The State and the Legalization of Dual Citizenship/Dual Nationality: A Case Study of Mexico and the Philippines

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The State and the Legalization of Dual Citizenship/Dual Nationality:
A Case Study of Mexico and the Philippines

by

Pamela K. Anderson

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Department of Government & International Affairs
College of Arts and Sciences
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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my mother, Rafaela. Your constant support, encouragement, understanding, patience, and strength have made it possible for me to be the person that I am, to achieve the goals that I have set, and to live the life that I dream. Thank you.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thank you, Dr. Amen for the continued support and patience as I found my way through this process. I greatly appreciate your efforts in making this thesis successful. Thanks also to the rest of my committee, Dr. Solomon and Dr. Conte-Morgan, for your support and guidance.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to address the question of how does the inclusion or exclusion of political participation with dual citizenship or dual nationality impact the Philippines’ and Mexico’s efforts to achieve the economic and political benefits of dual citizenship from their citizens?

The hypothesis of the paper states that if a sending state offers legal dual citizenship/nationality with political participation, then it will be successful at increasing the economic and political benefits provided by its emigrants; but if a sending state only offers legal dual citizenship/nationality without political participation than it will not be successful at increasing the economic and political benefits provided by its emigrants.

In order to explore this hypothesis an exploratory case study of Mexico and the Philippines is done to examine the implementation of those states’ legalization of dual citizenship/dual nationality. The case study of each state explains the dual citizenship/dual nationality laws of the state and examines data to determine if the state has been successful at increasing the economic and political benefits provided by its emigrants. In the end, these case studies show no difference between the implementation of dual citizenship/nationality with political participation and without political participation and therefore do not support this hypothesis. Furthermore, the case studies do not show any significant improvement in either country in its relations with its emigrants after the passage of the legislation legalizing dual citizenship/dual nationality.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

As the “issues of migration management, dual citizenship, expat voting, and migrant and refugees involvement in and influence on processes of democratization in their homelands are central to the wider debate on the scope and powers of the state in a period of globalization…it seems timely to pursue the interests, aims, and policies of sending countries towards their nationals abroad” (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003, 21-22).

Of great interest is the question of dual citizenship/nationality. As the current age of migration progresses there is a widespread acceptance of dual citizenship growing among states. Research is necessary to examine the motives of the state, the impact of dual citizenship on the state, and the impact of dual citizenship on the citizens that remain at home as well as those that live abroad. This thesis will attempt to examine one of these questions; the motives of the state and how successful the state is at achieving the goals that motivate it. Sending states legalize dual citizenship for two primary reasons: maintaining sovereignty over their citizens provides an economic benefit to the state and a political benefit to the state (Barry 2006), (Baubock, Citizenship and Migration - Concepts and Controversies 2006), (Bouhga-Hagbe 2004), (Escobar 2007), (Mazzolari 2009). The economic benefit is found in increased and continued remittances from nationals that nationalize abroad. The political benefit occurs when those emigrants nationalize in their new country and become a voice for their home country. These
benefits will be further discussed in the course of the paper. Citizens choose to maintain citizenship in their home country while naturalizing in their new country for three primary reasons: national identity, to maintain economic ties to their home country for possible return or visitation, and to maintain political participation in their home country (Barry 2006). This thesis argues that sending states which provide their dual nationals with participation in the political process in the sending state will be more successful at achieving the economic and political benefits that accompany dual citizenship than those states that prohibit political participation from their dual nationals.

In conducting this research this paper will do an exploratory case study of two countries of emigration that have recently legalized dual citizenship/nationality. The research question being addressed is: How does the inclusion or exclusion of political participation with dual citizenship or dual nationality impact the Philippines’ and Mexico’s efforts to achieve the economic and political benefits of dual citizenship from their citizens?

The hypothesis is that if a sending state offers legal dual citizenship/nationality with political participation, then it will be successful at increasing the economic and political benefits provided by its emigrants; but if a sending state only offers legal dual citizenship/nationality without political participation than it will not be successful at increasing the economic and political benefits provided by its emigrants.
Discussion of Key Terms

Some of the key terms that will be discussed in this research will be briefly summarized here. Those key terms are globalization, human migration, dual citizenship, dual nationality, and sovereignty.

Globalization

What is globalization and how is migration related to globalization? Globalization is a term that refers to many social processes that interact with one another to increase and intensify global interactions and interdependency.

One way that globalization is manifested is through migration. According to Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, “we are in [globalization’s] second stage: the Age of Mobility” (Ki-moon 2007). As Held, et al. further points out “notions of citizenship and national identity are being renegotiated in responses to contemporary patterns of global migration and cultural globalization” (Held, McGrew and Goldblatt, et al. 1999, 326). If globalization has created a ‘portability of national identity’ (Sassen, The De Facto Transnationalizing of Immigration Policy 1998) among migrants and this is combined with “a tendency towards claiming membership in more than one place” (Vervotec 2001, 575) than how does the state respond to individuals claiming multiple memberships?
Migration

There are many academic disciplines that have undertaken to study migration, such as anthropology, economics, history, political science, etc. In the early years of migration research scholars focused on the ways in which migrants adapted to their countries of immigration or ways in which these countries excluded migrants. Additionally, these scholars have recognized that migrants maintained contact with other individuals or institutions in their countries of origin in many ways (Vervotec 2001). Some of these ways included remittances and letters to/from family or friends. What is new about migrants’ contact with their country of origin is that with the immediacy of communication as a result of the process of globalization is that they are able to “stay” in their country of origin from a distance (Scholte 2005).

What is different as a result of the process of globalization is that migrants today are able to not only embrace their new national identity, but they are also able to maintain their former national identity.

Dual Citizenship/Dual Nationality

While historically it has been generally agreed that dual citizenship/nationality was to be avoided, there has been acknowledgement that it cannot always be avoided. Thiesing, states that there were four ways that one may acquire dual nationality: by birth (if one is born in a state whose citizenship is determined by jus soli and one’s parents
were citizens of a different country whose citizenship is determined by jus sanguis); by marriage, by “legitimation of illegitimate children”; and by naturalization (Thiesing 1918, 483). Additionally, dual nationality/citizenship, while not seen as beneficial to the state, was also not seen as beneficial to the individual, “any individual who intentionally or unintentionally possesses such dual nationality, is hardly in an enviable position. Two different states claim his allegiance and demand the duties and obligations owed under it” (Thiesing 1918, 483).

States have traditionally had strict policies that made dual citizenship illegal. There are many reasons why states under the Westphalian model would have such policies. The primary reason is the impact of dual citizenship/nationality on its sovereignty through factors such as the security of its borders, tax collection, political participation, military service, etc. “The control of migration – of immigration as well as emigration – is crucial to state sovereignty” (Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens 2004, 16). But, what is sovereignty? According to Waltz, “to say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems” (Waltz 2007, 36). So, if the conventional wisdom is that dual citizenship/nationality could negatively impact a state’s ability to “decide for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems” then why have over thirty states in the last sixty years changed their laws to allow for dual citizenship or dual nationality. Why would this change occur?
This brings us to the growing acceptance of dual citizenship by states, “citizenship – so long a symbol of rootedness, exclusivity, and permanence – has been discovered to be portable, exchangeable, and increasingly multiple” (Barry 2006, 18). In what way do policies of dual citizenship/nationality increase sending states’ position in the international system?

**Sovereignty**

The answer to that question is that sending states seek to increase or retain their sovereignty over their emigrants through their policies allowing for dual citizenship/nationality. But, what is sovereignty? According to Ruggie sovereignty is the “institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains” (Ruggie 1986, 143). Essentially, this means that sovereignty has been understood to be the supreme right of the state to enforce its policies and laws within its territorial boundaries without the interference of any other authority. However, there is a debate among scholars as to whether or not sovereignty is waning as an effect of the processes of globalization. Proponents of the idea that the state, and therefore state sovereignty, are declining cite issues such as environmental threats, global economic structures, and transnational actors as examples of ways in which the state is losing control. However, “those on the other side of the debate, while generally admitting of the presence and importance of the factors mentioned above, nonetheless argue that the state has historically shown remarkable resilience and remains the most basic unit in international
politics” (Brand 2006, 25). Additionally, “when it comes to immigrants and refugees…the national state claims all its old splendor in asserting its sovereign right to control borders” (Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization 1996, 63). States still control the issuance of passports, visas, work-abroad authorization, etc. In this way, sovereignty is very much alive in the study of migration.

But, how does sovereignty relate to the study of emigration? “Emigration implies a loss of resources, at least in the short run… [there is a fear] that losing population not only weakens the source economy, but also strengthens the economy of rival destination countries” (Fitzgerald, A Nation of Immigrants: How Mexico Manages its Migration 2009, 21). Sending states fear that emigration will cause a decrease in their capability and thus, a decrease in their position in the international system while increasing the capability and position of receiving states. Baubock puts it in these terms, “Why do so many sending country governments or political elites then still regard their citizens abroad as a population that they need to control and stay connected with? There seem to be three instrumental reasons: human capital upgrading, remittances, and the political lobbying of receiving-country governments” (Baubock 2003, 709). In order to maximize these resources of emigration, sending states must retain sovereignty over their emigrants while encouraging them to integrate fully into the receiving country. What better way to achieve this goal than by legalizing dual nationality/dual citizenship?
Theoretical Framework

The theoretical lens used in this study will be that of realism. The major tenets of realist theory are that the international system is anarchic, that the international system is one of self-help, and that survival is the primary goal of any state (Waltz 2007). Ultimately, according to realists, states are concerned with achieving a better position in the international system than their rivals through relative gains (Walt 2002). Waltz further states that position in the international system is determined by capability (2007).

So, how does realism assist in viewing the actions of states that legalize dual citizenship/nationality? Ultimately, as discussed on the section on sovereignty, loss of population through emigration can result in a loss of capability by the state and thus a loss of position in the international system. This loss of capability arises through decreased population, less availability of military forces by a decrease in citizens bound to military service through legal means or patriotic reasons, and less economic wealth through a decrease in the number of tax payers and investors. Additionally, the emigration states’ loss is the immigration states’ gain. However, if an emigration state legalizes dual citizenship/nationality than the citizens/nationals that emigrate remain as part of the states’ population (even if they are in a different territory), may still be called upon for military service (voluntarily), and most importantly they continue to contribute economically to the emigration state. Therefore, dual citizenship/nationality prevents a complete loss in relative capability, perhaps even an increase in capability as the emigrant citizens/nationals may provide increased wealth to the emigrant state. Ultimately, “to achieve their objectives and maintain their security, units in a condition of
anarchy…the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves” (Waltz 2007, 44). Thus, the emigration states’ legalization of dual citizenship/nationality can be seen as an attempt to achieve their goals (survival and increased position in the international system through increased resources and fostering of alliances).

**Methodology**

In examining this topic, an exploratory case study of two sending countries (countries of emigration) that have legalized dual citizenship/nationality is used. These countries are Mexico and the Philippines.

Chapter 2 will provide a literature review of the research done in these areas up to now. Chapter 3 will examine the history of migration, emigration policy, the 1998 Nationality Law in Mexico (which does not allow Mexican dual nationals living abroad the right to vote in Mexican elections), and will then look at data from Mexico on emigration, remittances, and naturalizations in the primary receiving country of Mexican emigrants, the United States. The independent variable then is the 1998 No Perdido Nacionalidad law that allows for dual nationality/citizenship without political participation. The dependent variables are: remittances (controlled for increasing or decreasing emigration) and the number of naturalizations in the primary receiving country also controlling for increasing or decreasing emigration. Remittances are a measurement of the state’s ability to increase resources and therefore increase standing in
the international system while naturalizations in the primary receiving country are a measurement of the state’s ability to foster alliances. Both of these measures together will determine the success of the state at increasing the economic and political benefits of dual citizenship.

Chapter 4 will then focus on the Philippines. The Philippines passed the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. As with Mexico, this chapter will review the history of the Philippines’ emigration policy up to the passage of the 2003 law. This chapter will then provide the same statistical information that is reviewed in the chapter on Mexico: number of emigrants, remittances, naturalizations in the primary receiving country of Filipino emigrants, also the United States in order to determine how successful the Philippines is at “upgrading human capital, in attracting remittances, or in using immigrant communities to promote economic and foreign policy goals” (Baubock 2003). As with Mexico, the independent variable is the 2003 Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 which does provide dual nationals with the option for political participation. The dependent variables are: remittances (controlled for increasing or decreasing emigration) and the number of naturalizations in the primary receiving country also controlling for increasing or decreasing emigration. Remittances are a measurement of the state’s ability to increase resources and therefore increase standing in the international system while naturalizations in the primary receiving country are a measurement of the state’s ability to foster alliances. Both of these measures together will determine the success of the state at increasing the economic and political benefits of dual citizenship.
Again, this paper’s hypothesis states that if a sending state offers legal dual citizenship/nationality with political participation, then it will be successful at increasing the economic and political benefits provided by its emigrants; but if a sending state only offers legal dual citizenship/nationality without political participation than it will not be successful at increasing the economic and political benefits provided by its emigrants. Therefore, it is expected that there will be an increase in those measures of the Philippines and either a decrease or no change in those measures for Mexico over the time periods measured.

Limitations of the Research

This research would benefit from the use of additional data that is not currently available. The data necessary for an improved research study would be return migration numbers and the number of citizens/nationals that hold dual citizenship in both the sending country and receiving country.

Also, as this researcher has limited information on the domestic politics of the sending countries in questions, it is necessary to note that there may be other driving forces at work in the passage of these laws as well as the implementation of them.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to acquaint the reader with the literature regarding migration and dual citizenship. However, the literature review will begin with a brief discussion of globalization as it is necessary to put the changes in migration and dual citizenship in the proper perspective.

Globalization

In order to properly understand modern migration one must understand the phenomenon of globalization which frames modern migration. Therefore, the next logical question is what is globalization?

Definition

Scholte traces the introduction of the term ‘globalization’ to the 1950’s (Scholte 2005, 50). Globalization is often difficult to define because it is not a simple idea, nor is it confined to one discipline, but rather it is a mixture of many events, processes, and patterns across all disciplines and structures. Held and McGrew state that “globalization
refers to these entrenched and enduring patterns of worldwide interconnectedness…growing [in] magnitude or intensity” (Held and McGrew, The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Divide 2003, 3).

Further, Scholte states that “important new insight is provided when globalization is understood in spatial terms as the spread of transplanetary – and in recent times more particularly supraterritorial – connections [emphasis added] between people” (49).

Additionally, “globalization involves reductions of barriers to such transworld [connections]. With globalization people become more able – physically, legally, linguistically, culturally and psychologically – to engage with each other wherever on planet earth they might be” (Scholte 59). Steger states that “the term globalization should be used to refer to a set of social processes that are thought to transform our present social condition into one of globality. At its core, then, globalization is about shifting forms of human contact” (Steger 2003, 8).

What all definitions seem to have in common is global interconnectivity, and that the acceleration and intensity of this interconnection is increasing. A good working definition of globalization then comes from Steger,

*Globalization refers to a multidimensional set of social processes that create, multiply, stretch and intensify worldwide social interdependencies and exchanges while at the same time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections between the local and the distant.* (13).
A New Phenomenon?

While the term globalization only came into existence in the mid to late 20th century, many argue that the process that is globalization is not new.

_Some presence of globality can be traced back centuries, while greater growth of transplanetary links occurred from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards and large-scale supraterritoriality has appeared for the first time in recent decades. Thus, today’s globalization is both old and new_” (Scholte 86).

Scholte describes three phases of globalization which he states has “no historical origin” (87). Held and McGrew instead subscribe to a “fourfold period of globalization: premodern, early modern, modern, and contemporary” (2003, 414). Scholte’s phase one goes back many millennia to the ancient world. Many of these civilizations conceptualized the world as a single space through religion, “early intercivilizational contact,” and transcontinental/transoceanic commerce. However, Scholte points out that there was no effective global communication as there is today, the velocity of interconnections was low, and that true global connectivity did not happen until the 19th century (Scholte 87-90). “Hence, to the extent that transplanetary connections existed before the nineteenth century, they unfolded entirely in territorial space” (Scholte 91). This would be the equivalent of Held’s and McGrew’s premodern period which “begin with the formation of distinct and separate centers of settled agrarian civilization in Eurasia, Africa, and the America’s around 9,000 – 11,000 years ago…developed the capacity to engage in the long-distance projection of power and even longer distance
trade… [however] the scope for enduring global interactions was constrained enormously by available technology” (2003, 415).

Scholte states that phase two shows a significant increase in “transplanetary links” occurring in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These links are the introduction of “major new global communications,” the “multiplication and consolidation of global markets,” “increased elements of global finance,” “two world wars,” and a “degree of suprateritorial connectivity in certain organizations.” However, Scholte notes that “in scale, quality and impact, globalization of the nineteenth century cannot be likened to the hugely accelerated rise of intense transplanetary connectivity that has unfolded since the middle of the twentieth century” (91). Held and McGrew would consider this period to be the early modern and modern periods of their timeline. During this time the world sees increased political, economic, and military activity in the form of empire building by European states in the global south. There were “new forms of economic globalization also began to gather pace, such as those initiated by the great trading companies. However, these “global relationships” are still very limited. (2003, 419-420). Held and McGrew do point out that one difference during this period “a much greater level of institutionalization. Migratory flows, for example, were more systematically controlled by government and private agencies in both home and host countries, with more organized labor markets at work and more regular systems of transportation” (2003, 423).

Phase three is the state of the world today. “Globalization has unfolded mainly since the mid-twentieth century. Although, transworld relations are not completely
novel, the pace and scale of their expansion has become qualitatively greater over the past five decades” (Scholte 101). Further, Held and McGrew point out that,

*in nearly all domains contemporary patterns of globalization have not only quantitatively surpassed those of earlier epochs, but have also displayed unparalleled qualitative differences – that is in terms of how globalization in the domains of politics, law and governance, military affairs, cultural linkages and human migrations, in all dimensions of economic activity and in shared global environmental threats. Moreover, this era has experienced extraordinary innovations in the infrastructures of transport and communication, and an unparalleled density of institutions of global governance and regulation. Paradoxically, this explosion of global flows and networks has occurred at a time when the sovereign territorial state, with fixed and demarcated borders has become the near universal form of human political organization and political rule. (2003, 425).*

Scholte points out that the older trend from phase one and two occurred “within territorial geography” and the in the new trend, phase 3, “territorial boundaries present no particular impediment” (62). This is what makes globalization new.

**Relevance of Globalization to Migration Research**

There is not any part of modern human civilization that is not globalized. While there are degrees of globalization based on the infrastructure of states and the resources of the individual to transcend boundaries and to increase the intensity, velocity, and density of that transcendence; globalization is everywhere, or at least has the potential to be everywhere. Those processes that are most relevant to this study are those that involve
human movement and communication. The era of globalized migration has begun. As Held and McGrew state, “one form of globalization is more ubiquitous than any other – human migration. At its simplest, migration refers to the movement of people and their temporary or permanent geographical location” (2003, 283). Additionally, when humans migrate, “family and friends are within instant reach, ‘home’ no longer needs to be ‘imagined’ (Chan 2003, 98).

**Migration**

Migration is the movement of people from one place to another. Generally, immigration is the term used by receiving states to describe the arrival of migrants. Emigration is the term used to describe the exit of migrants from sending states.

Human migration has occurred as long as there have been humans. According to anthropologists the human species (homo sapiens) developed on the African continent and during the “Upper Paleolithic [period], modern H. sapiens migrated throughout the world including North and South America and Australia, continents that had previously been unoccupied by hominids” (Scupin 2000). These early migrations were undertaken by nomadic humans in search of new sources of food. As technology developed, humans developed agricultural and pastoral societies. These societies became the “first rudimentary states over six thousand years ago” (Held, McGrew and Goldblatt, et al.
1999). Over time, states achieved “exclusive territoriality” that constituted the sovereignty of the modern state (Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization 1996). As the modern state developed states begun to implement policies that would regulate migration and the ways in which migrants would be included or excluded within the borders of the state.

**Brief History of Migration**

One of the “most important early large scale migrations occurred in Asia” during 175 BCE – 200 BCE (Held, McGrew and Goldblatt, et al. 1999, 287). This time period also witnessed migration throughout the Middle East and Africa (Held, McGrew and Goldblatt, et al. 1999). The next era of migration originated in Europe and had three phases: European conquest/colonization of the America’s & Oceania; slave trade, Asian labor. The third major era of migration began with the Industrial Revolution and led to regional migration. The fourth era of migration was during the global wars of the 20th Century. The current and fifth era of migration is of a global nature, while “previous eras have witnessed larger-scale migration…but what is new is the global nature of migration” (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003, 9). Also new to the migration experience is that it is no longer a “one-way journey.” It is not a simple round-trip either. Today’s “migrants bridge here and there by continuously going or coming, or by engaging economically, socially or politically in their region or country of origin while residing abroad” (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003, 13).
The Migrant and Migration

What of the migrant? “Since the early sociology of migration in the 1920’s – 1930’s, however, most migration research has generally tended to focus upon the ways in which migrants adapt themselves to, or are socially excluded from their place of immigration” (Vervotec 2001, 574). While many migrants adapted to a new homeland, they continued “to embrace the national identity associated with their previous homeland…their bonds with the homeland often lay mainly in the imagination rather than in regular concrete interactions” (Scholte 2005, 238). However, over time this connection to the homeland would fade as the “concrete interactions” of the new home increased; the “imagined” connection to the homeland decreased in importance. In today’s globalized age of migration this is no longer true, today “migrants [can] ‘stay’ in their place of birth from a distance” (Scholte 2005, 252).

The State and Migration

The next question regarding migration, concerns the state. Have states’ idly allowed migrants to depart or enter their territories? The answer is no, states have actively shaped migration through their policies (whether restrictive or lax) regarding migration. However, most migration research focuses on receiving countries’ policies regarding immigration. The table below provides a general timeline of receiving countries’ policies.
Table 1: Timeline of Immigration Control Policies of Receiving Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Policy Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1770-1870</td>
<td>“practically unrestricted in most receiving countries”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870-1880</td>
<td>Canada, Germany, New Zealand, United States, &amp; parts of Australia restricted Chinese and/or other labor migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890-WWI</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, United States restrict Japanese immigration; Britain Canada, United States block Eastern European immigration; Canada, France, Germany regulate temporary labor migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWI</td>
<td>Receiving countries limit permanent immigration and restrict former immigration and restrict former immigration; expand recruitment of migrant labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-1928</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, Britain, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and United States severely restrict immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-1928</td>
<td>Receiving countries pass little immigration legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-1935</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Switzerland and United States restrict immigration and/or stop recruiting migrant workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-1938</td>
<td>Continue to apply restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>Receiving countries expand recruitment of foreign labor; strengthen controls on permanent migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-1972</td>
<td>Western European countries accept permanent immigrants (from former colonies) or refugees; recruit migrant workers; eliminate discriminatory policies against Asian, African, East &amp; Southern European immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1974</td>
<td>Western European Countries halt or curtail migrant labor recruitment; Australia increased immigration intake; Australia, United States, and Canada accept large number of Indo-Chinese refugees; attempt to reduce illegal immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979 – present</td>
<td>Try to halt illegal immigration; create point systems to give preference to certain potential immigrants; allow migrant workers as temporary migrants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Meyers 2004, 173-175)

Emigration is often seen by sending countries as a relief valve in times of economic stress. This is exemplified during the late 1800’s when the “active export of Europe’s rural poor was facilitated in a number of ways. Restrictions on emigration were lifted in Britain, Sweden and Germany in the mid-nineteenth century” (Held, McGrew and Goldblatt, et al. 1999, 292). However, countries still had the right to restrict exit from their country, though few modern nations did. This changed in December of 1948 when the United Nations accepted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that
provided in article 13.2 that “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own…” (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights n.d.). It is no longer acceptable for states to keep their citizens from leaving their state, yet states will still need to retain sovereignty over their citizens.

State Sovereignty and Migration

“One of the most critical issues in contemporary politics is whether the nation-state – the organizational fusion of a territory, a government, and a people can control the forces of globalization that threaten to overwhelm it. Nowhere is this question more important than in the study of international migration” (Fitzgerald, A Nation of Immigrants: How Mexico Manages its Migration 2009, 15). This is a primary consideration of migration research because virtually every state is either importing or exporting labor (Held, McGrew and Goldblatt, et al. 1999, 197) – or as most often is the case, is doing both. There are many in the field of migration and globalization studies that fear the decline of the state is at hand; however one must remember that “the nation-state is still the main, if not the only, guarantor of citizenship rights and obligations, and participation in politics still mainly takes place within state boundaries” (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003, 20-21). Adding to this argument, Fitzgerald argues “that for countries of mass emigration such as Mexico, it is precisely the continuing strength of the sovereignty of states that is driving a reconfiguration of the relationship between a government, a
territory, and a people. One consequence of this particular form of nation-state is a new kind of social contract between emigrants and their countries of origin” (2009, 16).

So, in what way is emigration considered to negatively impact sending countries? First of all, “emigration implies a loss of resources, at least in the short run…losing population not only weakens the source economy, but also strengthens the economy of rival destination countries” (Fitzgerald 2009, 21). For sending countries with high levels of emigration there is also a loss of national prestige – the sending country looks weak (Fitzgerald 2009, 21). Finally, with increasing emigration there is the loss of nationalism and/or national identity. “The control of migration – of immigration as well as emigration – is crucial to state sovereignty” (Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens 2004, 16).

If emigration is so hurtful to countries than why would sending countries encourage emigration? Remember that states are concerned with achieving a better position in the international system than their rivals through relative gains (Walt 2002). Position in the international system is determined by capability (Waltz 2007). Remember also that, “realist theory suggests that the real question is not whether globalization will vanquish the state (which shows no signs of withering away anyway) but rather how it will affect the relative power of different states” (Walt 2002, 226). Also, the international system is one of self-help. Survival is the primary goal of any state in a self-help system (Waltz 2007).
Survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have, other than the goal of promoting their own disappearance as political entities (Waltz 2007).

Finally, realist theory explains that “states look for allies in order to balance the power of other states” (Walt 2002, 221).

So, how do sending states use emigration to increase their position in the international system, sustain their survival, and help them foster alliances to balance the power of other states? Sending states increase their capability and therefore their position in the international system through the remittances that emigrants send to their home country. Remittances have become a primary source of income for many of these countries. So much so, in fact that those remittances can also be said to assist with the survival of some of these states. Additionally, “sending states try to turn emigrants into a political asset when they encourage expatriates to form ethnic lobbies in their destination country” (Fitzgerald 2009, 26). This would be a way for sending states to foster alliances with (usually more powerful) receiving states.

In these ways the state can capitalize on emigration to improve its position in the international system and to foster alliances; however, what about the negatives of emigration listed above? Sending states must also attempt to neutralize those negatives in order to benefit from emigration. By increasing remittances states can neutralize the loss of resources stemming from emigration. But, how can states deal with the loss of prestige and also the loss of nationalism/national identity?
Solutions to the problems continue to depend on national policies...States facing global problems are like individual consumers trapped by the ‘tyranny of small decisions.’ States, like consumers, can get out of the trap only by changing the structure of their field of activity. The message bears repeating: The only remedy for a strong structural effect is structural change (Waltz 2007, 43-44).

The structural solution that some states have found to neutralize or reverse the negatives of emigration while also increasing their survival, their relative position in the international system, and fostering alliances with other states is to return citizenship to those citizens that have lost it due to naturalizing in the receiving country and to encourage those current citizens to naturalize that have not done so in their receiving country through legalizing dual citizenship. Baubock states that, “sending states’ external citizenship policies are motivated by a mix of economic interests in remittances, of political interests in exercising control over expatriates…” (2006, 57). Further, “allowing Mexican nationals to naturalize in the U.S. favored the Mexican state, first, because it encouraged migrants to participate in U.S. politics as an ethnic lobby in support of the interests of the Mexican state and second, because it could secure the continuing flow of remittances, investments, and development contributions of the migrant population to Mexico” (Escobar 2007, 54).

Economic Interests

At this point, it is necessary to have a brief digression concerning economic interests of sending countries in the form of remittances. The reasons why emigrants remit can be broken into three primary categories: altruism, self-interest, and family ties. According to Carling, emigrants remit for “pure altruism,” “various
forms of pure self-interest,” and because of “contractual agreements between the migrant and family of origin.” The reasons that fall under self-interest are aspiration to inherit, a wish to acquire assets in the home country, and in preparation for an eventual return (Carling 2008, 583). Bouhga-Hagbe also cites altruism, self-interest, and family ties. He further explains that sending money to the family serves as a type of portfolio diversification. Sending money home could also be a repayment for migratory expenses (A Theory of Worker’s Remittances with an Application to Morroco 2004). “These transfers can help establish a base of physical capital, enhance social prestige, or strengthen relationships with relatives and friends” (Carling 2008, 583).

Additionally, research indicates that those with attachment to the home country remit larger amounts. Furthermore, “several studies have found that future migration plans influence remittance behavior. Migrants intending to return are generally more likely to remit, and remit larger amounts” (Carling 2008, 589). Bouhga-Hagbe further argues that if workers have some degree of attachment to their home country, then the long-run elasticity between remittances and the acquisition of nonfinancial assets, such as real estate, must be positive” (Bouhga-Hagbe 2004, 3-4).

Finally, once naturalized in receiving country they have better economic opportunities and can remit larger amounts more easily (Escobar 2007). Mazzolari concurs with this point, stating that “immigrants coming from countries that have recently allowed dual citizenship are found not only to be more likely to naturalize but also to experience relative employment and earnings gains and to
lower their reliance on welfare...consistent with American citizenship conferring greater economic opportunities” (Mazzolari 2009, 187).

As this paper has already stated, one of the economic goals of states in regard to its emigrants is to increase remittances – it seems that encouraging strong ties to the home country while simultaneously encouraging greater economic opportunities in the receiving country through naturalization is the best way to do that. This is consistent with the argument that states are legalizing dual citizenship as a way to accomplish both goals in the area of remittances.

Dual Citizenship/Nationality

The Nation

In order to trace the roots of nationality one must first understand what the nation is. The nation is a “historically constituted community of people” (Stalin, Joseph 1994, 18). A nation has specific characteristics which are a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up which is exhibited through a common culture (Stalin, Joseph 1994). Additionally, Scholte states that the following features compose a nation: a large population, collective identity that is attached to a specific geographic territory, and “emphasis [on] attributes that set it apart from other national groups” (Scholte 2005, 227). When the Westphalian state system came into existence state boundaries were drawn with little consideration for the
boundaries of nations. As territories were conquered, treaties adopted, and modern state boundaries drawn, the boundaries of nations became further blurred so that states often consisted of multiple nations and nations often existed within multiple states. At some point in the seventeenth century it became a common practice to “employ the term nation as a substitute for that territorial juridical unit, the state” (Connor 1994, 38).

**Nationality**

The term nationality had originally meant individual membership to a nation. Therefore, to have a nationality meant to share a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and to have a common psychological make-up with others of the same nation. However, if the terms nation and state are now used interchangeably than nationality now means membership in the state. This membership in the state becomes “a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all other people” (Connor 1994, 36) by sharing a state-sanctioned language, a state boundary, a state-centered economic life, and a state history, culture, or myths.
The State and Citizenship

In order to understand the concept of citizenship one must first understand what the state is. The state is a “territorial-political unit” (Connor 1994, 36). Or more explicitly, the state is a sovereign government that exerts legitimate authority over a specific territory and is recognized by other legitimate sovereign states. The components of citizenship include: “membership in the political community [of the state], the collective benefits and rights associated with membership, and participation in the community's political, economic, and social processes” (Bellamy 2008, 12). So, what is the difference between ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’? Nationality “refers to the formal legal status of state membership.” (Jones-Correa 2001, 998) and citizenship is “nationality plus political rights” (Jones-Correa 2001, 1010). Or citizenship is, as Seyla Benhabib states in “Borders, Boundaries, and Citizenship,”

the concept of citizenship in the modern state can be analytically divided into three components: the collective identity of citizens along the lines of shared language, religion, ethnicity, common history, and memories [according to Connor and Scholte this would be the definition of nationality as previously discussed]; the privileges of political membership in the sense of access to the rights of public autonomy [these would be the political rights in Jones-Correa’s definition]; and the entitlement to social rights and privileges (Benhabib, Borders, Boundaries, and Citizenship 2005, 675).

However, as stated previously, the terms nation and state have become muddled and are used interchangeably so it should be no surprise that the terms citizen and national are often used interchangeably.
Dual Nationality/Dual Citizenship

Now that the terms nationality and citizenship have been unpacked, the terms dual nationality and dual citizenship can be discussed. According to Jones-Correa the terms have different meanings. He states, “dual nationality allows for individuals to hold memberships in two (or more) states. However, as illustrated…dual nationality does not necessarily entail access to all the rights and benefits of national citizenship, such as voting or the right to hold office.” (2001, 998). Unfortunately, Jones-Correa seems to be alone in the agreement of a distinction between dual citizenship and dual nationality. While many scholars lament the interchangeable use of the terms, few other scholars are willing to stick with a stringent distinction between the terms. For example in discussing the growing trend of dual citizenship, Faist uses both terms interchangeably in the following quote:

*The evidence suggests that dual citizenship is not simply a foreboding of cosmopolitan citizenship. The main trend has been the spread of dual nationality and the tolerance towards dual citizenship as a result of an emerging trend of nationality as a human right* (Faist 2003, 12).

While it is difficult to arrive at a distinct and separate definition of the terms dual nationality and dual citizenship; there is ample literature that describes the emergent acceptance of dual nationality/citizenship. With the Treaty of Westphalia our modern state system was formalized and it allowed states to determine their own laws of citizenship. Under “Westphalian theories of the sovereign state, multiple ties of loyalty
have been unthinkable, nor could one transfer allegiance from one sovereign to another. Therefore, clearly, dual citizenship was to be avoided” (Brand 2006, 39). Additionally,

*During the mass transatlantic migrations of the 19th century, changing citizenship, much less holding dual citizenship, was major source of tension between European states that kept claims on their overseas citizens and New World states bent on assimilating them* (Fitzgerald, A Nation of Immigrants: How Mexico Manages its Migration 2009, 31).

As recently as 1930, the Hague Convention “asserted the right of the state to grant citizenship” (Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* 1996, 70) and “reconfirmed the traditional view that nationality should be singular” (Brand 2006, 39). Finally, prior to the Cold War, “most states automatically excluded a citizen from membership when this person acquired the nationality of another state” (Faist 2003, 11).

Generally, dual citizenship/nationality has been viewed negatively by states.

*National citizenship is often compared to a marriage between a citizen and his or her state, and historically the state has been a jealous spouse. The nation-state is based on the principle that each nation (that is, each people) has one state, and each individual belongs only to one nation* (Fitzgerald 2009, 31).

The idea of citizenship is very closely linked to patriotism, national identity, loyalty to one’s nation, etc. These ideals are of grave importance to the state and are perhaps a main reason as to why states’ have generally discouraged dual citizenship/nationality.
At one level, citizenship serves an administrative sorting function by separating us from them and attaching various rights and duties to each category. In sorting us from them, citizenship constructs ‘the polity that defines the nation,’ and affilitates citizens with a designated political community. Like any membership designation, citizenship has a constitutive role in identity and long has been presumed to be central to an individual’s understanding of herself as part of a larger group defined by a shared history, genealogy, territory, or political-ideological vision. Citizenship codifies and institutionalizes identity, anchoring it in law. The very foundation of the way people think about themselves and the country to which they are assigned is in large part legally defined (Barry 2006, 23).

As Habermas states, “The social borders of a political community do not just have a functional meaning…They regulate rather one’s belonging to a distinct historical community united by a common fate and a political life/form that constitutes the identity of its citizens: Citizenship is the answer to the questions ‘Who am I?’ and “What should I do?’ when posed in the public sphere” (Habermas 2003, 171).

Migration in a globalized age has changed how migrants view citizenship and is changing how states must view citizenship. There seems to be a growing acceptance and encouragement on the part of states for dual citizenship/nationality as demonstrated by the growing number of states that have legalized dual citizenship/nationality.
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(United States Office of Personnel Management: Investigations Service 2001)
But why has dual citizenship become more acceptable on the part of the state? Kapur and McHale have expressed a theory: “The growing concern with competitiveness suggests that governments increasingly see themselves as competing for internationally mobile human capital via their immigrant policies” (Kapur and McHale 2005, 37). As Waltz states, “to achieve their objectives and maintain their security, units in a condition of anarchy…must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves” (2007, 44). It seems that dual citizenship/nationality may be one of the means that states can generate as a way to retain authority and loyalty from its citizens that migrate.

*Dual or multiple citizenship will become increasingly common. In fact, nearly all immigration countries have changed their citizenship rules over the last 40-50 years – sometimes several times. More and more countries accept dual citizenship (at least to some extent) (Castles and Miller 2003, 46).*

However, while more countries are coming to accept dual citizenship/nationality; “emigration and immigration countries approach dual nationality from different aspects and arrive at different evaluations” (Hammar 1985, 444).

Consider the case of Germany and Turkey. In 1999, Germany passed new legislation (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz or StAG) which, among other things, allows immigrants to naturalize after 8 years of residency in Germany (assuming they meet other conditions such as stable employment, stable housing, and passing a criminal background check). Additionally, dual citizenship is expressly forbidden for adult immigrants.
choosing to naturalize. They must provide proof of renunciation of previous citizenship in order to gain German citizenship. The only exception is made for children acquiring dual citizenship by birth or through naturalization by their parents. However, these children must choose between their multiple citizenships at the age of 23 in order to maintain German citizenship (Köppel 2009). Germany is quite conservative in the area of immigration, naturalization, and dual citizenship. As a receiving state, Germany is primarily concerned with the integration of new citizens and do not wish for newly naturalized citizens to retain a foot in the other country. Turkey, however, is a sending state and is most concerned with maximizing the contributions that emigrants can make to the state (through economic contributions in the form of remittances and political contributions through the formation of ethnic lobbying) and therefore wish to retain a hold on those emigrants. Yet, as research has shown those emigrants will be most valuable to Turkey if they naturalize in their country of residence. The majority of Turkish emigrants have migrated to Germany. So, how is Turkey to encourage them to naturalize while still remaining close ties to those citizens? The answer is found in the dual citizenship law that Turkey passed in 1995. The Turkish “consulate staff now encourage eligible emigrants residing in European Union member states to naturalize and become dual citizens. Turkey also has created an intermediate membership tier for emigrants who are required to give up their Turkish citizenship when they naturalize abroad per the citizenship laws of the immigration state. These former citizens can, with permission of Turkish authorities, live and work in Turkey and claim certain economic privileges.” (Barry 2006, 50).
Political Benefits and Dual Citizenship

What kinds of political benefits can come from granting dual citizenship/dual nationality and enhance the position of the sending state that grants dual citizenship/nationality? Well, consider the political benefits that a citizen of the United States receives. First of all, citizens of the U.S. can vote in local, state, and national elections. As voters and citizens they have the right to contact/lobby their elected officials and may also start/join a PAC or political party. Citizens of the United States may make campaign contributions to political candidates, political parties, and issues (permanent residents holding a green card also have this privilege; however, other foreign nationals do not) (Foreign Nationals 2003). If a sending state wishes to have their emigrants that have relocated to the United States participate in these political benefits; those emigrants would have to become U.S. citizens. All of these political benefits can contribute to the increased welfare of the sending state, assuming they still have strong ties with the emigrant and the emigrant is willing to serve as part of an official or unofficial ethnic lobby for the sending state.


**Economic Benefits of Dual Citizenship**

What kinds economic benefits can occur for the sending state by granting dual citizenship/dual nationality? As has already been discussed, the primary benefit to the sending state occurs in the form of remittances. Additionally, as the literature review has already stated, those states that foster stronger ties to their emigrants will receive increased remittances. However, a state does not have to encourage its citizens to naturalize elsewhere in order to maintain those ties of citizenship at home. However, there are economic benefits that a citizen and only a citizen can receive in the receiving country. These economic benefits may increase the economic opportunities of the citizen and thus, increase or maintain their power to remit to the sending country. What are these benefits? For example, in the United States, citizens receive the following economic opportunities/assistance: college student loans/grants, employment training assistance, federal retiree benefits, government jobs, government loans, government grants, small business financial assistance, disaster recovery assistance, welfare, and disability benefits (Government Benefits, Grants, and Financial Aid 2011).

**Immigration Countries**

Immigration countries, also known as receiving countries or countries of destination, are those countries that migrants flock to. Generally, these countries are considered to be developed countries with greater economic opportunities. Examples of these countries would be the United States, Canada, and Australia.
What motivates these countries to accept dual citizenship? Perhaps the answer lies in this idea:

*Major powers remain acutely sensitive to the distribution of power, are wary of developments that might leave them vulnerable and still strive to enhance their positions at the expense of potential rivals* (Walt 2002, 197).

Faist explains that “in Sweden, embracing dual nationality has functioned as part of a strategy of what one may call ‘nation-maintenance’, in which multicultural policies have effectively ensured assimilationist outcomes in the political realm” (2003, 21). Another way in which dual citizenship may serve to assist immigration countries is that it may help alleviate the aging problems of population growth that many OECD countries are experiencing (Held and McGrew, The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Divide 2003, 313).

**Emigration Countries**

Countries of emigration, also called sending countries or countries of origin, are those countries with high levels of migrants exiting either permanently or temporarily. These countries are generally less developed; some have high levels of human rights violations, most are seen as having low levels of economic opportunity.
…it is the extension rather than withdrawal of citizenship which is the trend among sending countries. Offering dual nationality or citizenship is a way for sending countries to kill two birds with one stone. They encourage their emigrants to seek naturalization, integration and increased political influence in their country of settlement, and they offer a set of rights promoting their engagement in the sending country (Ostergaard-Nielson 2003, 19).

Fitzgerald states that “…the acceptance of dual nationality has become a policy tool of countries of emigration trying to maintain claims on emigrants and their economic and political resources in host countries” (2009, 32). There “are strong economic incentives for emigration states to strengthen ties with their absent citizens…in approving dual nationality, states have allowed emigrants to retain legal membership at home, even as they acquire citizenship abroad” (Barry 2006, 11). Additionally, “…most sending countries seek not only to tap into the economic resources of citizens abroad but increasingly also to incorporate them in their domestic and foreign policy and to appeal to their love for, and sense of duty towards, their country of origin” (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003, 4).

This paper will now turn to the examination of specific emigration countries to examine how their social contract with their citizens is changing as a result of migration and whether or not those changes to the social contract will assist those countries in their long-term survival and in increasing their relative position in the international community.
CHAPTER 3: MEXICO

Introduction

Mexico presents an excellent opportunity for a case study because it is a country of emigration and is also one whose legislature has legalized dual nationality; a move that is a huge change in the way Mexico has traditionally viewed its emigrants. In studying Mexico, David Fitzgerald states that his “goal is to uncover what institutional actors in Mexico have done to manage emigration and its effects in specific domains of state and nation building and analyze how that has transformed citizenship on the ground in an age of globalization” (2009, 8). The goal of this research is determine how successful the steps Mexico has taken will be towards its goals.

Mexico is a federal republic and ranks 11th in the world population. The net migration rate in Mexico is -3.38/1,000 population (The World Factbook 2010). According to the CIA World Factbook, “ongoing economic and social concerns include low real wages, underemployment for a large segment of the population, inequitable income distribution, and few advancement opportunities for the largely Amerindian population in the impoverished southern states” (2010).
Mexico History

Mexico, once “the site of advanced Amerindian civilizations” (The World Factbook 2010) has a rich history of migration. By 700 B.C.E. there is the emergence of sustainable agriculture and the beginnings of permanent settlement by the descendents of the nomadic peoples to cross the Bering Strait. By the time the Spaniards arrive at the end of the 15th century there are well established, highly developed civilizations in this region. By 1521, the Aztec capital has fallen and the settlement of New Spain has begun (Kirkwood 2000).

As the period of colonialization begins, racial stratification takes hold of colonial society. “Despite the Spaniards initial awe at the achievements of the Aztec and Inca civilizations, they soon regarded the Indians as inferior. This position remains well established into the twentieth century” (Kirkwood 2000, 60). While Indians occupied the lowest rung of colonial society, those Spaniards born in New Spain, or of mixed race (Spanish and Indian) were considered to be inferior to those Spaniards born in Spain. By the early 19th century “a sense of Mexicanidad (an identity with things Mexican) fostered an attitude that rejected the long-established idea that somehow things European were superior” (Kirkwood 2000, 75).
In 1821, Mexico gained independence from Spain. The post-colonial time in Mexico is marked by economic and political instability and territorial losses to the United States, culminating in the Pofiriato, or Diaz dictatorship (Kirkwood 2000).

In order to recoup some of the population lost by the secession of Texas and the ceding of California to the United States, Mexico begins a policy of population importation from Europe. This policy proves unsuccessful. Mexico also attempted to limit additional emigration to the United States by instituting a ban on entering the United States without a work contract. This is also largely unsuccessful. From 1926 to 1929 Mexico’s federal government continued to oppose emigration from Mexico; however, local Mexican governments supported emigration as a way to ease the crisis caused by poverty & disease from the overpopulation of cities. Following the Great Depression, the United States begins mass deportations back to Mexico increasing the effectiveness of Mexico’s repatriation efforts. With the advent of World War II, the United States again has need for Mexico’s migrant workers and the U.S. and Mexico write the Bracero Agreements as a way to supply the U.S. need temporarily (Fitzgerald 2009). However, by the early 1990’s “a pattern of circular, mostly male migration gave way to permanent migration of whole families. Emigrants and their resources became less accessible within Mexico, prompting the Mexican government to reach out to them more aggressively” (Fitzgerald 2009, 56).

In 1994, Ernesto Zedillo became the President of Mexico and vowed to reform the election process to encourage greater democracy and transparency. “In his
inaugural speech in 1994, the new president had implied deficiencies in his own election and said Mexico needed a fairer voting system” (Preston 2000). President Zedillo spent the next six years pursuing the goals of political reform, economic reform, and migration policy reform. Among these goals was a change in the way Mexico views its emigrants. President Zedillo and other “Mexican leaders seem suddenly fascinated with the political and economic potential of the six million migrant workers and other Mexican citizens living north of the border” (Dillon 1996). His political reforms culminated in the election of Vincente Fox in 2000 which was seen as a victory for Mexican democracy and the work of President Zedillo. (Preston 2000). It is also important to disclose that in 2006, Mexicans living abroad would be eligible to vote for the first time after the passage of the amendment granting this right in July 2005.

From 1988 until 2005, the most interesting and intense chapter unfolded in the history of migrant political work in support of participation in Mexican elections. The effort coincided with other changes that were transforming and democratizing Mexico. These included the approval of substantive electoral reforms; the eventual creation of a Federal Electoral Institute, autonomous from the executive branch; the appearance and legalization of opposition parties; the breakdown of the previously unbeatable State party; the decay of the presidentialist regime; and the increasingly important presence of an active and organized civil society. In this new era, the migrants have been part of the change that has occurred in Mexico (Martínez Saldaña 2005).

However, there are major restrictions to this voting right that will effectively block many Mexicans abroad from exercising the franchise. One major restriction that will negatively impact the ability of overseas Mexicans to participate is the requirement that they already have a voter registration card obtained in person in Mexico. For the purpose of this study, the review of data on Mexico will be limited to the dates just prior to the passage of the 1998 No Perdido Nacionalidad and prior to the passage of the 2006 Overseas Voting Law.
No Perdido Nacionalidad

The nationality laws prior to 1998 stated that Mexicans naturalizing abroad would lose their Mexican citizenship or nationality. In 1998 this changed with the legislation titled “No Perdido Nacionalidad” (No Loss of Nationality). The law went into effect on March 20, 1998, abrogating a 1993 law which called for a loss of nationality in the event of naturalization abroad. The law allowed any citizen to newly acquire another nationality; while allowing those Mexicans that had previously lost their Mexican nationality a five year window (1998-2003) in which to reacquire it by proving their right to nationality and establishing their identity with the government of Mexico (Laws of Congress 2011).

The law benefits the emigrant who retains or reacquires their Mexican nationality by allowing them to: “[have] legal equality in the country” with other Mexicans; to retain or acquire property in Mexico; employment in Mexico; the ability to operate businesses or invest in businesses that are restricted to Mexicans such as “communication, broadcasting and telecommunications, gas and oil unions, credit and development banking institutions, and transport” (Consulado Honorario de Mexico en Bilbao 2011).

While the law benefits the emigrant, in what ways could such a law benefit the state? Returning to the ideas of realist theory, states need to survive, they will try to improve their position in the international system, and they need to foster alliances to balance the
power of other states. How can allowing emigrants to hold dual nationality contribute to those goals while minimizing the negatives of migration such as loss of resources, national prestige, and national identity?

While simply having those nationals that have lost their nationality renew it and retaining the nationality of those who now wish to nationalize in their country of destination may answer the question surrounding the loss of national identity, what about the other questions? The answer lies in remittances and in political participation of Mexican emigrants in their country of destination. “[T]he increasing importance to Mexico of its emigrants’ capital contributions has driven a sea change in the national identity toward one that more readily locates emigrant citizens well within the ‘imagined nation’ of Mexico citizens” (Barry 2006, 13). In presenting the law, Gomez Villanueva invokes “the self-interest of the Mexican state in encouraging remittances” (Fitzgerald, Nationality and Migration in Modern Mexico 2005, 185). Additionally, Fitzgerald finds that,

In agreeing to form a commission to study dual nationality, representatives from all parties signed a document suggesting the need to recognize dual nationality as a means of facilitating emigrants’ ‘economic and family projects in their country of origin’ (2005, 184).

Clearly the need to retain and attract remittance as a way to reverse a loss of resources stemming from emigration was part of the reasoning in passing this legislation. Additionally, an increase in remittances could be seen as a way to increase the state’s
position in the international community as an increase in remittances equates to an increase in resources.

Another benefit to Mexico from its dual nationality was that it was “intended in part to encourage Mexican nationals to become U.S. citizens so they would vote against measures like [Proposition] 187 [in California] and the politicians who supported them” (Fitzgerald 2009, 168). This benefit is recognized by then president of Mexico and used as a selling point for the law.

President Zedillo [who] privately told a group of US Latino leaders in Texas that the goal of dual nationality was ‘to develop a close relationship with Mexican-Americans, one in which they could be called upon to lobby US policy-makers on economic and political issues involving the United States and Mexico’ (Corchado 1995). Nationality law was to be a tool of Mexican foreign policy (Fitzgerald 2005, 184).

If in fact, promoting dual nationality does allow the government of Mexico to use its nationals to lobby the US government then not only have they found a way to foster powerful alliances, but they have also found a way to reduce any loss of prestige stemming from emigration.

In this reconfiguration of citizenship, emigrants have gone from being barely acknowledged, absent, second-class citizens whose Mexican-ness was suspect, to being national heroes who make great sacrifices for Mexico –essential members of the Mexico de afuera, or ‘Mexico outside Mexico’ (Barry 2006, 14).
However, one restriction in the No Perdido Nacionalidad may perhaps keep this tactic from being successful. “The Mexican reforms specifically sought to bar dual nationals residing elsewhere the right to vote and stand for office” (Feldblum 2000, 480).

**Emigration to the U.S. from Mexico**

The majority of all Mexican migration is to the United States. The data provided by the United States Department of Homeland Security shows an overall small increase in legal migration from Mexico to the United States from 1995. While illegal immigration to the United States from Mexico is also a major factor in any discussion on Mexican migration; it is incredibly difficult to quantify. Also, as this research is focused on those Mexican citizens that naturalize (or are at least capable of naturalizing) in a country of immigration while retaining their Mexican citizenship, the illegal immigrant is necessarily excluded from the discussion.
In the chart above, in 1996 there is an 81.88% increase in migration from 1995 to the U.S. from Mexico. However, this is followed by a decrease of just over 10% in both 1997 and 1998. No Perdido Nacionalidad went into effect March 20, 1998 and in the following year there is a slight increase in migration to the United States from Mexico. However, this increase is also concurrent with the beginnings of drought conditions in Mexico. In 1999, “the government of Mexico has declared five northern states disaster zones in the face of what residents are calling the worst drought in living memory” (CNN World 1999). In a 2010 study, authors Feng, Krueger, and Oppenheimer argue that migration levels from Mexico to the U.S. increase during times of drought (Feng, Krueger and Oppenheimer 2010). Migration in 2003 then has a 47.19% decrease from the previous year perhaps as a result of continuing U.S. fears of terrorism resulting from 9/11 and the war in Iraq. There is a significant jump in migration in 2004 (up
51.39% from 2003 that may be attributable to continuing drought conditions and increasing levels of organized crime along the northern Mexican border. From 2005 to 2009 there is a pattern of decrease one year followed by an almost equal increase the following year. This pattern of up and down may be attributable to many factors such as increasing rhetoric in the immigration debate in the U.S., the passage of Overseas Voting in Mexican elections in 2006, continuing drought conditions in Mexico and the Southwestern U.S., and the economic crisis beginning in late 2008. The table below lists the migration numbers from 1995 – 2009.

Table 3: Migration from Mexico to the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Migration numbers</th>
<th>% Increase/Decrease from previous year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>89,932</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>163,572</td>
<td>81.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>146,865</td>
<td>-10.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>147,573</td>
<td>-10.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>173,919</td>
<td>17.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>206,426</td>
<td>18.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>219,380</td>
<td>6.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>115,864</td>
<td>-47.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>175,411</td>
<td>51.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>161,445</td>
<td>-7.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>173,749</td>
<td>7.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>148,640</td>
<td>-14.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>189,989</td>
<td>27.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>164,920</td>
<td>-13.19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [DHS: Data and Statistics 2011](#)
Remittances

From 1992 forward there is a steady increase in remittances to Mexico with the largest percentage increases happening in 1996 (13.30%), 1997 (12.06%), 1998 (17.23%), 2000 (13.17%), 2001 (34.84%), 2003 (50.10%), 2004 (19.97%), and 2005 (14.51%).

![Graph showing remittances in Mexico 1990–2005](image)

Figure 3.2: Remittances in Mexico 1990 – 2005

Source (*World Bank Search: Mexico Remittances 2010*)

It is interesting to note that two of these notable increases occurred concurrently with significant decreases in legal immigration to the United States. Notably 1998 (the year of the implementation of No Perdido Nacionalidad) and 2003 (the final year in which former Mexican nationals may re-acquire their Mexican nationality) experienced sharp declines in legal immigration with sharp increases in remittances. The table below details the remittances from 1990 to 2005.
Table 4: Remittances to Mexico 1990 – 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Remittances</th>
<th>% increase in Remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$3,098,000,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>$3,030,000,000</td>
<td>-2.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>$3,700,000,000</td>
<td>22.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>$3,979,000,000</td>
<td>7.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$4,121,820,000</td>
<td>3.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>$4,368,120,000</td>
<td>5.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>$4,949,000,000</td>
<td>13.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>$5,545,800,000</td>
<td>12.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>$6,501,200,000</td>
<td>17.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$6,648,700,000</td>
<td>2.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$7,524,600,000</td>
<td>13.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$10,146,300,000</td>
<td>34.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$11,029,500,000</td>
<td>8.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$16,555,800,000</td>
<td>50.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$19,861,300,000</td>
<td>19.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$22,742,300,000</td>
<td>14.51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (World Bank Search: Mexico Remittances 2010)

So, how does one explain the increasing remittances that are not accompanied by equally increasing immigration? According to an article put out by the Federal Reserve Bank in Dallas at the end of the summer of 2007, it may have to do with a change in money transfer costs.

“Over the last decade or so, inflation-adjusted remittances have grown at an average annual rate of 15.6 percent. Since 2000, the rate has risen to 20.4 percent... What's driving the rapid growth of remittances to Mexico? It's a question that has puzzled researchers for years because the most likely economic forces don't seem to be in play. Fundamental factors, such as the size of the Mexican migrant population, their income and the strength of their bonds to Mexico, haven't grown as fast as remittances. Other variables, such as the peso–dollar exchange rate and Mexican economic conditions, have been relatively stable since at least 1996.

What have changed are money-transfer costs, which have plummeted since 2000, and Banco de México's measurement techniques. Together, these factors likely account for the bulk of unexplained remittance growth in the last few years.” (Canas, Coronado and Orrenius 2007)
But can a decrease in money transfer costs and a change in Banco de Mexico’s measurement techniques be the primary explanations? Is the implementation of No Perdido Nacionalidad partly responsible?

**Applications for US Citizenship by Mexican Nationals**

While there is an initial increase in Mexicans naturalizing in the United States in the year immediately following the implementation of No Perdido Nacionalidad (84.76% in 1999) the trend in U.S. Naturalizations by Mexicans from 2000 to 2004 was decreasing. However, we see another trend of increasing naturalizations from 2004 to 2008. Yet, when compared with the percentage of increases in naturalization during the 1990’s these increases do not seem particularly significant.

![Figure 3.3: Naturalizations to the United States by Mexican Emigrants 1990 - 2008](source: (DHS: Data and Statistics 2011))
Table 5: Naturalization to the United States by Mexicans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># of Applications for U.S. Naturalization by Mexicans</th>
<th>% Increase/Decrease from Previous Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>17,564</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>22,066</td>
<td>25.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>12,880</td>
<td>-41.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>23,630</td>
<td>83.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>46,169</td>
<td>95.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>81,655</td>
<td>76.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>254,988</td>
<td>212.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>142,569</td>
<td>-44.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>112,442</td>
<td>-21.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>207,750</td>
<td>84.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>189,705</td>
<td>-8.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>103,234</td>
<td>-45.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>76,531</td>
<td>-25.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>56,093</td>
<td>-26.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>63,840</td>
<td>-13.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>77,089</td>
<td>20.75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (DHS: Data and Statistics 2011)

Conclusion

While the legislation of No Perdido Nacionalidad may have assisted Mexico in attracting remittances back to the state and therefore increasing its resources and ability to improve its position in the international system, it certainly seems from the data that the legislation has failed at increasing the state’s ability to foster alliances as there has been little increase in the number of U.S. naturalizations of Mexican nationals from pre-1998 numbers.
CHAPTER 4: PHILIPPINES

Introduction

The Philippines are also an excellent choice for this case study as they are also a country of emigration that has recently changed their policy on dual citizenship. They also have a large portion of their population working outside the state’s borders.

_There are about 8.7 to 11 million overseas Filipinos worldwide, equivalent to 11% of the total population of the Philippines_ (Filipinos Abroad 2010).

The Philippines have also incorporated their migrants into the national story to portray their migrants as heroes.

The Philippines is a republic made up of 80 provinces. Their population growth rate is 1.931% and they have a net migration of -1.31 migrants/1,000 population (The World Factbook 2010).
Philippine History

The Philippines first documented contact with Europe occurred in 1521 when Ferdinand Magellan landed there during his attempt to circumnavigate the globe (Rodell 2002, 9). For the next 356 years Spain ruled the Philippines (Philippine History 2010). By the late 1800’s the Philippines was ready to break from Spanish rule. “The spark that ignited feelings of nationalism and broke sentimental ties to Spain came in January 1872 with a mutiny by Filipino workers and soldiers at the Spanish navy yard in Cavite across the bay from Manila” (Rodell 2002, 13). However, the Philippines were unsuccessful in gaining independence at that time. The United States became involved in war with Spain, the Spanish-American War, and the resulting Treaty of Paris found the Philippines ceded to the United States. It continued under U.S. rule until 1935 when it became a self-governing commonwealth (The World Factbook 2010) and gained full independence on July 4, 1946 (Philippine History 2010).

So, how long have Filipinos been migrant laborers? “Filipino overseas labor migration has been traced to as early as 1565 when Filipino seafarers were recruited to work in foreign ships plying the Manila-Acapulco trade route” (Alcid 2003, 101). However, “the year 1900 is deemed as the official start of the deployment of Filipinos for overseas employment” as this was when the first wave of migrant Filipinos were recruited to the Hawaii sugar plantations (Alcid 2003, 101). By 1934 there were 120,000 Filipinos in Hawaii’s sugar fields (Alcid 2003).
The second wave of Filipino migration went to the United States from 1946-1970. “By 1975 more than 250,000 Filipinos had migrated to the U.S., resulting in the emergence of ‘brain drain’ as a national concern” (Alcid 2003, 105). The third wave of migration went to West Asian countries (Alcid 2003).

The government of the Philippines viewed the development of overseas employment in a positive light.

*Overseas employment began as a ‘stop-gap’ measure to address unemployment and the lack of foreign exchange...also a way of diffusing people’s discontent and anger over the deteriorating economic situation and the declaration of martial law by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Alcid 2003, 107).*

In 1973, the government institutionalized overseas employment with the creation of the Labor Code of the Philippines. “The Code...provided for a proactive role of the state not only in regulating the operations of private fee-charging recruitment and placement agencies, but also in the actual recruitment and deployment of workers abroad” (Alcid 2003, 106). Additionally, the code required all migrant workers to send a certain percentage of their wages home through the national banking system (Alcid 2003). Then in 1982, the state established the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) which was “tasked with regulating the employment of Filipino workers and professionals overseas (Alcid 2003, 106). Clearly, the Filipino government recognized the potential to the state of Overseas Foreign Workers if these workers were properly regulated and utilized by the government.
In 1986, the presidential campaign of Corazon Aquino successfully ousted the dictator Ferdinand Marcos, restoring democracy to the Philippines and installing her as the first women president of the Philippines. Under her leadership, a new constitution was instituted that limited the powers of the president and provided for a bicameral legislature. Her successors continued her work of increasing the political and economic stability of the Philippines. As democratic practices strengthened in the Philippines, the issue of the treatment, rights, and responsibilities of Overseas Foreign Workers became more prominent discussions. Then in 2001, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo became the second female president of the Philippines. During her tenure as president, the Philippines passed the 2003 Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act and the Overseas Voting Act (Philippine History 2010).

**Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003**

On July 28, 2003, the Philippines enacted RA#9225, the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. RA#9225, Section 2 states:

> It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

Additionally, Section 3 allows Filipinos that had previously lost their Philippine citizenship to reclaim it:
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic.

Section 5 provides that “those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines.”

However, in order to exercise the rights to vote or hold office there are certain requirements that a Filipino citizen abroad must meet:

Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws

The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 requires overseas Filipinos to register to vote in person with their embassy or consulate and allows these registered voters to vote in federal elections. The rest of RA#9225 states that:

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.

(Dual Citizenship 2003)

Returning to the question of why the state would allow dual citizenship, this paper must return to the principles of realism. If the Philippines wish to successfully preserve their nation, increase their position in the international system, and foster alliances it is crucial that they provide their emigrants with a tangible connection to home. Perhaps as the Mexican president and legislature believed in 1998, the Philippines believed that renationalizing their former citizens and preserving the nationality of those which wish to nationalize elsewhere, they would be able to do these things. However, the Philippines did go a step farther than Mexico by providing its dual nationals the right to vote in federal elections and the right to return home and hold public office. Perhaps the
Philippines believed this would make their goals more successful. That is certainly the argument of this thesis.

**Emigrant Population**

According to the Commission on Filipinos Overseas the United States has received 66% of Filipinos that have emigrated since 1981. For this reason, this paper will focus on emigration numbers from the United States as well as naturalizations in the United States.

The Commission on Filipinos Overseas shows the following number of emigrants to the United States from 1981 to 2009:

Figure 4.4: Emigration to the United States from 1981 to 2009

Source: (Commission of Filipinos Overseas 2011)
However, Philippine emigration to the U.S. according to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security looks like this from 1993 to 2009:

![Figure 4.5: Emigration to the United States from the Philippines 1993 to 2009](image)

Source: (DHS: Data and Statistics 2011)

Both data sets show fairly steady flow of immigration with little increase and decrease over the years. The Philippines’ data shows no increase over 50,000 and almost no decrease below 30,000 for the time period measured. The U.S. data shows immigration levels from the Philippines rising to over 70,000 in 2006 and 2007, but mostly staying between 70,000 and 30,000 for the years measured. The following table provides more detail on the numbers of Filipino immigration to the United States.
Table 6: Filipino Immigration to the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># of Migrants</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>63,457</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>53,535</td>
<td>-15.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>50,984</td>
<td>-4.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>55,876</td>
<td>9.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>49,117</td>
<td>-12.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>34,466</td>
<td>-29.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>31,026</td>
<td>-9.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>42,474</td>
<td>36.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>53,154</td>
<td>25.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>51,308</td>
<td>-3.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>45,397</td>
<td>-11.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>57,846</td>
<td>27.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>60,746</td>
<td>5.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>74,606</td>
<td>22.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>72,596</td>
<td>-2.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>54,030</td>
<td>-25.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>60,029</td>
<td>11.10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (DHS: Data and Statistics 2011)

The increase in emigration from the Philippines to the U.S. in 2004 could be a result of the passage of the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act; however, other factors such as the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami might have had an impact on these numbers also. While the Philippines was not hit by the 2004 Tsunami, fears of a future tsunami and disruption in migration patterns to countries effected by the tsunami may have impacted migration to the United States. Additionally, the downturn in migration in 2008 may have been a result of the economic crisis that began in that year.

**Remittances**

If immigration to the United States has not changed dramatically over the years, it looks as though remittances to the Philippines have continued a gradual increase
from 1990 to 2009. However, there is not a noteworthy rise in remittances following the passage of the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Rather the trend of increasing remittances could be explained by the continuing increase in migration and not the legalization of dual citizenship.

![Figure 4.6: Remittances to the Philippines 1990 to 2009](image)

Source: (World Bank Search: Philippine Remittances 2010)

One question that does arise is why there are not concurrent drops in remittances when there are drops in migration such as in 2008? In 2008, the economic crisis began and there is a significant drop in migration from the Philippines to the U.S. of 25.7%; however, there is a rise of 14.35% in remittances. The table below shows remittances to the Philippines in dollars.
Table 7: Remittances to the Philippines 1990 to 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Remittances</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$1,465,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>$1,850,000,000</td>
<td>26.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>$2,538,000,000</td>
<td>37.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>$2,587,000,000</td>
<td>1.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$3,452,000,000</td>
<td>33.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>$5,360,000,000</td>
<td>55.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>$4,875,000,000</td>
<td>-9.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>$6,799,000,000</td>
<td>39.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>$5,130,000,000</td>
<td>-24.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$6,717,000,000</td>
<td>30.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$6,961,000,000</td>
<td>3.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$8,769,000,000</td>
<td>25.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$9,735,000,000</td>
<td>11.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$10,243,000,000</td>
<td>5.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$11,471,000,000</td>
<td>11.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$13,566,000,000</td>
<td>18.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$15,251,000,000</td>
<td>12.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$16,302,000,000</td>
<td>6.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$18,642,000,000</td>
<td>14.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$19,766,000,000</td>
<td>6.03%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (World Bank Search: Philippine Remittances 2010)

Naturalizations to the United States from Philippines

The trend line for naturalizations in the U.S. from the Philippines matches the trend line of migration to the U.S. from the Philippines very closely. Additionally, the passage of the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 does not seem to factor into the trend line for U.S. naturalizations. In fact, there is a slight decrease in 2003 and while the following years show a more or less upward trend in naturalization this could simply be attributable to increasing levels of migration and a continuation of the previous trend in naturalization. Furthermore, the 51.41% increase in Filipino naturalization in the U.S. in 2008 could have been a result of a decrease in the average
processing time for naturalization applications announced in August 2008 by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2008). As for the 33.78% decrease in naturalizations in 2009, this is probably a result of the decrease in migration in 2008 as a result of the economic crisis.

Figure 4.7: Naturalizations to the United States by Filipino Emigrants

Source: (DHS: Data and Statistics 2011)

The table below will provide more detailed numbers of naturalization in the U.S. by Filipinos.
Table 8: Applications for Naturalization in the U.S. from Filipinos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># Applications</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>40,777</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>37,870</td>
<td>-7.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>51,346</td>
<td>35.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>30,898</td>
<td>-39.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>24,872</td>
<td>-19.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>38,944</td>
<td>56.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>46,563</td>
<td>19.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>35,431</td>
<td>-23.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>30,487</td>
<td>-13.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>29,081</td>
<td>-4.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>31,448</td>
<td>8.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>36,673</td>
<td>16.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>40,500</td>
<td>10.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>38,830</td>
<td>-4.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>58,792</td>
<td>51.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>38,934</td>
<td>-33.78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (DHS: Data and Statistics 2011)

Conclusion

Remittances increase steadily from pre-2003 and there is not a significant increase after 2003 that can’t be attributed to increased migration. Naturalizations follow same pattern as migrations with no noticeable change after 2003. It does not look as though there was any notable benefit derived by the Philippines with the passage of the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

In concluding this research, it is necessary to recap the end of Chapter 1. The independent variable for each case study is the law allowing for dual nationality/citizenship. The dependent variables are: remittances (controlled for increasing or decreasing emigration) and the number of naturalizations in the primary receiving country also controlling for increasing or decreasing emigration. Remittances are a measurement of the state’s ability to increase resources and therefore increase standing in the international system while naturalizations in the primary receiving country are a measurement of the state’s ability to foster alliances. Both of these measures together will determine the success of the state at increasing the economic and political benefits provided by its emigrants.

This thesis’ hypothesis stated that if a sending state offers legal dual citizenship/nationality with political participation, then it will be successful at increasing the economic and political benefits provided by its emigrants; but if a sending state only offers legal dual citizenship/nationality without political participation than it will not be successful at increasing the economic and political benefits provided by its emigrants.
Therefore, it was expected that there would be an increase in those measures of the Philippines and either a decrease or no change in those measures for Mexico over the time periods measured.

This was not the result of these case studies. While remittances did increase over the time periods examined; there was no notable increase after the passage of the nationality/citizenship laws, rather the increase in remittances is part of a seeming trend that can also be attributed to other factors. Additionally, neither country experienced a notable advantage over the other in this area.

Also, the number of naturalizations in the primary receiving country of these two sending nations did not experience any notable increase following the passage of the nationality/citizenship laws that cannot be attributed simply to increasing levels of migration.

Ultimately, this research must conclude that neither law seems to have achieved any notable increase in its resources and therefore its standing in the international community. Nor did these states achieve any significant increase in its ability to foster alliances with the naturalization of its citizens in their receiving countries. Also, as the state to legalize dual citizenship/nationality with political participation (Philippines) did not fare significantly better than the state that legalized dual citizenship/nationality
without political participation (Mexico) it is the conclusion of this research that the hypothesis stated here is not supported.

Further research needs to be done in these areas of citizenship and migration perhaps in the areas of examining the attitudes of dual nationals/citizens to examine their connection to their country of origin and the impact of dual citizenship on those attitudes. This would best be accomplished with an intensive survey of those citizens claiming dual citizenship in countries of emigration.
REFERENCES


Consulado Honorario de Mexico en Bilbao. 2011.


