A discourse concerning two new compositions

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A Discourse Concerning Two New Compositions

by

Stanley D. Harrison

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of English
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida

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Dedication
To Pat, whose conversations refreshed and sustained me.

And to Stan, who would have laughed.
Acknowledgments

The teacher who is indeed wise does not bid you to enter the house of his wisdom but rather leads you to the threshold of your mind. -- Kahlil Gibran

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A Discourse Concerning Two New Compositions

Stanley D. Harrison

ABSTRACT
This project addresses problems for theorists of writing and composition that arose in the 1990s when capital privatizes the production of internetworked writing and starts operating in the manner of a practicing compositionist. I begin by noting that capital in the 1990s converted internetworked writing machines into fixed capital and started composing its version of the cultural form of the "social" we call the Internet. Thereafter, I argue that composition theorists can best understand the Internet, internetworked writing, and internetworked subjectivities if they regard capital as a formidable compositionist, one capable of making the machinofactured internetworked composition into a privately owned means for organizing the direct production of internetworked social writing and internetworked social being. I engage with this problem by pointing out that capital's private production of the internetworked social subsumes both the interindividual site of sociolinguistic production and the individual internetworked writer. I go on to establish that capital uses its control of end-user license agreements to transform the writer subsumed by capital into a privately controlled intellectual property. I argue that capital subjects internetworked writers to a form of accelerated decrepitude because the internetworked writer's cycle of life gets tied in to cycles of software and hardware upgrade, overwrite, and erasure. And, finally, I demonstrate that capital
converts the internetworked population of commodified writers, along with their commodified writing and commodified formal compositions, into allegorical symbols insofar as "every commodity is a symbol, since, in so far as it is value, it is only the material envelope of the human labour spent upon it" (Marx, Capital, vol. 1, chapter 2). On the strength of these positions, I argue that composition theorists should develop a theory of internetworked writing and composition that makes the following assumptions: capital has become a compositionist; internetworked compositionists and compositions have become commodities; and internetworked compositions, compositionists, and composition theorists -- for having become commodities -- have entered into an age of allegory -- that is, an age wherein internetworked compositions necessarily make other, allegorical reference to relations of production and exchange that support capital's ongoing production of the composed, commodified, and festishized internetworked "social."
Introduction

*A Discourse Concerning Two New Compositions*

Speak what you think now in hard words and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every thing you said to day.

Emerson, *Self-Reliance*

Two roads diverged in a wood, and I --
*I took them both,*
And that has made all the difference.

*Misprison* of Robert Frost

It has become a cliché to note with Frederic Jameson that postmodernism is the cultural logic of late capitalism. It has become commonplace to observe with him that the cultural logic of late capitalism, or postmodernism, is a "forcefield," or "cultural dominant," "in which very different kinds of cultural impulses . . . must make their way" ("Postmodernism" 57). It has become pedestrian to draw upon, supplement, contest, or dismiss Jameson's taxonomy of the postmodern forcefield -- his argument in "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" that the postmodern takes its shape from such things as the waning of affect, the rise of pastiche over parody, the onset of postmodern schizophrenia, and the increasing reach of the technological sublime. And, it has become an easy stretch to know along with Jameson that the postmodern emerges when capital makes aesthetic, cultural production an attribute of capitalist production; when capital penetrates and soaks through the entire social space, including with "the
most secret folds and corners of the quotidian," with the "culture of the image"; when capital manufactures a culture that gets consumed at all points of "daily life"; and when, for all this, capital "spells the end of the aesthetic itself, or of aesthetics in general: for where the latter suffuses everything, where the sphere of culture expands to the point where everything becomes in one way or another acculturated, the traditional distinctiveness or 'specificity' of the aesthetic (and even of culture as such) is necessarily blurred" ("Transformations" 111).

Our knowledge and appreciation of Jameson notwithstanding, composition theorists have never followed Jameson's remarks on the postmodern back to their roots in Ernest Mandel's *Late Capitalism* -- a text that framed a periodizing argument about late capitalism that bolstered Jameson in his periodizing desire to frame a theory of postmodernism, or the cultural logic of late capitalism. Familiar as we are with Jameson's texts, we have never needed to know, along with Mandel, that late capitalism represents the second phase of monopoly capital, or classical imperialism. Had we had reason to check, I am sure we could have made much ado of the fact that Mandel distinguished late capitalism from freely competitive capitalism (as from the early 19th century) and classical imperialism (as from the mid-19th century) "by the fact that alongside machine-made industrial goods (as from the early 19th century) and machine-made machines (as from the mid-19th century), we now find machine-made production of raw materials and foodstuffs" (191). Had we pressed through Jameson to reach Mandel, we might have done a good deal with his understanding that late capitalism represents that moment in the "becoming," "growth," and "vital process" of capital (Marx *Grundrisse* ch10.htm) in which capital became "fully industrialized" "all branches of the economy" "for the first
time" (Mandel Late 191).

We didn't. And we had reasons.

Composition theorists make it their business to discuss the manner in which socially constructed individuals use collectively negotiated technologies in the situationally contingent production of socially overdetermined cultural forms. As a rule, composition theorists don't cotton to the idea that they should be drawing general connections between the social relations of industrial production and the social relations of cultural production. This or that composition theorist might attend to Mandel where he adds that fully industrialized late capitalism is also notable for its "increasing mechanization of the sphere of circulation (with the exception of pure repair services) and the increasing mechanization of the superstructure" (Late 191). But, on the whole, we would rather hold with Marilyn Cooper that the postmodern -- even where it articulates with internetworked electronic discourse -- eludes the grasp of reductive schema like Mandel's that put the social and socially negotiated production of culture compositions within a "superstructure" and, for this, in terribly meaningful contact with the relations and forces of industrial production, or the base. We know that Cooper is correct to argue, instead, that compositions issue from the operations of collectively organized, culturally overdetermined, situationally contingent persons who have engaged with others in the social construction of such things as knowledge, power, and responsibility -- attributes of social by-play that both underpin composition and demonstrate that composition never functions "as a possession but as a relation" (145). Theorists are certain and have been justified in their certainty that composition, being an issue of the social, is never so determined by the forces and relations of industrial production that anyone should waste
everyone's time by making reductive claims about the relatedness of composition to some particular capitalist direct production process or a period in the "becoming," "growth," and "vital process" of capital (Marx Grundrisse ch10.htm).

I do not think that I would be overreaching to say that our understanding of composition is that composition circulates as an attribute of relations that generate both the social and being-in-the-world, or relations that ground cultural production upon social formation. But to this I would add that we also know that industrial production under capital, which is also a social relation, does not stand still. We know that it expands for the purpose of drawing all manner of productive relations into the social relations of industrial production. We know, just as surely as we know that composition is the complex issue of complex social relations, that capital will do according to its predisposition. For as Ernest Mandel explains, when capital runs up against primitive capitalists engaged in simple commodity production or non-capitalist producers of use-values with no exchange-value -- like a homemade meal, a refreshing drink, or a good word -- capital will penetrate and convert the ongoing processes of simple or non-capitalist production into processes of "normal," large-scale commodity production provided: 1) capital can market its new commodities at prices below "the cost price of the same goods produced in the sphere of simple commodity production or family production, or at least low enough for the original producers to consider that their own cheaper production is no longer profitable in view of the time and labour saved by the purchase of the new products" (Late 48); and 2) excess finance capital must be available and must realize a profit at least above the marginal rate of profit "yielded by additional capital investment in the spheres which are already capitalist" (48). In the event that
capital fails to satisfy these two preconditions for successful, large-scale capitalist production, then small- and medium-sized capital may decide to penetrate and convert simple and non-capitalist processes of production into more advanced capitalist production, clearing the way for the future large-capital, full-scale production of commodities.

We know that it is entirely possible that the social relations of production we call capital could make composition an attribute of industrial production. Capital could draw within the social relations of capitalist production all the conditions necessary for the productions of the social, being-in-the-world, and socially constructed formal compositions, just as once upon a time, in the 1950s and 1960s, capital capitalized the production of homemade meals and refreshing drinks through the successful introduction of "ready-to-eat meals" and "drink dispensing machines" (47-48). All capital -- which is always a social relation, never an object, never finally a possession -- would need do would be to gain a "specific relation . . . to the communal, general conditions of social production" (Grundrisse ch10.htm). In other words, if capital were ever to put "the production of the means of communication, of the physical conditions of circulation," "into the category of the production of fixed capital" (Marx Grundrisse ch10.htm), capital would have not only run up against primitive capitalists engaged in simple commodity production of formal compositions or non-capitalist producers of formal compositions with no exchange-value but would have also penetrated and converted the ongoing processes of simple or non-capitalist production of formal compositions into processes of "normal," large-scale commodity production. Capital would have succeeded in making fixed capital responsible for the direct production of the interindividual terrain of
semiotic, semantic production, call it the site where people have, heretofore, engaged in
the simple commodity production of formal compositions or the non-capitalist production
of formal compositions that circulate as use-values without exchange-value. Long and
short, capital would have located the communal, general conditions for the social
production of compositions within and as the product of the social relations of industrial
production. Capital would have caused a cultural form of "the social," a cultural form
called "being-in-the-world," and a cultural form of "socially constructed compositions" to
issue from the social relations of industrial production. And, for making the social
relations of industrial production, including the socially inflected operations of fixed
capital, responsible for the ongoing fabrication of "relations," "social formation," "being-
in-the-world," and "formal compositions," capital would have put real pressure on
composition theorists to press by Jameson to get at Mandel -- if only to determine if his
text still offers a valid periodizing thesis.

Anyone who has already been passed by capital through the crucible of exchange
en route to achieving an internetworked identity knows precisely where I am driving. If
you've ever paid to connect to the Internet, you know without having to know that the
state turned over to capital responsibility for the development and circulation of
internetworked communication in 1995. You know without having to know that capital
took state-sanctioned, juridically protected private ownership of the machines used in the
direct production of the site of transnationally internetworked writing and sociolinguistic
production (read: the Internet). For this, you also know if only implicitly that capital took
state-sanctioned, juridically protected control of the "communal, general conditions of
social production" (Marx Grundrisse ch10.htm) necessary for anyone's achievement of
internetworked "being-in-the-world." You know that industrial capital put fixed capital (read: internetworked writing technologies) into a rationalized direct production process that acts upon social beings and would-be compositionists and turns them into "social beings" and "would-be compositionists." And, for all this, you know with certainty that socially constructed individuals who agree in principal with capital to have the raw materials of themselves passed through the crucible of exchange are put into direct, inexorable contact with capital's fully automated system of writing machines and outputted in the same instant by capital, déjà vu, into "the period in which all branches of the economy are fully industrialized for the first time."

In other words, you know that we composition theorists must now attend to Mandel where he argues that capital, in the age of late capitalism, used automation and the development of nuclear energy, being the third technological revolution under capitalism, to industrialize all traditionally recognized branches of the economy for the first time but, in so doing, rationalized the production of just two of the three available forces of capitalist production -- these being "machines" and "raw materials" but not "wage labor." We have reason to note, along with Mandel, that the first and second technological revolutions under capitalism (i.e., the artisanal- and machine-production of steam-engines and then the machine-production of electric and combustion engines) succeeded in industrializing machine production. We also have reason to note with Mandel that automation and the development of nuclear energy, or the third technological revolution under capital, industrialized the production of raw materials and food stuffs. But, then, we have reason to pause and take note of a superseded limit in Mandel's work. For Mandel argued that capital had already entered into a "period in which all branches
of the economy are fully industrialized for the first time" even though capital had run into the social body of the wage laborer and failed in that moment to rationalize production of the third force of capitalist production.

To be sure, capital, in the age of late capitalism, seemed to have run up against a real limit on production. In each of industrial capitalism's first three stages -- i.e., "freely competitive capitalism," with its machine-made consumer goods; "classical imperialism" (or "monopoly capital"), with its machine-made machines; and "late capitalism" (being the second phase of "classical imperialism"), with its machine-made raw materials and food stuffs -- the proletariat had appeared as that class of people who own neither the means nor the ends of production, and who exchange their only commodity (labor-power) for wages that they use to purchase the historically variable necessities of life. The proletariat had emerged as that class of people who acquired their culturally meaningful, physically specific shape within unevenly developed, preindustrial domestic relations of production that, on the one hand, fell increasingly under capital's subjugating influence but that, on the other, escaped the organizing reach of industrial capital. That is to say, the proletariat appeared wherever women and men had procreative sex that resulted in childbirth and, thereafter, the rearing of human beings who were not slaves, who owned neither the means nor ends of production, who owned their own laboring bodies, and who sold their labor-power for wages that, in turn, secured labor's material continuance without making labor's material reproduction a productive moment in the processions of industrial capital. In each of the first three stages of industrial capitalism, capital purchased and disposed of wage labor (i.e., the third force of capitalist production), and, for its part, the proletariat necessarily escaped from becoming an industrially reproducible
means and ends of production (i.e., another industrialized "branch of the economy").
Social beings under the aspect of the proletariat escaped, as it were, from being turned
into a formal output, or material composition, of some capitalist direct production process
during not only Freely Competitive Capitalism and Classical Imperialism but also Late
Capitalism.

Were we to come at the problem of the third force of capitalist production from
the vantage of composition theory, we would say that capital never yet succeeded in
industrializing the social face of living labor because capital never yet succeeded in doing
two things: first, taking private possession of writing technologies that socially organized
individuals use in the social construction of identity; second, implicating these privately
owned writing technologies in a direct production process that makes the socially
constructed individual a primary input of capital's private system of writing machines --
that is, a machine system that actively recomposes the raw material of being-in-the-world
into a fabrication of "being-in-the-world" that capital circulates in alienable, commodified
form at locations that capital establishes for the distribution, consumption, and production
of "being-in-the-world." We would say, in other words, that capital, in the age of late
capitalism, had never yet succeeded in industrializing the social face of living labor
because it had run up against a seemingly insuperable yet altogether surmountable barrier,
that is, a barrier against production that capital superseded when it began connecting
being-in-the-world capital's machinofactured site of "being-in-the-world."

**Birth of a Compositionist, Death of the Social**

How did capital succeed in pressing past the period in which all branches of the economy
had been fully industrialized for the first time into the period in which all branches of the
The International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI) points out that late, or multinational, capitalism, advanced into the age of global, or transnational, capital through its efforts to reinvent itself and, so, to recover from its period in crisis in the 1960s and 1970s. Capital, the ICFI explains, did more to reinvent itself than increase the number of business dealings it conducted across international boundaries. Capital put itself through a structural change when, for the first time, it began distributing about the globe the planning, organization, and production of capital's formal compositions, its alienable use-values, its consumer goods, its commodities. Prior to this -- in the 19th and 20th centuries -- capital had globalized the marketing of its finished goods and the means by which capital engages in financial speculation. But now, in the late 20th century, capital managed to do for production capital what it had already done for commodity and financial capital. Capital globalized the direct production of commodities on the strength of decreased costs and increased efficiency of air and sea transport and the establishment of a new communications infrastructure. Capital took advantage of cheaper, more efficient physical transportation and started moving its production infrastructure to production points around the world so that particular transnational capitals could gain competitive advantage in their dealings with nation-states, price competition with other capitals, and struggle over wages with workers. And capital completed its transition from late, multinational capital to global, transnational capital by taking advantage of the newly developed communications infrastructure. This communications infrastructure allowed global capital to subcontract all manner of work processes; to shift production details from one place on the globe to another by completing a phone call, a fax, an email, or a
video message; and to monitor its globally distributed production processes through, for example, video link-up. For having followed commodity and finance capital in globalizing its routines, production capital allowed capital to break up and monitor production processes that during late, multinational capital had been of necessity both nationally and locally concentrated and unified (8-12).

The fact that capital succeeded in globalizing its production routines on the strength of a burgeoning communications infrastructure reminds us that capital's qualitative shift from multinational to transnational capital, from late capital to global capital, from the nationally to transnationally organized direct production of commodities, also depended for its success upon capital's financing of a fourth technological revolution under capital. It stands to reason that capital's procedure for organizing technological inventions and discoveries into technological revolutions, one of which Mandel tied to a restructuring of capital that gave rise to Late Capitalism, had to continue even after Mandel announced that capital had fully industrialized all branches of the economy. Mandel himself noted that the intellectual process of "scientific and technical invention and discovery" carries on both during times of economic expansion and stagnation, that processes of invention and discovery accumulate a "reserve of unapplied technical discoveries or potential technological innovations" during periods of economic stagnation, and that production capital forges accumulated inventions and discoveries into some form of technological revolution that supports capital in orchestrating a turnabout from a "long wave with an undertone of stagnation" to a "long wave with an undertone of expansion" (Late 251). Carlotta Perez adds to this story of technological revolution under capital by explaining that financial capital anticipates
production capital in making the move to technological revolution. During periods of economic stagnation, financial capital delinks from mature, market saturated technologies associated with an established, exhausted mode direct production and begins making massive investments in emergent technologies that stand on inventions and discoveries that financial and production capital had allowed to accumulate during capital's period of economic expansion. When, explains Perez, investment in technologies associated with an established mode of direct production fails to return satisfactory profits, financial capital makes a sudden turn and starts gambling on risky but more promising investment in emergent technologies. This, she explains, is precisely what financial capital did when it financed the production of the microchip in 1971. Capital's financing of the microchip and then the array of technologies that depended at their point of origin upon cheap microelectronics is, of course, the intervention into capital's direct production processes that supported production capital in its efforts to institute globally organized direct production processes. Because production capital articulated itself with inventions and discoveries that issued from financial capital's investments in what Perez calls the "Age of Information and Telecommunications," production capital was able to restructure itself and make the leap to transnationally organized direct production techniques.

Neither capital's leap to global production nor the appearance of a fourth technological revolution under capital justify anyone in questioning Mandel's statement that capital, in industrializing the production of machines and raw materials, had fully industrialized all branches of the economy for the first time. Nor, for that matter, do they suggest that composition theorists should make the capitalist direct production of cultural forms a starting point for the development of a composition theory that should, thereafter,
underpin the way we talk about the passing and development of compositions between social agents who are themselves made manifest within the world as cultural forms that issue from a capitalist direct production process. But all of this begins to change, as we already know, when in the 1990s the United States transfers responsibility for development and circulation of high-speed computing technologies to "economic and commercial enterprises" that belong to a system that is not properly American (Gray and Mentor 456).

Already dependent upon and invested in the newly developed communication's infrastructure that had grown out of the fourth technological revolution under capital, business transnationals like ATT World Com and MCI decided to articulate themselves with industrial, productive capabilities that had grown up along with capital in its leap to globalization but that the United States government had developed, first, with ARPAnet and, then, with NSFnet. The direct production of the transnationally internetworked site of sociolinguistic possibility emerged as a thoroughgoing private concern in the 1990s when the state turned over responsibility to global, transnational capital for both development and distribution of transnationally internetworked relationship technologies (read: the Internet). In the 1990s, capital began to use fixed capital to organize and compose the transnationally internetworked body politic. In the time it took for the State to turn over control of "The" so-called "Internet" to capital, capital entered into state-sanctioned, juridically protected, direct production of what some have described as a "dendritic network" of cybernetic control and possibility -- that is, a transnational space striated with short nerve-like fibers that bunch together and bulge at the Internet backbone; that bunch together and establish points-of-presence onto the Internet.
backbone through Internet Service Providers; that establish the dendritical limits of the transnational social space and "neural web" where points-of-presence come in contact with a computer screen and CPU; that attach organic organisms -- i.e., social beings -- to the transnationally internetworked social space through "prosthetics of language; and that convert system generated cyborgs -- i.e., social beings -- into cybernetic subsystems of the larger, transnationally internetworked neural webs of cybernetic control that are themselves the principal actors of the "cyborg body politic" (456-60).

Whether one decides to have the stress fall on capital's organization of a direct production process or on the cybernetic quality of the space that issues from capital's direct production process, we can agree that capital, with the privatization of "The" so-called "Internet," pulled all communication at the technological heights of the capitalist world economic system into the crucible of exchange. In what can now be described as capital's move to articulate "The" so-called global "Internet" with its own protracted efforts to restructure late, multinational processes of capitalist direct production into global, transnational processes of capitalist direct production, capital positioned capital to exceed, according to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, both its 19th century capacities for subsuming industrial processes of production, and its 20th century capacities for subsuming Jameson's aesthetic processes of production. By the start of the 21st century, capital had restructured capitalist operations to the point that global capital could begin the direct production of the "communal, general conditions of social production" and, in so doing, to make a cultural production of the social bios and that which develops from operations within the social bios, namely, civil society. Transnationals, particularly those focused on the production and reproduction of communications, had made capitalist
direct production simultaneously the issue of and means of entry into social operations that no longer included an uncolonized space between capital, the composer, and capital's direct composition, the living worker/consumer (Hardt and Negri xii, 24-25, 31-35, 402).

If we accept nothing more than this -- that "The Internet" is a language prosthesis that global capital produces for the dual purpose of drawing the third force of capitalist production into its direct production process and, at the same time, becoming "ever more tightly organized through dispersal, geographical mobility, and flexible responses in labour markets, labour processes, and consumer markets, all accompanied by hefty doses of institutional, product, and technological innovation" (Harvey Condition 159) -- then we can agree that composition theorists have good reason to launch a theory that both draws periodizing exception to the work of Ernest Mandel but, at the same time, connects itself to a line of theorizing that wends its way back through persons like Ernest Mandel to Karl Marx, to the Grundrisse, and to Capital. We can rest assured in making such a move, if only because we know that capital has already entered into the arena of formal composition, modified the rules governing the social composition of compositional practices, made the composition of the social construction of the social a function of capital, and, for this, made the composition of the social construction of serially connected, machinofactured identity capital the unabated expression of capital in its overdetermined leap to global capital. Capital has given cause for the development of a specifically Marxist theory of composition precisely because capital has produced a complex formal composition in "The" so-called "Internet" that speaks of capital's leap to global production, its underwriting of a fourth technological revolution, and its advancement of the mode of production into "the period in which all branches of the
economy are fully industrialized for the first time."

Having composed a cultural form that circulates for the purpose of "denaturing" and "reassembling" upwards of an estimated "1 billion people" into a machinofactured society of living commodities and computer-human subsystems of a larger, fully commodified, "dendritic network" of cybernetic control ("Population Explosion!")

capital -- one might argue -- has composed the very fabric of a social order that contains a reason for Marxist composition theory: Capital's formal composition of the social spells, one might argue, the end of the social itself, along with those compositions that issue from the social: for when the privatized sphere of cultural production produces the foundation of the social itself; when capital's formal composition of the social suffuses everything it touches; when everything touched by capital's formal composition of the social becomes in one way or another a commodified composition of the social, then the traditional distinctiveness or 'specificity' of the social as that which escapes and gives rise to compositions that escape the subsumptive reach of capital is not only blurred but obliterated. Given that the conditions of social being and social reciprocity have become fundamental aspects of the "becoming," "growth," and "vital process" of global, transnational capital (Grundrisse ch10.htm), composition theorists find themselves charged with producing theory that speaks to matters pertaining to capital's composition of the death of the social.

**One New Compositionist, Two New Compositions**

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the "growth" and "vital process" of global, transnational capital has resulted in capital's "becoming" a compositionist. If we accept that capital's development of the relations of production has resulted in the production of
formal compositions that circulate as "the social" and "being-in-the-world," then composition theorists must then also accept that capital has spelled trouble, both negative and positive, for composition theory.

On the negative side of the register, the presence of a maker capable of fabricating the social foundations upon which proceed being-in-the-world is an awesome presence that must cause composition theorists to reconsider even the most radical anti-foundations upon which composition theory has heretofore circulated. Composition theory, even a specifically Marxist composition theory, cannot take refuge in, for example, Althusser's remarks in "Marxism and Humanism" that Marxist anti-humanism has demonstrated for almost two centuries that the "human" is best understood as an ensemble of social relations rather than as a generator of social relations and a foundation for theory. Theorists cannot in untroubled fashion support Althusserian anti-humanism by making claims to the effect that the social construction of "human" subjects is for composition theory the fundamental anti/foundation upon which theories of cultural composition both rest and can never rest. Nor may composition theorists feel comfortable in asserting that formal compositions are "two-sided" word bridges, shared referential territories, between "addresser and addressee" that bear some oblique relation to the mode production but are never to be understood as being dependent upon the combined operations of fixed capital within a coordinated, rationalized, purposeful system of direct production (Vološinov 22, 86, 90). To be sure, internetworked language users continue to use material signs, which exist as part of reality, to grasp and, in so doing, to reflect and refract another state of reality, which includes the individual human consciousness, which is itself a "social-ideological fact," or product of sign use (Vološinov 9-12). But it is now also true that for
an estimated 1 billion people, the creative use of material signs and the "social-ideological fact" of human consciousness settles upon the issue of a direct production process that capital throws down between itself and the would-be consumer of the writer's own fully commodified, culturally fabricated identity.

The negative side of the theoretical register is further compounded by the presence of a maker that fabricates and circulates nothing more complicated than the machinofactured material substrate of being-in-the-world, or the commodified fabric of living compositions that circulate at the technological heights of the capitalist world economic system and locate their relative equivalent in money. Jeremy Rifkin made something very close to this point when he argued in *The Age of Access* that capital in our time has marginalized the old habit of visiting geographically bounded locations for the purpose of completing one-time deals that culminate in the transfer of ownership of fungible items. Companies, explains Rifkin, would rather use relationship technologies to establish beachheads in, on, or around the customer through the sale or gift of little valued physical products. These beachheads provide capital with a platform for delivering service upgrades, short-term services, and long-term contracts to those in the top-fifth of the world's economy -- the clients and living products of the world's burgeoning experience economy. In Rifkin's equation, transnational media corporations deploy relationship technologies so as to embed consumers in electronic feedback loops that support capital in calculating each consumer's lifetime value and deciding upon the best way to target and deliver "lived experiences," or the cultural form of "lived experiences" that capital channels to the end-users of what must be understood as capital's own world of private-social experience. Having noted that capital understands its dominant
commercial market to be the lived experiences of the top portion of the world's population, Rifkin points out that media conglomerates have taken ownership and now operate the pipelines that channel experiences to and between people, including the cultural form of spontaneous social reciprocity. In Rifkin's telling, media conglomerates have taken control of interindividual human communication through both the development and proliferation of technologies that position business transnationals as the gatekeepers of lived experience, as the social entities that one must pay if one is to live among, write to, and access the compositions of those other personified Lifetime Values that capitalist production realizes at the core of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system (Rifkin 3-8, 11, 86, 98-99, 101).

The formal composition by capital of practicing compositionists, the monetization of interindividual communication -- these are just two of the negative complications that promise to compromise the integrity of any compositionist who flirts with the idea of theorizing the value of composition in a time when composers in the world system are very often the final outputs of a direct production process that is the property of the collectively organized compositionist we call capital. At the same time, these negative complications are but trifles when compared to the troubles that await anyone who attempts to theorize our positive relation to capital, the compositionist.

If the "becoming," "growth," and "vital process" of global, transnational capital includes the direct production of being-in-the-world, then composition theorists must fabricate the stories that will generate, organize, and, finally, compose the very basis for ongoing relations between composition theorists, compositionists-at-large, and capital, the compositionist. Composition theorists have no choice but to organize for themselves
the ideological materials that will support them in this or that imaginary relation to their real conditions of existence-in-capital. They must throw down the word-bridges that they will use in their engagements with capital, with the social relations of private production that have both expanded and concentrated to the point of becoming a social agency responsible for the direct composition of being-in-the-world-of-capital.

So far as I understand my relation to that mode of production that includes the direct production of "me," "I"--being the commodified, internetworked form of a practicing compositionist--am presented with two paths that "I" may follow when setting out to forge "my" own self-conscious relation to capital's own direct production process of "my-being-in-the-world-of-capital." In "my" need to compose a supplement to already established, casually considered, oftentimes unconsidered connections to capital--i.e., the direct producer of the material composition of "me"--"I" may generate, organize, and, finally, fabricate either a "front-door" or "hidden trap-door" story about my relationship to capital, the composer of the "me" that circulates under the sign of exchange. Because capital enjoys legal rights of ownership over the means of producing and distributing the internetworked site of sociolinguistic possibility, "I" find that "I" am severely limited in how "I" may compose "my" imaginary relations to "my" relations-in-capital, to "my" relations-in-social-capital from which "I" am excluded except insofar as "I" or the purchasing agent for "me" (like a school or public library) agree with capital in principal that "I" should be passed through the crucible of exchange and then circulated as the "me" that circulates under the sign of exchange. Because the experience of "me" exists for "me" when "I" agree to be passed by capital through the crucible of exchange, "I" may, on the one hand, compose a consumerist version of the story of "me."
story, "I" may imagine that "my" acts in capital are best understood through a general
privileging of the moment when "I" consume the alienable use-value "I" and begin to
work "my" semiotic magics on the cultural composition that capital circulates as the
commodity form of "me." Because the experience of "me" exists for "me" when capital
brings its alienable form of "me" to market, "I" may, on the other hand, compose a
productionist version of the story of "me." In this story, "I" may imagine that "I" begin to
act in capital because capital has acquired for itself a "specific relation . . . to the
communal, general conditions of social production" (Grundrisse ch10.htm). In other
words, "I" may imagine that "I" act in capital because a recently globalized social relation
of production that developed in concert with a fourth technological revolution under
capital managed to convert the communications infrastructure implicated in the global
distribution of capitalist production processes into an instrument for the direct production
of concrete, world spanning, commodifiable "being-in-the-world." "I" may imagine that
"I" act in capital because capital has taken it upon itself to alienate "me" from the means
of producing "me," to invite "me" to participate in the enactment of the now alienable
form of "me," to suggest that "I" enter through capital's "front-door" and take ownership
and responsibility for the creative enactment of "me," to obscure from view the "trap-
door" in the economic stage that exposes the social relations of private production that
drive capital's formal composition of the alienable "me," and to hope that "no one"
decides to enter into relations with "one's" "me" through this second, illegitimate point of
entry into the story of the formal composition of "me."

I have no doubt that both these compositions are new to the theory of
composition, that they themselves are the two new avenues at our disposal for composing
our relations to never-before-experienced relations of cultural-social production that are produced to be consumed and consumed because they are produced. I am equally positive that whichever way composition theorists fly into their relations with the "me," whether it be in through capital's commodified "front-door" or up through the "hidden trap-door" in capital's economic stage, composition theorists will complicate their stories of "me" by coming at the problem of "me" through their less favored point of entry: through the production-of-consumption for those who stress the importance of entering the materialized social capital by way of capital's "front-door"; through the consumption-of-production for those who stress the importance of entering the materialized social capital by way of the "hidden trap-door" in capital's economic stage. Production and consumption are, after all, the two inescapably linked, synchronously calibrated faces of one social process that makes material our culturally mediated experience of capital's formal composition of the death of the social. And theorists worth their salt will do what they can to fuse what one does when one consumes the alienable use-value of "me" with capital's purposeful production of the alienable use-value of "me." They will attempt to put composition in conversation with composition because both compositions are faces of one and the same composition. Yet I also know that consumptionist and productionist compositions of the capital's formal composition of the "me" will yield entirely different, virtually incompatible imaginary relations to our real conditions of existence in capital. And, for this, composition theorists will have to make a difficult choice between the two new compositions of capital's new composition of the "me."

If one privileges what one does when one enters into the death of the social through the "front-door" of efficacious self-consumption and into the problem of the
direct composition of the story of "me," then one is more or less bound to argue that the consumer of the alienable use-value "me" who jacks into "The" so-called "Internet" also circulates as a cybernetic subsystem of larger, transnationally internetworked neural webs of cybernetic control that are themselves the principal actors of the "cyborg body politic." Though one must surely pass through the crucible of exchange if one is to appear as a cybernetic subsystem of larger, transnationally internetworked neural webs of cybernetic control, one's contact with the internetworked transnational becomes significant because it demonstrates that the ranks of civil society have been swelled by persons who have been "technologically modified in any significant way, from an implanted pacemaker to a vaccination" that reprogrammed the immune system (Gray 2). Contact with "The" so-called "Internet" becomes just another site in culture wherein individuals get "borged through immunizations, interfaces, or prosthetics" -- "embedded . . . in countless machine/organic cybernetic systems" -- implicated in a "fundamentally new development in the history of the human" that "goes beyond natural selection and the careful breeding Darwin called artificial selection" and into the area of "participatory evolution" (3, emphasis added). Yes, one must pay an Internet Service Provider a monthly fee in order to gain rights of access to one's internetworked self, but the composed consumer and composer of the internetworked "me" brings a powerful, undeniable, participatory agency to bear on the formal composition of being-in-the-world and being-in-the-world-of-capital.

If, in other words, composition theorists stress that consumers of "me" are best served by imagining that capital extends in their direction that which one experiences not primarily as capital but as a cybernetic subsystem of larger systems of control and
possibility, then composition theory must follow, more or less, the path blazed by posthuman/ists like Katherine Hayles. Composition theorists who imagine themselves as entering capital relations by way of capital's "front-door" must tend to insist upon a number of things. First, consumers of materialized social capital are best understood as attributes of a cybernetic system, or a homeostatic system that functions unconsciously and adapts itself, for example, to "fickle environments" through the creation of feedback loops, which allow human/machines units to operate and extend what they can do. Second, consumers and cybernetic attributes of capital's internetworked system of cybernetic control and possibility should regard themselves in both self-reflexive and autopoeitic fashions -- that is, by noting that they are both contained by the system they observe and capable of changing the course and substance of the containing system they inhabit by nothing more complicated than entering new information into the system. And, third, consumers and attributes of capital's internetworked system of cybernetic control and possibility should allow themselves the privilege of thinking about the cybernetic systems to which they belong as "springboards to emergence." Because even the most common garden variety of internetworked, cyborgized social being passes for a homeostatic system; and because homeostatic systems may qualify as genuine life forms if they contain "creatures" (i.e., "discrete packets of computer codes" that "evolve spontaneously in directions the programmer may not have anticipated"), then even the most common garden variety of internetworked, cyborgized social being may, under peculiar situations, pass for being a genuine, new life form (Hayles 11).

These are truly exciting times for composition theorists who imagine that they enter the materialized social capital by way of capital's "front door." For the small price of
admission, one gets to participate in a site of sociolinguistic possibility that supports notions of agency that are generative of fantastic possibilities. One gains the sense that living cybernetic attributes of the materialized social capital are also fully vested, creative participants in capital's internetworked system of cybernetic control and possibility. Or, at least, that is the feeling that issues from such noteworthy texts as Richard Doyle's "Uploading Anticipation, Becoming-Silicon" and Michelle Ballif's "Writing the Third-Sophistic Cyborg." Doyle makes plain that the coming together of carbon-based beings and silicon-based environments capable of supporting life has afforded us with a remarkable opportunity. Because we may upload information to more than one vital location in cybernetic systems of possibility, we have opened up for ourselves the prospect that one day soon the project of being-in-the-world may become a project bent on the proliferation of identities, rather than the establishment, growth, and conservation of an identity. In the near future, composition theorists may find themselves helping others to regard instantiations of personal identity as a momentary pause and omnipresent cause for anticipation in the face of unabated proliferations of identities. Following a different tack, Ballif argues that the insoluble fact that we are of the digital world does not mean that we should think of ourselves as being reduced to a "programmed, integrated circuitry of power and discourse." Because we may just as surely regard ourselves as an effect of language, that is, a rhetorical engagement with the embodied situation, we may make a positive art of refusing the "available set of codes," of "recreating territories" through the "recoding of language, that together, are the seedbeds of power relations." Sophistic cyborgs, she argues, can and should use rhetoric to "disrupt the circuit," to "produce noise," to crash the channel of "perfect communication." Together, Doyle and
Baillif tell a story about the consumer's "front door" engagement with capital's cybernetic system of control and possibility -- a story that John Muckelbauer and Debra Hawhee describe as containing "movements of uploading, consuming, hacking (all movements of becoming)" that were "designed to forestall the production" of "manuals" and "programs" for "doing rhetoric in the posthuman age" "unless the program is figured as a 'user's manual' listing only one order: 'Use!'" (773-74).

There can be no doubt. Theorists who follow the cyberneticist's trajectory through the materialized social capital have done good work in their emergent tradition. Yet, for all their good work, the cyberneticist's "front-door" composition represents but one of two ways of composing one's direct relation to the experience of "me" that circulates in the materialized social capital. There is, as I have suggested, another as yet unattempted way of engaging with the problem of establishing our imaginary relations to our real conditions of existence-in-capital. If one decides to privilege capital's efficacy in one's encounter with materialized social capital, if one decides to come up into one's experience-in-capital through the "hidden trap-door" in capital's economic stage, one may also do good work -- though this good work will undoubtedly yield different, counterintuitive, unsavory, and, very likely, incompatible ways of discussing the problem of "being-in-the-world," "identity," "the social," "composition," and "the cultural" in a space and time that shares time and space with capital's ongoing formal composition of "being-in-the-world" within the materialized social capital.

I want to make clear that I am not suggesting that composition theorists should supplement what they are already doing by putting either a soft or oblique stress on something we might call "the economic." I am not suggesting that one should, for
example, nuance our emergent cybernetic, consumerist, creative, participatory composition theories, in the manner of Jeffrey Nealon, with soft, giving stories about how individuals have come to circulate as "Money" but, also, how individuals on a case-by-case basis may experiment the "speeds and slownesses" of capital, "see what (else) it can do!", and work to "modify capitalism until it becomes a different sort of machine" (835).

Nor am I suggesting that composition theory should root itself in the perfectly reasonable albeit oblique understandings that "fast capitalism" not only induces users of core English to regard selfhood as a template and portfolio constituted of discursive skill sets but, also, that users of core English may resist fast capitalism's negative influence on the efficacious form of one's identity, that users of core English may become "responsive and responsible" to language users who live on the margins of the world system, to language users who are pressed into using English in situations designed to submerge them, to language users who use their englishes to describe lives that refuse to be submerged by either "fast capitalism" or the dominating effects of "core English" (Lu). Rather, I am suggesting in admittedly simple-minded fashion that composition theorists should develop a composition theory that starts in respect of capital, in due respect of capital's state-sanctioned, juridically protected rights of private ownership in the means of producing and circulating the transnationally internetworked site of sociolinguistic production.

I am really only suggesting that composition theorists should pause before paying and then entering mechanically into their cybernetically organized individual relations within the materialized social capital, if only to accord capital, being a collectively organized producer of formal compositions, the same respect that theorists automatically
accord to more singularly palpable but no less definite producers of material compositions. In the instant that it takes for one to admit that "The Internet" is by decree of state and under protection of law the issue of a collectively organized producer of formal compositions, the intrepid composition theorist may go hand-in-hand with Marx, and "take leave for a time of this noisy sphere [of circulation], where everything takes place on the surface and in view of all men and then follow them . . . into the hidden abode of production, on whose threshold there stares us in the face 'No admittance except on business'" (Marx Capital vol 1 ch06.htm). In that same instant, the intrepid composition theorist may join with Marx in seeing "not only how capital produces, but how capital is produced" and, for this, may again "force the secret of profit making" (ch06.htm). Composition theorists need do no more for starters than to wander down with Marx into the realm of production, stop there for an instant, turn around, and then come back up through the "hidden trap-door" in capital's economic stage. To do this would be to catch a glimpse of "The Internet," however briefly and imprecisely, from the still-commodified, still-mystified perspective of "one" who now regards "The Internet" not as the social but as "the social," not as a hyperreal simulation of the social but as a formal composition that supports all manner of "social activities" and circulates for the purpose of subsuming production of "the social," "social writing," "social beings," "being-in-the-world," and "socially posited compositions" under capital.

Slow "our" rush to "participate" with "others" like "ourselves" "who" circulate in the serially machinofactured congress of alienable "persons" that capital composes through its rights of ownership in the means of producing and circulating the cultural form of social capital, and we may "desert," at least in our imaginations, what Marx
called the "very Eden of the innate rights of man" that seems to apply to internetworked life within the world of circulation, that is, to the cybernetic composition that draws all within valorization. We may stop ourselves from talking about "Freedom," though "the buyer and seller of a commodity . . . are constrained only by their own free will"; "Equality," though "each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities"; a limited notion of "Property," though "each disposes only of what is his own"; and "Bentham," though "each looks only to himself," if only because each must purchase the self before one may look to engage socially in capital's formal composition of the social (Marx Capital vol. 1 ch06.htm). We may, in other words, refrain from concentrating, as if by instinct, upon the creative actions of those socially constructed individual agents that we regard, as if by instinct, as the proper point of departure for the development of both writing and compositional theories. We may, in entirely counterintuitive fashion, produce a theory of composition that follows from our understanding that capital, too, is a writer and a compositionist and, for this, may also represent the proper point of departure for theories of composition and the composition of writing. We may, in entirely counterintuitive fashion, produce a theory of composition that takes as its proper point of departure the demystification of capital's directly produced, fully commodified composition of "the social," "being-in-the-world," "writing," and "composition." We may, in other words, begin to redress the unbalance in theory created by theorists who enter the "front-door" of materialized social capital, draw up time sensitive contracts for rights of access to "The Internet," satisfy their fetish for the commodity form of internetworked "being-in-the-world," and, thereafter, draft cybernetic theories of internetworked composition that never begin to demystify a form of "being-in-
the-world" that is always a mysterious symbol insofar as "every commodity is a symbol, since, in so far as it is value, it is only the material envelope of the human labour spent upon it" (Marx, Capital, vol. 1, ch02.htm).

One Hobgoblin, Two Roads
At the time of this writing, no Marxist compositionist has delivered a classically Marxist reply to capital in its rise to the status of compositionist. At this juncture, no composition theory has recomposed the problem of composition theory in light of capital's advance beyond the seemingly insuperable limits that Mandel claimed for capital in 1972. Indeed, no composition theorist has brought a classically Marxist orientation to bear on the problem of capital's expansion of composition to include the capitalist practice of using, for example, its ownership of transnationally internetworked writing machines to redraft the problem of language use and language users so that both become elements of a transnationally internetworked composition that testifies to capital's industrialized production, commodification, and subsumption of the third force of capitalist production. As I have noted, the more intrepid theorists have advanced composition theories in full light of capital's practice of using computer prosthetics as an instrument for writing upon human bodies, for transforming human beings into self-consuming computer-human cyborg commodities and intellectual properties, for making life a textual production in the most literal sense of these words, and for wrapping all of emerging cyborg society within the posthuman, or the cultural logic of global capitalism that has already displaced postmodernism as the new cultural dominant or forcefield in which, as the saying goes, "very different kinds of cultural impulses must make their way."

But, for this, there has been no Marxist composition theory.
If I were to remain perfectly consistent with the tenor of my remarks to this point, I would now promise to satisfy in my forthcoming pages our very real need for a Marxist composition theory. I would claim for myself the right to do nothing more than make a probable case for the ongoing development of a thoroughgoing Marxist writing and composition theory. And, as a point of departure, I might then do what comes naturally for both more and less vigorous Marxists and ask, with Lenin, "What is to be done?"

Were I to do this, I might then take note that Engels narrowed the general problem of "What is to be done?" when he identified three possible avenues for Marxist struggle in *The Peasant War in Germany*: the narrowly political, practical economical class struggle against capital; the widely political, social democratic struggle to emancipate all social classes that share in the general suffering under capital; and, finally, the theoretical struggle that cannot, wrote Marx, "replace criticism of the weapon" but can grip "the masses" and, in so doing, help to bring "material force against material force" as soon as it "becomes radical," "grasps the root of the matter [man himself]," and, in that moment, "demonstrates ad hominem" (Marx *Contribution* intro.htm). And, finally, I might conclude with Engels that my purpose should be to channel my theoretical recomposition of capital's subsumption of internetworked composing practices down the path of struggle that affords the greatest chance of turning practical economical, political, and theoretical struggle against capital into a "harmonious and well-planned entity," that is, a social democratic, theoretically charged labor movement that helps to focus the entire range of emancipatory struggles under capital into a "concentric attack" upon capital (Engels ch0b.htm, see also Lenin 13).

Yet, were I to behave in a manner expected of me, a manner consistent with my
remarks to this point, I am certain that both you and I would find ourselves treading down an unfortunate path. For I would have had us succumb to what Ralph Waldo Emerson once characterized as "a foolish consistency." We would have fallen pray to his well-known "hobgoblin of little minds." For having adopted a singularly Marxist position, I would have had us pretend that the problem before compositionists is one that I could resolve through straightforward demonstration, even though the problem before us always begins when thoroughly mystified writers and compositionists enter into fetishistic relations with the commodity form of serially machinofactured "being-in-the-world."

As we begin to theorize our relation to writing and composition in a world that includes capital, the compositionist, we may not merely reject cybernetic, "front-door" approaches to the problem of capitalist composition in favor of Marxist "hidden trapdoor" theorizing. The pragmatics of the situation demand that even Marxists who do composition theory should be drawn feelingly to the entirely logical belief that a Marxist inflected, cyborg way of theorizing the composition of the internetworked transnational should prove sufficient to the problem of the capitalist composition of the internetworked transnational. Even Marxist composition theorists who jack into the internetworked transnational on a regular basis must catch themselves believing on this or that day that capital's composition of the internetworked transnational is best answered, at least in theory, by a theoretic approach that privileges the theorist's immediate point of view, the theorist's socially constructed subjectivity, and the theorist's ability to assert in rather straightforward fashion what the overdetermined meaning of one's own socially contingent compositions should mean on this or that occasion.

It defies our immediate sense of logic that one should develop a theory of writing
and composition that begins with general acceptance of the socially posited fact that one's own personal composition -- including one's own knowledge, power, and sense of responsibility -- and one's own interindividual compositions are alienable, insofar as each only exists -- by decree of state and protection of law -- through exchange, and by virtue of the operations of fixed capital, and by dint of a socially organized, fully rationalized process of direct industrial production. It defies our immediate sense of logic that one's personal composition and one's own interindividual compositions should not be approached and understood, first and last, as a complex set of socially overdetermined, polysemous offerings but, instead, as a system of mysterious symbols that open out into allegorical dimensions because every commodity that circulates within the death of the social carries within itself the traces of disarticulated moments of lived experience in the capitalist world economic system, that is, because "every commodity is a symbol, since, in so far as it is value, it is only the material envelope of the human labour spent upon it" (Marx, Capital, vol. 1, ch02.htm). Once again, it defies our immediate sense of logic that when one enters into the social, one enters into the social that is itself a symbolic action of capital that produces not the social but a platform for staging social engagements that may seem to be exceptional or relatively autonomous from capitalist processes of social production but are nonetheless consubstantial with social relations of capitalist production. And, finally, it defies our immediate sense of logic that the purpose of theory should not be bent toward the development of a straightforward, overdetermined, even deconstructed composition theory but, instead, the demystification of one's own being-in-the-world and, as importantly, the purposeful negation of any impulse that might support a living composition of capital from having faith that one's personal fetish for the
commodity form of internetworked "being-in-the-world" is ever something other than one's self-mystifying consumption of the direct production of a fetishized commodity.

Though I risk being misunderstood, I have decided to organize my forthcoming arguments in light of what I believe to be the genuine problem that confronts would-be theorists of the transnationally internetworked capitalist composition. My assumption is that given the pragmatics of the internetworked composition, one should never pretend that an "I" may come upon the capitalist composition, take note that "two roads diverge" where interface begins, and say: "And sorry I could not travel both / And be one traveler . . . / I took the one less traveled by, / And that has made all the difference" (Frost). Given the pragmatics of internetworked composition, my assumption is that even the most critically acute, astute, and uncompromising of theorists must find themselves traveling down the main-traveled road of cyborg composition theory and speaking "what" they "think now in hard words" (Emerson). My hope, however, is that the typical composition theorist, being but one traveler, may learn to backtrack, to commit oneself to taking both roads, and, in so doing, to be assured of taking "the one less traveled by." My sense is that consumers and theorists of the capitalist composition who have not fully internalized Marxist imaginary relations to their real conditions of existence should become dedicated to taking both roads into the problem of capitalist composition in order that they may be assured of making "all the difference" -- even though this requires of you that you should "to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every thing you said to-day" (Emerson). The lure that persons -- even persons aware of their mystified being-in-social-capital -- may somehow prove sufficient to their situation and compose a socially contingent, situationally limited response to their own life-as-capital
is so powerful -- powerful to the point of being irresistible -- that everyone should get in
the habit of indulging in and then negating one's fetish for one's own personal
composition, one's own formal compositions, and the other various signs of one's own
existence in capital.

In what follows, I make a purposeful demonstration of what I believe to be an
intractable demand for double theorizing that awaits anyone who hopes to produce a
classically oriented Marxist composition theory. In what follows, I present myself with
three problems for theory, answer the same problems from both a "front door" and
"hidden trap door" perspective, and, in so doing, demonstrate over the course of three
double movements that "front door" and "hidden trap door" theorizing not only depart
from each other but that they support entirely different, absolutely incompatible
imaginary relations to our real conditions of existence in capital.

The theoretical approaches depart as two roads in the wood. Both roads lead to
remarkable and remarkably disquieting theories of writing and composition. But one, for
its being counterintuitive, is the road less traveled and the one that will make for us all the
difference.

My invitation: notice how the roads depart, attend to how the two new
compositions of the capitalist composition differ by their differences, chart where they
lead, take note where the main-traveled road dead-ends, and then be as a fellow traveler.
Walk with me on the less traveled, painstakingly demystified, self-negating, thoroughly
allegorical path of symbolic action in, of, from, and against the materialized social
capital.
Part 1

*Parting of the Ways*

Problem: Identify and respond to the most fundamental challenge to the theory and practice of composition that follows from capital's production of the conditions for composition.
Our Cyberbodies, Ourselves

A "Front Door" Probe

Looking into my computer classroom these days produces feelings ranging from vertigo to exhilaration. When I open the door, strange students are there to greet me, and I pause at the sight, tremble at the thought, and wonder at the fact of them -- these posthuman students of mine.

*Theta* student, sitting at eir computer workstation, has a phone pack on eir belt and a wireless headset on eir ear. Without breaking from eir work on eir writing assignment, e rings at the belt, presses a button on eir phone pack, says "Be home at six" and "Love you, too" at eir headset mouthpiece, and then turns off eir mouth by repressing eir phone pack belt button. Next to em, *Gamma* student senses my presence at the door and closes out of a well attended transvestite chat room. Momentarily chagrined, e tries to cover eir tracks by performing an Alta Vista search for keyword "Harvard." Alta Vista knows better than to trust *Gamma's* erudite impulse of the moment. The search engine processes both *Gamma's* ivy league search term and eir transvestite cookie before coming back with text links to Harvard University and animated graphical links to *Frederick's of Hollywood*. Rumor has it that *Gamma* waited until I took up position in front of the class.

1 Those who MOO will no doubt be familiar with the terms e, em, eir, eirs, emself -- namely, the "Spivak" neuter gender pronoun sequence. For readers new to these terms, the Spivak pronouns supersede the more common alternative -- s/he, him/her, his/her, his/her, and (him/her)self -- and are useful to writers who have become uncertain of their capacity to attach dual sex/gender identities to socially constituted subjects. I decided to use Spivak pronouns when discussing my students because, given their increasingly intimate relationship with technology, they oftentimes seem as much like ambiguously gendered posthuman biotech workstations as they do biologic men and women.
before linking to Frederick's and purchasing the establishment's fabulous Harem set -- a four-piece ensemble that includes a veil, sequined headband, foamed shaped bra, and sheer pants with full back and built-in panty.

What a peculiar lot they are.

Small wonder then that I should feel as I do, like a teacher in a strange land peopled by creature students who profess to be human but who look and communicate like students from a distant planet. Still smaller wonder that the sight of Alpha student should fix me as e does, causing me to stare out at em from my place before the class, a fascinated witness to the act of SoundWriting. E, like Theta, speaks at eir headset mouthpiece, but, unlike Theta, eir voice is tethered to a computer by a short patch cord. When Alpha speaks, eir microphone transducer turns eir sound wave energy into a continuous flow of electrical energy that eir voice-to-text computer program changes into strings of interrelated but disconnected and rearrangeable digital information, which eir computer motherboard both stores in short term memory and reconstitutes as written words on a video screen. In other words, when Alpha speaks, Alpha SoundWrites, making text appear on eir computer monitor to the tune of 180 words per minute -- as e does when e quotes me in a paper e is writing on contemporary composing processes. "According to Stanley Harrison," e composes, "SoundWriting 'challenges the idea of speech as ephemeral activity, shifts the site of composition from hand to mouth, and increases the efficiency with which we produce written text. To be sure, because posthuman SoundWriters use a supernormal process to produce text in increasingly supernormal amounts, we might reasonably expect an intense, if not supernormal, debate to hinge upon the exploits and adventures of posthuman SoundWriters."
And then there is *Omega*. E looks at me from behind a pair of "smart eyeglasses," which e says connect to a computer e wears under eir shirt. E clicks eir handheld control and manipulates eir mouse rollerball. Of course, eir mouse clicking and rolling might signify nothing, but *Omega* is probably either sending a picture of me via wireless eyeglass webcam to a remote display station or opening an email that displays for reading on the underside of eir eyeglasses. In private conversation, *Omega* has claimed that eir tetherless system makes eir flesh body "smart": "The kind of synergy that arises from constant connectivity" is particularly strong, e says, "because [human-machine] interaction is sustained" over a long period of time (Mann). E says, by way of example, that wearing "smart eyeglasses" while grocery shopping has transformed the way eir eyes process fruits and vegetables. "I stare, let's say, at a cucumber display," *Omega* continues, "and, somewhere else, my wife looks through my eyes, inspects the produce, and emails me with comments" (Mann).²

So many times each class day, I look upon my uncanny students and see one incontrovertible fact: they are ceasing to be human beings in the traditional sense with increasing regularity. Whether they close quarters with hands-free cellphones, undergo subject position manufacture while surfing the cookied internet (Johnson-Eilola, "Control"), forge intermittent but nonetheless protracted connections with their computers in order to produce SoundWriting, or merge with tetherless "smart clothing" computing systems, my students fall or rush into posthuman cyborg states before my very eyes. When they take up the positions provided for them in my institution's computer classroom, they do -- at different times and to varying degrees -- what all good cyborgs

² *Omega* is derived from descriptions, pictures, and accounts taken from the website of MIT wearable-computing-specialist Steve Mann <http://www.eecg.toronto.edu/~mann>.
do: they become homeostatic systems functioning unconsciously (Clynes and Kline). In other words, they abandon their humanity for the privilege and burden of having powers and pressures beyond those of mere mortals.

This, however, is not the end of things.

What I also see is that my students, in becoming cyborgs, accede to being nothing less than "living commodities" in the literal sense of these words; that is, they put on their protheses and, in so doing, transform themselves into manufactured, animate, disposable exchange values that must pay to maintain and/or upgrade "themselves" if they are to survive as cyborgs. *Theta* student, for example, becomes just another human being who talks on the telephone if e forgets to pay eir monthly cellphone bill. To be sure, that which animates the living cyborg -- the software or public utility that fuels the cyborg's prothesis -- comes to us in the form of a ticket item that seems only to fuse with the cyborg's flesh if the cyborg, or the cyborg's patron (e.g., a college with an open computer lab), agrees to pay or, alternatively, to enter into an arrangement with capitalists for deferred payment. Indeed, a subtle arrangement for deferred payment accounts for the continued existence of *Gamma* student, my web-surfer in the harem outfit, whose free-linking, hypertextual subject position gets appropriated by capitalists who, for their part, use such things as Internet cookies to bind *Gamma*'s hyperlink movements to products, purchase, and consumption (Johnson-Eilola "Control"). The cost of *Gamma*'s web surfing is regular exposure to user-triggered, user-specific hucksterism that theoretically results in a user-defined, user-purchased range of products and services.

When it comes to *Alpha* and *Omega*, the cyborg imperative to purchase the commodity self becomes intensified to the point of explosion. Both tethered and
tetherless human/computer homeostatic systems transform unsuspecting computer users into network-ready, software-driven, hardware-supported, biological workstations. Even more, human/computer systems shift the electronic contact zone from the computer screen interface to the software-driven, hardware-supported nervous systems of biological workstations; undergo regularly scheduled technological obsolescence; maintain their embodied cultural identity through a program of software and hardware upgrades; and, from the outset, exist as actual commodities that know they must continue to purchase themselves if they would sustain themselves as commodities with identities. Seen from this perspective, Alpha and Omega exemplify, with one exception, what Donna Haraway meant when she wrote, "Cyborg writing is about the power to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other" ("Manifesto" 94). All I would add is that the power to survive, which is at the heart of cyborg writing, seems less about "seizing the tools" than about paying for the programs and program upgrades that constitute both the cyborg's world (e.g., Windows 3.1, Windows 95, Windows 98, Windows ME) and the cyborg's identity (e.g., Dragon NaturallySpeaking, Microsoft Office Professional Edition). Simply put, Alpha and Omega must cease to exist if they ever lack money to pay for those components of their cyberselves that have a quantifiable exchange value.

Strange, indeed, to look upon beings that are both the commodities and end-users of a system that wants its posthuman products to think of themselves as human users and not commodities.

Strange, also, that I should be so affected by the sight of these living curiosities. They are still my students, after all. But something has changed, something fundamental,
and I find myself grasping in vain for the conceptual tools that will, on the one hand, get me past my desire to walk into a classroom and see it populated by human computer users and, on the other, get me on with the task of helping these student commodities to mark the world that marked them as other. This much is certain: at a time when I need to acknowledge, if not appreciate, my students for the commodities they are, the open literature on computers and composition threatens to set in motion an unproductive nostalgia in need of correction -- that is, a nostalgia for bygone, if not illusory, days when teachers fought for the rights of "human" program-users, not posthuman "student-programs."

Accordingly, my purpose is to argue for a pedagogy of the posthuman that more completely meets the needs of those student writers we encounter in computer classrooms. Toward this end, I shall point out that the educational theorists of interface do offer critical approaches to the problem of computer writing, but they skew their proffered critical perspective by drawing impossible lines between human agents and their computerized instruments and environments when they suggest that critique of computer interface originates from points "outside" of technology or the human-computer connection. This perspective, my argument holds, contributes to an unproductive nostalgia for "the human" because it supports composition theorists who would "pay attention to technology" in order to become better "humanists" and advocates for the technological underclasses, not cyborg theorists would instruct writers faced with the challenge of becoming posthuman cyborgs at the point of interface.

For the purposes of correcting the "humanist" error in critical theories of interface, my essay will introduce the following proposition. We fail to serve the needs of
posthuman students whose subjectivities emerge at the conjuncture of consumer culture and cyberspace and emerge as commodities (i.e., as disposable market, as opposed to human, values) when we apply what Joseba Gabilondo calls the ideology of "Man" to the cyborg problematic -- that is, when we come at the problem of computer-generated cyborg existence through the phallogocentric understanding that First World nation-states produce the democratic, middle class, consumer, "Man" subject position as their first order of business. The effect of this observation will be to support my claim that the sudden appearance of commodity students requires that we produce critique that both gauges the pressures and limits that define commodity, or cyborg, subjectivity and, as importantly, resists the distorting influence of compositionist nostalgia for the human.

Coming at the problem of cyborg writing from this vantage will reveal that cyborg writers, in the first instance, are born into the non-society of ignorant, self-involved cyborg writers whose first order of business is to purchase, master, dispose of, and upgrade their prosthetic selves -- in other words, to acclimate themselves to a commodity-driven, blissful tyranny of the subject-self over the object-self that exists to be bought, used, and destroyed at the point of upgrade. With this in mind, I will move that critically-oriented compositionists must 1) accept the power of consumer and cyberculture to transform human life into a commodity fetish, 2) relinquish the ideology of "Man" when faced with the task of teaching cyborg writers, and 3) embrace posthuman critical pedagogy in hopes of demystifying cyborg-filled computer classrooms and, more importantly, designing curricula suited to the needs of our posthuman students. Forthwith, we need to begin doing such things as teaching student cyborg writers how to intervene in their subject formation at the level of software so that they might learn to participate in
the counter-hegemonic manufacture of a cyborg self that is not, at one and the same time, a living commodity.

**Humanist Theorists**

To their credit, theorists like Cynthia and Richard Selfe, Joel Haefner, and Johndan Johnson-Eilola bring a critical attitude to bear on the problem of interface. As a group, they stress, for example, that subjectivist individualism (the idea that computer users shape their environments according to their creative will) is inadequate to the task of accounting for language origins and practices in an era dominated by politically articulated computer writing spaces. Toward this end, they recommend that teachers identify the cultural metaphors and premises that shape the computer interface and the computer-user's experience, believing that close analysis of the computer interface will not only help educators perceive the effects of "domination and colonialism associated with computer use" but also empower educators to "establish a new discursive territory within which to understand the relationships between technology and education" (Selfe and Selfe 482). The educational theorists of interface also suggest that we take an active hand in customizing the programs we use in our composition classes because Structured Programming protocol -- the heart of ubiquitous American computer program code, interfaces, and operating systems -- is itself shaped by what Haefner calls "the profiteering imperative and hierarchical structure of corporate America" (325). Finally, these theorists express concern at our automatic preference for first-person and argumentative essays, as well as literature and literary criticism, allowing that this preference blinds us to the power of functional hypertexts (Online Help, for example) to underwrite composing practices that value transparency, efficiency, and performativity.
over contingency, dissensus, and negotiation (Johnson-Eilola Nostalgic). As a group, the theorists of interface advocate politically oriented critical literacy of computer technology, as opposed to task-oriented functional literacy, and they seem entirely unmoved by nostalgia for challenges associated with teaching in the pre-computer age.

At the same time, however, these theorists lose their edge where they succumb to an uncritical, ultimately disempowering nostalgia for a "Humanity" that not only exists "outside of technology" but also gains perspective on and effectively alters key points "inside of technology." Correct to protect against excesses in the direction of subjectivist individualism, the theorists of interface, interpolated by the ideology of "Man," make an understandable, albeit unfortunate, error in guarding against impulses that run in the opposite direction -- that is, toward theorizing that stresses the power of commercially organized and proliferated computer writing spaces to penetrate and utterly transform the computer user at the point of interface. Because educational theorists of interface need to believe that writers, writing teachers, and writing theorists should "use the technology to question the hegemonic tendencies of disciplinarity and discourse communities" (Johnson-Eilola Nostalgic 28; emphasis added), they permit themselves to draw impossible lines between human agents and their computerized instruments and environments for the purpose of allowing persons to 1) stand back from interface, 2) read interface critically, and 3) re-engage with interface from the position of critical literacy and with the effect of altering the political trajectory of interface. Toward this end, they deploy the "interface as contact zone" metaphor with a certain frequency, and dream of opening and privileging a nonexistent outside postcolonial space from which to bring the ideology of "Man" to bear on the inside "Cyborg" problematic.
Yet the truth is with cyborg theorist Joseba Gabilondo, who observes that "there is no such thing/subject as a 'postcolonial cyborg,' because postcolonial subject positions are always left outside cyberspace" (424, emphasis added). By way of explanation, he writes that "the production of 'Man' [in the economically privileged First World] has given way to the reproduction and simulation of 'cyborgs,' and the technologies and apparatuses of the nation-state that produce the democratic, middle-class, consuming 'Man' have been transferred to the peripheries of the First World and the Third World" (424). From this perspective, members of the set "Man" are either present in the Third World, where access to computers is a chimera; or prevalent on the peripheries of the First World, where access to computers is restricted or denied; but never members of the set "Cyborg," which includes no members of the set "Man," because interface transforms persons into cyborgs. To insist that human beings are not fundamentally transformed at points of human-computer conjuncture misses the point of interface: intimacy with computers takes hold of fleshy beings, typically born into this world as use-values who spend their lives fending off cultural pressures to become exchange-values, and changes them into cyborgs, borne by interface into a state of being an exchange-value that might, through sustained effort and cunning, become and then die as a use-value.

Bringing the ideology of "Man" to bear on the "Cyborg" problematic produces some rather interesting effects on behalf of the technological underclasses but contributes nothing to a philosophy that would help cyborgs (e)merge with(in) a giving, sympathetic, and self-controlled society of cyborgs that both values its citizens and, also, treats "Man," or being-prior-to-interface, with respect. This is what comes across when we read, from a heretofore undefined cyborg perspective, articles like Cynthia Selfe's "Technology and
Literacy: A Story about the Perils of Not Paying Attention." She appeals to the ideology of "Man" where she argues that the fight against the continuation of racism and poverty through the unequal distribution of technology is a battleground for humanists. The problem, she makes clear, is that "in our educational system, and in the culture that this system reflects, computers continue to be distributed differentially along the related axes of race and socioeconomic status and this distribution contributes to ongoing patterns of racism and to the continuation of poverty" (420). The solution to the problem, which asks compositionists to pay attention to technology, is slow in coming because technology is "either boring or frightening to most humanists" (412; emphasis added). She allows, shortly thereafter, that as humanists we prefer things to be arranged so that we don't have to pay attention to machines because "computer technology, when it is too much in our face (as an unfamiliar technology generally is), can suggest a kind of cultural strangeness that is off-putting" (413). Nonetheless, she believes that compositionists must take it upon themselves to merge "the technological and humanist perspective" and, in so doing, empower themselves to advocate "free access to computers for citizens at the poverty level and citizens of color" (434; emphasis added). By paying attention to technology, she concludes, we may "learn lessons about becoming better humanists, as well" (435, emphasis added).

Her perspective speaks to computers and composition scholars like Jeffery T. Grabill who argue, for example, that compositionists need to "work on access in nonschool settings" in order to prevent "the technopoor . . . from missing something" (Grabill 313). Clearly, this inside/outside approach to cyborg writing champions the cause of "Man" on the peripheries of the First World. Bearing this in mind, we need to
acknowledge that the critical, political program advocated by the likes of Grabill, Johnson-Eilola, Haefner, Selfe and Selfe proceeds from the mistaken assumption that postcolonial "humanism" is consonant with efforts to educate posthuman cyborgs. We need to accept that cyborg students, like their human counterparts, need the help of teachers who will address themselves to the particular needs of their students. Cyborgs materialize for the duration of interface and demand an education appropriate to the needs of cyborgs, even if this means that their teachers fail to advance the cause of "Man." Only when interface, or techno-human fusion, is broken and "Man," with the sense memory of "Cyborg," reappears does the need for a pedagogy of the human reappear. These appear to be the "facts" and, as such, serve as a warning against those who would succumb to the all-to-human practice of treating cyborgs as human correlatives and humanizing educational protocols as a matter of unstated policy.

Commodity Students
But how do we make this change? How do we learn to see our students for what they are? How do we develop appropriate strategies for teaching the cyborgs that increasingly populate our classrooms?

In the first place, we need to understand why pedagogy that is steeped in race, gender, and class analysis but that is not also grounded in class-inflected cyborg analysis must fail students who require a pedagogy of the posthuman. Toward this end, we need to accept that the experiential categories race, class, and gender correspond to a mode of production that manufactures human, as opposed to posthuman, subjectivity as its primary order of business. In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels provide an overview of the process that produces human subjectivity. The isolated human body,
imagined for the moment as existing outside of culture, has needs. The satisfaction of the body's first need leads to new needs and, as such, constitutes the first historical act. "The third circumstance," Marx and Engels write, "which, from the very outset, enters into historical development, is that men, who daily remake their own life, begin to make other men" (ch01a.htm). Labor and procreation, or the production of life, result in the first mode of production, for bodies in collective are quick to discover the necessity of cooperation. The need to improve cooperation through communication, of course, is what leads to language acquisition, what Marx and Engels call "practical consciousness," or language that "only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men" (ch01a.htm). Of obvious significance, human subjectivity emerges at this juncture as the result of the several divisions of labor: sexual labor (gender), physical and mental labor (class), and cultural labor (race). Indeed, the experiential categories race, class, and gender, which are the products of low- or no-tech embodied human interaction, are bound inextricably to that state of practical consciousness that Gabilondo calls "Man."

In contrast, the cyborg subjectivity that shows up in computer writing centers appears only at the technologically advanced stage of production when it becomes possible for human beings -- as the products of established systems of race, class, and gender identification -- to co-operate in the production, distribution, and reproduction of "intelligence amplifying" protheses that both network the body and inscribe the body with

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3 Other kinds of cyborgs, principally those derived from pharmaceutically driven biotech applications, may appear in computer writing centers, overlapping in the bodies of computer-tech cyborgs, but these biotech cyborgs should have little impact, at least in this analysis, on the formation of posthuman computer writing pedagogies. Other kinds of cyborgs, principally those derived from pharmaceutically driven biotech applications, may appear in computer writing centers, overlapping in the bodies of computer-tech cyborgs, but these biotech cyborgs should have little impact, at least in this analysis, on the formation of posthuman computer writing pedagogies.
semiotic traces of race, class, and gender distinctions that exist for cyborgs as powerful elements of the commodity prosthetic, as opposed to the product of lived human relations. In other words, culturally articulated human subjects decide to wear protheses that have the effect of birthing people out of their humanity and into a superstructural zone that conflates the forces and relations of production in the cyborg protheses and typically sells these protheses on the open market, indicating that cyborg subjectivity materializes at the conjuncture of cyberspace and consumer culture. That is to say, cyborg subjectivity begins when the self -- or purchasing agent for the self -- buys the tools that are to become indistinguishable from self and, in so doing, adopts a proprietary attitude toward the self as chattel -- the logical result of a cultural system of production that encourages cyborgs to sell, buy, and become the self that is a market value and to have no moral regard for or sustained relation to the self, which becomes garbage at the moment of upgrade, the refuse of a life manufactured, sold, bought, and discarded.

Strictly speaking, race, class, and gender analyses, each based on a division of human labor, will fail to penetrate the cyborg subjectivity and, therefore, fail to produce a posthuman pedagogy. These modes of critical analysis, and others, will yet prove indispensable to the cyborg scholar, critic, and teacher because cyberspace is already fully raced, classed, gendered, aged, nationed, etc. Yet, if our tools of analysis are to produce critique that escapes the pull of nostalgia for the human, they need to be rearticulated to address the problem represented by embodied subjectivities that are both mortal and commodity, both relation of production and material of production, both subject and object. For this to happen, we need to add at least one more element to our analysis of cyborg subjectivity as a subject/object conflation. We must ask ourselves, "What are the
pressures and limits that define the subject/object subjectivity -- including its potential for sustained, collective, counter-hegemonic action -- when it appears as a consumable sign within the sign-system of objects that manufacturers and advertising agencies produce in order to stimulate and control sales of the disposable self to the disposable self?"

Because interface transforms human beings, under typical circumstances, into self-consuming commodities, we need the help of a philosopher of consumption who is guilty of the kind of totalizing, deterministic, anti-social theorizing that holds small appeal for computers and composition theorists and does, in fact, overstep its bounds when applied to human culture. Jean Baudrillard is particularly useful here, even though his theories of hyper-reality, which depend upon such ideas as "the implosion of the social," become unstable when applied to human communities. Statements to the effect that resistance to advertising is futile in a world where the social is a simulation crumble when we remember that human beings still participate, however minimally, in locally generated communal relationships (primary groups like family, church, school, and community watch) that deflect or inflect the influences of advertising on individual subjectivity. However, Baudrillard appears to have much to say to teachers of computer-based writing, when we consider that 1) a commercial relationship between and for the continued existence of animate products results in cyborg subjectivity, and 2) cyborg subjectivity is consonant with commercial influence because cyborgs are borne by interface into direct relations with "providers," not primary social groups, who/that exist to deliver, not deflect, one message: become . . . dispose . . . and . . . upgrade. For us, there is no resisting Baudrillard, not when newly self-purchased cyborgs come packaged to accept "the providers message" -- that is, when they enter the human-computer world

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in a state of ignorant, self-involved isolation that amounts to an absence of relation; when they emerge as first-time cyborgs who do not know how to turn themselves on or off, let alone how to operate an email client, access and establish Usenet newsgroups, participate in and host IRC, or contribute to and administrate W3 bulletin boards. For their part, cyborgs materialize as inefficient users inside an absent social order, a non-society of cyborgs, and this renders them, even as it leaves them, unprotected from the sale of themselves to themselves.

Because the cyborg depends upon self-consumption for its existence and is, therefore, vulnerable to the dictates of consumer society, we need to ask with Baudrillard, What is the experience of life within consumer culture at its most extreme? To answer this question is to see the cyborg's soul, and to know that posthuman pedagogy must make provision for teaching subjects that begin by being marked as other, even from and to themselves.

Many people still believe that the words "consumer society" refer to a society of consumers who participate in a self-directed activity of commodity consumption. Baudrillard, however, argues convincingly in his essay "The System of Objects" that "the ideology of competition, which . . . was previously the golden rule of production, has now been transferred entirely to the domain of consumption" (11). "[A] fixed class of 'normal' consumers," he continues, "has been created that coincides with the whole population," and, as importantly, capitalists have developed a strategy for controlling these consumers that includes materializing the super-ego; stimulating the id, or deep drives; and sanctioning/censuring consumers to act "freely" on their deep drives, or desires, in order to be different from everyone else through consumption and exactly like
everyone else through consumption ("I ran Windows 98. Now I run Windows ME." "I ran OS. Now I run OS/2 Warp." "I am different. I am the same.").

The key here is in the materializing of the super-ego. Ordinarily, the super-ego is immaterial and exists because individuals participate in its production through syntactic linguistic exchange (speech acts) with members of a shared community. These syntactic exchanges give rise to, among other things, the super-ego, or unconscious consciousness, that may be defined in part as they internalized set of asyntactic expressions which defines (enables/limits) what speakers might say or think comfortably at any given time. The materialization of the super-ego through advertising subverts this process by providing consumers with a set of asyntactic expressions (Pentium I, Dreamweaver HTML editor, DSL) that emerges without the participation of the consumer. Because the consumer does not produce this set of expressions through syntactical exchanges, the materialized super-ego is always inappropriate to and incapable of integrating with the self. More importantly, the available set of expressions, which corresponds to related sets of products and recommended feelings, has no meaning for the consumer except insofar as it stimulates the consumer's desires (Chevy, Ram Tough -- BuyIT) and then breeds dissatisfaction in the consumer in order to produce a new set of desires (Chevy PT Cruiser, Retro, Cool -- BuyIT). Rather than exalting intelligence and wisdom, the authors of this system seem to champion the "ideology of personal fulfillment," the "triumphant illogicality of drives cleansed of guilt" (18) -- that is, the regression by adults into a series of unrelated, albeit reproducible, infantile desires for and dissatisfactions with products.

The impact of consumer culture on cyborg subjectivity, which exists within advertising's system of salable object relations as a disposable exchange value, is both
profound and unique to cyborg culture. Born into an absence of relation that is all about the purchasing of materials necessary to resolve a fundamental inadequacy in the self, the cyborg quickly learns that the self that will or should endure can never be bought. Cyborg subject positions are manufactured and sold with the intent of creating cyborgs who not only look upon the self as an object that must be re-consumed on a regular basis but, also, move into a relation of blissful tyranny over the self that exists to be bought, used, and destroyed. Cyberspace, given this arrangement, becomes something of a showroom display case filled with id-driven, self-involved, self-destructive subjectivities that are attractive to consumers because they are neither produced to forge meaningful, politically active communities on the web nor produced to be self-aware to the fact that the battle for profits has expanded to include the cyborg's self-financed war upon the self.

Each is made to destroy, buy, destroy, buy, destroy the self, which exists to be different from but identical too other cyborgs who destroy, buy, destroy, buy, destroy the self.

Posthuman Pedagogy
What precisely does this mean to one whose livelihood depends upon teaching cyborg writers to compose?

If I am correct in my analysis of cyborg subjectivity, then compositionists will need to do more than consider the influence of computer-based writing tools and environments on the processes and practices of human literacy. We will need to go beyond thinking, for example, that the computer interface is a semiotic contact zone that privileges and empowers male, Caucasian, American, corporate, human identity, even as it supports the creation of a technological underclass that includes disproportionate
numbers of African-Americans, women, and citizens of the third world. Instead, computer writing specialists should move to understand, in the first place, that the mere fact of computer use renders the computer writer a cyborg, which is not merely a postmodern subjectivity but also the hegemonic, albeit self-destructive, subject position that orders cyberspace. Thereafter, they should embrace the fact that while "humanistic" composition research correctly registers that online experiences lead to the development of "heterotopia, spaces to be negotiated and transformed as a result of the conflict that arises within them" (Blair 318), and then inflects this understanding from the perspective of gender (Sullivan), sexual orientation (Comstock and Addison), race (Taylor), class (Whitaker and Hill), second language acquisition (Belcher), and physical disability (Buckley), "humanistic" compositionists cannot help commodity students address their cyborg-specific problems and create counter-hegemonic cyborg heterotopia without the aid of a posthuman pedagogy that stands upon this understanding: chances for radically democratic cyborg writing wane to the degree that cyborg writing spaces are populated by animate-product subjectivities that have yet to critique and rearticulate the cyborg problematic, or, life as the salable, self-destructive conflation of posthuman subject/object relations.

To be sure, even the gross particulars of this proposed posthuman pedagogy are unknown to us. Yet, the necessity of posthuman pedagogy for the improvement of commodity students requires us to speculate on the shape it might take, the directions it might lead. For my part, I would suggest that computer writing specialists can take a meaningful step in the direction of posthuman pedagogy by opening the doors on their classrooms; looking in, without wonder, on their commodified cyber-students; and seeing
that commodity students are flush with the desire to buy and destroy themselves, even as they are humiliated in this regard because they cannot spend the $2,313.80 it would cost to build, but not upgrade, a competent cyborg writer (see Table 1).

A shortened list of the writing tools that our students need "to become" before they leave college justifies the estimated cost and makes daunting Haraway's characterization of cyborg writing as survival on "the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other." Obviously, cyborg writers need to own and operate a word processing prothesis (that is, a program) that saves text in the most widely supported word processing format (.doc). But can they afford this prosthetic device and the others they will need to complete themselves? Can they afford, for example, the mind mapping and tree outlining protheses they should use when developing and organizing their their texts? Then, too, they will need a portable document file distiller (.pdf), so they can open and print files on any computer without producing changes in the document's original layout and design. Next, commodity students will require both a file compression and file splitting utility, for times when large files must either be shrunk down or split up and distributed over many disks. They will want to enhance their oral presentations with slideshows saved in the popular PowerPoint format (.ppt). Then, too, students will need to learn how to compose and maintain databases, if only so they can create and update a bibliographic database. Those serious about group writing will want to establish an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) room and use an IRC client to log group chat, send private messages, and exchange files in "real time." Being able to create virtual network interfaces (networking personal computers via the Internet) will prove helpful because writers on virtual networks can view and edit documents at the same time, connect to and
write on home computers while on location, and provide direct technical support to writing group partners with computer troubles. Because students will want to produce help documents that will make computer documents and environments more accessible to the public, they will want to procure and learn to use a good HELP editor. All of our students should design and draft extensive academic websites that, on the one hand, comply with the current HTML standard and, on the other, support students in research and writing that happens while away from home; therefore, they will need to have and know how to use a high powered HTML editor with strong support for cascading style sheets. The need to program Internet servers to accept HTML files and, thereafter, to upload files to the world wide web makes a working knowledge of telnet and FTP clients essential. Of course, cyborg writers will want to send email and participate in Usenet news groups, so they will need an email client and newsreader. Increasingly pressured to conduct effective internet research, student commodities will want to acquire both a desktop searchbot and an offline browser, so they can query search engines and save their search results and, also, download entire websites for extended offline study. Finally, the frequency with which cyborg writers transfer files during group work necessitates that they procure reliable anti-virus protection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competency</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MS Office Compatible Document, Database, Spreadsheet, Slideshow, Desktop Publisher</td>
<td>Microsoft Office 2000</td>
<td>$499.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idea Generator</td>
<td>Axon 2001</td>
<td>$160.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outliner</td>
<td>Action Outline</td>
<td>$24.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTML Editor with CSS Support</td>
<td>DreamWeaver 3.0</td>
<td>$299.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable Document File Creator</td>
<td>Adobe Acrobat 4.0</td>
<td>$249.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competency</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>Cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Virus Protection</td>
<td>McAfee 5.1</td>
<td>$29.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>mIRC</td>
<td>$20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File Compressor</td>
<td>WinZip 8.0</td>
<td>$29.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File Splitter</td>
<td>File Splitter Deluxe 3.1</td>
<td>$11.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTP</td>
<td>WS-FTP</td>
<td>$40.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help Editor</td>
<td>RoboHELP Office 9.0</td>
<td>$899.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offline Browser</td>
<td>Black Widow 4.07</td>
<td>$39.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Searchbot</td>
<td>Web-A-Matic</td>
<td>$12.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email Client, Newsreader, Telnet</td>
<td>Outlook Express, Outlook Express Newsreader, Windows Telnet</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** $2,313.80

Source: CNET download.com, NoNags, and TUCOWS

By all outward appearances, the cost of becoming a competent cyborg writer exceeds the immediate grasp of most commodity students. And this is to the advantage of posthuman pedagogy, which demands that we exploit our students' inability to satisfy themselves through self-consumption, doing what we can to drive a wedge between the cyborg and the cyborg's consuming lust for self. We need to make our students aware, in their moment of financial weakness, that they need not purchase very much of themselves at all and, also, that cyborg writers may join with others of their kind in, for example, Usenet newsgroups that promote an alternative to commercial cyberspace. Our students must know that they can satisfy the cyborg's real need for software without activating the cyborg's infantile desire for disposable happiness through self-consumption. Indeed, compositionists who take time to become familiar with both Usenet freeware culture and the art of freeware self-fashioning -- as opposed to pay, ad, and spyware self-fashioning -- can advance their cyber-students toward this next understanding: living commodities should write their cyborg bodies with freeware software alternatives where possible, if only because this will help them to imagine and compose alternatives to the hegemonic
subject position that the ideology of multinational capitalism privileges.

But how do we do this? How should we teach a living commodity to compose the self in opposition to the self? My immediate recommendation would be to create projects that force cyborg writers to do two things. First, they must confront their status as consumers who buy, use, and destroy the self in a never-ending cycle of self-sacrifice that has no purpose except to stimulate the self to buy the self. Second, students need to participate in newsgroups, like alt.comp.freeware, for the purpose of working with others to establish freeware collectives that will, among other things, satisfy the cyborg's real need for advanced writing programs.

Significantly, such projects will teach cyborg student writers to upgrade themselves at a cost to them of $0.00 (see Table 2). Even more importantly, such projects should help cyber-students to understand that the conjuncture of cyberspace and consumer culture manufactures self-consuming subject/object commodities, and not human beings; that cyborgs -- cultural fictions that they are -- cannot be made powerful by appeals, implied or stated, to the idea that human beings should be agents in the creation of their computer tools/environments; and, finally, that others of their own kind will join with them in common struggle to seize the tools to mark the world that marked them as other. Indeed, students in posthuman classrooms, when they have done with their work, will have perceived, however dimly, a political alternative to the present version of life in cyberspace. They will have participated in the counter-hegemonic manufacture of a cyborg self that is still a subject/object relation but that is not, at one and the same time, a commodity.
Table 2: actual costs associated with establishing minimal cyborg writer competence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competency</th>
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<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MS Office Compatible Document, Database, Spreadsheet, Slideshow, Desktop Publisher</td>
<td>Open Office</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idea Generator</td>
<td>MindMan Personal</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outliner</td>
<td>KeyNote</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTML Editor</td>
<td>1st Page 2000</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS Editor</td>
<td>Balthisar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable Document File Creator</td>
<td>GhostScript, Ghostview</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Virus Protection</td>
<td>AVG Anti-Virus</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>XiRCON</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File Compressor</td>
<td>Ultimate Zip</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File Splitter</td>
<td>Chainsaw</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTP</td>
<td>FileZilla</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help Editor</td>
<td>Microsoft HTML Help Workshop</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offline Browser</td>
<td>WinHTTrack</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Searchbot</td>
<td>FirstStop WebSearch</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email Client, Newsreader, Telnet</td>
<td>Pegasus Mail, X-News, Easy Term</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$0.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Harrison Center Supply Closet <http://helios.acomp.usf.edu/~sharriso/supply-closet/index.html> and the writers/readers of the Usenet newsgroup alt.comp.freeware

It would be too much to say that projects such as the one alluded to above will stand any chance of redirecting the trajectory of cyborg culture on its current path through a morass of self-acquisition, self-absorption and self-destruction. Yet, a pedagogy of the posthuman should awaken living commodities to the truth that capital has finally succeeded in turning life itself into a commodity fetish and, also, to the unlikely possibility that cyborgs will someday exist as something other than the manufacturers of the self that exists as slave to the self that lives in political isolation from selves who would free the self from the manufacturers of the self if only they were free.
The Condition of the Writing Class

A "Hidden Trap Door" Theory

The time has passed when one could rely upon support from a composition theory, or a theory of the production of cultural forms, when talk of language as productive force turns to the manner in which people use language to produce and reproduce the conditions of everyday life.

In the not so distant past, one could rest assured in the practice of studying, critiquing, supporting, or rejecting the formal uses to which people put language--or the productive force implicated in all sociolinguistic production--precisely because no economic agent had ever succeeded in owning language, or the means of sociolinguistic production. Anyone's composition theory might allow for the fact that economic practices delimited by a dominant mode of production could exert a pronounced influence upon an individual's capacity to use language in the production of cultural forms, in the production of socially negotiated compositions. But no one could ever claim that language exists as a function or product of a socially delimited set of economic practices. No one could claim that any person's positive or negative capacity to use either spoken words or an alphabet in the production of embodied or technologically mediated compositions depends upon that person's class position as defined by the dominant mode of production. And, so, no one taking up the problem of language as a productive force could be expected or even encouraged to develop a theory of sociolinguistic production that was not also in some way a general composition theory, that was not also in some way a theory that stands
upon the presupposition that all human beings who are not physiologically predisposed against language acquisition share in the collective ownership of language and, thus, an unevenly developed but common potential to participate in and struggle over the sociolinguistic production of cultural forms.

Accordingly, one would have good reason to expect that anyone interested in taking up the problem of language as productive force would eventually focus upon the ways in which people shape language and use cultural forms in the production and reproduction of the conditions of everyday life. Because language, to date, has always existed as a "form of development of the productive forces" that has not come in conflict with "the relations of production, or--what is but a legal expression for the same thing--with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto" (Marx, *Contribution* preface-abs.htm), one might be justified in expecting all talk of sociolinguistic production to articulate with composition theory, or a theory that speaks to the highly variegated ways in which socially articulated language users work upon the semiotic materials that the world of language users produce and share in common.

But the times have changed. And no one may rely upon the support of composition theory when talk of language as a productive force turns to the manner in which the inclusive set of language users develop and deploy cultural forms in the production and reproduction of the conditions of everyday life. Today, talk of composition mistakes the central problem of sociolinguistic production when that talk fails to realize that language--a social, as opposed to a cultural, form that has always promoted the unfettered "development of the productive forces"--has, indeed, come in conflict with "the relations of production, or--what is but a legal expression for the same
thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto."
Adapting to our present circumstances the language that Marx used in the 1859 Preface to
A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, we can say that the social relations
which time immemorial have lead to the production and common ownership of language
have, today, changed from being social relations leading to development of the productive
forces to being productive relations that are not only defined by economic practices as
delimited by a dominant mode of production but, also, constitute a fetter upon the
development of the productive forces. Today, at the transnationally internetworked core
(read: the Internet) of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system, social
relations that result in the production of language are also relations that, on the one hand,
bind language users to economic agents who own the means of sociolinguistic production
and, on the other, exclude nearly all of the world's language users both from a share in the
ownership of the economically delimited means of sociolinguistic production and from
any and all guarantees of participating in the transnationally internetworked
sociolinguistic production of cultural forms.

A matter of history: between 1991 and 1998, capital took directive control of the
internetworked social, the globally internetworked realm of computer networked
solutions, the internetworked system of fully automated writing machines, the Internet. In
the short span of eight years, capital took possession of the field of internetworked
writing that nations had develop through state-funded projects like ARPAnet (Advanced
Research Projects Administration network) and NSFnet (National Science Foundation
network). Prior to 1991, capital had been excluded by the National Science Foundation
from NSFnet, the pre-commercial Internet backbone (read: the main network connections
that internetwork the computer networks that comprise the global Internet). In those days, the state-supported system of internetworked writing machines catered to the needs of researchers and educators. But in 1991, capital received permission from NSF to access and use the Internet for commercial purposes. By 1993, capital had started to build and internetwork its own computer networks, responding as it did to increased distribution of personal computers, the composition of the world wide web, and the growing popularity of the Internet. In the same year, capital's expansion into internetworked computing prompted NSF to propose a transfer of control of the Internet to capital. It took only two years for the commercially owned and operated Internet to receive its launch. In 1995, capital took control of the Internet, and NSF decommissioned NSFnet. Capital received help from NSF for three years, making the transition from state to private control easier. But, in 1998, a landmark year, NSF withdrew from its position of authority over the Internet, and the Internet completed its transition from being a state-financed operation to being a commercial venture ("Brief History," "Computers: Internet: History").

In less than a decade, capital had superseded the State as the provider of revenues used in the construction of the environs, or the conditions, that organize the networked processes of social production. In the short course of seven years, capital had taken over production of the automated system of internetworked writing machines that machinofactures the field of writing, or sociolinguistic possibility, that capital now produces, distributes, and exchanges for money. Capital, in other words, had managed to

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4 The state has continued in the business of constructing networked processes of social production but on a smaller scale. NSF, for example, still works to develop internetworking solutions for scientists and researchers. At present, NSF is involved in the construction of vBNS (very high-speed Broadband Network Service) and the Internet2 collaborative effort between NSF and 100+ U.S. universities to develop internetworking solutions and "advanced applications for learning and research" ("Internet2," "VBNs").
stake a state-supported, juridically protected claim to a machine-generated, 
transnationally internetworked space of sociolinguistic possibility and, in so doing, 
convert internetworked writing into both a force of capitalist production and an alienable 
use value (read: salable commodity).

Between 1995 and 1998, writing became, as it were, the proper expression of 
capital at every point in the circuit of capital, from points of production to distribution to 
exchange to consumption. And writing, now the privately owned means of sociolinguistic 
production, suddenly became an expropriated prerequisite for anyone wanting or needing 
to write within the field of writing, or sociolinguistic production, that productive capital 
had come to own, produce, distribute, and sell. Before anyone could participate in and 
struggle over the sociolinguistic production of cultural forms, before anyone could begin 
to work upon the semiotic materials that the world of language users no longer produced 
and shared in common, most everyone in the inclusive set of language users had to agree 
that they had no collective share in the transnationally networked means of sociolinguistic 
production, had no seeming alternative but to bind themselves to capital if they were to 
compose cultural forms within the transnationally networked core of the unevenly 
developed capitalist world economic system, had no seeming alternative but to sanction 
capital's right to take possession of the field of sociolinguistic production, had no seeming 
alternative but to contract with capital for the right to access and, thereafter, participate in 
the networked field of privately owned sociolinguistic opportunity.

The clearest and simplest way of making this point is to advance the following 
unspectacular observations. After absorbing the substantial costs associated with the 
purchase of a Pentium class computer, some of us pay ATT $11.95 a month for a 56 kbps
dial-up connection to the privately owned, transnationally internetworked processes of computer-mediated social production; otherwise known as, the privatized Internet. Others pay Verizon $34.95 a month for a 100 mbps DSL connection. Still others pay Cox Communications $49.95 a month for a 300 mbps cable connection. A growing handful pay $9.95 a day to connect at Wireless Hotspots around the country at speeds up to 50 times faster than Internet dial-up. The less fortunate go to public libraries, sit down at a tax-supported computer terminals, and make tax-supported connections to the privatized Internet through various State-sponsored, tax-supported leasing arrangements with various privately owned Internet Service Providers. But however we manage to forge our connections, typical users of the digitized everyday have one thing in common. They connect to the networked social--to the interindividual, computer-mediated site of language production--and encounter a wide range of networked writing practices that exist for us only under the ritualistic sign of exchange. More specifically, typical users of the digitized everyday connect to an ideological communications apparatus and encounter a productive apparatus that generates a sociolinguistic formation that not only reproduces social relations through ideology but, more importantly, produces the necessary conditions for the state-sanctioned, juridically protected production and reproduction of social relations through private industry.

To acknowledge that productive control over the automated field of internetworked writing has been ceded to capital is, perhaps, to understand why I doubt the explanatory and directive power of contemporary composition theory to deal with the role of language as productive force in what can only be described as the fettered production and reproduction of everyday life. Because language users at the
internetworked core of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system no longer share in the ownership of the means of sociolinguistic production, composition theorists, even Marxist composition theorists, with their focused attention on the production of cultural forms, must soon discover that they are overmatched in their encounters with the privatized system of machinofactured sociolinguistic production. The established range of composition theories must fail to galvanize compositionists in their encounters with the privately owned, fully automated system of internetworked writing machines that, for its part, establishes conditions under which the networked production of cultural forms becomes fundamentally inaccessible to expropriated language users unless they agree to bind themselves to the economic agents who, for their part, are the real owners and operators of the means of sociolinguistic production.

**Composition Theory**

Based upon our preliminary conclusion that capital has subjugated sociolinguistic production to the service of wealth, one might deduce, I believe correctly, that Marxists will produce the answer best suited to capital's penetration into and appropriation of the field of sociolinguistic possibility. Writing shortly after the fall of Soviet state capitalism to US private capitalism, Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff advanced a position that seems to support this conjecture. They argued that the specter of communism still haunts the capitalist world economic system because, plain and simple, capitalism generates Marxism, or the instrument for "class analysis that renders" communism "visible as the powerful 'other' of a now global capitalist system" (119). Marxism, explained Resnick and Wolff, is "sustained by its dialectical opposite, its capitalist other, whose contradictions and crises have always both threatened and invigorated Marxist theory and
Marxist organization" (123). In their estimate, the collapse of Soviet state capitalism did nothing to change the fact that "the current spurt of capitalist development will, like all previous spurts, sooner or later entail the parallel revival of its other--Marxism" (119). To be sure, capitalism and Marxism will both "have the new forms appropriate to the new conditions" (119). But, just as surely, capitalism will produce alienation. And Marxism, itself one of the inescapable contradictions produced by capitalism, will respond by voicing that "attendant Utopian longing for an end to exploitation, for that fullness of life that requires, among other things, that no separation exist between the collective of producers and the collective of appropriators of surplus value" (123).

At the same time, Marxist compositionists--those who have the inside track on capital's penetration into and appropriation of the field of sociolinguistic possibility--will likely falter when tracking capital's subjugation of writing for the first time. They promise to mistep when first striding to meet privatized internetworked writing with a Marxist sociolinguistic theory that renders communism visible as the powerful 'other' of the transnationally internetworked capitalist world system. Marxists compositionists must necessarily trip themselves and their composition theories so long as they stand upon their own longstanding assumptions about the social property status of language, the status of social language as an unfettered form of the development of the productive forces, and that related assumption that the inclusive set of vested and unfettered producers of the social property 'social language' share in an unevenly developed but common potential to participate in and struggle over the sociolinguistic production of cultural forms.

One might say that the problem for Marxist compositionists in their encounters with privatized, globally internetworked writing issues from the fact that until recently
Guy Debord, Frederic Jameson, Stuart Hall, James Berlin, Michel de Certeau, and Valentin Vološinov made fairly equal contributions to the discourse about the production of cultural forms at the core and on the peripheries of the most technology advanced sectors of the world community. To grasp my meaning, remember that we were confronted not so long ago by Guy Debord's charge that we live in *The Society of the Spectacle*--a media-driven culture marked by capital's industrial control over the technologically-mediated production of cultural fantasies that capital composes and projects over and across the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system. Capital, Debord argued correctly, has accumulated to the point of becoming Image (../display/16). Shortly thereafter, we were challenged by Frederic Jameson's remark that ours is an era marked by "a prodigious expansion of culture throughout the social realm, to the point at which everything in our social life--from economic value and state power to practices and to the very structure of the psyche itself--can be said to have become 'cultural' in some original and yet untheorized sense" (48). Charged and challenged, we responded to capital's spectacular, cultural penetrations into the social by claiming a special exemption from capital's influence for the domain of everyday life, practical consciousness, language games, rhetoric, composition. Many claimed or stood on the assumption that capital could not launch a prodigious expansion of the social throughout *the social*, that capital which had accumulated to the point of becoming the perceived, spectacular Image could not accumulate to the point of becoming the expressed, embodied *Word*. Stuart Hall, for example, claimed that media never manufactures consent among the governed but, instead, participates in the "production of consent" (87). James Berlin, following suit, argued that educators can help students, who
have been bombarded by the "image and spectacle," to become "active and critical agents in shaping the economic, social, political, and cultural conditions of their historical moment" (223). And, speaking on behalf of those who feel overpowered by the culture industry, Michel de Certeau insisted that even the weak may resist capital's penetrations into the social, provided, for example, that they deploy language in the form of memory at the "'right point in time' (kairos)" and, in so doing, produce a "founding rupture or break" that "modifies the local order" for having taken it "by surprise" (85). Each understood with Valentin Vološinov that language--being "the specific material reality of ideological creativity" (xiv) and an element of the "immediate superstructure over the economic basis" (13)--is intertwined with but is finally and assuredly distinct from the capitalist mode of production. And each demonstrated why compositionists--imbued with an equal appreciation for the power of capital and the power of language users to set limits on the reach of capital--may be predisposed to stand upon old, time-tested principles about language when confronted with a social order that transforms all manner of internetworked languaging, including the internetworked forms of ideological critique (Berlin) and memory (de Certeau), into the language commodity: the processes of sociolinguistic production that issue from capital's subsumption of internetworked writing; the monetized products of internetworked sociolinguistic production that circulate as the social, the everyday, practical consciousness, composition, rhetoric, and language.

The problem for the immediate future of Marxist composition theory stems from its deeply rooted connection to the following Marxist tenets: 1) all people own language; 2) all language users may own, operate, and contribute to the development of many--not
all--of the core technologies that language producers use to produce written compositions;

3) technologically mediated language users may be denied access to particular language-
producing technologies, but this failure of access is not so great as to make a private
property of language and, in so doing, to shift the central problem for writers from
negotiated interpretation and rearticulation of cultural compositions that are themselves
essential for the reproduction of everyday life to baseline struggle for the means of
semiotic production that is itself prerequisite to the production of everyday life;

4) operating writers need not therefore struggle so much for the sign as in the sign.

The immediate problem for Marxist compositionists in their inevitable encounter
with capital's penetration into and appropriation of the field of sociolinguistic possibility
stems from the fact that Marxist and non-Marxist theorists from Debord to Berlin share in
a fairly stable set of assumptions that reach back to the general theory of historical
formations that Marx and Engels first developed in *The German Ideology*. Marxist
theories and non-Marxist theories of sociolinguistic production recall with Marx and
Engels that one may abstract from the material activity of everyday life a total of five
constants that go into the production of every realized historical relationship. These
constant conditions result, time and again, in the human production of different
socioeconomic formations that always include language and practical consciousness but
never seem to include anything more radical than longstanding opportunities for language
producers to print and publish sequences of words, not whole living languages, and, more
rarely, to convert published words into copyright protected commodities. The first three
fundamental conditions in the material production of history by material individuals
include 1) the "production of material life itself," or the ability of each human animal to
satisfy physical needs like eating and sleeping and, so, to be in a "position to live in order to be able to 'make history'"; 2) the production and satisfaction of "new needs," or the ongoing production of material life itself; and 3) the reproduction of social life, or the "natural" / "social" "double relationship" that manifests itself in the sexual propagation of the species and the development of variegated social relations, including the production of gendered and raced social categories (ch01a.htm). Having theorized what feminist scholar Monique Wittig has correctly charged as being a naturalized, invidious, and unacceptable distinction between the natural and social, between the natural essence of Man and Woman and the social reproduction of men and women, Marx and Engels regroup the social and theoretically sound aspect of the third constant--the reproduction of social life--with their fourth and fifth historical constants. The production of social relations is now understood to include 4) "a certain mode of production, or industrial stage" that "is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage" (ch01a.htm). The combination and interplay between the production of social relations and the development of dominant mode of production results in what Marxists call the socioeconomic formation. And it is the existence of the socioeconomic formation, with its relatively autonomous social and economic modalities, that produces the conditions under which 5) human beings-in-collective produce consciousness, or language, which is "practical consciousness that exists also for other men." In short, the sociolinguistic substance of the social formation, which includes the practical consciousness as its first component, emerges through collective negotiations over and across the null, or unwritten, space between human bodies that intersects with both the production of social relations and the social relations of production but may never be reduced to an exclusive
property of either the social or productive relations.

The transhistorical implications that follow from Marx and Engels' fundamental albeit imperfect theory of the material production of historical relationships are clear. Capital may never finally succeed in converting the social property language into language capital--a private, or exclusive, property that production capital machinofactures and circulates for the purpose of converting the production of social relations into an alienable (read: salable) product of the social relations of production. Any socially or productively oriented group of people may, of course, pressure other groups not to use language, but no group may stop another from using social signs--even if a group called The Sovereign Lords of Language were to stake out an area and mandate that no group passing through their well patrolled sociolinguistic domain may use social signs without express written permission. Capital may, in other words, accumulate to the point of becoming the engine that produces The Society of the Spectacle, but capital may not accumulate to the point of becoming the engine that produces the The Society of the Society. These, at least, are the implications that follow from Marx and Engels' general theory of the material production of historical relationships.

From the perspective of one interested in producing a Marxist writing and composition theory fit to meet the challenges that issue from capital's recent subsumption of writing, the significance of Marx and Engels' remarks must be tied to Vološinov's philosophy of language, or, more precisely, to the manner in which Vološinov converted the Marxist general theory of historical formations into a Marxist frame for discussing the property status of language, both written and spoken. When brought within Vološinov's Marxist frame of reference, language emerges as the quintessential social property.
Toward this end, Vološinov points out that although sign use, or language, is a function of individual human consciousness, "individual consciousness is a social-ideological fact," not a trans-historical, non-material, non-semiotic function of the isolated human mind (12). The only definition of consciousness available to us, he continues, is a "sociological one" because individual consciousness, which requires the existence of some kind of semiotic material for its existence, only appears when members of a socially organized group have social intercourse. Human understanding appears only after the mind has been filled with signs, or "ideological content" (13). But, Vološinov explains, this filling necessarily occurs through the external "process of social interaction" (11). The individual human understanding, he continues, emerges where socially organized, as opposed to randomly grouped, human beings stretch ideological chains across "interindividual territory," make meaningful connections between themselves, and, in so doing, establish the conditions under which individual consciousness appears (11, 12).

According to Vološinov, individual human understanding appears only when individuals-in-collective grasp social signs with already known, socially negotiated signs -- that is, when social beings bear socially-generated signs upon socially-generated signs, which, for their part, bear upon a physical reality that collective sign use converts into ideological material. This socially-contingent, uninterrupted linking of signs constitutes for Vološinov the "chain of ideological creativity" that, on the one hand, gives rise to all individual consciousness and, on the other, never breaks and plunges into that which doesn't exist, a transhistorical human psychology that arises from a non-material, non-semiotic inner nature (11). At the same time, the manner in which individuals-in-collective produce individual consciousness demonstrates that sign production is not the
property of any one group or individual but of all language using human beings, each of whom use semiotic materials to negotiate the interindividual null, or unwritten, space that exists between and unites human populations, both large and small.

In this telling, language, or practical consciousness, is necessarily involved in productive relations from which might issue the right of private property over specific texts. At the same time, the vast, socially negotiated field of sociolinguistic production and ideological creativity never becomes an exclusive property of, for example, production capital (read: the body of capitalists who specialize not in finance but in the direct production process). In this telling, the relations of production rise from within the ongoing production of social relations from which issues an omnipresent opportunity for individuals-in-collective to stretch ideological chains across interindividual territory, to make meaningful connections between themselves, and, in so doing, to establish the conditions under which individual consciousness appears. Given this telling, it would be hard for anyone to imagine, let alone realize, a mode of production that so penetrates the production of social relations that the socioeconomic formation gets converted into an econosocial formation, or the product of a mode of production that specializes in the direct production of the interindividual grounds that human beings must access if they are to generate language, if they are to participate in the production of social relations, if they are to take up position within a determinate social formation that rises from within a determinate mode of privately owned and operated sociolinguistic production.

The power of Vološinov’s seminal remarks on Marxism and the philosophy of language is such that one can understand why I might regard the Marxist general theory of historical formations as a problem waiting to happen for the Marxist compositionists
who want, on the one hand, to theorize and provide a counterstatement to capital's recent advance upon and subsumption of sociolinguistic production, and who, on the other, must presuppose that an economic modality may not subsume its social formation, may not subsume the interindividual processes of agonistic yet unfettered language production. Because Marxists regard language as a social property, and because this social property rises out of a socioeconomic formation that cannot on the face of things be subsumed by its own economic modality, Marxists perforce conclude that the many faces of sociolinguistic production--call them speech, writing, rhetoric, composition, practical consciousness, the practice of everyday life, the quotidian, and individual subjectivity--must be overdetermined in substance but never necessarily a force of capitalist production (read: factory technology) or an alienable use value (read: commodity).

Because capital in theory cannot produce an economic modality capable of subsuming at the level of sociolinguistic production even a circumscribed portion of the entire socioeconomic formation, Marxist theories that bring the means of sociolinguistic production within their purview must take the next logical now untenable step. They must advance uncritically upon the production and reception of cultural forms. They have no choice but to produce a composition theory steeped in once valid conceptions about the status of language as a social property and a form of the development of the productive forces.

There are, of course, numerous examples that could substantiate my observations about the longstanding, no longer appropriate tendency of Marxist composition theory to stand upon a now compromised belief in the status of language as unfettered social property and form of the development of the productive forces. Of the two that I will
offer, Raymond Williams' work in *Marxism and Literature* is interesting because it continues to operate for contemporary compositionists as another touchstone in the long path from Marx to Vološinov to contemporary Marxist composition theory. Williams was quite candid about the fact that he grounded his Marxist literary theory, "cultural materialism," upon the foundation established by V. N. Vološinov--itself an echo, elaboration, and rearticulation of the general theory of the production of historical formations in *The German Ideology*. For Williams, interindividual sociolinguistic activity is implicated in the entire range of productive activities--industrial, political, legal, and cultural--and so may not be reduced to the condition of being an instrument for reflecting or refracting economic activities that are supposed to be the "real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness" (Marx, *Contribution* preface-abs.htm). Where Marxists at work in the earlier, orthodox tradition tended to reduce the production of cultural forms to an activity that referred back to the economic basis, with its consistent, very general set of properties, Williams posited that cultural production is something more than an activity which rises from and refers back to the economic. Cultural production, he argued, is a material activity that is constitutive, not reflective, of the socioeconomic formation. Marxists, therefore, who work within the more orthodox traditions are not, from Williams' perspective, being materialist enough when they critique and protest against a way of life that tends to reduce everything to economic activity and, at the same time, reinforces the idea that capital constituted a self-sustaining mode of production. For Williams, the problem of sociolinguistic production is as definite as it is challenging. He concludes that all productive activity, including economic activity, stems from social processes that
feature sociolinguistic conflict. And sociolinguistic conflict, even when it goes on within both the politico-legal and ideological superstructures, gives rise to the production of cultural forms that are themselves constitutive of the social order, that are important in creating and sustaining the impression that capitalist economic activity is a self-sustaining activity, and that cannot, therefore, be construed as being products of a reflective, "superstructural" process at all. Having rejected the idea that sociolinguistic activity can be reduced to a reflection of economic activity, and having argued that sociolinguistic activity is constitutive of the conditions that secure the future for capitalist economic activity, Williams moved, as I have argued, that sociolinguistic theory must translate itself into a Marxist theory of literary production, or a composition theory that stands, as I have argued, upon language as a social property and written language as a form of the development of the productive forces. He became the champion for Marxist compositionists who want to adhere to a "theory of the specificities of material cultural and literary production within historical materialism" (5, 90-94).

My second example comes from the institutionally delimited field of scholarship in rhetoric and composition. Having grounded his work upon Williams' Marxist literary theory, with its roots in Vološinov's *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* and Marx and Engels' *The German Ideology*, Bruce Horner translates Williams' revaluation of material cultural and literary production into a reason for compositionists to work purposefully within the Marxist tradition of historical materialism. Committed to advancing Williams' theory from an attempt to "reestablish the material groundings of what cultural practices might be about" (Harvey 354) to being a bona fide theory of cultural production, or composition theory, Horner establishes a benchmark for theorists
who want to bring historical materialism to bear on writing, rhetoric, and composition. He insists that rhetoricians who concentrate on the technologically mediated production of sociolinguistic forms (i.e., written compositions) must cleave to the "Marxist tradition of historical materialism [first developed by Marx and Engels in *The German Ideology*], in which the mode of production is understood to include social relations as a significant 'productive force'" (xvii). Significantly, Horner warns compositionists who want to become cultural materialists to steer clear of anything that smacks of Marxist base-superstructure analysis. In his estimate, compositionists will avoid those inescapable problems that plague materialists who pursue some form of cultural reflection theory if they draw on *The German Ideology*, in other words, a text from Marx and Engels' early career that attends to the unfettered, socially delimited work of language workers rather than the problem of political economy. In so doing, Horner secures for both himself and contemporary Marxist compositionists a place within the longstanding Marxist tradition that concentrates on the production of cultural forms because language itself necessarily exceeds the subsumptive reach of capital. Horner argues that compositionists must characterize composition as real work and that this work, which leads to the production of social forms, includes "actual work on material," involves a "material social process," and, therefore, may not be "separated from the material social conditions of its production" (xvii). Only then, when compositionists have characterized composition as work, can composition theorists be assured of accentuating "the materiality and historicity of our work, and so enable us better to understand the specific and changing delimitations governing it and its real potentialities" (xvii).

Yet the true disposition of language and composition is no longer with Horner,
with Williams, with de Certeau, with Berlin, with Hall, with Jameson, with Debord, with Vološinov, with the early Engels, with the early Marx. Theories of the production of cultural forms that stand upon assumptions about the status of language as a social property no longer advance from a position that addresses the material conditions of sociolinguistic production, where that production takes place at the transnationally internetworked core of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system. For well over a century, Marxist composition theory has maintained that economic activity cannot become an inescapable determinate in the life of any writer, cannot always interpose itself between a would-be writer and the act of writing, cannot necessarily come between a would-be writer and the writer's real potential to work upon semiotic materials in the production of cultural forms. Today, relations of capitalist production have advanced so far that capital can and does come between the world of writers and both the internetworked social formation--constituted entirely of expropriated writing--and the cultural forms that writers may not produce except under the ritualistic sign of exchange. And so, today, relations of capitalist production have disqualified composition theories based upon the idea of language as social property, based as they are upon the assumption of assured access to unfettered language, from speaking to the core problem of sociolinguistic production at the transnationally networked core of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system. Suddenly, contemporary (Marxist) composition theory, no matter how materialist, fails the test of being "materialist enough."

Bourgeois revisionist, liberal reformist Charles Moran attempts to get at this point in "Access: The 'A' Word in Technology Studies." Moran emphasizes that grim economic
realities underpin the work of literacy workers who specialize in computers-and-writing. Hard at work in a field where writers have little choice but to buy a new writing machine (read: computer) every four years, and where a fraction of the world's population can afford to connect to the internetworked econosocial formation, Moran brings into sharp relief the withering economic disparities that influence whether persons will gain or be denied access to the transnationally internetworked core of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system. Moran notes that between 1979-1989, the poorest 20% of American families experienced a 9% drop in income and families making less than $10,000 increased from 8.3% to 9.6%. At the same time, the richest 2% to 4% of US Americans increased their wealth by 29% and managed to concentrate 40% of the nations wealth in the hands of 1% of the population (216). Confronted as Moran was by economic disparities that must have an impact, positive or negative, on each US citizen's right of passage to the econosocial formation, to the expropriated databases of semiotic materials, and to the fettered production of cultural forms, Moran asks--quite understandably--that we forestall talk of composition and launch what can only be described as a narrowly economistic, vulgar materialist writing program that succumbs to what John Trimbur refers to as theoretical "presentism," or the leftist, postmodernist inclination to "mistake conjunctural effects for the organic trends in capital's persistent if uneven development on a global scale" (197). Moran asks teachers and researchers in the computers-and-writing community "to do something other than what we do now" (215). He suggests that literacy workers in computers-and-writing work to ameliorate conjunctural effects produced by organic trends in capital's persistent if uneven development on a global scale by 1) learning about, using, and advocating "less-
expensive equipment"; 2) bolstering the case for cheaper access by studying the impact of studying in "technologically-impoverished environment"; 3) contributing to a good "pre-employment curriculum for K-12 and college students" that is notable for its firm sense of what students need to learn "to function adequately in today's workplace"; 4) finding out if lower income negatively impacts the poorest "teachers, teaching assistants, and part-timers"; 5) taking stock of those things that teachers have done to "resist," "undo," or "redress the inequalities of access to technology"; and 6) uncovering what students have done to gain "the access that they need" but cannot afford (218-19).

The clarity of Moran's statistically driven perceptions aside, nothing Moran suggests will dissolve the fetter on writing and the production of cultural forms that afflicts members of the world community, over fifty percent of whom have never made a phone call (Rifkin 13; Hayles 20), nearly all of whom own no share of the means of internetworked sociolinguistic production. Nothing Moran suggests will assure increased access to the internetworked econosocial formation for the sociolinguistically challenged members of the world community because decreased access to goods and services in capitalist formations are not brought about by "crises of scarcity, like all precapitalist crises" but, instead, by "crises of overproduction" (Mandel 52). When, for example, business persons produce goods that through overproduction return neither surplus value nor the capitalist's initial investment, capital will suspend operations, lay-off workers, ruin lives, and send capitalists into crisis in the midst of abundance. When faced with an econosocial formation that contains areas of interest that have reached the point of market saturation, capital will, of course, curtail production of and close access to formerly profitable, now exhausted areas of the internetworked econosocial formation. Capital will
contract portions of the writing market as it did during the .com market corrections. Bearing this in mind, nothing Moran suggests will resolve the problem of privatized internetworked writing--except perhaps to underscore the failure of cultural materialist composition theory, with its assumptions about the dual status of language as social property and unfettered productive force, to deal with the problem of sociolinguistic expropriation. Nothing will change because Moran--like the compositionists he corrects--stops short of confronting those economic agents who control the relations of production that have already advanced upon the production of social relations and subsumed the processes of sociolinguistic formation, ideological creativity, and cultural production that proceed within the internetworked core of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system.

Despite the problems that Marxist compositionists, philosophers of language, and unclassified historical materialists might have when developing the new Marxist forms necessary to meet and contradict the new sociolinguistic forms that capital has developed since the fall of Soviet state capitalism, I continue to believe with Resnick and Wolff that, for example, the latent potential for a Marxist reply resides in the ongoing capitalist conversion of processes of simple or non-capitalist sociolinguistic production into processes of "normal," industrial, large-scale commodity production. One cannot be certain that a Marxist theory of writing will take root in the contradictory substance of capitalized writing, but no one should blanch at the thought that capitalized writing should give rise to a Marxist theory of writing and, perhaps, in due time, a fully elaborated Marxist theory of composition rearticulated to work within the new conditions of sociolinguistic production. And no one should be particularly surprised that the path to
a Marxist theory of writing will take us into direct contact with the tightly wound contradictions that permeate every byte of capitalized, alienable, alienated writing and take us, more importantly, into direct conflict with the capitalist class that has converted the ongoing non-capitalist production of the social property writing into a private property that capital produces, distributes, and exchanges for money.

**Subjugated Writing**
The time has come for a Marxist theory of writing. The time has come for Marxists to step beyond the once unshakable, now crumbled positions on cultural production as material work, positions that stand and now fall on an unfailing, once justified belief in the dual status of language as social property and unfettered productive force. Having become a state-sanctioned, juridically protected property of capital, internetworked language must be characterized as a form of the development of the productive forces that has come in conflict with the property relations within which it has operated hitherto. Because the internetworked form of language itself has become a private property, Marxists must now undertake an activity that Marxist cultural materialists and compositionists like Raymond Williams and Bruce Horner have long considered a failing in the historical materialist sociolinguistic methodology. Marxists must now trace internetworked, technologically mediated language back to capital. They must understand what it means for writing to become a component and by-product of the capitalist relations of production, its production delimited by laws of the motion of capital, as delimited by the dominant mode of production.

We have no choice. There are no alternatives.

And so we begin with a decision to let go of the exceptional status of language
and the sociolinguistic formation. And we turn to Notebook VI of the *Grundrisse*, wherein Marx details capital's method for translating ownership over the means of production into a mechanism for subjugating "historical progress to the service of wealth" (ch11.htm).

Marx wants us to know that capital's rise to power follows a path to dominance that departs from those paths followed by "all earlier forms of property" (ch11.htm). Rather than increasing its fortunes through development of protocols that "condemn the greater part of humanity, the slaves, to be pure instruments of labor" (ch11.htm), capital seeks from its workers compliance without threat of compulsion. As we know, capital thrives where it converts a large portion of the world's work force into a body of free workers who, being free, are fully at liberty to sell or abstain from selling their labor-power for wages, or, in our case, are free to participate in or turn their backs on the internetworked realm of sociolinguistic production. At the same time, capital thrives where it develops juridically sanctioned property relations that support capital in converting the relatively independent body of laborers into a fragmented body of the proletariat--"free workers" who have lost their rights of possession over the means of production and so have little choice but to exercise their free right to depend for their existence upon capital and, in so doing, to sanction capital's right to possess and distribute the means of production (ch11.htm).

Within the narrow confines of industrial production, capital gains control over the proletariat 1) by concentrating wealth into its own singular hand, 2) by concentrating bodies of relatively independent workers together in one location through the offer of wages, 3) by alienating workers from the social processes of work through the
introduction of the capitalist division of labor, and 4) by alienating skilled workers from
even the muscular aspects of work through capital's use of science to shift the power of
labor from human hands to privately owned and operated machine systems. When capital
brings workers together in one place and sets them to work before privately owned
machine systems, capital produces an objective relationship between workers, the activity
of work, and the workers tools and, in so doing, alienates workers from both the work
process and the product of their labor. Capital's talent for organizing and the presenting
the conditions of work to the proletariat is what allows capital to transform labor-power
into an objective property that capital may purchase, and eventually sell, and always
manipulate, for the purpose of increasing the rate of commodity production and the rate
of surplus profit (Marx, *Grundrisse* ch11.htm).

Wherever capital extends its organizational techniques beyond traditionally
recognized areas of industrial production, capital succeeds in penetrating into undespoiled
areas of the social formation, in subsuming heretofore relatively autonomous spheres of
productive, unfettered activity. All capital needs do to subsume another area of the social
formation is to establish a property-based, alienated, objective association between
human beings and all of processes of some heretofore unfettered form of the productive
forces—to take possession of the site of work, the instruments of labor, and the workers
who conspire with, even as they struggle against, capital in its quest to realize surplus
profits. That is capital's formula for subsuming areas of the social formation—a formula, I
might add, that has sustained capital through its latest successful venture into the area of
sociolinguistic production (Marx, *Grundrisse* ch11.htm).

For those wanting to work within the core or even on the semi-peripheries of the
unevenly developed capitalist world economic system, they must learn how to use the
transnationally internetworked site of sociolinguistic production. Capital, ergo, has
produced a consumer good that, in Marxist terms, functions as a wage good, or a
commodity that a would-be worker must purchase and consume if that worker hopes to
gain some specific type of future employment. Capital, in the case of internetworked
writing, has translated its state-sanctioned, juridically protected control of the language
commodity into the ongoing production of a wage good that language users must
purchase if they hope to work and produce anywhere near the core of capitalist world
system. In this way, capital produces its trademark property-based, alienated, objective
association between members of the proletariat and, in this case, the sociolinguistic
component of an econosocial formation that circulates at the core of the larger, unevenly
developed socioeconomic formation. Capital, in other words, subjugates sociolinguistic
production to the service of wealth by subjugating elite literacy workers at the core and on
the semi-peripheries of the capitalist world system to capital, owner and operator of the
language commodity as wage good.

For all users of the internetworked social, regardless of their employment
aspirations, capital organizes sociolinguistic production into a property-based, alienated,
objective association and so, again, subjugates sociolinguistic production to the service of
wealth. Writers who use internetworked writing for whatever purpose may only produce
internetworked communications if they direct writing into the field of sociolinguistic
possibility that capital produces with and controls through its ownership of the automated
system of internetworked writing machines (read: internetworked computers). What this
means is that capital has machinofactured a "field-to-point" (read: internetworked)
method of organizing technologically mediated communication. Capital has, in other words, machinofactured a field of sociolinguistic possibility to which writers must connect themselves one point at a time. In the past, capital had attempted but failed to subjugate interindividual communications to the service of wealth through its organization of "point-to-point" (read: telephone and telegraph) or "point-to-field" (read: radio and television) communications models. Point-to-point communications, with its genuine capacity to organize and capitalize upon the interindividual site of sociolinguistic production, was and is too narrowly focused to subsume an entire social formation. (Telephone companies have long since converted interpersonal communications into capital but cannot, at the same time, convert the entire range of simultaneous telephonic communications into a net that brings the entire set of language users together in one place, before a privately owned machine system, under capital control.) Point-to-field, or the broadcast model that vaulted Debord's Society of the Spectacle into existence, had the power to penetrate the social formation but never, of course, to subsume it. (Television companies have long since converted public and private domains into a canvas upon which to project a vast array of capitalized messages and, in so doing, to convert culture into capital, but capital cannot use broadcasted cultural capital to subsume the set of relatively independent language users because language users heretofore have grounded their interpersonal communications upon a social substrate that may be capital, as in the case of telephonic communications, but is never necessarily capital.) Field-to-point, on the other hand, subsumes the entire set of fragmented language users who latch themselves onto the fully objectified econosocial formation because the internetworked system of writing machines is, if nothing else, a vast social formation that brings the
production of social relations within an informational field that is itself coterminous with social relations of production, the mode of production, the economic. In this way, capital manages once again to subjugate to the service of wealth the sociolinguistic production of the variegated set of internetworked writers by producing its trademark property-based, alienated, objective association between writers and the sociolinguistic component of the econosocial formation.

Coming on the heels of capital's successful reorganization of the field of sociolinguistic possibility--its proven capacity to establish a property-based, alienated, objective association between each writer and the field of machinofactured writing--capital also manages to alienate the inclusive set of proletarianized field-to-point writers from their own writing. Writers who graft themselves onto the capitalized field of sociolinguistic possibility produce writing which now appears to them as both the product of the capitalist direct production process and an appropriated commodity that carries an exchange value at every point on its path across the capitalized field of sociolinguistic possibility. Because the internetworked social formation is constituted entirely of capitalized writing, all writing that gets directed into the capitalized field of writing emanates from the field of capitalized writing as an object that only exists because it was produced by capital's direct production process. If a language user directs any form of writing, any form of inscription, into and across the econosocial formation--no matter how complex the written message may seem and, in fact, be--that inscription is a product of a direct production process that the proletarianized language user helps to produce and reproduce but never owns. All writing that each field-to-point writer produces and passes through the econosocial formation emanates from the writer but only after the writer's
writing emanates from the capitalized field of sociolinguistic possibility. Every time someone passes a motion picture (cinematography), a photograph (photography), a map (cartography), a sound recording (phonography), a text (typography), a scanned document (facsimile, xerography), a handwritten note (chirography), point-to-point audio (telephony), point-to-field audio (radiotelegraphy), and point-to-field video (television) through capital's field-to-point system of communication, that written communication circulates as the product of capitalist industry until such time as its sinks into nothingness.

If the internetworked writer's own writing emanates from the internetworked field of writing as a product of capital's direct production process, the internetworked writer's own writing becomes converted into a commodity that capital appropriates and profits from as each byte of field-to-point writing traverses the subjugated field of internetworked writing. Today, the field of internetworked writing has been capitalized from its backbone to its peripheries. Those capitals responsible for owning and operating the Internet backbone are always shifting, but control is concentrated in a relatively few hands, with the major backbone providers being at one time "MCI, WorldCom, Sprint Corp. (FON), GTE, and PSINet Inc. (PSIX)" ("How the Internet"). These backbone providers traffic in and control the traffic of information that traverses the automated system of internetworked writing machines. Operating from a position of strength, backbone providers are well positioned to charge transfer fees to smaller capitals, or the thousands of Internet Service Providers (ISP) or Online Service Providers (OSP), like AOL, that typically own or rent and, of course, operate several points-of-presence, or access points to the rest of the commercially operated Internet. These smaller capitals, in turn, capitalize the points-of-presence that produce interface between personal computers
and the Internet backbone, which routes 75% of messages to their final destinations. ISPs and OSPs charge fees to businesses and individuals--the sometimes owners and operators of Local Area and Personal Area Networks--who must buy a quantifiable share of language commodity that they cannot otherwise access but must access if they are to write their way onto and within the transnationally internetworked field of automated writing. Although there are public peering points on the Internet, where carriers of similar size trade in kind and so pass data packets more cheaply to the Internet backbone, no one may communicate within and across the commercialized, privatized, internetworked social space without producing writing that is, on the one hand, the product of the capitalist direct production process and, on the other, a commodity that capital appropriates and profits from as capital creates, conducts, and exchanges the bytes of writing that internetworked writers produce but do not own as they travel between points on the internetworked field of sociolinguistic production.

If capital has reorganized sociolinguistic production so that internetworked writing exists as a wage good, as a field of writing that subsumes the social formation, as a product of each writer that circulates as a product of the capitalist direct production process, and as a commodity that internetworked writers produce and that capital profits from as it makes its way across the internetworked econosocial formation, capital has also reorganized sociolinguistic production so that the capitalized site of interindividual sociolinguistic production produces individuals who emanate from capital as capital. Capital has organized a social situation wherein language users come to a bear a property-based, objective, alienated association with themselves as social beings. Because the social formation and the writer's writing emanates from capital as capital, one must
conclude that writers themselves emanate from capital as capital. Capital, for having capitalized writing, has calibrated the automated system of internetworked writing machines to produce a social formation that produces capitalized writing subjects who emanate from capital as capital because they connect to the internetworked processes of interpersonal communication and, there, satisfy all but their strictly biological needs (e.g., breathing, sleeping, waking, eating, eliminating, copulating, reproducing) "through the exchange form" (Marx, Grundrisse ch10.htm). Capitalized writing subjects, as it were, pay for the right to write the social texts that enable them to feel as individuals-in-networked-collective who thrive at the transnationally internetworked core of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system. But capital's ownership of transnationally internetworked core of the capitalist world system converts the writerly self into a product of a direct production process because it presupposes that capital has converted both the interindividual semiotic, semantic terrain and internetworked social beings into alienable use-values, object for sales, commodities.

Having succeeded in tracing writing back to capital, we cannot but conclude that capital has, in fact, subjugated sociolinguistic production--once a form of the development of the productive forces--to the service of wealth. And, at the same time, we cannot help but feel that the time is ripe for a Marxist theory of subjugated writing, a theory that we now see must send its roots down into the sociolinguistic productive forces that, as I stated earlier, have come conflict with the property relations within which that had been at work hitherto.

Proletarianized Writers

The moment will soon arrive when a Marxist will succeed in mounting a composition
theory that thrives upon the expropriated conditions of sociolinguistic production. For now, however, we need take our first steps in the direction of this as yet unrealized composition theory. We need to provide ourselves with a reliable base upon which to develop that future composition theory, with its capacity to speak to the problem of the econosocial formation at the transnationally internetworked core of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system, and to the problem of alienated, fettered, subjugated sociolinguistic production. That base, I argue, emanates, along with the body of capitalized writers, from today's expropriated conditions of sociolinguistic production.

Because a vast body of writers now emanates from capital as capital, and that capitalized social body has lost its share in the collective ownership of language, we have no choice but to admit that that internetworked writers who are not capitalists are themselves members of the proletariat. These productive writers, none of whom own the means of sociolinguistic production, are, in typical proletarian fashion, the producers of value but not the appropriators of surplus value. More importantly, these productive writers--all of whom work on, with, and through expropriated materials of sociolinguistic production--belong to a class of proletarianized writers that capital has, for its own reasons, called into existence. Simply put, the overwhelming majority of internetworked writers who are not capitalists are, instead, the proletariat. And, for having recognized this fact, we have also provided ourselves with the reliable basis upon which to build a writing theory that, for its part, can develop into a composition theory that emanates from the proletariat as a theory for the advancement of the class struggle.

At this juncture, no one may expect any mature form of the class struggle to emerge from the writing proletariat. For now, we must be satisfied in knowing that
Internetworked writers constitute a class in the first of the two senses of the word that Marx forwarded in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*. Internetworked, proletarianized writers are a class that does not know it is a class and, therefore, does not operate as a class against capital. These writers constitute a class because they live under "conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests, and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter" (Marx, *Eighteenth* ch07.htm). Drawing upon the work of Mario Tronti, we can say that while the class of proletarianized writers appears from the outset to be a "class against capital" and not a "class for itself," the writing proletariat is, in fact, a class for itself and not a class against capital because the confrontation between capital and sociolinguistic producers transforms relatively independent language users into a uniform class of language workers who lack the necessary means to advance from being a "class for itself" to being a "class against capital." Today, the writing proletariat operates as a class for itself and not a class against capital because its interests, forged one contractual point at a time, never, for example, take a party-based form of political action that seeks to end, not revise, a mode of production that produces a core of writers who work on expropriated sociolinguistic materials and a much larger body of sociolinguistic producers who have never made a phone call. No matter how heated the political content which flows from local points-of-presence onto the transnationally internetworked econosocial formation, the writing proletariat remains a class that is not a class because, as Marx pointed out, "the identity of their interests forms no community, no national bond, and no political organization among them" (ch07.htm).

The writing theorist's job, at this juncture, is to assist the writing proletariat to
become a class in the second, positive sense that Marx forwarded in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*. It is possible, after all, for the proletariat to become aware of its condition and to struggle for the purpose of "asserting their class interest in their own name" (ch07.htm), indeed, for the purpose of presenting themselves to and against those who have appropriated the means and ends of productive activity for the purpose of taking control of the means of production. Mario Tronti explains that the social processes that convert relatively independent laborers into "class for itself" do nothing to guarantee that the unified body of fragmented workers will become an active, subjectively focused "class against capital." This change, he argues, will occur only through a long and terrible process of history that includes a series of moments when workers will not risk becoming a "class against capital," a refusal based upon their failure to produce an organization that can demand power. At the same time, this process of history may also include moments when workers will accept the risk of becoming a politically organized party that converts the proletariat into a "class against capital" that, for its part, may present capital with a simple, entirely justified demand for total power over production and an end to the structure in dominance that is the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system. It is, of course, the writing theorist's job to help the class of proletarianized writers to realize their very real potential to become a "class against capital."

Wedded as compositionists are to theories of cultural production steeped in once valid conceptions about the status of language as a social property and a form of the development of the productive forces, compositionists must surely struggle in their first attempts to forge a theory of sociolinguistic production that begins from the premise that internetworked writers have lost ownership and control of writing--all epiphenomenal
appearances to the contrary. Compositionists, themselves members of the proletariat, must surely struggle when faced with the challenge of producing a writing theory that genuinely serves the interests of the proletariat--the only productive writers in town. But the time has passed when one could rely upon support from any of the existing composition theories, or theories of the production of cultural forms, when talk of language as a productive force turns to the manner in which people use language to produce and reproduce the conditions of everyday life.

The time has come for compositionists to become writing specialists well versed in the largely alien apparatus of Marxist analysis, critique, and counterstatement.

Such are the demands of our time.
Part 2

The Problem of Properties

Problem: Predicated upon those grounds established in Part 1, how have the properties of composition changed and, again, respond with a theory of composition that is sufficient to the new properties of formal composition.
Cyborg Consciousness

A "Front Door" Probe

Consider the mouse roller-ball and the on-screen pointer. My hand moves the mouse roller-ball forward and to the right, and, in the same moment, the on-screen pointer moves into the upper right hand corner of the computer display screen. Now, consider me, a computerized cyborg citizen. Do I inhabit a place within the display? Does a one-to-one correspondence exist between this computer user and the mouse pointer? Am I in the upper right hand corner of the display, the self-contained expression of a forged correspondence between this computer user and that on-screen pointer, a human-machine organism that inhabits a determinate place within the computer's pixelated representation of a computer environment? Are we really to believe that I use my on-screen pointer to navigate deeper and deeper into computer recesses that are materially distinct from me and my roller-ball-controlled on-screen pointer? And, if so, are we to think of either the GUI or command-line computer display as a bona-fide ecology -- an environment that establishes relations with organisms residing, as it were, in the wilds of the display?

Certainly, the cyborg human-machine unit that features a command-line, flashing cursor interface will distinguish itself from the cyborg human-machine unit that features a graphical, mouse-pointer interface. As Johnson-Eilola writes, "A command-line interface encourages hierarchical, top-down verbal approaches whereas a graphical interface more readily supports visual, virtual-tactical work" (Nostalgic 23). But accepting this for truth should not necessarily lead one to conclude that the computer is "an ecology" (23) -- that
the different cyborg potentials that exist in command-line or graphical interfaces are also
forces that either draw rigorous ontological distinctions between the on-screen "human"
elements and the "non-human" elements in the computer display or, more importantly,
between the human, hardware, and software components in the cyborg ensemble.

Human beings do not inhabit computers; computers are not habitats for human
beings; computer displays are not ecologies. Instead, computer use transforms the human
computer user into a cyborg: a self-regulating organism that combines the natural and
artificial together in one system. When I boot up my computer, I am the amalgam of my
human heart, my motherboard, my operating system, my suite of program applications,
my system and application help documentation, my stored text files, my printer and
printer drivers, and my on-screen pointer. I am chewed fingernails, a filthy keyboard, and
pristine batch files. I am a heavily and complexly prosthetized entity, a living system, a
cyborg citizen, and, more importantly, the licensed intellectual property of corporate and
independent software writers. Indeed, I am a networked educator who is subject to the
terms of the end user license agreements (EULA) that both my university and I must
accept before the owners of my software prostheses will agree to publish me in this
season's finest, most farcical, copyrighted, theatrical production: "Resistance Minded
Cyborg Compositionist Teaches Students to Negotiate Their Encounters with Intellectual
Property in the Information Economy."

Both the fact of my cyborg existence as an intellectual property and the farcical
nature of my past ecology-oriented lessons on digitized intellectual property are plain to
see.

Had I rejected, when booting up my PC for the first time, the terms of the EULA
that shipped with my computer's operating system, my operating system would have
failed to complete its setup routine, and I would have failed to get myself published into
networked cyborg society. Had my university rejected the EULA that appeared during the
"office suite" setup routine, I would been forced to "go live" in my networked classroom
without the prosthetic module I rely on most when engaging with other amalgamated
cyborg citizens. The fact that my university and I determined to publish ourselves with a
full complement of program prostheses rather than to reject any of the standard
commercial program licenses we encountered during cyborg setup establishes our direct
knowledge of the conditions that produce cyborg citizens as published intellectual
properties. Moreover, the fact of our direct knowledge in this area establishes that we
might have processed our experiences into a new, teachable, cyborg-inflected, resistance-
oriented understanding of intellectual property in the information economy.

But neither I, nor my university, nor the wide range of networked universities and
educators have developed a resistance-based cyborg curriculum that proceeds from this
understanding: programs are not only the prosthetics which publish and contribute to the
overall character of cyborg citizens, but they are also salable intellectual properties that
cyborgs license, fuse with, and execute at the expense of becoming embodied intellectual
properties in the continuous possession of copyright holders. Instead, we have advanced,
as I will demonstrate shortly hereafter, the idea that intellectual properties are discreet
texts, objects, or environments that the population of relatively autonomous computer
users encounter in their travels through GUI or command-line ecologies -- properties that
networked students might plagiarize, educators might file in virtual databases, corporate
lawyers might protect through application of such things as the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), and commercial interests might seek to privatize.

Ridiculous.

I am not saying that networked students (read: embodied intellectual properties) cannot turn in a plagiarized paper for an undeserved grade. Nor am I saying that intellectual properties, understood in the traditional sense, cannot be filed, protected, or privatized. What I am saying is this: networked educators make a significant error when they treat digital intellectual property as an ecological concern, the inanimate produce of human creativity that computer users seek out, experience, and handle either ethically or dishonorably. Educating students, and ourselves, to think of intellectual property in this way prohibits students and educators alike from responding appropriately to emerging concerns about intellectual property in the present information economy that, I might add, begins and ends with the creation of networked cyborgs; embodied intellectual properties; culturally dominated amalgams of flesh, circuits, and "protected" information; the (dis)enfranchised citizens of commercially licensed cyborg society. Even more, traditional thinking about intellectual property forestalls the possibility that in the near future we might struggle with networked students and educators to develop cyborg conscientização, the updated Freirean capacity of cyborg citizens "to perceive social, political, and economic contradictions" in their forced publication as embodied intellectual properties, and "to take action against the oppressive elements of reality" (Freire 19).

In what follows, I shall make my case for a sea change in our scholarly and pedagogic handling of matters pertaining to intellectual property in the information economy. Toward this end, I will suggest that networked educators approach their work
on intellectual property from the vantage afforded by cyborg theory, not because it is fashionable to use the word "cyborg" or to traffic in cyber-this and cyber-that, but because cyborg theory is the only theory that accounts for 1) the computer prosthetized existence of cyborg citizens and 2) the circumstances that contribute to the publication of cyborg citizens as embodied intellectual properties. More specifically, I will press networked educators to agree to provide their students with instruction in critical cyborg self-fashioning: the self-consciousness and politically informed decision 1) to publish our cyborg selves using only open-source program prostheses, that is to say, free software (read: "liberty," not "priceless"); 2) to contribute to the development of open-source software prosthetics as a way of guaranteeing our cyborg freedoms; and 3) to oppose the further development of closed-source, commercial software prostheses that necessarily come packaged with the intention of transforming cyborgs into embodied intellectual properties. And, finally, I will move that computers and writing faculty take the vanguard position on cyborg conscientização, understanding as we do that instruction in critical cyborg self-fashioning is yet another logical extension of a discipline that regularly equates the word "composition" with such things as identity formation and political intervention.

**Ecology and Intellectual Property**
A first step in the right direction would be to see that we, in fact, do bring an ecological orientation to bear upon our thinking about digitized intellectual property. Turning to the open literature in computers and writing, we witness scholars working to develop the discursive field of "intellectual property" into a object-oriented relation between human computer-users and their non-human counterparts in the computer display, be they
Johnson-Eilola says of the *Kairos* coverweb, *Copyright, Plagiarism, and Intellectual Property*, that it "establishes the limits of intellectual property" as a boundary "encompassing the idea of copyright, the ethics of plagiarism, and production/ownership of texts in an information economy" (ov.html). Coverweb author Diane Boehm lends substance to Johnson-Eilola's observation by underscoring the idea that "computers and the World Wide Web have made the issue of intellectual integrity a far more challenging puzzle than it has ever been" and suggesting that "professional guidelines, clearly communicated ethical standards, and effective classroom practices can provide the platform to reexamine those values and structures of higher education which have created the climate in which [Internet] term paper mills flourish" (pixels.htm). TyAnna Herrington stakes out another corner in this survey of intellectual property where she identifies 1) the tendency of corporate intellectual property lawyers to treat "information in digitized form more restrictively than its exact likeness in print"; 2) the negative impact of this corporate tendency on networked educators, who "could face much greater restrictions to the information that provides the basis for learning, simply because they choose the Internet as a means of access"; and 3) hope of redress in the "fair use" statute that restricts "the intellectual property provision of the Constitution [that] provides a limited monopoly in authors and creators for the use and control of their work" (ff.html, prop.html). For their part, Jeffery Galin and Joan Latchaw detail a more rarely visited corner of the intellectual property map, where they describe archival websites, like MUSE and JSTORE, as heterotopic "living spaces" that not only attract and sustain communities of scholars but that might serve these communities better were scholars to transform their
well-guarded post-print archive systems into "pre-print archive systems to which all members of a given academic community contribute their pre-published texts" (websites.htm, newmodels.htm). And, finally, David Porush takes the measure of our "normal practices of treating publication and even expression as private," where he points out, on the one hand, that the "very viral properties of the Web, its technology for putting text into circulation and inviting people to navigate in no specifiable order along the possible routes of that circulation, are summoning legal forces of inoculation and quarantine" and, on the other, "we are very soon going to have to make a choice" between permitting "the commodification of knowledge to privatize the Internet" or discarding "an aberrant idea of knowledge in favor of a more open paradigm" (contra2.html, contra4.html).

This much is clear: the coverweb does according to Johnson-Eilola's word: *Copyright, Plagiarism, and Intellectual Property* serves compositionists in their need for information about and strategies for handling problems of knowledge production and ownership, "particularly at the loci where online communications and traditional print-economy values come together" (ov.html). Yet what also seems clear to me is that the coverweb fails needy compositionists and their students precisely because it establishes the limits of intellectual property where it does, as a boundary encompassing the idea of intellectual property as a set of discreet texts, objects, and environments that human computer-users can grasp through their discussions of copyright, the ethics of plagiarism, and the production/ownership of texts in an information economy. From my vantage, the boundaried perspective shared by these articles and the current literature by compositionists on intellectual property (cf. *Computers and Composition* 15.2 -- Special
Issue: Intellectual Property) constitutes a definite, insurmountable limit on our ability to perceive and, more importantly, to alter our negative relations to intellectual property in the digital age.

This may seem a counter-intuitive claim, especially because the coverweb articles present themselves as rhetorical interventions, each hoping to change the way we understand and engage with intellectual property. However, these supposed interventions serve, in fact, to catch us in an ideological web that sells off our personal freedoms, even as it returns dividends on our commonly invested belief in the idea that human beings can resist and redirect that which hurtles along an unimpeded trajectory through the information economy: the produce of our creative efforts: "intellectual property." Indeed, resistance to "intellectual property" that emerges from anywhere within the discursive limits that boundary our present imaginary relations to digitized information must conspire with cultural practices that exceed current definitions of and strategies for resisting "intellectual property" -- namely, the authoring of software prostheses that transform cyborg citizens into embodied intellectual properties. Prisoners within a wall that is the precise measure of our current boundary on "intellectual property," we fail to see that computer users are not human beings who both produce and need to learn to cope effectively with inanimate intellectual properties but are, instead, cyborgs who emerge as living intellectual properties whenever they don their commercially licensed software prostheses, fuse with their computers, and enter networked culture, cyborg society, the prosthetized population of embodied, dominated intellectual properties.

**Capital Expression and Intellectual Property**

If this be so, we need then to ask ourselves, what resides beyond the current limits on
intellectual property? For me, the answer is as simple as it is alarming. Intellectual properties emerge as the colonizing expression of advanced capitalism where it succeeds not only in transforming life itself into a commodity but in rendering life a non-transferable, embodied property that Capital uses to exercise direct control over the lives of cyborg citizens. Indeed, intellectual property in its most recent incarnation comes to us in the form of a dominating expression, a commodification, and an ongoing appropriation of embodied intellectual properties that quashes cyborg freedom even as it generates fantastic wealth for those armed with the power to copyright not culture but life-in-culture.

Stop to recall with David Harvey that "precisely because capitalism is expansionary and imperialistic, cultural life in more and more areas gets brought within the grasp of the cash nexus and the logic of capital circulation" \((\text{Condition 344})\), and we understand that the invention of computer software, which Espen Aarseth refers to as "an ongoing process of, rather than cause of, human expression" \((19)\), is the expression of Capital's need to transform life itself into a real commodity. Where the invention of wage labor pressed individuals to sell themselves as workers, the development of software forces the individual to purchase, not sell, the self. In the writing and legal protection of salable software prostheses, Capital has fulfilled its expressed desire to colonize life-in-culture, to bring all of cultural life within the cash nexus and logic of capital circulation.

"Cyborg subjectivity," seen now as the cleverly composed expression of Capital, "begins when the self -- or purchasing agent for the self -- buys the tools that are to become indistinguishable from self and, in so doing, adopts a proprietary attitude toward the self as chattel -- the logical result of a cultural system of production that encourages cyborgs
to sell, buy, and become the self that is a market value and to have no moral regard for or sustained relation to the self, which becomes garbage at the moment of upgrade, the refuse of a life manufactured, sold, bought, and discarded (Harrison 46).

Yet this is not the most important aspect of Capital's expressed desire to frame and take advantage of the cyborg's socially-constructed monetary relationship to the prosthetic self. As opposed to the sale of computer hardware, which becomes a cyborg possession through commodity exchange, the sale of software prosthetics grants cyborg "self-consumers" a license to use but not to own their own prosthetics, which, as intellectual properties, remain in the legal possession of the copyright holder. As Sandra Braman points out, "The sale of material goods means that the seller no longer has the good, while the buyer does. With information, sale doesn't deprive the original owner of possession. . . . In this sense, information is always a public good from the economic perspective, and cannot be appropriated in the way that a tangible good can" (152). Because the software prosthesis is not a material good but computer executable information, the sale of commodity prosthetics to needy cyborgs does not deprive the original owner(s) of possession. Computer executable information belongs to the software writer rather than the cyborg citizen, even though this information produces both the pixelated representation of a computer environment and the representation of tools for "moving through an environment" that, in the final analysis, are indistinguishable from the embodied cyborg citizen.

In this way, Capital gains direct, ongoing, repressive control over embodied cyborg citizens who, otherwise, would have been susceptible to repression only during the fleeting, albeit frequently recurring, moments of commodity exchange. For having
retained controlling rights to the informational prosthetic, corporate and independent software writers maximize their potential for controlling the future behaviors of cyborg citizens by stipulating, within the inescapable EULA, the precise range of activities that prosthetized cyborgs may enjoy. Typically, the EULA denies the freedom of cyborg self-determination to "end-users" by denying them the freedom to run their program prostheses for any purpose, to access their own prosthetic source codes, to study how their own prostheses works, to modify or adapt prostheses to meet the cyborg's own needs, to redistribute program prosthetics to a deserving cyborg neighbor, in short, to improve upon and redistribute program prosthetics and their open source codes so that whole community may benefit. To be sure, the EULA comes at cyborg citizens with the force of law that allows for the repressive, rather than ideological, subjection of cyborgs -- that is, the "legally protected" intellectual properties of imperialistic writers who have the legal right to compose and control the lives of amalgamated cyborg citizens who will be made to serve the repressive culture in dominance.

If this seems far-fetched, consider the case of Dmitri Sklyarov. Sklyarov, a Russian programmer and employee of ElcomSoft, was arrested for composing a software prosthetic that empowers cyborgs to disable restrictions that a publisher might have imposed on particular Adobe eBooks. The publisher of an Adobe eBook can, for example, disable the eBook Reader's text-to-speech read-aloud function. Be that as it may, Sklyarov's prosthetic allows blind cyborgs to disable these restrictions, deciding, as it were, to modify their prosthetic selves to suit their own particular needs. In other words, Sklyarov's prosthesis created cyborgs who could listen to intellectual properties that were formatted to exclude their participation (Lessing).
The problem from Adobe's perspective, writes Lawrence Lessing, "is that the same software could enable a pirate to copy an electronic book otherwise readable only with Adobe's reader technology -- then sell that copy to others without the publisher's permission." Stated a little differently but still from within the limits of current discourse on "intellectual property," Sklyarov's prosthesis constituted a problem because it violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and the arrest of Sklyarov and his prosthetic constituted something of a problem for many people because he "did not violate any law, and his employer did not violate anyone's copyright" (Lessig).

Stated now for a third time, but this time from the perspective of cyborg theory, Sklyarov's prosthetic seems wholly uninteresting for what it tells us about a system that -- rightly or wrongfully -- arrests human beings who attempt to circumvent copyright control of intellectual properties. Rather, Sklyarov's prosthetic is both interesting and important because it demonstrates that current law protects the right of software writers to repress cyborgs who for one reason or another exercise their cyborg initiative to modify cyborg prosthetics and to make these modified prosthetics available to the public.

Herein, we arrive at the reason why we must abandon all ecologically oriented approaches to intellectual property and bring a hard cyborg perspective to bear on the problem of intellectual property. Having gained legal ownership of the cyborg body, capitalists have been given the sanction to repress life-in-culture, to repress the whole of cyborg society, for the purpose of creating a software social system that brings the fabric of ongoing life-in-culture within the grasp of the cash nexus and the logic of capital circulation. According to Richard Stallman,

The idea that the proprietary software social system -- the system that say
you are not allowed to share or change software -- is antisocial, that it is unethical, that it is simply wrong, may come as a surprise to some readers. But what else could we say about a system based on dividing the public and keeping users helpless? Readers who find the idea surprising may have taken proprietary social system as given, or judged it on the terms suggested by proprietary software businesses. Software publishers have worked long and hard to convince people that there is only one way to look at the issue.

Thinking of computer programs as cyborg prosthetics leads one to the conclusion that cyborgs must be able to modify any cyborg prosthetic on their bodies, seeing as how these prosthetics constitute the indispensable addenda to their necessarily supplemented cyborg identities. An approach to intellectual property that would erase this understanding from our minds must be abandoned, unless we would willfully conspire with capitalists to colonize the living bodies of cyborg citizens for the purpose subjecting them to absolute controls and generating surplus value through the exercise of this control.

**Embodied Intellectual Property and Cyborg Conscientizaçao**

Here then is the situation. Our work on intellectual property has derived from an ideological web that requires us to see the computer as being an ecology that we inhabit and that we fill with items that go by the name of "intellectual property." Our true relationship to computers, however, is of a different order.

Although the computers we appear "to operate" do, in fact, influence the character and kinds of work we produce, they are not ecologies that human beings literally or metaphorically inhabit. Computers are prosthetics that human beings "put on" in the
moment of their cyborg transformation. Boot up computers equipped with a command-line interface, and we become cyborgs who bring a hierarchical, top-down, verbal approach to their expressive activities. Boot up computers outfitted with graphical interfaces, and, instead, we transform ourselves into the kinds of cyborgs who bring a visual, virtual-tactical orientation to their expressive activities.

The fact that we cannot exist as computerized cyborgs without our computers, the fact that our hardware-equipped, software-driven computers contribute something both fundamental and indispensable to the formation of our human-computer cyborg personalities more than disproves the idea that computers provide a series of personal computing habitats for humanity. It leads to the conclusion that computer use in the age of advanced capitalism has transformed life itself into a commodity. Because we have no alternative but to buy the hardware-equipped, software-driven computers we need to survive as cyborgs, we must accept that life itself has become a complex manufacture subject to artistic tendencies and market conditions that lead in the same wonder-full direction: planned obsolescence, constant revision, and ongoing self-destruction through a program of "voluntary" upgrades. In other words, we have become self-purchased entities that must purchase and then re-purchase newer, more up-to-date versions of ourselves if we are to escape from becoming obsolete citizens in a forever-changing cyborg society, the enmiserated members of the technological underclasses.

More troubling still, the software prosthetics that cyborgs must purchase, setup, and execute before they can exist as commodity entities are classified under current law as "information" rather than "material goods." This means that cyborgs, under the most ordinary of circumstances, may purchase a license to use but may not purchase and take
possession of their own prostheses. Because the law has classified the cyborg's software prostheses as "information" and, thus, the rightful "intellectual property" of corporate and independent software writers, the law has failed to recognize this fundamental truth: software prostheses are material to cyborg existence, the inescapable ontological components of cyborg citizens, not information that occupies an innocent niche within an innocent computer ecology that provides an innocent habitat for innocent humanity. The upshot of this fundamental error in the legal classification system is that computerized cyborg citizens, because they are indivisible from their prostheses, become, under current law, the intellectual properties of software writers. They exist as controlled publications in the possession of software writers, who, alone, may access "their" prosthetic source code, adapt it, improve it, repackage it, distribute it. Cyborgs who dare to go against the legal grain -- deciding, for example, to adapt their own prosthetic source codes to their own needs -- risk bringing the weight of law down upon themselves, receiving substantial fines and real prison time for attempting to wrest possession of themselves away from their owners.

The implications of this arrangement are clear. If the definition of chattel slavery is one which includes the idea of living beings who are both subject to purchase and the material loss of legal self-ownership, then current practice, which renders the cyborg both a commodity and a possession, institutes and subjects us to a perverse twenty-first century version of chattel slavery in which cyborgs must purchase themselves in order to gain the privilege of becoming slaves.

For those who would object, saying that they enjoy their work with computers and that somehow their enjoyment nullifies the fact of what I am saying, let me offer this: just
because you're are busily occupied with enjoying yourself doesn't mean that you're not a slave.

The role that the university plays in this horrible arrangement is equally troubling. Because networked educators have determined to conduct their teaching and research under the current aegis of "intellectual property," they are guilty of conspiring, however unwittingly, with capitalists to advance this most latest institution of the master-slave society. When we teach our students that "intellectual property" refers to the copyright protected produce of human labor that appears in various shapes and forms within the ecology of computer space, as opposed to the juridically supported system that capitalists exploit for the purpose of gaining proprietary control over the non-transferable publishing rights to life itself, we perform as the instruments through which the educational ideological state apparatus supports the repressive practices of the culture in dominance. When the computers in our networked classrooms come loaded with proprietary operating systems, and we use closed-source software in the conduct our networked classes, we exercise our students in the practice of accepting, enjoying, and working productively within conditions of abject servitude. When we appeal to the "fair use" statute in hopes of maintaining or increasing current legal limits on our intellectual activities, we set ourselves up as a privileged class within the cyborg master-slave economy and demonstrate forcefully to our students that "fair use," as a practical concept, should apply to them only so long as they remain within the university. When they depart, the protections afforded them under the "fair use" statute must also depart. They must once again join the untold ranks of cyborg citizens who exist in non-academic cyborg society as the fair and legal property of corporate and independent software writers.
The situation is grim to say the least, but not without alternatives that are every bit as clear as they are available, necessary, and exciting.

A first necessary step that networked educators must take in the direction of cyborg emancipation is to admit that we have nothing to tell the oppressed about the quality of their own oppression or which paths they should travel in hopes of gaining their emancipation from the emerging class of cyborg slave-holders. I begin with this "negative" recommendation not because we have lost our right to speak authoritatively for being so slow in expanding the boundary of "intellectual property" to include talk of its function in a system of domination that encourages the wrongful ownership of cyborgs through the wrongful ownership of their life-giving cyborg prosthetics. Rather, I am suggesting that we advance toward our goal of cyborg emancipation in light of Paulo Freire's germinal contributions to pedagogies of the oppressed. Accordingly, we should never merely discourse on the present situation or provide cyborg citizens with educational "programs which have little or nothing to do with their own preoccupations, doubts, hopes, and fears" (77). It is not sufficient that we tell embodied intellectual properties that they have been "destroyed precisely because their situation has reduced them to things" and that "they cannot enter the struggle as objects" in order later to become emancipated cyborg citizens (50). As networked educators of the oppressed, we should, instead, dialogue with our cyborg students about their view of the emerging world and ours (77). And we should be conducting this dialogue for the purpose of helping both networked educators and students to perceive social, political, and economic contradictions in their forced publication as embodied intellectual properties and, more importantly, to take action with them against the oppressive elements of reality (Freire
This, of course, is something easier said than done, but we also know that the seeds of the future always already exist within the present, and that we may disengage these seeds from dominant capitalist social relations and cultivate them for the purpose of yielding environments brimming with the manifest contradictions and opportunities necessary for composing struggle, resistance, and change (Jameson "Theories" 30). Provided we take care in our efforts, we should be able to develop a ground that will support the sapling growth of a nascent cyborg political consciousness, what Freire might have called "cyborg conscientização."

Toward this end, we will want to work for the day when every computer prosthesis on every university campus is configured to do what they already can and should be made to do: contain and boot both closed- and open-source operating systems. "Dual boot computers" initiate their run sequences by asking would-be cyborgs whether they would like to fuse with either, for example, GNU/Linux (open-source) or Microsoft Windows (closed-source). This decision-point tacks at most a few extra seconds onto each cyborg computer startup routine, but the seconds are priceless for the political contradictions they make manifest and the pedagogic opportunities they afford networked educators of the cyborg oppressed.

If universities stipulate that cyborgs must shut down their prostheses at the end of each networked class session, then cyborg teachers and students alike will find themselves confronted at the start of each class by the need to make a very simple decision: "Do I fuse with a prosthetic that transforms me into the embodied intellectual property of cyborg slave-holders or one that comes under my control until I put off my
prosthesis and cease to be a freely-composed computerized cyborg." This point of
decision in the dual boot sequence is both inescapable and a guaranteed point of entry for
networked educators who would dialogue with their students about, for example, the
socially constructed place of typical cyborg citizens in the emerging world; the meaning
of cyborg ontology; the different impacts that closed-source and open-source prostheses
have on the trajectory of cyborg society; the rarely distinguished but very different faces
of twenty-first century slavery and freedom; the commonly held understanding and fear
that cyborgs must accept whatever restrictions come with closed-source systems and
applications if they are to thrive economically in the age of advanced, multinational
capital; and, finally, the opportunities available to open-source cyborgs for contributing to
the development of the very same software prosthetics that constitute a large measure of
their own cyborg identities.

Networked educators -- particularly technical and professional writing instructors
-- who boot regularly into their GNU/Linux partitions will have the added advantage of
being able to take real action with their students against the oppressive elements in
society. Because, for example, the larger open-source software projects rely on volunteers
to compose reliable documentation, technical and professional writing instructors can
have their write, test, revise, and submit wanted program manuals, HOWTOs, FAQs,
animated examples, and templates. In a class such as this, student writers might find
themselves composing for the Free Software Foundation, Linux Debian (an open-source
operating system), or Open Office (an open-source suite of office productivity
applications), all of whom make constant requests for assistance in the selfsame area:
"writing good documentation" (Debian); "writing documentation" (Free Software
Foundation, "GNU Task List"); "create and maintain documentation for the various programs that make up the OpenOffice.org suite" (OpenOffice.org).

While the writing and submitting of help documentation may not seem on the face of things to constitute an act of open cyborg resistance, students afforded the opportunity to participate in such activities cannot help but strengthen the open-source movement and, for that matter, their own resolve to advance, or reject, the potentials for social action and self-realization that come standard with the open-source movement. If nothing else, they will have had direct experience with developing open-source prosthetics and, for their efforts, will have come to understand that open-source grants cyborgs the freedom to run their own program prostheses for any purpose; to access their own prosthetic source codes so they may study and adapt their own prostheses to their own needs; to redistribute copies of their cyborg prostheses as they see fit; and to improve upon their prostheses and release both the source code and improved prostheses to the public so that the whole community may benefit (Free Software Foundation, "Free Software").

Of course, these preliminary recommendations for pedagogic action do nothing to exhaust the possibilities for developing a fully-realized pedagogy of the cyborg oppressed. They are intended merely to indicate that networked educators may, indeed, stand in the forefront of a vanguard movement that appropriates the word "composition" for revolutionary purposes. Rather than continue in the service of Capital by teaching our students to think of intellectual property in outdated terms that have real present-day power to blind us to the legally sanctioned right of Capital to objectify, colonize, and enslave us all, we can appropriate and expand the current definition of "composition" to include the project of critical cyborg self-fashioning. When the composer becomes an
intellectual property as a precondition of learning the skills that lead to the creation of text, then we find that we need to radically reconsider what education in composition is all about. We must realize that the computerization of composing practices vaults composition from a field concern primarily with rhetoric and the negotiated formation of human subjectivities to a political field concerned, in the first instance, with the ontological composition of the composer, the slave writer of the 21st century, the embodied intellectual properties who shore up the foundations of an emerging blissful tyranny, the cyborg citizen in cyborg society. And, in the final instance, networked composition must become the proving grounds for resistance to cyborg oppression, for the development of cyborg conscientização.

Or, perhaps, I really do inhabit the upper right hand corner of the computer display.
Classes form when social actors struggle for control of those productive assets that get
used in the shaping of a particular pattern of exploitation. Classes form when the asset
rich use their decisive control over the unequal distribution of the means of production to
appropriate at least a portion of the social surplus that the asset poor produce through
their labors. Under feudalism, lords exercised their ownership in the laboring body of the
living serf to extract a portion of the social surplus, while those in the serf class struggled
for individual liberty. The class structure under capitalism continues to take shape
because capitalists use their ownership of the alienable means of production to
appropriate a portion of the social surplus through market exchanges and the production
of commodities, and workers struggle for the socialization of the means of production.
State bureaucratic socialism appeared and then withered, but before it did, managers and
bureaucrats planned for the appropriation and distribution of the social surplus through
their hierarchal control of organizational assets, while nonmanagers struggled for the
democratization of organizational control. One day, we may be fortunate to see the rise of
socialism and witness the brand of exploitation that appears when experts use their
certified possession of the inalienable assets "skills" and "knowledge" to cause a small
portion of the social surplus to flow from workers to experts, while workers struggle for
substantive equality. Whatever its face, exploitation follows when a real inequality in the distribution of productive assets empowers members of an exploiting class to appropriate an unearned portion of the social surplus that members of an exploited class generate through contact with productive assets they that must use but may not own (Wright 8, 12-24).

Operating on this spartan definition, my immediate purpose is to suggest that writing as it appears within the structured relations of capitalist exploitation must give rise to a class theory of writing -- that is, if real inequalities in the distribution of the productive asset writing cause a portion of the social surplus to flow from those who labor at writing to those who enjoy real economic ownership of the productive asset writing. Were capital to convert the act of writing in all of its particulars into a complex mass of alienable assets, and were capital to draw these alienable assets into the structured relations of capitalist exploitation, the writing theorist would be able to write about writing as a class relation. Capital, after all, would have made alienable assets of the environment wherein interpersonal writing occurs; and the empty interindividual space that confronts writers who want to use writing to communicate across time and space; and the ether upon which individual writers float and propel their written, interpersonal messages; and the written messages themselves that writers pass to each other; and the technologies that writers use to produce the written messages that they pass between themselves; and the personal identities that writers assume when they meet and communicate with each other; and the indispensable material substrate of each self-identified writer who only thinks and writes and self-identifies because the writing subject is an object both comprised of and sustained by matter. Having converted the act
of writing in all of its particulars into a complex mass of alienable assets, capital would have presented asset poor writers, who must work at writing but do not own the means of written production, with access to alienable assets in writing. Capital, through shifting strategies of commodity production and market exchange, would have converted its decisive control of the alienable means of written production into a mechanism for extracting unearned portions of the social surplus from that class of asset poor writers that capital managed to dispossess of writing. And for having exploited the dispossessed class of asset poor writers, capital would have vaulted writing theorists into sudden, necessary relations with the class theory of writing.

**Exploitation**
Between 1991 and 1998, the State ceded control of the Internet to capital. During this time, the National Science Foundation decommissioned NSFnet, the state-funded Internet backbone. In 1995, capital succeeded in launching its privately owned, fully automated, computer internetworked, machinofactured site of sociolinguistic possibility, and the State stopped using "deductions from the social revenue" to pay for the production of the "general conditions" of the internetworked "processes of social production" (Marx *Grundrisse* ch10.htm). Capital took fiscal responsibility for building both the Internet and the means of transport and communication through the Internet. Capital started paying "out of capital as capital" for the ongoing production of the general process of internetworked social production (ch10.htm). And, for having invested in the commercial production of the Internet, capital took real economic control over the Internet, concourse through the Internet, congress within the Internet. Capital, as it were, organized a situation wherein the fabric of internetworked writing and everything touched by the
fabric of internetworked writing started to emanate out of capital as capital ("Brief History").

Heightened awareness of internetworked writing-as-exploitation and heightened sensitivity to the need for a class theory of writing follows when we classify social being touched by the fabric of internetworked writing as a productive asset that capital controls for the purpose of appropriating an unearned portion of the social surplus. We already know that capital controls the environment built of machinofactured internetworked writing, as it does any intellectual property good, through a strategy of selective exclusion, "through control of access to consumption at the direct point of sale" (Bettig 80). But in so doing, capital also takes control of the indispensable material substrate; the expressive, cogitative manifestation; and the working futures of the materialized social being, or writing-identified-writer. No body may become a cogitative, expressive subject unless the subject is also an object. It is as Theodor Adorno reminds us: the cogitative, expressive subject depends for its existence upon "Something," an "indispensable substrate" that is not identical with, reducible to, or separable from the expressive manifestation of the cogitative subject (135). No one may think or speak unless their thoughts and rhetoric permeate and become permeated by entities which are, themselves, indivisible from the cogitative, expressive subject. This simple understanding becomes potent when we recall that before the would-be subject of writing can exist, the writing subject must pay for access to the machines which machinofacture the fabric of internetworked writing and the machinofactured fabric of internetworked writing -- both of which are elements of the indispensable material substrate of the writing-identified-writer. Because writers who aspire to exist and work at the internetworked core of the
unevenly developed capitalist world system must exchange with capital before capital will agree to process them into machinofactured social beings, they must agree to be drawn into the structured relations of capitalist exploitation. In other words, they must pay before they may become materialized internetworked social beings who may then enter into work contracts with internetworked employers and receive the wages they must have if they are to continue becoming materialized in the form of internetworked social being. They must pay to be and be of writing and, therefore, must experience a "fall in the value of labor power" before they may be in and of writing, and, thereafter, become devalued wage-earning labor (Harvey *Limits* 30-31). As it were, they must pay to benefit capital in every moment of their machinofactured experience of writing-as-exploitation.

To draw the previous set of conclusions is, of course, tantamount to saying what we already know but cannot easily or comfortably say: The Internet is an automated system of machines that capital owns and operates for the purpose of transforming raw materials (asset poor writers) into materially altered finished goods that capital machinofactures for the purpose of appropriating a portion of the social surplus through the mechanism of market exchanges. The Internet, in other words, is nothing less than a *factory of the social* that capital operates for the purpose of producing and organizing writing-as-exploitation. Capital uses its control over the automated system of writing machines (read: internetworked computers) that produces the digitized everyday in order to transform the site of internetworked writing into a *social factory: an automated system of writing machines* / that produces and distributes machinofactured living commodities / who must contract with capital / if they are to become the raw materials / that the social factory converts into the commodity form of social being / that writing-identified-writers
must buy in unit installments / before they may contract with capital to exchange labor-power for wages / that they must return to capital / if they are to become processed / by capital's automated system of writing machines / a.k.a., capital's factory of the social / a.k.a. the social factory. Set in motion, the social factory processes relatively autonomous language users as any factory would raw materials. Capital's social factory converts primary inputs into final outputs. Capital's factory of the social works upon and transforms the raw material of relatively autonomous language users into the materially altered social being of the internetworked writing-identified-writer that, having been produced, capital markets as it would any other finished good, commodity, alienable use-value. Capital enjoys real economic ownership of the productive asset writing through its real economic ownership of the forces of production that capital uses in the direct, rationalized production of the writing-identified-writer who, according to design, must pay to become the self-purchasing alienable use-value that capital machinofactures for the purpose of transforming writing into writing-as-exploitation.

To recognize a factory condition in capital's deployment of "the Internet" is really only to see what I have been describing from the outset: Capital's privately owned factory system of automated writing machines overwrites writing in all of its particulars for the purpose of drawing a class of writers dispossessed of writing into the structured relations of capitalist exploitation. Because capital controls the alienable means of written production, asset poor writers must come before and take the shape of capital if they would write. Through its real economic ownership of internetworked writing in all of its particulars, capital succeeds in converting the non-class of relatively autonomous social beings who had always used the social property writing in the procession of everyday life
into a class of factory produced writing-identified-writers who have been dispossessed of the private property "social writing." Through its real economic ownership of private-social writing, capital positions itself to deliver an economic determination in the first instance upon every writer who needs pay to become a machinofactured point of presence on the privately owned and operated field of internetworked writing. And, so, capital positions itself to organize each writer that capital deploys around its factory system of internetworked writing machines to become a member of an exploited writing class-in-itself -- that is, a group of writers who do not own the means of sociolinguistic production, who become devalued through contact with the internetworked social, and who, as members of a class-in-itself, do not know that they belong to the exploited class of writers dispossessed of writing.

In so doing, capital has produced the elements that might combine and set off a class theory of writing. Capital has used its real economic ownership of the alienable means of internetworked writing to posit the existence of class relations between asset rich and asset poor writers and, at the same time, to draw ongoing struggles for the alienable means of internetworked writing into the structured relations of capitalist exploitation. For this, writing theorists find themselves vaulted, as previously suggested, into sudden, necessary relations with the class theory of writing.

**Contradiction**

Capitalist exploitative control of the assets used in the production of internetworked writing justifies the launching of a class theory of writing. But being so justified does not mean that writing theorists are positioned to launch a class theory of writing. After all, our manner has never been to argue that writing subjects are dispossessed of writing even
as they are machinofactured by a privately owned and operated social factory that transforms the raw material of relatively autonomous social being into an alienable use-value that capital circulates for the purpose of drawing writers into the structured relations of capitalist exploitation. Nor has it been our custom to argue that the structured relations of capitalist exploitation prohibit the class-in-itself of writing-identified-writers from writing and, at the same time, taking up position in internetworked social relations for the purpose of challenging either capital's real economic ownership of the means of sociolinguistic production, or capital's enactment of writing-as exploitation. Instead, the way of writing theorists has been to regard language as a social, as opposed to a private, property. Our fashion has been to characterize languaging as an activity that necessarily circulates within but is necessarily never the product of factory processes. Our mode has been to classify one's own identity, along with one's material substrate, as being an asset that is neither alienable nor reducible by capital. Our habit has been to assume that identity formation is never a moment in the capitalist direct production process that draws writing-identified-writers into the structural relations of capitalist exploitation. And, so, the purpose of our complex style of theorizing has been to prepared writers to take up position within the relations of production for the purpose of launching discussions about the technologically mediated, socially negotiated production of each writer's overdetermined, polysemous, relatively autonomous, symbolically enacted identity -- but not about writing-as-exploitation.

Would-be theorists of classed writing know that theory tends to locate the "arena of the class struggle" in the vital, dynamic, multiaccentual sign (Vološinov 23) -- not in the struggle against the real inequalities in the distribution of the productive asset writing
that cause a portion of the social surplus to flow from those who labor at writing to those who enjoy real economic ownership of the productive asset writing. Struggle-in-the-sign flames up, the story goes, when agents in dominate class locations try to "impart a supraclass, eternal" "uniaccentual" "character" to signs that appear within overdetermined, "varidirectional contexts" (23, 81), and when subalterns try to leverage the "inner dialectic quality of the sign" in hopes of either intensifying the emancipatory potential in the dialectically charged sign, or stopping signs criss-crossed with ideological accents from becoming univocal and "degenerating into allegory" (23). Struggle-in-the-sign is never characterized as being ancillary to struggle for ownership of the forces of production used in the machinofacture of the alienable sign-consuming identity that experiences the relations of production as writing-as-exploitation. The presumption here is that the act of writing empowers writers to take up position within the relations of semiotic production and, there, to revolutionize the always already relatively autonomous relations of semiotic production.

Even when theorists locate the arena of the class struggle in writing as a private, alienable, productive asset, they tend to reduce class-struggle-for-the-sign to liberal democratic struggles intended to ameliorate class difference by making the internetworked social more congenial to the needs of the technological underclasses. Very much in the manner of Jeffrey Grabill, liberal theorists struggle to expand public access to writing technologies because they are concerned that "the technopoor" may be "missing something" (313). Such approaches neither question nor countermand capital's rights of ownership in writing. They assume capital's rights of ownership in the forces of production. They gift capital with its primary mechanism for drawing internetworked
writers into the structured relations of capitalist exploitation. And they concede to capital that capital's industrial processing of writing-identified-writers by capital's factory system of writing machines is not tantamount to the production of writing-as-exploitation. In fact, the presumption is, as before, that once one acquires "the Internet," internetworked writers are empowered by their facility with writing to take up position within the relations of semiotic production and, there, to struggle-in-the-sign and, perhaps, to revolutionize that which continues to pass as the relatively autonomous relations of semiotic production.

The general presumption that writing theory should never take its fundamental orientation from engagement with the struggle for real economic ownership of the forces of semiotic production may even be found in that germinal contribution to the class theory of writing, Walter Benjamin's "The Author as Producer." Benjamin argues in "The Author as Producer" that the "revolutionary struggle between . . . capitalism and the proletariat" (238) requires that revolutionary writers take up position in the relations of production for the purpose of revolutionizing the relations of production. This, he added, should prove sufficient to socialize the means of production and contribute to the struggle for general emancipation from the capitalist mode of exploitative production. Toward this end, Benjamin dissuaded writers from adopting the manner of the "informing writer" -- that is, one who exposes the limits and failures of the current system, funnels revolutionary themes through capital's productive apparatus, who contributes to the development of free thinkers inclined to oppose private ownership of the alienable means of production, but who introduces no new literary techniques that promise to revolutionize current relations of literary production and energize the revolutionary
struggle between capitalism and the proletariat. Having noted that capitalists can profit as easily from the sale of revolutionary as establishment themes, Benjamin asserted that writers contribute to the revolutionary struggle when they develop progressive literary techniques, not themes, that result in the production of cultural forms, or written compositions, that, in turn, operate upon contemplative writers and consumers of writing, transforming them into collaborators, actors, producers. Where writers produce texts that produce writers who produce texts that produce writers who produce in kind, writers challenge capital wherever it seeks to expand or even maintain its already limited ownership over the means of literary production. Because, according to Benjamin's formulation, relatively autonomous producers of cultural texts would have started to compose cultural forms that contribute to the ever-expanding production of producers, writers will have positioned themselves to revolutionize the social relations of production to the point that writers will not only become the non-exploitative publishers of other writers but also agents who challenge capital where capital restricts access to the means of literary production for the purpose of profiting from ongoing renewal of "authors," or the "long-since-counterfeit wealth of creative personality" (232).

For all its elegance and one-time correctness, Benjamin's solution to the problem of writing-and-capital runs into the same trouble that contradicts theorists who lend themselves to struggle-in-the-sign and struggle-for-access to struggle-in-the-sign. Today, the relatively autonomous relations of written production that writing theorists presume and hope to revolutionize have been privatized. Any and all deployments of asset poor writers around the privately owned, industrially organized forces of sociolinguistic production takes writers up and positions them within the structured factory relations of
capitalist exploitation. Because internetworked writers must write if they are to be, they cannot escape from or take up position against the structured relations of capitalist exploitation if they are to be and write at the level of the transnationally internetworked core of the unevenly developed capitalist world system. Writing and writing theories that bespeak the need to revolutionize the social relations of written production are always already contradicted by asset rich writers who own the alienable means of writing and who use their real economic ownership of the means of sociolinguistic production to profit from writers that capital both machinofactures and then invites to theorize about such things as the need for writers to become producers who compose texts that, in turn, invite audiences to become operating writers; or the need to increase public access to the digitized social; or the need to struggle-in-the-sign and, in so doing, intensify the emancipatory potential in the dialectically charged sign. Where capital once profited as easily from publication of revolutionary and establishment themes, capital now profits from the machinofacture of both revolutionary and establishment subjectivities. Nothing that anyone writes after having been processed by the social factory alters the condition of writing-as-exploitation that contradicts even the most concerted efforts to revolutionize that which capital has already revolutionized: the factory relations of machinofactured private-social production. And there is nothing that any writer or writing theorist who struggles to take up position in the machinofactured relations of sociolinguistic production can do to resolve the contradiction in writing that draws writers inexorably into the structured relations of capitalist exploitation. Simply put, writing, in our time, has been contradicted by writing.

By way of demonstration, I want to point out that internetworked writers who
enjoy no real economic ownership in the means of internetworked sociolinguistic production but who exercise "effective control" over the inalienable assets "skill" and "knowledge" may attempt to take up position within the relations of social production for the purpose of forging alliances with capital, receiving disproportionately high salaries, operating as "de facto exploiters" (Wright 30), and, at the same time, socializing the relations of production. As such, members of a comparatively small group of internetworked writers occupied in managerial, bureaucratic, or specialist positions, may participate in and benefit from the capitalist appropriation of an unearned surplus value despite their lack of ownership in the means of production. Johndan Johnson-Eilola and Stuart Selber make this point when they point out that the relationship between skilled, knowledgeable, and credentialed writers and capital need not be "repressive or disempowering" (342). Technical communicators, for example, may stand on common ground with corporations that are not necessarily adverse to constructing "all aspects of communication as constructive, social activities" (355). Writers who want to socialize the site of internetworked writing may receive corporate support for the composition of hypertexts that "expand rather than contract processes of communication" and that "oscillate between cycles of automation and user control" (344-45), rather than simply speeding up "the pace of work by translating repetitive, predictable human activities into machine instructions" (344-45, 347). Because corporations can derive profit from the production of texts that both expand processes of social communication and increase user control in the typical writer's encounter with automating technologies, Johnson-Eilola and Selber argue that technical writers may forge successful alliances with corporations through the composition of texts that raise the "prestige, responsibility, creativity, and
The forging of alliances with capital is not the only way that writers and writing theorists can attempt to *take up position* in the machinofactured relations of sociolinguistic production for the purpose of revolutionizing internetworked social relations. In particularly "good times," writers who are asset poor in the alienable means of internetworked social production but asset rich in skills and knowledge may take the wealth gained through successful alliance with capital; invest it in the acquisition of financial capital or production capital; and, in so doing, orchestrate a move into the class of capitalist exploiters (Wright 30). This they can do, argues Jeffrey Nealon, by stealing themselves against the more ugly realities that go along with full participation in an social system. People in the world will no doubt experience misery for coming in contact with a social system that promotes the promotion of certain writers into the capitalist rank and file. "All good things," Nealon points out, "are bathed in blood at their origin" (832). Bearing this mind, Nealon recommends that writers stop denouncing "capitalism as a misery machine," try saying Yes to capitalism long enough to "map the ways in which misery is produced by capital," and respond to the production of misery by working to modify the capitalist machine so that it supports "a different series of outputs" (834-35). He continues: were would-be capitalists to start thinking of themselves as a mutual fund, rather than a subject, they might begin diversifying their portfolios of the self and, in so doing, follow the "revolutionary path" through the stock market. Rather than "morally" denouncing or judging capitalism, and, in so doing, proving ourselves to be the "most reactive pustule of resentment," Nealon would have us "see what (else) it can do!" by experimenting with its "speeds and slownesses" (834). Rather than
withdrawing "from the world market," we should move "in the opposite direction," "go
still further . . . in the movement of the market, of decoding and deterritorialization."
(835). When we realize with Nealon that the "problem . . . is not capitalism," but, rather,
"the style of subjectivity that capitalism has produced and rewarded" (833), we will be
finally be able to take up position within internetworked social relations -- to "lodge"
one self "on a stratum" (835) -- and, there, work to revolutionize the relations of
production -- to speed up and modify capitalism "until it becomes a different sort of
machine" (835).

There are, of course, still others who would take up position within the privately owned
relations of social production for the purpose of opposing the consequences of capital's
penetration into the domain of social production. When, for example, internetworked
writers produce writing under less than fortuitous circumstances, they may not only
become aware that anyone who "can telecommunicate can always be teleterminated" at
the hands of capital "by cheaper services uploaded from anywhere on the planet" (Dyer-
Witheford 143-44) but may also seek alliance -- even if only in theory -- with the
dominant exploited group, the proletariat located in polarized class locations (Wright 30).
Toward this end, M. J. Braun argues that the internetworked writer may take up position
internetworked social relations for the purpose of revolutionizing attitudes toward
internetworked social relations. Braun argues that we should not be satisfied making
"claims about what these machines allow us to accomplish -- claims about nonlinear
thinking, reading, and writing about how those practices have decentered us as subjects,
somehow freeing us from the bonds of the rational world view" (157). Nor should we
"make claims that if only more of America's people could have access to the technologies
somehow a social leveling would occur" (151). Instead, Braun argues that we should "consider not only the presence of the programmer laboring over all those zeros and ones in our machines, but also the presence of the minimum-wage worker who could have died making the CD we just popped into our machine" (157-58). Braun would have internetworked writers respond to their proximity to the "minimum-wage worker who could have died making the CD we just popped into our machine" by composing "ethical antagonism" to positions that obscure the fact that moves designed to bring more democracy (not less exploitation) to those at the core of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system are always executed at a cost of more immiseration for those who work in third world conditions. Internetworked writers must compose ethical antagonism when confronted by internetworked writing that obscures that fact that internetworked writing bears a direct relation to "working conditions" at "electronic assembly plants" in California's Silicon Valley that feature the same kinds of sweatshop conditions that prevail in third world nations: "overcompetitive subcontracting, poverty-level wages, piece-rate compensation, chemical and ergonomic hazards, routine health and safety violations, no medical benefits, retaliation, and an immigrant, largely female, non-union work force" ("Living on the Bottom").

If this brief review of scholarship devoted to the relationship of writers to capitalist writing demonstrates anything, it is this: anyone may do precisely what any these respected writers suggest: take up position within internetworked social relations and work to revise or revolutionize internetworked social relations. Indeed, capital privatized and, thus, revolutionized the production of social relations so that writers could begin to emanate out of capital as capital and, as living capital, posit a host of
contradictory solutions to the problem of social relations under capital. But because capital owns the means by which bodies in internetworked community produce social relationships with strangers, acquaintances, friends, lovers, family, and the materialized self, no one may take up position within internetworked social relations and write anything that countermands one's subjection of structured relations of capitalist exploitation. Writers who emanate out of capital as capital may forge alliances with capital, orchestrate moves from the class of proletarianized writer to the capitalist class, or forge alliances with those in more completely polarized class locations. They may write in hopes of generalizing local access to the internetworked production of social relations or energizing the dialectical struggle-in-the- sign that takes place between consumers of the private-social who are transformed through contact with the social factory into commodified aspects of the private-social. But they may not write anything that is not also the positive expression of real inequalities in the distribution of productive assets that must result not only in the manifest exploitation of asset poor by asset rich writers but, also and more importantly, in the drawing of writers without alienable assets in internetworked writing into the structured relations of capitalist exploitation, which disallow the possibility of presenting private-social relations as alternative to private-social relations. Capitalist control of the assets used in the production of internetworked writing may, in other words, justify the launching of a class theory of writing. But being so justified does not mean that writing theorists are positioned to launch a class theory of writing.

Dialectics
A contradiction of this magnitude in practice represents a contradiction in theory -- or an
unexplored aspect of a contradiction that contains unreleased, uncharacterized energies that might take the writing of internetworked writers in unimagined directions. Because writing theorists -- in their life as capital -- must meet the challenge of exploitative factory relations that contradict machinofactured writers in their every attempt to achieve positive identity through writing, class theorists of writing must meet capital's magnificent contradiction of writing practices with a theory of contradictions -- that is, "to proceed dialectically," "to think in contradictions, for the sake of the contradiction once experienced in the thing, and against that contradiction" (145). Even more, class theorists should consider traveling along the counterintuitive path of negative dialectics -- Adorno's theoretical apparatus for ending the tradition of the "constitutive subjectivity" as the locus of criticism (xx) -- because the path of dialectical theory became an option when identity capital convicted the positive production of internetworked identity of being both identified with and contradicted by capital.

Long before capital subsumed the internetworked social, Adorno engaged not with Fordist production, not with "long-term and large-scale fixed capital investments in mass-production systems," nor with "presumed stable growth in invariant consumer markets" (Harvey *Condition* 142), but, instead, with the product of capital's decision to guarantee stable growth in invariant consumer markets through investments in market research and analysis, advertising, "customer manipulation," and the "planned obsolescence of commodities" (Mandel *Late* 229). Long before capital subsumed the internetworked social, Adorno responded to a social order that Henri Lefebvre once described as being managed," "administered," "entirely mediated," and "mass-mediated" "in large part by multinational corporations that have colossal investments in it" and,
thanks to marketing, make "projections of up to ten years" (79). Witness to capital's Society of the Spectacle, Adorno confronted capital in its decision to confront the individual with systems of commercial representation that blunt the formation of the subject through introjection; that induce the subject to give over or abandon itself to the "false needs" of "repressive satisfaction" (Marcuse 5, 7); and that visit upon the subject the "death of the subject," or a "fragmented and schizophrenic decentering and dispersion of this last" (Jameson "Cognitive Mapping" 351). Witness to capital's Society of the Simulacra, Adorno ran circles around capital, even as capital ran circles of information around consumers, encased the private sphere of the individual within a capitalized cultural sphere, compelled the encircled consumer to operate within a "hyperrealism of simulations," and left the individual with no alternative but to experience the "satellization of the real" (Baudrillard "Ecstasy" 128). Adorno claimed for capital that capital's "extroverted technicians [corporate planning units]" had "taken over" "the moon" "behind" which "dwell" the "introverted thought architect [the subject]" (3). And Adorno lamented that in capital's "administered world the impoverishment of experience by dialectics, which outrages healthy opinion, proves appropriate to the abstract monotony of that world. Its agony is the world agony raised to a concept" (6, emphasis added); to capital accumulated to "to such a degree . . . that it becomes an image" (Debord 16.html, emphasis added); to television advertising and programming that penetrates, cannibalizes, and represents private space in such a way that media "explodes the scene formerly preserved by the minimal separation of public and private" (Baudrillard 130).

Adorno considered the life of identity in light of capital and claimed for dialectics the task of breaking the "compulsion to achieve identity" (157). The dialectician needed
to remember at all times that that which "is, is more than it is" (161). Awash in a society of the spectacle and hyperrealism, the theoretician could rest assured in knowing that "objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy" (5). But the dialectician needed also to leverage this understanding by refusing to theorize out of the identitarian concept but, instead, out of the "means of the energy stored up in that compulsion [to achieve identity] and congealed in its objectifications" (157). The theoretician needed to grope, in the "critique of identity," for the "preponderance of the object" (183). Dialectics, Adorno reminded us, requires that we theorize "rather, out of these things" (33). For the contradiction that exists between the conceptually permeated material substrate and the materially permeated identitarian cover concept not only attempts to confine the heterogeneity in the object to the adequacy of the subject but constitutes a "contradiction in reality" that is also a hopeful "contradiction against reality" (145). Dialectics, Adorno warned, requires that we be suspicious of "all identity." Certain that prepared and objectified forms of administered, conceptually organized identity amounted to an "untruth" that contradicted the adequacy of "reality" (144-45), Adorno sought a method in dialectics for countermanding one's need to fuse with the "facade of immediacy" and for theorizing out of that which is "concealed beneath . . . the supposed facts" (167). Today, as in Adorno's time, the vitality of his nonidentitarian dialectical method depends for its vitality upon "the seriousness of unswerving negation," a seriousness that "lies in its refusal to lend itself to sanctioning things as they are" (160). As such, negative dialectics necessarily slouches toward the "indispensable substrate of any concept, including the concept of Being" (135); follows a logic of "disintegration: of a disintegration of the
prepared and objectified form of the concepts which the cognitive subject faces, primarily and directly" (145); returns "the thing's own identity against its identifications" (161); and emerges without identity but, instead, with that which is both "indissoluble in any previous thought context" and "transcends its seclusion in its own, as nonidentical" (163).

Today, the class theorist of writing turned negative dialectician needs attend more than ever to the specificity of Adorno's appeal to the untruth in identity, or the nonidentitarian truth in the negation of untrue identity. For capital has advanced beyond confronting and encircling the subject with capital accumulated to such a degree that it becomes mass-mediated spectacle or hypperreal simulacra. Capital's direct production process now produces the materiality of the writing subject, or capital accumulated to such a degree that it becomes the indispensable, material substrate of the cogitative, expressive subject. A living substance shaped on the forge of capital, the internetworked subject has no present alternative but to suspect the constitutive, identitarian subjectivity of untruth; to know that internetworked identity presupposes a total identification with capital in the first instance of every internetworked moment; to know that "total contradiction is nothing but the manifested truth of total identification" (6); and to grope for the preponderance of the repressed heterogeneity in the conceptually permeated, machinofactured object-as-subject that may deliver the needed, nonidentitarian contradiction against the reality of untrue internetworked identity. The nonidentitarian object of the subject must now be to seek the "surplus of nonidentity" that capital would "suppress, disparage, and discard" so that capital may persist in the machinofacture, circulation, and exploitation of writing-identified-writers, or living alienable use-values that meet and greet each other in a manner that exceeds Georg Lukács' description of the
commodity as phantom objectivity.

Following Lukács, the first object of the subject must be to notice that the material substrate of the machinofactured self bears strong resemblance to Lukács' phantom objectivity -- that is, the product of "relations between people that takes on the character of a thing and, in so doing, acquires a strictly rational, all-embracing autonomy, or a 'phantom objectivity,' that conceals all traces of its fundamental nature, that is, its origin as a relation between people." But, then, the subject-as-machinofactured-phantom-objectivity must take for its first object the ability to recognize in its material substrate advances in the workings of capital -- capital's capacity, for example, to circulate alienable use-values that pass for relations between people, not objects; and that acquire in the moment of consumption the appearance of socially organized, fundamentally irrational, relatively autonomous subjectivities. If the phantom objectivity that passes for a constitutive subjectivity is to fulfill its nonidentitarian objective and release the surplus of nonidentity that capital would suppress, disparage, and discard in its private production of internetworked subjectivities, the subject that figures phantom objectivities within its material substrate must render the presence of a phantom where once had stood a subject: a ghostly, machinofactured figure that conceals the presence of relations between people that participate in what is now the direct production of privately owned and operated relations between people.

Today, if the living product of the social factory is to secure even one nonidentitarian release from the object of the subject, the machinofactured subject must begin to suspect:

- the concepts that issue from and organize the identity of an internetworked
phantom objectivity is capital accumulated to the point of becoming an image;

• the writing which penetrates the indispensable substrate of the internetworked
  object/subject is capital accumulated to the point of becoming entity;

• capital-as-image and capital-as-entity interpenetrate and so constitute the
  internetworked-subject-as-phantom-objectivity;

• the internetworked-subject-as-phantom-objectivity, for having been penetrated
  and constituted by capitalized image and entity, is no longer a relatively
  autonomous subject of social writing but, instead,

• the total identification of the writing-identified-writing-subject with capital:

• the total contradiction of the writing-identified-writing-subject by capital:

• the accumulation of capital to the point of becoming the identified subject of a
  total social contradiction:

  • the *phantom subject*.

To see in one's internetworked self the presence of a phantom subject is a
significant step but, of course, only the beginning of dialectical operations designed to
expose the untruth of internetworked identity. If the phantom subject hopes to release the
contradiction against reality contained in its constitution by capital as a contradiction in
reality, the phantom subject must know that the identitarian impulse organized within
writing-as-exploitation induces capital's phantom subjects to repress those heterogeneous
social energies that collide with and exceed the limit of contradicted identity in an
totally unfamiliar manner (Adorno 5). The identitarian impulse that has heretofore
driven relatively autonomous subjects of relatively autonomous social formations to
repress psychological and ideological matters in the psychological unconscious and the
political unconscious now drives the phantom subject to repress matters of production in
the latest instantiation of the materialized unconscious -- the phantom subject's *economic
unconscious*.

For all we know that mitigates against our faith in the immanence of identity, we
who are phantom subjects do not know that the site of our unconscious repressions is now
not merely psychological and political but, also, economic. Identity, which we "relish . . .
as adequacy to the thing it suppresses" (Adorno 148), is no longer something we may
decenter through customary appeals to the psychological and the political unconscious.
We, of course, know that individuals may never destroy the instinctual drives that the
super-ego experiences as being deplorable and represses into the unconscious mind. We
recall that Sigmund Freud's contribution to nonidentitarian discourse was to theorize the
*psychological unconscious* and, in so doing, to expose the subject as being inadequate to
the self by classifying the subject as the active site of drives, ongoing repression, and the
inescapable return of the repressed, which discomforts, disorients, and decenters the
pained, inadequate subject. We also know that individuals may never destroy the trauma
of Otherness that politically organized social beings repress through ideology, or the
symbolically organized concretization of the political unconscious. Individuals, who are
indivisible from the politically organized social formations from which they issue,
experience ideology in its most "primal form" as "the primacy of identity" (Adorno 148)
and as the politically, historically antagonistic Other who is characterized as both progeny
and embodiment of pre-reflective states of nature. And we recall that Frederic Jameson's
contribution to nonidentitarian discourse was to theorize the *political unconscious* and, in
so doing, to expose the inadequacy of the subject as revealed through encounters with
literature and other symbolic forms that simultaneously encode a culture's repressed responses to unresolved conflict and deliver a return the repressed upon the culturally indivisible mass of individuals who are invited to experience and cope with their otherwise invisible crimes against poleis. But, for all we know of the unconscious, we have not reconciled ourselves to the existence of a third site of repression that mitigates against faith in the immanence of identity: the economic unconscious.

Because writing is now an exploitative relation:

1. Writing-as-exploitation follows from capital's real economic ownership of the forces of production used in the direct, rationalized production of the writing-identified-writer;

2. The privately owned forces of production that produce the writing-identified-writer have congealed in the form of an automated, internetworked system of writing machines that operates as a factory directly upon the raw material of relatively autonomous, socially organized writing subjects and converts these raw materials into the commodity form of socially organized subjects of writing;

3. The relatively autonomous, socially organized writing subject, in each tautological moment of exchange, must purchase and become identified with the commodity form of the privately produced, cogitative, expressive subject if the relatively autonomous, socially organized writing subject would become the commodity form of the cogitative, expressive subject: the phantom subject;

4. The phantom subject -- in becoming a living commodity -- is penetrated by capital accumulated to the point of becoming the phantom's entity (body) and
image (discourse) and, in a privately produced moment of internetworked social reciprocity with other phantoms, becomes both the material substrate and commodity form of capital accumulated to the point of becoming internetworked social conourse and congress, or the concentrated presentation of the general conditions of the internetworked processes of social production in the form of the social commodity;

5. The social commodity -- or commodified field of internetworked sociolinguistic possibility to which machinofactured writers must connect themselves one point at a time -- "subsumes the entire set" of phantom subjects who must "latch themselves onto the fully objectified econosocial formation because the internetworked system of writing machines is, if nothing else, a vast social formation that brings the production of social relations within an informational field that is itself coterminous with social relations of production, the mode of production, the economic" (Harrison);

6. "The social character" of the social commodity, inclusive of all subsumed phantom subjects, like all "socially useful commodities in relational exchange with the equivalent-form of the ultimate money-form of the world of commodities . . . actually conceals, instead of disclosing, the social character of private labour, and the relations between the individual producers" (Marx Capital Vol. 1 ch01.htm);

7. The absent presence of social relations that are always already materialized in the substrate of all forms of the social commodity are no longer merely concealed in relational exchange with the equivalent-form of the ultimate
money-form of the world of commodities but, instead, are repressed -- for they are that surplus of experience that is present in material substrate of the congress of internetworked phantom subjects that cannot be present if phantom subjects are to "rejoice" and "bask" in the "primal form of ideology," that being "identity" (Adorno 148);

8. The absent presence of social relations that collide with the limit of internetworked identity and threaten to exceed it are repressed, or become the concealed absence of a present absence, not through psychological or ideological repression but through economic repression brought on by relational exchange with the equivalent-form of the ultimate money-form of the world of commodities, or the conceptually permeated functioning of the real conditions of economic existence;

9. The constitution of internetworked identities through ongoing exchange, consumption, production, and distribution represses into the economic unconscious the present absence of presently absented social relations of production that, on the one hand, imbue the machinofactured substrate of internetworked congress that circulates as the relative form of the commodity that seeks its equivalent in money and that, on the other, threaten to deliver a return of the economic repressed against the self-identified, capital-identified contradiction in reality that is the phantom subject;

10. Phantom subjects, like all other commodities, may experience a powerful return of the economic repressed when and if dialectical analysis "strips off" the phantom's "mystical veil," revealing it to be in a moment of dialectical
reversal a "production by freely associated" producers, "consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan" (Capital ch01.htm).

The question really isn't whether I am correct in presuming the existence of an economic unconscious. Nor is it whether we should be antagonistic to the identitarian impulse that satisfies itself only through repression of the structured relations of capitalist exploitation into the economic unconscious. As I see it, the question of the moment must be: What methods may the class theorist of writing use to deliver a return of the repressed upon the phantom subject of writing-as-exploitation and, in so doing, posit a negative negation of the identitarian impulse that is always already totally contradicted in its total identification with capital's ongoing repression of the nonidentitarian heterogeneity in capital's economic unconscious?

The good news is that the class theorist of writing turned negative dialectician will find ready-at-hand a Marxist methodology for returning the inner structure, or economic unconscious, of phantom subjects. The bad news is that this methodology will demand that writing theorists adopt a entirely counterintuitive way of writing about the constitution of writing subjectivities.

With this warning in mind, the class theorist of writing can start organizing a return of the third repressed -- a return from the economic, as opposed to the psychological or political, unconscious -- by recalling with David Harvey that all commodities -- even living commodities -- begin as the "material embodiment of use-value" (the commodity's qualitative aspect); "exchange-value" (the commodity's quantitative aspect); and "value" (the interchangeable units of abstract, invisible human labor power that workers, drawn by capital into the structured relations of capitalist
exploitation, crystallize within the materialized form of alienable use-values) \( (\textit{Limits} \ 1) \). Class theorists advance still further by attending to Harvey where he explains that the three "values" must never be regarded as "fixed, known, or even knowable building blocks" \( (2) \). Instead, Harvey continues, one must approach the three "values" as sets of interlocking pairs, or three two-dimensional value-windows that provide flat perspectives onto the inner structure of capitalist exploitation. Use-value \( \rightarrow \) exchange-value; exchange-value \( \rightarrow \) value; and value \( \rightarrow \) use-value -- that is, the three value-windows onto and out of the phantom subject's economic unconscious -- provide the negative dialectician with a "relational," non-linear, agglomerative "way of proceeding" that requires the nonidentitarian theorist to move in ceaseless fashion from one to "another window" so as to see "things that were formerly hidden from view" \( (2) \). Use-value \( \rightarrow \) exchange-value; exchange-value \( \rightarrow \) value; and value \( \rightarrow \) use-value -- they provide the class theorist of writing with the means of gazing into and theorizing out of the phantom subject's infinitely complex, irreducibly heterogeneous, hopelessly explosive inner constitution.

When applied to the phantom subject, the immediate results of Harvey's relational way of proceeding are as interesting as they are arresting.

When we look into and theorize out of the use-value \( \rightarrow \) exchange-value window onto the phantom's economic unconscious, we understand that when the internetworked "I" writes, "I" writes what Terry Eagleton calls the alienable use-value's "esoteric self-reference" \( (29) \) and, also, the evacuation from self-referential use-value "by exchange-value to mere abstraction" \( (30) \). When I contracts with capital to write I, capital composes the alienable use-value I that, like all commodities, "merely seeks out in its partner that essence in which it can find itself securely mirrored" \( (29) \). At the point of exchange, when
I purchases I, I commodity makes an "intimate ad hominem address" to each serialized consumer of I (26). I "sees in everyone the buyer in whose hand and house it wants to nestle" (27). And so I "tarts" itself up "in dandyish production." "promises permanent possession to everyone in the market without abandoning its secretive isolation," "disports itself with all comers without its halo slipping" (26, 27). As a result, the world around, I appeals to I who exchanges the money form of the commodity for I, and, in so doing, inflates the skin of I to "garish proportions," making I seem like the most important purchase one can make on the planet. At the same time, "this very excess of materiality comes to signify nothing but itself, collapsing the object back upon itself as a monstrous tautology" (30). As such, the sale of I to I delivers the first return of the repressed. For in the sale of I to I, I metes out upon I an infantile fantasy of becoming I at the cost of becoming I. I is the commodification of the use of the identitarian impulse to become I, which, at first, is nothing more than I mirroring an infants' drive to participate through purchase of the material substrate of identity in the primal form of ideology, that being the "imaginary object" of identity, or that which "bolsters the subject in an illusory self-identity by ceaselessly reflecting back to it an image that is at once itself and another" (37).

At the same time, the exchange of the money form of the commodity for the right to consume the use-value of both the material substrate and imaginary object of I does not merely machinofacture a socially organized identity that under more familiar circumstances would reproduce the drama of I and Other that politically organized social beings repress in the poltical unconscious through ideology. Instead, the use-value exchange-value window on the phantom's economic unconscious returns upon
the economic fact that the consumption of I is, as I have already noted, "evacuated by exchange-value to mere abstraction" (30). The substance of this observation necessarily follows when one takes into consideration Marx's comments in Chapter 1 of Capital on the operation of exchange value on use-value. In light of Capital, we would know that I is abstracted from use-value because I may exchange for I under the aspect of 1) the universal form of value, 2) the general form of value, 3) the expanded form of value, and 4) the accidental or elementary form of value (ch01.htm). That is to say, we know that free agents may come to market for the purpose of receiving a quantity of I in exchange for money, or that commodity that gets produced within advanced systems of commodity exchange for the sole purpose of regulating exchange, which it does by providing the universe of commodities with a single equivalent that is money because money may not exchange against the universal equivalent (read: itself) and may not exchange for other commodities because all commodities express their relative values in the equivalent form of money (universal form of value) (Capital ch01.htm). Free agents might as easily come to market for the purpose of receiving a quantity of I in exchange for an equal amount of one special commodity, like cattle in the old West, that becomes, through force of habit, the generally recognized local standard against which and within which a local system of commodities can exchange and become regulated with a strong degree of certainty (general form of value) (ch01.htm). Less likely, but just as plausibly, free agents might come to market for the purpose of receiving a quantity of I in exchange for an equal amount of any other commodity that exists within the haphazard universe of freely exchanging commodities that, as a system of exchange, predates, is embedded within, and underpins both the general and universal forms of value (expanded form of
value) (ch01.htm). In other words, free agents may come to market for the purpose of 
receiving a quantity of I in exchange for an equal amount of a single commodity they 
happen to have in their possession, like Ex-Lax (accidental or elementary form of value) 
(ch01.htm). All of which means to say that anyone's exchange of the money form of the 
commodity for I conceals the economic fact that I finds its metonymic equivalent in every 
other commodity that circulates within the entire capitalist system of identically 
interchangeable exchanges. That is to say, when I enters the world of exchange and, in so 
doing, exchanges a quantify of x commodity for a quantify of x commodity, I becomes 
implicated in the "smoothly continuous," infinitely interrupted, different instantiation of 
an identical repetition (exchange value) (Eagleton 29). I becomes caught in a metonymic 
chain that does not yield I but, instead, I-as-Ex-Lax-as-Ipecac-as-YooHoo or, just as 
arbitrarily, I-as-Swanson-TV-Dinner-as-Dixie-Cup-as-Tupperware. As such, the sale of I 
to I delivers the second return of the repressed. In the sale of I to I, I ceases to become the 
equivalent of the I meted out through psychological and ideological repressions but, 
instead, signifies that I is no more glorious or discreet than sewage removal. For, after all, 
anyone may come to market and exchange quantities of sewage removal for I.

If the dialectical reversal afforded thus far by the return of the third repressed is 
not sufficient to disintegrate the identitarian impulse that thrives because it represses its 
equivalence in compost, the class theorist of writing must move on and gaze through a 
second value-window onto the economic unconscious of the phantom subject -- perhaps 
but not necessarily the exchange-value ₪ value window. When seeking the 
preponderance of the object in the phantom subject, we may look into and theorize out of 
exchange-value ₪ value and, in so doing, note that I-as-Levi's-as-Volkswagen-as-
Donovan is not only the presence of exchange-value abstracted from use-value but that
the "phenomenal form" I that seeks its equivalent in Money is "the mode of expression
. . . of something contained in it, yet distinguishable from it" (Marx Capital Vol. 1
ch01.htm). In the moment when I exchanges for I, and I becomes the metonymic
equivalent of Chiclets or money, I does not become equivalent to a specific quantity of
Chiclets or money because either I or Chiclets or money possess inherent value. Each
time I or Chiclets or money factors in the identical repetition of commodity exchange, I or
Chiclets or money are rendered exchangeable within the structured relations of capitalist
exploitation because they are the "expressions or embodiments of one identical social
substance, viz., human labour" (ch01.htm). Each commodity is exchangeable with all
other commodities because all commodities contain "crystals" of and may be reduced to a
"social substance, common to them all," viz. "human labour in the abstract" (ch01.htm).
Each phantom I is rendered exchangeable within the structured relations of capitalist
exploitation because I is a value, or the absent presence of an "unsubstantial reality"
common to all commodities, the "congelation of homogeneous human labour, of labour-
power expended without regard to the mode of its expenditure" (ch01.htm).

As such, the sale of I to I delivers a third return of the third repressed. For in the
sale of I to I (I/I), I/I ceases to be merely the evacuation of tautological use-value to mere
abstraction in the form of metonymic equivalence with all of other alienable use-values
(I/I-as-x-as-x-as-x). I/I-as-x becomes an evacuation from all manifest forms of
equivalence -- that is, an evacuation from I/I-as-Plutonium-Pellets-as-Mosler-Safe. I/I-as-
x now becomes the inscrutable presence of an unexpected "history, in the sense of
content, but not in the sense of a set of occurrences that have befallen it" (Benjamin

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Origin 47). I/I-as-x, which as a commodity contains units of homogeneous labor power abstracted from human labor-power, becomes the indissoluble point of connection between I/I-as-x and the "total labour-power of society, which is embodied in the sum total of the values of all commodities produced by that society," and which "counts here as one homogeneous mass of human labour-power, composed though it be of innumerable individual units" (Marx Capital Vol. 1 ch01.htm). I/I-as-x, in the moment of its production, is put under the influence of the absent history of the production of every unit of value and surplus value, or v, that circulates in the capitalist world economic system at any given time. And, suddenly, that which began as an infantile fantasy of becoming I at the cost of becoming I becomes a nonidentitarian instance wherein the impossibility of immanence comes under the influence of an irreducibly heterogeneous, decidedly historical, unquestionably material, fundamentally explosive essence: the production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of both value and surplus value that imbues the phantom subject with an absent history and expands the formula for the consumption of internetworked subjectivity to I/I-as-x/v.

Once upon a time, Jean Baudrillard characterized the enclosure of the subject by the mass-mediated social as "The Implosion of the Social In the Media," or that state in which the subject becomes shackled within a world of simulations and incapable of knowing the real because the subject has been given too much information. Today, in history, incessant devolution of phantom subjects into the lived experience of identical repetition of a metonymic tautology that becomes imbued with abstracted value -- I/I-as-x/v -- and is disintegrated from within by shocks and tremors delivered up by the return of the third repressed. The appearance of the individual has been put in direct contact
with the total value structure of the capitalist world economic system. But what is more important is that the phantom has come under the influence of every specific, concrete social process of production that bears a relation to globally dispersed structured relations of capitalist exploitation.

In the end, the class theorist of writing may reveal the absent presence of the concrete processes of social production in the world system by advancing upon, looking into, and theorizing out of the value use-value window onto the economic unconscious of the phantom subject. The class theorist of writing who describes the relationship of value production to the direct production of the rapidly disintegrating I/I-as-x/v is the theorist who promises to put capital and phantom subjects in intimate albeit disarticulated contact with the vital substance that gets repressed during direct production of the constitutive internetworked subjectivity. But, for this to happen, we need remember a little something that Marx forwarded in the first chapter of the *Grundrisse* -- every abstraction, including his labor theory of value, that one might use to "reproduce the concrete by way of thought," is an abstraction that derives from our engagement with the concrete, defined as "the concentration of many determinations, hence the unity of the diverse" (ch01.htm). Ernest Mandel added that for Marx "the concrete was both the 'real starting point' and final goal of knowledge" (*Late* 14). Today, it would appear that concrete phantom subjects [alienable use-values] are imbued with the material traces of the 6,445,508,092 concrete human beings, projected to 06/03/05 at 16:39 GMT (U.S. Census Bureau), who have all been taken up within what Immanuel Wallerstein identified as the world capitalist system's single division of labor. Today, phantom subjects are imbued with labor-power abstracted by capital from human workers who are responsible
for the production of the total aggregate of value that circulates in the world system that bears systemic relation to the production of each life form that appears within the structured relations of writing-as-exploitation. Today, phantom subjects are imbued with the real struggles of concrete human beings who stand in direct relation to any process in the entire world system by which capital's abstracts labor-power into value.

The alienable aspect of I/I is, in other words, summarily exploded from within by the figures of Itsekeri women from the Ugborodo and Arutan villages in Escravos, Nigeria, who live not only in the oil rich Niger Delta under the shadow of Chevron Nigeria's $400 million dollar Escravos Gas Plant but struggle as the immiserated member of capital's surplus labor army to live without benefit of jobs, roads, water service, electricity, houses, schools, clinics, and a local fishing economy that succumbed to Chevron oil spills. The economic unconscious of phantom subjects contains the figures of 2000 unarmed Itsekeri women who invaded and laid siege to Chevron's Escravos Gas Plant Nigeria, inflicting a daily loss of revenue in the amount of $7.8 millions dollars. The economic unconscious not only contains the moment when Itsekeri women succeeded in bringing Chevron Nigeria to the bargaining table and, there, exacted verbal promises but no promises in writing from Chevron Nigeria for specific reforms, reparations, and restitution. It also contains the moment when victorious Itsekeri women went home to their villages and waited in vain for Chevron Nigeria to fulfill any of its wholly inadequate list of promised reforms, reparations, and restitutions (g8, Galiana, "Kudos!" "Nigeria," "Nigerian Women," "Women Occupy," "Women Protesters," "Women Storm").

The alienable aspect of I/I is just as possibly and arbitrarily exploded from within
by the bytes and PCs of Quyen Tong, a 51 year-old, Vietnamese immigrant; his 10-year-old son; and 18-year-old daughter who spend "long nights" in Silicon Valley, "assembling tiny transistors onto printed circuit boards, at pay of 1 penny per component, with each transistor bent and then carefully inserted into tiny holes in the circuit board following a complex chart" (Immigrant Hands). Because capital abstracts into value both the consumption of the private-social and direction production where it occurs, positing value relations to the consumption of the alienable private-social explodes I/I from within but without leaving traces to the origins of each explosion of I/I that may be reconstructed through, for example, the tracing of commodity chains -- "the whole range of activities involved in the design, production, and marketing of a product" (Gereffi 1). Instead, shocks from the site of the third repressed that delivered up Quyen Tong family and Itsekeri women from the economic unconscious delivered their dialectical reversal upon the identitarian impulse of phantom subjects because capital converts cogitative, expressive subjects through machinofacture into alienable use-values that through exchange puts phantom subjects in contact with value, or the complex issue of a capitalist world system that abstracts both labor power and consumer goods from the specificity of labor and consumption, and intermingles both within a system of arbitrary exchange. The cost to capital of advancing production to the point that even the living subject becomes a product of capital's direct production process is that all phantom subjects become an identical repetition of that which bespeaks their common nonidentitarian impulse to express and wrangle over the instants and trajectories, the synchrony and diachrony, the life and the history of the repressed-elsewhere that is always immanent in the ongoing falsification of identity through the internetworked writer's insistence on being the self.
identification of an esoteric self-reference that ponies up money in order to become the leveraged objectivity that capital composes in the phantom subject of writing-as-exploitation.

**Rhetoric**
The return of the repressed as visited upon the phantom subject provides a force sufficient to decenter the consciousness of serialized phantom subjects and, in so doing, to disintegrate, however temporarily, the serialized identitarian impulse to mirror the self in the imaginary object and material substrate of the machinofactured entity in writing. Such a return is valuable in itself because it demonstrates that Adorno was always correct to believe that one could, under the right circumstances, "use the strength of the subject to break through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity" (xx). But my purpose has never been so much to break through a fallacy as to leverage the repressed strength in the indispensable substrate of the expressive, cogitative phantom subject and, in so doing, to launch a class theory of nonidentitarian-rhetorics-in-writing. My hope, all along, has been to advance an object-oriented theory of technologically mediated rhetorical production that both issues from and delivers a contradiction upon the contradiction of writing by capital's writing. The possibility of delivering a negative negation of the phantom subject's identitarian impulse has suggested to me that the writing theorist, turned negative dialectician, turned negative rhetorician may respond to capital's evacuation of internetworked writers from subject position with a negative, nonidentitarian, rhetoric that advances the class interests of internetworked writers, if not the adequacy of their evacuated identities. Even though capital has used its real economic ownership of the forces of production used in the direct, rationalized production of the writing-identified-
writer to draw technologically mediated rhetoricians into the structured relations of capitalist exploitation, the writing theorist, turn negative dialectician, turned negative rhetorician might presage the arrival of nonidentitarian rhetorics that are always elsewhere but always material in the object of writing capital and, as such, constitute the presence of an absent contradiction against the contradiction in reality that is capital accumulated to the point of becoming writing-as-exploitation. In brief, the newly minted negative rhetorician may at long last participate in what Adorno once characterized as the "critical rescue of the rhetorical element" (56).

For Adorno, rhetoric was finally communication "on the side of content," or the release of heterogeneous, nonidentitarian energies in the conceptually permeated object of the subject. Rhetoric that consistently inclined toward and returned a nonidentitarian release of the repressed heterogeneity in the conceptually permeated object of the subject enacted Adorno's critical rescue of the rhetorical element: the "mutual approximation of thing and expression, to the point where the difference fades" (56). In today's market for and of writing, this would mean that rhetoric that aspires to the condition of negative rhetoric must celebrate its failure to participate in the primal form of ideology under the cover of capital's general evacuation of writers from subject position. An object-oriented rhetoric would, as it were, incline not toward the concept of identity but from rhetoric's indissoluble articulation with nonidentitarian, fundamentally heterogeneous materials that may be repressed but may never go into "their concepts without leaving a remainder" (5). The organized release of repressed rhetorics in language -- where language is capital -- allows language, "literally . . . the organon of thought" (56), to foretell the arrival of that which preponderates in the object of the evacuated subject: the repressed heterogeneity of
life under cover of capital that may imbue the embodied voice with the "seriousness of unswerving negation," a seriousness that "lies in its refusal to lend itself to sanctioning things as they are" (160). This arrival in practice of negative, irreducibly heterogeneous rhetoric in language capital would secure the rescue of rhetoric from capital because it would disembody any residual hope that rhetoricians might have of addressing the problem of writing-as-exploitation through reconstitution of the individual identity, the constitutive subjectivity. Then, too, negative rhetoric, or rhetoric rescued from subjection to the concept of identity under capital, would make concrete the real possibilities for delivering contradictions in writing against globally internetworked capital, capital's composition of nonbeing in life, capital's composition of identity as both infantile wish fulfillment and structured evacuation of identity from the dream of life into the structured relations of capitalist exploitation.

In the selfsame moment when negative dialectics delivered blasts, shocks, and tremors from out the phantom subject's economic unconscious, negative rhetoric became for us a real possibility. When the inner structure of identity under capital expanded to the point of disintegrating the phantom subject, internetworked writers evacuated by capital from subject position were gifted with an opportunity to consume the consumption of the commodified aspect of writing-as-exploitation -- that is, to live in the only way possible, to live by "consuming the standpoint" (Adorno 56). Internetworked writers were afforded an opportunity to see that when rhetoric under the sign of exchange passes from capital into the machinofactured writer, rhetoric commodity expands from being rhetoric -- a two-sided activity between structurally overdetermined, socially contingent, relatively autonomous language users -- to being the constitution of I/I-as-rhetoric-as-x/v: the
identical repetition in the life of a dynamic commodity that, for being a commodity, always makes extrinsic, allegorical reference to something other than interindividual communication -- the deflected expression of rhetoric commodity's relative value in the universal equivalent, money, and the aggregate mass of interchangeable locations of commodity production and consumption that through agglomeration constitute the absent presence in negative rhetoric of the abstraction of life into value that touches all parts of the capitalist world economic system. When the capitalist direct production process succeeded in composing the object of the evacuated subject, the object of the subject-as-capital was given a mind to discover that the I/I-as-x/v -- or the provisional, allegorical subject in writing-as-exploitation -- may never address its situation in writing until it accepts that rhetoric commodity, like all commodities, contains an "irreducible surplus of signification that" not only "deflects the sign from its truly representational role" but requires the evacuated subject to cease from "feeling through words" and begin "feeling for words" (Eagleton 4). Use through consumption of the commodified aspect of writing-as-exploitation delivers up, as it were, a chance to address the inalienable fact that alienable two-sided, internetworked rhetoric puts provisional moments of being-under-the-sign-of-exchange in allegorical relation, first, with the aggregate mass of abstract value that circulates throughout the capitalist world system and, second, with every moment in this world that bears relation to that mode of production for profit that never allows national boundaries to shape its aspirations; that includes but a single division of labor, or grid of interdependent socio-economic relations, wherein members of even the most remote communities assume that their futures depend upon "exchange" with other parts of the world-system; that recruits and compensates wage-laborers, slaves, coerced
cash-crop producers, share-croppers, and tenant farmers -- the many faces of labor in the whole world-economy -- for the purpose of appropriating surplus-value; and that, for all this, draws core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral areas of capitalist production (frequently but errantly classified as co-existing stages of capitalist, pre-capitalist, and semi-capitalist production) into a unified web of highly differentiated capitalist relations of production (Wallerstein).

Because the inner structure of the congress of serialized phantom subjects always makes repressed, potentially explosive reference to the circulation of value throughout the capitalist world economic system, phantom concourse through the private-social at the level of discourse demands of internetworked writers that they produce something other than positive identitarian reversal of capital's contradiction of individual identity: namely, the resurrection through negative, suddenly allegorical rhetoric of a "significance" that "is always elsewhere, in the social relations of production whose traces" the identitarian word as commodity "has obliterated" (Eagleton 29). Easier written than done, the I/I that communicates with other phantom subjects also participates in what Angus Fletcher once called "the whole point of allegory," the fact that it need not be "read exegetically" because "it often has a literal level that makes good enough sense all by itself" (7). As we have come to understand, capital's goal for organizing production within the social factory has been to present the phantom subject with something that closely approximates without replicating the processes by which socially organized social bodies take possession of relatively autonomous, constitutive subjectivity. Under capital, would-be consumers of writing-as-exploitation assent to becoming machinofactured phantom subjects because they are drawn to that in writing-as-exploitation which is both absolutely
provisional but obviously "good enough": the suddenly falsified story of relatively autonomous individuals who come in contact with what Mikhail Bakhtin once described as the "zone of contact with the an inconclusive present (and consequently with the future) that creates the necessity" not only of the "incongruity" of person with self but of the associated challenge to being "either greater" than one's "fate, or less" than one's "condition" as a human being (n.p.). Yet, for its being "good enough," the provisional story of textual concourse through and congress within capital's social factory still contains a divided tendency and, as such, an opportunity for internetworked writers to meet the demands put upon them by the material conditions of rhetorical production. Internetworked writers may cease to concentrate on socializing, or revising, the social relations within text, word, letter, sign, space, and the many other stuffs of capital's internetworked, allegorical composition: "the Internet." Instead, they may begin to posit the absent presence in identity of an "other" set of actions that get repressed into the economic unconscious when capital's social factory causes capital-as-image and capital-as-entity to accumulate in the composition of the phantom subject. Internetworked writers may discover in "the" provisional "Internet" a platform in writing for delivering, on the one hand, proof of capital's systemic contradiction of such conceptions as the inconclusive present, the incongruity of person with self, and the challenge of being either greater than one's fate, or less than one's condition as a human being, and for releasing, on the other hand, repressed, nonidentitarian, unevenly developed rhetorics that deliver what Lenin might have called social democratic contradictions against the reality of capital's contradiction of writing in reality.

For those who believe that class theorists of writing may forge deflected
engagements with capital's vast social allegory and continue to persist in the habit, following Vološinov, of leveraging the "inner dialectic quality of the sign" in hopes of either intensifying the emancipatory potential in the dialectically charged sign, or stopping signs criss-crossed with ideological accents from becoming univocal and "degenerating into allegory" (23), I/I-as-x/v would forward the following observation.

Because capital has subsumed the production of both the sight of semiotic production and the consumption of social signs through the direct production of internetworked private-social being, internetworked writers who grasp the significance of capital's subsumption of the general processes of social production under capital must try to cultivate a refined taste for allegory. No one may stop an allegorical sign from degenerating into allegory; no one may leverage the inner dialectical quality of allegorical capital-as-signs by leveraging the inner dialectical quality of the ideological aspect of allegorical capital-as-signs; and no one may start to leverage the inner dialectical quality of allegorical signs until struggle in the sign is displaced by struggle for the object of the sign. Only when this happens will internetworked writers begin to discover the ways and means for articulating with and delivering contradictions against capital's contradiction of writing by writing. Only when this happens will internetworked writers begin to struggle over that which is indissoluble from but extrinsic to the provisional, interindividual sign: omnipresent conditions of nonbeing in the sign which may be proved but never traced through dialectical analysis, which may be annunciated but never made contingent through rhetoric.

A Gordian knot awaits anyone who attempts to take up rhetorical position within the machinofactured production of social relations. To purchase a share of alienable identity-in-writing from capital is to receive an invitation to attend capital's identitarian
ball, but it is also to be overmatched in the writer's dance with a conundrum-in-capital
that trips anyone who hopes to take up position within capital and, thereafter, establish a
positive relationship with one's own machinofactured, private-social identity. The already
revolutionized private-social relations of capitalist production contradict writerly attempts
at self-possession where writers circulate at the internetworked core of the unevenly
developed capitalist world economic system. Indeed, the capitalized production of social
relations contradicts anyone who looks past internetworked rhetoric's foundation in
capital in order to leverage the situated power of rhetoric in the fabulous construction of
the constitutive subjectivity. But, for all this, the subsumption of writing under capital
presents nonidentitarian rhetoricians with the obligation to do what the I/I must in order
to exist-in-struggle -- that is, to consume capital's general evacuation of writers from
subject position -- but, also, to go deeper into the materials of nonidentity than capital
would have the I/I go.

It is well within the reach of I/I to participate in a congress of serialized phantom
subjects dedicated to the object-oriented, nonidentitarian possibilities in internetworked
writing. A congress of I/I-as-x/v might easily deflect the composition of internetworked
rhetoric from the provisional site of interindividual, ideological creativity into the
repressed inner structure of allegorical capital; into the values that abstract us away from
the world of lived experience; into the posited memory of social relations that values
suspend, that capital represses, and that each serialized member of the class of exploited
writers must take for an essential personal history that has "never befallen it" (Benjamin
Origin 47). A congress of I/I-as-x/v, congealed into the nonidentitarian class of exploited
writers against capital, may bespeak a collective desire for that which is nonidentical in
internetworked identity: both the absenting of being from capital's system of global exploitation, and the absenting of being into the "that which is not" (Adorno 57). Indeed, a congress of I/I-as-x/v might even become Legion, in the sense that diffuse concentrations of nonidentitarian I/I-as-x/v may become allegorical prisms possessed of the inextinguishable colors of nonbeing under capital (Adorno 57) -- from Silicon Valley, to Escravos, to the transnationally internetworked core of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system: prisms that make glamorous "every second of time" that is "the strait gate through which the Messiah could enter" (Benjamin "Theses" 264). And, too, a congress of I/I-as-x/v might even become Legion, in the sense that diffuse concentrations of nonidentitarian I/I-as-x/v may become allegorical prisms possessed of the terrifying clamor that meets with and then exceeds the limit of nonidentity under the cover of identity, that achieves no identity through rhetoric but disintegrates into the billions of eyes and mouths that break through from the repressed core of the economic unconscious and write the collective end of exploitation.

In the unholy congress of I/I-as-x/v, nOoNE bereft of identity may communicate nonbeing possessed of the cold fury that writes the absent presence of hell's minions in the nonidentical repetition of that which has been written:

My Name is Legion: for we are many.
Part 3

*What Genres Have Come?*

Problem: Develop a theory of genre that follows from and demystifies the relation individual writers to capitalist composition.
How Old Am I?

A "Front Door" Probe

An unremarkable beginning: I had been making pitchers of martinis in anticipation of my fortieth birthday. That day had drawn too near and, along with it, thoughts of death, so I resolved to enjoy myself a bit too much. After connecting to the Internet and locating two poetry websites, I nipped from the long-stemmed glass in my right hand, ran fingers through graying hair with my left, and slipped mawkishly between pictures of the gone world and intimations of immortality: in one breath, remembering how "she would smile and look away / light a cigarette for me / sigh and rise / and stretch / her sweet anatomy / let fall a stocking" (Ferlinghetti); in the next breath, finding "Strength in what remains behind; / In the primal sympathy / Which having been must ever be; / In the soothing thoughts that spring / Out of human suffering; / In the faith that looks through death, / In years that bring the philosophic mind" (Wordsworth). A little beat-romanticism never hurt anyone, I told myself, and, then, while poised in the drunken, hypermedial balance between spent youth and cumulated age, I did all I could to tip the scales toward bathos and the grave. I activated my computer's "media player" program, loaded Sinatra's "How Old Am I?" into CD-ROM drive d:\, turned up the volume control, got a little sloppy, and sang, in faltering tones, "If I make you happy today / I'm the perfect age. / As for tomorrow, / turn the page."

An unexpected reversal: The computer's media player disrupted my crapulent, sentimental, all-to-human celebration of gradual, relentless, biologic aging by auto-
connecting to the Internet, informing me that a newer version of my media player program had become available, asking me if I wanted to download the program upgrade, waiting for me to click "okay," and then replacing both the program and me with a brand-new, short-lived, soon-to-be-upgraded version of this human-machine composition, "my" cyborg "self."

And so it began, my consideration of cyborg aging, its impact on cyborg composition, and its impact on cyborg composition. That is to say, I started my study of cyborg gerontology in hopes of appreciating how networked computer-human cyborgs (Acronym: NCHC; Pronounced: nick-hick; Spelled: nikhic) get composed and the kinds of things that nikhics (Definition: networked computer-human cyborgs) should be composing. I had long since understood that computer-enhanced life exists for us when we become self-regulating organisms that combine the natural and artificial together in one system; when we become the amalgam of our hearts, motherboards, circulatory and operating systems, program applications, neural networks, stored text files, mouse roller-balls, and on-screen pointers; that is to say, when we submit, however intermittently, to the power of hardware-driven software prostheses to publish the invisible file systems, iterated computer interfaces, and random on-screen movements that are all, quite literally, appendages of complexly prosthetized nikhics. But, for all this, I had failed to account for the compositional influence that regularly upgraded software appendages must exert on our abilities to compose stories about something so basic as human aging. When that strange evening began, I believed that unequal parts of ethanol, hypermedial intertext, and eternity would combine in my performance of "thanatophobia, denial, and the middle-aged dipsomaniac" to produce a pleasing, decidedly bittersweet affair with human life in
the shadow of death. What I did not anticipate was that, at the height of my revels, my human affair with death in the cradle of the eternal would combine with an equal dose of computer instrumentality to produce an alternate, incommensurate, nikhic sense of life-in-time, one driven by the compressed, posthuman rhythms of endlessly renewable nikhic prostheses. But that is what happened, and that is how I came to understand that when we allow ourselves to be composed as nikhics, we cannot help but experience the compressed cycle of "death" and "life" that emerges through the ongoing process of program upgrades, overwrites, and erasures. It is also how I came to see that the more intimately involved we become with our computers, the more intense this posthuman experience must become for us, the more the ideology of "computer renewal" will overwrite the ideology of "human aging," and the more this conflict should become the subject of nikhic compositions.

Convinced that composition studies should forge a connection with politically inflected cyborg gerontology, I am recommending that we thoroughly acquaint ourselves with the cyborg body electric, its culturally constituted cycle of "death" and "life," before continuing down the path cleared by such notables as Pamela Gilbert, who, in "Meditations Upon Hypertext: A Rhetorethics of Cyborgs," suggested that we rely upon self-knowledge to resolve a whole range of ethical dilemmas she associates with hypertextual reading/writing. "Although it is not always possible to 'know' the other voices in the hypertext in the richly contextualized, long term fashion prescribed by the feminist care-respect model," Gilbert concludes, "it is possible to know one's own selves in that way – that is, to narrate the selves . . . in a way that is consistent with one's own narratives of self and Other and which maintains them in a caring manner" (267). To be
sure, Gilbert makes an interesting point where she argues that "self-knowledge and self-expression become not merely a right but a responsibility" for hypertext readers/writers who understand that issues of identity and ethos are always involved in their various encounters with electronic text (267, emphasis added). But I would quickly add that nikhics at the time of this writing must fail to live up to the responsibilities that Gilbert establishes for them because present-day nikhics lack self-knowledge; because they cannot know themselves; because none of them can answer even this most basic of questions: "How old am I?"

Of course, if we hope to answer this question and, in the same breath, approach rudimentary nthic self-knowledge -- an affective/intellectual state that has neither been established as a cyborg right or responsibility -- then networked scholars, critics, and teachers must begin the hard work of perceiving and, thereafter, interrogating the fundamental social unit of networked computer-human society: the regularly upgrading nthic. When we ground our cyborg-oriented propositions on statements, or assumptions, to the effect that the "liberatory potential" of networked computer technology is "only actualized to the extent the human user is able to do so" (Gilbert 255, emphasis added), we do something other than, for example, establish a "cyborg rhetorethics." We demonstrate that self-identified "human" scholars, critics, and teachers 1) recognize "human computer-users" when faced with networked members of the cyborg body politic; 2) develop weak theories about computer-prosthetized life that make the least of historically specific, culturally constituted, categorical differences between human beings and nikhics; and 3) socially justify knowledges about networked composition that diminish our capacities for making strong cyborg interventions into any of the ongoing
conversations about computers and composition. Then, too, we call attention to the fact that "cyborged" human educators oftentimes publish essays that stand on the problem of "cyborg composition" but stumble where they fail to perceive or privilege their faint perceptions of historically realized computer-human frames of cyborg being -- i.e., essays like Gilbert's "Meditations" and, as we shall see, those devoted to "Literacy and the Body Electric" in *Literacy in the Age of the Internet*.

My immediate goal in writing this essay will be, of course, to redress this weakness in composition studies: to toughen the relationship of compositionists to cyborg theory; to press for acceptance of the idea that "human being" and "nikhic" are culturally differentiated experiential categories; to advance nikhic self-knowledge by demonstrating that posthuman "nikhic aging" comes hard on the heels of frequent program upgrades, overwrites, and erasures; to point out that "nikhic aging" pressures nikhics to vacillate schizophrenically between moments of "resurgent youth" and "accelerated decrepitude"; to argue that ongoing nikhic vacillations between "resurgent youth" and "accelerated decrepitude" amount to yet another peculiar expression of postmodernism, or the cultural logic of late capitalism; and, finally, to propose that nikhics not only identify "accelerated decrepitude" as the dominant face of "nikhic aging" but, also, respond to it by composing what might be called "The Universal Order of Gray Cyberpanthers."

To substantiate these positions, I propose to investigate the following. I shall examine texts by Beth Kolko, Cynthia Haynes, and Raul Sanchez (*Literacy in the Age of the Internet*) for further evidence that compositionists either fail to perceive or privilege their perception of the nikhic. Next, my study will revisit this evidence in light of Monique Wittig's findings on historical and biological experiential categories: first,
biological categories -- like man, woman, lesbian, heterosexual, human being, human lifespan, nikhic, and nikhic lifespan -- are, instead, historico-discursive categories that one may resist and change; and, second, the "natural" body, being a historico-discursive category, is a cultural apparatus for producing politically contradictory, oppressive, and contestable renditions of something called "the body." Suddenly free to arrange "human" and "human lifespan" alongside "nikhic" and "nikhic lifespan" as two agonistic historico-discursive frame sets for producing "the body," I shall explore the way that cultural "speed," or human "rates of information exchange," erases the contradictory understanding that rapid information exchange is the "natural" expression of nikhics caught in the tight rhythms of prosthetic "aging" and "renewal." After having noted that prosthetic "aging" and "renewal" not only emerge within the networked cyborg's computer-human "frame of being" but, also, appear to us as stable "activity genres," or "forms of life," that give historical concreteness to nikhic identities, I shall then look to David Russell's "activity theory" for a means of justifying the idea that current "human" compositions of the "the body" should be revised in the light of a new, highly reproducible, social activity genre: the aging nikhic. A return at this juncture to Jameson's "Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" will allow us to see that our freshly justified cyborg body responds powerfully to the cultural pressures that produce postmodern schizophrenia and, predictably, breaks into tightly wound, alternating flows of "resurgent youth" and "accelerated decrepitude."

Bearing this in mind, and depending upon whether one defines the "nikhic lifespan" singularly, in terms of the computer-specific rhythms of nikhic upgrade, overwrite, and erasure, or dialectically, in light of the contradiction that exists between
the nikhic's "computer" (read: compressed) and "human" (read: extended) lifespans, one will finally be able to supply an answer to that most basic of cyborg questions: "How old am I?" For those seeking a singular, computer-specific, prosthesis-localized solution to the problem, the answer amounts to the quantification of postmodern schizophrenia, that is, one-zero-one-zero-one-zero. For those willing to forgo the allure of this appealing but nonetheless premature solution and, thereafter, to solve the problem in terms of the computer-human "age" dialectic, their answer should come to an unquantifiable "old."

Although nikhics of position and privilege, for example, Bill Gates, should find it easier to withstand the geriatric force of cyborg accelerated decrepitude, the cyborg body politic -- being subject to the logic of late capitalism -- will always contain more citizens who lag behind the upgrade curve, contain masses of obsolete prosthetics, grow weary from the posthuman pace of "cyborg renewal," and become "old" (i.e., culturally obsolete) at "human age" 47, 37, 27, or 17. And this, of course, informs my reason for believing that networked educators and their students should begin to work out the rules and play the serious game of transforming politically disorganized, geriatric nikhics into "The Universal Order of Gray Cyberpanthers."

**Composing the Nikhic Body**

Before we can affect any of these changes, we will need to determine why compositionists have either failed to perceive or privilege their momentary perceptions of the nikhic body. Essays by Beth Kolko, Cynthia Haynes, and Raul Sanchez, comprising that section of *Literacy Theory in the Age of the Internet* devoted to "Literacy and the Body Electric," make clear why compositionists have struggled to perceive the nikhic body and, on the strength of this, advance strong cyborg interventions into the ongoing
conversations about computers and composition.

For Beth Kolko, the computer prosthetic is a tool that human beings use to invent virtual identities, not an integral component of the nikhic body. Knowing as she does that activity in virtual space impacts physical bodies, Kolko requires that we interject accountability into the idea of cyberspace as a place of multiple textual selves. She points out that those who create dialogic, electronic voices often argue that physical selves have "no claim to and no responsibility for the words" they throw into "virtual environments" (62), even though online interaction evokes visceral reactions, affecting "the meat left behind" (65). Troubled by anything that might weaken our crucial sense of writing as expression with impact and consequence, Kolko recommends that we "reconcile multiple selves with accountability for words and actions" by adopting strategies of discursive resistance (72). We should use multiple subject positions online to interrupt the very notion of the unified self, thereby creating social structures and political formations that benefit the living body, while they demonstrate that language can be used as a political, consequential tool. Sound as this advice is for the "human" "computer" "user," it does and can do nothing to acknowledge or respond to the existence of a nikhic subject.

Cynthia Haynes comes closer than Kolko to presenting her reader with a picture of self-regulating nikhics but stops short of turning her faint perception of the cyborg body into a bona fide cyborg intervention into the ongoing conversation about computers and composition. Hoping to establish that rhetoric and composition will thrive in a postdisciplinary matrix of "rhetorical and textual writing technologies" (88), Haynes points out that artificial intelligence in the form of "intelligent agents" may transform computer applications and even writing classrooms into intelligent computer programs.
that will learn the habits of their human authors, "troll databases" and do student-directed research, or, perhaps, even "learn the habits of other 'authors'" and help students to plagiarize (89). Still, she passes on her clear opportunity for merging students and computers into a population of nikhic bodies. Instead, she forces the students she discusses to remain separate from the machines that will do work for or upon them by undermining the power of "prostheses" to merge with human bodies in the creation of nikhic subjectivities. Haynes uses the word "prosthesis" to mean everything from a profound and anguished recognition that we have loses we cannot regenerate; to tools we use ("prosthetic extensions" of human beings); to employees of the academy ("prosthetic agents"); to ways of communicating ("prosthetic rhetorics"); to contents that we teach to students ("prosthetic rhetorics of critical literacy") and, finally, to feelings that teachers have toward technology, namely, the sensation that teaching with computers is like wearing a prosthesis and the fear that technology amputates the self (79, 81, 85, 87).

Without a stronger cyborg orientation toward the range of fully integrated computer-human prosthetics, Haynes has little chance of pressing her faint perception of the nikhic body into a sustained treatise on embodied cyborg subjectivities.

To his credit, Raul Sanchez comes the closest to making a genuinely helpful contribution to a cyborg theory of writing, even though he, too, falls short of perceiving the living nikhic. By pointing out that what usually passes for multiple subjectivity in a MUD is in fact the "illusion of a unified Enlightenment subject trying on different roles" but nonetheless "maintaining the idea of a core being that exists apart from discursive exigencies" (103), he arrests compositionists in their tendency to reinscribe the "centuries-old split between mind and body" (94). He criticizes computer-oriented writing
pedagogies that draw upon a "mind/body dualism that has thus far characterized many of our visions of cyberspace" (95). Although he makes no effort to collapse the human/computer dualism that characterizes our theoretic and practical encounters with nikhic citizens, he refuses to sanction the idea that changing one's name, description, or behavior in "cyberspace" extends the mind beyond the limits of "the body," which he insists, following Judith Butler, is not an "ontologically prior" category that falls "beyond the purview of discourse, or representation" (96).

This tactic of his is, as I have suggested, a potential help to the cyborg theorist. Because he denies the biologic primacy of the organic body while preserving "the body" as the discursive limit for that which we call "the mind," Sanchez rightly establishes 1) that "the body" is an historic, discursive construct; 2) that the boundary for this historico-discursive "body" is both arbitrary and an imaginary overlay that conforms, more or less, with the limits of that which we call "the organic human body"; and 3) that "the body," once established as an arbitrary, historico-discursive limit, must be considered a well-defined, non-dualistic container for that which we call "the mind." Given that "the body," as Sanchez describes it, is both an arbitrary construct and, thereafter, a well-defined container, the idea of "the body" may be used by cyborg composition theorists to advance the following perspective: the arbitrarily established, well-defined, historico-discursive boundary that we call "the body" may and should be reestablished at a different arbitrary, historico-discursive limit when circumstances demand that we recognize and respect the presence of a new well-defined, non-dualistic container for "the mind."

The trick, of course, at this point, is to establish that current circumstance is, in fact, pressing compositionists to reestablish "the body" at a new historico-discursive limit.
and, at the same time, to refocus our vision so that we can perceive the unbroken outline of the nikhic body. Unless we reach these ends, compositionists will have good reason to continue down the capable path they have already cleared, interjecting accountability into the idea of cyberspace as a place of multiple textual selves (Kolko), advancing the idea that rhetoric and composition will thrive in a post-disciplinary matrix of rhetorical and textual writing technologies (Haynes), resisting our pedagogic tendency to reinscribe the centuries-old split between mind and body (Sanchez), and maintaining our narratives of self and Other in a caring manner (Gilbert). After all, if a new "body" is not being pressed into existence and this new "body" is invisible to the discerning eye, then compositionists may as well follow those who have described the undivided human mind/body that uses computers, thrives in a post-disciplinary matrix, takes responsibility for the impact and consequences of its computer writing, and exercises care when constructing hypermedial narratives.

As the saying goes, if it ain't broke.

Yet, as I have suggested, we have both means and reasons to perceive and respond productively to a new historico-discursive embodied limit -- the nikhic.

We have, in the first place, Monique Wittig's politically-inflected critique of "natural" experiential categories to help us establish grounds for making visible the new embodied limit. According to Wittig, systems of domination are built upon material and economic divisions that the Masters abstract, turn into concepts, and present as naturally occurring divisions of labor. For a slave class to resist its oppression, it must work to expose the social oppositions that ground the seemingly "natural differences" that "justify" oppression. Wittig takes women as her example of a slave class that must expose
a "natural category," in this case "sex," as being the product of a system of domination that casts society as being, for example, fundamentally heterosexual and an instrument through which women are forced into heterosexual roles that include the compulsory reproduction of the species. Seen from this perspective, "sex," the historico-discursive category, does not concern "being" but relationships and explodes the idea that women's oppression is both biological and historical. Proceeding from this awareness, Wittig argues that women should work to constitute themselves as the subjects of their own history, one that liberates both men and women from the man/woman system of social opposition and oppression even as it disallows the continued existence of "man" and "woman," that is, the "natural" two-gender system that shackles women to "heterosexual biology" (1-20).

What Wittig says has obvious importance for women, but cyborg theorists should recognize an instrument in Wittig's general theory of "natural categories" both for reestablishing "the body" at a new historico-discursive arbitrary limit and for gauging the nikhic's need for such redefinition. After all, nikhics, following Wittig, find themselves bound by a system of domination that naturalizes differences not between man and woman but between human beings and computing machines. Nikhics exist within a system of domination that forces them to support the "natural" division between humans and machines; to exist within a society that is fundamentally human; to valorize the human penchant for protracted aging, biological death, and gradual decay; and to suppress the computer's upgrade-related, alternating flows of "resurgent youth" and "accelerated decrepitude" that need to be recognized as contributing to the cyborg's sense of life-in-time.
Some may object at this point, saying that my pretense of subjecting inanimate machines to ageist practices does nothing either to disprove that "age" is essentially a biological matter and "ageism" a cultural concern, or to justify expanding "the body" to a new computer-human limit. People grow old, and machines are machines, the counterargument might begin. And then it might continue, "We have long since understood that age plays a vital role in current systems of oppression. We know that the combination of industrialism and advanced capitalism oftentimes results in older people losing their jobs to younger people, that age discrimination is a deeply troubling component of the human world, but, also, that the troubling existence of ageist practices does nothing to shift the rate at which bodies age from a biological to a historico-discursive category."

Such objections, however, miss the point entirely. The rise of networked society has exposed the ideological limits of those who believe that "ageism" is a cultural concern and "age" a natural course that we may attempt to influence only through, for example, pharmaceutical (cyborg) interventions. If a cyborg's computer-influenced sense of life-in-time gets produced by that easily discernible, ongoing practice of program upgrades, overwrites, and erasures -- a sense of life-in-time that embodies the compressed, posthuman rhythms of endlessly renewable cyborg prostheses -- then the nikhic's "computer age" comes in opposition to its "human age," and, more importantly, the nikhic's age/age self-contained system of domination and oppression becomes historically and discursively established as something other than a naturally occurring division of labor. What might have seemed like a naturally occurring division of labor when it emerges within the "human" community becomes an culturally occurring set of
contradictory posthuman aging "realities" when it emerges within the "nikhic" community.

If one needs additional proof, perhaps an obvious display of this pervasive computer-human system of domination and oppression, I hasten to point out that the structural concreteness and reach of historico-discursive systems of domination and oppression are often best grasped through attention to erasures of difference rather than their manifest presence. The absent presence of strong cyborg perspectives from treatises on, for example, the problems of cultural "speed" (i.e., high rates of information exchange) should be sufficient to demonstrate the extent to which the nikhic's "computer age" has been erased from contemporary discourse and, as such, justify an overwriting of the "human" with the "nikhic" body.

Frederic Jameson's "The Antinomies of Postmodernism" is my case in point. In his essay, Jameson argues that "speed" creates "time" in postmodern culture. Through their rapid turn over of images, representational apparatuses -- like cameras, projectors, televisions, and computers -- produce the seeming speed of the outside world in postmodern culture and make a serious "demand on reality." A "reality" that is constantly being photographed/printed, filmed/projected, and digitized/pixelated must "scramble" to keep up with representation, with the effect being that we read our subjectivity off the outside of things/representations. The effects of this, Jameson says, are manifold. The old opposition between "clock time and lived time," between "measurement and life," drops away. Opposing feelings of external transience and slow internal permanence die out, and we (read: human beings) find ourselves living in a period of "change without its opposite," an age wherein space and time (object and subject) seem to be identical.
Creating a new postmodern subject, Jameson suggests, requires merely that one be willing to refurnish rooms or "destroy them in an aerial bombardment." A new identity will appear in the "ruins of the old," proving that subjectivity has become what Jameson calls "an objective matter" (51-52).

What Jameson's says about the shaping effects of "speed" on postmodern culture is essentially correct and, for this, will inform the closing moments of this essay. But it is also true that Jameson's reified use of "speed" to account for changes in the temporal, affective dispositions of postmodern subjects, rather than "prosthetic upgrade, overwrite, and erasure" masks the way in which "change without its opposite" describes the upgrading nikhic's highly compressed cycle of computer "death" and "life," and "informational speed" translates directly into "communication betweennikhics who grow old and young, at least in part, through their specialized habit of 'communicating' software upgrades, overwrites, and erasures throughout nikhic activity systems." More importantly, because we, like Jameson, have grown accustomed to reifying postmodern "speed," we fail to recognize our hand in suppressing very real differences between nikhic and human subjects, not the least of which has to do with the manner in which nikhics grow old and young. In other words, we force nikhics (read: ourselves) to participate in an age/age oppositional system of domination and oppression, wherein nikhics are constrained to age like "humans" and to discuss the speed-driven formation of postmodern "human" subjectivities, when they might be better off working to understand the nikhic aging process and to publicize and politicize the more apt study of cyborg gerontology.

Surely, there can be no doubt that software is material to the nikhic, that informational "speed" is a function of nikhic activity, and that nikhic activity produces in
part a highly compressed, regenerative cycle of "death" and "life" through iterated patterns of program upgrade, overwrite, and erasure. The unshakable reality of the situation seems a genuine, even pressing reason for compositionists to reestablish "the body" at a new historico-discursive limit. But the question of "how" still remains. How can we train ourselves to "see" this body long enough and often enough to permit us to respond to it in our theorizing and pedagogy? How, indeed, can we set our sights on the unbroken outline of the nikhic body and, at the same time, convince ourselves that the compositionist's job must now expand to deal with the politico-ontological, as well as the politico-rhetorical, compositions of composing cyborgs?

In this instance, compositionists are fortunate to have a ready solution at the heart of contemporary composition theory. David Russell's activity theory, when calibrated to work with the cyborg problematic, allows us to perceive both the nikhic's "body" and "lifespan" as social activity genres, or "frames for social action." According to Russell, the influence of sociology and anthropology on composition studies has provided a fresh way of looking at writing. While he maintains that genre in the traditional sense of a static category of texts that share certain formal features is still important to any principled analysis, he argues that "genre" refers to something much greater than textual forms with definable features, namely, "forms of life," "ways of being," or "frames for social action." Genres, he says, emerge out of activity systems, which, he explains, are collectives (often organizations) that cohere for indefinite periods of time; share common purposes, objects, and motives; and use certain tools, both mechanical and discursive, in certain ways. Through routine tool-use, individuals and collectives within activity systems create, recreate, and temporarily stabilize a range of activity genres, from identities, to objects, to
motives, to material and discursive tools. Understood in this context, "genre" is the result of social activities, or, the tool-mediated ways that individuals in a discreet or linked social activity system interact purposefully and dialectically with others in the same discreet or linked activity system. Appearing as they do within diverse environments, ranging from family units to corporate settings, genres may be everything from grocery lists, to environments for learning and teaching, to the socially constructed lifespan of heavily prosthетized nikhics ("Activity Theory"; "Rethinking Genre").

Cyborg-calibrated activity theory provides compositionists with a useful tool for framing both the nikhic "body" and "lifespan." It allows us to see that someone sitting in front of an upgrading computer exists within the nikhic frame of being, replete with its "human age" - "computer age" dialectic. It makes us fully capable of perceiving the wide range of nikhics that take shape across ranges of both isolated and linked nikhic activity systems. It even sensitizes us to the fact that different activity systems produce different versions of the nikhic's "body" and "lifespan." On the one hand, we recognize that members of the technological underclasses who rarely upgrade their prostheses will tend to forge casual relationships to their nikhic bodies and lifespans. For their part, citizens of the Third World who may have little or no contact with networked computers will have no regular means of creating, experiencing, recreating, or annihilating what is personally unavailable or unimportant to them: temporal and embodied frames of nikhic being. On the other hand, we recognize the existence of a nikhic esprit de corps, those economically privileged citizens who tend to reside in the technologically advanced First World, who connect regularly to the Internet, who upgrade their software prostheses frequently, and who experience the rhythm of upgrade as a more or less stable genre that appears across a
range of highly differentiated but nonetheless linked activity systems.

And, for our having gained the power to see such things, we, as self-identified nikhic compositionists, can accept that compositionist's job must now expand to deal with the ontological, political, and rhetorical compositions of composing cyborgs. That is to say, we must begin to work with our nikhic students to help both them and us to recognize and compose intelligently about, for example, the social oppositions that constrain nikhics to suppress "computer" generated "accelerated decrepitude" and "resurgent youth; to valorize "protracted human aging," "biological death," and "gradual decay"; in other words, to erase the dialectical play of computer-human "age" genres that are at the core of nikhic being and, for that, constitute such things as the nikhic's ontological, epistemological, and affective cultural dispositions.

**Composing Answers and Reply**

So, we return to the point of origin. Equipped now with tools, on the one hand, for creating human and nikhic "bodies" and "lifespans" as frames of being, or social activity genres, replete with historically constructed arbitrary limits, and, on the other hand, for identifying the "human" age/ "computer" age oppositional dialect that generates the nikhic's sense of life-in-time through the regular suppression of disqualified "computer" age by natural "human" age and the regular disruption of natural "human" age by disqualified "computer" age -- we may attempt to quantify the First World nikhic's dialectical polyrhythms of "death and life" (read: computer aging) and "life and death" (read: human aging) that, one night not so long ago, disrupted my celebration of "biologic," "gradual," "relentless," "human aging and death."

As I stated earlier, one's answer to the question will depend entirely upon whether
one calculates nikhic age singularly, in terms of the computer-specific rhythms of 
upgrade, overwrite, and erasure, or dialectically, in light of the contradiction that exists 
between the nikhic's "computer" (read: compressed) and "human" (read: protracted) 
lifespans. My understanding is that one has no choice but to read the nikhic's internalized 
age/age dialectic when attempting to quantify any nikhic's age. Because, however, the 
singular approach produces an answer that amounts to the quantification of postmodern 
schizophrenia and, as such, resonants with critical assessments of postmodernism, not the 
least of which is Jameson's "Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 
I would like to begin by solving for the nikhic's "computer" lifespan.

Taken by itself, the ongoing process of "computer" upgrade instills a 
discontinuous private temporality in the living subject and, for that, imparts a 
"schizophrenic" identity structure. If Jameson is correct in suggesting that identity is a 
function of language and that coherent identity occurs when living subjects are able to 
arrange statements about themselves in unbroken chains of coherent syntactical units, 
then we may conclude, with him, that living subjects become schizophrenic when their 
syntactic relationship to themselves breaks down, when the links in their personal 
signifying chain snap into "heaps of fragments," that is, when subjects can no longer unify 
the "past, present, and, future" of their own biographical experiences or psychic lives. 
When this happens and living subjects appear amidst a "rubble of distinct and unrelated 
signifiers," these subjects exist in a time of the present that cannot focus itself on 
"activities" and "intentionalities" over time. The present of the world, Jameson explains, 
comes before schizophrenic subjects with heightened intensity and engulfs them with 
overwhelming vividness, bringing with it a "mysterious charge of affect," either negative
or positive. Typically schizophrenic subjects experience negative feelings of "anxiety and loss of reality" or positive feelings that come on with euphoric, "intoxicatory," or "hallucinogenic intensity" ("Postmodernism" 71-73).

Viewed from this perspective, nikhics -- composed through an ongoing process of program upgrades, overwrites, and erasures -- have, as a matter of course, their own biographical signifying chains broken, restarted, and broken again, resulting in a fragmentary, emotionally charged practice that passes easily for postmodern schizophrenia. In this context, nikhic age can never advance beyond "one" because frequent upgrades force nikhics to set their prosthetic clocks back to zero. When calculated in this way, a fair response to the nikhic question "How old am I?" might be "one-zero-one-zero-one-zero."

Additional proof that a schizophrenic binary accounts for the lived experience of upgrading nikhics comes from the additional fact that frequent upgrades, overwrites, and erasures bring with them the heightened intensity, vividness, and charge of positive or negative affect that Jameson binds to the experience of postmodern schizophrenia. Intoxicatory or hallucinogenic intensity capable of freeing nikhics from their own biographical experience or psychic life surfaces in a fascinating Usenet post by Michael Soibelman, unabashed champion of the SuSE linux operating system. In his post to alt.os.linux.suse, Soibelman writes ecstatically about the revitalizing, hallucinogenic experience that comes through a program of frequent upgrades, overwrites, and erasures:

Hey everybody,
Here I go again....I finally got a paycheck and just bought 7.2 Professional...I've been upgrading ever since 6.0 (gave up on RedHat by then since its hardware detection wasn't very good and didn't care for
Gnome much)...Now I'm just a SuSE junkie...Gotta get the next one....and the next...This stuff is great....

It's now about 1:00 P.M. and I'm rebooting to DVD....

Since I always manually select my packages I should be back this evening provided I don't take too many breaks...a 25 mile bike ride sounds good.

Mmmmmmm...Take a deep breath.....breath out....breath in.....realax....

REBOOTING>>>>>>>>:)

By his own admission, Soibelman experiences the euphoric feeling of resurgent youth that erupts out of the nikhic's "computer age" genre. A self-described SuSE junkie, he cannot wait to have his identity disrupted with a new version of the same program. The experience is all the more exciting for him because he likes to dig in and commit himself to rebuilding himself: he always manually selects his packages (i.e., programs). This is not the first time he has done this, nor will it be the last. After all, rebooting for Soibelman is more than a little like sex, the little death, with all the iconographic force of ejaculation ">>>>>>>>" and tremulous satisfaction ":)  :)."

Yet feelings of resurgent youth are only one side of the nikhic's "computer age" genre. The other side is dominated by feelings of accelerated decrepitude, or, what Jameson refers to as "anxiety" and "loss of reality." In his article "Too Old to Write Code?" James Lardner makes a strong case that counterbalancing charges of negative affect, concretized as feelings of accelerated decrepitude, erupt when nikhic's compose themselves through frequent upgrades, overwrites, and erasures. For Lardner, the problem begins with the "critical shortage of computer programmers" that seems to be haunting the computer industry. Having noted that there seems to be a real shortage of software engineers, with estimates that "core" jobs in the computer industry outnumber computer-science majors 3:1, Lardner points to an anomaly in the system. Ageism strikes software
developers at a peculiarly young "human" age. Even if new computer skill sets are comparatively easy for programmers to learn, software industry careers tend to be short-lived, with the half-life of a software or hardware engineer being only a few years and with careers that have the "life expectancy rivaling that of a pro football player." Lardner brings this point home by quoting a 27 year old Hewlett Packard programmer, who says, "We're all scared." "First there's a shortage -- then people respond, and," he says, "you get kind of a glut with the particular skill," The problem for this programmer is that a newer technology always comes along and takes its place. "The new skill may not be that hard to learn," he says, "but the perception of the industry is that you can't learn it. There's a whole marketing mantra that goes with it, even if it's not really that new." From this, he predicts, "only half-jokingly," there will be programmers out on the street a few years down the road "carrying signs that read 'Will Code for Food.'"

The fact that Lardner's interview reveals that programmers, with life expectancies rivaling those of pro football players, are "scared" and imagining the day when they will "code for food" demonstrates the power of upgrade to break the signifying chain that composes the nikhic identity genre and, in this instance, to produce feelings of panic in the face of an inescapable, accelerated decrepitude.

The appearance of a predictable, double-faced, upgrade-related charge of affect underwrites the logic behind adding resurgent youth (age 1) to accelerated decrepitude (age 0) en route to a schizophrenic solution (one-zero-one-zero-one-zero) to the nikhic question, "How old am I?" The problem with this solution, however, is that it is partial. Nikhics contain not one but two "age" genres, the "computer" and the "human," and they "age" according to the dialectical play of these oppositional genres. Nikhics, it would
appear, compose their sense of life-in-time through what I have already called the regular suppression of their disqualified "computer" age by their natural "human" age and the regular disruption of their natural "human" age by their disqualified "computer" age. In other words, nikhics privilege their humanity, believing as they oftentimes do that fortieth birthdays deserve to be celebrated with a little too much drink, a little too much poetry, a little too much song. At the same time, they cannot help but feel the disruptive charge -- both positive and negative -- of their suppressed "computer age" genre wherever it erupts. More importantly, they must tend to experience this charge as negative affect in the concretized form of accelerated decrepitude whenever it erupts in the increasingly computer-intensive work environments that are consonant with business-practice in the age of late capital. That is to say, computer upgrade, or the activity genre that produces nikhic feelings of insurgent youth, is thrilling, but it cannot insulate even the nikhic esprit de corps from the economic forces that drive the pace of "computer upgrade" and the feelings of accelerated decrepitude that frequently accompany the computerization of professions and work environments.

And what is the upshot of all this? Simply put, if trained professionals in high-tech work environments cannot keep pace with the rate of information exchange (read: nikhic communication) that forces reality to "scramble" to keep up with representation and constrains postmodern subjects to exist in a time of change without its opposite (Jameson "Antinomies"), then what hope is there for the rest of us? What hope is there for the collective of nikhic compositionists, who may well lose their collective rights to tenure because tenure only "makes sense" when one uses the human "age" genre as the basis for composing "life-time" contracts; because, schools and universities are being run
increasingly like and by corporations; and because "human" compositionists will never be able to keep pace with the daunting corporate version of "nikhic" upgrade, overwrite, and erasure that already haunts other systemically linked members of the nikhic esprit de corps? Indeed, what hope is there for our nikhic students when there may be little or no hope for us?

The truth, finally, is that there is really only one viable, nonspecific answer to the nikhic question, "How old am I?" We as nikhics are all born "old." Nikhics can be rendered obsolete, or at least dislocated, at "human" ages ranging from 37, to 27, to 17, to 7. Even worse, we are born "old" into the course of a protracted "human" lifespan, an experience that cannot help but express the corporate driven collision of incommensurate "computer" and "human" "age" genres except through the eruption of schizophrenic moments that amount to what Jameson calls the underside of culture, the "blood, torture, death and horror" that mark all of class history ("Postmodernism" 57).

What then, given this, is a nikhic compositionist to do? There are no easy answers to this next most basic of nikhic questions. But I can suggest that we begin to work toward an answer by adapting a page from Wittig's "book" and accepting this as our charge: nikhics must work to constitute themselves as the subjects of their own history, one that liberates them from the computer/human dualism that hides the system of social opposition and oppression that makes this shocking demand on reality: youth, middle-age, and old-age must all be gray. We must accept that the unshakable reality of our situation demands that we reestablish "the body" at a new historico-discursive limit and, more importantly, that we recognize that ageism has now become a pervasive, systemically invisible virus of epidemic proportions. We have no alternative but to
dispense with the notion that we have the right to be "young" on grounds that an
unjustified, systemically oppressive reverence for youth is tantamount in the right cultural
moment to suicide or murder. We must accept the "fact," at least for now, that we have all
become "old"; that a profound and unmarked social contradiction thrives in every nikhic
frame of social being; that "accelerated decrepitude" in this and then this and then this
schizophrenic moment, must unite against "resurgent youth"; that we, as geriatric nikhics,
must take an aggressive stand against the way that this culture manufactures and disposes
of its old/young/old; that, finally, we must identify ourselves as belonging to the
Universal Order of Gray Cyberpanthers, if for no other reason that we would prefer to age
and die with protracted dignity.

Or, perhaps, we should simply look the other way, concede the battle, have
another drink, read a little poetry, and sing, once more, in still faltering tones: "If I make
you happy today / I'm the perfect age. / As for tomorrow, / turn the page."
The Processions of Capital

A "Hidden Trap Door" Theory

It is not impossible that our own Model will die a violent death, ruthlessly smashed by an unprovoked assault of new forms -- unprovoked as the nova of 1572.

C.S. Lewis, The Discarded Image

"Understand in order that thou mayest believe my words; believe in order that thou mayest understand the Word of God." When Saint Augustine wrote these words, he not only reduced the problem of knowing-in-the-world to its simplest determinants. He also managed to reduce the problem of knowing-in-the-world to its inevitable foundation in nothing more substantial than ungrounded belief in those words, those "god terms," that gain their power, according to our creed, to fashion the known world that appears to us, in faith, for what it is. We have all been confronted by a challenging statement from a peer, or a deucedly difficult problem in our daily encounters with the objective world. When so confronted, we do what we must to support us in accepting or rejecting the object of our dismay. Yet the process by which we proceed from and then come into understanding is an awful process, for it always turns and then stands on faith in the most basic of our understandings, understandings that we do not even take for or experience as faith, understandings about the nature of the known world.

What I have just written is, of course, of no particular interest to people who specialize in the theory of symbolic action. That which I have written is according to their
Theorists of symbolic action know that people's various understandings of the world and being-in-the-world follow from faith in this or that paradigmatic "god term" that by procession from "the Word" creates for them "the heaven and the earth," or that world which must exist as it does if they are to "Understand in order that thou mayest believe my words." Yet for all its obviousness, this introductory aside on the role of faith in the procession of understanding is of import to theorists of symbolic action. For, today, their unquestioned faith in one longstanding, virtually invisible "god term" for "the heaven and the earth" not only allows them to understand the workings of symbolic action but bars them from understanding how symbolic action operates in the early twenty-first century, how symbolic action operates in light of a new "Word of God," or "Godhead" that, today, creates "the heaven and the earth" after a fashion that one must understand in order to believe, and believe in order to understand.

In order that "thou mayest believe my words," let us advance through digression on the matter of symbolic action as theorized by Thomas Kent. Kent has done good work in describing the procession of symbolic action as it occurs within the shared world. To his credit, he has reduced symbolic action to its simplest determinants. According to Kent, wherever one encounters a symbol user locked in meaningful exchange, one encounters a) one language user, b) a second language user, and c) a shared world. For Kent, symbolic exchange between complete strangers who succeed only in confounding each other because they speak alien languages is reducible to the exact same set of three determinants that operates when travelers intimate with each other's thoughts engage in the practice of symbolic exchange. When one language user encounters another anywhere in the unfamiliar or familiar world, one language user passes a message to another across
a novel, never before experienced space in a world they both happened upon and so share between them. In Kent's formulation, one language user invariably attempts, however imperfectly, to close the space between the first and second language user by triangulating their ever-changing, metonymically interchangeable locations in the contemporaneous world through reference to that world they have come upon and so share. Because this shared world in Kent's theory is nothing more organized or articulated than "the shared world," that is, the world happened upon by language users in each new and, thus, relatively unstructured moment in this world, Kent's language users never rise to the point of becoming "agents" who exercise decisive control over their symbolic acts. Neither do they ever know with any degree of certainty what their counterpart is thinking or how their counterpart in metonymic procession will respond to any attempted symbolic triangulation. As a result of their happenstance meeting in Kent's "shared world," one language user and a second language user may never engage in anything that might pass for logical, codifiable symbolic practice. Instead, they necessarily engage in what Kent terms "paralogical hermeneutics," or the passing of messages between language users who must interpret their's and their counterpart's engagement with the ever-changing shared world and then take symbolic shots in the dark at communicating across the shared world that never develops into a scene that yields to anyone's interpretation.

So that we may better understanding why faith has barred twenty-first century symbolic analysts from understanding the most recent processions of symbolic action, let us digress a second time -- this time upon the matter of symbolic action as theorized by Kenneth Burke. Like Augustine and Kent, Burke reduces symbolic action to its simplest determinants. For Burke, symbolic action always reduces to the elements of drama: to
"act," what was done; "scene," when or where it was done; "agent," who did it; "agency," how the agent did it; and "purpose," why the agent did as the agent did. So powerful is Burke's dramatistic "grammar" that he was able to combine "scene," "agent," and "act" into "scene-agent" and "scene-act" dramatistic ratios -- those ratios that demonstrate that an agent and an agent's symbolic acts share synecdochically in the dramatistic scene that resembles for Burke the scene, or set, of an established albeit unscripted drama -- and in so doing suggests that Kent's storied version of the procession of being in "the heaven and the earth" is both true and less than true. When reduced to Burke's set of determinants, our experience of the world is not nearly so unstructured and unpredictable as Kent would have it. Because symbols users tend to operate within painfully familiar scenes that appear as they do because groups of symbol users have taken collective pains to organize scenes to the point of becoming painfully familiar, symbol users manage by and large to achieve fairly stable, socially situated, "self-subsistent," "unit" identities, capable of "proclaiming" their "peculiar natures" (Rhetoric 23). Language users, however novel their encounters, do seem to emerge as agents who operate within and as a part of established scenes populated, in dramatistic fashion, by other agents who also operate within and as a part of essentially knowable, agent-populated scenes. More importantly, and by dint of our faith in the descriptive and predictive power that follows from Burke's dramatistic ratios, we accept with Burke that individuated symbol users aspire to something more than Kent ever allows. Without ever escaping the metonymic pull of Kent's interchangeably novel paralogical triangulations that surely underpin our shared encounters in the known world, Burke's agents deploy rhetoric for the purpose of producing an imperfect consubstantiality with another agent who appears within their
shared Burkean scene. Even though Burke admits that, for example, agent "A is not identical with his colleague, B," Burke's scene of rhetoric is nonetheless capable of supporting, according to his creed, an imperfect "doctrine of consubstantiality," that states that "substance" is "an act," an "acting-together," that allows people to have "common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them consubstantial" (Rhetoric 20-21). When the world is figured, as it is in Burke's conception, as scene, and scene begets language users figured as agents, then materially distinct agents may use their control over language to achieve a heteroousian, symbolic "consubstantiality" -- that is, if one believes that agents may persuade others who share synecdochically in the same scene that they are conjoined by common interests, even when, as it happens, they are not (21).

Having advanced thus far upon my meaning by way of two digressions, I would revisit my earlier statement that theorists of symbolic action are, today, barred from understanding how symbolic action operates in the early twenty-first century due to their adherence to an unquestioned faith in a longstanding, virtually invisible "god term" that creates for them a hard-won version of "the heaven and the earth." Nothing I have advanced thus far could impel any understanding person to believe me in my contention. Kenneth Burke, after all, captured the general substance of my digressive remarks in more economical, straightforward fashion when he observed that symbol users make telling observations about being-in-the-world because they exercise their faith in the explanatory power of and potential for rational action implicit in certain summarizing words or nomenclatures that operate as "god terms" that sum up "a manifold of particulars under a single head" (Religion 2-3). Believe in the efficacy of Kent's paradigmatic "god terms" --
one language user, a second language user, and a shared world -- and one is inclined to
discover paralogical hermeneutics. Believe in the efficacy of Burke's dramatistic pentad,
and one may come upon the possibility of heterousian, symbolic consubstantiality; and
the notion that no one needs believe in an "entity named 'God'" in order to know that
"words 'about him' must reveal their nature as words"; and, finally, the understanding that
mortal symbol users act "somewhat as gods" when they use "god terms" to produce
heterousian, symbolic consubstantiality (Religion vi, 2).

With these words re-echoing and re-amplifying in our minds, let us indulge in one
last, more unexpected digression on the role of faith in our understanding of symbolic
action. Let us return to the work of Søren Kierkegaard who, like Burke and Augustine,
argues that one must have faith if one is to have understanding but who would dismiss as
so much poppycock Burke's remarks about the likeness of language users to the trinitarian
Godhead, and God's irrelevance to anyone's understanding of the terms for God. Long
after the supernova of 1572 appeared in the constellation Cassiopeia and impelled Tycho
Brahe to doubt the veracity of the Christian version of Ptolemaic cosmology, with its
portentous division between the mutable earth and incorruptible sky; and long after the
practiced engagement of modern science with our shared, scenic world succeeded in
displacing the Medieval science of theology from its supreme position in the world of
knowledge -- Kierkegaard, like Augustine, like Kent, like Burke, reduced symbolic action
to its simplest determinants. Faith and, thus, understanding of the double nature of
"procession" is all one needs, says Kierkegaard, to advance a theory of symbolic action
that features both Kent's experience of contemporaneous being in the shared world and
Burke's synecdochical participation in the scene of the organized world -- and to twist
them toward radically different ends. Kierkegaard's "Training in Christianity" asserts time and again that nothing may be deduced from the profane history of being-in-the-world that either proves or disproves the divinity of Christ or the persistent exercise of the trinitarian Godhead's shaping, sustaining influence upon the worldly scene. Nonplussed, Kierkegaard argues that nothing that happened as a consequence of Christ's being-in-the-world ever spoke to, will ever speak to the importance of Christ's appearance in world history. Only faith in the divinity of Christ can reveal that Christ was the same in humiliation on this earth as in his exaltation in heaven. Only faith in "Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and all things visible and invisible; the Son of God, the Lord Jesus Christ, "Begotten not made, consubstantial to the Father," "before all ages"; and the "Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of life, who" "proceeds, not by way of generation, but by way of spiration, from the Father and the Son together, as from a single principle" ("Nicene Creed" and "Holy Ghost") -- only by way of faith in the Procession of the Homoousian Consubstantiality of the trinitarian Godhead will anyone understand that "Christ's life on earth," was part of "sacred history, [which] stands for itself along outside of history" (409). Only by way of faith may anyone "go out in the street and perceive that it is God in this horrible procession," to "fall down and worship Him," to become "contemporary only with the age" in which one lives -- "and then one thing more: with Christ's life on earth" (410). Only by way of faith in the sacred procession in the profane procession of history will anyone understand that they, too, may be drawn into metonymically fragmented, synecdochically arranged, allegorically doubled attraction to a consubstantial, homoousian procession of life that both underpins and exceeds the heteroousian procession of life-in-time as described and contradicted first by paralogical
and then by dramatistic theories of symbolic action.

Having advanced through three digressions on the role of faith in establishing our understanding of symbolic action in "the heaven and the earth," I would now confess that my digressions were more a purposeful regression from Kent through Burke to Kierkegaard in order to make active in our imaginations the latent explanatory power that resides in what Raymond Williams described as a "residual formation." Williams argues that we tend to abstract "from 'epochal' analysis" -- with its "emphasis on dominant and definitive lineaments and features" of a "cultural process . . . seized as a cultural system" -- that which is "crucially necessary" for anyone wanting to connect processions within the dominant to "the future as well as the past" (121). That is, we tend to abstract from 'epochal analysis' the word and spirit of residual formations, or elements that were "effectively formed in the past," but that operate as an "active," "effective element" of contemporary "cultural process" (121-22). Those among us who like Kierkegaard still believe in the spiration of saving grace that follows from the homoousian procession of the trinitarian Godhead in creation make manifest that "god term" that underpins the secular operations of theorists like Burke and Kent who I contend may not understand the operations of symbolic action in the twenty-first century because they have longstanding faith in a virtually invisible "god term" that is invisible because we typically abstract from analysis of symbolic action both the word and spirit of Kierkegaard's "god term" for the world: God. We who believe in and understand how to theorize from a foundation in heteroousian nature deprived of spirit are not congenial toward the homoousian Godhead and, so, abstract homoousian consubstantiality from analysis of symbolic action. But, following Kierkegaard, we know that nothing ever happened in the great transfers from
the geocentric to the heliocentric to the acentric cosmos that ever disproved that the procession of life in the universe is a complex potentiality set in motion by the perfect simplicity of God, the prime mover; that the procession of life in the universe continues to exist only through direct influence of God; and that the procession of life-unto-death is redeemable only through faith in the procession of the Father, Father-in-the-Son; and the Holy Ghost by way of consubstantial spiration of the Father and Son. Indeed, my congenial re-insertion of spiritual matters typically abstracted from discussion of symbolic practice reminds us that Modern and Postmodern theories of symbolic action stand on nothing more substantial than ungrounded faith that we communicate in and across a sub-discursive world wherein every materially differentiated personage partakes in the common primary matter of the universe but experiences being-in-the-world through paralogical efforts to conjoin heterousian subjects in nothing more substantial than heterousian, purely symbolic "consubstantiality." From time to time, theorists like Donna Haraway remind us to engage with the object world as one would an "active entity," "an actor and agent, not a screen or a ground or a resource, never finally as a slave to the master that closes off the dialectic in his unique agency and authorship of 'objective' knowledge" (Simians 198). But even where we do this, we remain stalwart in our well-earned faith that the meeting of language users -- even if one is the objective world -- are conjoined in a "power-charged social relation of 'conversation'" that issues from relations with the material world of the Modern/Postmodern age that, for being our most powerful "god term," never allows anyone to notice or theorize the efficacy of a homoousian consubstantiality that by its order of procession calls symbolic actors into existence at the transnationally internetworked core of the unevenly developed capitalist
world economic system.

Today, as in the time of Saint Thomas Aquinas, symbolic actors are called into being by procession of a perfectly consubstantial, homoousian Godhead. Today, at the transnationally internetworked core of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system, there is a system of privately owned writing machines that is capital. Today, at the transnationally internetworked core of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system, the system of privately owned writing machines that is capital machinofactures a site of sociolinguistic opportunity that is also capital, even before serialized consumers of the machinofactured social partake of the body of capital through the commodity consumption of materialized social capital. That materialization of capital in the commodified form of social capital carries the significance of Capital, the Father, maker of all things that are living capital. When agents contract with agents who increase their share of the social surplus by exchanging money for shares of machinofactured social capital, the buyer and seller of the machinofactured social capital proceed by order of the procession of Capital, the Father, and come under the influence of the Capitalist, the Son of Capital, begotten not made, consubstantial to the Father -- or the first, most quintessential expression and materialization of Marx's comment in Capital, vol. 1, that "the characters who appear on the economic stage are but the personifications of the economic relations that exist between them" (ch02.htm). Because Capital, and the Capitalist begotten from the Procession of the Father in social capital, must reproduce itself through the spiration of Capital -- Capital, the Father, and Capital, the Son, proceed together, as from a single principle, to call forth the unholy spirit of homoousian Capital: the proletarianized internetworked writer, or the writer who must buy the self as capital in
order that the self might become living capital that holds no ownership in the alienable means by which living proletarianized capital comes into being: the proletarianized writer who becomes by spiration of capital the second, most quintessential expression and materialization of Marx's comment in *Capital*, vol. 1, that "the characters who appear on the economic stage are but the personifications of the economic relations that exist between them" (ch02.htm).

It is so.

Today, at the internetworked core of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system, there is a homoousian consubstantiality that by procession of capital underpins the symbolic actions of all socially variegated internetworked writers. In precisely the moment that transnationally internetworked writers come into internetworked social being, they proceed from the perfectly consubstantial processions in the creation of Capital, the Father, or the materialized form of alienable social capital; Capital, the Son, or the Capitalist personification of materialized social capital who proceeds by order of the processions of the Father-in-the-Son; and Capital, the UnHoly Ghost, or the Proletarian personification of materialized capital that proceeds by way of consubstantial spiration of Capital, the Father, and Capital, the Son.

It is so.

But for its being so, it may not be understood and believed by anyone who persists in believing that symbolically conjoined being-in-the-world proceeds through paralogical, anti-Nicene efforts to conjoin heteroousian subjects in nothing more substantial than heteroousian symbolic consubstantiality built upon nothing more consubstantial than symbolically empty, heteroousian primary matter. It may not be understood by anyone
who does not believe in the symbolic procession of homoousian capital that has already appropriated the internetworked social and that now works to appropriate the biological. It may not be believed unless we abandon our most fundamental beliefs about the known world. We, of course, must abandon our beliefs in the world of novel, heteroousian experience, so we may believe and understand the processions of Capital.

**Intellige ut Credas Verbum Meum**

Asking people to unlearn that which they understand and therefore believe, in order that they may believe and therefore understand something entirely incompatible with their well-educated understanding is a tall order and, if I may say, an unreasonable request.

To my seeming credit, I am not asking for anyone to believe in the homoousian Godhead of Christian faith. But, to be entirely honest, that's not conceding very much because I, too, was raised to believe with Sartre that God's existence has no bearing on how we perform and understand symbolic action in this world: "if God did exist, that would change nothing" (51). To my seeming credit, I am not demanding or even suggesting that anyone become contemporaneous with "Christ's life on earth, sacred history, [which] stands for itself along outside of history" (Kierkegaard 409) in order to secure understanding of John 12:32: "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me" (Online Bible). But, as before, that's not conceding very much because I, too, was raised to believe with Burke that no one need "make any decisions about the validity of theology qua theology" in order to "ask how theological principles can be shown to have usable secular analogues that throw light on the nature of language" *(Rhetoric of Religion 2)*.

We all know I concede nothing when I concede the following: Until someone
demonstrates a need to consider the existence of a homoousian capital, theorists of symbolic action should put their faith in the Modern/Postmodern story of creation that begins with the symbolic emptiness of primary matter and then develops into something interesting when language users and agents use material signs, which exist as part of reality, to grasp and, in so doing, to reflect and refract another state of reality, which includes the individual human consciousness, which is itself a "social-ideological fact," or product of sign use (Vološinov 9-12). I, like most of you, was raised to accept that social beings "make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past" (Eighteenth Brumaire ch01.htm). And I, like most of you, was raised to reject that "essence," understood as "the production routines and the properties which enable" existence "to be both produced and defined," "precedes existence" (Sartre 15); to know that matter in the cosmos evolves "in a very regular way according to certain laws" (Hawking 11); to weaken one's objective bead on the creation by stressing that even our capacity for thinking and for making more or less objective knowledge claims is socially generated, rather than innate, and authorized through involvement in socially constructed discourse communities (Bruffee); to strengthen one's objective bead on the creation by taking into account that "all human beliefs -- including our best scientific beliefs are socially situated," and then insisting that some "social situations [may] tend to generate the most objective knowledge claims" (Harding 142); to note that such weakening and strengthening of subjective objectivity follows from shared faith that our socially contingent relations with all elements fundamental to philosophy -- epistemology and hermeneutics, fact and value, theory and practice, objective and more
dubious forms of knowledge -- develop through the antifoundational play of sentences in
a universe without symbolic potential of its own, a play of sentences that ultimately
reduces all matters of certainty and doubt to matters of familiarity (Rorty Philosophy 321,
Contingency 5, 8, "Contingency of Language"); to pleasure in the seeming paradox that
subjectivity can be both antifoundational, for its being overdetermined by "personal,
social, and historical circumstances" (Dobrin 10-11), and the universal foundation, for
"There can be no other truth to take off from than this: I think; therefore, I exist" (Sartre
36). In truth, I was raised to share faith with all those of the Modern/Postmodern,
Enlightened/Dubious, Objective/Subjective, Presentational/Unpresentable,
Scientific/Sophistic age who, like Jean-François Lyotard, argued that postmodern,
antifoundational, historically situated subjectivism did not come after modern,
foundational, transhistorical rationalism, but was anterior to the Modern: a jubilant
searching for "new rules of the game" that can give rise to the Modern penchant for
sublime forms that both expose the "lack of reality' of reality" but also forge a collective
"nostalgia for the unattainable" unity lost during our shattering of belief in and
withdrawal from our absolute relation to the absolute reality of, for example, the
Christian Epic (77, 79-81). I was raised to share faith with all those who balanced their
highly differentiated, oftentimes incompatible, approaches to the problem of symbolic
action in "the heaven and the earth" upon a common "god term" for "the heaven and the
earth" -- the symbolically empty, heteroousian, primary, cosmic matter that was
unleashed on 11 November 1572 by a flash of light in Casseopia, a supernova that burned
brighter than Jupiter, then faded, then disappeared, but, before it did, entered into the
historical record the distinct possibility that nature, corruption, mutability, and symbolic
emptiness awaits all those who looked up from earth to sky; through air to aether; out beyond Mercvrii, Veneris, Solis, Martis, Iovis, and Saturni; and, beyond these, upon the firmament, the orb of fixed stars, the Stellatum; out beyond the sublunary realm of change, irregularity, corruption, and death, into the superlunary realm of permanent perfection.

Having conceded that theorists of symbolic action should put their faith in the Modern/Postmodern story of creation until someone can write convincingly of the need to consider the existence and efficacy of homoousian capital, my sense is that contemporary theorists of symbolic action should probably also concede that the Modern/Postmodern theory of symbolic action includes the distinct possibility of its supersession by a successor reality beyond the immediate grasp of theory. "Modernity," writes Lyotard, "in whatever age it appears, cannot exist without a shattering of belief and without discovery of the 'lack of reality' together with the invention of other realities" (77). Because capitalist production partakes in the Modern/Postmodern invention of other realities, and because capital makes its decisive contribution to the invention of other realities through the direct production of commodities, a.k.a. cultural forms, a.k.a. formal compositions, it is well within the reach of imagination that capital should succeed in composing a cultural, commodified form of the shared world and scene of symbolic action that epochally differentiates the symbolic actions of language users and agents carried on within a materialized, symbolically charged social capital from the symbolic actions of language users and agents who work their magic upon, against, and in disregard of a materiality without symbolic potential of its own. Capital -- the most dedicated compositionist in modern times -- might produce an alternative reality that contributes to
the composition of symbolic actions that are themselves incompatible with Bakhtin's sense of symbolic action in the Modern age of Novel, wherein actors on the epochal stage withdraw from the "Epic wholeness" and immerse themselves in the "plasticity" of an "inconclusive present" that takes the shape it does because "the world and man" have assumed "a degree of comic familiarity" and, for this, the collectively posited individual (not the individual produced through and in context of collective processes of material production) acquires "the ideological and linguistic initiative necessary to change the nature of his own images" (27, 37-39). Knowing as we do that "no mode of production and therefore no dominant social order and therefore no dominant culture ever in reality includes or exhausts all human practice, human energy, and human intention" (Williams 125), it stands well within reason that capital should be able invent a material successor to modernity, particularly given its compositionist tendency to make material its inventions of other Modern/Postmodern realities. And then, of course, there's the sauce for the goose. Knowing as we do that what the ideology of the dominant culture "effectively seizes is indeed the ruling definition of the social" (125), we also know that were capital, for example, to make material an alternative, oppositional, or successor definition of life within the dominant, this alternative definition may "impinge on significant areas of the dominant" and, in so doing, give rise to "spheres of practice and meaning which, . . . in its profound deformation, the dominant culture" would be "unable in any real terms to recognize" (126). If capital were to make material the composition of a successor reality to modernity, there is absolutely no reason that anyone should recognize in the supersession of modernity the supersession of modernity.

My immediate contention is that capital has managed to supersede the conditions
of symbolic action in modernity by composing a novel context or containment for symbolic action -- a materialized social capital -- that allows capital to reorganize and, in so doing, to profoundly deform the practice of symbolic action to the point that capital succeeds in both dislocating language users and agents from Modern/Postmodern symbolic practices and completing the maneuver while passing under the radar of Modern/Postmodern theorists of symbolic action.

So, what changed?

Lester Faigley summed it up simply, concisely, and best, when he wrote, on 30 April 1995, "the National Science Foundation unplugged its backbone and the Internet became privatized" (135). Another way of saying the same thing is that social beings involved in the social construction of production routines brought their proprietary attitudes to bear upon the social construction of production routines and, in so doing, imbued production routines with social properties that created new rules of the game but also altered conditions under which symbolic action had proceeded. For having brought their proprietary attitudes to bear upon the social construction of production routines, social beings involved in the social construction of production routines composed a socially constructed, symbolically permeated precondition for the social construction of *dasein* (social-being-in-the-world) that cannot be accounted for by the various anti-Nicene stories of discursivity in the Modern/Postmodern age. More specifically, the ceremonial transfer of control of the internetworked social formation from the state to capital on 30 April 1995 had the effect of putting "the production of the means of communication, of the physical conditions of circulation," "into the category of the production of fixed capital" (Marx *Grundrisse* ch10.htm). The ceremonial transfer of
control of the internetworked social formation from the state to capital on 30 April 1995 had the effect of creating a transnationally internetworked social space that was also entered into the organic composition of capital but deployed for the purpose of producing a hermetically sealed, thus, alienable site of sociolinguistic production that could be made to circulate in the form of a commodity and exchange for money. For having produced a fully commodified space for the containment and production of symbolic action, capital provided itself with the means to subjugate the social production of socially constructed social being to the service of wealth. Then, too, because capital had succeeded in making consumers of the materialized social capital depend for their internetworked existence upon the operations of fixed capital, capital produced a rhetorical situation that validated Marx in his faith that in capitalist production "there opened up . . . the prospect, which cannot be sharply defined at this point, of a specific relation of capital to the communal, general conditions of social production, as distinct from the conditions of a particular capital and its particular production process" (Grundrisse ch10.htm). Capital, an anarchistic system of production, has taken into itself the responsibility for producing the preconditions for the social itself -- for making capital, not particular capitals and particular production processes, responsible for staging within a formal composition that is capital the relations of social symbolic production and formation.

So that you may understand and believe me when I write that such an alteration in the composition of the shared world and scene of symbolic action produces changes in the production of symbolic action that are incompatible with Modern/Postmodern theories of symbolic action -- I want us to take short walk through what Marx posited as the double theoretical movement by which theorists appropriate the concrete conditions
of life in the world by way of thought. For Marx, the concreteness of this world is concrete because many determinations become concentrated to the point of becoming a concrete rendering of being-in-the-world. The concrete, he wrote, is concrete because it is the "unity of the diverse" (Grundrisse ch01.htm). With this in mind, Marx wrote that anyone wanting to grasp the larger significance of particular manifestations of concrete social being in this world must first subject the concrete to analysis and, in so doing, evaporate the concrete to the point of yielding "abstract determinations" (ch01.htm). For those of us who are interested in understanding the concrete processions of symbolic action after 30 April 1995, this means that we must reduce -- like Augustine, like Kent, like Burke, like Kierkegaard -- our direct encounter with the vastly complicated procession of internetworked symbolic actions in everyday life to its simplest determinants. Only then may we complete a second theoretical move and shape our set of simplest determinants into a concentrated, parsimonious, paradigmatic, entirely provisional model of symbolic action that passes for an attractive theory only so long as it represents the most elegant solution to an inelegant problem, resists temptation to pluralize the problem, never increases the number of entities needed to explain a concentrated diversity, uses the least motion and fewest steps to produce maximum force and clarity, decreases rules to a minimum and amplifies explanatory complexity to a maximum, describes and makes accurate predications about materialized being-in-the-world, and so survives the transhistorical cut of Occam's razor. Through analysis of the concrete that yields abstract determinations, through recombination of abstract determinations into paradigmatic models, we may be able to appropriate by way of thought the concrete that capital has composed and, in so doing, understand why the
production of symbolic action in context of capital produces symbolic actions that are incompatible with Modern/Postmodern theories of symbolic action.

Let us allow that on 30 April 1995, the theorist of symbolic action could suddenly do what had never been done before, namely, to evaporate concrete, internetworked symbolic action and arrive at a set of simplest determinants that include a delimited, transnational internetworked sociolinguistic formation (Sociolinguistic Formation), private ownership of property, including the fixed capital used in the machinofacture of the internetworked social formation (Private Property), the commodity form of capital (Commodity), and the money form of capital (Money). Let us also allow that on 30 April 1995, the theorist of symbolic action could for the first time combine Sociolinguistic Formation, Private Property, Commodity, and Money -- the determinants abstracted from concrete operations of internetworked, socially organized symbolic actors -- to reproduce, by way of thought, a Sociolinguistic Formation under the productive aspect of Private Property that, through its operations, converts the Sociolinguistic Formation as Private Property into a Commodity that exchanges for Money. In other words, theoretic engagement with "The" so-called "Internet" allows us to see that capital, proprietor of the transnationally internetworked site of sociolinguistic production, gave new meaning to Marx's old dictum: social beings "make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past" (Eighteenth Brumaire ch01.htm). The double movement of theory exposes that our ritual encounters with the Sociolinguistic Formation, under the aspect of Private Property, that appears as a Commodity, and finds its relative equivalent in Money, are such that symbolic actors at the heights of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system now communicate within capitalist circulation, or the
production and exchange of commodities into and out of the money form of capital. In
truth, symbolic actors emanate from capital as capital, or from those circumstances
existing already, given and transmitted from the past that do something a little more than
exert pressures and establish limits on our history-making, internetworked symbolic
action in the present.

That "something more" that issues from circumstances existing already, given and
transmitted from the past is easy to finger. Capital expanded production to the point
where symbol users came to depend for their internetworked existence upon the
production routines of a privately owned and operated system of internetworked writing
machines, or fixed capital. Following Harry Braverman, we can say that capital acquired
an advantageous position in its relations with individual and associated symbolic actors
because the machines that support the production of symbolic action are the property of
capital and not the property of the individual producer of symbolic action nor the
"associated producers" of symbolic action. Capital, acting from its position of advantage,
was able to stipulate that capital's ownership in the means of producing the space of
symbolic action grants capital the right to put proletarianized producers of the space of
symbolic action in contact with capital's machines, to "deploy" producers "around"
capital's "machinery," to bring producers and machines together "in a special way" that is
itself productive of certain ends that are congenial to the needs of capital (133-34).
Capital's ownership in the means of producing the space of symbolic action grants capital
the uncontested right to appropriate "all the social conditions" necessary for the
communal, general conditions of social production and to place these conditions "in
valorization" (Negri 112). In short, capital's ownership of the means of social production
afforded capital with the opportunity to expand circulation of capital to the point that capital appropriates the circulation of non-capitalist production of the social to the point that the "basis for production and reproduction" of social being is taken up by capitalist circulation and identified with capitalist production (112-13). When, through its control of the means of production, capital succeeded in expanding circulation to the point that symbolic action, or social productivity, became identified with valorization of capital, expanded circulation, and capitalist production, capital also succeeded in making its historic "leap" to materialized "social capital," which, Negri reminds us, "like the leap to 'social labor,' is not a generic one. It is a qualitative leap which permeates the category of capital" (114). Suddenly, "society appears to us as capital's society," and capital becomes the social force that "constitutes society, capital is entirely social capital" (114).

Working strictly from this description of the expansion of capitalist circulation, we can see that the privatization of the transnationally internetworked Sociolinguistic Formation on 30 April 1995 identified sociolinguistic production with circulation and, in so doing, appropriated the social conditions necessary for the production symbolic action. We can see that capital appropriated that which previously had been the social property of symbolic actors -- i.e., the socially constructed conditions needed for individual's production of symbolic actions -- and then returned the social conditions necessary for the production symbolic action to serialized consumers of the transnationally internetworked Sociolinguistic Formation in exchange for Money, or the valorization of capital. And we can see that today at the transnationally internetworked core of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system, thanks to the privatization of "The" so-called "Internet," capital has made its qualitative leap to materialized social capital, has produced a society that
appears to us as capital's society, has identified symbolic action with circulation, has placed symbolic action in valorization, and has appropriated the production of *dasein* as another moment in the "becoming," "growth," and "vital process" of capital (*Grundrisse* ch10.htm).

What we may also derive from capital's historic leap to social capital is precisely that the *sine qua non* of capital is no longer penetration into the social relations of symbolic production -- that is, all manner of symbolic operations that once directly acted upon and organized the materiality of an ineffectual cosmos -- but, instead, the direct production of a culturally fabricated space in support of symbolic action; the direct production of a culturally fabricated space that is itself a symbol in the sense that "every commodity is a symbol, since, in so far as it is value, it is only the material envelope of the human labour spent upon it" (Marx, Capital, vol. 1, ch02.htm); the direct production of a culturally fabricated space that is itself a semantically charged space for its being the formal output of compositional production processes; the direct production of a culturally fabricated space that brings a pointed, purposeful, symbolic, semantic efficacy to bear upon capital's relations with consumers of the materialized social capital who must cease to exist in the transnationally internetworked site of sociolinguistic production if they exercise their right *not to be acted upon* by the fully commodified shared world and scene of internetworked symbolic action. Very clearly, the social relations of material production that throughout the Modern/Postmodern age were themselves borne upon all manner of symbolic operations that organized the materiality of an ineffectual cosmos into a staging-ground for the social performance of symbolic action have themselves been fatally modified because they must now share space with a transnationally internetworked
world society that is itself dependent upon the operations of fixed capital, semantically impacted by the efficacious operations of fixed capital, and symbolically charged for being circulated in the form of a commodity. To be sure, capital has succeeded in producing a staging ground for the performance of symbolic action that, for being borne upon all manner of production routines and rights of private property, has pressed into "the heaven and the earth" a set of social relations that is borne upon and within the processions of the social relations of material production -- the almost indescribably strange appearance in "the heaven and the earth" of an econosocial formation. Long and short, capital has so expanded circulation that the sine qua non of capital is no longer the penetration into and subsumption of social processes that in the socioeconomic formation had circulated beyond the reach and logic of capitalist production but, instead, the induction of social beings into capital's area for the staging of the economically posited social formation. Long and short, we may conclude that theories of symbolic action may no longer stand upon faith that capital does no more than penetrate into Modern/Postmodern social formations but, instead, must begin where production becomes identical with circulation; where the communal, general conditions of social production have been placed in valorization; where social beings have become dependent upon a specific economic modality for their internetworked experience of being-in-the-world; and where everyone's state of internetworked being-in-the-world has come to depend upon fixed capital and social processes embedded in automated production routines -- or the factory operations of the materialized social capital, the social factory, the factory of the social.

They must, in other words, have the temerity to admit that role of capital in
operations of symbolic action in the twenty-first century is to produce a kind of unity through symbolic action that has not been theorized as being part of the dominant definition of the social for a very long time. In the moment of its historic leap to materialized social capital, capital effectively reverses, in one motion, the predicament of the subject that Frederic Jameson described not too long ago in his essay "Cognitive Mapping." Jameson wrote that in "older societies and perhaps even in the early stages of market capital, the immediate and limited experience of individuals is still able to encompass and coincide with the true economic and social form that governs that experience" (349). He continues, "In the next moment, these two levels drift further apart and really begin to constitute themselves into that opposition the classical dialectic describes as \textit{Wesen} and \textit{Erscheinung}, essence and appearance, structured and lived experience" (349). And, finally, he concludes, "the phenomenological experience of the individual subject -- traditionally, the supreme raw materials of the work of art -- becomes limited to a tiny corner of the social world. . . . But the truth of that experience no longer coincides with the place in which it takes place, . . . bound up [as it is] with the whole colonial system" (349). Yet, today, because the site of sociolinguistic production in the materialized social capital is capital, and because the language users and agents that capital materializes within the materialized social capital are capital, and because the symbolic actions by fully capitalized language users and agents are also capital, and because the lived experience of social being in the materialized social capital is capital -- we can say with a certain degree of confidence that capital's direct production of the materialized social capital has deposited the symbolic essence of the social relations of capitalist production directly into the material substrate of the cogitative, expressive,
materialized, capitalized social being. In other words, essence has been revisited upon the disintegration of immanence. For having put the conditions necessary for social production in valorization -- that is, for having made exchange a precondition for being materialized in the materialized social capital and for having made contact with efficacious fixed capital a preconditions for being materialized in the materialized social capital -- capital has positioned itself to draw capital's materialized productions of internetworked being directly into the heart of a pre-existing formal composition that carries within itself the expression of capital's specific relation to the communal, general conditions of social production. Those who contract with capital and come belatedly into capital's materialized social capital experience such a powerful and thoroughgoing revisitation of essence upon existence that social being is forcibly leveraged out of modernity and into capital.

From the vantage of one interested in theorizing about symbolic action, it's really quite remarkable -- capital's qualitative leap to materialized social capital; capital's appropriation of the social conditions necessary for the production of the social; and, for this, capital's placement of symbolic action in valorization. It really came to pass -- that which Sartre once tossed away in confidently dismissive tones. "Essence," he wrote, would, in fact, precede "existence" if, in our godless universe, "production routines and the properties which enable" existence "to be both produced and defined" happened to precede existence (Sartre 15). He allowed that under such circumstances, "production," and the essence of production," would precede "existence," and then dismissed this impossibility as a fundamental irrelevance. But that which Sartre dismissed has, in truth, come to pass. And, in so passing, it has come to mean that theorists of symbolic action
caught all higgledy-piggledy in the Modern/Postmodern historic trajectory have lost their capacity to describe or predict, through no fault or short-coming of their own, the entire privatized range of concrete internetworked symbolic actions that never, when evaporated, precipitate out of itself the Modern/Postmodern discursive antifoundation in cosmic, heterousian, objective matter that, for its part, evolves in a very regular way according to certain laws but without symbolic potential of its own. They have lost capacities they never had nor wanted: the capacity for speaking to the problem of a privately operated, machinofactured staging platform that deposits a specific essence into the material substrates of both the materialized social capital and each social actor that capital causes to materialize in and as social capital; the capacity for addressing the problem that arises when social actors materialized in the social capital necessarily bear within themselves "the personifications of the economic relations that exist" not only "between them" (ch02.htm), as in the age of Modern/Postmodern discourse, but within the symbolically charged material substrate of their materialized selves. Burke and Kent and, with them, the whole lot of Modern/Postmodern theorists of symbolic action -- What can they say about social beings, or "the characters who appear on the economic stage," who no longer necessarily appear on an economic stage that puts its pilings down into the objective matter of the universe that evolves in a very regular way according to certain laws but without symbolic potential of its own. What can they say about social beings, or "characters who appear on the economic stage," who suddenly appear on an economic stage which is itself capital and so converts the personifications of economic relations from being the personifications of particular capitals and particular production processes to being the perfectly consubstantial personification of capital concentrated in both the
production of the communal, general conditions of social production and the internetworked social beings who have become consubstantial with a materiality that contains within itself the essence of capital expanded to the point of becoming the social. 

Pace Sartre, for internetworked social agents are always already the symbolic expression of communal capital before they may engage in the "absolute truth of consciousness becoming aware of itself" (36). The future, the present, the past are all still subject to contest, but the contest between internetworked social agents is always imbued with the essence of capital -- and it is so imbued because on 30 April 1995 capital started to materialize social beings within a Sociolinguistic Formation under the productive aspect of Private Property that, through its operations, converts the Sociolinguistic Formation as Private Property into a Commodity that exchanges for Money.

\textbf{Crede ut Intelligas Verbum Dei} 

I am unexceptional. I am the rule without exception. I am the unexceptional composition of a rule that issues from this most latest run of the mill, this most latest run of the mine.

This may be hard to believe.

It is true that the system of internetworked writing machines runs on, producing a serial chain of internetworked entities: connect: entity; connect: entity; connect: entity; connect: entity. Yet I, like the others in my run, acquire from the start a distinct, strikingly different appearance. It is true that each one who gets machinofactured in the run of internetworked writing machines is an entity that issues from a serialized connection to the system of internetworked writing machines. Yet I, like the others in my serialized run, recognize myself when I appear in the run and recognize that I differ by my differences from others in that run.
I make "marxists.org" material of my screen. Most others in the serialized run that is my run do not. I make my serialized connection to the internetworked system of writing machines the modus operandi of "Stan Harrison," for the machines and I take the "Stan" and "Harrison" in my email signatures and make "Stan Harrison" a constant material of my screen. I assure that the issue of my connection is even more distinct because the machines and I enhance the compounded composition of "Stan Harrison" with "son Thatcher," taking a phrase that repeats in several emails attributed to "Stan Harrison" and making "son Thatcher" an attribute of "Stan Harrison." The machines work upon the raw materials that I put in touch with the machines, and supply me with a custom fitted me that is distinct from all others in the run that is my run. The machines and I work to fashion "me" and then "me" and then "me" in a continuous flow operation that composes "Stan Harrison" from the "embrained," "embodied," "encultured," "embedded," and "encoded" materials of a life (Keenan 51) that I feed into the machines. The machines and I work just-in-time to deliver that which I desire unto me: the "Stan Harrison," who enjoys "son Thatcher," and who, from time to time, makes "marxists.org" material of "his" screen. For all this, I understand why I recognize myself in the run and recognize that I differ by my added differences from other just-in-time, continuous flow productions of "serialized entity" that is the issue of the run (Aquinas 20).

But for all my differences, for the manifold ways in which I differ from others in the run, I am unexceptional. I am the rule without exception. I am the unexceptional composition of a rule that issues from this most latest run of the mill, this most latest run of the mine.

But be forewarned, lest you fail to take me at my meaning, I am not the
unexceptional composition of a rule that is the complex issue of machines and the end
ers of machines, although that is precisely the appearance I radiate when I am made
material of my screen. Just this morning, I put myself in touch with the machines. I input
information into the machine on my desktop, instructing that machine to make itself a
more active node on the internetworked system of machines to which it belongs. The
internetworked system of writing machines received my instructions and, in the end,
relayed Trotsky back to me, making "The Permanent Revolution" material of my screen.
At first, the machines were a little slow in satisfying my yen for Trotsky and "The
Permanent Revolution" -- seven seconds passed . . . still waiting -- and I thought that I
might be better off compounding myself with Lenin and "What Is To Be Done?" But,
just-in-time, the machines responded to my instructions and refashioned the serialized
production of my screen, filling it with "The Permanent Revolution." Just this morning,
the machines and I ran on from there, compounding the material of my screen, without
exception, from the by-play of inputted instructions and embedded production routines
that invariably resulted in the entirely unexceptional, notably distinct, continuous flow
composition, and just-in-time delivery of the me that the machines and I custom-fitted to
me.

But, at the same time, the machines made something manifest that should have
been obvious from the first. Yes, the machines operated for the purpose of making me
material of the machines and composing things so that I could recognize myself in the
material issue of the machines. And, yes, the machines operated for the purpose of
coordinating my activities with the activities of others who, like me, put themselves in
touch with the machines and who, in one fortuitous case, uploaded "The Permanent
Revolution" into the machines -- making "The Permanent Revolution" a retrievable attribute of the machines. And, yes, the machines operated for the purpose of producing conditions under which the discreet activities of serially machinofactured, differently compounded entities might be compounded with the activities of other serially machinofactured, differently compounded entities to produce the appearance of a world-spanning society that is, of course, material of the machines. And, yes, the machines operated for the purpose of producing conditions wherein the appearance of a world-spanning society would become dependent upon the operations of internetworked writing machines; wherein the appearance of coordinated activities between differently compounded entities on the system of internetworked writing machines would become dependent upon the operations of internetworked writing machines; wherein the appearance of serially machinofactured, differently compounded entities would become dependent upon the operations of internetworked writing machines; whereupon the appearance of each serialized, individuated entity in machine-mediated society would come to depend for its machine-mediated existence upon the operations of internetworked writing machines. But, at the same time, the machines operated for the purpose of compounding the serial production of machine-dependent entities in machine-dependent society into a never before symbolically enacted composition -- one that composes capital's specific relation to the communal, general conditions of social production into the most important symbolic action of our time.

What did the internetworked machine operations communicate to its dependents? No one touches the machines except under the sign of exchange. The self, or the purchasing agent for the self, be it a school or a state-run library, must contract with
capital before capital will put individual selves in touch with machines that are fixed
capital. No one touches fixed capital for the purpose of entering capital's society -- that
which issues from the operations of fixed capital and takes the form of materialized social
capital -- except under the sign of exchange.

If the simplicity of the official literal statement that issues, moment by moment,
from the run of the machines is staggering, the figurative contents of this simple
statement are mind boggling.

When the machines and I made "The Permanent Revolution" material of my
screen, I came to believe -- as I always do -- that my serialized, custom-fitted
manifestation is no exception to the rule of private machinofacture but the rule without
exception. In me is the unexceptional composition of a rule that issues from this most
latest run of the mill, this most latest run of the mine. In me is the composition of the rule
of private machinofacture because the latest run of the mill and the mine produces
nothing in the first instant of each machinofactured moment but serially produced,
differently compounded entities; the coordinated activities of serially produced,
differently compounded entities; the society compounded from the coordinated activities
of serially produced, differently compounded entities -- that is, the specific relation of
capital to the communal, general conditions of social production. The run of the machines
that is in me has been charged by capital with the task of putting the social itself into
valorization -- including society, and the coordinated activities of society producing social
entities, and the entities who appear as entities and then social beings because they touch
upon fixed capital and are sustained by fixed capital in their coordinated compositions of
social being in capital's society. The run that is my run has drawn me up into the social
relations that capital posited when it made its historic leap to materialized social capital. In the machinofactured me is the sign that says capital has made social production identical to circulation by making production of the world-spanning internetworked social depend for its existence upon the social relations of material production, distribution, exchange, and consumption that produce the fixed capital that capital controls for the purpose of putting the social in valorization. Because I had no choice but to exchange with capital if I was to consume and exist as produced and distributed social capital, I came to believe that I bear within my custom-fitted, continuous flow, just-in-time machinofactured self the marks of a machine run that converts everyone who touches upon capital's machines into a symbolic substance that bears witness to the literal and figurative meanings of capital's historic leap to materialized social capital.

In faith that the machines had acted upon my material being and converted me into produced and distributed social capital, I came to believe something about myself. In the time before capital made its historic leap to materialized social capital, the process we call capital achieved its end -- to organize a mode of production that "corresponds to itself" -- by dislocating producers from production processes that had sustained them; by drawing dislocated producers together in a site wherein capital gathers its expropriated means of production; by making dislocated producers volunteer to become dependents of capital, the most powerful creator and distributor of life-sustaining work in culture; by forcing the concentrated, fragmented band of dependent producers to come together as a group under capital and, for this, to regard capital as the organizer of social cohesion (Grundrisse ch11.htm). In the time before the circulation of social capital, capital, the creator of work, had not dispossessed anyone of the means of creating social cohesion.
itself and so was restricted to becoming the organizer, not the creator, of social cohesion. 
But in its historic leap to social capital, capital did manage to dislocate producers of the social from the production processes that had sustained them in the heretofore relatively autonomous work of constructing the fabric of social being from chance and organized encounters with other symbol users and a shared world that was never capital in its fundamen. In the moment when capital finally succeeded in dislocating produces from the means of social production and gathering the expropriated means of social production together in one world-spanning location, capital had taken such control over the communal, general conditions of social production that would-be producers of a world-spanning society began to mass on the peripheries of the materialized social capital and, there, to exercise their right to become dependent for their transnationally internetworked existence upon capital -- the creator of the work of social being. They began to regard capital not as the organizer of social cohesion but as the direct producer of being in capital that might then be coordinated within capital to produce the semblance of capital's society. For being one of the masses assembled on the peripheries of social capital who volunteered to issue in serial fashion from the run of the machines, I came to know in faith of capital that my decision to become dependent upon capital, capital's machines, and capital's production routines was also the expression of a moment in valorization that likens capital to the God of Christian mythology: the one responsible for the genesis, for "the creation of the heaven and the earth," and, on the sixth day, for the creation of the social being in the image of the creator (Gen. 1:6-10, 27).

In the same moment that I became material of Capital, creator of all things visible and invisible in the creation, I came to know in faith that my existence in capital
depended upon something more than the creative powers that capital wielded at the point of direct production. I bore within myself the specific relation of capital to the communal, general conditions of social production. I bore within myself the relation of a world system to a society of the world. The objective form of the subjective me, the material composition of my social being, was a signed composition that testified to the manner of the relation between the world economic system and the world system's world society. The serially machinofactured, differently compounded version of my me-commodity and its circulation within the materialized social capital -- these both demonstrated that the world economic system had become concentrated in the operations of a fully automated machine system that operated for the purpose of giving rise to a societal composition -- the supreme fiction of our nonfictional times -- that never bears an exceptional relation to capital. In the machine run production of outputted social capital, capital's subsumption of Whitman's "The Song of Myself" was also the figuration of the world system's relation to itself as author of a society in a machinofactured world that must cease to exist if the author-in-system gets cut off from the society-in-creation. The song of myself that issues from the latest run of the mine and the mill is the song of unplumbed relations between me and the author of me who must exist if the form of me and the form of the creation is to continue.

Like the God of Christian mythology who sustains "the heaven and the earth" that would otherwise cease to exist if God, the Father, withheld his power from the creation ("Relation of God"), capital posits that the internetworked social, for its being capital, must cease to exist if capital is stopped from circulating, from drawing the many faces of labor in the whole world-economy -- wage-laborers, slaves, coerced cash-crop producers,
share-croppers, and tenant farmers -- into the world system's single division of labor; and from dislocating workers from production processes by embedding production processes, including the means of social production, into fixed capital; and from circulating according to the laws of the motions of capital. It is, of course, common sense to allow that the materialized social capital is itself dependent upon the continuing operation of capital in the world system. It is no less sensical to know in faith that the process that makes me material of social capital is also the process that composes serially machinofactured, differently compounded entities into symbols that speak to the efficacy and necessity of capital in the creation. Disrupt the operations of capital in the world system, and the serial production of differently compounded entities that populate the outputted social capital must cease. Halt the processions of capital in the world system, and all partnerships at the transnationally internetworked core of the unevenly developed capitalist world economic system must dissolve. All compounding of machine-supported social activities that acquire the form of capital's world-spanning society of the creation must vanish, along with the horrible processions in the creation, in the same instant that something stops Capital, the Father, conserver of the creation, in its useful course.

In the time before capital made its historic leap to materialized social capital, Marx wrote that "the persons" who existed "for one another merely as representatives of, and there, as owners of, commodities," appeared only, "in general" to be "characters who appear on the economic stage" as "but the personifications," the "dramatic personae," in the form of "buyer" and "seller," of the "economic relations that exist between them." (Capital Vol 1. ch02.htm, ch04.htm). Precisely at the moment when capital made the leap to social capital and, in so doing, personified its specific relation as world system to its
omnipresence in world society, Capital, the Father, said, Let their be an economic stage in
the creation that sets its pilings down into fixed capital and begets that which is
consubstantial of the Father in the Creation: the figures of the capitalist and the proletariat
that must be present in the creation if the creation is to be the product of the specifically
capitalist mode of production. Mario Tronti once wrote that social class is "the historical
paradox which marks the birth of capitalist Society, and the abiding condition which will
always be attendant upon the 'eternal rebirth' of capitalist development. The worker
cannot be labour other than in relation to the capitalist. The capitalist cannot be capital
other than in relation to the worker. The question is often asked: 'What is a social class?'
The answer is: 'There are these two classes.'" Now that we are witness to the birth not of
capitalist society but of a society in capital, we find that the classes that are prerequisite to
the functioning of the specifically capitalist mode of production are already manifested in
the materialized social capital for being consubstantial of the personified social process
that generates of itself an economic stage that is not consubstantial of the Father, being
the creation of the Father, but that predates, anticipates, subsumes, and acts upon the
belated arrivals in this, the efficacious, symbolically charged stage that is co-present with
all things in the creation.

Even before I experienced my first composition as one of the creation, I knew in
faith that I would find the capitalist waiting for me at the limits of the creation, prepared
to contract with me, and to draw me into the creation. Because capital is the creation that
exists to be sold, the systemic force that became concentrated in the figure of Capital that
creates and conserves all within the creation is the same systemic force that becomes
concentrated in the figure of Capital that exists to draw the raw materials of life into the
unexceptional composition of a rule that issues from this most latest run of the mill, this most latest run of the mine. Massed on the peripheries of the creation are all those who know in faith that the creation will come to them only through the direct intercession of the capitalist, advocate of all those who would enter the creation and become the material expression of Capital, the Father. Capital, the Son, begotten not made consubstantial of the Father, is the figure we seek to conjoin when we manifest our faith in the efficacy of capital in the creation through our actions which we intend to fulfill our unsatisfied desire to valorize, consume, produce, and circulate as attributes of the materialized social capital. Knowing as we do that capital has appropriated and placed within valorization all social conditions necessary for productive participation in the society of the creation, we do not seek intervention from one who is also a belated arrival in the creation -- a serially machinofactured, differently compounded personification of the specific, individual capitalist who belatedly treads the boards of the economic stage in the creation. We seek that which must exist even before we arrive belatedly in the creation, the figure of Capital, the Son, who like the Christ, has said: "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth into capital, will draw all who can pay unto me" (John 12:32). In the time before capital made its historic leap to materialized social capital, we learned to seek out the specific instance of the capitalist personification who trod upon the boards of an economic stage that had its pilings driven directly and exclusively into the symbolically empty primary matter of the universe. Because capital-as-system had not acquired its specific relation to capital-as-society, the personification of economic relations that have always been present in the social mode of capitalist production was humiliated in the earth, destined to be confused for a particular representative of a particular production process, or some particular output
of a particular production process. But, today in the creation, we bear witness to the exaltation of Capital, the Son, who draws persons into the social relations of economic production and is grasped as prerequisite to one's placement in the run, appearance in the creation, and contact with all those conditions necessary for social production that have been placed in valorization. It is the efficacy of Capital, the Son, that I sanctify when I consume the specific relation of the system to the society that is presented to me in the transubstantiated form of the Host/ing Service that, like me, arrived belatedly in the creation but that I must consume if I am to enter the creation and, once there, to sit on the right hand of the throne of Capital.

In Christian mythology, the procession of the perfectly consubstantial Christian trinity includes the "Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and all things visible and invisible; the Son of God, the Lord Jesus Christ, "Begotten not made, consubstantial to the Father," "before all ages"; and the "Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of life, who" "proceeds, not by way of generation, but by way of spiration, from the Father and the Son together, as from a single principle" ("Nicene Creed" and "Holy Ghost"). Now that capital has succeeded in forging a specific relation between capital, the economic world system, and capital, the world society in capital -- capital has succeeded in raising a perfectly consubstantial trinitarian personification of capital that is omnipresent in the machinofactured social that bears within itself an absolute dependence upon the operations of fixed capital. But that much is obvious. We already know in faith that Capital, the Father, both creates and conserves the creation, and that Capital, the Son, intercedes on behalf of those who the Son would draw into direct relation with the Father. And, for this, we already know that the perfectly consubstantial personification of the
Proletariat must proceed by way of spiration of the Father and the Son together, as from a single principle, precisely because no one wakes and says in good humor: I want to be a member of the proletariat; I want to have my labors and the output of my labors appropriated by those who operate on behalf of a system that deforms production until it becomes exploitation; I want someone to appropriate my accustomed means of social production and to return the expropriated conditions of social production to me in exchange for wages or, now, under condition that I will contract to valorize capital before I might be permitted to exist and produce. If capital is to survive, capital and the capitalist personification of capital relations must bedevil producers by laying claim to some means of material production and presenting dislocated producers who mass on the peripheries of capitalist operations with an option, an Either/Or proposition: enter into contract relations with capital, take within yourself the personification of the proletariat, and supply capital with what it must have if capital is to live, or refuse the offer of proletarianized work under capital and see how well or if you can live. The proletariat is, thus, both a prefigured personification in capital relations that may not be absented from material production on a world scale if specifically capitalist relations of production are to endure, and the prefigured personification in capital relations that Capital, the Father, and Capital, the Son, make appear of and for themselves.

What is not common knowledge -- except, of course, to Marxists -- is that capital may through the expansion of circulation subsume any aspect of society that both issues from social relations of production and can be made to depend upon the operations of fixed capital. Producers associated with any social operation that gives rise to a formal composition may be proletarianized, or proceed by spiration of the Father and the Son.
together, as from a single principle. Even if the formal composition that follows from collective social action is an atypical "composition" like "social being," the expansion of capitalist circulation may make fixed capital an essential element in the production, for example, of the formal albeit atypical composition of *dasein*, or "being-in-the-world," and, in so doing, induce dislocated producers to seek out the figure of the capitalist, to acknowledge their dependence upon fixed capital in the formal composition of *dasein*, to enter capital relations through the crucible of exchange, and, in that moment, to compound themselves from the proletarian personification that is already present in the procession of Capital, the Father, and Capital, the Son, in the materialized social capital. Now that capital has succeeded in forging a specific relation between capital, the economic world system, and capital, the world society in capital -- capital has demonstrated, first, that its specific relation to communal, general conditions of social production turns on its newfound talent for becoming the direct producer of the consumption of the means of social production, and, second, that capital's talent for becoming the direct producer of the consumption of the means of social production has drawn both the ends of social production -- call it the everyday unity of personal, leisure, and work processes -- and the suddenly proletarianized producers of everyday life into the specifically capitalist mode of production.

That capital should have been able to expand circulation until its reaches its equivalence in social production is, of course, in line with the logic of capital. Capital has long since worked to expand its control over the objective means of performing all manner of productive operations so that capital might, first, alienate social beings from the means of performing this or that work -- whether it be in politics, art, science, rhetoric.
-- and, second, draw freshly alienated social beings into specifically capitalist relations of production. Capital has long since followed this pattern of development so that it might succeed in making capitalist production the ends of society in all of its particulars (Grundrisse ch11.htm). But the fact of its recent accomplishment should still come as something of a surprise. For, as we all know, in the time before the production of the materialized social capital, capital struggled and ultimately failed to make the consumption of the means of production a fixed attribute of capitalist production. Through the development of corporate planning units, capital attempted to guarantee sales through the planning of sales -- through market research and analysis, advertising, "customer manipulation," and the "planned obsolescence of commodities" (Mandel Late 229). Toward this end, capital succeeded in making consumption an attribute of capitalist production to the degree that capital was able to surround the private sphere of the individual-at-liberty-from-capitalist-production with a "hyperrealism of simulations," with a capitalized cultural sphere that encased and disoriented the subdued consumer who was compelled to experience, in some cases, nothing short of the "satellization of the real" (Baudrillard "Ecstasy" 128). Capital succeeded in even greater measure where it was able to outfit the world-at-liberty-from-capitalist-production with functional life spaces, with economic staging grounds -- like shopping malls, with their goal of selling goods -- that, on the one hand, allow some people to behave as shoppers, others as thieves, and others to use it as a hang out, an exercise walk path, a place to acquire their social orientation, but, on the other hand, require that people who pass through functional life spaces be treated as "consumers in training," who must be exercised in their "duty to consume" (Stallabrass 156, 167). Yet, for all its successes, capital in the time before
materialized social capital really succeeded in doing nothing more remarkable -- and this was remarkable -- than scheduling and organizing work -- at, for example, the factory -- and scheduling and organizing relaxation -- at, for example, the mall -- and scheduling and organizing the regular arrival of hyperreal simulations within the greatly diminished space of the personal (Lefebvre 36, Baudrillard). In the time before capital's historic leap to materialized social capital, capital ultimately failed to make consumption a fixed attribute of capitalist production because capital failed to subsume the moment of sale that was always predicated upon an uncontrolled moment of social reciprocity. Capital's failure to subsume the means of producing social reciprocity is, of course, that which allowed Michel de Certeau to make so much of the fact that consumers who are "commonly assumed to be passive and guided by established rules," engage in tactics that adapt the act of purchasing to "their own interests and rules" (de Certeau xi, xvii). Capital's failure to subsume the social itself is what allowed theorists of everyday symbolic action to make much ado of someone who poaches on unguarded moments in the scheduled and organized everyday, that is, someone who writes "I Love You" in the top right hand corner of every check drafted within a thirty day period, knowing that the bank must return this stack of canceled I Love You's in time to mark the beginning, and end, of a couple's trial separation. As we know, the space of writing itself was beyond the subsumptive reach of capital, and capital could never proletarianize those who circulated in the space of the social-at-liberty-from-capitalist-production.

All of this changed, however, precisely in the moment when capital took monopoly control over the production of the materialized social capital -- 30 April 1995. On that day, capital finally managed to draw the individual-at-liberty-from-capitalist-
production into capitalist production because capital deformed the production of the
world-at-liberty-from-capitalist-production, making it an attribute of fixed capital, and
deformed the production of the social-at-liberty-from-capitalist-production, making it an
attribute of fixed capital. Because capital had finally appropriated all the necessary means
of producing the spaces that had formerly contained and sustained those moments of
social reciprocity that had always been at liberty from capitalist production, capital was
able to cause a general massing on the peripheries by all those in the world who know in
faith that they must proceed by way of spiration of Capital, the Father and the Son, if they
are to enter a creation that organizes symbolic action in ways and according to principles
that the world never did. In truth, even before I experienced my first recomposition as one
of the creation, I knew in faith that I would find the proletariat waiting for me at the limits
of the creation, the figure in the procession who would bind me to capital, in subjection to
capital, in the first structured instance of every serially machinofactured, differently
compounded moment I might pass in the creation.

For having taken directive control over nothing less than the means of the
production of communal, general conditions of social production, capital -- the
procession of the Father and the Father-in-the-Son -- is finally at liberty to proceed in the
creation by way of the UnHoly Ghost, who alone is the Lord and Giver of life to Capital.
Capital is finally in a position to demand that would-be consumers of the materialized
social capital enjoy a precious moment of social reciprocity with capital before capital
will deign to compose a being from a being. Capital's procession in the creation is
complete, for all who enter the materialized social capital must partake in a symbolic
exchange with capital, the omnipresent essence of which is that all who would be in the
procession must breathe life into capital through valorization, which itself produces no new value, but "enables capital to produce surplus value at every point of the circulation" (Negri 113). All who would be in the procession must make valorization the genesis of being, the genesis of social production, the genesis of circulation in the world society that itself circulates as an allegorized symbol that the horrible procession in the creation and the world proceeds under the daemon of capital homoousian, the perfectly consubstantial processions of capital in the creation.

I am unexceptional. I am the rule without exception. I am the unexceptional composition of a rule that issues from this most latest run of the mill, this most latest run of the mine. It is true that the system of internetworked writing machines runs on, producing a serial chain of internetworked entities: connect: entity; connect: entity; connect: entity; connect: entity. It is true that I, like the others in my run, acquire from the start a distinct, strikingly different appearance. But that changes nothing. "Strictly speaking," writes Aquinas, "primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very being diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same" (20). Strictly speaking, writes this I in the procession, capital, like God, does not differ from but is "absolutely distinct" from that which is "very . . . diverse" for being compounded out of very "simple things" (20). Thus, it follows that I, like the others in my serialized run, should recognize myself when I appear in the run and recognize that I differ by my differences from others in that run. But it always follows that I should recognize in me the symbolic action of the consubstantial social relation in me that creates, conserves, exalts, and subjugates my compounded social meanings in the creation: the homoousian processions of Capital, the Father, the Son, and the UnHoly Ghost.
This is no modern tale.

That story has ended.
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