Moving Thumos: Emotion, image, and the enthymeme

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Moving *Thumos*: Emotion, Image, and the Enthymeme

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Table of Contents

Abstract .......................................................................................................................... iii
Chapter 1 – Introduction: A Vision of Thumos ............................................................. 1
  Internal Di-visions ............................................................................................... 7
  On Reconstructing the Sophists ........................................................................ 10
  Taxonomies of Historiography ........................................................................... 17
  Sorting Antifoundationalist Sheep from Foundationalist Goats ................ 20
  The Primacy of Rhetoric in Rhetorical Theory ............................................... 23
  Further Di/visions .............................................................................................. 30
  Recovering Thumos .......................................................................................... 34
Chapter 2 – Reconsidering the Heart of Enthymemic Rhetoric .............................. 38
  A Problem of Definition .................................................................................... 45
  Aristotle’s Legacy ............................................................................................ 54
  Pedagogies of the Enthymeme ......................................................................... 60
  Joyce’s “Technic Enthymemic”: Or, Bloom Blows It ........................................ 72
  The Enthymeme: Two Paradigms ................................................................... 88
Chapter 3 – Recovering Thumos in (the History of) Rhetoric ................................ 99
  Reuniting Cognition and Emotion in the Enthymeme ..................................... 100
  A Skeptical View of the Desire for Emotion in Rhet-Comp ............................ 107
  Interdisciplinary Contributions to the Study of Affect and Emotion ............ 115
  What is Thumos? .............................................................................................. 118
  Thumos as the Internal Dialogue of Ideology ............................................... 125
  Visualizing Thumos ......................................................................................... 130
Chapter 4 – Re-seeing the Visual Enthymeme for the First Time ......................... 133
  The Visual Enthymeme in the Academic Mind ............................................. 135
  The Enthymeme Does Not Exist ..................................................................... 139
  Naturalizing the Enthymeme .......................................................................... 142
  The Political Work of Visual Enthymemes .................................................... 146
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation connects classical theories regarding the enthymeme and *thumos* (a Greek word commonly translated as “heart,” “mind,” or one’s “capacity for emotion”) to modern theories of images and emotion in order to reconsider the central role of visual discourse in persuasion, ideology, and subject formation. Since “enthymeme” comes from *en* and *thymos*, meaning “in heart,” etymologically the enthymeme is an argument that is realized in an individual’s thumos. This dissertation thus attempts to establish the notion of thumos in rhetorical studies by developing a theory of visual enthymemes.

The understanding of the enthymeme used within this dissertation works less from the Aristotelian model of the enthymeme as a truncated syllogism, and more from the sophistic use (particularly that of Gorgias, Anaxamines, and Isocrates) of enthymêmata—the kairotic “emotively charged reasons” that rely on stylistic force to create an “enthymemic moment” in the audience’s experience that produces persuasion or belief. In other words, where Aristotelians envision enthymemic discourse as a structure, the sophists see it as an event. This sophistic enthymemic tradition is evident in the visual rhetoric of modern social activists, particularly in what Kevin DeLuca calls “image events”—the visually
based rhetorical efforts of those attempting to move people to action. These activities embody a form of “biopolitics” in which the traditional binaries between emotion and rationality, between body and mind, and between text and image no longer hold.

The visual enthymeme is offered as one way to understand the affective power of visuals without returning to conventional understandings that situate images and emotional appeals primarily as immoral or otherwise underhanded rhetorical strategies opposed to reason. Depictions of thumos in both classical rhetoric and poetics exemplify a type of “internal rhetoric” in which subjects identify with one “package” of reason and emotion over other possible packages. This packaging holds significant implications for understanding how multimodal texts function enthymemically, and how teachers participate in the education of student emotion.
Chapter 1

Introduction: A Vision of Thumos

This dissertation seeks to contribute to the recovery of the notion of *thumos* in rhetorical studies. Thumos, in its broadest sense, is one’s capacity for emotion—a *dunamis*, according to Aristotle, that incorporates both activity and characteristic disposition. While this Greek term (spelled either thumos, or *thymos*) is relatively unknown to modern rhetoric scholars, this dissertation will integrate thumos into rhetoric and composition studies through a concept much more familiar to rhetoricians: the enthymeme. In particular, Jeffrey Walker’s work in ancient rhetoric reveals a significant relationship between thumos and the enthymeme (the word enthymeme being from *en* and *thymos*, or “in heart”). Etymologically, an enthymeme is an argument that is realized in an individual’s thumos (171).

The involvement of one’s capacity for emotion is not the understanding of an enthymemic argument that is most familiar to academics. For most academics, the enthymeme is primarily associated with the logical structure of the syllogism, and, thus, the mode of the audience’s participation is strictly rational and linguistic. There is a small amount of scholarship that has sought to reinvigorate our discipline’s understanding of the enthymeme by reconsidering its pre-Aristotelian roots in affective persuasion. But none of this scholarship has
sought to connect the enthymeme to one of the most pervasive forms of persuasion and argument in contemporary public discourse—the image.

In addition to contributing to the long-standing disciplinary debate over the nature and function of the enthymeme, this dissertation will engage current conversations in rhetoric and composition related to emotion and visual studies. As will be clear later, the value of a notion of thumos to these domains is that it provides a way of speaking about the work of rhetoric in ways that do not depend on the traditional binary hierarchies between emotion and rationality, that between body and mind, or that between text and images. It also contributes to current models of subjectivity and belief in composition theory by recognizing how the emotion-based enthymeme is part of the visual heteroglossia through which individuals identify themselves as subjects. While an understanding of the thumos-based enthymeme will contribute to the current scholarly interest in emotion and visual rhetoric, thumos also promises to be a productive term for many interests often grouped under the rubric of cultural studies, including studies of race, class, gender, ideology, and politics, as well as the many branches of visual studies.

Barbara Koziak has shown the potential of the concept of thumos in her book, *Retrieving Political Emotion*, in which she uses it to examine gendered political practices and the politics of gender in drama and criticism. Koziak does not argue that emotion is absent from public discourse. Rather, she argues that we need to overcome the “dread of political emotion” in public discourse without calling for the “overthrow of reason,” and develop instead a sense of political
emotion that enables political action rather than discouraging it (2). Koziak chronicles a “sea change in the scholarly understanding of emotion” that has drawn from work being done across several disciplines, noting that scholars “have gone from viewing the passions or emotions as universally wild, irrational, dangerous, subjective bodily phenomena that impair good practical and theoretical judgment, to posing emotions as rational, cognitive, evaluative, and essential to good moral character and action” (13). This dissertation extends Koziak’s valuation of the political work made possible through a concept of political emotion to consider the significance of the reception and production of visual discourse as part of this political work.

This dissertation is also undeniably about rhetoric and, to some degree, the historiography of rhetoric. By reconstructing the enthymeme based on the pre-Aristotelian notion of thumos, it participates in the recovery of sophistic rhetorical theory in order to shed light on modern rhetorical practices. Linking discussions of images, persuasion, and emotion allows one to articulate, for instance, how the rhetorical and ideological practices that engage emotions through the use of images do so by creating visual enthymemes. This leap from emotion to enthymeme is enabled by the pre-Aristotelian notion of the enthymeme which includes discourse that affects someone in his or her thumos. One could argue that this alternate version of the enthymeme is available even in Aristotle, but it is most visible in sophistic works such as those of Isocrates, Gorgias, and Anaxamines, and thumos is well-represented in the narrative works of Greek poets, such as Homer’s Iliad.
This updated version of the enthymeme continues a long tradition of reformulating the enthymeme to match contemporary scholarly interests, a history that Carol Poster has chronicled in her essay “A Historicist Reconceptualization of the Enthymeme.” As she writes, the continual redefinitions of the enthymeme are “typical of the process by which rhetorical theorists of all ages seem to reinterpret Aristotle to bring his theories into conformance with the dominant rhetorical thinking of their period” (6). Rather than see this as a reason to discount the enthymeme as a rhetorical concept, I view this as one of the theoretical strengths of the enthymeme, especially in view of William Covino’s observation in The Art of Wondering that the “major figures of classical rhetoric—Plato, Aristotle, Cicero—define and demonstrate rhetoric as the elaboration of ambiguity” (2). If the definition of the enthymeme were not ambiguous, it would not be of much use to rhetorical theorists. In other words, the ambiguity of the enthymeme makes it a productive concept in rhetorical studies.

The term “visual enthymeme” is not new, but it may be new to some rhetoricians as it has been primarily defined and deployed by scholars working and publishing in journals only indirectly associated with the field of rhetoric and composition. While I believe there is much value in the work being done in these fields, I also believe that these approaches would benefit from a greater engagement with the conversations within the field of rhetorical studies about the nature of the enthymeme. Although the definition of a “visual enthymeme” has been attempted before, grounding a definition of the visual enthymeme in thumos
has not. Adopting the pre-Aristotelian relation between thumos and enthymeme, visual enthymemes would be images that work by engaging the thumos, or emotional capacity, of the viewer. Compared to the “enthymeme-as-rhetorical-syllogism” derived from Aristotle and preserved in so many textbooks and articles, the visual enthymeme has been barely theorized. In fact, those scholars who have gestured toward the possibility of visual enthymemes have been (universally, as far as I can tell) housed in philosophy, communication, and speech departments.

In the scholarship emerging from these departments, “visual enthymeme” seems to be a synonym for “visual argument,” the equation of which strips the enthymeme of all the characteristics which have made it worthy of recovery in rhetoric and composition over the last half century—namely, the engagement of the audience in the construction of the meaning of the event in ways not entirely bound to the discursive structure presented by the rhetor. The prevailing understanding of a visual enthymeme, seemingly, is limited both by a lack of engagement with scholarship in rhetoric and composition, and by the assumption of a hierarchical distinction between argument and persuasion—a relationship that might alternately be figured as a hierarchy between philosophy and rhetoric. The enthymeme required by philosophical logic is dependent on a definition of the enthymeme as a linguistic structure (an incomplete or deficient syllogism). This formalistic and systematic (i.e. Aristotelian, or structural) understanding of the enthymeme is not conducive, I argue, to effectively theorizing the rhetorical force of emotions and images.
Even Aristotle’s extensive commentary on the enthymeme is typically left unaddressed by scholars in other disciplines proclaiming the possibility of visual enthymemes, and the disciplinary debate over the enthymeme’s forms and functions is even less likely to appear. This means that many of these scholars simply consider the enthymeme a type of syllogism in which the viewer participates by supplying the missing premise. One of the scholars of the “visual enthymeme” presents the resulting “authoritative” approach toward the enthymeme when he writes that the enthymeme is “a form of argument . . . in which the arguer deliberately leaves unstated a premise that is essential to its reasoning. Doing so has the effect of drawing the audience to participate in its own persuasion by filling in that unexpressed premise” (Blair, “Rhetoric” 41).

While this is one view of the enthymeme (garnered most often from the survey work on the enthymeme done by Lloyd Bitzer), it is one that ignores totally the sophistic notion of the enthymeme which focuses on the emotional engagement of the viewer. In other words, it ignores thumos. Admittedly, this is a common understanding adopted by scholars in many fields, rhetoricians included. Thus, the goal of this dissertation is not simply to dismiss academic work being done in certain departments, but to provide an expanded understanding of the visual enthymeme by recalling an alternate construction of the enthymeme itself.

This ignorance of thumos is unfortunate since thumos is directly implicated in the capacity for individuals to be moved by discourse—to respond to rhetoric—as well as to the active circulation of desire through discourse. It is the thumos-
enabled potential for movement that forms the basis of politics and, for some, confirms the existence of such a thing as “effective rhetoric” (Jacobs and Micciche 3). If thumos does indeed describe an effective venue for the work of discourse, then it is easy to agree with Ellen Quandahl that “this heart-word [thumos] ought to become a key term for rhetoric” (14). By bringing a sophistic understanding of thumos to bear on the enthymemes that circulate in contemporary public discourse, I hope to facilitate the recognition of this concept as a productive term in contemporary rhetorical theory.

Internal Di-visions

Preceding the chapters below, the subsequent sections of chapter 1 will situate the methodology of this dissertation. Part of that methodology is the serious consideration of sophistic positions on knowledge, emotions, and discourse–what ironically might be charged by some to be itself a type of sophism, by making “the worse case appear the better.” Sophistic rhetoric has been attacked both in classical and modern times as being relativistic, materialistic, and immoral. Some scholars have even charged that all classical rhetoric is ultimately “unassimilable to a contemporary context (Knoblauch and Brannon, S. Miller)” (Jarratt xix). But this dissertation is also an appropriation of sophistic texts and concepts, if not a deliberate misreading, without the intent of remaining faithful to the intentions of the original authors. This is a practice now more commonly practiced and accepted than it was, for instance, in 1991 when Susan Jarratt wrote Rereading the Sophists, or as evidenced in the work of Jasper Neel, but it is one that still encounters resistance. The introduction will
explore the conventional forms of this resistance and establish to what extent this
dissertation (or any recovery of sophistic rhetoric) can be considered to be within
the sophistic rhetorical tradition. The organization and content of the subsequent
chapters are explained in brief below.

The first chapter, “Reconsidering the Heart of Enthymematic Rhetoric,”
considers the recurrent question in rhetorical studies regarding what an
enthymeme is and how it functions, and provides an overview of the various
approaches to defining and implementing the enthymeme as a rhetorical concept
that have been active in the field of rhetoric and composition studies. While most
of these approaches have focused on what might be called technical issues
related to the structure of the enthymeme and its relation to the syllogism, I argue
that the heart of the enthymeme is the experience of ambiguity and that, since an
engagement with ambiguity is a traditional objective of rhetoric, the enthymeme
is a rhetorical event that defies assimilation to a structural definition (as in its
definition as a “rhetorical syllogism”). The ambiguity sets the stage for the
dialogue between emotion and rationality that is often ignored or disparaged by
conventional accounts of persuasion.

The second chapter, “Recovering Thumos in Rhetoric,” investigates the
ancient notion of thumos and modern debates over emotion and cognition in
order to better understand why thumos is deserving of recovery at this time. It
looks to rhetorical treatises and classical Greek epic to generate an
understanding of this “heart word” that defies traditional valuations of emotion,
reason, and images. By considering the place of thumos within the psychological
and rhetorical theories of the Greeks, as well as current conversations regarding discourse and ideology, it seeks to offer insight into the role and utility of thumos in rhetorical theory.

The third chapter, “Re-seeing the Visual Enthymeme for the First Time,” addresses how the visual enthymeme has previously been theorized through the lens of communication studies and argues for the possibility of a visual enthymeme based in thumos. Specifically, it critiques the constructions of visual argument that reference the enthymeme yet limit it to a formal linguistic structure that mirrors the logical structure of syllogistic argument. It also addresses the approaches to persuasion and images that have emerged through the various fields contributing to visual studies, ones that have downplayed the role of emotion in the meaning of visual discourse. It builds upon critiques of reader response theory, and the work of Kevin DeLuca on “image events” produced by activist environmental groups to theorize the visual enthymeme as an event rather than a structure.

The final chapter, “Touching Thumos,” contemplates briefly the usefulness of thumos and the visual enthymeme to other areas of study within the fields of rhetoric and composition and cultural studies. Specifically, it looks at the status and description of movement within these fields as a way of illustrating the need for a concept like thumos—one that embraces the complexity of subjectivity over the need to reduce emotion, reason, and identity into a static knowable formation.
On Reconstructing the Sophists

This dissertation attempts to separate the enthymeme from its history as a *linguistically deficient logical structure* (a structured lack based in Aristotle’s description of the enthymeme as a type of syllogism), and to reconceptualize it as an *emotionally sufficient image event* (an organized excess based on the sophistic understandings of thumos and the enthymeme). This project, admittedly, relies primarily on sophistic and pre-Aristotelian understandings in order to appropriate classical discourse “to provide critical insight to contemporary theorists”—what Edward Schiappa, in his essay, “Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines?”, would refer to as “rational reconstruction” (Schiappa’s term for the less appropriative practice of studying classical discourse to determine the meaning of the original author is “historical reconstruction”) (194). Schiappa has taken pains to argue his understanding and acceptance of postmodern approaches to historiography such as those practiced by neosophists. But many still maintain that Schiappa ultimately denies the validity of neosophistic approaches to classical texts and figures, treating such approaches as either unknowable or less worthy than traditional approaches to historiography.¹

Victor Vitanza, for instance, argues that Schiappa himself appropriates the work of Richard Rorty on the history of science and philosophy in order to privilege “‘historically grounded’ (would-be responsible) historiography over and against fictionalized, therefore, ungrounded (irresponsible) historiography” (31). According to Vitanza, Schiappa constructs a binary between the *responsible*
“historical reconstruction” of sophistic doctrine—historiography that attempts to
be faithful to the meaning of the Sophists—and the irresponsible “rational
reconstruction” of sophistic doctrine—historiography that holds some other value
above one’s faithfulness to historical meaning.

One might ask: (where) would the present work fit in to this classification
system? The punctum, to use Roland Barthes’ term, of this dissertation through
which thumos is being explored, is the enthymeme. And the main classical
source for the dominant definitions of the enthymeme is Aristotle (primarily his
Rhetoric and Prior Analytics). And it is Aristotle’s commendation of the
importance of the enthymeme in his works that has made the enthymeme “the
most intensively studied” element of Aristotle’s rhetorical treatises (Gaines 5). So,
it may at first seem that I am addressing a topic lacking the need for
reconstruction. But this dissertation ultimately rejects the conceptions of the
enthymeme developed from Aristotle as being unsuited to the highly visual
nature of modern discourse, favoring instead the sophistic understanding of the
enthymeme derived from the works of Isocrates, Gorgias, and Anaxamines. But
the ultimate goal is not simply to understand what these rhetors meant in their
use of the term “enthymeme,” but to motivate these alternative approaches in the
study of modern discourse. The debates over the historiographic methods used
to construct sophistic and neo-sophistic rhetoric is thus relevant to this
dissertation’s development of an understanding of visual enthymemes born from,
but not beholden to, sophistic accounts of enthymemic discourse.
Edward Schiappa, in “Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage?”, contends that despite efforts by neosophistic scholars such as John Poulakos to produce a coherent sophistic definition of rhetoric, that sophistic rhetoric is a “mirage—something we see because we want and need to see it” (5). Later in his essay, Schiappa critiques attempts to distinguish a “sophistic rhetoric” by pointing out several difficulties inherent in such work. Among these difficulties lie the most basic of questions, including how one defines who was a sophist. Some scholars, including Poulakos, adopt the list compiled by Herman Dielz and Walther Kranz in their work *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, which identifies the following rhetors as sophists: Gorgias, Hippias, Protagoras, Critias, Antiphon, Prodicus, and Thrasymachus.

This list is easily criticized, since many ancient Greek texts identify other individuals as sophists, and any set of evaluative criteria will always be open to the charge of being arbitrary. Truly, the figures on the Diels-Kranz list have garnered more attention than others in modern scholarship (partially due to their placement on the list), but various scholars have included on their lists of sophists the following: Prometheus, Homer, Hesiod, Damon, Solon, Thales, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Zeno, Plato, Socrates, Isocrates, Gorgias, Antiphon, Thrasymachus, Hippias, Prodicus, Aeschines, Eudoxus, Protagoras, Critias, Polus, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Callicles, Antisthenes, Alcidamas, Anaxamines, Alcidamas, and Lycophron, as well as several as-yet-unnamed authors of ancient rhetorical treatises (“Mirage” 5–7).
Schiappa focuses on three questions one must confront when attempting to discuss sophistic rhetoric: First, are there any ideological or political views common to the sophists? Poulakos does argue in “Sophistical Rhetoric as a Critique of Culture” that sophists shared a liberatory purpose that was subversive of the dominant social order. And Sharon Crowley has called for the revival of sophistry based exactly on its tradition of socio-political critique in her essay, “A Plea for the Revival of Sophistry.” But Schiappa argues that the evidence of socio-political subversion is undercut, despite their challenge to orthodox understandings of knowledge, for instance, by the high fees that would have restricted such rhetorical education to only the rich (“Mirage” 10).

Even the charging of fees, though often cited, was not universal, and therefore makes it difficult to answer in the affirmative Schiappa’s second question: are there any professional behaviors common to sophists? Other behaviors attributed to the sophists are arguably even less consistent than the charging of fees. Often, specific sophists are held up as exemplars of a more general sophistic practice. For example, Roger Moss argues, based mostly on Gorgias’ highly poetic style, that one of the defining characteristics of sophistic rhetoric was the “highly-wrought use of alliteration, assonance, rhyme, and other parisonic devices, [and] parallelisms of all kinds” (213). But Gorgias was as popular as he was exceptional, and such generalizations may obscure more than they illuminate. Also, the attention given to Gorgias is partially a function of the status of Plato’s work of the same name, so that placing him at the center of a
definition of sophistic theory is ultimately a deference to Plato and his (evaluative) definition of what it means to be a sophist.

Schiappa’s third question concerns whether it is possible to say of the sophists (however defined) that they had anything adding up to a unified (or at least, organized) sophistic rhetoric. Barring any material commonalities yet unknown, Schiappa calls the desire to see sophistry as a unified project “simply wishful thinking” (“Mirage” 5–10). The difficulty of defining a sophistic rhetoric is compounded by the fact that the term from which we derive our modern word rhetoric—\textit{rhêtorikê}—was coined by Plato; “the sophists used not rhetoric but \textit{logos} to refer to their art of discourse” (McComiskey, \textit{Gorgias} 7). Schiappa writes of the word “logos” that it is “one of the most equivocal terms in the Greek language” (“Mirage” 8). In fact, Schiappa has been a vocal proponent of the argument that the word we now translate as “rhetoric” was most likely “coined by Plato in the process of composing \textit{Gorgias} around 385 B.C.” and is therefore unsuitable for application to the practices of sophists (“Did” 457). Of course, as mentioned above, if we are always already viewing the notion of sophistry through works like Plato’s \textit{Gorgias}, then perhaps it is more acceptable to use the word rhetoric in reference to their art of discourse.

Even if one could identify a group one was willing to label sophists, one must still deal with their being a diverse set of individuals with divergent views and methods. Even the sophistic use of “logos” rather than “rhetoric” does not provide a solid basis on which to build a sophistic rhetoric. McComiskey notes that the two most prominent sophists, Gorgias and Protagoras, each held a “very
different conception of *logos*” and, therefore, any conception of sophistic rhetoric is admittedly a “generic fiction with little historic validity” (*Gorgias* 7). As Schiappa puts it, the construction of neosophistic rhetoric, especially one with the goal of socio-political critique, is simply a sign that “it is we who have formulated the rhetoric” (“Mirage” 15, emphasis added).

Here is where I would like to part with Schiappa, not by denying his claim that we actively formulate (the history of) rhetoric to match our purposes, but by arguing that he doesn’t acknowledge the full implications of this claim for all of rhetorical theory. Schiappa’s critique of neosophistic rhetoric seems to want to bypass the neosophistic claim that “every historical account is itself a historically conditioned act of inventive writing and that every historian is inescapably situated in his or her own contingent historical perspective” (Consigny 255, emphasis added). The recognition of this claim by Schiappa would call into question not only conceptions of sophistic rhetoric, but of all rhetorical theory. As Covino reminds us, all conceptions of rhetoric are a product of interpretation practiced by historically-situated selves, not only conceptions of sophistic rhetoric. He writes:

. . . until recently, students and teachers were acquainted with an Aristotle whose *Rhetoric* prescribed the style and arrangement of prose, and whose *Poetics* reduced Tragedy quite neatly to rising and falling action punctuated by catharsis. This was an Aristotle who had reached us through centuries of interpreters, the Aristotle made congenial to Medieval formulae for eloquence, Renaissance logic, and Enlightenment positivism.
This rather tidy, decisive Aristotle was quite appropriate to mid-century American classrooms that mimicked the military virtues that won the war and saved the peace: a codified, schematized philosopher who gave us rules. (Art 1–2)

If all conceptions of rhetoric are products of interpretation (which Schiappa does elsewhere admit), then it seems odd for him to single out neosophistic conceptions of rhetoric for special treatment. In other words, it makes sense to problematize the construction of a neosophistic rhetoric that appeals to the needs of contemporary rhetoricians, but only if one is equally willing to problematize the construction of all rhetorical theory and the positions advanced by its historical formulations.

Perhaps the challenge to articulating a description of sophistic rhetoric would be partially alleviated by treating each sophist individually (to study Gorgian rhetoric, Critian rhetoric, Hesiod rhetoric, etc., separately). After all, part of the reason that the dominant rhetorical traditions seem fixed is that they focus almost exclusively on the works of only a few individuals (i.e., Aristotle and Plato). But even the works of these two have been interpreted variably by theorists over time. Looking at the historiography of rhetoric, Covino concludes that the “very instability of the ‘rhetorical tradition’” should signify to us that “[h]ow we read the history of rhetoric, and what we read, and the implications for teaching we derive, can change” (2). Any attempt to identify a group of Greek thinkers to whom we can apply a generic label, and a group of Greek thinkers to
whom we can not apply these labels, thus seems unlikely to hold up under historical analysis.

Taxonomies of Historiography

“SOCRATES: I am a great lover of these processes of division and generalization; they help me to speak and to think.”
– Plato, Phaedrus

Schiappa makes a distinction between studying sophistic rhetoric through “historical reconstruction” and “rational reconstruction,” terms borrowed from Richard Rorty’s “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres.” Schiappa distinguishes these approaches, respectively, as the desire either to interpret or to appropriate ancient texts, claiming that “both ought to be done, but done ‘separately’” (“Neo-Sophistic” 196). Schiappa compares his distinctions to those made by Stephen Malkin between historical and rational reconstruction:

“historical reconstruction of some philosopher’s thought gives an account of what some past thinker said, or would have said, to his contemporaries” while a “rational reconstruction treats a thinker (in many cases, dead) as within our own philosophical framework” (Qtd. in “Neo-Sophistic” 193–194).

Schiappa describes the appropriative practice of rational reconstruction thusly: “Since the goal of rational reconstruction is to provide critical insight to contemporary theorists, the needs and values of current audiences justify less rigidity and more creativity in the process of interpreting how dead authors through their texts speak to live, contemporary authors (“Neo-Sophistic” 194). As postmodern theory confirms, it’s not possible to have a value-free description, and Schiappa’s is no exception. Schiappa depends on hierarchical oppositions
(creative/academic, formal/informal, rigid/flexible) to describe rational reconstruction, oppositions where one term is typically favored in any given discourse community. Since value-embedded descriptions are inevitable, perhaps the greatest indictment of Schiappa’s description, then, is not that he uses such oppositions, but that he associates rational reconstruction with terms that his own discourse community does not favor.

Bruce McComiskey critiques Schiappa’s taxonomy, arguing that “historical reconstruction and rational reconstruction are fluid points on a continuum, not all-or-nothing categories, and this continuum is best understood as historical interpretation” (Gorgias 10). Furthermore, McComiskey refuses even to allow that all examples of “neosophistic appropriation” fall within the category of rational reconstruction, arguing that some writers “search the past for contributions to modern theoretical problems and problematics” without necessarily “treating a thinker ‘as within our own philosophical framework.’” Furthermore, not even all neosophistic appropriation is performed in order to “appropriate ancient doctrines in the same way,” and thus those desiring to categorize historicist work in rhetoric cannot maintain a “clear distinction between the goals and methods of historical scholarship that interprets ancient doctrines and ‘neo’ historical scholarship that appropriates ancient doctrines for contemporary purposes” (Gorgias 11, 8). In Vitanza’s words, the application of such exclusionary categories “disenable history-writing and historiography” (352).

Victor Vitanza is less kind to Schiappa than McComiskey is (or, apparently, I am), stating that Schiappa is a “traditional-philological-
‘metaphysical’ formalist” who, in his opposition of rational and historical reconstructions of sophistic doctrine, is attempting to sort “sheep from goats” (32, 31). Vitanza’s disapproval of Schiappa’s distinctions is part of his greater inquiry into what he calls the “negative dialectic” in his book *Negation, Subjectivity, and the History of Rhetoric*. The negative dialectic includes various mechanisms of exclusion, including the “dividing practices” (*diaerisis*) that Vitanza claims Schiappa employs “to do history” (12). For Vitanza, the negative “enables, it disenables . . . [but it is] mostly a disenabler because it excludes.” Vitanza finds such a disenabling in Schiappa’s essay mentioned earlier, “Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage?”:

> Let me in/cite in historiography one general example: Schiappa asks the question: The Sophists, oasis or mirage? He employs a dividing practice, either oasis or mirage. No matter how anyone, including Schiappa, needs or wants to say otherwise, with this formulation of the question, Schiappa destroys the conditions of possibilities of the Sophists. (13)

In view of the dividing practices being applied to sophists, Vitanza feels his own work in the history of rhetoric serves to “resurrect, or recreate the conditions of the possibilities for, the Sophists as sublime, sovereign subjects that-are-not-subjects” (11).

Vitanza argues that by opposing historical reconstruction “over and against fictionalized, therefore, ungrounded (irresponsible) historiography,” Schiappa privileges historical reconstruction in ways that are not supported by Rorty’s more pragmatic views from whom Schiappa takes his terms (Vitanza 31).
According to Vitanza, Rorty is more of an “‘ironic’ formalist” and the difference between Schiappa’s and Rorty’s approaches to historiography can be summed up in this way:

The difference here, then, lies between the new philology (as practiced, say, by Nietzsche and Rorty) and the old philology (as practiced by Ulrich Wilamowitz-Moellendorff and Schiappa). The two have radically different notions of ‘describing’ the world: Again, for Rorty, the ironist believes in no ‘final vocabulary’ and, thus, [believes] in redescriptions (anything can be made to look either good or bad, like an oasis or mirage, a fact or fiction) while the metaphysician, [believes] in descriptions (anything is either good or bad, etc.). (32)

This raises the question of whether the success of the negative dialectic is restricted by the possibility embedded in Vitanza’s own words—that, for the ironist, “anything can be made to look either good or bad, like an oasis or mirage, a fact or fiction” (emphasis altered). Although Vitanza seeks to expand the possibilities of emergence of sophistic rhetoric, his own language reproduces a dividing practice by limiting the ironist’s redescriptions to binary sets of either-or constructions.

Sorting Antifoundationalist Sheep from Foundationalist Goats

If McComiskey’s critique challenges the very possibility of categorizing scholarship easily by the degree of interpretation, it also suggests the impossibility of the easy application of the labels “anti-foundationalist” and “foundationalist” in the debate over the theorization of sophistic rhetoric
(admittedly, I write this with the full realization that neosophistic theorists have been widely, perhaps exclusively, associated with antifoundationalism). In a response to Schiappa, Scott Consigny writes with remarkably high confidence that

. . . we may characterize Schiappa’s neosophistic rivals, a group including John Poulakos, Sharon Crowley, Victor Vitanza, Kathleen Welch, and Susan Jarratt as ‘antifoundationalist’; and we may identify Schiappa’s own camp, one including Eric Havelock, G. B. Kerferd, Jacqueline de Romilly, and Thomas Cole, as ‘foundationalist.’ This distinction is illuminating, for it situates their battle within the war raging in the intellectual community over the nature and scope of rational inquiry and of knowledge itself. (253)

As McComiskey critiques the bifurcation of all theorists of sophistic rhetoric into responsible and irresponsible historiographers, so would I critique the automatic labeling of those who doubt the existence of a coherent system of sophistic rhetoric with foundationalism (as long as this doubt is qualified as a lack of current persuasive account of sophistic rhetoric, not the impossibility of such an account).

Significantly, the association of sophism with antifoundationalism is related to the recovery of rhetoric as a field of critical inquiry in the twentieth century. As Stanley Fish writes, “another word for antifoundationalism is rhetoric, and one could say without too much exaggeration that modern antifoundationalism is old sophism writ analytic” (Doing 347). The eagerness to engage in a debate over
the viability of a concept of sophistic rhetoric is thus a marker of the valuation of rhetoric itself, and engaging in such a debate, regardless of the side taken, could be taken as an affirmation of antifoundational principles. As Schiappa himself writes, the “worst fate in academia is to have one’s work ignored” (“Some” 272). In some ways, the conversation of rhetoric can only continue to the degree that it is antifoundational.

The “war raging in the intellectual community” between foundationalists and antifoundationalists that Consigny identifies may exist, although the differences among factions in this “war” are unlikely to boil down to two opposing and contradictory groups, one of which is wrong and the other right. Such classification seems incompatible with some of the sophistic pronouncements favored by neosophists, such as Protagoras’ assertions that “of all things the measure is man,” that one can make the “weaker logos stronger,” and that “contradiction is impossible,” since these assertions suggest that “there are no absolute, context-independent criteria that exist independently of the human beings who hold them” and, thus, the “truth of any assertion derives from the persuasiveness with which it is presented to a particular audience” and not in any disinterested realm of abstract truth (Consigny 256). What this suggests, rather, is the dependence of the persuasiveness of any claim on the standards of specific communities of scholars. If one accepts that even foundational accounts are persuasive to some communities of scholars, then one can see that foundationalism and antifoundationalism are similar in that that they are both deployed rhetorically.
Consigny claims that “many neosophists tend to describe their fifth-century Greek precursors with the pivotal topos of ‘philosophy and rhetoric,’” where philosophy is identified with the “search for ontological or epistemological foundations” and rhetoric is identified with the “antifoundational world view itself” (255). At the least, Consigny’s description elides one central point—that despite the meta-differences among historiographic communities, they both proceed to defend their views rhetorically. Consigny states that sophists advocated a “rhetoricist model of language in which ‘truth’ is a sobriquet awarded by particular audiences to persuasive, partisan fabrications rather than a condition of the world that some statements accurately represent.” But Consigny’s dismissal of Schiappa’s account of sophistic rhetoric overlooks the manner in which Schiappa’s foundationalist discourse is part of the vocabulary found persuasive by a certain historiographic community. Stated another way, foundationalist discourse (even if “wrong”) is entirely rhetorical, since it appeals to the search for foundations espoused by members of a community of scholars. To set such a community against another community that is supposedly committed to rhetoric is to limit rhetoric to only that with which you agree.

The Primacy of Rhetoric in Rhetorical Theory

I will return to Consigny’s defense of the work of neosophists and the need to view these theories as rhetorical endeavors below, but want to here point out that I bring up this debate, not simply to justify attention given later to a non-Aristotelian (“sophistic” seems too loaded at this point) account of the enthymeme grounded in thumos, but to temper my own dismissal of the
enthymeme tradition derived from the work of Aristotle. According to James McBurney’s early retrospective, “The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory,” scholars have traditionally concerned themselves with six areas of inquiry regarding discussions of the enthymeme in the works of Aristotle:

1. The passages in which Aristotle explains that the materials of the enthymeme are probabilities (είκότα) and signs (δηµεία);
2. The passages in which Aristotle declares example to be a form of the enthymeme;
3. The passages in which he discusses the relationship of the enthymeme to the topics or topoi;
4. Those in which we may see the relation of the enthymeme to ethos and pathos;
5. The passages in which demonstrative and refutative enthymemes are distinguished; and
6. The passages relating to the suppression of a proposition in the enthymeme. (56)

It is not uncommon to find entire essays devoted to one of the above concerns, essays that seek to answer limited inquiries such as how many premises must be present for an audience to construct a syllogism from, or whether the enthymeme makes use of fallible or infallible signs. It is not my goal to show that theorists interested in these conventional questions and characteristics are wrong (or that they’re foundationalists), only that such considerations are not as useful to contemporary scholars interested, for instance, in the field of visual rhetoric, as a
conception of the enthymeme understood through thumos can be. The easy
designations of groups into extreme positions—both Schiapp a’s separation of
scholars into rational and historical reconstructionists as well as Consigny’s
division of scholars into either antifoundationalists or foundationalists—is likely to
be inaccurate and, to use Vitanza’s word, “disenabling.”

I am less interested in clarifying what Aristotle “meant” the enthymeme to
be (and, honestly, not entirely committed to what Gorgias or Anaxamines or
Isocrates “meant” by it either), than in a more expansive view of the practices
found in enthymemic rhetorical practices. And while I believe that the theorization
of the visual enthymeme may further certain antifoundational projects, I’m not
convinced that its derivation from sophistic approaches to the enthymeme or
thumos make it automatically antifoundational. It seems unlikely that much of
what Consigny characterizes as foundational principles—that “there are rational
laws and standards immune from the vagaries of time and chance and that
knowledge is more secure than the transient beliefs of contingent human beings,”
for instance—is evident in any strong sense in the works of the authors he labels
as foundational (253–254). Rather, these are absolute statements to which few, if
any, scholars in rhetoric would ascribe. In fact, Schiappa has argued quite
forcefully for his antifoundational chops and the acknowledged situatedness of
his own inquiry in his “Some of My Best Friends Are Neosophists: A Response to
Scott Consigny.”

One way to restate the incongruity at the heart of antifoundationalist
critiques such as Consigny’s is that, though they assume that the “the art of
reading is thoroughly ‘rhetorical’ in that it involves using the vocabulary of one’s own community in order to invent a persuasive account,” they do not allow that, for some communities, the language of foundationalism is such a vocabulary (254). So, while I generally agree with the observations of antifoundationalists, it is hard to agree with Consigny’s dismissal of Schiappa’s work on the grounds that it “presents a highly partisan interpretation” when antifoundationalism itself reveals that “truth’ is a sobriquet awarded by particular audiences to persuasive, partisan fabrications” (253, 255). According to antifoundational principles, persuasive arguments can only ever be “partisan fabrications.” To insist otherwise would be to deny the situatedness of speakers in what Stanley Fish calls interpretive communities, communities that ensure that “every interpretation is a provisional fabrication whose validity depends solely on its ability to elicit commendation or approval from members of the community” (Consigny 254).

Consigny’s claim that Schiappa “fails to make [his reading of the sophists] stronger than that of his neosophistic rivals,” disregards the basic insight of antifoundational theory—that the determination of what makes one argument stronger than another is only possible within the evaluative standards of some community (253). By not distinguishing between the standards of what is persuasive to the communities being addressed by the foundationalists and the communities addressed by the antifoundationalists, this claim deploys a universal standard (of what makes an argument strong), even as it repudiates the notion of universal standards. Just as Aristotle’s description of the sophists enabled “future rhetoricians to vilify the sophists as opponents to everything right and good . . .
regardless of its actual resemblance to what many of the sophists might have professed,” the contemporary specter of foundationalism promoted by Consigny may enable the vilification of historical reconstructionists (McComiskey, Gorgias 3).

I am cautioned here by Foucault’s explanation of repression in The History of Sexuality in which he posits that there is a “speaker’s benefit” embedded in the belief that sex is repressed which ensures that the “mere fact that one is speaking about it has the appearance of a deliberate transgression” (6). It is possible that advocates of antifoundationalism have often benefited from a characterization of foundationalism as more uniform, more entrenched, and more influential—in a word, more foundational—than its practitioners achieve. I have no desire to defend foundationalism, only to remind myself that the disciplinary history of the enthymeme, and of all historiography, is based within a “war” (to use Consigny’s description) among various discourse communities, each of which, as antifoundationalism teaches us, is “inescapably situated in [its] own contingent historical perspective” (Consigny 255). To dismiss the arguments of situated scholars on the basis that they are situated within communities with which one does not share founding beliefs is to construct unnecessary impasses among scholars, and to grossly underestimate the dialogic potential located within the play of signification, which regularly overcomes the incommensurability of situated language games.4

Arguing for the recovery of a concept of thumos in order to reform our understanding of what an enthymeme is, and what a visual enthymeme might be,
will undoubtedly break with current dominant accounts of the enthymeme. But
where this endeavor will most strongly align with past attempts at theorizing the
enthymeme is in the rhetorical nature of the endeavor. In regards to Poster’s
claim cited earlier—that the history of the enthymeme shows that “rhetorical
theorists of all ages seem to reinterpret Aristotle to bring his theories into
conformance with the dominant rhetorical thinking of their period”—it should now
be clear that such reinterpretation is consonant with an antifoundational view of
discourse as rhetorical, regardless of the specific community addressed or the
principles invoked (6). With this understanding, there is more to gain by exposing
continuity between this and past accounts of the enthymeme, than by a strictly
oppositional framework.

In the terms used by Vitanza and Rorty above, this dissertation is
admittedly a redescription of the enthymeme that is also an appropriation of
thumos, conceiving of it as a notion which “can be made” to apply to today’s
visually saturated discourse. My evaluative criteria becomes thus to be useful, or
to be interesting, or to be provocative, but not necessarily to be correct. The
redescription of visual enthymemes is intentionally an act of theorizing—“the act
of engaging in critical, philosophical, hermeneutic speculation about a subject”—
as opposed to theory-building—“the attempt to arrive at a generalizable
explanation of how something works” (Olson 8). By theorizing the circulation of
visual enthymemes, I do not anticipate being able to describe how all visuals
work, or even how all enthymematic visuals work, but rather to speculate as to
the connections between our understandings of emotion, images, and a Greek concept over 2500 years old.

The desire to understand the relationships among images, emotions, and persuasion by (re)theorizing (visual) enthymemes matches Vitanza’s desire to “redescribe so as to create the conditions for the possibility of new configurations” (33). The reconfiguration of the enthymeme made available will hopefully better accommodate the widespread use of images in modern discourse and recognize the role of the audience’s capacity for emotion in the reception of these images. This is a speculative act with no intention to remain within the traditional bounds of the ancient rhetorical texts from which it proceeds. Thus, this text is probably best viewed as “provocation rather than information, as interruptions in the long-standing conversation about the elements of rhetoric” (Covino 3).

The redescription of the enthymeme in this text could be considered a form of rational reconstruction that probably falls further towards the appropriation pole of McComiskey’s continuum of historical interpretation. Although it does make use of sophistic texts, it primarily appropriates a notion from classical rhetoric proper, the enthymeme, thereby reinforcing the notion that every rhetorical concept is brought to us through a process of interpretation. And, therefore, it focuses also on the reception and uses of these theories by various scholars, rather than their original contexts. This text will not establish a “theory with a big T” capable of translating all images into a formally structured model of the visual enthymeme or even necessarily arrive at an applicable model
appropriate to the teaching of college-level argument (Olson 8). In fact, one of the key features of the enthymeme explored here will be its ambiguity—its conceptualization as a "rich set of relationships with the potential of being expressed in a multitude of ways"—a quality that makes the enthymeme, despite its classical heritage, uniquely suited to theorizing connections among postmodern argumentation, visual persuasion, and the experience of emotion (Emmel 132). It is the enthymeme’s malleability, rather than its specificity, that makes it of interest here.

Further Di/vision

Discussions of the enthymeme are often characterized by the same type of dividing practices as those identified by Vitanza and practiced by Consigny in discussions of the sophists. The following examples provide insight into how the features identified above with the debate over the recovery of sophistic rhetoric have been deployed in debates specifically concerning with the enthymeme. Richard Lanigan writes, for instance, that the “scholarly preoccupation with enthymematic definition is a continuing attempt to explicate faithfully or radically depart from the corpus of Aristotelian writings” (207, emphasis added). Such a characterization misrepresents the nuanced differences among the various approaches to defining the enthymeme. It also perpetuates, without naming it so, the binary between the historical reconstruction and rational reconstruction of rhetorical theory. In practice, what it provides is simply a way to dismiss certain scholarly work or approaches as inferior or misguided.
Another scholar who is interested in sorting sheep from goats in the context of the defining of the enthymeme is Robert Gaines. In his essay, “Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the Contemporary Arts of Practical Discourse,” Gaines produces an overview of the scholarly works on the enthymeme, attempting to show that most of them “exploit their chosen subject merely as the platform to launch a doctrine that is either foreign or antithetical to explicit doctrines in Aristotle's position” (10). Gaines softens this statement with the following:

Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong in holding views that oppose Aristotle—about enthymemes or anything else. But insofar as argument theorists directly or indirectly attribute such views to Aristotle himself, a problem arises; for they put words in Aristotle's mouth that he would have refused to speak. The result is a misappropriation of Aristotle's authority and, ultimately, the demotion of the *Rhetoric* to a shallow heuristic, devoid of consistency or theoretical force. (10)

Here, Gaines is defending the legitimacy only of reconstructing the ideas of Aristotle, and he does so by assuming that most of the scholarly works he consults are attempting historical reconstruction in order to level his criticism that they claim “Aristotelian authority for a position that Aristotle could not have accepted” (17). But even Gaines admits that the *Rhetoric* reveals that Aristotle is “openly committed to contrary views” regarding the enthymeme (8). Despite this, Gaines displays a clear willingness to criticize scholars for attempting rational reconstruction. For instance, in response to Jasper’s Neel’s statement in *Aristotle’s Voice* that “Of this one claim, however, I am certain: whatever an
enthymeme may be, it is not a syllogism” (63), Gaines writes that “Regrettably, Neel was not at pains to specify the non-syllogistic nature of enthymeme” (15). Rather than read Neel’s work as an intentional misreading of the passages Neel cites, Gaines chooses to “infer [Neel’s] view from the Aristotelian passages he stresses.”

Gaines’ criticism of Neel is especially ill-aimed considering the fact that Neel makes it exceptionally clear that his goal is not to reconstruct Aristotle’s (or any other figure’s) original meaning. Neel explicitly contrasts the “professional” discourse of scholars like Gaines and Schiappa with what he calls “mere sophistry” (190). He writes:

One alternative to such professionalization is sophistry, which seems to be the place where I always end up. The most obvious way to become a sophist is to articulate and then inhabit the theory and the pedagogy of previous sophists. . . . Increasingly, I prefer a second, perhaps less obvious, way of seeking out a theory and a pedagogy with the name "sophist." And I find the second way more reliable and more productive than trying to figure out what Protagoras or Gorgias or some other sophist meant or thought. I prefer to inhabit the notions of "sophistry" created by Plato and Aristotle. Whether Plato and Aristotle described "sophistry" accurately matters little to me. What matters is that the theoretical frame (up) that Plato and Aristotle left for us exists through its exclusion of something that they called "sophistry." (190–191)
Rather than try to walk in the shoes of past sophists by reproducing specific pedagogies or theories, Neel chooses instead to (dis)identify with the characterization of sophists as passed down from rhetoric’s “founding fathers” (191). The historical figure of the sophist is one that, as Neel admits, is “quite difficult to pin down.” Aristides, a Greek rhetorician of the second century, writes of this term skeptically in his Orations:

Did not Herodotus call Solon a “sophist,’ and in turn Pythagoras? . . . Does not Lysias call Plato a ‘sophist,’ and again Aeschines? By way of reproach in the case of Lysias, one might say. But the rest of the authors at any rate were not reproaching those other distinguished individuals; nevertheless they called them this name. . . . No, I think that ‘sophist’ was probably a general term . . . . (Qtd. in McComiskey, Gorgias 3)

Although the historical accuracy of the term sophist is debatable, the description of sophistry given us by Plato and Aristotle is something that Neel can engage (and inhabit), without feeling the need to explicate the works of specific individuals to find the most accurate interpretation or most faithful translation. Besides, this pursuit would most definitely be hindered by the fact that “the ancient Greek term sophist simply meant ‘wise man,’ until, that is, Plato and his fourth-century BCE contemporaries changed its usage to a term of reproach” (McComiskey, Gorgias 3).

It is only by adopting the definition of sophist passed down by Plato that one has a specific approach to rhetoric to contend with. Thus, the study of sophistry is for Neel a way to recognize how “Plato and Aristotle located rhetoric
in a certain place and oriented it in a certain direction. I am not content either with the place or the direction, and I would very much like to know what happens when that foundation is moved and the orientation turned" (191). It is difficult to see how Gaines, in defense of his own interpretation of the enthymeme, could legitimately accuse Neel and others of being "shot through with misappropriation . . . [because, for instance, their] reading conflicts with Aristotle's sharp distinction between logical and expressive matters within the Rhetoric" (18). Such an accusation assumes that Neel is attempting to produce a historical reconstruction of the sophists, which obviously he is not.

Recovering Thumos

Rather than align the recovery of thumos in rhetorical studies via the enthymeme with antifoundational or foundational thinking, it may be more accurate to say that this recovery will be rhetorical. The connection of thumos to the visual enthymeme is useful, not only because it allows one to bring the enthymeme into line with contemporary rhetorical thinking and forms of discourse, but because it enables the linkage of the discourses of emotion and images to classical persuasion. Although my goal is to construct a space for theorizing the visual enthymeme, a concept I believe would be useful to rhetorical theorists, I imagine no ultimate telos for it (nor for the conventional enthymeme) within rhetoric and composition studies. As Michel Foucault has said, “If you knew when you began a book what you would say at the end, do you think that you would have the courage to write it? . . . The game is worthwhile insofar as we don’t know what will be the end” (Technologies 9).
In the discussion below, the enthymeme may emerge primarily as a practice to be resisted due to its ability to obscure the workings of ideology because of “how natural enthymematic reasoning is in the arguments we make” (Emmel 134). Or the reconsideration of the enthymeme may needlessly reaffirm tenets of reader-response theory that now comprise the “foundational assumptions” of much modern day scholarship (Harkin 416). Or the enthymeme may appear irrelevant once it emerges that the enthymeme is a “condensed, mediated, and now ubiquitous, form” of public argumentation, a banal feature of the always “already said” condition of fragmented postmodern discourse (Aden 62, 55). If any of these outcomes occurs, I will not be entirely disappointed or surprised.

In terms set forth by Gregory Ulmer, the transformation of the enthymeme from a linguistic model to an affective model constitutes the “choral work” of heuretics—the creation of a space in which a new method can be invented, work that is “only preclusive, a mere beginning, a proposal, an experiment” (33). Heuretics is Ulmer’s answer to the oft-cited divide between theory and practice. While method is often considered a prior condition to theory, heuretics is a project of “generating a method out of theory,” a method that is based on the work of avant-garde artists and therefore applies “performance strategies to research” (xii). It focuses on production rather than interpretation, prompting us to ask not, “what is the meaning of an existing work?”, but “[b]ased on a given theory, how might another text be produced?” (xiii).
According to Ulmer, the enthymeme of Aristotle is part of a discourse focused on the creation of unassailable (because correctly structured) arguments. In this type of “argumentative writing the reader deals with the product or end result of a reasoning process” (38). Rather than introducing the audience to the potential meanings and knowledge accessible through dialogue, argument “provided one path and suppressed everything else . . . the goal of the enthymeme was to convince the reader that the solution offered to the problem was the only one possible.” Reinventing the enthymeme is thus also an opportunity to place it beyond the realm of argumentative writing. The visual perhaps represents a method that is valuable exactly because it can be an enthymeme without being an argument.

Due to the speculative nature of attempting to reinvent the enthymeme, application is not an explicit goal. In other words, the goal is not to produce a Theory of the visual enthymeme that will allow one to explicate individual images in a mechanical manner. As Brian Massumi writes: “The first rule of thumb if you want to invent or reinvent concepts is simple: don’t apply them. If you apply a concept or system of connection between concepts, it is the material you apply it to that undergoes change, much more markedly than do the concepts” (17).

Massumi’s charge perhaps takes postmodern accounts of incommensurability to an unnecessary extreme, suggesting that rethinking concepts is only possible within the arena of a single assembly of language games. But it does draw attention to the fact that the most contested areas of theoretical work are not likely to be in the application of concepts, the
consequences of which, he claims, are mostly limited to the objects of criticism. Because new objects lack hierarchical distinction within a discipline, the work of theory is most contentious when practiced within a discipline’s recognized borders. Such is the work of recovering the enthymeme, not through applying a conventional definition to a new field of objects (images), but through the recovery of a suppressed conception of the enthymeme made visible by inquiry into our modern reliance on visual discourse.
Chapter 2
Reconsidering the Heart of Enthymemic Rhetoric

“What then was an Enthymeme? Oxford! Thou wilt think us mad to ask.”
– Thomas De Quincey, Selected Essays on Rhetoric by Thomas de Quincey

In William Covino and David Jolliffe’s 1995 collection, Rhetoric: Concepts, Definitions, Boundaries, which attempts to introduce students to the “‘scope’ and ‘circumference’ of the field of rhetoric” by illuminating the “presence of rhetoric in intellectual and institutional history and as a shaping force in contemporary intellectual, academic, and political domains,” the enthymeme does not appear in any of the collected excerpts of scholarly articles and books (xi). According to the text’s index, the single mention of the enthymeme is in the opening glossary. The opening words of the first three of the five paragraphs in this glossary definition reveal the approach of the editors in defining the enthymeme: “In his Rhetoric, Aristotle proposes the enthymeme . . . “; “For Aristotle, the enthymeme . . .”; “Aristotle’s proposal that the enthymeme . . . “ (Covino and Jolliffe 48).

The fourth and fifth paragraphs of the enthymeme’s glossary definition focus on two examples that illustrate Lloyd Bitzer’s reconsideration of the enthymeme from his essay “Aristotle’s Enthymeme Revisited” (emphasis added). Obviously, the heart of enthymemic rhetoric is here defined by Aristotle and his interlocutors. In Keywords in Composition Studies, the enthymeme garners just a single mention in the section on argument, where it is given the sole definition as
“a syllogism from probabilities and signs” (a structural definition derived from Aristotle) (Heiker and Vandenberg 14). In the race for contemporary rhetorical theory, the enthymeme appears to be an “also ran.”

It seems that despite the contemporary resurgence of interest in classical rhetoric, of which Covino and Jolliffe’s text is a part, the enthymeme has not lived up to Aristotle’s claim that the enthymeme constitutes the soma, or fundamental body or substance, of persuasion. Charles Mudd writes that if we believed Aristotle’s claims that “the enthymeme is the heart of this rhetoric . . . we should expect to find the enthymeme at the very basis of our teaching of argumentation and persuasion. Such, however, is not the case” (409). In fact, only one textbook has made the enthymeme a central part of its pedagogy, John Gage’s 1991 The Shape of Reason (Gage has also authored several well-known articles on the enthymeme). Before considering the various pedagogies built upon the enthymeme (not much evident in textbooks, but evident in scholarship, and presumably, therefore, in individual classrooms), the recent history of the enthymeme within the field and the record of its transformations as a rhetorical concept should be addressed, since it is here that one finds the theoretical bases for these pedagogies.

Open up handbooks of rhetorical theory, classically-based writing textbooks, or the many journal volumes in which discussions of the enthymeme have appeared throughout the 20th century, and you will find a range of descriptions of what lies at the heart of enthymemic rhetoric. And this is not due to the fact that there exist in these documents sophistic and Aristotelian
In most cases, the range of definitions and approaches derive solely from the work of Aristotle. Aristotle’s trend toward systematizing may provide many things, but, historically, one of them has not been an authoritative understanding of the enthymeme. In the absence of such an authoritative definition of the enthymeme, one encounters definitions like the following:

- “The enthymeme was understood to be a syllogism of which one proposition is suppressed” (Seaton 113)
- “[by enthymeme, Aristotle] means concrete proof, proof applicable to human affairs, such argument as is actually available in current discussions” (Baldwin, qtd. in Bitzer 400)
- “The enthymeme is defined as a syllogism with one (or more) premises missing” (Simonson 303)
- “[Aristotle] defines the enthymeme as a syllogism with a specific subject matter, namely syllogisms from probabilities (eikos) and signs (seion)” (Madden, “Treatment” 167).

In looking at the various accounts of the enthymeme (and there are dozens more, to be sure), one finds that even the most straightforward descriptors are found in incongruous and sometimes contradictory forms. For instance, scholars don’t agree on the number of premises that can be missing from a syllogism in order for an enthymeme to exist. Some scholars claim that only one premise can be missing, while other scholars claim that more than one premise can be missing from the original syllogism.
One could support the former claim that only one premise can be missing by arguing that any two propositions of a syllogism do contain all three elements that are being related. Therefore, deductive syllogistic reasoning that does not diverge from the original syllogism can be constructed enthymemically from only two propositions because all three terms will be explicit even in only two of the three propositions that make up the syllogism. The caveat to this approach which supports the latter claim is the recognition that, in any speech situation, there are always a host of unarticulated assumptions or premises that could provide the basis for the elaboration of deductive reasoning, even from just one premise of a syllogism, which will necessarily establish some relation between two elements. The enthymemetic elaboration of an argument from only one premise understandably allows more flexibility in the connections drawn between the terms, but the standards of the discourse community in which these premises circulate effectively limit the possible connections that community members will construct.

Of course, there are many other constructions of the enthymeme that do not depend on whether one or more than one premise can be missing. As Covino and Jolliffe’s text mentions, current “scholarship has called into question the practice of defining an enthymeme in terms of the number of its parts” (48). Other sources refer to the enthymeme as a “rhetorical syllogism,” a “dialectical syllogism,” the “very body of proof,” or the “substance of rhetorical persuasion” (Miller and Bee 201). These definitions alternatively stress the incompleteness, the mode of reasoning, the materials used, the concreteness (i.e. probability) of
these materials, or the extent or type of audience participation necessary to consider a statement an enthymeme. While these distinctions are important to an understanding of the enthymeme’s disciplinary history, the two paradigms of the enthymeme that are of primary importance here are what will be referred to as the *structural* and *rhetorical* paradigms of the enthymeme.

Obviously, from the competing definitions mentioned above, it would be mistaken to claim that the enthymeme has been ignored in the discipline of rhetoric and composition. But neither has it been embraced in any standardized manner. One theorist claims it is the “the most intensively studied of all Aristotelian subjects among communication and English scholars” (Gaines 5). But the amount of scholarly attention given to the enthymeme is no measure of its disciplinary status. Rather, since the enthymeme is generally theorized via the works of Aristotle, this more likely says something about the disciplinary status of Aristotle himself. As Thomas Conley claims, “nowhere outside of Aristotle does any notion of the enthymeme as a syllogistic creature *or* as a stylistic turn play a very important role in rhetorical theory” (180).

The two notions that Conley mentions above represent two common approaches to the syllogism—that which treats as its heart the logical structure of deductive reasoning (a “syllogistic creature”), and that which treats as its heart an aesthetic or emotional effect. Scholarly definitions of the reasons for using enthymemes rarely focus on the logical structure, but do tend to focus on the interpersonal or situational aspects of communication, as when one scholar writes that the “shared communal perception” on which the enthymeme is based
is so familiar that to mention it would “insult the reader’s intelligence, advertise the writer's ineptitude, and slow down the discourse” (Green 624). The first concern above is most closely related to pathos, as a desire to avoid insulting the audience; the second concern above is most closely related to ethos, as a desire to maintain the writer’s aura of intelligence; while the third concern above is most closely related to stylistic concerns. In none of these conventional explanations for why the enthymeme is used in persuasive discourse do formal qualities play a significant role.

The opposition between descriptions of the logical form of the enthymeme and the contextual explanations for its existence and use—earlier likened to the opposition of rhetoric and logic—has provided a productive dichotomy for rhetorical scholars exactly because it reproduces the boundary between objective and subjective models of communication, a barrier that scholars are perpetually fond of transgressing. Similar boundaries saturated the debates over process and product, for example. In some cases, these boundaries were transcended by introducing a third term. In the work of James Berlin, the writing pedagogies based in the objective and subjective epistemological theories of reality and rhetoric are considered in the light of a third (arguably superior) category that he calls “transactional.” While objective approaches located truth in the material world and subjective approaches located truth in the internal experience of the subject, transactional approaches locate truth in the interaction of the elements of the rhetorical situation. As Berlin writes:
Transactional rhetoric does not locate reality in some empirically verifiable external phenomenon (sense impression or the quantifiable) or within some realm apart from the external (ideas or vision). It instead discovers reality in the interaction of the features of the rhetorical process itself—in the interpretation of material reality, writer, audience, and language. (155)

The distinction is important to the discussion of the enthymeme here because, since scholars have been preoccupied with defining what an enthymeme is—regardless of whether they base this definition in syllogistic structure or in the audience’s reaction—they often ignore the rhetorical contexts in which enthymemes circulate. It is interesting that Berlin singles out vision as one of the realms of interior subjectivity (although, oddly, “sense impression” is associated with external phenomena despite the less-than-objective condition of most sensory experience; seemingly, vision is not one of the objective senses).

Berlin’s association of vision with subjective approaches to reality suggests that our experience of an image is highly individualized. But scholars such as John Berger, Laura Mulvey, Roland Barthes, and Stuart Hall have detailed how ways of seeing are socially constructed, reproduced through codes suffused, for instance, with ideologies of race, class and gender. Whether a theory of the visual enthymeme based in the notion of transactional rhetoric has been or could be developed remains to be seen. But just because the two dominant versions of the enthymeme are opposed along traditional lines of objective and subjective approaches does not mean they have been given equal weight in composition theory.
A Problem of Definition

Claims that the enthymeme has been understudied or overstudied lack any easy criteria for how much a discipline *should* pay to a particular concept. It can be said with surety, however, that within the texts that have sought to address the enthymeme and its role and potential in rhetorical theory, there is no single agreed-upon definition of the enthymeme. Carol Poster recognizes this when she states that “Despite the frequency with which the enthymeme has been discussed in contemporary rhetorical literature . . . there seems to be no general agreement on the precise nature of what it is that is under discussion when the term enthymeme is used” (1). Even “most of what we have read about the enthymeme in the literature,” Conley states, “proves on closer examination to be simplistic” (183).

Many essays focusing on the enthymeme begin with a declaration of the ambiguity surrounding its definition, echoing the incredulity expressed by de Quincey above. Nancy Harper begins her essay on the enthymeme by stating that “[a]s most students of rhetoric eventually learn, everyone knows what an enthymeme is and no one knows what an enthymeme is” (304). Conley echoes this dilemma of students when he writes that “A great deal of what circulates these days as settled opinion about the nature of the enthymeme . . . is less secure than most students of rhetoric seem to realize” (168). Daniel Goulding simply states that the “concept of the enthymeme continues to be an enigma” (104).
In a sense, the ambiguity identified is the exigence the author cites to justify the imminent essay, lending support to the idea that the enthymeme’s ambiguity is indeed productive—at least of scholarship in rhetorical theory. The “problem of definition” is the comfortable port of entry for many a scholar into the scholarly conversation surrounding the enthymeme. These authors acknowledge the ambiguity of the enthymeme, yet do not always attribute this lack of consensus to any specific cause, leaving readers merely with the sense that there exists a disciplinary lack of a systematic or resolute definition of the enthymeme. In many cases, this ambiguity regarding the enthymeme is seen as something that can be eliminated through rigorous scholarship, rather than as a necessary component of the enthymeme’s function.

Besides modern scholars’ lack of agreement over the definition of the enthymeme, other grounds exist for substantiating the need to re-examine this concept. For instance, some scholars locate the cause of the uncertainty regarding the enthymeme in the content or shape of Aristotle’s work. As Brad McAdon writes, Aristotle’s accounts of the materials that constitute enthymemes are “never reconciled into a coherent account (or theory) in the Rhetoric. Rather, each conception of materials for the enthymeme is presented in a way that obscures, rather than facilitates, our understanding” (223). Lanigan points to Aristotle’s placement of discussion of the enthymeme in separate texts (in the Organon and in the Rhetoric) as contributing to the widespread belief in the “bifurcation of formal and material causes,” a belief which obscures the actual “unity of conceptualization” achieved in Aristotle’s discussions of the enthymeme.
Others scholars suggest that the lack of agreement regarding the enthymeme signifies confusion, incompetence, or even opportunism among scholars. As mentioned in the opening chapter, Gaines leans toward the latter when he accuses scholars of the enthymeme of “exploit[ing] their chosen subject merely as the platform to launch a doctrine that is either foreign or antithetical to explicit doctrines in Aristotle’s position” and putting “words in Aristotle’s mouth that he would have refused to speak” (10). It’s not clear that such attacks on theorists are to be taken seriously, however. While not every instance of theory is equally interesting, reasonable, or even ethical, it is commonplace to attack theorists for, basically, being theorists. For instance, the editors of the recent anthology, *Theory’s Empire: An Anthology of Dissent*, mount an attack on the dominance of theory in the field(s) of English studies over the last few decades by claiming that

. . . today’s theoretical vocabulary has led to an intellectual void at the core of our educational endeavors, scarcely masked by all the posturing, political zealotry, pretentiousness, general lack of seriousness, and the massive opportunism that is particularly glaring in the extraordinary indifference to or outright attacks on logic and consistency. (Corral and Patai 13)

Here, the charge of opportunism is brought to the forefront, since charges of incompetence or confusion are less likely to find purchase among the established
scholars these editors seek to dethrone. In short, the editors of *Theory’s Empire* attack the ethos of theorists, hoping to convince readers that these scholars’ motives are selfish and insincere, and that their methods are lacking in professionalism.

In fact, Wayne Booth calls such a view of discourse “motivism.” Those who take this view believe that “anyone’s justification for an action is always suspect and often merely self-serving” (Covino and Jolliffe 55). Patricia Roberts-Miller writes in her book *Deliberate Conflict* that such an “interest-based model of discourse” assumes that the primary motivation of communication is selfishness and therefore conflict “should not be settled through argument as much as through bargaining” (5). Roberts-Miller also states that such a model of communication is “likely to have come from the agonistic tradition in rhetoric” (5). Motivism thus positions rhetors in competition with one another, without the necessary tolerance for alternate viewpoints or for incommensurable language games that many have argued is a requirement for living in contemporary society. Because they do not focus on commonalities among positions and communities, but rather take a polemical view of discourse, motivists find it difficult to discuss values or to endorse any reasons that could be used effectively in the public sphere to generate consensus among discourse communities.

Not all attacks on scholars of the enthymeme rely on ethical claims. Bower Aly’s verdict combines the two faults of confusion and incompetence when he writes that “philosophers generally, I have come to suppose, either have not read
or do not understand the *Rhetoric of Aristotle*" (266). Richard Lanigan advocates the former as well when he claims that the “historical controversy generated by logicians and rhetoricians over the definition of the ‘enthymeme’ appears to derive from a *confusion* of causality and persuasion” (207, emphasis added). Edward Madden impugns logicians in particular when he writes that they reproduce willingly a simplistic definition of the enthymeme based on the syllogism, “falsely suggest[ing] a uniformity in views among philosophers which neither existed historically nor . . . exists currently” (“Crossroads” 368).6

One might say that the redefinition of the concept of the enthymeme has become so commonplace that it requires some effort to make such a well-trod path appealing to readers. One essay inaugurates its investigation into the enthymeme as a form of confession. In “Enthymemes: the Story of a Light-hearted Search,” Aly writes:

Now for a confession: I am no longer confident that I know what an enthymeme is. When I was an age of the youngest of you here, I could have told you neatly and precisely that an enthymeme is a truncated syllogism. This kind of innocence I forfeited long ago. (266).

Although seemingly unique in its approach, Aly’s essay perhaps underscores the association of indulgence with the study of the enthymeme that has led Poster to label the modern state of theory on the enthymeme an “embarrassment of riches” (4). Due in part to this sense of excess, the desire of scholars to redefine the enthymeme is sometimes associated with vanity or weakness. Conley, in his survey of various scholars’ approaches to the enthymeme, warns that it is
“always risky to record the consensus of a group of scholars, for scholars like to have their own positions on issues, distinct from others” (168). Divesting himself of the status of what Lacan calls the “subject supposed to know,” Aly begins his essay with a self-admitted lack. But this admission of lack may also be an obsession with lack which calls to mind Foucault’s description of the practice of confession:

. . . the confession lends itself, if not to other domains, at least to new ways of exploring the existing ones. It is no longer a question of asking what was done . . . but of reconstructing, in and around the act, the thought that recapitulated it, the obsessions that accompanied it, the images, desires, modulations, and quality of the pleasure that animated it.

(Technologies 63)

In some sense, the confession is itself a genre of exigence, one motivated by desire for subjectivity, one that turns inward to explore new ways of understanding existing domains. This last part at least seems a fair description of the continual redefinitions of the enthymeme, a process that turns toward past descriptions of the enthymeme in a quest for insight.

In Aly’s case, his essay is a transcription of a speech given to an audience of students and peers, and is thus an interesting divestment of the position of knowing subject. In part, Aly admits this lack of knowledge, only to spend the rest of the speech working on his lack of knowledge, a public display of what Foucault might classify as a “technology of the self”—an activity that
. . . permit[s] individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. (Technologies 18)

Whereas the other opening lines above identify a lack in others (in their competence, intent, or understanding), Aly identifies a lack in his self that prompts further reflection. That Aly uses the topos of confession, titles his speech a “light-hearted search,” and that the confession is obsessed, in part, with images and desires, holds much promise for the enthymeme as the crossroads of persuasion, image, and emotion.

While a single performance of attempting to understand the enthymeme is unlikely to prompt criticism, the large number of similar attempts to understand the enthymeme, having little in the way of concrete results, makes theorizing the enthymeme seem to some critics indulgent at best and, at worst, a form of narcissism. Foucault’s claim that “confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement” would seem to substantiate this view (Technologies 61). But making the subject of an enthymeme a speaking subject also seems fitting to the exploration of the enthymeme, since the enthymeme is a rhetorical event in which the audience’s “completion” of the enthymeme is viewed as a commitment to or identification with a belief considered already part of the self. The enthymeme thus may serve as a form of self-identification or self-affirmation, vindicating one’s present beliefs by placing
them in the context of a reasonable argument. Supporting this view of the enthymeme as self-affirmation, George Kennedy has even claimed that the enthymeme functions because it “flatters the vanity of those to whom one speaks by leaving something to their intelligence” (297).

Imagining the enthymeme as a form of pandering or flattery surely reinforces Plato’s accusations against the Sophists (and those who would learn sophistic persuasion from them) that they were more concerned with money and status than in truth. In the *Phaedrus*, for instance, it states that the orator need not “learn what is really just and true, but only what seems so to the crowd” (Qtd. in Fish “Rhetoric” 123). In Plato’s *Gorgias*, Socrates claims that the “orator need have no knowledge of the truth about things; it is enough for him to have discovered a knack of persuading the ignorant that he seems to know more than the experts” (23). The enthymeme’s place as one of the primary means of rhetorical performance thus indicts all of rhetoric as being unconcerned with truth. A caricature of (sophistic) rhetoric, even repeating the well-known charge of making the worse appear the better, appears in Milton’s description of Satan in *Paradise Lost*:

. . . up rose
Belial, in act more graceful and humane;
A fairer person lost not Heav’n; he seemed
For dignity compos’d and high exploit:
But all was false and hollow; though his Tongue
Dropt Manna, and could make the worse appear
The better reason, to perplex and dash
Maturest counsels: for his thoughts were low; . . .
. . . yet he pleased the ear,
And with persuasive accent thus began. (II, 108–15, 117–18)
This passage, as Fish writes, is “recognizable as a brief but trenchant essay on the art and character of the rhetorician” ("Rhetoric" 122). The focus of the scene is on the actions leading up to the speech, since these allow Milton to contrast the pleasing appearance and sound of the speaker with the unprincipled content of the speaker’s arguments. Such an approach depends on a form-content binary that has historically been used to denigrate rhetoric, or at least diminish its importance.

In the sixteenth century, Peter Ramus contributed to such a diminishing of rhetoric by claiming that issues of invention, arrangement, logic, and ethics were the province of philosophy. Ramus instead circumscribed rhetoric to issues of style and delivery—the mere performative aspects of persuasion. A similar circumscription leads students to believe that writing teachers and writing center personnel are most concerned with presentational aspects of writing such as the mechanical correctness of spelling, grammar, and punctuation. This definition of rhetoric as presentational rather than substantive or inventional continues to hold sway in many uses of the word “rhetoric” in the public sphere, where it is common to hear the accusation directed toward a political opponent that his or her words are “just rhetoric”—the show or appearance of sincerity or truthfulness that masks a deeper motive or deception.

One of the striking features of Milton’s caricature is the emphasis on the senses. The devil is “fair” in appearance, he physically rises up even as his thoughts are “low”, and he pleases the ear—in short, his actions reinforce binary distinctions, such as that between surface/depth and exterior /interior expressed
through Satan’s outward grace and internal emptiness. Similar binaries attempt to separate the faculty of reason from passion. Thus, the critique of rhetoric as a performance addressed to the senses is often also a critique of the role of ethos and pathos in persuasion. In this way, vision has often been associated with an attempt to bypass logos. As shown above, the enthymeme has also become associated with the individual’s unseemly vanity or need for ego strengthening. In the next chapter, the work of thumos as a type of “internal rhetoric” will expand upon this notion of the subject as the subject of the statement within enthymemic discourse, not in order to show the weakness or defect of those interested in (enthymemic) theory, but to inquire into the interrelation of emotion and reason in all persuasion.

Aristotle’s Legacy

“How for example shall we know what our author (Aristotle) means by the term Enthymeme? This question goes to the very heart of the Rhetoric since Aristotle tells us that enthymemes are the essential instruments of oratorical persuasion” – Lane Cooper, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*

It is clear that theories of the enthymeme that do circulate in the field of rhetoric and composition (and literature) are primarily those derived form Aristotle. Conley claims this quite forcefully when he writes that “all who write on the subject [of the enthymeme] base their discussions on one author, the ‘inventor’ of the enthymeme and its comprehensive expositor, Aristotle” (169). This narrow range of sources is unfortunate, since there are enthymemic traditions within sophistic works (often under the term enthymêma) that offer alternative approaches to theorizing the enthymeme that do not focus on the
enthymeme’s relation to the syllogism, as Aristotle’s does. In order to understand the significance of these alternative approaches, it will first be necessary to understand the place of the enthymeme in Aristotle’s rhetorical theory, which necessitates an understanding of Aristotle’s approach to discourse as a whole.

According to Aristotle, discourse can be divided first into that which seeks scientific truth (a.k.a. apodeictic certainty), and that which seeks to establish probable truth and instill belief. In the *Prior Analytics*, Aristotle details the use of the syllogistic method as a means to attain truth through scientific demonstration. The search for probable truth is separated into two methods: dialectic and rhetoric. Dialectic is the traditional question and answer method used notably in philosophical dialogues as a means of inquiry. Aristotle’s *Topics* develops a catalog of the common, general, and special *topoi* which orators use to further such inquiry (topics are not limited to use only in dialectic, however).

Rhetoric also deals with probabilities, and its end is thus belief, not truth. Within the art of rhetoric, according to Aristotle, the two types of proofs, or *pisteis*, utilized by rhetors are non-artistic and artistic ones (also known as “atechnic” and “entechnic” proofs). Non-artistic proofs are those elements of persuasive discourse that the rhetor does not create but are “preexisting: for example, witnesses, testimony of slaves taken under torture, contracts, and such like” (*Rhetoric* 1355b 37). Artistic proofs are “whatever can be prepared by method . . . one must use the former and invent the latter.” Thus, the emphasis of many textbooks on *heuresis*, or invention, can be attributed to Aristotle’s definition of the artistic proofs necessary for effective rhetoric. These artistic proofs constitute
the three species of persuasive proof that have been widely adopted in both pedagogical and theoretical approaches to writing: ethos, pathos, and logos. Put simply, ethos refers to the character of the rhetor performed or invoked, pathos refers to the rhetor’s ability to invoke emotion in the audience, and logos refers to the reasoned argument presented to the audience.

Aristotle places the enthymeme directly in the realm of logos when he writes that all speakers “produce logical persuasion by means of paradigms [examples] or enthymemes and by nothing other than these” (Rhetoric 1356b 40). Aristotle suggests in both the Rhetoric and in the Topics that the example is an inductive form and the enthymeme is a deductive form, which solidifies the enthymeme’s syllogistic pedigree. While it would be easy to regard the enthymeme as a purely logical form of persuasion, this does not seem to match Aristotle’s claim that the enthymeme is the substance of all persuasion. James McBurney admits that, at first, the enthymeme may not seem appropriate to persuasion through ethos or pathos, since the enthymeme is a “rhetorical device and as such is dependent, so to speak, upon language symbols. Persuasion arising from the personality of the speaker . . . is therefore clearly outside the realm of the enthymeme” (62).

But McBurney goes on to write that ethical and pathetical appeals are expressed in words, both make use of the topics, and “we are explicitly told that these topics are the sources to which we may turn for the propositions to compose our enthymemes” (63). In other words, Aristotle presents the enthymeme as the foundation of all persuasion, not just logos established
through “terms and propositions” (McBurney 62). If the topics are to be the basis of persuasion, it is clear that one must consider how these topics may be expressed visually as well.

So far, the enthymemic legacy of Aristotle has been presented as relatively straightforward and consistent. But this conflicts with the approaches of various scholars seen above that take as their starting point the inconsistency or ambiguity within Aristotle. It would be convenient to believe that the lack of agreement on the definition of the enthymeme is simply due to a lack of understanding by modern scholars as to what Aristotle meant by the term. But Aristotle is not as helpful in this situation as one might think. We have already encountered Bitzer’s observation that “the reader of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* will find no unambiguous statement defining the enthymeme” (399). The result of this condition is that when scholars attempt to define the enthymeme through Aristotle, the passage they cite is really dependent on what they already believe the enthymeme to be.

In some sense, the process is itself enthymemic, since the reader finds persuasive those statements that speak to his or her pre-existing beliefs regarding the enthymeme. For instance, those who view the enthymeme as an abbreviated syllogism often point to this passage from Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*: the enthymeme is “drawn from few premises and often less than those of the primary syllogism; for if one of these is known, it does not have to be stated, since the hearer supplies it” (*Rhetoric* 42). George Kennedy calls this passage the “authority for defining an enthymeme as a syllogism in which one or more
propositions are not expressed” (297). Thomas M. Conley suggests that a tentative list of such authoritative statements might include the following from Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and *Topics*:

“Everyone who persuades by proof in fact uses either enthymemes or examples. There is no other way” (1.2, 1256b 5–7). “Enthymemes are the substance of persuasion” (1.1, 1354a 14f.). “The enthymeme is a sort of syllogism (*syllogismos tis*)” (1.1, 1355a 8). “Enthymemes and examples deal with what is for the most part contingent” (1.2, 1357a 14f.). “An enthymeme is a syllogism dealing with . . . practical subjects” (2.20, 1394a 25ff.). “The enthymeme must consist of a few propositions, fewer than those which make up a normal syllogism. For if any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need to mention it; the hearer adds it himself” (1.2, 1357a 16ff.). “We must not carry (the enthymeme’s) reasoning too far back, or the length of the argument will cause obscurity; nor must we put in all the steps that lead to our conclusion, or we will waste words in saying what is already clear” (2.22 , 1395b 24–8). “We must use as our modes of persuasion and arguments notions possessed by everybody, as we observed in the Topics when dealing with the way to handle a popular audience” (1.1, 1355a 27 ff.; cp. *Topics* 1.2, 101a 30–4). (169–170).

Such a list lays bare statements that taken singly may seem “straight forward and unambiguous,” but which, taken together, comprise a complex and contradictory
web of possibilities (Conley 169). However, none of these “authoritative” statements has achieved dominance over the others.

While some scholars such as James Raymond suggest that there does exist a single authoritative understanding of the enthymeme that has been “misunderstood, ignored, or denigrated” by the multiple attempts to bend it to match individual scholars’ own needs and desires, it is unlikely that such an authoritative account of the enthymeme has ever existed (140). It’s not that theorists haven’t tried either. Solomon Simonson produced, perhaps overconfidently, an essay titled “A Definitive Note on the Enthymeme.” Lanigan authoritatively claims that “for Aristotle the enthymeme is best understood as a speaker’s syllogistic method, not as a listener’s syllogistic response” (emphasis added, 207). It’s not uncommon for scholars to claim that their approach to a particular topic is useful in some intellectual or practical context. But in response to Lanigan’s statement above, besides questioning what criteria makes something best for Aristotle, one might also ask: why best for Aristotle? Why not best for contemporary scholars? Or for student writers? “Best” seems to conceal a particular set of interests which are primarily geared toward a certain type of historiography, hermeneutic rather than heuristic (and definitely not heuretic). Furthermore, one might point out that valuing certain approaches to historiography is most likely to benefit certain historiographers, not their objects of study who have been dead for over 2300 years.
To better understand the “embarrassment of riches” represented by so many competing definitions of the enthymeme, Poster categorizes textbook definitions of enthymemes into the following types:

(a) abbreviated syllogism (one premise omitted)

(b) syllogism of which at least one premise is probable

(c) abbreviated syllogism of which one premise is probable

(d) informal deductive reasoning

(e) syllogism of which one at least one premise is a sign

(f) syllogism of which at least one premise is a maxim

(g) syllogism from premises in accord with audience’s world view (4)

The common factor in all but one of the above classifications is that the enthymeme is a type of syllogism. This is pure Aristotle and a clear sign that textbooks have generally embraced a structural approach to the enthymeme. According to these texts, the heart of enthymemic rhetoric is a logical form, one with an underlying structure that validates the connections made by the audience using the premises presented to them. Such is Aristotle’s legacy.

Pedagogies of the Enthymeme

So far, it is clear that the enthymeme has received much attention in theoretical attempts to explicate it. But how does the enthymeme fair in rhetoric and composition pedagogy? Barbara Emmel writes that, “despite a growing body of scholarship that positions the enthymeme at the very heart of the composing process,” the enthymeme is “more likely to alienate composition teachers than to attract their interest and attention” (132). Another scholar claims that the large
amount of talk surrounding the enthymeme is “theoretically interesting but pedagogically insignificant” (Madden “Treatment” 198). Popular texts based in classical rhetoric such as Edward Corbett’s *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student* seem to support this assertion. This text’s characterization of classical rhetoric is thoroughly Aristotelian, and the sophists are mentioned as part of rhetorical history without attempting to make use of their ideas pedagogically. In this text, the enthymeme is discussed in the section on the three modes of persuasion (ethos, pathos, logos), under the heading “The Appeal to Reason.” Corbett presents a traditional perspective by describing the enthymeme as an “incomplete” or “abbreviated” syllogism that produces “a tentative conclusion from probable premises,” emphasizing the criteria of incompleteness and probability (60).

Corbett opposes this enthymeme to the “normal syllogism” that leads to a “necessary conclusion from universally true premises” (60). Understanding the enthymeme as merely an incomplete syllogism provides little incentive to develop students’ understanding of it. This subordinating approach is evident when Corbett asks students, not to produce enthymemes, but to translate the enthymemes presented by the text into complete syllogisms. This basically positions the student as the audience in the rhetorical situation rather than as the speaker. The subordination of the enthymeme to the syllogism is further evident by the fact that Corbett’s text devotes over 40% less space to the enthymeme than it does to the syllogism proper.
Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee’s textbook, Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students, reverses this trend by devoting more space to the enthymeme than to the syllogism (although the enthymeme does not garner a listing in the index). But much of this section in Crowley and Hawhee’s book is taken up by an analysis by Kathleen Hall Jameison that portrays the use of the enthymeme as one of the unethical “dirty tricks” that political campaigns employ to lead voters to “draw conclusions that [are] not true” (Qtd. in Crowley and Hawhee 143, 145). Crowley and Hawhee even write of this example that, “[f]rom a rhetorician’s point of view, however, [the enthymemetic argument presented] is an example of what Aristotle calls ‘false reasoning,’ because its premises were not true.” They disregard the “winning candidate’s point of view,” in which the enthymeme might be valued as a technique of effective rhetoric and instead focus on the logical characteristics of the enthymeme (Crowley and Hawhee 145).

By locating the enthymeme in sections devoted to their chapters on logical reasoning, Crowley and Hawhee (and Corbett) further entrench the application of logical criteria to the enthymeme. Even though the enthymeme is treated as a form of rhetorical proof productive of probable knowledge, textbooks often lead students to subject enthymemes to the criteria of apodeictic logic: the ability to arrive at necessary truth. Under this criteria, “what counts is ending rather than continuing the discourse” (Covino 129). Also, by focusing on the presentational structure of the discourse (i.e. the enthymeme, or the syllogism), textbooks embrace what John Gage calls “empty forms” (“Towards” 6). A narrow focus on
the forms, or shapes, that discourse can take can replace discussions of what constitutes ethical persuasion, reducing the evaluation of rhetoric down to what Wayne Booth calls measures of “skill, not knowledge or wisdom” (qtd. in Gage, “Towards” 6). By not making this distinction, Booth warns, textbooks suggest that the “goal of all thought and argument is to emulate the purity and objectivity and rigor of science, in order to protect oneself from the errors that passion and desire and metaphor and authority and all of those logical fallacies lead us into” (Qtd. in Gage, “Towards” 6).

Crowley and Hawhee do make distinctions about the ethical qualities of arguments, but it is interesting to note that the primary narrative by Jameson, and the editors’ analysis of this narrative included in the section on enthymemes, shows enthymemes being used unethically. A reasonable question is: why is the enthymeme introduced primarily as an example of an underhanded method of persuasion when the syllogism is not? Discussion of the syllogism includes examples that are overreaching but benign, claiming that ghosts and vampires are immortal creatures, politicians cannot be trusted, and the death penalty cannot be justified (Crowley and Hawhee 139). These might be considered incorrect, but not underhanded. Most importantly, information about the syllogism is embedded in a section titled “deduction,” thereby equating the syllogism with reason itself. The effect of this characterization seems to be to reinforce a positivistic and technocratic view of communication in which one’s success is dependent upon the formal comprehensive linguistic display of premises that obtain logically.
Not all pedagogical uses of the enthymeme stress its logical pedigree. Lloyd Bitzer’s 1959 article in the Quarterly Journal of Speech, “Aristotle’s Enthymeme Revisited,” has served as a springboard for many scholars attempting to develop pedagogies of the enthymeme that focus attention on the epistemic nature of knowledge and the collaborative nature of discourse. In his article, Bitzer identifies three general schools of thought concerning the enthymeme: that “the enthymeme is distinctive on account of (1) its basis in probability, (2) its concreteness, and (3) its usual formal deficiency” (400). Bitzer then goes on to show how each of these approaches “failed to name a truly distinguishing feature” of the enthymeme that would separate it from other forms of syllogism.

According to Bitzer, the single aspect of the enthymeme that sets it apart from other forms of reasoning explored by Aristotle is that, in the enthymeme, “the audience itself helps construct the proofs by which it is persuaded. . . . [the enthymeme’s] successful construction is accomplished through the joint efforts of speaker and audience and this is its essential character” (408). Such a view makes the social processes underlying the enthymeme and the relationship between rhetor and audience central concerns, making it impossible to justify allowing students to “write artificially for a fictitious audience” (Emmel 133).

Even those who do not explicitly cite Bitzer often adopt the focus on process over structure, as Barbara Emmel does when she argues for the usefulness of enthymemes in guiding “activities of inquiry—thinking, questioning, defining, conversing, understanding, connecting, and concluding” (Emmel 133).
Scholars such as Emmel have moved this undervalued aspect of enthymemic discourse to the forefront of pedagogies that aspire to be “genuinely dialogic in nature” by using the enthymeme as “a means of continuing that dialogue” begun by the shaping of an argument (147).

Although Emmel begins by stating that the enthymeme is “not just a logical paradigm . . . but a conceptualization of a rich set of relationships,” she still adopts a fairly structural account of the enthymeme (132). Emmel’s approach is one that adopts the enthymeme as an architectonic principle of argument in general. As she writes, the enthymeme “serves both as an heuristic for the thinking that leads to a recognition of the argument and as a paradigmatic schema of the key ideas and premises that create a progression toward a complete argument” (147). For Emmel, the enthymeme represents not just a model for the product of writing but for the process of writing. She claims that the enthymeme is representative of the “processes of thought that are inherent in reasoned discourse and of the organic connections that exist among those processes, the process of writing a paper, and the final structure of that paper” (Emmel 133, emphasis added).

This does have the advantage of embedding the enthymeme in the dialogic space of the classroom, in which students articulate, defend, and amend their discourse to better accommodate the response of their (classroom) audience. In this way, Emmel transforms the imagined dialogue of the rhetor and audience in which enthymemes circulate into the actual dialogue among students in which enthymemes are developed, discarded, and built upon. But Emmel’s
classroom, in which students “offer assertions or claims that they want their classmates to accept and when questioned, they offer additional statements (or claims) in support of those initial claims,” simply restages the fundamental scene of dialectic, turning authority for what is correct to the class rather than to a single speaker (134).

While such passing of authority may, ideally, be dialogical, it also puts the force of the group’s endorsement behind the logical connections drawn between statements. If students simply adjust their claims to produce ones acceptable to the class, then it is hard to see how such a pedagogy is an advance over forms of collaborative learning advocated by the likes of Kenneth Bruffee, the critiques of which have well established how such scenes stage cultural reproduction as learning. The ensuing “predictable pattern” of student discourse in Emmel’s classroom where “claims naturally lead to enthymemes” may simply reinforce logos as the sole quality of good arguments. If it is only “[w]henever a line of reasoning is offered in support of a claim, an enthymeme ensues,” then we have not moved far from the notion of the enthymeme as a pseudological device modeled on the syllogism (134).

Just as Emmel promises to take students beyond the traditional definition of the enthymeme, Gage’s textbook, *The Shape of Reason*, presents the enthymeme to students as a way to refer to the “relationship created between a reason and a conclusion” that is “more open and flexible” than models from formal logic (58). But just as Emmel’s approach returns to a basically formal conception of the enthymeme (albeit one that provides structures at more than
just the level of the sentence), Gage’s enthymeme reduces down to an unregulated relationship between an assumption, a stated reason, and a conclusion. Gage emphasizes the enthymeme’s flexibility and, indeed, in the span of a few pages, Gage’s enthymeme appears as a form of implicit reasoning, as two ideas connected by a “because,” as a thesis statement, as a way of generating an essay’s structure, and as the grouping of an assumption, a stated reason, and a conclusion (Shape 77–80). What is flexible here seems to be the manner in which Gage describes the enthymeme, but not necessarily the structure being described.

The structural legacy of Gage’s enthymeme is unquestionable considering its placement in a chapter titled “Developing Structures” and filled with subtitles such as “The Structural Enthymeme” and “From Enthymeme to Structure.” Again, the enthymeme appears in a metonymic relationship to the overall structure of an essay, the frame of which is presumed to consist of interconnected enthymemes that provide the “outline of ideas” that is not a mere list of topics, but a chain of claims and reasons that flow in a sequence (Shape 80). While Gage denies any formulaic method for “generating a structure of ideas from the parts of an enthymeme,” he does say that using enthymemes produces a “responsibility” in the writer to the “several potential structures implicit in the enthymeme” (Shape 81). These structures are seemingly self-revealing, as they unfold logically from prior statements according to underlying rules of reason and decorum. As Gage writes in “Teaching the Enthymeme: Invention and Arrangement,” it is possible to
obtain from Aristotle the notion that the “structures of whole arguments can be seen to derive from a single enthymeme” (39).

These pedagogical approaches do differ from classical definitions of the enthymeme as a truncated syllogism by identifying in enthymemes a process of structuring embodied in the activity of the rhetor, and not just a formal structure of words. But it is exactly because these more flexible conceptions of the enthymeme simply extend the structural form of the enthymeme—finding in it an alternative to more rigid formulas of essay-writing—that they transform a structure of expression into a dynamic of thought. Of course, these theorists would not deny that this is what they are doing, but would defend the transfer of the structural definition of the enthymeme into a “metonymy for the whole rhetorical activity of discovering a basis for mutual judgment,” arguing, for instance, that such approaches are useful because they are more flexible and less prescriptive than traditional approaches, and therefore teach students, not to adhere to rigid linguistic models, but to engage in a process of dialogic performance (Gage “Adequate” 157).

One inflexible feature of Gage’s enthymeme is its embodiment as a purely linguistic structure. Gage’s conceptualization of the enthymeme, (like many others derived from Aristotle’s technical descriptions), is a type of linguistic relationship, calling upon the audience to provide language that provides a bridge between a “stated reason” and a “conclusion.” This is still a considerable status upgrade from the appearance of the enthymeme in other textbooks. But even Corbett’s exercises already conceive of the syllogism as a linguistic relationship
between two statements. While the focus on the relationships among words is unsurprising in a writing class, it is also unfortunate since this attention tends to devalue ethos and pathos, since these are often presented in these texts as arising from non-linguistic sources.

Although the textbooks above include the enthymeme to differing degrees as part of their approach to writing (with Gage’s text being the most incorporative), many writing textbooks ignore the enthymeme altogether. It is possible that textbook authors find that the flexibility of the enthymeme or its lack of a necessary conclusion make it unsuitable for writing instruction (at least for current-traditional writing instruction with “clarity” as its primary goal). But it is also possible that textbook authors don’t believe classical rhetoric to be applicable to modern contexts, or that they are simply unacquainted with the enthymeme. It could still be true today that, as Kathleen Welch states in the opening sentence of her 1987 article, “Ideology and Freshman Textbook Production: The Place of Theory in Writing Pedagogy,” that “[o]f the hundreds of pounds of freshman writing books produced each year, few are constructed with any overt indication that composition theory has ever existed” (269). In their introduction to the collection (Re)Visioning Composition Textbooks: Conflicts of Culture, Ideology, and Pedagogy, Fredric and Xin Liu Gale identify a “conspicuous lag of textbooks behind the changes” in the field of rhetoric and composition. But this lag cannot be blamed entirely here, since revivals of the enthymeme have been ongoing throughout the last century (4).
It is also possible that the absence of the enthymeme from composition textbooks is related to the general devaluation of emotion in textbooks. In her essay “The Pathos of *Pathos*,” Gretchen Flesher Moon examines how composition textbooks’ treatment of emotion is characterized by two (negative) positions toward pathos: either the little attention pathos is given associates it with the fallacies and other unreasonable or unethical methods, or “pathos as a rhetorical appeal to the reader’s emotions, values, and beliefs” comprises the textbook’s entire treatment of emotion (35). Each of these positions toward pathos enacts an explicit or implicit critique of the role of emotion in judgment, subordinating emotion to reason and often portraying the effects of emotion as “potentially unsavory” (Moon 35).

Moon goes on to chronicle the many ways in which textbooks disparage the role of emotion in persuasion, and how they advocate an affectively neutral discourse free of “crude emotionalism” (36). The enthymeme is the target of a similar devaluation. For instance, the enthymeme is often chastised exactly for its ability to admit into discourse passionately held beliefs that are “self-evident to an audience” regardless of their validity (Crowley and Hawhee 146). In *Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students*, the editors Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee write the following:

> Enthymemes are powerful because they are based in community beliefs. Because of this, whether the reasoning in an enthymeme is sound or whether the statements it contains are true or not, sadly enough, often makes little difference to the community’s acceptance of the argument.
Enthymemes work best when listeners or readers participate in constructing an argument . . . . The audience will enjoy supplying the missing premises for themselves, and may be more readily persuaded by the argument because they have participated in its construction. (145–46)

Here, the enthymeme is responsible for allowing into discourse beliefs shared by community members that do not meet some external (if not universal) notion of truth. Also, there is a potentially moralistic critique present of the enthymeme as supplying pleasure to the audience (presumably because it will make the audience overlook the lack of truth in the enthymeme). This hearkens back to Milton’s warning in *Paradise Lost* that Satan “pleased the ear” even as he spoke falsehoods (II, 117). These indictments parallel Moon’s discussion of pathos in that both are assumed to contaminate a neutral discourse of rational beings and reasonable arguments by allowing into an argument elements that do not meet standards of reasonable and ethical behavior. Thus, the anxiety over the use of the enthymeme may likewise be an anxiety over the role of emotion in persuasive discourse, since it is possibly through the enthymeme’s ambiguous functioning that passionately held beliefs may enter discourse. Recovering a notion of the enthymeme grounded in one’s capacity for emotion (i.e. thumos) thus faces a dual opposition from those already wary of both enthymemes and emotions as insignificant components of, or actual impediments to, successful writing pedagogies.
Joyce’s “Technic Enthymemetic”: Or, Bloom Blows It

“I cannot possibly do this mechanical part with my wretched eye and a half”
– James Joyce, quoted in Gottfried’s *Joyce’s Iritis and the Irritated Text*

If the enthymeme’s status as a pedagogical method is small, it’s acknowledged usage as a literary technique is microscopic. Admittedly, scholars such as Doug Hesse have considered the role of enthymemes in the “narrative dimension [that] underlies the text” (34). At this level, Hesse claims, the “enthymeme shares the same epistemological ground as plot, both depending on the configuration of wholes from parts through causal connection in time.” Hesse identifies a narrative underlying Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, arguing that Aristotle’s arguments emerge over time, and therefore any conviction produced in the reader can “hardly [be] the product of single arguments isolated in time” (32). The recognition that persuasion is temporal is actually quite common. Robert Reich, writing about the four stories that “Americans have been telling each other since our founding” argues that political arguments speak to four basic narratives embedded in American culture and that these “four mental boxes are always going to be filled somehow . . . because people don’t think in terms of isolated policies or issues. If they’re to be understandable, policies and issues must fit into larger narratives about where we have been as a nation, what we are up against, and where we could be going” (17). Hesse’s and Reich’s observations undermine the importance of individual instances of persuasion embodied in demonstrative argument and look instead at rhetorical performance in a more holistic way, as a process of accretion of evidence that enables eventual
persuasion, or, perhaps, sustains adherence in the absence of evidence. Just as "plot mediates between individual events and a story taken as a whole,” enthymemes can motivate the audience through the articulation of ideas and evidence experienced over long periods of time and embedded throughout a work (Hesse 34).

Such a view of persuasion is more akin to Bakhtin’s description of the dialogic novel, which “orchestrates all its themes, the totality of the world of objects and ideas depicted and expressed in it, by means of the social diversity of speech types and by the differing individual voices that flourish under such conditions” (263). In some sense, Hesse is arguing that the selection of the voices that are allowed into a narrative constitute the parts of the enthymeme. Hesse’s statement that the enthymeme shares the same “ground as plot” might also be taken as a directive to consider the relation of the narrative enthymeme to Bakhtin’s notion of chronotope. While literally meaning “time-space,” chronotope refers to the “the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature” (84). Such inquiry might reveal that enthymemes are a widespread literary technique in which the physical and temporal topography of the story is related to the structure of the enthymeme being expressed.

Hesse’s description of enthymemes in literature is quite similar to Gage’s belief that chains of enthymemes can be used to produce outlines for essays. As Gaines states, this type of approach conceptualizes the “movement of a rhetorical audience from its initial state to final judgment as requiring narrative
emplotment by the rhetor” (15). This perspective removes some of the emphasis off of the structure of the enthymeme, since Hesse’s enthymemes become “events [that move the reader] towards the text’s conclusion” (emphasis added, 35). But these narrative enthymemes continue to serve structural purposes within the process of reading and writing the text, as Emmel’s did, and thus do not transcend their structural function.

The existence of structural enthymemes within narrative is not the same as claiming that the enthymeme is a conscious literary technique. The one place where the conscious use of the enthymeme has been a topic of attention is in the seventh chapter of James Joyce’s modernist tour-de-force Ulysses, in a chapter commonly referred to as the “Aeolus” episode because its contents correspond to Ulysses’ encounter with King Aeolus in Book 10 of Homer’s Odyssey. Bloom, one of the main characters, spends the novel wandering throughout Dublin, and the Aeolus chapter is the only one where Bloom is seen working. According to the stemma of the Aeolus episode transmitted to us through Joyce’s interlocutor, Stuart Gilbert, we know the following about this chapter: the scene is the newspaper, the hour is noon, the organ is the lungs, the art is rhetoric, the color is red, the symbol is the editor, and the technique is enthymemic (177).

Many of these elements are easy to identify in Joyce’s text (“easy” at least relative to the frequent obscurity of Joyce’s allusions). The setting is primarily the office of the newspaper Freeman’s Journal and National Press and the hour is reported as noon. Other elements are less straightforward yet still easy to divine. The lungs are commiserate both with the emphasis on oratory in the chapter, the
many references to “wind” or wind-related themes (Aeolus is the King of the Winds), and the bluster of the Irish newsmen, particularly Miles Crawford (the editor of the *Telegraph* and the Homeric counterpart of Aeolus, king of the winds). The color red appears throughout (in the character of Red Murray and in Stephen’s blushing, for example). And the editor is not only embodied in the figure of Mr. Crawford, but is present through the insertion of the numerous headlines into the chapter by an “external” editor.

Despite one critic’s claim that “The art of the chapter is rhetoric, a subject that now seems tedious to nearly all readers, critics, and writers,” there may yet be some value in considering the chapter’s relation to the enthymeme and rhetoric more generally (Hodgart 121). There is a significant amount of persuasive discourse in the chapter, although that attempted by Bloom generally fails (hence, the wind-inspired subtitle above, “Bloom blows it’). Rhetoric as an art is visible generally in the interactions of the characters and explicitly presented in three speeches exemplifying the three main kinds of oratory according to Aristotle: the deliberative, the forensic, and the epideictic. In short, deliberative rhetoric is that of politics and future action; forensic rhetoric is judicial speech and judgment of past events, and epideictic rhetoric is ceremonial speech of praise or blame focused on the present. One of the speeches in the Aeolus chapter—Mr. Justice Fitzgibbon’s epideictic speech concerning the revival of the Irish tongue—is, interestingly, the only passage from *Ulysses* that Joyce ever consented to make an audio recording of, strengthening this chapter’s claim to realizing the art of rhetoric.
While most of the stemma is easily identified, critics are routinely confounded as to what it means that the episode’s technique is “enthymemic.” M. J. C. Hodgart calls this “one of the most irritating minor problems in the interpretation of Ulysses,” partially because “neither Joyce nor anyone else seems to know what an enthymeme really is” (123). So far, all this tells us is that Joycean scholarship suffers from the same confusion common to other investigations of the enthymeme. The nature of the “technique” of Joyce’s text is also unclear. Is it a technique of composing, in which Joyce himself employs the enthymeme to develop the text? Is it a technique of interpretation, in which readers employ the enthymeme to construct the text? Is it a technique evident in the actions or dialogue of the characters? In short, exactly how is the chapter technique related to the enthymeme?

Gilbert does little to resolve this question. Gilbert does attempt to catalog every rhetorical scheme and trope active in the chapter, and does provide an example of the enthymeme from the chapter, but never directly addresses the issue of the enthymeme as a technique. While his catalog includes over ninety examples of schemes and tropes from the chapter, Gilbert’s analysis of this episode has been cited as “inaccurate and incomplete” (Tompkins 199). For instance, Gilbert has difficulty with individual schemes and tropes. Although he provides an extensive inventory, Gilbert omits two common devices from his list: polyptoton and anatanaclasis.

Polyptoton (the use of multiple words based on the same root) is found in the Aeolus chapter of Ulysses in the form of “imperial, imperious, imperative”
Anatanaclasis (the use of a word twice in two different senses) is found at least twice in the chapter, once on page 116 with the phrase “sitting in,” and once on page 119 with the word “brawn.” The latter example is part of a story that Stephen Daedalus tells titled “The Parable of the Plums,” in which two elderly women climb to the top of “Nelson’s Pillar.” The two women first purchase “one and fourpenceworth of brawn”—a type of sausage most often made from the head of a pig (also known as “head cheese”). Later, as they wearily climb the winding staircase to the top of the pillar, one asks the other “have you the brawn,” using it in the more common sense of strength or endurance. But none of this makes it into Gilbert’s account of rhetorical devices. Considering the inexactitude with which Gilbert handled rhetoric within the Aeolus episode, perhaps it is fortunate that he did not attempt to explain the meaning of an “enthymemic” technique.

In truth, Gilbert’s analysis of the chapter’s rhetorical features is not simply incomplete, it is faulty. For instance, Gilbert identifies three examples of oratory in the chapter as “deliberative,” “forensic,” and “expository” (188). Since the Rhetoric is concerned with persuasive speech and standard translations of Aristotle refer to this third type of speech as “epideictic” (the speech of praise or blame, sometimes called “demonstrative” or “panegyric,” but not expository), Gilbert’s use of “expository” rhetoric seems out of place, especially considering that his example of expository rhetoric is the speech of Dan Dawson, which is clearly epideictic in its praise of Ireland. To oppose Gilbert’s characterization of this speech as expository, Phillip Tompkins points to the celebratory headline
given to the speech by the external editor—“ERIN GREEN GEM OF THE SILVER SEA”—and the contents of Dawson’s ensuing speech, which praises the “peerless panorama of Ireland’s portfolio, unmatched, despite their wellpraised prototypes in other vaunted prize regions, for very beauty, of bosky grove and undulating plain” (Joyce 230).

The typical view of an enthymeme that Gilbert may be operating under is that of the truncated syllogism—a syllogism with an omitted premise. Understanding the enthymeme as a scheme of omission suggests other “enthymemetic” discourse in the Aeolus episode, since omission in a more general sense is a common theme within the episode and the novel as a whole. *Ulysses* is quite famous for omitting, among other things, quotation marks and other punctuation. Schemes of omission such as apocope (removing the ending of a word to form a new word, as in “morn” from “morning”), aphaeresis (removing the beginning of a word to form a new word, as in “neath” from “beneath”), and asyndeton (omitting conjunctions, as in Joyce’s “They watched the knees, legs, boots vanish” [97]) also appear within the Aeolus episode.

Gilbert explicitly identifies examples of four other rhetorical devices of omission: ellipsis, brachylogia, syncope, and synaloepha. Instances where words are left off the ends of sentences, where spaces between words are omitted, where letters are skipped, where names are shortened, where conjunctions are excluded, and where acronyms are used are examples of similar linguistic and typographical omissions. Other instances in which words, individuals, or actions are “omitted” arguably exist (Bloom is excluded from the
camaraderie of the office workers, for instance), though these are not constructed in any truly enthymemic sense as discussed so far. One might even read omission into the 3/4 time signature of the newspaper presses (which “clanked in threefour time”) and of the Polish round dance that Lenehan performs to lampoon Bloom, since this could be read as an “incomplete” 4/4 measure (Joyce 98).

While Gilbert does not address the enthymemic technique of Joyce’s chapter, he does give an example of an enthymeme in his list of rhetorical devices active in the Aeolus chapter. Though there is no way to be sure under what definition of enthymeme Gilbert was working, the example he gives is from a short exchange between Bloom and Mr. Hynes, a reporter. The background necessary to understand this scene is that Hynes owes Bloom money:

—Right: thanks, Hynes said moving off.

Mr. Bloom stood in his way.

—If you want to draw the cashier is just going to lunch, he [Bloom] said, pointing backward with his thumb.

—Did you? Hynes asked.

—Mm, Mr. Bloom said. Look sharp and you’ll catch him. (Joyce 98–99)

Gilbert refers to the line “If you want to draw the cashier is just going to lunch” as an enthymeme, presumably because the premise that Hynes could pay Bloom the three bob that he owes him by drawing it from the cashier has been omitted. This could match the formalistic conception of an enthymeme as a less-than-three-part syllogism. But if this is just a part of the syllogism, what does the
completed syllogism look like? Below is one possible formulation of a syllogism that adequately summarizes the situation:

\[ M: \quad \text{Hynes should retrieve and give to Bloom the three bob he owes him at the earliest convenience.} \]
\[ m: \quad \text{The earliest convenience for Hynes to retrieve and give to Bloom the three bob he owes him is right now.} \]
\[ C: \quad \text{Hynes should retrieve and give to Bloom the three bob he owes him right now.} \]

This syllogistic formulation is hardly correlated to the dialogue above. The line that Gilbert identifies as an enthymeme (“If you want to draw the cashier is just going to lunch”) could be considered an approximation of the minor premise above: “The earliest convenience for Hynes to retrieve and give to Bloom the three bob he owes him is right now.” But what does it mean for an enthymeme of this syllogism to exist? The loss of any one premise from the syllogism above would still leave the three “terms” intact (the three terms being “the earliest convenience”, “right now”, and “that Hynes should retrieve and give to Bloom the three bob he owes him”). Furthermore, this idealized formulation only states what Bloom believes should happen, but not what will happen. In other words, this is simply an exhibition of Bloom’s own desire, not an attempt to engage the desire of Hynes (to be a good neighbor, to act honorably, etc.).

The example above does not make use of the exact phrase that Gilbert identifies as constituting the enthymeme. The following syllogism better captures the information presented in Gilbert’s enthymeme example:
\textbf{M:} Hynes can pay back Bloom (by drawing money) if the cashier is still available.

\textbf{m:} The cashier is still available (i.e. just about to go to lunch).

\textbf{C:} Hynes can pay back Bloom.

Again, what seems to be missing from this view of the enthymeme is the will to act. Gilbert seems to mean by enthymeme the simple omission of information, but what is more strikingly absent is any motivation embedded in Gilbert’s example; there is no evoked ethical imperative regarding the relationship between Bloom and Hynes. Without these, it is unlikely that Hynes will spontaneously supply an enthymemetic response that leads him to action.

Even if one does accept this exchange as enthymemic, one must admit that it is a rhetorical failure: Hynes does not catch Bloom’s hint (or at least, he does not let on that he does). It seems that Hynes was unable or unwilling to supply the premise missing from the enthymeme. It’s unclear though that this exchange can function enthymemically, since not only one premise, but the conclusion is unknown. How this could be stated without the conclusion being already given is unclear. Without Bloom telling Hynes openly that he should get the money to give to him and then supplying Hynes with one of the premises that would lead, through Hynes participation, to the realization of the previously stated conclusion, no action seems likely, and in fact that is exactly what does (fail to) happen. Without a reason for catching the cashier before he goes to lunch, Hynes will not seek him out, and not simply because the knowledge of the given conclusion is not shared between both the rhetor and the audience.
There are more conventional examples of enthymemes than Gilbert identifies. Bloom reasons that if he can get the ad design to Nanetti, he’ll “give it a good place,” and Crawford claims that he knows Taylor did not prepare his speech because “there was not even one shorthandwriter in the hall” (Joyce 100, 116). Each of these is a claim to knowledge (one about an event in the past, one about an event in the future) that leaves out an assumed premise. Even similes are like enthymemes. Bloom thinks of the newspaper men as weathercocks, stating: “Funny the way those newspaper men veer about when they get wind of a new opening. Weathercocks” (Joyce 103). One could easily argue that the simile, “Newspaper men are like weathercocks” is based on the premises that “Weathercocks veer about in the wind” and “Newspaper men veer about in the wind” and, therefore, “Newspaper men are like weathercocks.” Of course, this is only an enthymeme insofar as one adopts a structural view of what an enthymeme is.

Bloom’s job as an ad canvasser is significant to the argument here concerning the circulation of visual enthymemes. Bloom spends the greater part of the episode attempting to get an ad placed in the Telegraph, the content of which is “Two crossed keys here. A circle. Then here the name. Alexander Keys, tea, wine, and spirit merchant. So on” (Joyce 99). When Bloom goes to sell the ad to the foreman at the newspaper, he draws the foreman’s attention to the conclusion offered by the ad’s illustration:
—The idea, Mr. Bloom said, is the house of keys. You know, councilor, the Manx parliament. Innuendo of home rule. Tourists, you know, from the isle of Man. Catches the eye, you see. Can you do that?

Bloom locates the effect of this ad exactly in its “unstated” yet shared knowledge regarding the meaning of the “house of keys” as signifying home rule, here being used to promote drinking (ironically, Joyce associates alcohol consumption exactly with the “g.p.i.” [general paralysis of the Irish], a state most unfavorable to the establishing of home rule). That such an image “catches the eye” suggests that there can be a visual trigger for enthymemetic discourse. Visual discourse saturates the newspapers at the Telegraph office. As Bloom points out, “It’s the ads and side features sell a weekly, not the stale news in the official gazette. . . . M.A.P. Mainly all pictures” (Joyce 98).

Bloom never does succeed in getting Keyes’ ad published, though this is not the only ad that brings him grief. The jingle for “Plumtree’s Potted Meat,” plagues Bloom throughout the day, reminding him as it does of his wife’s possible infidelity with Blazes Boylan. This jingle states” What is home without Plumtree’s Potted Meat? Incomplete. With it, an abode of bliss.” The incompleteness of the home is offered as a reason for the consumption of the product. This raises the question of whether all commercial discourse is enthymemetic in the sense that it proffers a lack that the consumer can then fill by buying the product. Perhaps it is appropriate that Joyce’s chapter utilizing an enthymemetic technique occurs within the commercial scene of the newspaper office.
Reassessing the dialogue that Gilbert identifies as being enthymemic, it is possible to see enthymemic structure functioning in another manner. Consider the end of the exchange:

—If you want to draw the cashier is just going to lunch, he said, pointing backward with his thumb.
—Did you? Hynes asked.
—Mm, Mr. Bloom said. Look sharp and you'll catch him.
—Thanks old man, Hynes said. (Joyce 98–99)

Hynes unfinished question, “Did you?,” in view of Bloom’s subsequent imperative to “Look sharp,” very probably was the beginning of the full question “Did you just see him?,” to which Bloom’s answer is an affirmative “Mm.” The success of this exchange, confirmed by Hynes’ appreciative “Thanks,” relies on Bloom’s participation in supplying the unspoken words. The conclusion that Bloom provides, that which would necessitate both Hynes’ question and Bloom’s interruptive response, is Hynes’ desire to meet the cashier before he goes to lunch. This conclusion has been handily provided by the earlier dialogue, though the exact reason why Hynes desires to see the cashier proves not to be the same as Bloom’s. This should give pause to those who might think that an enthymeme based in emotion or images would be somehow more effective than those using words. More likely, ambiguity and misreading will be the norm, as one’s emotions are often not obvious to observers, nor even to those experiencing them.
Jacques Derrida, in an address given at the Ninth International James Joyce Symposium in Frankfurt, (West) Germany in 1984, provides a meditation on the word “yes” in the works of James Joyce, one of the most famous uses of which comes at the end of Joyce’s Ulysses in Molly’s monologue. Derrida writes that although “yes,” is something that

... names nothing, describes nothing, whose grammatical and semantic status is most enigmatic, it seems at least possible to affirm the following: it must be taken for an answer. It is always in the form of an answer. It supervenes after the other, to answer a request or a quotation, at least implicit, of the other, even if this is the other in me, the representation in me of another word. Yes implies, as Bloom would say, an “implicit believer” in some question put forward by the other. (34)

Since “yes” always arises in answer to a previous event in the context of a prior discussion or relationship, Derrida suggests that one might question even calling Molly’s speech a monologue (27). The recognition of the question put forth by the other is for Derrida a critical moment because every utterance is at once addressed to the other and to itself; it is a “dispatch to oneself, a dispatch returned from oneself which both never leaves itself and never arrives” (66). Such a conception of communication matches well with contemporary descriptions of the role of affect as well. Massumi writes that affect is the field of emergence for sensation, perception, and memory, a “complicating immediacy of self-relation” (14, emphasis added).
Bloom’s “Mm” in response to Hyne’s question of “Did you?” is just such a dispatch, one that attempts to affirm a complex relation between Bloom and Hynes not limited to the linguistic display of premises, but dependent instead on the remembered ethical responsibility underlying the act of communication. Thus Derrida finds in the repeated yes’s in Joyce’s works the “always already implicated affirmative of any statement” which questions the “independent status of ‘subject’ and ‘object’” (Bernstock 71). The meaning of an utterance is always dependent on one’s relationship to an Other, a relationship maintained “[w]ith or without words, taken as a minimal event, yes demands a priori its own repetition, its own memorizing . . . . The memory of a promise begins the circle of appropriation, with all the risks inherent in the technique of repetition, of automatized archives, of gramaphony, of simulacrum, of wandering deprived of an address and destination. (Derrida 68) This allows a reconsideration of Gilbert’s example of the enthymeme in which Bloom attempts to remind Hynes of his debt. Derrida’s discussion of the “yes” in Ulysses establishes dialogic conditions that we might apply to the enthymeme by asserting that the enthymeme relies on a type of prior affirmation of premises, of a social or ethical commitment that is an essential element of the recognition that precedes not simply the completion of an argument, but the event which is the presupposed “yes” that is called for by the premises, as well as the “yes” that is the result of the enthymeme.

For Derrida, this posterior “yes” is not merely embodied in a linguistic structure, for the event of language is one in which “Only another event can sign,
can countersign to ensure that an event has happened. This One, that we naively call the first One, can only affirm itself in the confirmation of the Other: a completely different event” (70). In Bloom’s case, this event never happens, for there is no recognition by Hynes of the ethical obligation between them, and therefore, one might argue, no enthymeme. In his essay “Discourse: Structure or Event?”, Michel Pêcheux doubts the usefulness of any interpretive method in which the eventfulness of discourse is ignored and, rather, discourse is reduced to a structure “without any other or real” (648). The latter is precisely what the conventional approach to identifying enthymemes does when it is expressed in the structure of the syllogism’s major premise, minor premise, and conclusion. Pêcheux warns that

“... the act that consists in inscribing a given discourse in a series, in incorporating it in a corpus, always risks absorbing the event of this discourse into the structure of the series insofar as this series tends to function as a historical transcendental reading grid or anticipatory memory of the discourse in question.” (648)

The syllogistic structure used to delimit the enthymeme’s corpus imposes a grid upon the discursive act that screens out all but the linguistic relationships between utterances. Such a “structural conception of discursivity” leads to the “obliteration of the event.” Treating the enthymeme as an event rather than as a structure invites one to recognize the host of elements left out of the traditional model of enthymemic argument, such as the visual and emotional aspects of persuasion. Claiming the enthymeme as a completable structure (completed by
expansion into a syllogism) is one way of “denying the act of interpretation at the very moment it occurs” because such an approach locates the telos within the structure presupposed by the enthymeme. Rather, one might locate the enthymeme as the effect of the “yeses” of the “implied believer” that Derrida identifies, and which are the “effects of identifications that are [conventionally] assumed” (or ignored), but which a model of the enthymeme based in thumos attempts to make explicit (Pêcheux 648).

The enthymeme as event recognizes that its claim to existence “can only affirm itself in the confirmation of the Other” who interprets that event (Derrida 70). By doing so, it returns the enthymeme to the sphere of rhetoric, and thus to ethics, since only if every event is motivated by an Other can discourse become “a matter of ethics and politics: a question of responsibility” (Pêcheux 648). This is not the “responsibility” Gage identifies, which is a responsibility the writer holds to the “several potential structures implicit in the enthymeme” (81). Gage’s responsibility is the accountability of words to other words, of subjects to predicates or verbs to objects. Derrida’s and Pêcheux’ notion of responsibility is that which one accepts for others engaged in ethical and political struggle. The enthymeme can become truly rhetorical, but it must transcend its structural history to do so. It must exist as event.

The Enthymeme: Two Paradigms

“It is in ambiguity that we develop the capacity to change”
- Janet Bean, “Manufacturing Emotions"
So far, most of the familiar disciplinary definitions provided of the enthymeme and the pedagogies built upon this concept focus on the enthymeme as a (syllogistically) structured entity, one that can be extended as a structuring principle to the whole process of writing. Even those approaches that do attempt to forego comparison of the enthymeme to syllogisms still focus on the enthymeme’s structural characteristics. Therefore, the most common definition is not one in which a premise is provided via the audience’s previously held knowledge in a context of ethical obligation, or one that evokes other responses in the audience, but one that defines the enthymeme in terms of content, in which a premise is lacking which would otherwise make the structure a true syllogism, irregardless of the audience’s reaction.

This latter approach to the enthymeme will be called here the “structural” approach following the work of Gaines and predecessors such as Lawrence Green, whose essay “Enthymemic Invention and Structural Prediction” claims that enthymemes can not only provide structure to an argument but to an entire discourse as well, and claims that the enthymeme is possible only because of a predetermined structural relationship among its premises. In order to show that there is always an assumed syllogistic relationship enabling the enthymeme, Green writes that the . . . relation between the writer’s conclusion (the thesis) and the writer’s basic strategy (the minor premise) is enthymematic in the Aristotelian sense because it always implies the existence of a second premise that
joins the two clauses. This second and implicit premise is the major premise of the enthymeme. (624)

Thus, according to Green, no one can establish a causal relationship between two elements without employing enthymemic structures. The enthymeme thus becomes an architectonic principle applicable to all levels of discourse (this approach is evident in pedagogies such as that of Emmel discussed above). Green’s willingness to base his account of invention on the Aristotelian enthymeme was not unrelated to the recovery of classical rhetoric that was stimulated by the publication of Edward P. J. Corbett’s 1965 textbook, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student and James L. Kinneavy’s 1971 work, A Theory of Discourse, both of which relied heavily on Aristotelian concepts to construct a modern view of rhetoric. Together, these two texts provided an Aristotelian foundation for both composition pedagogy and composition theory.

Green’s work was influential as well. As Gaines notes, the “theory of structural enthymemes developed by Green was quite influential on subsequent attempts to provide compositional precepts for the classroom” and was adopted in pedagogical approaches developed by John T. Gage, Maxine Hairston, Martin Jacobi, Barbara Emmel, Hiu Wu, Marshall Gregory, Wayne Booth, Linda Bensel-Meyers, and others (12). These “applications of the enthymeme stressing its architectural features” found purchase in diverse areas, including teaching argument, professional and business writing, ethics, and public speaking, often as an inventional method designed to both work backwards from established syllogisms and to work towards intended theses (Gaines 12).
The other approach to the enthymeme that Gaines identifies remains nameless, although he does associate it with those who, like Kinneavy, have “attempted to advance composition theory” (12). Gaines associates this alternative approach with the work of scholars such as Lisa Ede, Andrea Lunsford, Robert Connors, Jasper Neel, and John T. Gage. Admittedly, John T. Gage was associated with the structural approach as well, but this is mainly because his work has been employed by several scholars to advance a structural view of the enthymeme, and thus his influence falls within both camps. By connecting their reading of Aristotle to a more social and epistemic view of communication and knowledge, scholars such as the ones Gaines lists emphasized the enthymeme’s social nature—that it supplied an inventional method in the “rhetor’s search of mutually agreeable grounds for probable knowledge” (Gage “Adequate” 157). This approach will be called here the “rhetorical” approach to the enthymeme.

The division of the enthymeme into structural and rhetorical approaches to the enthymeme is not unlike other attempts to define theoretical approaches to discourse and culture. One can see clear parallels to these divisions, for instance, in Stuart Hall’s discussion of cultural studies in his well-known essay “Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms.” In this essay, Hall identifies two ways of practicing cultural studies that he labels “culturalist” and “structuralist” paradigms. Hall associates the culturalist paradigm with the work of Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson, whose works understand culture “not as a set of privileged texts,
but rather as the systems of meanings embodied in all social practices” (Katz 43).

This approach to social practices values the individual’s experience of the world, and is thus often associated with “humanism and experientialism.” On the other hand, the structuralist paradigm that Hall associates with scholars such as Claude Levi-Strauss and the Louis Althusser “decenters experience by showing it to be an effect of social structures which cannot be reduced to the ‘materials’ of experience” (Katz 43). By looking outside the subject for the root of subjectivity, structural approaches are sometimes criticized for denying the possibility of individual agency. Thus the Marxist desire to develop a scientific approach to history is sometimes viewed as an attempt to read “human will and agency out of history” (Trimbur, “Articulation” 38).

Such “limited” agency is complicated by Michel Foucault’s view of power in his earlier works which stresses the circulation of power through all levels of a structure. One’s placement within such structures is indicative of one’s access to “power-knowledge”—Foucault’s term for the way in which regimes of power are constituted through systems of knowledge. Also, access to such power-knowledge contributes to one’s perception as to what exactly constitutes agency in any situation, thereby further limiting possible action. Whatever the weaknesses inherent in such approaches, the more structural that one assumes the world to be, the greater predictive value these theories hold. As Stuart Hall writes, the “great strength of the structuralisms is their stress on ‘determinate’ conditions” (67, emphasis added). But determination has rarely been a success
story of even the most orthodox structuralisms. As Raymond Williams wrote, "No problem in Marxist cultural theory is more difficult than that of determination" (83).

Halls’ attempt to negotiate the role of determination in culture without depending exclusively on either of these two approaches led to the development of his theory of articulation, which John Trimbur describes as an attempt . . . to formulate a model of determination that avoids, on the one hand, the traditional Marxist view of a fixed and necessary correspondence between cultural practices and social structures and, on the other, more recent poststructuralist views of the indeterminancy or necessary non-correspondence and incommensurability of discourses, practices, and structures. By looking at how particular ideas, discourses, and practices are linked—or articulated—to particular conjunctures in the social formation, Hall has sought to define a "Marxism without guarantees," a guide to action that relies not on the predictive certainties of classical Marxist theory but on a reading of those linkages and how they articulate, at specific times and places, interests, subjectivities, and social forces. (“Articulation” 39)

This approach allows Hall to avoid the extremes of either the structuralist or the culturalist approach, and to recognize that, since power is reproduced at every level of a structure, so too is the possibility for resistance to that structure. The degree and type of determination will therefore always depend upon historical linkages, for instance, among discourses and artifacts, and among ways of knowing and modes of production. Hall’s project is bolstered by what Williams
calls the "extraordinary linguistic complexity" of the term "determine" (84).

According to Trimbur, the historical roots of this term that Williams unearths show that "determine" can be used to refer "not only to an external force or authority—whether history or God—that decides or controls the outcome of an action but also to the way limits are set and pressures exerted by the momentum of the social process itself" ("Articulation" 38).

This more contextual and fluid sense of determination is perhaps what underlies Carl Holmberg's essay "Dialectical Rhetoric and Rhetorical Rhetoric," in which he argues that "rhetoric can be determined and grounded rhetorically instead of dialectically determined" (232). According to Holmberg, the past two thousand years of rhetorical history reveal that "what has been called rhetoric . . . has been a dialectical rendering of rhetoric and, hence, not pure rhetoric." A dialectical rendering of rhetoric (represented most clearly in the Platonic dialectic seeking to verify that which is already known) would have us view reality in "only one way," while a rhetorical rendering of rhetoric would have us experience "one of the many views" that are possible (Holmberg 236, 237). Dialectical rhetoric assumes that "Being is determinate, physical, and morphic," while rhetorical rhetoric assumes that "Being is indeterminate, not necessarily physical, and amorphic" (238). Holmberg identifies strongly with the Sophists, since it is in their view that reality was "basically relativistic" and the "means of describing reality were contradictory" that he finds a kinship with his own views of rhetoric as an "ambiguating way of speaking" (236, 239).
Dialectical rhetoric does not value ambiguity. The two main characteristics of dialectical rhetoric are that “[s]peaking and writing are to be clear and correct if truth is to be ascertained,” and, since only one of the various experiences of reality can ever be the correct one, the goal of the rhetor is the “conversion of experiencers who are ‘incorrect’ to the ‘correct’ view” (Holmberg 238). Dialectical rhetoric might be viewed as discourse committed to what Gary Olson calls the “rhetoric of assertion” (7). According to Olson, the English studies model of composing “has always seemed to be associated with asserting something to be true.” Olson claims that this “rhetoric of assertion” is “masculinist, phallogocentric, foundationalist, often essentialist, and, at the very least, limiting” (9). At the least, the perspective in which the truth of discourse is born from assertion is one in which the enthymeme can not occupy any position except that of an obstruction to clarity and closure.

But this dialectical perspective ignores the history of rhetoric as a “philosophy of composition that exploits writing as a mode of avoiding rather than intending closure” (Covino 130). This “revisionist history” is the topic of Covino’s The Art of Wondering, which argues that the “formulary obedience” of rules-based interpretations of classical rhetoric is part of the perennial codification of rhetoric into rules and systems, a practice that ignores that, to reiterate Covino’s observation, the ways modern rhetoricians and the “major figures of classical rhetoric—Plato, Aristotle, Cicero—define and demonstrate rhetoric as the elaboration of ambiguity” (2). The alternative to the dialectical model of rhetoric is
to “delay answers, postpone closure, avoid assertion, looking instead for more open-ended, dialogic methods of inquiry—a non-assertive rhetoric” (Olson 10).

By refusing to make an assertion that is necessarily true, the enthymeme may be a key element of a non-assertive rhetoric faithful to the dialogic inquiry that Olson calls for and the tradition of ambiguity that Covino identifies as active in classical and modern rhetoric. As Holmberg writes: in rhetorical rhetoric, “[s]peaking and writing are enthymemic . . . [enabling] various and equally correct interpretations . . . [made possible by the] duplicity or ambiguity of expression and nonconventional syntax” (238–239). Images are enthymemic for these reasons as well, and it is only by associating rhetoric with the dialectical demands of clarity, or “duplicity or ambiguity of expression” with maliciousness, that one can justify excluding them from the canon of persuasive method in their most rhetorical forms.

It is telling that Blair, in his attempt to argue that a cartoon by British cartoonist David Low is a visual argument, takes pains to reassure the reader that “there is no ambiguity or vagueness whatsoever about Low’s meaning” (“Rhetoric” 48, emphasis added). Ironically, this is in a section attempting to refute the claim that the “vagueness or ambiguity [of images] make visual argument impossible” (“Rhetoric” 46). Blair’s refutation of this claim is that 1. Words are ambiguous, not just images, and that 2. Images (as shown by the Low cartoon) can achieve the clarity (i.e. lack of ambiguity) commonly attributed to words (45–49). In other words, ambiguity is in Blair’s portrayal one of the “risks” that all communication must negotiate, a flaw that must be overcome
("Rhetoric" 47). For Blair, visual argument is possible because “not all visual communication is vague or ambiguous” (59, emphasis added). Blair is thus able to accept that images can be arguments without altering his sense of what an argument is.

If we accept Holmberg’s argument that a rhetorical approach to rhetoric embraces the enthymeme and the ambiguity through which it functions, then it is hard to see Blair’s approach to the enthymeme as anything but an expression of dialectical rhetoric. The construction of rhetoric as dialectical in the sense of logical determination helps account for the academic interest in the structure of visual argument, because it is only by adopting the uncompromising structure of the syllogism that one can determine what visuals mean. If one values the ambiguity necessary to rhetorical exchange, then images become legitimate rhetorical arguments, without any need for the apologies scholars often offer in light of their tendency to lack propositional content, to evoke emotions, and to incorporate numerous and even contradictory appeals. Mirzoeff writes in _An Introduction to Visual Culture_ that we must move beyond the idea (which he attributes to semiotics) that “visual images succeed or fail to the extent that we can interpret them successfully” (Mirzoeff 13). To do so would be to enact another iteration of a dialectical approach to images. Approaching enthymemes as examples of rhetorical rhetoric forces one to see enthymemes as robust axes of rhetorical forces, as entities that are not “simply statements of probable fact but reflect values and attitudes as well. That is, enthymemes, viewed in their
rhetorical context, function not just as *logos* but involve *ethos* and *pathos* as well" (Conley 169).

Ambiguity is key in discourses of emotion, and the enthymeme’s ability to express and incorporate ambiguity thus holds promise for its ability to draw attention to the affective elements of discourse. Megan Boler, in *Feeling Power*, develops what she calls a “pedagogy of discomfort” in which students, along with instructors, are invited to explore the “emotional dimensions of [their] cognitive and moral perception” (xxiv). By asking students to engage in the “discomforting process of questioning cherished beliefs and assumptions,” Boler hopes to get individuals “willingly to inhabit a more *ambiguous* and flexible sense of self” (176, emphasis added). Approaching rhetoric as the “elaboration of ambiguity” and as a way of engaging with discourse both ethically and politically complex enables one to develop an understanding of the enthymeme that is amiable to the role of images and emotion as fundamental elements of belief and persuasion, rather than as distracting or disingenuous tactics of unethical rhetors (Covino 2). Thus, the ambiguity of the enthymeme is its greatest asset, and the ambiguity of images makes them likely candidates to be enthymemes.
Chapter 3
Recovering Thumos in Rhetoric

In order to justify the recovery of thumos in rhetoric, it is necessary to consider the place of emotion in discussions of enthymemic discourse and in the field of rhetoric and composition more generally. Many of the pedagogies described earlier, especially those based on Bitzer, value foremost the participatory aspect of the enthymeme. How does one establish, however, not just the social character of the enthymeme, but its emotional character as well? Aristotle may be a more useful source in this regards than might be expected. First we can look at, as Arthur Miller and John Bee state, “Aristotle’s rationale for viewing the enthymeme as the primary engine for rhetorical proof and practical reasoning” (201). Bitzer’s answer would likely focus on the collaborative method of enthymemic production, arguing that “[b]ecause they are jointly produced, enthymemes intimately unite speaker and audience and provide the strongest possible proofs” (408).

But Miller and Bee claim that “the affective component inherent in the enthymeme is the essence of Aristotle’s concept of the enthymeme as practical reasoning” (they define the affective component as denoting the “area of feelings and emotions”) (201). Miller and Bee locate the enthymeme’s claim to affective structure in the etymology of the word enthymeme, which they note is from thymos, the basic meaning of which is “soul, spirit, as the principle of life, feeling
and thought, esp. of strong feeling and passion” (201). Thus, the roots of the enthymeme in thumos show that “enthymemes inherently involve an affective component that operates from a base of feelings and emotions” (Miller and Bee 202). It is this affective component of discourse which addresses both mind and appetite that “gives the enthymeme force as rhetorical proof, *pisteis*, and thus as the substance of rhetorical persuasion” (Miller and Bee 205). Even a more traditional conception of the enthymeme could incorporate some affective aspects, if one acknowledged the following: that reasoning is not a solely rational operation and therefore emotion is an active part of practical reasoning; and that the audience can “complete” the enthymeme, not just by supplying a linguistic proof, but through an affective response. In fact, the conventional focus on the logical structure of the structural enthymeme might be attributed, not to a dismissal of passion, but to a passionately held attachment to logic.

Reuniting Cognition and Emotion in the Enthymeme

Though they have often been opposed to each other, emotion and reason are not discrete processes. As Ellen Quandahl shows, pointing to the work of scholars such as Jeffrey Walker and Martha Nussbaum, “emotions are not only *not* fully separate from reason, but involve reason or cognition—and thus also language—in crucial ways” (12). Some scholars even reverse the traditional hierarchy of rationality over emotion. George Marcus claims in his book, *The Sentimental Citizen*, that “people are able to be rational because they are emotional; emotions enable rationality,” ultimately arguing that sentimental citizens are the only ones capable of functioning as political subjects (7). Antonio
Damasio even provides a neurological basis for the role of emotion in the maintenance of consciousness, suggesting that “Biologically, emotion makes consciousness possible, and consciousness translates emotions into feelings, from which spring language and reason” (Kerr 28). It is thus difficult to maintain the “false dichotomies between reason and emotion, mind and body, text and person” that underlie the structural approach to the enthymeme.

The notion that an enthymeme can require an affective rather than linguistic response is not overly difficult to accept if one looks at the goal of persuasion as moving people to action. The Latin root of emotion, *motere* means “to move,” and Aristotle, in his model of the soul, suggests that desire was important to moving people to action (Jacobs and Micciche 3). Miller and Bee reinforce this notion that the realm of emotion is where one moves people to action, by stating that, according to Aristotle “mind, by itself, is never sufficient to originate action or movement. For action to occur there must be appetite” (203). In other words, “Action requires an affective state” (204). For those who maintain, as Blair does when describing visual argument, that “Assertion is a kind of action,” it becomes clear that the affective is operational at all stages of persuasion, including the original assertion, not just in the audience’s reception of the argument (“Rhetoric” 44). Forming arguments requires emotion.

It might seem strange, considering the vast literature on the nature of the enthymeme, to find little on its relation to thumos. This oversight might be considered part of the general disdain for emotion that is evident in so much academic discourse. There is no doubt that the enthymeme remains an active
rhetorical concept, both in pedagogical and theoretical discourses, although it mainly persists in its structural form. The relationship between the enthymeme and thumos has mostly been ignored by modern scholarship on the enthymeme as well as recent scholarship on thumos.\textsuperscript{11} This ignorance of the relationship between enthymeme and thumos might be seen as part of the long-standing desire to characterize argument as a rational enterprise, and to banish emotion to the periphery of the public sphere.

By adopting the paradigm of the enthymeme as a quasi-syllogism with an underlying logical structure complete, scholars have been able to accept the social aspect of enthymeme formation while denying the role of emotion in this process; in other words, it allows them to value argument while devaluing persuasion. Such policing of public discourse to limit the role of emotion recalls Jürgen Habermas’ conception of the “ideal speech situation,” which has been criticized for, among other things, its “assumption that emotions undermine rationality” (Marcus 6). Rather than explore the context that always exceeds the logocentric structure of argument, such approaches embrace the notion that rationality is the standard for public discourse since “only reason can make its claims explicit, available for public discussion and deliberation” (Marcus 19).

Alternately, the ignorance of the relationship between enthymeme and thumos might be seen as related to the general belief that “strong emotion is inconsistent with poststructuralism” as well as the resistance to emotion within discourses that critique subjectivity (Terada 1). This perspective allows one to deny the role of emotion in enthymeme formation as well, but for different
reasons than above. From this post-structural perspective, scholars committed to such postmodern views are understandably wary of the approach to emotion of scholars such as Sondra Perl, who hopes that attention to emotion will favor embodied ways of knowing that challenge postmodernism and enable “genuine expression” and “full experiencing” (59). By recasting disciplinary debates over the status of the enthymeme within the pre-Aristotelian framework of thumos, I hope to illuminate the relationship between images, persuasion, and emotion in a way that neither maintains any hierarchy between rationality and emotion, nor reinforces notions of subjectivity that see emotion, perception, or belief as markers of an essential self.

Fredric Jameson famously wrote in *Postmodernism: Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, of what he calls the “waning of affect in postmodern culture” (10). According to Jameson, the “modernist thematics of alienation, anomie, solitude, social fragmentation, and isolation” found in art such as Edward Munch’s painting *The Scream* is not merely an expression of a certain type of emotion, but participates in “a virtual deconstruction of the very aesthetic of expression itself” (11). The loss of the concept of expression in the postmodern era, Jameson argues, is marked by the “end, for example, of style, in the sense of the unique and personal” (15). This brings with it the “‘death’ of the subject itself—the end of the autonomous bourgeois monad or ego or individual” and the “end of the psychopathologies of that ego.” What follows for Jameson is that the “liberation, in contemporary society, from the older *anomie* of the centered subject may also mean not merely a liberation from anxiety but a liberation from
every other kind of feeling as well, since there is no longer a self present to do the feeling.” In light of such statements, many accounts of poststructuralism have assumed that “[post-structural] theory does not have an account of emotion” (Terada 3).

This post-structural dismissal of emotion is not unchallenged (and by challenge, I do not mean here a return to the centered subject or to belief in the primacy of expression). Rei Terada, in her book *Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the “Death of the Subject,”* writes that postmodern theory has often seemed to take a dim view of the persistence of emotion in postmodern subjects. But she argues that emotion is not proof of subjectivity at all. Rather, Terada states that “we would have no emotions if we were subjects” (4). In other words, Terada rejects the notion that “only subjects feel” and takes the existence of emotion instead as proof that we are not autonomous subjects (3). She looks, for instance, to the passions, which are “often portrayed as expressions of a subject imposed upon a subject, as when someone is seized by remorse or surprised by joy” (5, emphasis added). Alison Jaggar, in her essay “Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology,” observes as well that the “common way of referring to emotions as the ‘passions’ emphasized that emotions happened to or were imposed upon an individual, something she suffered rather than something she did” (146). That we conceive of ourselves as the object of emotion is one way in which the existence of emotion is characteristic of the “nonsubjectivity within the very notion of the subject” (Terada 5). In this way, emotion might be considered a central method in enabling students to move towards the goal of
critical pedagogy in which they are encouraged to “develop a relationship of non-
identity with their own subject positions” (Giroux 129)

For Terada, the death of the subject does not destroy the possibility of emotion; rather, “emotion entails this death,” providing the grounds for self-
difference (3). This self-difference is not simply cognitive, as in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s definition of a “first-rate intelligence” as “the ability to hold two opposed ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function” (69), Nor is it merely deceptive, as in George Orwell’s definition of “doublethink” as “[t]o know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing both” (35). Such duplicity seems like a recipe for inaction, but Fitzgerald at least attempts to alleviate this concern when he gives as an example of the ideal response to holding opposed beliefs that one should not just be able “to function,” but “be able to see that things are hopeless and yet be determined to make them otherwise” (69). This self-difference is the effect of our embodied selves as the field of emergence for sensation, perception, and memory, a “complicating immediacy of self-relation” that Massumi calls “intensity” (14).

More important to the argument for recovering thumos in rhetorical studies, Terada writes that the “‘poststructuralist’ dissatisfaction with the subject appears in classical thought about emotion: theories of emotion are always poststructuralist theories” (3, emphasis added). Terada claims that the dominant discourse of emotion defines it as “nonsubjective experience in the form of self-
difference within cognition.” It is exactly this cognitive experience of self-difference which I believe is visible in the Greek notion of thumos. As stated earlier, thumos is used nowadays, in its broadest sense, to refer to an individual’s capacity for emotion and is thus directly implicated in one’s capacity to be moved by discursive and non-discursive phenomena—to respond to rhetoric. It is variously translated from the Greek as “spiritedness” or “mind” or “passion” or “heart,” although these words do not fit without difficulty into the variable models of the psyche active in ancient Greek thought. It is, as Caroline Caswell writes in her extensive work, *A Study of Thumos in Early Greek Epic*, the “most-used psychological term in Homeric diction,” but has received “little attention” in the twentieth century (1). Those seeking to translate it into English have been forced to use words ranging from “soul” to “mind” to “anger,” to encompass all of the faculties and situations in which one finds this word being used, for instance, in Greek epic.

The multiplicity of associations that thumos invokes is evident in its etymology. Throughout *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity*, Jeffrey Walker consistently uses “thymos” rather than “thumos” in order to stress its relation to other Greek terms such as *thymoo* (to “make angry” or “impassion”), *thymoumenon* (“passion”), *enthymeomai* (to “lay to heart, ponder, consider, form a plan, infer, conclude, be concerned or angry at,” and *enthymêmata* (the “emotively charged reasons” invoked in the audience’s thumos) (171–72; 175). This choice might be best understood in contrast to Walker’s choice to use “enthymeme” rather than the Greek “enthymêma.” Walker chooses “enthymeme”
because his work is an intervention into the ongoing disciplinary debate over the term “enthymeme,” not over disciplinary debates over the term “enthymêma.” Using both of these terms provides Walker an easy way to differentiate between the rhetorical tradition which draws on Aristotle’s account of the enthymeme and the sophistic discourse in which enthymêma was a “nontechnical term in common use” (171).

In terms mentioned in the introductory chapter, this allows Walker to move between the poles of historical and rational reconstruction in order to “develop a general notion of ‘enthymeme’ for which both Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian approaches offer some lines of description” (184). Walker admits that to reconstruct a pre-Aristotelian notion of enthymêma would require access to a “sophistic discourse that is no longer fully available to us” (171). The use of thumos rather than thymos throughout this dissertation is based on a similar ambition—to mobilize thumos in order to understand the role of emotion in contemporary imagistic discourse rather than to reconstruct a classical notion of thymos.

A Skeptical View of the Desire for Emotion in Rhet-Comp

While there is important intellectual work being done and to be done in the study of emotion, and while the study of thumos done here is intended to further the conversation regarding the relation of emotion to rhetorical studies, it may be fruitful to ask why emotion has become interesting to scholars in rhetoric and composition right now, for asking: to what degree is the study of emotion fed by emotion itself? The centrality of emotion to the study of rhetoric is currently being
promoted by work in several disciplines and by many scholars, particularly those influenced by feminist studies. The recent collection, *A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion and Composition Studies*, is representative of the scholarly attention now being given to emotion in the field of rhetoric and composition. The editors of this collection, Dale Jacobs and Laura Micciche, note that their articles are broken into three types: those that “develop theories of emotion that work out of classical rhetoric, feminist studies, and cognitive neuroscience,” those that “explore the specific ways in which emotion shapes and is shaped by our teaching practices,” and those that focus on the “relation between emotion and the our professional roles as teachers and administrators” (2). To the commonly cited theory-practice binary—oft represented by the contrast of the transient, low-paid, unsatisfied composition teacher to the tenured, better-paid, satisfied professor of literature (or nowadays, perhaps, of cultural studies)—Jacobs and Micciche add a third term: management.

The addition of management as a significant division of interest is unsurprising when one considers the changes in English departments over the last two decades, which have placed many scholars with degrees in rhetoric and composition studies as writing program administrators in charge of large numbers of graduate teaching assistants and other temporary faculty. With this new division in mind, I would offer that the role of rhetoric and composition professors as managers—as what James Sledd and others have called “boss compositionists”—has precipitated the interest in emotion in composition studies. This is because, within a context of “flexible, mobile, and precarious labor
relations,” it is primarily emotions that these professionals must manage (Hardt and Negri 112). It is in these relationships that professors increasingly face “emotionally laden ethical dilemmas” as they recognize that the programs they manage depend on exploitative labor practices and “structures of entrenched inequity for teachers” (Gillam 113; Peters 136).

Labor itself undoubtedly contains an emotional aspect. Marxist theorists Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri see proficiency in such “affective labor” as one of the “primary skills employees need” in today’s global service economy and which they classify as any “labor that produces or manipulates affects such as a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, or passion” (108). In the context of writing program administration in English departments, “emotion work” has been defined as:

. . . responsive attention to the emotional aspects of social life, including attention to personal feelings, the emotional tenor of relationships, empathy and encouragement, mediation of disputes, building emotional solidarity in groups, and using one’s own or others’ outlaw emotions to interrogate structures. (Holt et al 147, original emphasis).

Efforts to change structures are thus conventionally seen as developing out of an (subversive) emotional response, a position that is often grounded, as it is above, in Allison Jaggar’s notion of “outlaw emotions.” According to Jaggar, “unconventional emotional responses” can be used as the basis “for forming a subculture defined by perceptions, norms, and values. By constituting the basis for such a subculture, outlaw emotions may be politically (because
epistemologically) subversive” (144). Laura Micciche writes as well that anger can become a “necessary response to inequity” that has historically functioned “as a catalyst for collectively organized social movements” (34).

The differences between the two conceptions of emotional labor above are telling: one sees such labor as constitutive of the service orientation in modern capitalism in which legal assistants, flight attendants, and fast food workers provide service with a smile (Hardt and Negri 108). The other sees such labor as the basis for subversive and critical activity. The first sentence in one of the chapters of *A Way to Move* states the author’s response to his recent firing as “I got angry. . . . losing a job hurt. I was at turns angry, sad, pitiful, and funny.” (Wright 124). He resents that he “had believed many of the encomia to community,” and he resents the call for “‘No hard feelings,’ which we were told more than once, [and which] came to mean ‘no feelings at all.’” The downsized author seems to value an emotional labor grounded in anger even as he resents the emotional labor that previously made him feel at ease in his position as a supposed member of a community. His belief that the “official discourse of letters, meetings, and pronouncements” called in fact for “no feelings at all” seems to suggest that any emotion is here considered an outlaw emotion, a claim that may render moot Jaggar’s distinction of outlaw emotions as “unconventional.”

What the author characterizes as “no feelings at all” could be seen, not as the absence of emotional labor, but as a failed attempt at the emotional labor of the type that Hardt and Negri focus on—the labor to produce feelings of ease,
well-being, and satisfaction. When the author later calls for “a theory of workplace pathos,” it’s unclear how the “line[s] of comfort” and other forms of supportive and indignant pathos that he dismisses at the beginning of the essay differ in any way from the expressions of “mirth, anger, and sympathy” that he longs for at the end of the essay (Wright 124–25, 134). Any theory of workplace pathos should consider that emotional labor will not always serve the interests of what he calls the “potential heroes,” but what he calls the “potential villains” and “minor devils” as well (Wright 128). Likewise, academic work on emotion will not necessarily be subversive, but could lead to potentially more effective forms of emotional labor that better placate those, for instance, with legitimate bitterness toward inequitable conditions. Insight gained from such work may make WPAs better managers who are better able to manage the emotions of those who work under them, and better able to empathize with and excite employees within today’s corporatized university.

Among “boss compositionists,” the inequitable conditions of English departments may be more likely to evoke guilt rather than anger, at least if one agrees with the prediction embedded in the title of an essay by Mark Bousquet and published in JAC that composition is becoming “A Discipline Where Only Managements Gets Tenure.” In a 1998 essay in the online journal Workplace, Cary Nelson wrote that many literature faculty thought of composition teachers as part of the “Rhet/Comp Droid assembly lines,” who simply “beep and whir and grade” and who therefore need no reduction in teaching loads because they are not trained (or expected) to do research (section 18). It is such sentiments that
Joseph Harris claims shows the “routine contempt that English still holds for intellectual work in composition” (44). Such observations draw attention to the diversity of emotions that attend hierarchized departmental structures where, perhaps, the feelings of ease or security experienced by one group of professionals depends on the denial of these to other groups.

The “sad women in the basement”—as Susan Miller labels the dominant image of composition teachers—is another routine acknowledgement, not just of the low status and poor conditions of adjuncts and graduate students, but of the differential distribution of emotion throughout English departments (121). Ira Shor comments as well that English departments and composition courses in particular are increasingly staffed by an “army of underpaid, overworked writing instructors (largely female) [that] marks our field's continuing shame” (Interview by Parascondola, section 2). It is possible to argue then that the material conditions of English departments have provided a strong stimulus for the study of emotion, by placing professionals within a set of unequal relationships that hosts a large mass of low-status and disenfranchised individuals whom these managers exercise power over, conditions that seat professors with strongly felt ethical and emotional obligations.

That these obligations contribute to an increased desire to study emotion may say little about the efficacy of emotional labor, subversive or not. Asking individuals to act on such obligations means asking them not just to embrace the (righteous) anger of those opposed to inequity and/or the shame of those who benefit from it, but to embrace the feelings of anxiety and disempowerment that
the dismantling of institutional hierarchies would likely induce in those who previously held positions of security. Until calls for action consider the emotional consequences of change and not just the emotional motivation for change, real structural changes seem unlikely. Regardless, there may be a strong degree of what might be called “emotion hope” embedded in scholarship on emotion. Stanley Fish’s notion of “theory hope” posits that most attempts to generate a theory have been grounded in the possibility that knowledge claims could be made that could be objectively justified without reference to the context of those making the claims. In this traditional view of theory, the hope is that by providing a generalizable account of how things work, it can “reform practice by neutralizing interest” (Fish Doing 319, emphasis added). Emotion hope is not the same as theory hope. In the case of theorizing emotion, a recurrent view seems to be that one can reform practice by stimulating interest. While Fish’s work suggests that theory can have no consequences outside of the practice of theory itself, emotion hope seems to be based in the desire that theory can have social and political consequences.

As the editors of A Way to Move write, they want to conceive “emotion as a basis for professional and social action” that produces a “galvanizing force to create social and institutional movement” (Jacobs and Micciche 5, 6). But this may underestimate the degree to which emotion is also attendant to professional and social inaction. If emotional labor is not recognized as being active in both the act of resistance and the act of complicity, attempts to reform academia by calling for increased attention to emotional structures may accomplish little. In
Textual Carnivals: The Politics of Composition, Susan Miller warns us that it is possible that such “‘reforms’ in fact re-form tradition by sustaining its root metaphors and masking what was at stake” in the original structure (10). Such reforms may ignore the deep ideological power of emotions—their ability to define the stakes which academics are willing to defend and the structures they are willing to change.

In her afterword to A Way to Move, Lynn Worsham cites Toni Morrison’s “distinction between feeling ‘touched’ and being ‘moved’” as being critical to understanding the ideological function of emotion (161). “Feeling touched” is the appeal to emotion that “goes nowhere and accomplishes nothing except a confirmation of the distance between self and other.” It is the triggering of emotion in ways beholden to dominant ideologies. “Being moved” goes “beyond mere sentimentality” to become a “vehicle for critical consciousness.” The desire for emotion in rhetoric and composition studies may lead to critical interrogation of the role that emotion plays in the formation of subjectivity through a form of “paideia, the whole social education of members of a culture” (Quandahl 11). This “schooling of emotions,” as Worsham calls it, allows us to see that “all education is sentimental, that all education is an education of sentiment” (163). But if scholarly interest in emotion simply touches us, if the experience ends at (re)forming our own subjectivity, then political action is unlikely to occur, and our positions will remain unmoved.
Interdisciplinary Contributions to the Study of Affect and Emotion

As indicated earlier, article authors in *A Way to Move* find support for their inquiry from scholars in other fields. The work of Damasio in neurobiology, as stated earlier, is used to establish a biological basis for the central role of emotion in the maintenance of consciousness. Damasio’s work is used to argue that emotion is critical to all conscious thought, including language and reason (Kerr 28). In his investigations into patients with brain lesions, Damasio found that patients who had lost the ability to feel emotion had also lost their ability to make simple decisions. It was not that these patients could not employ reason, but that in situations where there were no strict reason-based criteria on which to base a decision, the patients were unable to reach a conclusion. For instance, patients could not schedule appointments in the future by choosing between a Monday or a Tuesday. Lacking any absolute criteria on which to choose one day over the other, the patients were unable to make plans. What Damasio’s research perhaps best exemplifies is the degree to which emotion is “embedded in the social and institutional fabric” of everyday life and the decisions we make using seemingly logical criteria (Jacobs and Micciche 3).

The inability of Damasio’s patients to make simple decisions recalls the philosophical paradox commonly referred to as “Buridan’s ass.” Jean Buridan was a French priest and philosopher of the 14th century, and this paradox is associated with him even though he never directly writes of it. In fact, the situation described in the paradox is referenced in book 2 of Aristotle’s *De Caelo*. In Aristotle’s version, a man is placed equidistant between food and drink, and is
both hungry and thirsty. In the version attributed to Buridan, a donkey is hungry and standing equidistant from two equally matched bales of hay. In both cases, the actor lacks a rational basis on which to choose one object over the other, and therefore no action occurs. This is sometimes used as a way to discredit theories (such as those posited by Buridan), that one should always choose the greater good. But it is also possible to see this inaction as a failure of emotion, not a failure of logic. As Aristotle wrote, choice is a function of “desire and reasoning with a view to an end” (qtd. in Miller and Bee 204). Reason alone is never the origin of decisions.

Damasio’s work corresponds well with the work of scholars such as Martha Nussbaum, Jeffrey Walker, and John Cooper, all of whose work suggests that “emotions are not only not fully separate from reason, but involve reason or cognition—and thus also language—in crucial ways” (Quandahl 12). Such work makes it difficult to maintain the “false dichotomies between reason and emotion, mind and body, text and person,” suggesting a more complex relation between desire, rationality, ethics, and emotions (Kerr 28). For scholars such as Ellen Quandahl, any conceptualization of emotion “belongs in the ethical sphere” and, therefore, she finds thumos closely associated with Aristotelian virtues (ἀρέτες) (13). She notes that virtues for Aristotle are “dispositions toward praxis and pathos, toward acting and being acted upon, doing and feeling” (15). Aristotle says as much in the *Nicomachean Ethics* when he writes that “the virtues have to do with actions and emotions” (1104b).
The connection of thumos to ethical action through virtue is one reason for making the distinction between emotion and affect. Emotion typically refers to a psychological event that is at least “minimally interpretive” (Terada 4). The physiological aspect of this experience is affect. Brian Massumi emphasizes the linguistic nature of emotion, arguing that “An emotion is a subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of experience which is from that point onward defined as personal” (28). Thus, affect is always that which is in excess, the supplement that escapes the letter of emotion, the repressed energy that returns, the complexity that is reduced to a knowable emotional state.  

Despite the complexity of affect, the reduction of emotion to affect would leave little room for a rhetorical interest in emotion. As Elizabeth Spelman writes, “we could not regard our emotions as very interesting facts about us—in particular, as deeply connected to ourselves as moral agents—if emotions were simply events, things happening in us like headaches or bleeding gums” (222). Based on the definitions of emotion and affect above, the configuration of thumos as the capacity for emotion places it at least on par with other forms of linguistic discourse in terms of its importance to the liberal arts. Thumos is the foundation of our capacity to be moved by discourse—to respond to rhetoric that calls upon our reason and emotion. Politics would not function, nor would everyday instances of persuasion and cognition, without this element of “effective rhetoric” (Jacobs and Micciche 3). To reiterate Quandahl’s call to rhetoricians: “this heart-word [thumos] ought to become a key term for rhetoric” (14).
What is Thumos?

Defining thumos is not an easy task. Even though it is “the most-used psychological term in Homeric diction” efforts to develop a coherent definition of it have mainly succeeded only as far as they have ignored the high degree of variation in its uses (Caswell 1). Even in its primary role as a term to describe inner experience in Homeric epic, its uses are so varied and cover “almost every important aspect of inner human experience, that it seems possible only to translate each occurrence as is fitting to that passage without attempting consistency.” Issues of translation have also proven difficult, and one finds thumos translated as “soul” or “spiritedness” or “mind” or “passion” or “heart.” Scholars such as Caroline Caswell, rather than seeking a “universal [English] equivalent” of thumos, have sought instead to enumerate its “semantic associations”—the functional contexts in which references to thumos appear in Greek literary texts. Caswell identifies five of these contexts:

1. Loss of consciousness/death
2. Intellect/cognition
3. Emotion
4. Inner debate/conflict
5. Motivation (49–50)

Thumos thus links together the realms of cognition, affect, emotion, and perception. As Caswell writes, “Homeric diction does not compartmentalize the physiological and the psychological” (16). In addition to these functions, thumos is often associated with breath, storms, and wind, especially when “inner turmoil .
. . [is] compared to violent storms and winds on the water” (50). (This is also yet another reason to reconsider Joyce’s choice of the enthymeme as the technique of his Aeolus chapter.)

Thumos is distinctive from some other rhetorical concepts in that it was an active term within ancient Greek poetics. But the various words now used in its place must be contextualized within an understanding of how thumos was situated within the Greek psyche by different thinkers. Especially significant is the reduction of the scope of thumos by Plato, who downgrades thumos to one of three parts of the unified soul (reason, spirit, and appetite) which should ideally be ruled by reason, or logos. Rather than hierarchize the parts of the soul by insisting that one rule over the other, Homer presents thumos as the seat of emotions in order to explore the psychic interior of the characters in his epic poem, *Iliad*, the very first line of which focuses our attention on the anger of Achilles. While for Homer the thumos was not associated with any specific emotion, but was rather the “site, location, the interior mental but quasi-physical part where emotions happen,” later writers have tried to restrict the scope of thumos to the emotion of anger (Koziak 43).

The strong association between anger and thumos is understandable, since the paradigmatic emotion of representative texts such as the *Iliad* is anger. And following these early Greek epics, this association is reinforced by Plato and Aristotle, who do not simply ignore thumos, but severely restrict its rhetorical potential. As Koziak writes, “Plato’s *Republic* gives an especially meaty role to thumos,” but one that “concentrates almost exclusively on the experience of
anger” (39). Such interpretations of thumos continue to modern times with scholars such as Allan Bloom, who argues in *The Closing of the American Mind* that the ancient concept of thumos establishes the paradigm of the “ambitious, warlike, protective, possessive character” of men; this “central natural passion” he renames “machismo” (129). But Koziak has effectively shown that such a definition of thumos does not match with the illustrations of thumos in the *Iliad*. While Homer does most often associate anger, this is not true in all cases. Anger is most often associated with the thumos of men and sorrow is most often associated with the thumos of women, but both genders have thumoi that host not only sorrow, anger, and fear, but “the desirable, pleasurable emotions of delight, gladness, and love” (Koziak 42).

Plato’s well-known division of the soul into reason, spirit, and appetite in book 4 of the *Republic* differs from earlier accounts by insisting that thumos (spirit) is ideally ruled by reason. The relationship between the three parts is “more coercive than dialogical,” as evidenced in Socrates’ second speech in the *Phaedrus*, where the tripartite soul is compared to a charioteer guiding two horses (Neinkamp 31). Put simply, the noble white horse (spirit) aligns itself with the charioteer (reason) to control the ignoble dark horse (appetite). In this model, the alignment between reason and spirit is so close that some have even argued that this in fact a bipartite soul, since the aims of the charioteer and the white horse are the same (Robinson 117).

What sometimes goes unnoticed in this model is that reason and emotion are not opposed but dependent on each other. As Jaggar writes, this model of
the soul suggests that the “split between reason and emotion was not absolute, therefore, for the Greeks. Instead, the emotions were thought of as providing indispensable motive power that needed to be channeled appropriately. Without horses, after all, the skill of the charioteer would be worthless” (145). Granted, emotion is portrayed here as subordinated to reason, but this scene can also be used to support the “complete interdependence of reason and emotion in moving action” (Moon 34). Moon argues that the Aristotelian view that being moved to ethical action is only possible when “one’s emotional state is ready for rational guidance” should be read against the many warnings found in composition textbooks against succumbing to non-rational appeals, as well as the tendency for textbooks to treat logos, ethos, and pathos separately (another variation of the dividing practices that Vitanza writes against). None of the twenty-five textbooks Moon looks at include examples that “explicitly illustrate the effective combination of all three appeals” used together (36).

The trivial role given to thumos in the Platonic soul is unlike earlier articulations of thumos, such as those found in Homer’s epic poem, the Iliad. Rather than hierarchize the parts of the soul by insisting that one rule over the other, Homer presents thumos as the seat of emotions as a way of narrating the psychic interiors of his characters, as he does when he opens with Achilles’ anger. But thumos is just one part of Homer’s version of the psyche which is to modern readers a “strange collection of interior elements, some neither purely organic nor purely psychic—kardia and ētor meaning heart, phrenes meaning lungs, or diaphragm, or mind, noos meaning mind, plan, or purpose, psuchē
meaning a breath that flees the body at the point of death, and *thumos*” (Koziak 37). Furthermore, Homer indicates that emotions are “in” the thumos, that emotions emerge “out of” the thumos, and that one can affect one’s thumos emotionally (for instance, by gladdening it) (Koziak 43).

Considering thumos’ malleability, it is not surprising that Plato’s and Aristotle’s more systematic formulations of the soul would downgrade the role of thumos. Luckily, thumos is not being introduced here for its ability to provide systematic coherence to the process of persuasion or to the structure of the psyche. The feature most relevant to the functioning of the enthymeme is that the Homeric thumos is not merely a container for emotion, it also participates in deliberation. It is in the thumos that “one considers things, draws inferences, becomes impassioned, forms desires, has intentions, and makes plans” (Walker 173). Consider Homer’s exposition in the *Iliad* of Odysseus’s mental state as the Trojans advance upon him:

> And troubled, he spoke then to his own great-hearted thumos: 
> “Ah me, what will become of me? It will be a great evil 
> If I run, fearing their multitude, yet deadlier if I am caught 
> Alone; and Kronos’ son drove to flight the rest of the Danaans. 
> Yet still. Why does the thumos within me debate on these things? 
> (11.401–12)

While some have argued that Odysseus’ ultimate decision to stand his ground in the face of the Trojan assault is a triumph of reason over emotion, Koziak argues that this ignores the fact that Homer shows that “both the emotion and the reason seem to reside in the *thumos*” and that, rather than reason winning over emotion, it is true instead that “one package of a reason and
emotion wins over another." (51). As later lines in the Iliad show, the emotion of fear is packaged with the reason that Odysseus is badly outnumbered, and the emotion of anger is packaged with the reason that this is an opportunity to win honor as a warrior. By siding with the latter, Odysseus “both reasons and feels himself into staying” (Koziak 51). That this articulation of emotion and reason into action occurs in the thumos suggests rich possibilities for the enthymeme as a site of the persuasive function of the collaboration between pathos and logos.

Jean Nienkamp argues that the model of “mental divisiveness” evident in Homer “necessarily constitutes what James J. Murphy calls the ‘rhetorical consciousness’” and what she calls “internal rhetoric” (Nienkamp 11). In her book, Internal Rhetorics, Nienkamp argues that “people persuade themselves into certain decisions or actions” and that these deliberations can form the basis of a study of “internal rhetoric” (7). She begins with Classical formations of internal rhetoric, arguing that the activity of the thumos as described in works such as the Iliad is a form of internal rhetoric where “heroes talk to themselves in order to clarify situations, reinforce convictions, or make decisions in the midst of battle” (Nienkamp 37–8).

It is such “rhetorical moments of the epic” that Susan Jarratt uses in Rereading the Sophists to argue against claims that “there is in Homer no genuine reflexion, no dialogue of the soul with itself” (15; Snell 19). Jarratt claims instead that the “mythic discourse” of Greek epic contains the “beginnings of a ‘rhetorical consciousness’” and that this consciousness “expresses itself both through public argument and internal debate” (35). Jarratt’s assertions are a
response to scholars who identify in the fifth century B.C.E. a “shift from *mythos* to *logos* as a major restructuring of cognition resulting from the growth of literacy” (xxii). In effect, these scholars try to divide mythic consciousness from rhetorical consciousness, claiming that the preliterate or oral consciousness of the “mythic” world is unsuitable to the “introspection or critical distance presumed necessary” for “elaborated syllogistic logic” (Jarratt 31).

Walker corroborates Jarratt’s defense of pre-literate rhetorical consciousness by identifying in Greek lyric poetry an enthymeme-suffused “rhetorical poetics”—poetic discourse as the “oldest and original type” of epideictic rhetoric (6). The deliberating function embodied by thumos therefore serves to connect the study of rhetoric back through poetic discourse, not only to highlight the argumentative function of poetics, but to illuminate how the rhetorical tradition is related to a poetic tradition in which Dionysius of Halicarnassus could say the best orations were “like the mightiest poems and lyrics,” and Aelius Aristide could assert that the best poetry was that which “comes nearest to *rhētorikē,*” where *rhētorikē* is understood as an “art of eloquently reasoned argument” (Walker 154–55).

This debate is important to the defense of a thumos-based enthymeme because some scholars dismiss the working of thumos and the pre-Aristotelian meanings of the enthymeme as being relics of pre-rational discourse from before the “progress toward non-narrative philosophical prose” (Jarratt 45). The favoring of *logos* over *mythos* leads many scholars of the enthymeme to restrict their attention to the works of Aristotle in order to codify a narrow logic-based reading
of the enthymeme that defines it primarily through its schematic relationship to
the syllogism (xxii). Covino’s The Art of Wondering exposes as “reductive
summaries” those attempts to reduce rhetoric to “tree diagrams of finite
categories or subcategories, or lists of rules and precepts,” as well as attempts to
construct unity out of a Rhetoric “rife with inconsistency, meandering, and
sketchiness” (9, 22). Covino claims that these scholars ignore the Aristotle for
whom “the principles of discourse are supple, inclusive, and finally indeterminate”
and construct instead a “rather tidy, decisive Aristotle . . . a codified, schematized
philosopher who gave us rules (24, 1–2, original emphasis). The return to a
sophistic notion of the enthymeme grounded in the deliberative function of
thumos denies that Aristotle’s enthymeme is one of the “fixed monuments in the
dust of progress”—“progress toward a comprehensive description of the art of
rhetoric” (Covino 5, 23, original emphasis). Rather, it recognizes that this history
is unstable and that “[h]ow we read the history of rhetoric, and what we read, and
the implications for teaching we derive, can change” (Covino 2). Thus, the
enthymeme of Aristotle is not necessarily superior to the enthymemes of
previous authors based on its situation in a “new” type of literacy represented by
syllogistic rhetoric.

Thumos as the Internal Dialogue of Ideology

Classical epic, Nienkamp claims, “portrays internal rhetoric in a variety of
circumstances and with a variety of types of reasoning, all pointing toward
initiating action at a crucial moment” (14). By initiating action at the opportune
moment, the activity of thumos may even be associated with the ancient concept
of *kairos*, of due measure, fitness, or proper timing. Nienkamp argues that the
submersion of the internal aspect of rhetoric is primarily due to the focus of Plato
and Aristotle on (philosophy as separate from) rhetoric in the public sphere.
Nienkamp relies most heavily on Isocrates because of his refusal of the Platonic
bifurcation of thought and speech (and, therefore, between philosophy and
rhetoric, and between persuasion and clarification). This refusal allows him to
pursue both public argument and internal debate under the rubric of *logos*.
Isocrates’ belief in the continuity between philosophy and rhetoric is evident in
this excerpt:

> With this faculty [logos] we both contend against others on matters which
are open to dispute and seek light for ourselves on things which are
unknown; for the same arguments which we use in persuading others
when we speak in public, we employ also when we deliberate in our own
thoughts; and while we call eloquent those who are able to speak before a
crowd, we regard as sage those who most skillfully debate their problems
in their own minds. (qtd. in Nienkamp 18)

Nienkamp believes that Isocrates, through his emphasis on *kairos* and his
understanding of a thumos-enabled internal rhetoric that “has both a positive
ethical evaluation in its own right and a role as the source of ethical behavior,”
provides a solid argument for rhetoricians to embrace the study of thumos (20).

Nienkamp’s support for the study of thumos as internal rhetoric depends
on the presence of an active dialogue in one’s mind. Susan Griffin, in an article
titled “The Way of All Ideology,” writes that “speculation about dialogue is also a
speculation about ideology,” since the way we think is both dialogic and ideological (274). Our experience of ideology as internal struggle may therefore be similar to Neinkamp’s description of thumos as a type of internal rhetoric. As Bakhtin writes in *The Dialogic Imagination*, our “ideological development . . . is an intense struggle within us for hegemony among various available verbal and ideological points of view, approaches, directions and values” (345–46). The location of this struggle is arguably the thumos. Although she doesn’t use this term “thumos,” Judith Goleman suggests that our ideological lives are guided by our (shifting) investments in a range of discourses, and that, by structuring our identifications, these discourses provide the basis for the internal hegemonic struggle that is our experience of ideology.

It is possible to see Griffin’s essay as an attempt to narrate the workings of thumos. By identifying the internal workings of thumos as separate individuals arguing within her thoughts, Griffin anthropomorphizes the discourses that constitute her own ideological (thumotic) struggle. At the least, thumos' association with emotion serves to solidify the association of ideology with emotion. Griffin begins her essay by figuring ideological thought as a type of dialogue:

I speculate about ideology. About form. And then about dialogue. The three phenomena occur to me at once. Forms: the form of hierarchies, of institutions, of habits, the way things are done; the forms of language, gesture, art, of thought, and equally, of emotion. What we say to one
another being often what it is predictable that we will say; what I will say, if you say that: Dialogue. (273)

The forms that Griffin identifies implicate both rational and emotional thought, the body as well as the mind. Instead of the thumos as participant in deliberation, Griffin envisions two internal presences, asking herself “Who are these two in me? The ‘I’ with whom I identify, the ‘you’ whom I define as not ‘I’” (274). That Griffin has already identified herself with one of these presences suggests perhaps that much of our reaction to arguments is embedded in our past relations to these internal forms, to these positions that we have occupied in the past, and not as much to the cohesiveness to the discursive structure we are facing. Through identification with one of these presences, Griffin enacts the same sort of distancing that is evident in Terada's view of emotions as “expressions of a subject imposed upon a subject,” which Terada uses to question the connection of emotion to subjectivity (5).

Griffin enacts a similar disconnection in her description of the shifting identities of the figures that constitute her internal rhetoric—sometimes one is a “nag, the dictator, the time and motion expert, the boss, the destroyer;” and sometimes the other is “the authority, the good girl, the stable and predictable one” (274). Regardless of the specific ideologies or identities that these figures represent, it is through their “exhausting argument” that Griffin can say to herself “I know I am split from myself” (275). In other words, Terada and Griffin both identify an experience of internal otherness that marks the limits of understanding the non-subjectivity of subjectivity—the experience of being a spectator to one’s
thoughts and emotions. Such experiences are arguably connected to Bakhtin’s views on the dialogic nature of language, in which our words are always borrowed from the world around us. The internalization of that dialogue within the thumos provides a model for how ideology works, even as it suggests ways in which the critique of this dialogue can occur through identification with and in opposition to these imagined speakers:

   Slowly I begin to identify myself with the new thought. I split away from my doubts, calling this doubting self ‘you.’ Now I project the doubting half of my own inner conversation upon another. I supply her with her missing part of the dialogue. As I argue with myself, I imagine I am arguing with her. (Griffin 275).

Griffin’s meditation on ideology mirrors the participatory debate depicted within the thumos in classical texts, and shows that affect and emotion, ideology and reason, are part of the heteroglossia that underlie our beliefs and values. Griffin’s essay also shows the usefulness of a concept of thumos in which reason and emotion are not set at odds, but are considered constitutive of each “side” in the internal debate of thumos. As Griffin writes, the Other with which she argues “embodies all that is part of the natural, sensate life of the body and all of the natural emotions which so often cause one to feel out of control, even frightened of oneself” (275). Her example shows that ideology works to lead us to conceptualize our own internal rhetoric through the restrictive binaries that structure much of discourse—to see emotion as the Other to our rational selves. Thumos may provide a way of referring to one’s “internally persuasive discourse”
that is just unfamiliar enough to displace conventional understandings of what it means to be a subject within ideology (Bakhtin 342).

Visualizing Thumos

The next chapter will address the ongoing debates over visual argument, and make a case for understanding the visual enthymeme through its relation to thumos. The choice here to recover the concept of thumos, not by exhausting the history and uses of this term through a deep analysis of Greek texts, but by developing a concept of the visual enthymeme, is directly related to the historical usefulness that the enthymeme has shown in rhetorical studies. As Poster writes, the changing definitions of the enthymeme are “typical of the process by which rhetorical theorists of all ages seem to reinterpret Aristotle to bring his theories into conformance with the dominant rhetorical thinking of their period” (6). Recognizing that the enthymeme has always been used as a way to assess the relation of Greek thought to contemporary rhetorical thinking, I see no reason to not continue this process. In Defining Visual Rhetorics, editors Charles A. Hill and Marguerite Helmers write approvingly of this timely practice of reinterpretation that Poster identifies; they write: “every new turn in the study of rhetorical practices reveals yet more possibilities for study, for discussion, for wonder. The visual turn is just the latest of these” (21). The desire to redefine the enthymeme as a visual and emotional structure thus proceeds from Poster’s historicizing of the highly variable definitions of the enthymeme, an analysis which shows that “rhetorical terms are not so much immutable entities with fixed and unchangeable meanings, but rather methods by which a culture analyzes its
own discursive practices” (1). That these practices are increasingly visual in contemporary society is undeniable. One might even say that our historical context invites a visual redefinition of the enthymeme. And as mentioned above, one goal here is to avoid reinscribing the visual enthymeme as a structure, and redefine it in terms of its eventfulness.

But how will this redefinition connect the enthymeme to events? As shown, the majority of models of the enthymeme emphasize its relation to the syllogism (stated variously as it being a truncated, abbreviated, or incomplete syllogism), a portrayal that limits the enthymeme to being a “formally deficient” structure (Bitzer 404). In comparison to the “complete” syllogism composed of a major premise, minor premise, and conclusion, the enthymeme seems to be lacking a premise. But as Brian Massumi writes in Parables for the Virtual, “the effect of the mass media and other image- and information-based media simply [cannot] be explained in terms of a lack” (43). Rather, Massumi focuses on what he calls the “potential” embodied in the “image/expression events in which we bathe. . . . images as conveyors of forces of emergence” (42–43). As Nicholas Mirzoeff writes, visual culture is defined

. . . by the interaction between viewer and viewed, which may be termed the visual event. When I engage with visual apparatuses, media and technology, I experience a visual event. By visual event, I mean an interaction of the visual sign, the technology that enables and sustains that sign, and the viewer. (13, emphasis added)
This event is the visual enthymeme, and is the basis of the “power of things visually to persuade us” (Blair, “Rhetoric” 42). Since the “exemplary event is a deferred completion,” the “incompleteness” of the enthymeme is its potential as an event (Massumi 64). A theory of visual enthymemes must thus shift focus from the propositional structure of traditional argument to a notion of argument as event.
Chapter 4
Re-Seeing the Visual Enthymeme for the First Time

As seen in the previous chapter, the enthymeme has a variable history within rhetorical studies. But what is the view of the enthymeme from outside of English departments? The current understanding of the enthymeme active in visual studies is part of the disciplinary formations that have accompanied the increased interest in the visual. Since Arguments and Advocacy’s special issue on visual argument in 1996 there has been a substantial expansion in the locations of visual studies in the academy. The list of disciplines in which academic interest in the visual is currently thriving is long. Art History, Media Studies, Humanities, Women’s Studies, English, Cultural Studies, Film, Comparative Literature, Communication, Education, Philosophy, Sociology—these are just some of the fields/departments in which some form of what James Elkins calls “visual studies” has taken hold (8). The confluence of approaches to the visual has led to a rich and somewhat overwhelming Burkean parlor of ideas regarding the study of image-based discourse.

As James Elkins writes, the disciplinary homes of visual studies scholars, the academic canons to which these scholars point, and the favored objects of their studies seem “hopelessly miscellaneous or happily inclusive, depending on your point of view” (36). The same year that A&A published its special issue on visual argument, the journal October published responses to a questionnaire on
visual culture in which the “general tenor . . . was that visual culture is a disorganized, possibly ineffectual, illegitimate, and even misguided extension of art history and other disciplines” (Elkins 18). Although the viability of visual studies is today less questionable, the anxiety and irregularities emerging from the interdisciplinary nature of visual studies remain.

Such disciplinary anxieties regarding the viability of visual studies have not hindered the wide circulation of visual media, which have become “commonplace in all aspects of contemporary public discourse” (McComiskey, “Visual” 188). This is in no small way related to the cultural importance of the screens which “have gradually so infiltrated our habits of being that their presence has become normal for many citizens at work and play” (Welch, Electric 4). While we are most likely to think of T.V. and computer screens, Anne-Marie Christin writes in *L’image écrite* that we should define screens as any host medium of a sign, and that these screens work to “screen thinking.” As Jan Baetens writes, screen thinking is not simply the name for how viewers decode signs, but “a matter of subjective evaluation of emergent networks of framed visuality. . . a way of looking [that] becomes a way of thinking” (194).

Christin’s notion of “screen thinking” has much in common with what Kenneth Burke calls “terministic screens.” According to Burke, our choice of terminology functions as a screen that determines what can and cannot be said: “even if any given terminology is a *reflection* of reality, by its very nature as terminology it must be a *selection* of reality, and to this extent it must function also as a *deflection* of reality” (45). But such functions must apply to our
understandings of these terms as well, including the implied hierarchy among reflections, selections, and deflections. The understanding of the enthymeme that views it as an “incomplete” or “abbreviated” syllogism, producing “a tentative conclusion from probable premises,” as opposed to the “normal syllogism” that leads to a “necessary conclusion from universally true premises” is a screen as well, focusing arguments, for instance, onto issues of technical difference between probability and necessity (Corbett 60). Accepting any definition of the enthymeme, or of visual studies for that matter, must necessarily “affect the nature of our observations, in the sense that the terms direct the attention to one field rather than to another” (Burke 46). Re-seeing the enthymeme thus almost requires the introduction of a term such as thumos, which is not an active term in most of the debates over the enthymeme’s function.

The Visual Enthymeme in the Academic Mind

In a study of the various understandings of the enthymeme in academic work, Lloyd Bitzer finds that the enthymeme is conventionally marked as “distinctive [from the syllogism proper] on account of (1) its basis in probability, (2) its concreteness, and (3) its usual formal deficiency” (400). Bitzer concludes, however, that each of these approaches “failed to name a truly distinguishing feature” of the enthymeme that would separate it from other forms of syllogism. According to Bitzer, the single aspect of the enthymeme that sets it apart from other forms of reasoning explored by Aristotle is that, in the enthymeme, “the audience itself helps construct the proofs by which it is persuaded. . . . [the
entymeme’s] successful construction is accomplished through the joint efforts of speaker and audience and this is its essential character” (408).

Bitzer’s argument has been influential across many disciplines, and is the sole characteristic of enthymemes that authors typically invoke when they announce the possibility of visual enthymemes. Past articles in *Argumentation and Advocacy* contain several such statements. For instance, Cara Finnegan, in her 2001 exposition of the “naturalistic enthymeme” active in documentary photography, claims that “the enthymeme leaves space for the audience to insert its own knowledge and experience; it assumes an audience of judges capable of ‘filling in the blanks’” (143). In “Can Pictures Be Arguments?” David Fleming summarizes theorists who claim that “political cartoons are a kind of enthymeme, relying on socially-sanctioned presuppositions to produce reasoned belief and action in others. Cartoons, that is, argue for political positions by adducing acceptable (albeit unspoken) reasons to hold those positions” (12). Even when only alluding to the possibility of visual enthymemes in the opening to the *A&A* special issue on visual argument, David Birdsell and Leo Groarke look to the social sanctioning of ideas to authorize visuals, stating that “[s]tudents of argumentation have accepted since Aristotle the influence of acculturation in the production of verbal enthymemes. We are now arguing that the same allowances must be made for visual commonplaces as well” (7). In each case above, the participation of the audience in constructing the latent argument from socially available premises is emphasized over all other possible characteristics of the enthymeme.
The dominance of this participatory aspect in the definition of the enthymeme is not unrelated to the “social turn” that occurred in many disciplines, and the development of reader-response theories that “formed an important part of the wider concern with popular participation in the 1960s and early 1970s” (Harkin 414). According to Harkin, the theories that focused attention on the role of the reader in the meaning-making process now simply form the “foundational assumptions” of much modern day scholarship (416). At one time, Harkin claims, these theories were intellectually exciting, if not radical. Scholars could publish articles, as Chris Anderson did, on the “rhetoric of gaps,” where he argues that the reading experience “depends on the ‘gaps’ or ‘blanks’ in a text, the gaps arising from dialogue, for example, or from unexplained events, delayed revelations, and uninterpreted concrete images” (10).

Such approaches are often based on the work of Wolfgang Iser, whose book *The Act of Reading* introduced many to the notion that “what is said only appears to take on significance as a reference to what is not said” (168). In this system readers are “assigned the tasks of filling in the ‘gaps’ between the fixed points [within the text]” (Bérubé 15). This is precisely the view taken by Blair in his recent essay “The Rhetoric of Visual Arguments.” In his essay in A&A ten years ago, Blair was rather skeptical about the possibility of visual argument. Diana George finds that Blair’s previous essay “just barely manages to agree that visual argument, possessing all of the ‘salient properties of arguments,’ could actually be said to exist” (29). Blair’s more recent essay affirms the existence of visual arguments more forcefully, and, of particular interest here, it very clearly
announces that “[v]isual arguments are typically enthymemes—arguments with
gaps left to be filled in by the participation of the audience” (“Rhetoric” 52).

This approach to the visual enthymeme repeats the participatory aspect
shown to be valued in Bitzer and reader response theories in general. Blair
ascribes to two related notions about enthymemes: that they leave a premise
unstated, and that the audience supplies this missing premise. As Blair states at
the beginning of his essay, the enthymeme is “a form of argument . . . in which
the arguer deliberately leaves unstated a premise that is essential to its
reasoning. Doing so has the effect of drawing the audience to participate in its
own persuasion by filling in that unexpressed premise” (“Rhetoric” 41). This
characterization of the function of the enthymeme is squarely based on the work
of scholars such as Iser in which gaps “draw the reader into the action” (168). To
better understand what Blair means by the term “visual enthymeme” (especially
in relation to the broader concept of visual argument), one can consider the
primary example he offers, which is a TV spot run during the 1964 presidential
race between Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater.

In this ad, a little girl is seen picking a daisy apart while counting upward;
when the girl reaches “ten,” a voice over begins a downward countdown; at zero,
a mushroom cloud appears and we hear Johnson’s voice state “These are the
stakes, to make a world in which all God’s children can live, or go into the
darkness. Either we must love each other or we must die”; the screen then fades
to black and we see the words “On November 3rd vote for President Johnson”
(qtd. in “Rhetoric” 50). Blair claims that the purpose of this ad was to “suggest
that Goldwater was trigger-happy about the use of the H-bomb, and thus that to
elect him would be to place the nation in grave peril” (“Rhetoric” 50). He goes on
to claim that the ad is “a kind of visual enthymeme requiring the viewing public to
supply Goldwater as the alternative to Johnson” (Blair “Rhetoric” 50). In addition
to some factual assumptions discussed below, Blair’s example ignores the
substantial critique of Iser and of the rhetoric of gaps, which effectively
demonstrates that the enthymeme, imagined as a structure with gaps
intentionally placed by the arguer, does not exist.

The Enthymeme Does Not Exist

In what Michael Bérubé calls the “Fish-Iser Debate,” which initially played
out in the pages of the journal *diacritics*, Stanley Fish claims that Wolfgang Iser’s
theory of reader response, which depended heavily on the notion that “some
features of texts exist prior to or beyond any scheme of interpretation, while other
features are variable and therefore susceptible to interpretation” was, to put it
simply, wrong (Bérubé 13). Iser believed that readers are “assigned the tasks of
filling in the ‘gaps’ between the fixed points” of the text, although he did allow for
a “certain degree of critical pluralism by acknowledging that different readers will
fill these gaps in different ways” (Bérubé 15). Blair makes a similar statement
when he writes that, in addition to the premises that he extrapolates from the
image, “a number of equally plausible alternative verbal renditions of the
argument are available” (“Rhetoric” 50). The assumption of both Iser and Blair is
that the argument is inherent in the original text, and not much changed by the
interpretation of viewers.
Blair suggests that the role of the individual is to reconstruct the author’s intentional argument implied by the gaps in texts, and that there is more than one way to “correctly” verbalize this argument. This structural approach reduces visual argument to a type of rebus—a visual puzzle where pictures represent words—and is part of Blair’s distinction between “visual argument” and “visual persuasion.” The former is “logical or dialectical,” while the latter is “rhetorical” (“Rhetoric” 51). Blair’s approach submits the visual to a structural criterion that relegates the “evocative power” of images to the realm of persuasion (“Rhetoric” 51). In this system, the audience’s participation in the argument is merely a convenience, not a requirement. It may add “more force or immediacy” to the expression of the argument, but it adds nothing to the structure of the argument (“Rhetoric” 53). Thus, when scholars such as Blair talk about visual enthymemes, they may reference rhetorical approaches to the enthymeme, but they seem more concerned with structure. The discussion of visual argument thus becomes an analysis of underlying propositional structures to which people might or might not respond (depending supposedly on whether they are capable of constructing the propositions from the images presented). Presenting these visual arguments as enthymemes is a way to affect a concern with the social aspect of rhetoric without disrupting one’s devotion to a structural approach to argument.

The development of critical theory led to the realization that gaps could be found in every part of the text, not just in those places intentionally predetermined by authors. Fish’s devastating conclusion was that “what follows from the possibility that ‘gaps’ are everywhere is the conclusion that ‘gaps’ are only
where you—that is, where your interpretive assumptions—find them” (Bérubé 16). In short, (the gaps that signal the presence of) enthymemes are produced in the act of reading, and thus are not realizations of some hidden meaning implanted by the author, and are not either true nor false, but only more or less interesting or compelling to other readers. Individual interpretations of an image are not, as Blair claims, “equally plausible,” since this would mean that individual interpretations would only be capable of recognizing gaps in texts, but not creating them. Instead, each interpretation is subject to the standards of what Fish calls “interpretive communities,” which he defines as a “set of practices that are defining of an enterprise and fill the consciousnesses of the enterprise’s members” (“Yet” 36). If the enthymeme is constructed through sets of interpretive practices embodied by different communities of readers, there can be no identification of author-intended gaps.

For instance, take Blair’s claim that viewers of the “Goldwater” ad, based on the girl picking apart the flower, would believe that “Goldwater might, on something as arbitrary as a whim (the mere chance of which petal was plucked last), engage the nation in a nuclear holocaust, thus causing the destruction of everyone, including the innocent children who pluck daisies playing ‘s/he loves me; s/he loves me not’” (“Rhetoric” 50). Some readers could point out that the girl in the ad, somewhat obviously, is not playing the loves-me-loves-me-not game. She pulls off petals while counting upwards (imperfectly) to ten, and proceeds until a male voice begins a countdown from ten to zero, at the end of which we see a nuclear explosion. From another perspective (a possibly more compelling
one to some interpretive communities), there is no erratic dynamic in the image of the girl from which to extrapolate that it stands for an arbitrary whim of any sort, only a forceful and direct movement and counter-movement.

Could it be argued that Johnson’s invocation that we must “love each other” or die supports the existence of a “loving/not-loving” motif amenable to Blair’s interpretation? Of course. Do viewers construct meaning from images in ways that are “radically contingent, radically situational” (Olson 9)? Surely. But this only means that these interpretations will never be more than localized acts of interpretation situated in a visual culture’s ways of seeing and thinking. If nothing else, Blair’s next sentence—“The inference that it would be a danger to the national interest to elect Goldwater follows straightforwardly”—grossly fails to qualify the rigidity of the interpretation offered, and thus fails to interrogate to what degree his “verbal argument is consistent with the visual presentation” (consistency is yet another textual property that is constructed through discourse), or the degree to which the context is amenable to this interpretation (Blair, “Rhetoric” 49, emphasis added). The “gap” that Blair identifies as existing in order to forward this interpretation does not exist (as a gap) prior to Blair’s identification of it as such, and therefore, there can be no such thing as a visual enthymeme that exists prior to a viewer’s awareness of it.

Naturalizing the Enthymeme

“True philosophy is to learn again to see the world.”
– Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception
One essay in A&A since the 1996 special issue on visual argument directly affirms the possibility of the visual enthymeme: Finnegan’s “The Naturalistic Enthymeme and Visual Argument: Photographic Representation in the ‘Skull Controversy.’” In this article, Finnegan finds that documentary photographs of the 1930s use their “perceived relationship to nature” as an argumentative resource (135). In other words, documentary photographs are persuasive by virtue of their (presumed) “realism”—the audience’s assumption that the image portrays a real or natural setting (Finnegan 136). Finnegan ultimately finds that this “naturalistic enthymeme” in which the audience assumes the realism of the photograph, although ultimately vulnerable to challenge, is often so embedded in a culture’s way of seeing that individuals prefer to argue over what level of realism is acceptable rather than challenge the very possibility of realism in representation. John Berger, following Walter Benjamin’s argument in “The Work of Art in the Age of Reproduction” that art has lost its “aura,” writes that our ways of seeing constitute a “language of images” and that, since “The art of the past no longer exists as it once did. . . [its] authority is lost. In its place there is a language of images. What matters now is who uses that language for what purpose” (33). Finnegan’s analysis of the naturalistic enthymeme suggests that, although high art had lost its aura, a function of its distinctiveness and individuality, photography retained something of its aura in its claim to absolute realism.

While Finnegan’s analysis of the debates over the persuasive use of images is compelling, there are a few difficulties here in understanding this as an
enthymeme. First, Finnegan’s “naturalistic enthymeme” names an assumption of the audience that exists prior to the image and is used to authorize the use of the image in an argument. This seems to me to simply be another way of referring to what Stephen Toulmin calls the “backing” in the structure of an argument. In *The Uses of Argument*, Toulmin establishes a six-part system of argument description: to the familiar data, claim, and warrant (which are roughly similar to the three parts of a syllogism common to analytical argumentation) he adds the qualifier, rebuttal, and backing. In Toulmin’s terminology, the backing is composed of “other assurances, without which the warrants themselves would possess neither authority nor currency” (103). The “visual culture of realism” that Finnegan identifies could be considered the backing that allows one to connect, using one of Finnegan’s examples, the image of a bleached cow skull with the drought conditions depicted in the photograph (136).

What does calling this process an enthymeme add to Toulmin’s description, except to draw attention to the fact that Toulmin does not include images in the examples he gives of his system? “Visual backing” would seem just as descriptive a term for an underlying assumption that supports the use of images in some argumentative context, and might not carry so much disciplinary baggage as the term “enthymeme.” Gaines writes similarly that although theorists adopt a notion of the enthymeme that is generally “consistent with Aristotle’s view. . . . upon close inspection, it appears equally consistent with other views of practical deduction—not least those recently offered by Toulmin and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca” (16). Also, the philosopher Douglas Walton writes in his
book *Informal Logic* that "determining enthymematic premises is a pragmatic task of argument" (115). This linking of the enthymeme to practical argumentation suggests that this approach to the enthymeme treats it merely as the backing to more structured (i.e. "real") arguments.

Also, Blair writes recently that the "reasons [arguments] use are propositions," and since these "propositions are standardly expressed in sentences" that have a "truth value," visuals can be persuasive but cannot be arguments ("Rhetoric" 44). But people rarely speak of images as being true or false. This suggests to me that Finnegan's "naturalistic enthymeme" is really a way of describing how statements about images to which we can attribute a truth value (i.e. "This image is realistic") affect our interpretation of images, and not really about images themselves as visual enthymemes.

By her own admission, Finnegan's enthymeme is of limited use since the naturalistic enthymeme is only active in images that make a claim to realism and, thus, much of modern imagery is beyond the scope of this resource. Contrary to what might be expected, Finnegan claims that public anxiety over the manipulation of images shows the continued strength of the naturalistic enthymeme, not its demise (147). Truly, it is only when we are no longer anxious about the "specter of digital fraud" that the naturalistic enthymeme will lose its potency (Baron 28). But while continued anxiety does maintain the specter of a realistic image, this also shows that the source of Finnegan's "naturalistic enthymeme" is the degree to which manipulation of the image is expected or
authorized in the context in which the image circulates. At best, these are enthymemes about visuals, not visual enthymemes.

The Political Work of Visual Enthymemes

The focus on contradiction as a quality of enthymemic discourse might raise doubts about the possibility of visual enthymemes, and does raise the question of negation. Typically, images are assumed to be incapable of embodying the negative, which is reserved for language. As Kenneth Burke writes, “The negative is not picturable, though it can be indicated . . . . It is properly shown by a sign, not by an image. For a ‘negative image’ would be a contradiction in terms” (430). This is a standard view of images, but it does not restrict the functioning of an enthymeme. Contradiction need not be negation, since visual elements may make use of visual binaries that are considered oppositional without necessarily negating each other. Darkness and light, for example, can be used to establish visual contradiction. Such a strategy may even be active in the Goldwater ad that Blair examines, since the intense light of the nuclear explosion is followed by a “fade to black” that is reinforced by Johnson’s voice warning the audience of the possibility that they may “go into the darkness” (qtd. in “Rhetoric” 50).

The visual opposition of dark and light is a powerful binary that is employed in many persuasive contexts. In a review of how democrats can “win back the heart and soul of the [American] electorate,” Robert Reich writes that democrats “have to speak to the basic stories that have defined and animated the United States since its founding,” narratives such as the triumphant
individual, the benevolent community, the mob at the gates, and the rot at the top
(16). Reich admonishes to politicians that “Speak to these four stories and you
resonate with the tales Americans have been telling each other since our
founding—the two hopeful stories rendered more vivid by contrast to the two
fearful ones” (17). These narratives explicitly invoke the oppositions that Walker
identifies as enabling enthymemes (in this case, the four stories present the
various combinations of the oppositions of individual/group and good/evil). It is
reasonable that their imaging would deploy opposition as well.

Reich notes that in the “mob at the gates” story, “the United States is a
beacon light of virtue in a world of darkness, uniquely blessed but continuously
menaced by foreign menaces” (16). The image of the U.S. as a beacon of light
was often used in speeches by President Bush following September 11, 2001.
Since 2002, and as recently as the 2006 Armistice Day celebration at the Korean
War Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., Vice President Dick Cheney has
referenced a high-contrast satellite image taken at night of the Korean peninsula
that makes use of this opposition. This image shows South Korea awash with
lights, while only one pinpoint of light comes from North Korea, from its capital
city. In an address to Korean War veterans in San Antonio, Texas, in 2002,
Cheney stated:

Because so many sacrificed [in the Korean War], South Korea is today a
land that enjoys progress and prosperity, its people free from repression,
scarcity and starvation; the daily conditions of life in North Korea.

President Bush has observed, on a number of occasions, that satellite
photos of the Korean Peninsula at night show the North in almost complete darkness.

South Korea, on the other hand, is bathed in light; a vibrant enterprising society, a prosperous democracy, sharing ties of commerce and cooperation with many nations all over the globe, a peaceful and talented people who have built the third largest economy in Asia.

We look to the day when the light of freedom and progress covers all of Korea and stability on the peninsula rests on a foundation of peaceful reconciliation. Until then, stability will be maintained by our great military alliance.

That the “enthymeme’s power lies in its use of emotively significant oppositions” speaks to the potential of this passage and image (Walker 178). Specifically, Cheney invokes oppositions such as prosperity/scarcity, light/darkness, cooperation/isolation, and freedom/repression to “motivate audience adherence” to both the validation of past U.S. military ventures in Korea but to present ones in Iraq as well. Cheney’s speech holds much in common with the style of Isocrates’ Panegyricus, in which Isocrates famously called for a “‘Hellenic’ identity” that could be shared by all those who shared in Greek culture. Nowadays, the call is for the spread of democracy, but persuasion still requires that “reasons [be] embodied in the network of emotively significant, evaluative oppositions” communicated through enthymemes (Walker 178). The above
narratives not only tap into affects of fear and hope and into the spirit of American nationalism, they are intensely visual as well.

To reduce these combinations of image, narrative, and affect to syllogistic logic would be to remove the very heart of what makes them powerful. To call them “persuasion” rather than “argument” is to ignore how individuals experience arguments as enthymemic events in which they are called to produce and identify with a number of propositions both spoken and embodied in emotions and images. The strength of the non-Aristotelian enthymeme is that it does not separate persuasion from argument, nor does it portray a disinterested structure as the standard by which to measure the efficacy of visual argumentation. It does not reinforce the disciplinary anxieties about the role of emotion or the body in persuasion, nor does it retreat to a Ramus-like circumscription of rhetoric to issues of style and delivery.

Imag(in)ing the Enthymeme

“We desperately need a political economy of the image.”
– Mark C. Taylor and Esa Saarinen, *Imagologies*

The scene opens with snow-covered hills beyond a sea of icy blue-green water, a cold wind blowing clouds across the screen. All-caps lettering floats in front of the polar landscape calling upon us to “Save the Greenbacks,” and a voice states that the “plight of the greenbacks continues.” It then cuts to a figure standing in the snow wearing a red jacket with a high-contrast patch on the chest on which can barely be made out the shape of a whale. A close-up follows of a dollar half buried in ice and snow. The individual bends down to retrieve the
dollar, which is in two pieces, and declares that “this [dollar] barely stood a
change . . . but together we can save thousands just like it by taking part in Kia’s
‘Save the Greenbacks’ program.” Two other “activists” join the first in examining
the torn dollar (their whale patches now clearly visible) and they raise a
handmade “Save the Greenbacks” banner (with amateurishly off-center lettering)
before we are shown a fan-shaped (whale tail-shaped?) group of Kia vehicles on
which we can save money if we “hurry” and buy “today” (Kia Motors America,
“Arctic”).

The television ad described above undoubtedly alludes to the efforts by
groups such as Greenpeace to draw media attention to environmental concerns.
This ad most directly evokes the activist movements to stop hunting of baby harp
seals and to rescue animals following the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill off the
Alaskan coast. Another Kia ad in the same campaign shows individuals gathering
dollars on a beach and collecting them into a rubber raft—a craft strongly
associated with Greenpeace’s efforts to ban commercial whaling—while warning
us that “greenbacks are disappearing at an alarming rate” (the similarity between
“greenback” and “humpback” is unambiguous, especially so in view of the whale
patch worn by individuals in both ads) (Kia Motors America, “Beach”).

The rubber raft, the handmade banner, the concern with future events
(i.e., extinction), the call to action—all of these features are appropriated
generally from environmental activism and specifically from what Kevin DeLuca
calls “image events.” In *Image Politics*, DeLuca studies how “image events”—
staged acts of protest intended for media dissemination—emerged as the
primary rhetorical tactic of environmental groups such as Earth First! and Greenpeace (3–4). That the Kia ad designers can expect the audience to recognize the appropriated form of their commercials is proof that the image events of past activists continue to circulate in cultural consciousness.

Below, I will relate the circulation and success of image events to the method of rhetorical argument known as the enthymeme. Loosely put, I am arguing that image events aspire to be visual enthymemes. This formulation might seem to establish an unfortunate hierarchy between the material event and its argumentative structure, one in which words trump images. DeLuca specifically criticizes the desire to make words primary in a discussion of image events, and singles out Roger Aden’s essay, “The Enthymeme as Postmodern Argument Form,” as representative of the “tendency in the discipline of rhetoric to study television and other imagistic media by focusing on words to the neglect of images” (18). While Aden does admirably show how political figures present arguments that take advantage of the public’s “postmodern processing” of enthymematic forms, his examples of enthymemes deviate little from the common depiction of the enthymeme as an “incomplete” linguistic structure, a “syllogism with one (or more) premises missing” (55; Simonson 303). He may put this linguistic structure in the context of a broader of persuasive rhetorical concerns, but ultimately Aden’s enthymemes are relations between observations, generalizations, and inferences composed of words. My conception of the enthymeme is not word-based, however. It is thumos-based.
The image events that DeLuca discusses may be seen as calling upon an individual’s capacity for emotion realized in that individual’s thumos. The presence of thumos in ancient Greek poetics as well as sophistic discourse suggests a performative aspect that fits DeLuca’s focus on the public protests of environmental groups. Since most accounts of the enthymeme as a logic-ruled linguistic structure are based on Aristotle’s systematic treatment of the enthymeme, a thumos-driven conception of argument hopes to displace this word-centric model by returning to a “sophistic, non-Aristotelian notion of the enthymeme that is pervasive in the Hellenistic rhetorical tradition” (Lauer 53). In this tradition, an enthymeme

“is not strictly propositional and may include among its ‘premises’ such things as sense perceptions, mental imagery, memories, cognitive schema, deepset beliefs and values (ideologies), bodily states, the aesthetic effects of things like music or drugs, and existing emotional predispositions . . . as well as explicit propositions or “ideas” overtly present to the psyche” (Walker 174).

The adoption of this expansive notion of the available resources from which to construct enthymemes is meant to endorse rather than dismiss the visual nature of image events.

The idea that image events aspire to be visual enthymemes should also not raise fears of word-centrism because this is basically a temporal distinction: the formation of visual enthymemes occurs after the image event is disseminated. As DeLuca writes, in the production of image events we “witness
people acting passionately (‘irrationally’) on behalf of nature and place, [with]
commitments that owe as much to love and emotional connections as they do to
instrumental reason” (59). I would argue that in the reception of image events we
witness people forming enthymemes on behalf of emotion and reason, and that
these enthymemes can be constructed from visual resources that generate
action. As Jeffrey Walker writes in Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity, the
“conclusion” of an enthymeme is “not a proposition or ‘thought’ but an action or
will to act. . . a physically embodied will to act” (174, original emphasis). If the
conclusion of an enthymeme need not be a proposition composed of words, why
would we restrict its initiation in this way?

Image and Emotion in Rhetorical Theory
Aden’s account of postmodern argument as a “condensed, mediated”
recombination of “previously articulated fragments” would seem to describe the
Kia (and many other) ads well (55). But even by Aden’s account, it’s unclear
whether the Kia ad described above could be considered enthymemematic. It is
surely a condensed and mediated argument, although the fragments of discourse
it recirculates are both verbal and visual. The emotions it seeks to evoke are less
clear, however (and, as we shall see later, the thumos is not only home to
emotional responses, but to debates involving both reason and emotion). Under
a thumos-based account of the enthymeme, this ad’s borrowing of features from
other texts—the “already said”—is simply not enough to be enthymemematic. To be
an enthymeme, the ad would have to tap into the “already felt” as well. It may
seem here that I am being naïve by suggesting that ads don’t routinely make use
of audience emotions. Rather, I am claiming that any description of these texts as enthymematic is inadequate without a serious consideration of the emotion at the heart of the enthymeme.

In Aden’s article, for example, even though he observes that the arguments of political candidate and ex-KKK member David Duke found traction by appealing to “frustration,” “anti-government sentiment,” and prejudices such as “racial fear,” he introduces these as “cultural factors” (56–57). Aden writes that “Duke’s rhetoric features subjects deeply ingrained in the American psyche” and then he provides examples of enthymemes that make no explicit reference to the emotions that make these subjects resonate in the first place (59, emphasis added). This is a modified form-content bifurcation—emotions are associated with the content of argument without ever being allowed to enter the structural form of the enthymeme. If emotion is the reason for the audience accepting the observation that is presented, then it is misleading to state that “Duke relies on the ‘already said’ to provide both the political cover he desires and the political response he craves” (Aden 60). By focusing on the verbal (the “said”), and by using emotive words (“desires” and “craves”) to describe someone attempting to appeal to the worst in people, the role of emotion is either ignored or demonized by Aden. Granted, Aden’s article is a potent analysis of persuasive method, and the enthymeme here is at least recognized as a powerful tool of persuasion, but the article does these things without integrating emotion into the structure of the enthymeme.
In fact, Aden seems to overall devalue the role of emotion in public discourse. He writes that a greater understanding of enthymemes will help critics to “identify both the unsaid/already said and [reveal] the means by which public figures attempt to further their own ends at expense of . . . the societal good”; this understanding will also help break the “cycle of cynicism” in public discourse (Aden 61, 62). Aden associates the condensed enthymematic form with immoral intent by stating that it is the “enthymeme that allows Duke to appeal to prejudice without overtly doing so” (57). His statements that public argument should be more “open” and “explicit,” and “public officials [forced] to clarify their arguments” suggest that the influence within public discourse of “unsaid” factors such as people’s fears, anger, and cynicism could be overcome by a greater commitment to clear speech. (Aden 62).

The injunction to clarity follows from the standard belief that composing must be an exercise in “asserting something to be true” (Olson 9). Gary Olson claims that we should abandon this “rhetoric of assertion,” partially because it is “masculinist, phallogocentric, foundationalist, often essentialist, and, at the very least, limiting” (9). Also, Aden’s goal of eliminating ambiguity from argumentation ignores William Covino’s observation that “major figures of classical rhetoric—Plato, Aristotle, Cicero—define and demonstrate rhetoric as the elaboration of ambiguity” (Covino 2). Arguably, the enthymeme depends upon a degree of ambiguity to initiate audience participation in its completion. Furthermore, the resistance to ambiguity makes it difficult to take seriously either emotion or images in arguments. The immateriality of emotion makes unambiguous
description difficult. And it is common for people to assume that “the visual is inescapably ambiguous or vague” (Blair, “Rhetoric” 46). In Aden’s view of clarified communication, the goal is to turn language into a static representation of discourse. Dialogue is not valued, nor are more open-ended methods of interpretation and assertion.

Despite a general distrust of emotion that stretches back to Socrates, critical interest in emotion has increased significantly among rhetoricians in recent years. Foremost in prompting this interest is the recognition that emotions are not merely experienced privately, but can be understood “as evidence of one’s position in social relations and as a form of social action” (Jacobs and Micciche 4). In their introduction to A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion and Composition Studies, editors Dale Jacobs and Laura R. Micciche find the potential for rhetoric to enable social change embedded in the word “emotion” itself:

[A] key term for us is move. We take, as our starting point, the Latin root of emotion, motere, which means “to move,” suggesting that a tendency to act is implicit in every emotion. Movement, or repositioning oneself in the face of ever-changing situations, is a central goal of classical and contemporary rhetorical theory. Effective rhetoric is dynamic rather than static; effective rhetoric moves us towards new ways of knowing and creates avenues for social change. In our book, linking emotion with movement underscores the rhetorical nature of emotion as a mode of
articulation by which thought and action are moved, or are always in flux, and are a source of moving others. (3)

These scholars explicitly connect emotion with moving people to action, a central goal of activists. Arguably, this emphasis on action is evident in Aristotle as well. Larry Arnhart claims that the connection between emotion and action is always assumed in the Aristotelian enthymeme “since enthymematic argumentation is a practical form of reasoning, its aim is to move men not just to think, but also to act; and arguments cannot move men to action unless it somehow elicits the motivational power of emotion” (10). While many approaches to argument (and, indeed, politics) have generally de-emphasized the role of emotion, or, less kindly, associated it with distraction, fallacious reasoning, or deception, these scholars suggest that a social capacity for emotion must be the warrant of any form of rhetoric that claims to be “effective.”

In a manner similar to the way in which emotion has been dismissed, image events have also often been dismissed by theorists “as gimmicks or the antics of the unruly . . . [or reduced] to flares sent out to gain the attention for the ‘real’ rhetoric” (DeLuca 17). Even in classroom practice, where “visual literacy is an old and perennial” concern, images are often conceived “as a problematic, something added, an anomaly” (George 13). In these classrooms, image analysis is common but image production is not considered a serious rhetorical practice, despite the fact that images have become “commonplace in all aspects of contemporary public discourse” (McComiskey, “Visual” 188). The lack of instruction in the rhetorical uses of images, and in how to take advantage of
media to disseminate visual arguments, is unfortunate, especially considering the common notion that teaching argumentation is “necessary for the life of the polis” (Roberts-Miller 3).

Admittedly, doubts exist as to whether visuals can constitute arguments in more than a “non-metaphorical way” (Blair “Possibility” 23). But an image’s lack of a formal propositional structure made up of a “linguistically explicable claim and one or more overtly expressed reasons” should not condemn images to dismissal from the rhetorical classroom. After all, images dominate the public sphere because of the “power of things visually to persuade us, to shape our attitudes, and even our beliefs and actions” (Blair "Rhetoric" 42). It is unsurprising, then, that activists embrace the visual as central to the political work enabled by mass media. For instance, the 2005 Live 8 concerts made extensive use of visual media to disseminate Live 8’s anti-poverty message.15 This “political event,” as organizer Bob Geldorf calls it, functioned in at least one way like Greenpeace’s naval confrontations with whaling boats: it did not succeed primarily as a direct action but as an image event (qtd. in Tyrangiel 66; see DeLuca 1–6). As activist-musician Bono of U2 stated, the fact that Live 8 organizers had moved on from the “tin-cupping of Live Aid” to applying “real pressure” on world leaders —moved on from the direct action of raising money to the orchestrating of events that raise awareness—was a sign that they had “moved into real politics and real activism” (qtd. in Tyrangiel 66). This real activism is no longer measurable in dollars contributed, but in people moved to action.
Since images and emotions often tend to be dismissed using similar strategies, it is likely that a defense of the legitimate and necessary role of emotion in argument and a defense of the legitimate and necessary role of images in argument will be mutually supportive. If image events succeed when they function as visual enthymemes, “moving thumos” can be considered an effective strategy for the political work of activism. Addressing emotion is vital to activism because, as mentioned earlier, the “mind, by itself, is never sufficient to originate action or movement. . . . Action requires an affective state” (Miller and Bee 203, 204). The widespread validation of the “emotive power of the image” suggests that the production of images is therefore appropriate to responsible rhetorical pedagogies (LaGrandeur 119). Once one accepts “emotion as a central [and legitimate] ingredient in the act of persuasion,” it is easy to agree that thumos should be recovered in the field of rhetoric (Jacobs and Micciche 2). If thumos ought to become a key term for rhetoricians, “visual enthymeme” ought to become a key term for activists as well (Quandahl 14).

Arguing against the Structure of the Visual Enthymeme

Scholarly skepticism of the possibility of visual argument rests less on denying the rhetorical force of images and more on a restrictive definition of what constitutes an argument. J. Anthony Blair, for instance, has published multiple articles on the possibility of visual arguments. Indeed, his claim that “[v]isual arguments are typically enthymemes” would seem to be ideal support for this chapter (“Rhetoric” 52). But Blair’s depiction of visual argument is, I believe, too focused on structure to be useful in developing a concept of the visual
enthymeme. As George observes, Blair “just barely manages to agree that visual argument, possessing all of the ‘salient properties of arguments,’ could actually be said to exist” (29). Even if Blair does allow for the possibility that visual arguments exist, his discussion of visual arguments does not advance a sophistic understanding of the enthymeme that recognizes the role of thumos. By defining enthymemes as “arguments with gaps left to be filled in by the participation of the audience,” Blair ultimately subordinates the visual enthymeme to the verbal structure of traditional argument by positing visual arguments as complete, but not fully expressed, structures that exist independent of the actions of those who observe them (“Rhetoric” 52).

Blair’s approach to visual argument enacts another content-form bifurcation. He focuses on the content of images to understand their argumentative potential, hoping to derive from them propositions that will validate the image’s status as argument. This stance adheres closely to the convention that the “reasons [that arguments] use are propositions,” and that these “propositions are standardly expressed in sentences” that have a “truth value” (Blair “Rhetoric” 44). Blair’s test for whether a visual is an argument is “whether it would be possible to construct from what is communicated visually a verbal argument that is consistent with the visual presentation” (“Rhetoric” 49). All of this suggests that the content of images cannot be considered part of the form of the enthymeme until it has been translated into propositional content. Furthermore, Blair states only situations in which the audience “consciously assents” can be considered persuasion, and only situations in which the audience is presented
with “reasons for accepting a point of view” can be considered argument (“Rhetoric” 43–44).

Blair’s requirement that persuasion occurs only when we assent or “can choose to comply” might be read alongside Aristotle’s claim in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: “The origin of action—its efficient, not its final cause—is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end” (“Rhetoric” 43; qtd. in Miller and Bee 204, emphasis added). In other words, choice for Aristotle presumes the involvement of emotion, reason, and a concern with possible outcomes. Choice for Blair seems merely to be an acceptance or rejection of the argument as structured previously by the arguer. By focusing on the structural qualities of visual arguments (regardless of whether he ultimately decides visuals can or can not be arguments), Blair treats emotion as immaterial to the determination of the possibility of visual argument. This is evident in the two examples Blair provides: two examples of situations that function as instances of persuasion yet do not constitute arguments: one where a person is robbed at gunpoint, and one where a man is seduced by the touch of a woman. Blair states that you might hand your wallet over to an armed man, but “the robber has not presented an argument for doing so just by pointing his gun at you. [Blair’s] fantasy woman’s seduction might have been persuasive, but stimulating an erogenous zone does not constitute an argument” (“Rhetoric” 43). What Blair overlooks in these situations is the central emotional components of these events, namely fear and desire.
Blair’s dismissal of these events as non-arguments rests on a tidy division between the rational and the irrational: emotions located bodily in the gut or in an erogenous zone are considered outside the economy of reason and thus outside the structure of the argument. One way this can be refuted is by recognizing that emotions can be considered propositional. George Marcus, in *The Sentimental Citizen*, defines an emotion as “sensation together with a meaningful commentary” (10). Massumi writes similarly that an “emotion is a subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of experience which is from that point onward defined as personal. . . . It is intensity owned and recognized” (28, emphasis added). In other words, emotions can be propositions. As Quandahl writes, “our access to emotion, finally, is in language.” In other words, emotions are always already propositions; they are statements we make about ourselves that have a truth value, such as “I am happy” or “I am fearful.” And since emotions are always already language, they can be integrated into either the structural or the rhetorical model of the enthymeme.

The realm of emotion and perception is not simply some unregulated subjective realm; it is accessible to individuals through language that turns affective states and sensory stimuli into internal propositions. When Blair argues that “the arguer has to be able to predict the nature of the audience’s participation,” and that the “visual arguer must be particular[ly] astute in reading the audience,” part of this astuteness involves being aware of the emotions that these visuals will invoke (“Rhetoric” 52). These emotions are predictable due to the highly social dimension of emotion. Much recent scholarly work has
highlighted how “emotion is schooled through cultural institutions such as the family, the media, and all levels of the education system” (Jacobs and Micciche 4). This schooling ensures that emotions emerge in predictable ways conditioned by social expectations regarding “how, when, where, and by whom emotions ought to be enacted” (Lutz and Abu-Lughod 12).

The recognition of affective states as specific emotions transforms them into a content of the internal rhetoric that we engage in continually (and which, arguably, falls within the domain of thumos). If one insists that these arguments need to be elaborated verbally, one could imagine the individuals in Blair’s examples responding to the situation (i.e., the presence of the gun or the touch of the woman) with the phrases “I am afraid” or “I am turned on.” It is not even difficult to place these phrases into the enthymematic structure forwarded by Nancy Harper:

Observation: I am afraid right now.
Generalization: When I am afraid, I should not put up a fight.
Inference: I should not put up a fight right now.

In Harper’s system, an enthymeme is a “psycho-logical process of inference based upon observation” connected by an often unstated generalization (306). Harper differentiates the “causal” nature of the enthymeme from the “conditional” if-and-then nature of the syllogism, which is a structural relationship that “can only be valid or invalid” (309). A causal is a “combination of two or more propositions joined together by a connective word or phrase such as because” (305). Harper develops her definition of the enthymeme inductively by looking at
examples provided by Aristotle in the *Prior Analytics* and the *Rhetoric*. What she finds is that the enthymeme is an “arrangement of propositions in which one proposition is presented as a *claim* and another . . . is presented as a *reason*, or as evidence to support the claim. In other words, an argument and a causal partake the same form.” Additionally, the reason supporting the inference is “always something observable by the senses” (Harper 305). As causal statements, enthymemes are obviously arguments. Blair’s position on visual argument is limited because he is unable to account for the fact that “something observable by the senses” is likely to evoke a proposition (Harper 305).

The linguistic fixing of emotion allows it to have a truth value. In fact, the individualized experience of emotion is often used “as the ground of and warrant for knowledge” (Worsham 163). Though unsophisticated, we know something to be true because we feel it to be true. In what Rei Terada calls the “content approach” to emotion, emotions are “less sensations that happen to one than thoughts that one pursues” (19). Edmund Husserl provides the phenomenological foundation of the content approach: “We do not merely have a presentation, with an added feeling *associatively* tacked on to it, and not intrinsically related to it, but pleasure or distaste *direct* themselves to the presented object, and could not exist without such a direction” (qtd. in Terada 19, original emphasis). In this view, the emotion is an intention directed toward the object. Therefore, the emotion would not occur without the object’s presence. By presenting the gun, then, the robber in Blair’s example could be considered to be
presenting the reason for the emotion. Blair is searching for the truth value in the content of the image rather than in the emotion of the audience.

Since Blair insists that the reason is given by the arguer and that this reason supplies the content for the argument, he is more interested in the “creator of the visual expression” than in the package of reason, emotion, and expected outcome involved in the choice being, presumably, internally debated by the audience (“Rhetoric” 53). Blair’s claim that visual arguments do not exist because the “essential components [of] arguments—propositions—cannot be expressed visually,” disregards the possibility that propositional content arises through the interaction between individuals, rather than simply being transmitted by one party and assented to or rejected by the other (“Rhetoric” 47, emphasis added). Specifically, he does not consider the possibility that an object presented for observation can constitute the reason for a proposition.

Blair’s resistance to visual argument is based on approaching argument as structure rather than approaching argument as event. This impasse is akin to what Lyotard calls the “differend,” in which the “success (or the validation) proper to one genre is not the one proper to others” (136). But in order for emotion and images to matter, arguments may have to become events. Massumi writes that the “primacy of the affective in image reception” does not guarantee any “correspondence or conformity” between the content of an image and its effect (what Masumi calls the image’s “qualities” and “intensity”) (24, original emphasis). Rather, the “primacy of the affective is marked by a gap between content and effect” (Massumi 24, original emphasis). Approaches that look only
at the content of visual arguments exist, but what such approaches “lose, precisely, is the expression event—in favor of structure” (Massumi 27). If Blair (or others) situate their definition of (visual) argument in effect rather than content, then the possibility of visual argument will be difficult to deny.

The Sophistic Contribution to the Visual Enthymeme

Although DeLuca writes that image events fall “outside the domain of a rhetoric traditionally conceived,” the qualities of image events DeLuca identifies resonate with a classical understanding of the enthymeme that is not exclusively Aristotelian (xii). Certainly, Aristotle is responsible for much of the scholarly attention given to the enthymeme, since he called it the “body” or substance of persuasion in the opening of the *Rhetoric* (1354a). In fact, Poster writes that the “only universally agreed upon notion of why the enthymeme is of any but historical importance” is that it is “central to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*” (5). But beyond the affirmation of the importance of the enthymeme, Aristotle is not as helpful as one might think. As Lloyd Bitzer observes: “the reader of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* will find no unambiguous statement defining the enthymeme” (399).

Even within textbooks, which should be “conservative recapitulations of the agreed upon assumptions of an academic discipline,” Poster categorizes seven competing definitions of the enthymeme (1). Out of the seven, six make explicit reference to the syllogism, reproducing the narrow reading of the enthymeme as a logic-based linguistic structure (the divergent one defines the enthymeme simply as “informal deductive reasoning”) (Poster 4). But a thumos-based conception of the enthymeme draws attention to those aspects that
engage emotion most directly. According to the approaches introduced below, enthymemes are: 1. stylistically kairotic, 2. composed of oppositions or contradictions, 3. premonitory (future-oriented), and 4. amenable to visual resources. These are all qualities that successful image events possess as well.

From Isocrates and Anaxamines, two philosophers roughly contemporary with Aristotle, one encounters the first professional and technical descriptions of the enthymeme. Although some claim that Isocrates use of enthymeme suggests merely a “well-turned phrase, a well considered-thought,” this downplays the importance of *kairos* in Isocrates’ system of rhetoric (Poster 12). *Kairos* is typically associated with right timing, or due measure or proportion (Kinneavy 85). *Kairos* is an important factor in the tactics of grassroots environmental groups as well. DeLuca writes that the success of grassroots tactics “require people close by who can seize on the wing the possibilities that offer themselves at a given moment” (76). In *Against the Sophists*, Isocrates portrays the essence of rhetorical skill as being the ability “to see what *kairos* demands, and speak a discourse wholly wrought with fitting enthymemes” (16–17). Being kairotic, these enthymemes will “in some sense come as a surprise” and therefore “will not be fully predictable, will not follow as inevitable conclusions necessitated by the ‘premises’ preceding them” (Walker 179). In other words, the typical view of the enthymeme as an audience’s expression of unstated premises that completes the enthymeme ignores the stylistic force of the enthymeme’s presentation—of the production of “what might be called an ‘enthymematic moment’ in the audience’s experience” (Walker 175, original emphasis).
Anaximenes closely associates the enthymeme with style as well. Seven of the thirty-eight chapters in his Rhetoric to Alexander are directly concerned with style, and he begins this discussion by stating that an effective style is "achieved in this way—you state half an enthymeme, so that the audience may understand the other half for themselves" (qtd. in Walker 177). It is from a similar perspective that George Kennedy writes in “The Concept of the Enthymeme as Understood in the Modern Period.” that “abridging the statement, makes it stronger and more lively” (297). The latter part of Kennedy’s statement points to the stylistic efficiency or eloquence which many scholars believe an abbreviated syllogism engenders. A similar deference to the stylistic demands of the audience is contained in Raymond's statement that enthymemes “are appropriate to the audience of rhetoric because these lines of reasoning do not tax the attention” of the audience (148). DeLuca’s observation that the “televisual public sphere” is home to corporate and state “spectacles” as well as counterpublic “performance of image events” reinforces the necessity of considering style in public argument (21). By incorporating style as part of its successful functioning, the non-Aristotelian enthymeme remains an appropriate strategy in this era of “[c]ritique through spectacle, not critique versus spectacle” (DeLuca 22).

To show how “all the grace” can be taken from an expression when it is in stated in full syllogistic form, Kennedy looks at this line from Ovid’s Medea: “I was able to save you: do you then ask if I could slay you?” (279). Expanding this to include the premises “He who can slay can save” and “I saved you,” Kennedy
writes, goes against the principle that one of the primary beauties of an enthymematic statement is “to give an opportunity to the mind to form a thought more extended than the expression” (298). Depriving the audience of such an opportunity seems, not merely to disengage active attention to the argument, but to oppose the aesthetic and communitarian sensibilities of those involved in rhetorical exchange, who assume both a certain ability to construct arguments as well as an appreciation of eloquent expression.

Part of the stylistic force of the enthymeme comes from its use of opposition. Anaximenes writes that enthymemes are composed of contradictions or “oppositions” embodied “not only in words or in actions . . . but also in anything else” (qtd. in Walker 176). These contradictions can often be situated in “principles of justice, law, expediency, honor, feasibility, facility, or probability” or in “the character of the speaker or the usual course of events.” Anaximenes places enthymemes within an “exetastic discourse” consisting of an “exhibition’ of inconsistencies or contradictions in someone’s intentions, deeds, or words” (Walker 176). The emphasis on contradictions and inconsistencies challenges the typical view of enthymemes as depending solely on accepted knowledge, and suggests that enthymemes can be epistemic. Such deconstructive intent is clear in the tactics of activists to “contest social norms and deconstruct the established naming of the world” (DeLuca 59).

Contradiction is also a point of entry into critical discourse. As part of her work to articulate counter-hegemonic teaching practices that avoid the tendency of critical pedagogies to ignore the internal struggle of ideology that every
individual faces (and never really overcomes), Goleman writes: “As writing instructors, we need a concept of contradiction that will help us to accept and accommodate this intense, ongoing struggle toward critical discourse among our students, a struggle that leads them toward both a reproduction of social contradiction and its critique” (85). Perhaps the concept(s) that Goleman seeks is thumos, and the method appropriate to its functioning: the enthymeme. Griffin’s conceptualization of this struggle as an internal dialogue which must ultimately have a single winner may not sit well with critical pedagogues. The model of discourse that Griffin presents is not one amenable to how critical pedagogues often represent interaction in their classrooms. Griffin writes:

Here then is another aspect of ideological structure. Dialogue—which is finally perhaps the form of all thought—must become a war. One must lose and the other win. There must be a clear victor. One must be shown to be wrong. And therefore, each kind of thought is pitted against the other. (283)

This is not your teacher's contact zone. But Goleman attempts to make a space for the continuation of contradiction as a way to understand subjects within ideology. Rather than eliminate this state of struggle, Goleman calls on students to identify with it. By visualizing contradiction, images events may serve as useful tools in such pedagogies, especially since the technologies of vision and reproduction always call into question the extent to which manipulation is part of discourse, and therefore, enables us to ask ourselves “to what extent are we manipulating the direction of this struggle” (Goleman 85). By making the
contradictions of ideology visible and available for critique, Goleman lays bare the workings of ideology, since ideology “must insist that no other truth than its own is possible. The very idea of an alternative suggests a search. But any search might disclose the original lie” (Griffin 286).

Image events often make deliberate use of opposition to further critical ends. For instance, the images distributed as part of Greenpeace’s efforts to stop whaling operations regularly utilize the visual opposition between the rubber raft (a small craft filled with smiling members of the progressive counter culture) and the whaling boat (a “massive depersonalized, technical juggernaut of Soviet communism”) (DeLuca 98–99). Images of activists chained to vehicles and lying across or buried in roads evoke an opposition between action and immobility, between helplessness and authority. Also, the “contrary images” presented when grandparents are arrested while protesting (as opposed to the stereotype of naïve twenty-somethings) derive their force from a similar set of “emotively significant oppositions” that work to produce shame in viewers (DeLuca 10–11; Walker 178). Based on the qualities advocated by Isocrates and Anaxamines, the sophistic enthymeme emerges as a “concise emphatic statement of an emotionally charged opposition” (Walker 177). This is also the foundation of image events.

Thomas Farrell’s contemporary approach to the enthymeme stresses its status as “premonitory” discourse, which he defines as “interested, unfinished reference” regarding a “world yet to come into existence” (104). The call to action embedded in image events is just such a kind of future-oriented discourse, and
environmental groups display a “rich tradition of struggle that provides a spark of hope for those confronting a daunting future” (DeLuca 163, emphasis added). This concern with the future poses special problems for image events dealing with environmental concerns. The distended timeline of environmental effects can conflict with the intended *kairos* of the performance—the consequences of inaction may simply seem too far off to be motivational. As DeLuca points out, environmental groups must also contend with the powerful ideograph of progress. By arguing that “humanity, by dominating nature through the use of instrumental reason and technology, will achieve progress,” industrialists have made it difficult to think of the future without the unrelenting exploitation of natural resources (DeLuca 40).

It is clear that visuals are exceptionally well-suited to provide the sophistic qualities of enthymematic discourse. The gestalt nature of images—their all-at-once-ness or “immediacy”—make them ideal for the “sudden, dramatic sense of opening prospects” that characterizes enthymemes (Walker 179). Even Blair recognizes that “one can communicate visually with much more force and immediacy than verbal communication allows” (“Rhetoric” 53). The economy of the image parallels the desire expressed by the sophists to create “enthymemes that embody these oppositions as briefly and economically as possible” (Walker 176). Thus, the enthymeme Walker finds in sophistic discourse is one that affirms the role of visuals in stimulating the senses and the emotions, while maintaining the necessity of *kairos* in their presentation. The rhetorical rhetoric of the
enthymeme anticipates the necessarily ambiguous and flexible nature of such situationality.

What is referenced by enthymemes is the “mosaic of commonplaces, conventions, traditions, and provisional interests making up the doxa [popular opinion] of rhetorical culture” (Farrell 99). The corporate-centric control of the production and distribution of mediated images has led to an association of images with corporate interests. Kathleen Welch identifies a series of “visual koinos topos,” or visual commonplaces, that infuse news media (Electric 165). These specific visual topoi she claims are “sight bites . . . fragmentary . . . visual shards that lead nowhere except to the visual similarity of the commercials” (Welch, Electric 163). But it is also true, if visual commonplaces can be used, as Welch argues, to “reduce the ability of any decoder in any discourse community to absorb and assess what is going on,” that visual commonplaces can also be utilized to improve the ability to decode and assess (and produce) meaning. After all, rhetoric allows us to see the available means of persuasion, but does not restrict us from the use of any particular appeal. The anxiety over the ability of enthymematic images to persuade, and even to deceive, is understandable. But only if one rejects the possibility that images can be used for a variety of rhetorical ends.

At the beginning of Image Politics, DeLuca states “How are people persuaded, moved? In a word: rhetoric” (xii). If the enthymeme is the citizen’s proper rhetorical strategy, then citizens have at their disposal a wide variety of resources that are already in circulation, “fragments” of discourse that
characterize the postmodern condition in which “apparently finished discourse is in a fact a dense reconstruction of all the bits of other discourses from which it is made” (McGee, qtd. in Aden 55). Although aware of the necessary play of language, and its usefulness in forming community, DeLuca is critical of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s concept of “floating signifiers” as elements useful to activists since their status as “relatively empty and ambiguous” cannot be the basis for shared understanding of the material world (DeLuca 43). DeLuca favors McGee’s notion of the “ideograph” instead, but the available elements of visual discourse might also be located in Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of speech genres, those textual types that originate and draw material from everyday life, manifesting an organized yet heterogeneous system of relationships among genres of writing. If such forms exist, then there is no reason that a parallel system of “image genres” has not developed in our image-dominated media culture, a type of shared visual knowledge, what Welch calls visual topoi, upon which enthymemes can be built.

Activating Thumos

When activists seek to take advantage of the potential of image events, they harness their enthymematic potential to move affect. There are really two events here: the image event coordinated by activists to disseminate through media, and the event realized in the reception of these image events. Whether an audience responds to an enthymeme is “at least in part, connected with its eventfulness,” but the scope of this event should not be limited to the original act of protest (Farrell 102). As Massumi claims: “what the mass-media transmit is not
fundamentally image-content but event-potential. A mediatized event has the potential to transfer into new domains, and when it does it repeats its eventfulness, with a change in its nature” (269, emphasis added). The enthymemematic function of image events demonstrates that the domain in which the event is repeated is the domain of thumos.

Because thumos is not simply a specific emotional appeal, but the place of rational/emotional deliberation, it is related to the classical notion of *konoi topoi*, the common topics or common places of rhetorical argument. As Welch explains: “A *topos* is not a *what* Greek keyword; rather it is a *how* keyword. . . . it is part of informed performance. ‘Topos’ in Greek signifies place; it is a location where one takes oneself in order to develop an issue” (*Electric* 114–15). In other words, such places facilitate the invention and performance of arguments. The role of the thumos in moving people to action suggests that the effective rhetor should forefront “presentational and inventional concerns: the means by which enthymemes can most effectively be generated ‘in’ a listener’s *thymos*” (Walker 175, original emphasis).

Emmel claims that “[t]he paradigm of the enthymeme is not a form imposed on the process but rather a form representative of how that process takes shape” (Emmel 137, emphasis added). Not just a structure, the enthymeme might be seen as a method similar to what Gregory Ulmer describes as that of the “chorographer, then, [who] writes with paradigms (sets), not arguments” (38). Visual enthymemes are not simply examples of images structured to have a certain effect on audiences, but a description of how images
are both produced in kairotic ways, and how those images are received by audiences through an interactive package of reason and emotion. Composing image events with paradigms requires the articulation of the shared visual elements of discourse. How both activists and scholars envision this process is evident in the visual enthymemes they produce.
Chapter 6

Touching Thumos

There is much hope attached to the study of emotion. The hope of some is that the current interest in emotion will lead to understandings that propel programs of social and individual change and will help realize the long-term projects in composition studies that seek to develop students’ critical consciousness and rhetorical ability. The editors of *A Way to Move* make claims for emotion that range from the ambitious—it will “create a culture of movement”—to the unexceptional—it will “move our discipline in new directions” (Jacobs and Micciche 2). Others, such as Sondra Perl, seem to hope that attention to emotion will favor embodied ways of knowing that challenge postmodern accounts of subjectivity and, rather, enable “genuine expression” and “full experiencing” (59). If nothing else can be said, it is at least true that approaches to emotion and the purposes that motivate them are local and diverse. The belief in the possibility of change, however, seems universal, as does the anxiety over the failure to take advantage of the motivational power of discourses of emotion. As Worsham states, it would be a “shame if the new interest in emotion as a category of critical thought does not move us into a new orbit of social and political possibility” (163). But she also warns of the possibility that the study of emotion may simply reinforce existing boundaries and patterns of discourse.
In reference to Toni Morrison’s distinction between being touched and being moved, the title of this chapter, “Touching Thumos,” suggests the difficulty involved in the intellectual work of re-educating emotion, and in the ethically and politically sound deployment of affect in public discourse. The title of this work, “Moving Thumos,” represents the hope that this can be done in a politically engaged and self-reflective way. It is not as if opportunities for reflection are rare. Events we encounter daily trigger different affective responses—we may be shamed by events at Abu Ghraib; disgusted by Morgan Spurlock’s 30-day indulgence in fast food in the film “Super Size Me”; in awe at photos of the human body’s interior landscape; indifferent to celebrity charity concerts; angry at the money spent on our university’s latest re-branding effort; joyful at a sonogram of a friend’s baby; bitter at the result of the latest televised trial; and, hopefully, moved by the passionate commitment of other citizens. The primacy of the affective in discourse is part of the momentum of its circulation. By connecting the affective dimension of discourse to the paradigm of the enthymeme, it may become clearer how citizens engage in the production of events that move thumos, and how we interpret these events as calling upon us as certain types of subjects, subjects who respond to discourse over time and through a range of enthymemetic modes that are not reducible to the linear structures of traditional argument.

Movement in Theory

I return to the question of movement. Composition studies has had difficulty theorizing subjects in motion. As Massumi writes, many “accounts of
subject formation emphasize systemic structurings,” embracing a language of positionality (location on a grid, an “oppositional framework of culturally constructed significations”) and treating the body as merely the “local embodiment of ideology” (2–3). The enthymeme, as shown earlier, has suffered a similar fate—being reduced to a structuring that separates it from its potential as a rhetorical event. Advocates of change (whether they embrace expressivism, constructivism, growth theory, or some form of liberatory pedagogy) often unintentionally idealize the individual subject’s capacity to change at the expense of a more nuanced understanding of the complexity of subjectivity. Recall Jacobs and Micciche’s claim that “[m]ovement, or repositioning oneself in the face of ever-changing situations, is a central goal of classical and contemporary rhetorical theory” (3). Here, the language suggests that the situation changes and that individuals reposition themselves in relation to external change. Representing this process as a repositioning—as movement between positions—de-emphasizes the fact that subjects are always already subjects-in-motion.

While the goal of this model and others may be to authorize “local resistance in the name of change,” they authorize this potential for change by first “subtracting movement from the picture” (Massumi 3). Critical models based on ideologically structured positions between which movement takes place don’t really theorize movement at all. They are Zeno’s paradox writ large. Zeno’s paradox basically goes like this: when Zeno imagines an arrow being shot, he thinks of its flight as a linear sequence of points that the arrow inhabits one after
the other. But since in Zeno’s model there is an infinite number of intervening points between each point, and since the nature of infinity is that you can never reach its end, the arrow never actually moves from the point it currently inhabits. This paradox has been disproven in several ways, one of the more well-known being Diogenes simply stepping forward (i.e. moving) and claiming “thus I refute Zeno.”

The problem with how Zeno imagines motion is similar to the problem with how composition pedagogies often construct subjectivity. Zeno refuses to see that the arrow moves because he imagines an infinite number of positions which the arrow can inhabit. But it might be more accurate to say that the arrow is never in any single point, it is in passage across them all. As Massumi claims, “A path is not composed of positions. It is decomposable: a dynamic unity” (6). In this “continuity of movement” intermediary positions only appear retrospectively by being constructed through discourse (Massumi 6). The subject of composition pedagogy is also in continuous movement, albeit one that cycles among favored positions in response to recurring contexts.

Goleman warns that pedagogies based on restrictive models of “situationality” threaten “merely to ratchet up expressionist modes of writing to new heights of self-consciousness” by characterizing critical reflection as increasing self-knowledge (Working 99). Her theory of “critical effectivity” proceeds not from a denial of situationality, but from attempts to use “contradiction and overdetermination” as “speculative instruments that give students a nonfoundational language for the effectivity of a structure in its effects”
(99). The last part of this sentence refers to Althusser’s notion of structural causality (what Goleman calls “structural effectivity”). In Reading Capital one finds that, for Althusser,

[The object of structural causality] is precisely to designate the mode of presence of the structure in its effects. . . . The structure is not an essence outside the economic phenomena which comes and alters their aspect, forms and relations . . . on the contrary . . . the structure is immanent in its effects, is nothing outside its effects” (qtd. in Goleman 15).

To say that a “structure is immanent in its effects” is to recognize that “all knowledge must be understood historically as the particular effects of a social structure” (Goleman 14). Therefore, no transcendental subject exists to make absolute knowledge available. Knowledge does not reside in objects where it waits to be discovered. More importantly, being able to know something through its effects (rather, than say, through its essence) allows Goleman to argue that situated knowledge can be used to further the goals of critical pedagogy.

Goleman’s builds her theory of agency upon Althusser’s materialist epistemology and Bakhtin’s theory of dialogic language and seeks to engage students in a process of incremental change characterized by the “incessant recognition of ideology’s effects and mechanisms” (20). Through this process, ideology is not avoided or negated, but simultaneously reproduced and critiqued. Movement is thus reconceptualized, not as movement outside of ideology, but as movement within the multiple ideologies that we inhabit (or, in light of the desubjectifying effects of emotion and thumos, the ideologies that inhabit us).
Goleman’s critical effectivity recognizes that there are a host of positions within these ideologies that can be used for self-critique. Of course, the idealization of the possibility for movement can become its own justification and thereby “radically truncate the possibilities of drama by eliminating action, reducing action to sheer motion” (Massumi 10).

One effect of the critique of situationality is to help recoup the notion of change in composition studies. It is impossible, of course, to predict in any meaningful way specific changes caused by discourse. To do so would be to automatize the dialogic struggle of discourse. But models of discourse or subjectivity that deny the possibility of movement are much less useful descriptions of subjects in discourse. But such discourses still recognize difference as a key concept, and perhaps change is simply difference over time. Descriptions that depend upon a subject incapable of change have simply substituted another form of centered subject for previous models. Without the possibility for change, there is no decentered subject. It is perhaps better to describe this change as movement, and admit that we are all subjects in motion. As Brian Massumi writes, although we think of the ground on which we stand as stable, “ground is anything but,” and our recognition of it as a stable and physically measurable space is “predicated on the capture of processes already in operation” (11). Such is the self. The enthymeme, with its connection to the Greek concept of thumos—our capacity to be moved—could become a key term for discussing the role of affect in subject formation and the political organization of subjects through the education of emotion. And the theorizing of visual
enthymemes can contribute to our understanding of argumentation in contemporary visual culture, and to the development of a rhetorical rhetoric of images in which visual ambiguity is seen as an argumentative resource.
Notes


2. To better understand the claims regarding the coherency of “sophistic rhetoric” to which Schiappa is responding, see John Poulakos’ “Towards a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 16 (1983): 35–48.

3. I believe the Bush administration currently faces a similar crisis of vocabulary as when antifoundationalists put their trust in the community. For instance, the Bush administration claims that it is quite interested in spreading freedom throughout the Middle East by establishing democratic elections. But it is still possible, as seems to be the case in Iran, that democratic choices by a community can still lead to electing anti-democratic regimes. In the same way, because standards for what counts as truth are always established within the discourse of that community, it is entirely possible for a scholarly community to adopt a foundational regime of truth, even in light of antifoundational critiques of the inadequacies of foundationalism.

4. “Incommensurability” is a concept rooted in the work of Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, and, perhaps most notably, Jean-Francois Lyotard.

5. The textual evidence for the centrality of the enthymeme to Aristotle is hard to challenge, although some scholars seem to acquiesce halfheartedly: “I submit that in Aristotle’s rhetorical system the enthymeme is the element or unit of all persuasive discourse” (McBurney 63). This compunction might be read as evidence that the enthymeme truly does not fit well into the “more prescriptive and schematic treatments” of the *Rhetoric* (Covino 6).
6. The arguments of Madden and Lanigan are both highly relevant to the development of theories of the visual enthymeme out of the field of communications. In particular, the distinction between causality and persuasion that Madden recognizes is key to understanding how my own theorization of the visual enthymeme differs from previous attempts. Rather than claim that scholars confuse the two, as Madden does, I argue that causality has become the sole standard for the discussion of visual enthymemes, leaving persuasion, and thus rhetoric, out of the picture.

7. In the September 15, 2006 digest of WPA-L, a listserv for those interested in writing program administration, which covers all messages sent in a 24-hour period, a request was made for suggestions for the “perfect rhetoric text to teach the dreaded Aristotelian enthymeme.” The first three suggestions were for textbooks discussed in this dissertation’s section on pedagogies of the enthymeme: Corbett’s Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, Crowley and Hawhee’s Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students, and John Gage’s The Shape of Reason. That these were the primary texts recommended by multiple respondents suggests that they represent accepted dominant approaches to teaching the enthymeme. Other texts mentioned include the following: Joliffe and Roskelly’s Everyday Use: Rhetoric at Work in Reading and Writing, and Dobyns and Callaghan’s A Meeting of Minds.

8. Some of the significant names in the disciplinary conversation over the value of collaborative learning in the composition classroom include Kenneth Bruffee, John Trimbur, Xin Liu Gale, Greg Myers, and Patricia Bizzell. See especially Trimbur’s "Consensus and Difference in Collaborative Learning."

9. In addition to the literal winds blowing through Joyce’s “Aeolus” chapter, Hodgart identifies over 45 different allusions and metaphors dealing with wind. As Hodgart writes, the wind embodies all types of high and low distinctions; it “may be flatulence, over-blown rhetoric or false inspiration, but it may also be the true inspiration of religion and art” (118). The significance of the relation of wind to the chapter’s enthymemic technique may become clearer when the close association between the wind and thumos is discussed in the next chapter.

10. “Nelson’s Pillar” is a common but incorrect reference to “The Nelson Pillar,” a granite pillar raised in Dublin in 1808 with a statue of Horatio Nelson at its top. Horatio Nelson was an English Admiral made famous in the Napoleonic Wars. The pillar, built against the wishes of the Dublin city council but pushed through by the British Lord Lieutenant at the time, was reminiscent of Nelson’s Column, a similar monument in Trafalgar Square in London, England. While opposition to the pillar was steady after its construction and into the 20th century, the Nelson Pillar remained standing until it was bombed by members of the Irish Republican Army in 1966.
11. While Arthur Miller and John D. Bee’s essay discussed above “Enthymemes: Body and Soul,” which appeared in the journal *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, does recognize the thumotic roots of the enthymeme, their article is exceptional in this respect. Other recent works on thumos, such as Barbara Koziak’s book, *Retrieving Political Emotion: Thumos, Aristotle, and Gender*, fail to connect thumos to the enthymeme. Jeffrey Walker’s work provides one of the few sustained articulations of the relationship between thumos and the enthymeme, and will provide the foundation of much of the next chapter’s discussion of thumos in relation to the enthymeme.

12. “Affect” is the term Massumi uses to refer to the “intensity” that becomes emotion once fixed linguistically. The difference between affect and emotion is critical to Massumi, who claims that “Affect holds a key to rethinking postmodern power after ideology” (42). In most cases below, I will continue to use “emotion” since this seems to better identify the recognized affective states that enter into deliberation within one’s thumos.

13. DeLuca also cites the work of Kathryn Olson and G. Thomas Goodnight as representative of analysis that “implicitly instantiates a hierarchy that privileges the discursive (words) over the nondiscursive (images)” (18).

14. See Jameison’s *Dirty Politics* for a view of emotion as exploitative rhetoric. See Walton for a book-length treatment of how emotion is associated with fallacious reasoning and other “odious” rhetorical tactics (3). Although the book’s first sentence claims that “The thesis of this book is that appeals to emotion have a legitimate, even important, place as arguments in persuasion dialogue” the book focuses on the latter half of this sentence, which warns that emotional appeals “need to be treated with caution because they can also be used fallaciously” (1). For Walton, the “value of arguments that appeal to emotion” is ultimately based on the possibility that “emotional appeals can be reasonable arguments in some cases” (255, emphasis added).

15. The Live 8 concerts and the debates surrounding them represent a rich source of theorization regarding image events which, for the most part, lie outside the scope of this essay. Watched by approximately 2 billion people and accessible to roughly 80% of globe, it set a new standard for media dissemination of political activism. The image-based interactive features available to viewers were many, including the “G8 Gallery,” where supporters were encouraged to submit images to Live 8 organizers which were printed and placed along a 2-mile stretch of the “Long Walk to Justice,” the closing march to Edinburgh. The actual marchers along the Long Walk to Justice, however, had to deal with police taking pictures of them as well. Bono’s claim that the “The lingua franca [of political momentum] . . . is not English—it’s pop music” is evocative as well, suggesting that the aural component of image events may benefit from further attention (Tyrangiel 66).
16. Again, Bono is prescient here. He states that “There’s got to be a moment, an explosive moment of concentration on [poverty]. The point of Live 8 is to provide the colossal, dramatic moment where everybody gets to grips with it” (qtd. in Tyrangiel 66).

17. For those who find this sentence confusing, it is a reference to the 1988 campaign by General Motors to revive interest in their redesigned Oldsmobile in a younger demographic: "This is not your father's Oldsmobile."
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196


About the Author

Eric Daniel Mason received his Bachelor's and Master's degrees from Florida Atlantic University in Boca Raton, Florida. Born a Floridian, he spent much of his time outdoors before moving to Tampa. His love for the outdoors developed mainly through his work with the Boy Scouts of America, for whom he has served as a youth and adult leader, and by whom he has been recognized as an Eagle Scout, Woodbadge leader, and Founder's Award recipient. His wife, Julia, and three cats—Kate, Molly, and Sasha—prefer the outdoors as well.