized the masses that saw him as one of their own and was considered to be the “most-voted” deputy in Congress (Van Cott 2003, 772). In the 2002 presidential race, when the US Ambassador warned the public not to vote for someone affiliated with “drug trafficking and terrorism,” public opinion suddenly shifted towards MAS and Evo Morales came in second place, with 20% of the popular vote and just 1.5 percentage points behind Sánchez de Lozada (Van Cott 2002,
Felipe Quispe’s militant indigenous political party, the Movimiento Indigena Pachakuti (Indigenous Pachakuti Movement, MIP) also received 6% of the vote (Van Cott 2002, 2003). Sánchez de Lozada gathered the traditional parties (MIR, UCS, and AND) in a “Co-Government for National Responsibility” pact that would keep the legislative block of elites intact, but just barely (Van Cott 2002, 1). What the pact also did was emphasize to the public how biased Bolivia’s government was towards the traditional classes and how little public demand was actually channeled through the political parties (Van Cott 2003). Public opinion polls\(^{61}\) showed that confidence in the political party system went from 54.3% in 1998 to the lowest captured 28.4% in 2002. Governmental confidence in general did not score much higher with a 53.8% confidence rating in 1996 and a 48% in 2002. This is deeply indicative of a political system losing legitimacy with the masses.

Overall, Sánchez de Lozada’s second term in office was characterized by a crisis of state-society relations as disenchantment with continuing neoliberal governmental economic policies reached a critical point (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 55). His policies included a tax restructuring plan, the open seeking and lobbying for free trade agreements, and continued natural gas export negotiations with Chile, and were extremely unpopular with the masses (Salman 2007). Furthermore, the military was often used to violently disband protests and enforce the wishes of the executive. Comments such as, “These problems and difficulties are born of what I consider a very radical group in Bolivian society that believes they can govern from the streets and not from Congress of the institutions,” and, “I will not resign from the presidency because my wife wants to keep on being the first lady of the nation” did not help his cause and

\(^{61}\) Latinobarómetro data can be accessed publically at http://www.latinobarometro.org
deepened public views that their representatives were out of touch with the realities of the nation (Sánchez de Lozada as qtd. in Dangl 2007, 124, 125).

In 2002, the annual growth rate per capita remained below 1%, the distribution of wealth was the most unequal of any country of the world, and over 90% of rural indigenous persons lived in poverty (World Bank; Hylton and Thomson 2007, 107). New average monthly protests rose to 35.7 and were concentrated overwhelmingly in the urban areas of the state (68.1%) (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 56). Middle sector protest rose to a high of 40% (public employees [11.6%], students and teachers [17.3%], and small business owners [4.8%]), with the heterogeneous and not specifically affiliated “others” (13.5%), general citizenry (11.2%), and campesinos (8.7%) in alliance. Economic demands (27.8%), political articulations (22.8%), social demands (18.9%), state support demands (10.4%) and democratic demands (9.7%) were manifested primarily through marches and demonstrations (29.9%), seizures and occupations (18.5%), hunger strikes (18%), blockades (17%), and temporary strikes (7.7%) (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 57-59). October of 2002 and February, June-July, and October of 2003 were the most intensive periods of protest and claims were largely made against the ongoing governmental policy to privatize Bolivia’s natural resources, governmental subservience to the international financial institutions, and general lack of governmental accountability to the people (Barr 2005; Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 56).

A new tax plan, urged by the IMF, was announced by Sánchez de Lozada in February of 2003 and was designed to reduce budget deficit by raising income taxes to a flat 12.5% on salaries over 880 Bolivianos (around $115) (Assies and Salman 2003). Instead, it was estimated that a 30% salary reduction would occur for a large number of
middle class workers, and led to the creation of a virtual civil war between the masses, now including striking police, and the military, believed to be protecting IMF interests (Assies and Salman 2003; Kohl and Farthing 2006, 173; Dangl 2007, 77). Following military violence on protestors outside of the presidential palace, governmental buildings were set on fire in La Paz and El Alto (Assies and Salman 2003; Lewis 2004, 168-169; Kohl and Farthing 2006, 172; Hylton and Thomson 2007, 109). At least 35 people were killed and over 250 seriously injured in the clashes, and as the government passed a “code of citizenry” prohibiting blockades alongside a different tax system “modernization” and resumed talks to export natural gas through Chile, the networks that led to the state-wide protests in 2000 were reactivated and the system broke down in October (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005, 193-194).

Between the 2000 water protests and the 2003 gas protests, Bolivian civil society awakened and interpersonal trust networks strengthened between large sectors of normally segregated society. Traditional networks of obreros, miners, and teachers (from the 1930s) were joined by new networks of water-consumers, cocaleros, campesinos, pensioners, and transportistas as livelihoods continued to deteriorate and the government only seemed to listen to the citizens’ demands when they took to the streets (Assies and Salman 2003, 151). This demand focused primarily on access to Bolivia’s patrimony – coca, gas, land, water, and a constituent assembly to re-found the nation – while Quispe and Morales, from their places within the political institution, urged a repeal of the tax and a cabinet reshuffling (Assies and Salman 2003, 155; Olivera 2004). In addition to mass street protests and parliamentary workings by minority party members, a new gas Coordinadora was created from the original to channel popular discontent through the
organization of these differing subgroups of society and apply pressure to the government (Olivera 2004; Lazar and McNeish 2006). National conflict events incorporating the entire state-society relationship represented 6% of all conflicts during Sánchez de Lozada’s term, and working through existing networks of organization, the new Coordinadora unified “the multitude” under a common banner of exclusion (Lazar 2006; Perreault 2006). This was facilitated by an intensive history of neighborhood organizing in El Alto, the resurgence of labor union organizing, and political support by newly elected leftist and indigenous representatives.

In September, ongoing strikes and roadblocks around La Paz and El Alto, along with solidarity hunger strikes led by Quispe, won sympathy with the urban workers and a national dialog on economic transformation was initiated (Perreault 2006). National dialogues with the government were failing and a confrontation in September between military and campesinos resulted in seven deaths and unified and radicalized the altiplano region (Lazar 2006, 184; Perreault 2006, 162). By October, approval ratings for Sánchez de Lozada stood around 8%, and tensions ran high (Hylton 2003). His continued backing of gas export through Chile ignored the demands of the masses to look to Peru, instead, and the decision to call for a referendum on the issue came too late. When a protest in primarily Aymaran El Alto of neighborhood associations, woman leaders, and transportation workers led to violence, word spread quickly (Lazar 2006). Soon, urban neighborhood associations, pensioners, students, school teachers, small entrepreneurs, miners, campesinos, cocaleros, and even some political elites throughout the country mobilized with calls for the “re-founding of the country” denying ongoing governmental privatization of Bolivia’s patrimony, challenging a system that sanctioned violence
against citizens expressing their views against a closed system, and demanding the resignation of the President (Lazar 2006, 184; Perreault 2006, 163; Albó 2007). When the military finally withdrew its support of Sánchez de Lozada on October 17, 2003, he had already resigned and was on his way to Miami (Perreault 2006, 163-164). Over eighty people had died in the “gas war” alone at the hands of the military, and Carlos Mesa Gisbert, the Vice President, was sworn into the office that evening.

Immediately promising a referendum on the gas issue, the passage of a more favorable hydrocarbons law, and the formation of a constituent assembly to reform the Constitution, Mesa formed a tentative alliance with Evo Morales and MAS to ensure “breathing space” in which to work with a government to be formed largely of “independents” (Assies and Salman 2003, 156; Perreault 2006, 164). Governing without a legislative coalition, however, while relying on an image of a political outsider proved difficult, and he relied heavily on more traditional forms of nationalist-populist appeal to the general public when legislative difficulties ensued (Centellas 2008). One important reform that did get passed in June of 2004, however, was the Referendum Law. This binding law allowed referendums to be propagated at the executive, legislative, departmental, municipal, and citizen-levels, with the greatest amount of initiation authority (both proactive and reactive) in the executive and legislative (Breuer 2008, 17). In particular, initiatives were allowed for citizen-based proactive constitutional (citizen-driven change, such as a constituent assembly) and reactive abrogative initiatives (recall voting), mandatory and binding referendums, and proactively triggered congressional referendums (popular voting on Congressional proposals) (Breuer 2008, 4-5). This was a necessary step in the actualization of a hydrocarbons referendum, but also very important
constitutionally for Bolivia, as it was one of the only South American countries up to this point to not have any institutions of direct democracy.\textsuperscript{62} At the same time, the Constitution was also changed to allow for groupings of citizens and indigenous to gain registration with the Corte Nacional Electoral to run against political parties in elections (Hochstetler and Friedman 2008). Indigenous and civil society organizations (CSOs) remained wary of its potential as it simply allowed for their incorporation into the existing ineffective system, but this provision marks a definite first step in changing a society with very little trust in traditional political parties (Hochstetler and Friedman 2008, 11).

Sensitive to deepening overt political pressure by the \textit{media luna} elites, Mesa ensured the careful wording of the July hydrocarbons referendum to prevent the nationalization, but proposed higher taxes and greater state involvement (Salman 2007; Hylton and Thomson 2007).\textsuperscript{63} Even with an abstention rate of 60 percent, the measure passed, but upset parties on both sides – the \textit{media luna} elites who wanted a greater share of the hydrocarbon revenue and continued profit from international investment in their region and the mass public who wanted state nationalization and development redistribution (Salman 2006; Breuer 2008, 17). Particular and party interests re-emerged and municipal elections held in 2004 were largely a victory for MAS as political fragmentation and bickering characterized the rest, but they still only garnered 18\% of the vote (Hylton and Thomson 2007, 120).

\textsuperscript{62} Brazil and Paraguay are the only other two Latin South American countries not to have any institutions of direct democracy provisioned in their constitutions as of 2004 (Breuer 2008).

\textsuperscript{63} Again, as stated earlier in the historical Bolivia section, the \textit{media luna} departments are Tarija, Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando. They are so named for the crescent shape that they form in the eastern portion of Bolivia. They are lower in altitude than the mining highland region, have been traditionally less settled, and contain the vast majority of Bolivia’s wealth – forestry, agriculture, and hydrocarbons.
In January of 2005 political protests returned with a vengeance. A second Water War erupted in El Alto organized by the local urban popular association demanding the expulsion of a French water consortium, Agaus de Illimani, to which Mesa agreed (Webber 2005). Upset by the resurrection of nationalization and constituent assembly demands, however, the extreme right elites of the media luna region mobilized themselves demanding greater autonomy, private property protections, and control over the hydrocarbon deposits in their regions (Webber 2005; Hylton and Thomson 2007; Centellas 2008). In response, Mesa gave support to the Santa Cruz demands and embraced support for the multinationals and entrepreneurs, which, of course, exacerbated tensions with the other side. By March of 2005, Mesa had broken all alliances with the popular and non-traditional sectors, and as blockades spread and intensified throughout the state, the traditional parties, their interests secured, rallied to his defense (Hylton and Thomson 2007). In response, an unusual coalescing of normally segregated groups, leaders from the COB, MST, CSUTCB, Coordinadora, as well as Quispe and Morales met and went back to the streets en masse, effectively sealing off most major cities and shutting down 7 of the 9 departments (Hylton and Thomson 2007, 123). Nonetheless, the new Hydrocarbons Law eventually passed in March from the House to the Senate and protests quieted for a couple of months.

Increased traditional elite political maneuvering and Mesa’s public appeal for peace and the cessation of “undemocratic” popular movements, however, led to another round of protests beginning in mid-May in El Alto and La Paz (Webber 2005). This would become known as the second Gas War, as diverse sectors of the popular national front came back together and petitioned for the nationalization of gas, a temporary
shutdown of parliament, and Mesa’s resignation; demands for a constituent assembly were included as well (Webber 2005). When Mesa responded with the promulgation of the new law, which only set treasury royalties at 18% and rent taxes at 32%, popular sectors began the organization process that would culminate in resource (gas and oil) occupations in the highlands and lowlands, the effective shut down of eight of the nine departments, intense clashes between highland and lowland supporters, and the resignation of Mesa on June 6, 2005 (Webber 2005).

When the data is examined for Mesa’s short term, 2004 actually had the highest number of protests (654) of any year since 1970, except for 1984, as the popular masses and elites alike protested in the streets to make their claims upon the state in reference to the country’s hydrocarbons policy (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 82). On average, 52.4 new protests each month were registered and spread pretty evenly between Cochabamba (29.6%), La Paz (25.7%), and Santa Cruz (25.4%) (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 60). Middle sector public employees, transportation workers, and students made up the majority of the 28.3% of protestors, with unaffiliated grouped “others” (18.6%), campesinos (14.9%), and the popular urban sectors (12.4%) following. Protestors expressed a rejection of the government and its policies (15.1%), sought changes in laws and regulations (18.7%), economic demands (21.1%), land disputes (10.3%), and greater respect for laws in force (8.5%) (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 61). Marches and mobilizations (29.3%), blockades (24.8%), seizures and occupations (21.2%), and hunger strikes (12%) were the main forms of protest (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 62).

Following Mesa’s resignation, intense fighting over who would be the next in succession erupted, as the popular sectors were vehemently opposed to both the current
President of the Senate and of the lower house. They had shed much blood over the continuation of elite politics as usual, and would not have a prolongation of the same, even if only until elections were called. A series of clashes between miners and police, that left one miner dead, resolved the issue, and the president of the Supreme Court, Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé, would take control on the condition that early elections be called as soon as possible (Webber 2005). He was sworn in on June 9, 2005, early elections were approved by Congress in July and called for December 18 (for all 157 elected positions within Congress), and political maneuverings continued along the traditionally fractured lines vying for position in what would come to be a historic government (Breuer 2008). Street protests continued, but did not affect the functioning of the government at this time and only averaged about one a day (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 63).

In summary, the turbulent political years encompassing the terms of Sánchez de Lozada (his second), Carlos Mesa, and Eduardo Rodríguez were characterized by a crisis of governability (defined as the “capacity of the state to make and execute decisions” [Van Cott 2000, 2]). Disenchanted with the neoliberal model so popular with international financial institutions and large business owners, the popular sectors made their wishes known by giving Morales a chance at the presidency in a runoff with Sánchez de Lozada. However, as the political elites brokered deals to block the threatening MAS party, the people realized that their effective political voice did not count for much and took to the streets. For Quispe and the MIP and Morales and the MAS, when political channels were open, they took advantage of the situation to lobby their views for change. On the other hand, when they were blocked by elite
maneuvering, the leaders took their political parties to the streets. Mesa managed to implement a few constitutional changes which broke definitively with traditional political opinion toward mass participation in political decision-making and opportunity, but these years largely deepened the protest-negotiation-agreement cycle of politics as usual in Bolivia as the government reneged on deals brokered outside official political channels, renewed protest ensued, violence erupted, and the ability of the demands to be recycled back into the system broke down (Lazar 2006, 185). Political support for the government across the board hit all-time lows in 2002 (Latinobarómetro).

Many of the mechanisms which emerged in the Banzer-Quiroga terms were deepened during the Sánchez de Lozada-Mesa-Rodríguez period. For example, the realignment of many formerly unionized workers following massive layoffs during the 1980s and 1990s (resulting in the weakening and effective dissolution of their existing trust networks) facilitated the enlargement of popular sectors lacking access to networks for risky activities. Furthermore, the sluggish economy (real GDP growth per capita remained below 1% until 2004 and still remained below the growth rate seen in the mid-1990s) and increased threat of continued political segregation dissolved much of the remaining segregation between the former corporate and antagonistic sectors of popular society (World Bank). New national bodies were created to channel popular demand and the Coordinadora (reconstructed to deal with the gas crises in 2003 and 2005) joined with MAS, MIP, COB, CSUTCB, MST, and even the Federación de Juntas Vecinales (Federation of Neighborhood Associations, FEJUVE) and the Confederación de Obreros Regionales (Confederation of Regional Workers, COR) to gather their members and create a situation in 2003 and 2005 in which the people – *el pueblo* – made the decisions
and the leaders simply “obeyed” (Lazar 2006). In this way, the governability crisis represented both an opportunity (for mass mobilizations and identity formation) and a threat (to entrenched interests) which the system could not absorb (resulting in presidential oustings). Although these mechanisms did not lead to many signs of deepening state-society linkages, they did result in Mesa’s shift of state behavior away from coercive actions against collective claims-making towards those of support of the collective wills of the people – particularly through the constitutional extension of citizen rights to constituent assembly, citizens’ legislative initiatives and the referendum (Breuer 2008). This was a significant step in officially recognizing institutions of direct democracy for Bolivia and creating lasting networks of trust between the state and society. However, these moves also heightened many regional and indigenous identities which had primarily existed underground or were more effectively channeled through other networks, and facilitated ongoing mass risky activities through popular sector mobilizations constantly under (real and perceived) threat of violence. For Tilly, systemic shocks often result in bursts of democratization, and the discussion now turns to the ongoing presidency of Evo Morales.

**Juan “Evo” Morales Ayma**

Winning the 2005 presidential election with an unprecedented majority of the vote (53.7%), Morales and MAS received 72 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (55%), 12 Senate seats (44%), and 3 prefectures (33%). Poder Democrático y Social (Democratic and Social Power, PODEMOS) was the runner-up (a refashioned ADN),

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64 Election data comes from the Bolivian Corte Nacional Electoral (CNE) and is accessible at http://www.cne.org.bo and at the Political Database of the America’s website at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Bolivia/bolivia.html
with Quiroga gaining 28.6% of the popular vote and 3 prefectures (33%), 13 Senate seats (48%), and 43 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (33%). Therefore, while MAS did receive a simple congressional majority, it fell short of two-thirds and did not even carry a simple majority in the Senate. What should be emphasized, however, is that most people did not foresee a landslide victory for MAS. Popular opinion among CSO leaders believed Morales to be increasingly distanced from the social movements recently instrumental in effecting governmental change, but election results with high voter turnout (84.5%) revealed a differing opinion among the population at large (Oscar Olivera as qtd. in Democracy Now 2005; Webber 2005; Salman 2006). In particular, it revealed that regional conflict remained a salient obstacle to an open political system and was now more represented on the streets – especially since the election of departmental prefects (the first in Bolivian history) was the direct result of governmental compromise with *media luna* social movement demands (Centellas 2008, 19).

Morales’s term within our time period of focus runs from his inauguration on January 22, 2006 to the official passage of the new Plurinational Constitution of the State (Constitución Plurinacional del Estado, CPE) enacted on February 7, 2009, and has been characterized as much by state-society transformation as reflective of deep divisions within Bolivian society that have become openly hostile to each other in the streets since 2000. The majority of claims were still made on the state (47.3%), but unlike earlier periods, these claims were primarily political articulations (47.7%) focused on the rejection of the government and its policies (26.7% [indicative of PODEMOS supporters in this case]), demands for ongoing political restructuring of the state (16.7%), and in express support of the government (4.2%) (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 67).
Cochabamba (32%) and Santa Cruz (29.8%) saw the majority of the marches and mobilizations (34.6%), blockades (23.5%), seizures and occupations (17%), and hunger strikes (10.2%), and overall actors were the middle sectors (39.6%), “others” which included numerous heterogenous groupings not affiliated with one particular sector (21.8%), popular urban sectors (17.1%), citizenry in general (10.9%), and traditional campesinos (10.5%) (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 67-68). Protests were definitely urban in nature (72.4%) and Morales experienced an average of 40.4 new protest events each month (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 66).

What is different with politics during this period, however, is the shift in the balance of power in formal politics towards a more representative reflection of the population at large, and presents a victory for the incorporation and deepening of trust networks activated since the first term of Sánchez de Lozada. Morales embraces an indigenous Aymara identity, but he grew up primarily in Quechuan communities and worked as both a campesino and cocalero (Hylton and Thomson 2007, 129-130). Protests during Morales’s term in office are now a projection of battles in the legislative branch rather than demands for inclusion within it. In particular, because the entrenched elites of the media luna region do not have an outright majority, they have coopted the popular repertoires of protest and pitched battles in the street seeking expedited attention to their demands (Hochstetler and Friedman 2008, 10). Most of these battles are against Morales’s “nationalization” of the hydrocarbons industry in May 2006, which increased state control of the international contracts and recovered rights to lost rent privileges, as well as issues demanded from the elected Constituent Assembly in constitutional
reformation (Laserna and Villarroel 2008, 65-66). Although his “nationalization” fell short of a true state seizure, he termed it such to gain public support.

Aside from protests, governmental policies are another crucial factor in understanding new state-society relationships during Morales’s term. In his inaugural speech, Morales set the mood for his term by stating a need to convok a Constituent Assembly to re-write the Constitution, recognizing the import of democracy for the “decolonization” of the state, and acknowledging the right of Bolivians to the access and material wealth of their natural resources – including coca, water, land, and gas – which should be carried out “responsibly” by the state (Gómez 2006, 142-145). Making good on his word, in May 2006 Morales restructured the hydrocarbons industry (which continued to be modified and expanded though 2007) and used a portion of the increased state revenues to fund state-welfare programs (through 2008) including a national literacy program (including parallel campaigns in Aymara and Quechua), improvements in healthcare and malnutrition, a retirement program, and campesino developmental resources (Ribando 2007; Weisbrot and Sandoval 2007; Gray Molina 2008b). Regional battles over control of these resources fueled the lowland push for autonomy, so social redistribution options are limited. Other policies during this time period emphasized the decriminalization of coca and emphasis on the development of alternative uses for the plant, land reform designed to redistribute land to indigenous communities and provide campesino and indigenous access to credit and technical training, and raised wages (Ribando 2007).

Furthermore, legislation passed in March 2006 allowed for a Constituent Assembly election, and referendums in July on both departmental autonomy and
Constituent Assembly elections set into motion the beginning of constitutional reform (Ribando 2007). The *media luna* departments voted for the inclusion of greater autonomy provisions (the remaining 5 voting against), and MAS won 51% of the seats in the Assembly (Centellas 2008; Postero 2010). Constitutional reform, however, did not prove an easy process as political motivations and maneuverings on all sides continually stalled progress of the Constituent Assembly (voted to be *originaria* [of native origin] in September and not simply a reform of the existing 1967 Constitution) (Gray Molina 2008b; Postero 2010). In November of 2006, MAS delegates orchestrated the passage of legislation allowing for a simple majority to approve constitutional draft proposals (as long as the final vote is ratified by two-thirds) and proposed measures to allow for the impeachment of elected prefects – both resulting in large and violent oppositional protests through 2007 (Ribando 2007). The Assembly approved two drafts by 2008, but votes had been controlled through the forced exclusion of oppositional candidates (Gray Molina 2008b; Lehoucq 2008; Postero 2010). Santa Cruz began a regional coup in response, and called for a recall referendum (which Morales passed easily with 67.4% approval and with a 91.8% of registered voters participating [CNE]) but when a group of 11 indigenous MAS supporters were murdered by oppositional supporters in Pando, negotiations between all parties were initiated and a compromise on the new Constitution was reached (Postero 2010, 67). A national referendum passed the CPE in January 2009, and Morales signed it into law on 7th of February.

To claim that the first two years of Morales’s term was characterized by extreme socio-political conflict would be an understatement. However, important mechanisms and signs point to the increased integration of trust networks with public politics. In
particular, mechanisms created or utilized by the early Morales administration include the increase of state resources for the protection of the population from risk seen in the social welfare and development programs (education and literacy programs, agrarian reform, social security program, healthcare improvements, and the decriminalization of coca) and the creation of external guarantees for governmental commitment most exemplified by the ratification of the new Constitution, which included deep negotiation and concessions on all sides including greater autonomy for indigenous territorial groups and departments. Signs of trust network integration include the increasing number of newly formed indigenous groups able to run for political office unaffiliated with an existing political party, social and developmental provisions mentioned above which facilitate popular reliance on political agencies for long term security and social services as well as participation within such agencies, a drive in the early Morales administration (not mentioned above) to register rural and indigenous peoples with the state, deeper involvement of the media luna regions in risk-taking activity in civic community organizing, and the extensive use of institutions of deliberative democracy (especially the referendum) and social movements to facilitate governmental action rather than resorting to force.

A Brief Summary

This narrative has focused on state-society relations over four periods of distinct presidential activity, including two periods encompassing multiple administrations. According to Charles Tilly, the incorporation of interpersonal trust networks into public politics is a necessary (but not fully sufficient) component of democratization, as it
directly influences the ability of the government to respond to the demands of the people. Crises of the state often create the conditions for the emergence of mechanisms associated with producing this integration as well as signs that this is occurring. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 on pages 109 and 110 summarize the integration of Bolivian interpersonal networks with public politics.

Table 4.1: Summary of Presidential Terms and Mechanisms Associated With Trust Networks

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<tr>
<td>Disintegration of existing segregated trust networks</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>Slight decrease</td>
<td>Slight decrease</td>
<td>Slight decrease</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enlargement of sectors of the population which lack access to networks for risky activities</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>Slight decrease</td>
<td>Slight decrease</td>
<td>Slight decrease</td>
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<tr>
<td>Appearance of new opportunities and threats that existing networks cannot absorb</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of external guarantees for gov’t commitments</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase of gov’t resources for risk reduction and/or compensation of loss</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
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Source: Author’s compilation based on mechanisms provided by Charles Tilly (2007)

The first term of Sánchez de Lozada provided the clearest example of a relatively painless emergence of mechanisms and signs associated with changing state-society relations in reference to trust network incorporation. In particular, his Plan de Todos deepened the neoliberal restructuring of the state began by Victor Paz Estenssoro. This weakened and/or dissolved many existing segregated trust networks between the state and society, increased the number of unrepresented sectors, and increased the strain on a system ill equipped to absorb the changing situation. However, accompanying reforms of
Table 4.2: Summary of Presidential Terms and Signs of Trust Network Integration With Public Politics

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<td>The public creation of associations, communities, political parties, or unions which have only existed underground</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pursuit of kinship, friendship, security, and other risk endeavors within such associations</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relying on political agencies for long-term security and vital services</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in governmental registration of identities, births, deaths, and census activities</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The shift of state behavior away from coercive actions against collective claim-making towards those of support of the collective wills of the people</td>
<td>Slight decrease</td>
<td>Moderate decrease</td>
<td>Moderate decrease</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation based on signs provided by Charles Tilly (2007)

the Constitution, educational and pension systems, and the creation of a (theoretically) decentralized and more accountable municipality-based local governance structure increased the governmental resources available for the protection of public risk-taking. It also facilitated public reliance on state institutions for long term security and vital services, opened new spaces for the inclusion and public participation of indigenous and community-based networks, strengthened existing linkages between these two groups by the incorporation of many of their demands into constitutional reform, and raised the quality of education and thus facilitated future access, benefits and participation within the system. However, actions working against this integration include a closed executive political decision-making process, continued racism and social stratification which
prevented the actualization of many of the identified opportunities, failures to provide social securities, and the use of state-sanctioned violence against protesting groups.

The Presidencies of Banzer and Quiroga, on the other hand, revealed deep tensions existing between the hopes of the earlier administration’s policies and the difficulties of transforming 500 years of stratification, exclusion, and opposition to change. Banzer’s party opposition to that of Sánchez de Lozada largely resulted in the marginalization of many of his reforms, and exclusionary decision-making returned to benefitting regional political and economic elite power (Van Cott 2000). However, the mechanisms set into motion in Sánchez de Lozada’s term provided areas of opportunity for identity formation and political framing processes. This facilitated the public creation of new protest organizations and networks, as well as supported the positions and participation of kin and class groups in existing networks, which united to increasingly engage in behavior associated with a high degree of personal risk of violence and repression against the state carrying new demands which the political system could not absorb. Therefore, new threats to the existing system emerged (from below) as confidence in the representational system weakened and increased local political participation failed to translate to tangible executive and legislative results. Additionally, judicial reform opened new areas for the addressing of human rights abuses and the mediation of state-society conflict as well as created external guarantees (theoretically) for governmental commitments and the protection of risky endeavors. Uninterrupted census participation in 2001 within a period deeply affected by protracted social movement activity also provides signs of trust in the existing system as little trust would
broker little interest in providing the state with personal information on one’s self and one’s household.

The blatant blockage of Morales’s ability to gain the Presidency in a fair election by congressional approval in 2002 revealed the true nature of Bolivia’s exclusionary form of democracy and strengthened the resolve of the masses to create new representative networks of their own. The increased use of force against these protesting networks sanctioned by the state quickly provoked a crisis of governability for Sánchez de Lozada. The public had been working hard to appropriate spaces that he had provided in his earlier term and incorporate new networks into public politics in the time between his two terms. The inability and unwillingness of the political leadership to incorporate these new networks of the demanding public into the existing system to effectively channel and respond to increasing demand resulted in increased mass protests and state violence. This created an impossible governing situation; political support for the government and political parties hit reached record lows in 2002 and protests emerging from failures in government resulted in the resignation of both Sánchez de Lozada and Mesa.

Although almost no new mechanisms and signs of trust network integration were present during this period of governance, the deepening of preexisting ones continued. In particular, existing popular mass networks of segregation were reduced in number as the public increasingly came together and created a coherent body of demands for the government. New national bodies, such as the Coordinadora, were created to cohere and channel popular demand, and the governability crisis represented both an opportunity (for mass mobilizations and identity formation) and a threat (to entrenched interests) which the system could not absorb (resulting in presidential oustings). Important results from
this maneuvering, aside from the deepening of networks formed through protracted activity over the previous ten years, were a governmental behavioral shift away from coercive actions against (and the prevention of) collective claims-making towards those of support of the collective will of the people – particularly through the constitutional extension of citizen rights to constituent assembly, citizens’ legislative initiatives, and the referendum (Breuer 2008). This officially legitimized space for increased political action by those demanding recognition and began the incorporation of trust networks born out of earlier reforms into the existing system (although threatening the interests of existing ones).

Tilly’s definition of democracy is based on governmental conformity to popular claims made on it by the greatest number of competing interests. This conformity, in return, is facilitated by the incorporation of trust networks representing the widest number of interests and people into political channels. The ongoing term of Evo Morales provides the most tangible example of this facilitation. Firstly, his election by popular consensus prevented the ability of the entrenched elites to constitutionally prevent his presidential legitimacy, and afforded him a simple majority in the Chamber of Deputies. As a member, as well as important mover of the networks seeking guaranteed accommodation (as well as reconstruction of) into the political system, he was in a unique position to actually effect change. Protests intensified during his first few years in office, and he resorted to questionable political tactics to create structural changes to the system, yet the creation of external guarantees for governmental commitments to the people as well as the increase in state resources dedicated to the protection of risk for the general population can hardly be disputed. Secondly, his educational, registration,
agrarian, social security, healthcare, and credit modifications officially opened the political door for increased legitimacy of the government, reliance on political agencies for long-term security and vital services, more trust in institutions believed unrepresentative and harmful before, and participation in governmental registration of births, deaths, census activities, and identification cards. Thirdly, the new Constitution is the manifestation of greater representative demand accommodation into the system, represents a tangible codification of increased opportunity for electoral and popular means of change, interest group and social movement recognition, and the official recognition of a new plurinational and inclusionary democratic mountain for Bolivia to summit (Van Cott 2000).

Only time will tell if the recent restructuring of state-society relations will result in a calming of the policy-protest-negotiation cycle of politics so entrenched in Bolivia. What still needs to be evaluated, however, is how well these identified mechanisms and signs of trust network incorporation into public politics translate into democratic change (in one direction or another). The following chapter reintroduces Tilly’s measures of democratization as well as how they are operationalized in this paper. Furthermore, the constructed model will be compared against Freedom House and Polity IV datasets for Bolivian democracy during this same time period to evaluate which model best captures the changing realities of the Bolivian political system.
CHAPTER FIVE: DEMOCRATIZATION

The Relation of Findings to Theory

Measuring Democracy

As stated in Chapter One, for Tilly democracy is defined as the “extent to which the state behaves in conformity with the expressed demands of its citizens,” which is, in turn, measured by assessing the “degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected, and mutually binding consultation” (2007, 13-14). Ideally, measures of breadth refer to “the share of population having legally enforceable rights to communicate complaints about governmental performance to high officials,” equality measures record the “number of distinct legal categories defining rights and obligations of different population segments via-à-vis the state,” protection “is the proportion of the population imprisoned without legal sentencing or legal recourse,” and mutually binding consultation includes “the share of all citizens’ complaints regarding denial of legally mandated benefits that result in the delivery of those benefits” (Tilly 2007, 66). As such, Tilly admits that “no existing body of data contains these measures for any substantial number of regimes” and substitutes Freedom House evaluators for these measures (2007, 66). However, these measures are at odds with his initial definition of democracy, which is claims-based. It is one thing to give everyone
the right to express an opinion, and quite another for all opinions to matter to decision-makers and within the decision-making process.

As will be examined in more detail below, Freedom House measures lack explanatory power for Bolivia. They are based upon a model of democracy which takes a relatively homogenous population (or else folds differing groups into one), confers rights and freedoms upon it, and minimally manages it through interest articulation and representation mechanisms while ensuring the greatest amount of freedom for the autonomous citizens to go about their daily lives (Van Cott 2000). This is not the sort of democracy being created in Bolivia. Instead, its society is dominated by “unrepresentative, oligarchic, personalistic parties with weak roots in society, which obstruct the access of popular groups and peripheral populations…to political decision-making spheres” (Van Cott 2000, 9). In theory, everyone is equal under the law in Bolivia, but in reality, the vast majority of the population is excluded. Claims were made on the government by indigenous groups seeking official inclusion into the system based on the recognition of their difference from other sub populations for decades before this started to change. When it did, it was in the uneven and unequal way that Bolivian politics has evolved over centuries. Therefore, what should be captured in more detail is the actual state-society relationship, referring back to the original definition of democracy as the conformity of state behavior to expressed demands.

Returning to Tilly’s initial recommendation that analytical concentration should focus on “observations of interactions between citizens and state” and on changes in the translation of citizen demand to state action, the overriding question of concern becomes: how effective is popular claims-making on governmental behavior? If democratization is
associated with increased conformity of state behavior with citizen demand, one cannot only include one partial measure of demand delivery (Tilly’s measure of mutually binding consultation). Therefore, as stated in the Methodology section, democratization is measured based on how state behavior was influenced by changes in the sub-variables of breadth of demand, the changing equality of those demands vis-à-vis entrenched interests, how protected the population is when making those demands, and the ability of those demands, once translated into state action, to be mutually binding on both state and society.

Interpreting Bolivian Democratization

Table 5.1 below represents ordinal measures of broad, equal, protected, and mutually binding consultation by Presidential term based upon observed trends in the data presented in the previous section. Notations of slight and moderate increases and decreases, as well as those of no change, are the same as in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.

Table 5.1: Summary of Democratic Sub-variable Change by Presidential Term/s

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<tr>
<td>Breadth of claims made</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality of those demands vis-à-vis entrenched interests</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of the population while making those demands</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Moderate decrease</td>
<td>Moderate decrease</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do those demands become mutually binding?</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation based on methodology provided by Charles Tilly (2007).
This data clearly shows that the system is incorporating a greater breadth of demands, and people are feeling more equally represented. Initial state restructuring under Sánchez de Lozada (first term) challenged traditional regional autonomy and increased local opportunities for the incorporation of new and existing networks of trust into public politics. Furthermore, the recognition of indigenous demands into constitutional reform also created new spaces for claims-articulation and network incorporation. Banzer’s term in office continued the decentralization policies of the LPP and facilitated the inclusion of more indigenous representatives in office in the 1997 elections, but deepening economic and political crisis led to increasing numbers of frustrated individuals who felt that their economic demands were not being met. Existing trust networks built on trade and class were dissolved as people lost their jobs and the power to politically negotiate, and the existing parties were too dominated by entrenched elites to effectively channel popular demand. When Morales was removed from Congress in early 2002 (after receiving around 70% of the popular vote by his constituents) for participation in social movements against the current government, yet came within 1.5 percentage points of Sánchez de Lozada in the 2002 elections, the people realized that change would have to come from the bottom-up. Trust networks became increasingly integrated, identities more fluid and inclusive, and demands more clearly articulated. Finally, through public political means, popular demand articulation resulted in a series of Presidential oustings, the passage of binding legislative measures of increased protections and opportunities for more direct popular participation in governmental decision-making in the interim periods, and the election of a perceived
more representative and able president by an overwhelming show of support (for Bolivia).

Changes in the protection levels of both people and their claims making and the mutually binding nature of legislation passed are a bit more difficult to ascertain. Measures of state violence against citizens are not reliably available from Bolivia during this time period, Bolivia has a notoriously dismal record on judicial activities in general, and separating state-sanctioned violence from elite-based violence is difficult. Furthermore, trials of atrocities committed by the military during periods of protest in the Water and Gas Wars are just now being addressed. Generally speaking, however, it has only been since Mesa’s term that the executive has officially distanced himself from the use of violence to disperse contentious public political activities. Deaths and injuries were common especially during the periods of protest associated with the major conflicts in 2000 and 2003. Estimates identify at least five deaths associated with the Water War in 2000, fifty with the militarization of coca under Banzer, and thirty and eighty, respectively, in the Tax and Gas Wars of 2003 (Assies 2003; Assies and Salman 2003; Breuer 2008). The restructuring of the judicial system by Sánchez de Lozada in his first term, and in the CPE during Morales’s term, indicate increased effort towards systemic accountability and transparency. Additionally, Donna Lee Van Cott’s rating of Bolivian state protections from terror, unjustified imprisonment, and torture recorded a “partially free” rating of 3 (with a score of 1 being the most free), which also represents the highest disaggregated measure in the overall civil liberties index and improved from 2004

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65 For example, the trial of five top military commanders and two cabinet officials involved in the Gas War riots of 2003 just concluded on August 30, 2011 with a conviction for all ranging from 3 to 15 years (personal communication from the Andean Information Network received via email on August 30, 2011). Charges were also brought against Sánchez de Lozada, who was indicted, but Bolivian law prohibits a trial by absentia, and the ex-President fled to the United States in 2003.
Unfortunately, no other Freedom House crossroads reports have included this subdivision of the scoring methodology for civil liberties and the ratings cannot be compared further.

Finally, the binding nature of legislative decisions made on both the state and society is also difficult to ascertain. Judicial restructuring in 1994 and 2009 in the Constitution was an important start in creating accountable institutions to the society, but Banzer’s term was notoriously corrupt, and most measures are too aggregated to obtain a clear measure. However, the institutions of direct democracy added to the Constitution in 2004, and subsequent uses and defenses of their results by both the populace and the government are a pretty good indicator of deepened mutually binding consultation. This was especially clear when Morales prevented media luna deputies from voting on early drafts of the CPE and tried to avoid incorporating regional autonomy issues that had been passed through binding referendums in 2008 and 2009. Instead, he was forced to acknowledge them, as well as the refusal of a measure granting him the ability to run for another consecutive term, in the final negotiated and approved draft of the CPE.

The recent trial and conviction of state figures involved in the October protests and judicial restructuring to open judicial staffing to the general electorate are further important evidence towards combating corruption and making the overall system more binding and accountable, but they are outside of the scope under review and should be only considered in passing. Moreover, recent trends of Morales’s avoidance of recognizing the binding nature of indigenous consultation on matters pertaining to their legally protected territories is seen in the ongoing TIPNIS (Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure, Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory) conflict.
and is further evidence that this issue remains in conflict – especially as conflicts between indigenous autonomy and developmental projects are involved.66

In summary, the clearest evidence of democratization as measured by the conformity of state behavior to expressed citizen demand occurred in the first and last Presidential terms of the time period studied; however, the ongoing neoliberal restructuring of the state from 1993 until 2005 created a crisis in Bolivia’s political system and state-society relations in particular. The earliest restructuring of the state from 1985 through 1997 failed to create a level of economic growth (as measured by per capita gross domestic capital) beyond 2.87% and only moved beyond 3% in 2008.67 Emboldened both by new opportunities as well as by existing tensions, the public tried to gain representation through the existing party system, but continued racism and political maneuvering blocked attempts between 1997 and 2004, and convinced the masses that a reformulation from the bottom-up was the only viable option for sufficiently effecting change. Furthermore, once Morales was elected President, all sectors of the population have used popular mechanisms of mobilization to hold the government mutually accountable.

Analytical Conceptions of Democracy

One frustration identified in the literature review at the beginning of this analysis is the problematic explanation of alternative manifestations of democracy – those more

66 Ongoing information on the TIPNIS conflict has been distributed to Andean Information Network subscribers since the 21st of September, 2011.
participatory than representative, for example. These democracies often have lackluster performance within the existing models. Reasons as to why this is the case remain highly debated, but the same measures and models of representative and rights-based democracy are perpetuated. Writing before Tilly’s *Democracy* (2007), but concurrently with the germinations of his theory, Donna Lee Van Cott defines democratization as “the movement toward democracy, whether from an authoritarian regime or within an already democratic one” (2000, 4). Democracy is defined by an ongoing process characterized by: a more inclusive and transparent decision-making process; the widening and ongoing legitimization of democratic institutions; an environment where popular interests and desires are represented through political channels as well as civil society; an increasingly autonomous, organized, and pluralistic civil society; and a tolerant and inclusive dominant political culture (Van Cott 2000, 4).

For Van Cott, this view privileges the mutually reinforcing nature of culturally defined “‘networks of responsibilities and accountability’ within the state and between state and society” as well as recognizes that Latin American democracy represents a wider view of democracy than the “Liberal, Western constitutional tradition” presents (2000, 5, 6). This has also been the main argument of this paper. In lieu of an easily replicated model of democratization, this paper has adapted a portion of Tilly’s model which focuses on this incorporation of interpersonal networks of trust into public politics, which effect change within state-society relations, and result in an increased conformity in state behavior with citizen demand. He also adds the important of the reduction of categorical inequalities and the power of autonomous decision-making bodies to this.  

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68 As identified in various places above, categorical inequalities remain a persistent problem in Boliva as well as regionalism (autonomous power centers). For this reason, maximization in change along the
but like Van Cott, this study emphasizes the first process. The question now remains as to whether a more nuanced view than that of traditional model has been provided.

**Democratic Comparisons**

As has been discussed thus far, democracy is an elusive concept to understand and study. It is even harder to define and measure universally. Some analysts seek to remove normative affiliations and rely on minimalist definitions focused on the presence of free, fair, and competitive elections between at least two viable candidates (Dahl 1971; Huntington 1992; Linz and Stepan 1996; Przeworski et al. 1996), while others add institutional, procedural, and/or normative rights and freedoms to the definition (Dahl 1982, 2005; Lijphart 1977, 1999; Schmitter and Karl 1991; Whitehead 2002). Still others take a minimalist definition for granted, and compare between deeper measures/conceptions of accountability, consolidation, governability, and legitimacy (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 2010; Diamond 1999; Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999; Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro Leongómez 2006; Diamond, Plattner and Abente Brun 2008).

Publically available time series measures of democracy exist in minimalist and expanded liberal forms as well. Minimalist datasets 69 emphasize political rights that ensure democratic openness and fairness, while expanded measures 70 include a civil liberties component designed to capture a majority of the human rights enshrined in the dependent variable is more able to be seen in relation to this one independent variable. Furthermore, neither Freedom House nor Polity IV data sets include explicit economic or factional determinants in their models (although factionalism is used in related measures by their sponsoring organizations).

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69 See, for example, the Polity datasets (now in Polity IV) sponsored by the Center for Systemic Peace and available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
70 See, for example, Freedom House sponsored annual reports on Freedom in the World available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=5.

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the Bolivian state of democracy according to Polity IV and Freedom House data. The Polity IV data only captures political rights and was not adjusted other than divided by a factor of 10 to make the scale comparable to the adjusted Freedom House scores. Democracy scores range from .1 to 1. The Polity IV data is generally considered to be a less liberal measure of democracy than the Freedom House...
The Freedom House scores have been weighted to more closely resemble Tilly’s measure of democracy, which emphasizes political rights (popular demand breadth, equality, and mutually binding consultation upon government) and civil liberties (protection of popular demand) in a 3:1 manner (Tilly 2007, 60). The original scores of political rights and civil liberties were multiplied by 3 and 1 respectively, summed, inverted, and re-indexed on a scale of 1 to -1 with -1 representing extreme not free conditions and 1 representing ideal freedom. Partially democratic scores range from -0.33 to 0.33, and democratic scores range from 0.42 to 1.

Both models show a decrease in levels of democracy over time in Bolivia. For the Polity IV model, a “mature and internally coherent democracy [is]…operationally defined as one in which (a) political participation is unrestricted, open, and fully competitive; (b) executive recruitment is elective, and (c) constraints on the chief executive are substantial” (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010, 15). It is a minimalist definition and does not capture other aspects of democracy including, “the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press” as well as civil liberties (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010, 14). Scores range from 0 to 10, but have been recoded to capture an easier comparison with the Freedom House adjusted model. Looking at the movement of Bolivian democracy in Figure 5.1, the only movement is located between 2002 and 2003, and 2008 and 2009 and it drops by 0.1, or by one degree of measurement each time. It remains in the ambiguous realm of not-quite-there-yet. With movement only occurring

71 See Howard and Donnelly (1986), Donnelly (1989), Joseph (1996), and Van Cott for discussions on the liberal biases of democratic measures that include a notion of rights or liberties enconced in the notion of individual, rather than collective, rights.

72 For Freedom House, scores range from 2 to 14 with scores of two representing ideal levels of freedom. (Please refer to www.freedomhouse.org for any additional information on Freedom House Scoring.) For the purposes of comparison within Tilly’s model, this would mark scores from 4 to 28 with 4 representing the ideal levels of freedom.
between 2002 and 2003 and between 2008 and 2009, it is evident that only the ousting of Sánchez de Lozada and the increasing factionalization of the state leading up to the ratification of the CPE are captured.

Freedom House, on the other hand, includes measures of governance for both political rights as well as civil liberties and scores them on a freedom index covering scores from 1 to 7 (1 being the best score). Combined scores are often used as a measure of democracy and inverted to create a scale of 2 to 14 (14 being the best score). Again, in order to make this measure more comparable to Tilly’s model, as he weights political rights three times higher than civil liberties, Bolivia’s political rights scores were inverted, multiplied by three, added to the civil liberties score, and recoded on a -1 to +1 scale with scores ranging from +1 to .417 as Free and .333 to -.333 as Partially Free. This captures the range of democracy and semi-democracy in the model. Movement in Figure 5.2 decreases by one measure from 1994 to 1995, returns in 1996, increases my three measures between 1996 and 1997, decreases by three measures between 2001 and 2002, further decreases by three measures between 2002 and 2003, and remains constant through 2009. The bobble between 1994 and 1996 can be interpreted by the massive protests by the middle following sectors following the privatization of the state-run industries and job loss, while the climb attributed to the other reforms resulting in a more open and, theoretically, accountable political system. Movement between 2001 and 2003 reflects the increasing frequency and intensity of protracted social movements, but fails to account for any changes created by the Banzer movement as well as the states of siege and deaths occurring during the Water War in 2000. Continued inaction along the

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73 Tilly includes a lengthy discussion on Freedom House measures on pages 2-8. For original coding information, please refer to http://www.freedomhouse.org.
Freedom House scale implies that it is driven mainly by the ongoing presence of street politics and the failure of any meaningful conformity with their measures. Van Cott presents a fair assessment of the deficiencies of the system between 2004 and 2007, which are acknowledged, but the model remains unable to adequately compare tangible gains made between 1993 and 2006 and portrays a substantial decrease in freedom, especially over time.

Figure 5.3 below, is the visual representation of Bolivian democratization based on yearly observed changes in the democratic sub-variables in Table 5.1.

![Figure 5.3: A Process-Oriented Index of Democracy for Bolivia 1993-2009](image)

Each year of each presidential term/grouping presented in Chapter Three was evaluated in terms of observed changes in participatory breadth, equality, protection and mutually binding consultation. Zero points were allotted for maintenance of the status quo and no noticeable change, one point for a slight increase, and two points for a more modest increase over the previous year. One point was deducted for a slight decrease and two points for a significant decrease. This yields an index ranging from -8 to 8 of democratic transformation with negative movement associated with de-democratization and positive
movement as democratization. Only the range from 1 to 8 is shown to make it more comparable to the other two models.

While it is a rough estimate, it clearly shows changing levels of Bolivian democracy. Sánchez de Lozada’s term was marked by uneven incremental increases in democratization loosely following his implementation of the LPP and constitutional reforms which allowed for a greater incorporation of broad and unequal sectors of society into the political system and opened future spaces for governmental protection and mutually binding consultation between state and society. Banzer’s term, however, was plagued by violent repressions of cocaleros associated with his “zero coca” policy, and marred by mass protest mobilizations against poor economic conditions, unpopular governmental policies, and perceived injustices of the representative system.

Sánchez de Lozada’s second term did not de-democratize further in terms of the measures being utilized, but continued repression against the popular sectors, a complete lack of confidence in the political system, and the President’s insistence on further neoliberal economic policies resulted in his ousting in 2003 and the quick passage of policies by Mesa in 2004. These policies created institutions of deliberative democracy for the first time in Bolivia and marked a visible increase in mutually binding consultation. Furthermore, electoral changes in the nature of political party registration slightly widened the breadth of demands able to be made on the system. The election of Evo Morales to the Presidency by majority in 2005 (who took office in 2006) was a visible result of the reforms initiated in first Sánchez de Lozada term and the ability of the masses to incorporate new networks of trust into the existing exclusionary system. This led to incremental increases in the opening of democracy as various reforms were
passed over the next 3 years, culminating in the passage of a New Constitution, which bound state and society together in a new more equal and inclusive manner.

**Analytic Utility**

Table 5.2 below identifies the presidents, terms, political party affiliation, and measures of a lack of confidence in political party and of democratic dissatisfaction for Bolivia during the time period under consideration. Firstly, a quick glance reveals a high overall lack of both confidence in political parties and satisfaction with the way democracy works in Bolivia. This supports arguments that the existing system is exclusionary and indicative of traditional periods of uneven political growth (Malloy 1970; Van Cott 2000; Crabtree and Whitehead 2008). In particular, the masses do not feel adequately represented by their political parties or satisfied with the way in which it responds to their claims upon it.

Secondly, the Presidents with the lowest confidence and satisfaction levels are Banzer-Quiroga, Sánchez de Lozada (second term), and Mesa. These reflect the series of “wars” that occurred in the streets over water (2000, 2005), taxes (2003), and gas (2003, 2005). These are highest during the terms more characterized by crisis and the emergence of mechanisms leading to the creation and solidification of new networks of trust (the first five terms) than those which demonstrated signs of their increased integration into the state-society structure (the first and last).
Table 5.2: Bolivian Presidents, Their Terms, Parties, Percentage of Popular Vote Received, and Lack of Party Confidence/Democratic Satisfaction Levels

| Period       | President         | Political Party | % of Popular Vote Received in National Election | % Popular Lack of Confidence in Political Parties<sup>a</sup> | % Popular Dissatisfaction with Democracy<sup>b</sup> |
|--------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
| 8/93 to 8/97 | Sánchez de Lozada | MNR             | 35.5%                                         | 74.6%                                                      | 64.2%                                                      |
| 8/97 to 8/01 | Banzer            | ADN             | 22.3%                                         | 84.8%                                                      | 73.9%                                                      |
| 8/01 to 8/02 | Quiroga           | ADN             | None<sup>d</sup>                                | 86.4%                                                      | 68.6%                                                      |
| 8/02 to 10/03| Sánchez de Lozada | MNR             | 22.5%                                         | 92.1%                                                      | 74.4%                                                      |
| 10/03 to 6/05| Mesa              | None            | None<sup>e</sup>                                | 87.9%                                                      | 73.7%                                                      |
| 6/05 to 1/06 | Rodríguez         | None            | None<sup>f</sup>                                | 87.5%                                                      | 68.8%                                                      |
| 1/06 to Present | Morales       | MAS             | 53.7% // 64.2%<sup>g</sup>                      | 77.2%                                                      | 47.4%                                                      |

<sup>a</sup> combination of people reporting “little” or “none” when asked to define the amount of confidence they have in political parties; figures are for responses closest to the end of the term identified (1997, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2009 respectively)

<sup>b</sup> combination of people reporting “little” or “none” when asked on their satisfaction level with the way democracy works in Bolivia; figures are for responses closest to the end of the term identified (1997, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2009 respectively)

<sup>c</sup> Sánchez de Lozada received 25.6% of the popular vote, but the Congress elected Paz Zamora

<sup>d</sup> Quiroga took over for Banzer when he stepped down due to illness. Quiroga was Vice-President under Banzer.

<sup>e</sup> Mesa succeeded Sánchez de Lozada after he resigned due to immense mass protests

<sup>f</sup> Rodríguez succeeded Mesa after he resigned due to mass protests and political deadlock

<sup>g</sup> Morales won the general election with 53.7% in 2005 and defeated a popular recall referendum with a 64.2% support rating

Sources: Author’s compilation using data from Bolivia’s Corte Nacional Electoral at www.cne.bo, Laserna and Villarroel (2008), and Latinobarómetro data obtained from www.latinobarometro.org

Thirdly, the higher levels of political party confidence and democratic satisfaction during Sánchez de Lozada’s first term and that of Morales reflect popular attitudes that the government behaved in a manner more indicative of the desires of the population at large. Protest levels remained high, especially for Morales, but protest activity facilitated negotiation and governmental accountability more than hampered it. Lastly, although not
included in the table, it should be noted that a “not at all” response to the Latinobarómetro’s question, “In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Bolivia” decreased to under 10% of the total responses in the cases of Rodríguez and Morales, while they peaked at over 20% for Banzer, Quiroga, and the second term of Sánchez de Lozada. Furthermore, when asked “How interested are you in politics” responses indicating political distance at 72.4% in 1997 rose to 79.6% in both 2003 and 2004, but fell to 68.5% in 2009. This demonstrates that people became more interested in the political process as the system became more responsive to citizen demand (as the economy didn’t improve markedly and exclusionary factionalist increased).74

Which of the models presented above provides the clearest picture of Bolivian democracy? The purely political model, Polity IV, only shows movement corresponding to the unconstitutional ousting of Sánchez de Lozada in 2003 and increased regional factionalism in 2009. The Freedom House model, on the other hand, acknowledges increased democratization with the implementation of governmental policy designed to widen political opportunity spaces, but decreases with the increased repression of mobilized popular protesting sectors between 2001 and 2003, and does not go back up – despite an obvious widening of the system through constitutional reform in 2004 and a new Constitution in 2009. However, analysis based on Tilly’s model shows a different picture. Here, democratization has clearly been the more recent trend in Bolivian politics, and is further supported by changing popular opinions reflected in polls over the years.

74 All Latinobarómetro questions and responses for the years under consideration can be found online at http://www.latinobarometro.org
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

This analysis was motivated by a personal dissatisfaction with contemporary analyses of Latin American democracies. Traditional democratic theorizing has generally been dominated by representative models of democracy inspired by the histories of the United States, France, and England. Some theories emphasize the importance of governmental guarantee of civil right and political liberties, while others only focus on political aspects of elections and formal representative institutions. Fewer still build theories based on the effective participation of the mass populace and include measures of accountability and transparency. With a rapidly increasing universe of newly democratizing countries to study following the break-up of the Soviet Union, comparative democratic theorists sought ways to easily compare increasing numbers. Initial studies on the identification of factors influencing initial and continued transitions gave way to an emphasis on the “correct” implementation of procedures and institutions needed to consolidate and deepen democracy.

However, the political realities of Latin American democracies defied conventional explanation. Here democracy stalled and failed to stabilize and deepen. Neoliberal restructuring policies meant to curb high inflation did not result in reinvigorated economies. Reduced social spending resulted in massive political protests throughout the region and many presidential terms were cut short. Largely, the formal electoral systems were still being utilized by the disenchanted masses, but the political
systems were not effectively channeling popular demand. Analysts changed methodologies to better capture underlying social, economic, and political factors that may be influencing the democratic troubles of the region, but few questioned the fundamental liberal representative assumptions of these views of democracy.

When public politics is examined in Bolivia between 1993 and 2009, it is obvious that substantive political transformations have occurred. If nothing else is acknowledged, it cannot be ignored that a completely new Constitution was drafted and replaced the pervious one dating back to 1967 which contains uniquely widened spaces for the political inclusion of previously excluded sectors of society. While true that Bolivia has had 17 Constitutions in the past, this one is significant as it originated from public politics, and was only obtained through a painful fight between the marginalized masses and the powerful political elites. While the reality is not as dichotomized as it is commonly portrayed, the state-society relationship in 1993 was markedly less inclusionary as the one in 2009. Theoretically, the political system was open in 1993, but it has only recently become available in practice. Contemporary democratization theorists focus on Bolivia as a struggling, illiberal, inchoate, semi-, and delegative form of democracy and spend more time theorizing on why it is not conforming to the existing models, rather than questioning the fundamental universal application of the models the models in the first place.

As Van Cott recognized in 2000, and deepened in 2009, other models of democracy can be constructed through constitutional change. Tilly’s model adds that the methods by which they are obtained may not necessarily be granted exclusively from the top-down. This does not, however, imply that only a revolutionary insurrection can
fundamentally alter state-society relations either. Bolivians did not take up arms in their protests and continued to voice their interests and desires through electoral channels. However, when the system failed to demonstrate the capacity to willingly incorporate these demands, and the state even used the military against the people, the power of the citizen networks of trust based on shifting and fluid identities to integrate within all forms of public politics (the institutional as well as non-) demonstrated that change is possible. State behavior is now visibly more representative of demands from all sectors of society and is increasingly more in conformity with those demands. Contemporary models universally compare the events in Bolivia between 1993 and 2009 in relation to a model built off of the longest enduring democracy in the world, the United States. This model, however, may not be as applicable in today’s world as in the past. Nations are not as homogenous as before (nor do they want to be in some cases), not all countries have a long history of fostering a political culture, global levels of economic and technological interaction are vastly different than just thirty years ago, and democratization must have a measure that can account for this. There is a demonstrable need for a more inclusive model of democracy able to capture changes and transformations in the unique forms of democracy that are currently under construction around the world.

It has been the goal of this analysis to test a different model of democracy in exploring a particular case of democracy, perceived as stalled or decreasing in contemporary models, in order to demonstrate that there are different types of democratic manifestations that require a more illustrative model of ongoing and internal democratic processes at work. All of the trappings of formal democracy endured in Bolivia during the structural changes made between 1993 and 2009, but the reality of the gains made by
civil society and the underrepresented masses is not captured in existing models. On the other hand, by viewing democratization simply as the increased conformity of state behavior to citizen demand, influenced through the crucial process of incorporating interpersonal trust networks into public politics, expanding public politics to include a multitude of ways that citizens make claims upon the state (or those wishing to be included as citizens), and measuring levels of democratic conformity through expanding, weighing, protecting, and binding these citizens and state to one another, the ongoing process of democratization can be applied to any regime. It also presents a clearer view of Bolivia as a state that is visibly democratizing. In moving the analysis to where democracy is constructed, it provides us with a dynamic model. Democracy can be constructed from the bottom-up, as well as from the top-down, and state-society relations can be redefined and reincorporated along the way. Rather than conferring basic rights upon a population and measuring how well they are allowed, this model allows for the incorporation of the actual formation of these rights, and they may be different than those promulgated by contemporary measures.

Bolivia’s new Constitution represents a clear and distinct break with its past. However, the masses did not achieve this through a coup or insurrection. They continued to utilize conventional electoral methods of representative interest articulation, but deepened and expanded them in the streets with visual and vocal demonstrations that the entrenched elites could not ignore. Although clientelistic, racist, patron-client, and exclusionary forms of politics still exist, the rule of law remains weak, and interest articulation remains primarily entrenched in traditional spaces (i.e. the streets and the elite civic communities), it is evident that politics in Bolivia is a learned process and that
positive steps are being taken for a more officially inclusive state based upon a celebration of difference than on an exclusionary of forced accommodation. Where Bolivia goes from now, only time will tell. However, it is evident that Bolivians have defined and selected their form of democratic mountain, and that their expedition to the top has begun.
LIST OF REFERENCES


