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Transnational Social Movements and the War on Drugs

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
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Transnational Social Movements and the War on Drugs

Ben Mostyn

ABSTRACT

This thesis discusses the growing body of work on transnational social movement theory. Transnational social movement theory is an attempt to adapt social movement theory to the changing nature of international relations. To further this theory, I test the hypothesis that “a transnational social movement has caused drug law reforms at the local and state level”.

To test this hypothesis I undertake a case study of one local and one national drug law reform. The drug laws in the state of New South Wales, Australia were reformed in 1999 to allow heroin addicts to use a medical center to inject their drug. The second case study is of Bolivia’s national coca laws where the government allows a small amount of coca to be grown for legal traditional consumption.

I conclude that a transnational social movement has had little impact on these law reforms but perhaps in the future such a movement will begin to have a greater impact on local and national drug laws around the world. To become more effective, I suggest that the transnational movement should establish a set of goals, strengthen networks among activists, develop insurgent consciousness, develop an innovative repertoire of contention, and it needs to take advantage of the political opportunity structure when it opens.
Chapter One

Introduction

In 2002, I attended the “Million Marijuana March” in Vancouver, Canada. For the past decade, on the first Saturday in May, diverse groups of people have taken to the streets of Argentina, South Africa, Japan, Australia, Israel, North America, and Europe protesting marijuana prohibition. Roughly a year after I marched in Vancouver, the Prime Minister of Canada announced he would repeal marijuana prohibition. Also, in 2002, a large group of coca farmers in Bolivia were marching on La Paz, demanding their government stop persecuting the growth of coca. Claiming that their President, Gonzalo Sanchez, was a puppet of the American government, they demanded his resignation and an end to US operations in Bolivia. Last year, Sanchez was toppled from power and forced to flee to America. In 2003, New South Wales (NSW) parliament passed a law to extend the operation of a heroin safe injecting facility until 2007. These three episodes occurred on three separate continents and suggest that a social movement is arising in response to the War on Drugs. Further, this transnational social movement appears to be causing drug law reforms.

To recognize the significance of this topic, it is necessary to identify the many problems perceived to be caused by the War on Drugs. In many places, social movements are growing in opposition to the war. Broadly described as drug law reform groups, these social movements come in many forms. From peasant coca farmers in Bolivia, to student activists in the USA, to elected politicians in Europe, to medical professionals in Australia, a diverse group of people are working to reform drug prohibition (the War on Drugs).

If these groups are able to form a transnational social movement and have a significant impact on drug policies around the world it would represent a movement away from
states dominating international relations towards a situation where concerned citizens could combine outside of the traditional state-centered international relations framework to affect public policy. Perhaps more startlingly, an effective transnational social movement may represent a movement away from states even dominating their own public policy. If a transnational social movement can change public policy in various countries it may mark a point where concerned citizens in one country can change policy in another country.

Several IR theories may be potentially relevant for this thesis topic. I briefly summarize the three main IR theories (idealism, realism, and Marxism) in order to set the stage for determining, in the concluding chapter, which of these theories is most relevant in light of the results obtained from testing the hypothesis.

The realist paradigm believes that the nation-state is the most important actor in international relations. Similarly, social movement theory tends to place the state in the center of social movements and contends that all social movements are in conflict with a nation state. Many social movement theorists – wittingly or unwittingly – agree with a realist rationale that a social movement can not exist unless it interacts with a nation state. A realist perspective would see the War on Drugs as the work of a hegemonic state (see Chapter Three) enacting a policy which best suits its own interests. Such a powerful state would not let a transnational social movement have an impact on its public policy and further, would not let weaker states bow to the pressure of the movement either.

However, social movement theory has recently seen a new branch of theorists who espouse transnational social movement theory. Transnational social movement theorists attempt to explain how social movements can operate across nation-state borders and how social movements can become an important non-state actor in international relations. In a similar vein, a growing body of theorists are formulating ways to analyze “resistance to globalization” – or “anti-globalization”. Both these new fields of study would most
likely adopt a neo-idealist belief. However, it appears that one group is ‘pro’ neo-idealistism and the other is ‘anti’ neo-idealistism.

Transnational social movement theorists are looking for evidence of interactions and similarities across borders which bring together transnational social movements. Such theorists are generally ‘pro’ neo-idealistism because they think interaction and cooperation between diverse groups of people over varying spaces can impact on local and national polities. Conversely, those scholars who analyze resistance to globalization are often highly critical of neo-liberalism claiming such interactions and similarities across borders have so far only brought together an elite class at the expense of everyone else. They see interaction and cooperation amongst diverse groups as occurring simply in opposition to the negatives of a neo-ideal world. They strive to find an alternative form of neo-liberalism which benefits the majority of the world’s population. However, these perspectives agree that a transnational non-state actor can impact on nation-state’s public policies just as the transnational environmental activist networks and transnational fundamental Islamic terrorist networks have been able to. Neo-idealistic theorists may agree that the transnational drug law reform social movement is increasingly able to combine their efforts to bring pressure on nation states’ policies.

The last major theory in IR is Marxism. Karl Marx famously called for the workers of the world to unite back in 1848 so he would surely hope that the exploited classes of the world would be able to unite by 2004. Marxists must surely believe then, that transnational social movements can form solidarity to change public policy. In the context of the War on Drugs, it is common for countries to be designated “producer” and “consumer” countries – two extremely Marxist terms. That consumer countries are responsible for the demand for drugs and that these same consumer countries are also responsible for the repression that destroys peasant crops which are trying to meet this demand is a paradox that must have Marx turning in his grave. Further, a Marxian dilemma occurs because the War on Drugs is causing social movements in many
producer countries and consumer countries and the Marxian paradigm believes that two groups at opposite ends of the mode of production can not form solidarity to provoke change.

I want to find out which of these theories best explain reactions to the War on Drugs. In order to do that, I propose to test out the following hypothesis: Transnational social movements have caused drug law reforms at the local and state levels.

This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the War on Drugs has led to the proliferation of social movements on various continents. This assumption is supported by my description of the War on Drugs in Chapter Three. The War on Drugs, with the outright support of the United Nations, is clearly a global phenomenon. Further, as various social movement organizations on every continent claim many problems have been caused by the War on Drugs it can be safely assumed that these social movements are clearly a response to the global War on Drugs.

The independent variable in the hypothesis is transnational social movements. The concept of transnationalism is perhaps best defined by what it is not. Smith (2001) talks of a social science tendency towards binary frames. One such frame is the local-global binary which, taken to its extreme, suggests there is a zero-sum game between the nation-state and globalization. The concept of transnationalism, Smith contends, treats the nation-state and transnational practices as more mutually constitutive than such a zero sum game analysis - nation-states and transnational forces are inter-locked and enmeshed. Such transnational forces include the flow of people, money, goods, culture, ideas etc. through nation-states. Further, I would add, even if there is a zero-sum game between globalization and the state, the concept of transnationalism may provide an explanation for the complex and contradictory process of moving from a local to global world.
The definition of a social movement is hotly debated as will be seen in the next chapter. For the purposes of this thesis, a group which advocates change in public policy and tries to garner wide support for their publicly stated aims through coherent and innovative strategies, often in conflict with the state, will suffice. The definition of a transnational social movement is even trickier. By the most liberal definition, the simple presence of a social movement on separate continents may suggest a transnational social movement, yet to be truly transnational a social movement must organize, cooperate and activate across borders. A transnational social movement illustrates that political voice is now often exercised by micro-level actors capable of jumping scales and transcending political borders: “The operation of social networks ‘from below’ through the mechanisms of transnational migration and political mobilization thus provides one important answer to the more general question of how socio-cultural and political-economic forces articulate with the politics of every day life at local, national, and transnational scales throughout the world” (Smith, 2001, p.5). This definition will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

The dependent variable is local and national drug law reforms. For the purposes of this thesis, a drug law reform is any change in a drug law which reduces punitive measures or which legitimizes the use of a previously illegal drug. By local drug law reforms, I mean any law reform below the nation state level. For instance, a state in the USA or Australia may change its own laws with or without the support of the Federal Government. National drug law reforms occur when a country’s government changes the drug laws even though these reforms may only apply to a particular section of the country. Often national drug law reforms occur in a very limited fashion, whether it be the British government testing a new cannabis policy in a crime-ridden section of London, the US government allowing religious uses of peyote by indigenous Americans, or Bolivia’s government allowing certain zones of production for the production of coca for traditional use.
The methodology I will use will be of a case study of two drug law reforms (i.e., evidence about the dependent variable) to test the impact that a transnational social movement (i.e., the independent variable) had on them. A definitive study would require a larger sample of cases of the many drug law reforms occurring throughout the world. Throughout most of Europe stretching to Russia, continuing on to parts of China and into Thailand, drug law reforms have occurred. Drug law reform has swept through most states in Australia, New Zealand, some Pacific Islands and on to many states in the USA (and Canada) which have passed various drug law reform legislation. Throughout Latin America, several governments are also reforming their drug laws (including Brazil in the past week). Since this is an exploratory case study, I have limited myself to an in-depth analysis of only two cases. I selected cases where the level of economic development was significantly different in order to determine how important this factor was to whether or not transnational social movements had an impact on law reforms. I chose Australia due to its unique status as a developed country. It is not part of Europe (where changing inter-state relations complicates the relationship between transnational and local) and it is not the global hegemon (where a transnational social movement would be expected to have little impact). Geographically, Australia is very isolated which provides a unique test of the length and breadth of transnational forces. I have used Bolivia as representative of a country which is less economically developed. Bolivia is considered to be the poorest country in continental Latin America, a continent which is at the center of the global War on Drugs. These two countries provide relevant evidence in answering some of the central questions posed by transnational social movements regarding solidarity and organizational strength amongst disparate people, movements and countries.

The social movement theory will be used to set the limits on the case study and to direct the case study on what aspects of the social movement to study. It should be noted that it is not the aim of this thesis to undertake a public policy analysis. Of course, with any law reform a number of factors may be present (e.g. the media, the electorate, the elite, or the
bureaucracy) yet this thesis only seeks to measure the impact of a transnational social movement.

The case study method used will be an exploratory case study using a multiple case (replication) study. Due to the nature of what is being studied and the difficulty in testing the hypothesis, this thesis serves as an exploratory case study to see what evidence there is of a transnational social movement for drug law reform and to explore if there is evidence of such a movement having an impact on local and national drug laws.

Chapter Two discusses the development of social movement theory, the theory on transnational social movements and then also reviews another body of literature – resistance to globalization – which is similar to transnational social movement theory and may help its evolution. The last section of chapter one deals with the small collection of articles that have been written on social movement theory and the War on Drugs and concludes by noting that there has been nothing studied on transnational social movement theory and the War on Drugs.

Chapter Three analyses the global War on Drugs and the growing dissatisfaction with it. This chapter therefore provides evidence in support of an important assumption on which the thesis is based – that the War on Drugs has caused a social movement on several continents. The War on Drugs will be analyzed by studying secondary sources such as newspaper articles and research papers that discuss the UN conventions and American drug policy. The growing dissatisfaction with the War on Drugs is analyzed by quoting various activists’ arguments.

Chapter four is a case study of the social movement that has occurred in Sydney, Australia, and Chapter five is a case study of the social movement that has occurred in Bolivia, as part of a transnational response to the War on Drugs. These chapters will test
the hypothesis by testing the impact that a transnational social movement has had on the drug law reforms in each of the countries. Each of these chapters presents the drug law reform (the dependent variable) by using primary evidence (the law passed in parliament) in the case of English speaking parliaments (Australia) and second hand accounts in the case of Spanish speaking parliaments (Bolivia). These chapters test the hypothesis that a transnational social movement (the independent variable) caused the law reforms by using newspaper reports about social movement activities and parliamentarians’ comments on the drug law reforms to assess the impact that the social movements had on the law reforms. Generally this involves a timeline approach to see if major drug law reforms occurred at a similar time to major social movement activity (and whether parliamentarians responded to social movement activity). Each chapter will subsequently look for evidence that a transnational social movement had an impact on the local and national drug law reform.

The concluding chapter will assess the evidence found in the case studies and evaluate whether there is a causal relationship between a transnational social movement and the drug law reforms studied. It will also discuss what can be learned about the nature of transnational social movements from the case studies and how the theory may suggest that the transnational social movement for drug law reform become more effective. The chapter will finish with suggestions for further research on this topic.
Chapter Two

Literature Review

Introduction

A major debate running through social movement theory for the past 50 years has been whether a social movement is distinct from an interest group or a lobby group. This debate remains unresolved yet there appears to be growing consensus that in modern industrial societies, social movements and interest groups often overlap to the point of being indistinguishable.

A major shortcoming of social movement theory may be its inability to measure the outcomes of social movement activity. Several theorists have recently tried to measure the consequences of social movements by looking at their impact on various public policies and suggest that social movement theory has a large role to play in analyzing foreign policy and policies based on moral regulation.

More recently, the role of the state has become an important issue in social movement theory. Whilst traditional social movement theory focuses on the state as the focus of social movement activity, there has been a move towards the study of transnational social movements. Many scholars in the field are trying to come to terms with the increasingly global nature of the world. Several scholars adopt the tools of social movement theory and say they can apply to transnational social movements. Other scholars have attempted to begin ways of analyzing transnational social movements and the impact that global forces have on the political opportunity structure in local spheres.
A growing field of research which is similar to transnational social movement theory concerns resistance to globalization. Although lacking in the depth that social movement theory brings to transnational social movement theory, this literature, with its emphasis on globalization, provides a more complex understanding of transnational forces and their impact on social movements. Several articles concerning resistance to globalization provide frameworks for analyzing transnational social movements. They also provide an interesting way to analyze transnational repression that may be increasing due to globalization.

Lastly, I review three articles that apply social movement theory to the War on Drugs and groups striving to reform drug laws. These articles use a similar framework to analyze a similar situation to the case studies I undertake in the following chapters. They use social movement theory to explain drug laws however they do not consider the impact of a transnational social movement on local and national drug laws.

**Social Movement Theory**

Tarrow (1998) gives a summary of social movement theory from a political science perspective. The irreducible act at the base of all social movements is contentious collective action. Contentious politics occurs when ordinary people join forces in confrontations with authorities and elites “…mounting, coordinating and sustaining them [confrontations] are the unique contribution of the social movement – an invention of the modern age and an accompaniment to the rise of the modern state” (p.2). Tarrow argues that social movements only became possible when modern states were born and that social movements must be seen as interaction with the state.

Tarrow’s (1994) history of social movement theory begins with a brief discussion of Marx and class conflict, Lenin and resource management and Gramsci and cultural hegemony. Marx sought to answer why so many groups who should revolt did not and answered with his concept of false consciousness – that groups often falsely believed the
status quo was good for them. Lenin concluded that such groups needed leaders to organize them and represent their “real” interests. Gramsci added to these ideas by suggesting that a working class culture, or solidarity, developed by multiple levels of leaders and initiative would need to interact in a dialogue with the dominant capitalist culture and the state. Although Gramsci concluded that there was no guarantee the working class society would win the battle for collective action.

According to Tarrow (1994), collective behavior theorists of the 1950s and 1960s resembled Marx in their focus on the grievances responsible for mobilization. “The most sophisticated versions of this theory linked collective behavior to the functional view of society in which societal dysfunctions produced different forms of collective behavior – some of which took the form of political movements and interest groups” (p. 14).

In 1965, Mancur Olson’s *The Logic of Collective Action* applied a utilitarian rationalist approach to collective action and found that collective politics is unlikely due to individuals’ narrow self interest and the problem of free-riders. Olson concluded the cost to individuals of collective action was far higher than the perceived benefits, especially considering that they would receive the benefits of collective action whether they participated or not.

However, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977), in what came to be known as resource mobilization theory, overcame the problem of self-interest by proposing that professional movement organizations use expanded personal resources, professionalization, and external financial support to build social movements.

Fireman and Gamson (1979) offer a critique and extension of Olson’s 1965 work by adopting utilitarian logic to a resource mobilization perspective. Although Olson was concerned with interest groups, they claim that sharp distinctions between dramatic social movements and other political organizations are being abandoned. Using utilitarian
logic, they conclude that self-interest can be overcome if a group of elites (organizers):
encouraging solidarity; align the program of a social movement with the interests of the
solidary constituency; and stress that the movement is necessary and can produce results.

Tarrow (1998) labels the actions available to social movements as “repertoires of
contention” which is not only what people do when they are engaged in contentious
politics (e.g. marching) but what they know how to do and what others expect them to do.
Social movements often begin as a narrow and specific conflict with the state and then
are joined by groups not normally known for insurgent tendencies. Innovation
accelerates and new modes of contention are formed as various groups combine and
interact. The demobilization phase begins as the social movement exhausts itself,
periphery members drop off as the state offers moderate concessions to woo them and
frustrate the radicals. Finally, often the radicals participate in extreme actions and the
state suppresses them.

The main arguments of Tarrow’s study is that when political structures open, social
movements are more likely to arise. Tarrow theorizes that social movements don’t
simply arise due to deprivation, because deprivation is far more widespread than social
movements are. Rather, it depends on a political opportunity structure – the dimensions
of the political environment which either encourage or discourage people from using
collective action. Social Movements respond to changes in opportunity such as the
opening up of access to power (e.g. democratization), a shift in ruling alignments, the
availability of influential allies and from cleavages within and among elites.

Tarrow (1998) concludes that successful movements need formal structure but also a
large degree of freedom. “What underlies the most successful of them is the role of
informal connective tissue operating within and between formal movement
organizations” (p.137). As a large degree of a social movement’s power comes from the
fact that they activate people over whom they have no control, it is important that the
leadership and structure do not become too domineering. A less formal structure also increases the potential of forming alliances with similar movements.

Elaborating on the political opportunity structure which is central to Tarrow’s work, Loveman (1998) seeks to answer when and why sustained collective action will occur under severe repression – which she claims to be an important area of research largely neglected by social movement theory. Studying human rights organizations which emerged during the extremely repressive dictatorships of Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina from the 1960s to the 1980s, she suggests that it may not always be improvements in political opportunity that induce social movement participation. Her research leads her to conclude that such repression may indeed create social movements. The “early risers” may mobilize in response to, rather than despite severe repression. Their action may then create space for later waves of participants who may indeed be responding to improvements in the structure of opportunities.

Giugni (1999) states that the study of the consequences of social movements is one of the most neglected topics in the literature. This is even more unfortunate, he laments, as the raisons d’etre of social movements is to bring about changes in society. Further he notes, measuring the impact of social movements, in regards to causality is very hard. He suggests the following methodological agenda:

- Define the range of movement consequences
- Specify the types of consequences to be studies
- Search for plausible relevant causes
- Reconstruct causal patterns and histories

He concludes that the study of the consequences of social movements should become a central and durable concern in social movement research.
Burstein (1999) tries to place social movements within a pluralist theory of democracy. Firstly, he argues that there should be no distinction drawn between social movement organizations (SMOs) and interest groups. Briefly summarizing the literature on the issue, he says attempts to distinguish SMOs from interest groups by saying SMOs are more marginalized or that they speak on behalf of those lacking formal representation or that they employ unconventional disruptive tactics are flawed. Rather, in the context of democratic politics, we need just one theory about collective action which realizes “how seamless is the set of ‘protest’ activities that includes both street demonstrations and arguments before the Supreme Court” (See also, Burstein 1991)

Having established that SMOs and interest groups are the same thing, Burstein concedes that SMOs have a very limited impact on public policy when public opinion feels very strongly on an issue. However, he (tentatively) concludes that SMOs can influence public policy (within national governments) on issues the public cares little about; and they can influence policy indirectly by changing the public’s policy preferences and its intensity of concern for particular issues. Further, he also (tentatively) concludes that social movements can have a large impact on the way in which public policy is implemented through bureaucracies and courts.

Wald, Button, and Rienzo (1996) use two broad theoretical frameworks – urbanism/diversity approach and social movement theory – to analyze why some American communities adopt local gay rights policies and others don’t. Using a strongly behaviorist approach they run a multivariate logistic regression analysis to measure the impact four factors – urbanism, resource mobilization, political opportunity structure, and oppositional movements – have on gay rights ordinances in 126 local communities. They conclude that while urbanism has the largest impact, they may have underestimated the impact of political opportunity structure in their analysis. Further, they claim traditional approaches to public policy differences are less able to explain policy debates rooted in
questions of moral regulation and social identity and that their findings illustrate the value of extending theories of social movements to the realm of conventional politics.

Another area of public policy that has been neglected by social movement theorists is foreign policy. Culverson (1996) attempts to amend this with his analysis of the anti-apartheid movement in America. By analyzing the long term change in opportunity structure that the anti-apartheid movement experienced in America, Culverson claims resource mobilization theory has many inadequacies and proposes a political process approach. Culverson also deals with the dilemma of defining an interest group vs. social movement. He settles for Tarrow’s definition that a social movement is, “groups possessing a purposive organization, whose leaders identify their goals with the preferences of an immobilized constituency, which they attempt to mobilize in direct action in relation to a target of influence in the political system” (quoted in Culverson, p.132). Culverson concludes that grassroots organizations, and the impact they have on institutions beyond their reach, merit the same consideration in political science research as more traditional concerns – interest groups, congress and the foreign policy bureaucracy.

**Transnational Social Movement Theory**

Smith and Johnston (2002) in their introduction to *Globalization and Resistance: Transnational dimension of social movements* begin by admitting that most social movement theory takes the modern nation-state as the context of contemporary political contention and that whilst the global integration process has crucial implications for political contention, it is poorly understood. They argue that the papers in their book have a general theme that global processes shape both domestic and transnational political mobilization. Domestically, global processes produce similar opportunities in different countries by changing the opportunity/repression structure, help social movements borrow ideas and information across borders which results in social movements tending
to take similar forms. At the transnational level, global processes create globally defined
targets; feed a flow of information, resources, skills, technology; and affect organization,
interpretations and the framing of issues.

McCarthy (1997) also argues that while critics are correct to fault social movement
theory for being excessively state-based, it is not parochial and can be adapted to
transnational contention. He expands on this idea and uses the conceptual tools often
applied to state-based social movements and uses them to increase knowledge about the
transnational dimensions of social movement activity. He concludes, however, that
whilst these tools provide an enormous first step, the study of transnational movements
must also be based on newly generated systematic evidence about the shape and extent of
them over time and across space.

Giugni (2002) expands on the idea of global forces impacting on domestic social
movements. Claiming that theorists often stress the differences of movement families
across countries, Giugni sets out to provide a general framework to explain similarities
among social movements in different countries. He suggests four steps to account for
similarities among social movements across borders: identify similarities across nation-
states; look for possible explanatory factors; formulate clear and testable hypotheses to
explain the similarities; test the hypotheses on different movements and in different
circumstances

To identify similarities he suggests singling out concrete items that lend themselves to
empirical observation: issues, themes and goals; levels of mobilization; strategies, tactics
and forms of action; organizational structure; cultural frames, ideas, and discourses;
timing of protest. Regarding possible explanations for similarities across countries, he
looks at three sets of factors: long-term, global, macro structural changes; similar
configurations on the state level; short-term exchanges among nation states.
Once movement similarities have been identified, Giugni suggests three possible explanations which all impact on political opportunities in multiple countries: the globalization model where the inter-connectedness of the world simultaneously affects transnational movements; the structural affinity model where similar structures in countries lead to convergent patterns; and the diffusion model where cross-national flows of information diffuses from one country to another. Giugni concludes that future research should further explore the relationship between globalization and political opportunities in different countries.

As a way of measuring the extent of a transnational social movement, Alger (1997) lists five categories of transnational social movement activity which may be identified: creating and mobilizing global networks, participating in multilateral political arenas, facilitating interstate cooperation, acting within states, and enhancing public participation.

It is interesting to chart Tarrow’s ideas on transnational social movements. As late as 1998, in a new chapter devoted to transnational contention, he was arguing that whilst the thesis of transnational social movements made strong claims, transnational movements were often advocacy networks which “lack the categorical basis, the sustained interpersonal relations, and the exposure to similar opportunities and constraints that social movement scholars have found in domestic social networks” (Tarrow, 1998, p. 189).

Tarrow, writing for the Annual Review of Political Science in 2001 begins his article by declaring that a) nation states still dominate most areas of policy; b) globalization has been around for at least a century; and c) states have always reached beyond their borders and played a transnational role. Tarrow then defines a Transnational Social Movement as:
socially mobilized groups with constituents in at least two states engaged in sustained contentious interaction with power holders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution …(p 11)

Tarrow argues that TNSMs are different from International Nongovernmental Organizations which engage in “routine transactions … made up of dedicated, cosmopolitan, well-educated people” (p.12) and Transnational Advocacy Networks (“TANs are not alternatives to social movements or INGOs; on the contrary they can contain them” (p.13)). Tarrow concludes that global civil forces are currently resulting in INGOs and TANs and enabling them to voice their concerns through international institutions. Social Movement Theory however would indicate that global civil forces are currently not strong enough to maintain a global social network and global collective identity to create a transnational social movement strong enough to compete with the political opportunities national polities.

By 2002, Tarrow had further conceded that whilst there is something new in these transnational interactions, they cannot necessarily be attributed as products of globalization. However, the perception of globalization is a very useful framing device for social movements. Firstly, it is an effective device for bringing together material claims and principled issue groups. Second, it brings together many divergent groups with very divergent demands. Third, the hegemonic state of the world makes it easy to condense the target to simple anti-Americanism. But fourth, globalization has so far lacked the capacity to transform region-specific claims into a new global collective identity.

To summarize, social movement theory is still grappling with the difference between a social movement and interest groups. This problem is becoming even more difficult in contemporary times with transnational social movements often indistinguishable from transnational advocacy groups. Both theories also admit problems in measuring the consequences of social movements – local or transnational. However, transnational social movement theory is trying to amend its predecessor’s focus on the state as the
center of activity to account for the globalizing world. One area which may assist this is the literature on resistance to globalization.

**Resistance to Globalization**

A field of study which is growing very quickly concerns “resistance to globalization”. Separate and distinct from transnational social theory, the two nevertheless significantly overlap. A central tenant of this literature is that there is no single globalization. Rather there are several alternative globalizations. Often this literature focuses on market-driven globalization as the dominant form which needs to be resisted. In fact, it could be said that much of this literature is obsessed with neo-liberalism. “The issues on which the new resistance movements campaign may seem diverse … but all are part of a societal response to market-driven globalization” (Gills, 2002, p. 9). The alternative forms of globalization which these authors discuss are referred to as “grassroots globalization” (Routledge, 2003) and “globalization from below” (Waterman, 2002).

Peck and Tickell (2002) talk of a first stage of “roll-back” neo-liberal globalization in the 1980s which has been replaced by a second stage of “roll-out” neo-liberalism. In the 1980s, the first stage saw a global policy of deregulation which removed government intervention from social policies. This resulted in a second phase which saw aggressive social policies in the areas of incarceration, policing and urban surveillance to discipline and contain those people marginalized and dispossessed by the first stage. They claim that these aggressive incarceration policies have transfused from America around the world (see also Wacquant, 1999). They conclude that it will be premature to anticipate an era of “pushback” neoliberalism until international institutions are remade in a way which contain and challenges the forces of marketization.

In response to this aggressive government behavior, Routledge (2003) discusses the challenges to the currently dominating neo-liberal globalization by what he terms “grassroots globalization” – a network of diverse social movements working in
association to engage in multi-scalar political action. Using a term common to this body of literature he discusses space and the space which such resistance occupies. Many of the social movements are based locally yet have to form coalitions across diverse geographic scales. They form networks which become embedded in different places at a variety of spatial scales: global, regional, local, national. These alliances across various scales lead to contradictions among networks. Routledge paraphrases David Harvey by concluding that social movements can either remain place based and avoid these contradictions or gain greater solidarity by creating a more universal politics that transcends narrow solidarities.

Waterman (2002) further discusses the dichotomy between social movements based in local places and globalized spaces. He mentions the problems facing social movement theory - which suggest locality is the privileged site for movements - now that globalization has created new trans-, supra- or non-territorial terrain. Waterman expands on the idea of globalization’s discontents mentioned in Peck and Tickell (2002) and Routledge (2003) and says that globalization makes an alternative global solidarity culture (loosely labeled “globalization from below”) both necessary and possible. Waterman then sets out a list of criteria by which to evaluate such an international solidarity – identity, substitution, complementarity, reciprocity, affinity, restitution. Throughout these criteria, he argues, transnational social movements need to be understood in communicational/cultural rather than in the traditional political/organizational terms.

Chin and Mittleman (2002) conceptualize resistance to globalization as constitutive of cultural processes. They call for a conceptual framework that integrates the local with the global using the “Gramsci-Polanyi-Scott triad”. This triad involves the concept of counter-hegemony, submerged collective action and infrapolitics. Counter-hegemony is openly declared militant movements (e.g. demonstrations, boycotts) with the aim of seizing control of the state. Submerged networks offer different meanings to those the
dominating classes dictate but rarely come into direct confrontation. Infrapolitics is everyday forms of resistance which fall short of openly declared contestations. It may involve the formation of dissident subcultures and is made up of hidden transcripts which occur outside of the surveillance structures set up by the dominant classes (e.g. drug use, addiction, and trafficking?).

To summarize, the literature which explores resistance to globalization is focused on the impact globalization is having on social movements, or more exactly, how “Globalization” is causing social movements which happen to be transnational. This perhaps exposes a weakness because many theorists in this area do not consider transnational social movements caused by other factors (which may be transnational but are distinct from globalization).

**Social Movement Theory and Drug Law Reform**

Bluthenal (1998) argues that because syringe exchange programs (SEPs) are illegal, they are a unique social movement. He begins his article by arguing that drug policy appears to be data-proof, and even though SEPs have the support of over 20 national and state medical, professional, and scientific associations and former Surgeon General, Jocelyn Elders, consecutive federal governments have refused to lift a ban on them. Therefore, the harm reduction elements (i.e. reform) of drug policy in Oakland California have come about due to the mobilization of impacted communities and their allies.

Using a social movement theory approach to harm reduction in the USA, Bluthenal looks for three elements: the structure of political opportunities, insurgent consciousness, and organization strength among syringe exchange operators. “Beginning to understand the social movement aspects of harm reduction is vital given the continued reluctance or inability of local, state, and federal government officials to effectively respond to the epidemic of HIV among IDUs in the United States” (p.1152).
Bluthenal describes the political opportunity structure which enabled SEPs to start in the San Francisco Bay Area. Despite Federal bans and a State Governor and Attorney General opposed, county police and authorities agreed not to persecute SEPs. Bluthenal continues, however that the favorable political environment still required insurgent consciousness to capitalize on the situations. Insurgent consciousness is the recognition by aggrieved populations, moral/political entrepreneurs, or other interested parties that a conducive political environment exists. Lastly, Bluthenal feels it is necessary to measure the organizational strength and political support which made it possible to sustain the contentious action. In the social movement theory, says Bluthenal, organizational strength is typically assessed by looking at the availability of potential members, established incentives for participation, reliable communication networks and leadership among the immediate aggrieved population.

Weiloch (2002) claims there has been a paradigmatic shift away from a resource mobilization approach to the study of social movements with a continued interjection of cultural analyses into theoretical models of collective action. This emphasis, he continues, has led to an understanding that political grievances are inextricably tied to ideas, ideology and identity. Wieloch uses social movement theory’s concept of collective identity through which political activists create in-group cohesion and distinguish themselves from society at large. He develops this idea into a concept of “oppositional capital” whereby drug users redefine “stigmatization” as status. Weiloch hypothesizes that the value placed on being rebellious helps drug users form a collective identity. Further, Wieloch claims that a specific phenomenon in the history of contemporary Western societies has been the expression of political resistance through everyday practices (e.g. Drug use?). Wieloch analyzes the zine, Junkphood to describe how actors within the harm reduction social movement are able to present their collective identity by co-opting popular culture symbols often used in opposition to them (e.g. the word, “junkie”). He concludes “that it is not just through letter-writing campaigns,
political rallies, or alliance-building strategies that harm reduction activists express themselves as oppositional. They also do so more broadly through popular culture. Popular culture has often been recognized as political in its expression of a social criticism” (p.66).

Lastly, Kubler (2001) argues that drug policy in Switzerland can be presented as a competition between competing coalitions advocating opposing positions – harm reduction versus prohibitionist. Stating that Swiss drug policy was originally based on the prohibitionist regime established by a series of international conventions (see Chapter Three), by the late 1980s and 1990s, it had changed to a policy of harm-reduction. Kubler uses the advocacy coalition framework and adds elements from social movement theory – specifically the mobilizing structure and the political opportunity structure. By using this framework, Kubler attempts to account for the policy change.

Kubler concludes that the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s gave new impetus to long term critics of drug prohibition and mobilized powerful actors within the health sector to form a coalition advocating harm reduction. Although Kubler considered a major drug policy change to have taken place, Swiss drug policy ended up as a compromise between the policy that the harm reduction coalition was advocating and the policy that an opposing abstinence/prohibitionist coalition was advocating. He also concluded that coalition behavior is strongly framed by openings in the political opportunity structure – that is, activists mobilize where they expect to have most impact.

Conclusion

Social movement theory and transnational social movement theory are still grappling with the fundamental question of defining a social movement. There is disagreement over the difference between a social movement, an interest group and an advocacy group. This debate has been further complicated by growing transnational advocacy groups. A further problem for theorists have been that of measuring the consequences of social
movements. Analysts of resistance to globalization are furthering our understanding of the impact of globalization on social movements but are encountering similar problems in measuring the impact of such social movements.

By offering a case study of a social movement in a less developed country and a social movement in an industrialized country, this thesis will further the understanding of social movements in the contemporary world. By offering two case studies of policy changes, it will further the understanding of measuring the consequences of social movements. By testing the hypothesis that a transnational social movement has caused reforms in local and national drug policies it will further the understanding of transnational social movements and their impact on nation-state and local public policy. Further, this hypothesis extends the work already undertaken on social movement theory and drug policy by moving the unit of analysis beyond the local and/or national to the transnational.
Chapter Three

Transnational Repression – The War on Drugs

Introduction

According to social movement theory, not all aggrieved populations will form a social movement - but - all social movements do come from an aggrieved population. In regards to a transnational social movement, it stands to reason that there needs to be a transnational aggrieved population. The cause of this vis a vis the drug law reform movement comes from the global War on Drugs. I have coined the term transnational repression to describe the war on drugs.

The first element of this transnational repression comes from the United Nations. The UN, since its very inception, has attempted to rid the world of illegal drugs through global repression. Nearly every country in the world is a signatory to UN conventions that force them to outlaw the possession and distribution of certain drugs. Lately, with these conventions coming under attack, the UN has sought to suppress any report which suggests prohibition is not the best policy. They have also put pressure on countries which are trying new approaches for treating drug addiction that don’t focus on punishment and incarceration.

The second element of this transnational repression comes from the United States. Apart from the large role America plays in the enforcement of UN conventions it also acts unilaterally in many areas of drug policy. Most visible is US policy in the Andean region of South America where it has sustained a military presence in Bolivia since the mid 1980s. With Plan Colombia in the 1990s, America has used its military - and funded
local militias - in an attempt to suppress drug cultivation in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. Less visibly, it has used back room tactics to thwart a proposed heroin trial in Canberra, Australia.

The War on Drugs has created conditions which some people find unacceptable and this discontent is the basis for the social movements analyzed in the following chapters. This chapter ends with an analysis of the negative impact this transnational repression is having on developed (consumer) countries and developing (producer) countries. Many people feel that prohibitionist policies have failed and that this policy itself causes more problems than drug use.

**Transnational Repression: The Role of the United Nations**

According to Bewley-Taylor (2003) there are currently three international conventions which regulate worldwide drug control. The 1961 Single Convention (United Nations, 1961), the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances (United Nations, 1971) and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. As of November 2002, 179 states were party to the Single Convention, and the number of nations signatory to the 1971 and 1988 conventions is 172 and 166 respectively. However, international narcotics repression began almost 100 years ago in Shanghai, 1909.

The first attempt to deal with the drug problem on a multi-lateral international scale was the Opium Commission which met in Shanghai in 1909. This resulted in a fairly vague document but did have the goal of suppressing opium smoking. Waddell (1970) claims that until the end of the 19th Century, trade in narcotics was legitimate. However, with the advent of opium derivatives and the hypodermic syringe, plus the expansion of world trade, an increase in addiction became apparent. The 1909 meeting passed a number of resolutions urging the gradual suppression of opium smoking but it was not until The Hague in 1912 when the first international narcotics convention was signed.
As evidence of the importance of drugs to international relations, Article 23 of the League of Nation’s Covenant said that the league members should supervise opium traffic (Waddell, 1970). The Geneva Convention of 1925 required governments to submit annual statistics of their opium and coca production and another convention in 1931 strengthened this requirement to include estimates of countries whether or not they were parties to the agreement. “Thus for the first time the principle of a planned economy on a world scale for a particular industry were introduced” (Waddell, 1970, p. 313).

At its first meeting, the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council created the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), again showing the importance of the drug trade to international relations. The commission convened the Paris Protocol of 1948 and every party to this protocol is obliged to inform the secretary general of any new drug which the party considers capable of abuse. The Secretary General forwards this information to the World Health Organization (WHO) which then must decide whether the drug is addiction forming (Waddell, 1970). Bewley Taylor (2003) however, notes that the WHO can only make non-binding recommendations. It is the CND which makes the final decision and this body is unlikely to change the schedule.

By 1961, eleven treaties and protocols had been created to deal with international narcotics control (Waddell, 1970). In 1961, with drug use continually increasing around the world (and especially in America) the definitive Single Convention was held. The Single Convention (so named because it sought to have a single law for worldwide prohibition (Malkin, Elliot, & McRae, 2003)) obliges signatory nations to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs. It places more than 100 drugs in four schedules with cocaine, heroin and cannabis in schedule one which subjects them to all of the control measures under the convention. The Single Convention also
created the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) which is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the UN conventions (Bewley-Taylor, 2003). It also set the goal to abolish the chewing of coca leaf within 25 years (Jelsma, 2003).

The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances came about as a result of growing global concern of the harmful effects of increasingly popular substances such as amphetamines, barbiturates and LSD. Once again, the substances were classified according to four schedules based on dependence creating properties, potential level of abuse and the therapeutic value of the drug. Once again, substances in schedule one must be strictly limited to medical and scientific purposes. As with the Paris Protocol of 1948, under these conventions, the WHO is responsible for medical and scientific assessment of all substances and to advise the CND (Bewley-Taylor, 2003).

The 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was convened due to the huge increase in drug trafficking since the introduction of the Single Convention, and due to the earlier conventions’ limited treatment of this issue. The 1988 convention provides comprehensive measures against drug trafficking, including provisions on money laundering, asset seizure, agreements on mutual legal assistance and the diversion of precursor chemicals. Whilst the earlier conventions had required criminal sanctions for supplying drugs, the 1988 Convention requires each party to make the possession of drugs for personal consumption a criminal offence under domestic law (Bewley-Taylor, 2003).

In 1998, recognizing the continual inability of the UN treaties to control drug use and distribution, Kofi Annan opened the “Twentieth Special Session of General Assembly Devoted to Countering the World Drug Problem Together”. In his speech he announced a mission to create a drug-free world in the twenty-first century, calling the consensus on drug policy “almost unprecedented in United Nations history” (Annan, 1998). More than 150 governments at the session committed themselves to strengthening national
legislation against drugs and “strengthening judicial cooperation” (UNODC newsletter, 2003).

According to Thoumi (2002) “It is widely recognized that American policies, highly influenced by the peculiar puritanical way in which the United States look at mind-altering drugs, have had a significant effect on international policies and United Nations conventions”. Sir Keith Morris (2003), British ambassador to Colombia in the early 1990s claims that the 1988 UN convention was primarily used by America to garner international legitimacy for its increasingly militaristic and interventionist drug policy in Latin America. Bewley-Taylor (1999) in his detailed account of The United States and International Drug Control concludes, “The present UN-sanctioned prohibition-based international drug control system can, as has been demonstrated, be seen as the product of ninety years of endeavor by the United States” (p.211).

A recent incident shows America’s role in the United Nations. In the late 1990s, the World Health Organization was due to release its first report on Marijuana in 15 years. The report stated that marijuana was far less harmful than alcohol and tobacco. Unfortunately, the report was never released. According to New Scientist, “It is understood that advisers from the US National Institute on Drug Abuse and the UN International Drug Control Programme warned the WHO that it would play into the hands of groups campaigning to legalize marijuana” (“High Anxieties”, 1998).

In a similar vein, Jelmsa (2003) talks of a WHO study into cocaine use. Quoting a briefing kit summarizing the study as saying that most cocaine users suffered no negative consequences and that coca was sacred for indigenous Andean populations, the study went as far as to say,

“Most authorities agree that it is unrealistic to expect to eradicate the use of cocaine and other drugs…The largest future issue is whether international organizations, such as WHO and the United Nations Drug Control Program will continue to focus on supply reduction approaches such as crop destruction and substitution and law enforcement efforts in the face of mounting criticism and cynicism about the effectiveness of these
approaches. Countries such as Australia, Bolivia, Canada and Colombia are now interested in examining a range of options to legalize and decriminalize the personal use and possession of cocaine and other related products ... current national and local approaches which over-emphasize punitive drug control measures may actually contribute to the development of health related problems.” (quoted in Jelmsa, 2003, p. 189)

In response to the briefing kit, Neil Boyer, the USA’s representative to the 48th meeting of the World Health Assembly in Geneva said that the WHO was heading in the wrong direction, was “undermining the efforts of the international community to stamp out the illegal cultivation and production of coca”, accused the WHO of associating with organizations which supported the legalization of drugs, and issued a clear threat: “If WHO activities relating to drugs fail to reinforce proven drug-control approaches, funds for the relevant programs should be curtailed” (Jelsma, 2003, p. 189). Large parts of the report were never published.

One last event shows the role of the UN in transnational repression. When the NSW state parliament voted to legally sanction a medically supervised heroin injection site, the INCB threatened to embargo Australia’s $160 million a year legal opiate trade. Claiming that five times in the past the INCB had threatened action against countries but each time the country had backed down. “Ultimately the issue was solved because the pressure was such that the country did not want to be named at the [UN’s] Economic and Social Council of being in breach of the treaty” said a spokesman (Mann, 1999). In the board’s annual report for 2000 it renewed its attack on the trial. “By permitting injecting drug rooms, a government could be considered to be in contravention of the international drug control treaties by facilitating in, aiding and/or abetting the commission of crimes involving illegal drug possession and use as well as other criminal offence, including drug trafficking”(quoted in Riley, 2000).1
Transnational Repression: The Role of the USA

The second major force behind the War on Drugs is the USA. America has pursued an aggressively interventionist policy in Latin America since the 1980s. This policy culminated in 1989 with the invasion of Panama and removal of its head of state to face trial in the USA. In the 1990s, interventionist repressive policy morphed into Plan Colombia. Even further a field, the USA has also intervened in the domestic politics of Australia to fight the proposed liberalization of drug laws there.

Whilst America’s draconian drug laws arose from a desire to stop demand from American drug consumers, the 1980s also saw a radical shift of policy to try and prevent supply from abroad. Totaklian (1988) documents how the Reagan Administration turned drugs into an issue of national security which allowed it to militaries the drug war. He concludes, “Employing a strategic-military rationale to deal with the drug problem leads, and has led, to an interventionist attitude and policy which places national sovereignty in great jeopardy” (p. 141).

Considering recent events, it seems worthwhile to quote at length from Cocaine Politics (Scott and Marshall, 1991):

Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, branding drugs a ‘direct threat to the sovereignty and security of our country,’ ordered commanders to develop specific plans for “operational support” of anti-drug missions in Latin America and vowed to ensure ‘a more aggressive and robust’ US military presence in the Andes. And with the invasion of Panama in December 1989, justified in part as an effort to capture an indicted drug suspect (General Noriega), the Bush Administration dramatically demonstrated the terms on which it is willing to fight the new drug war (p. 2).

Another country at the forefront of the War on Drugs is Bolivia. Despite the importance of the coca leaf to many Bolivians, where it has been used for over 5,000 years, America has pressured the country’s government to eradicate coca crops. This began in 1961 with pressure to sign the Single Convention on Narcotics and began in earnest in the 1980s under the Reagan and Bush Administrations. From 1980 – 1982 Bolivia had a military
government heavily involved in drug trafficking but large mobilizations against it led to a popularly elected leftist party in 1982. It was in 1984 that the Reagan administration began pressuring the Bolivian government to eradicate coca and the Bolivian government compromised with “alternative development” – substituting coca crops with legal crops (Estellano, 1994).

In 1986, Operation Blast Furnace was a name given to a US military operation which invaded Bolivia to destroy cocaine-processing plants. Over 170 US personnel, using helicopters, took part in this five-month operation destroying dozens of labs. Afterwards, during the second half of the 1980s, pressure continually increased from America (and partly Europe) to reduce the production and distribution of the coca leaf (Healy, 1991). This pressure culminated in the 1988 anti-coca law (Ley de Regimen de la Coca y Sustancias Controladas) which spelled out a plan to eradicate coca in 10 years.

In 1990, the commander in Chief of the Bolivian armed forces revealed that US ambassador Gobert Gelbard had made foreign aid to Bolivia conditional on the active participation of the military in the counter-narcotics effort. In 1991, it was revealed the US ambassador was promoting and negotiating the sale of Chapare fruits and vegetables without consulting the Bolivian government and in 1992, Bolivia’s Agriculture Minister told the press that a freeze on US aid was likely if Bolivia expelled Drug Enforcement Administration agents (Arganaras, 1997). At the same time, USAID was donating $679 million to the Bolivian government for projects in line with the alternative development.

In 1998, President Hugo Banzer launched a “zero coca” policy to eliminate all illicit coca in five years and announced the transfer of the Armed Forces High Command to Cochabamba, the city closest to the coca growing region of Bolivia. With US financial support, the Bolivian military is reinforcing its existing infrastructure in the Chapare region, ensuring military control of the region for the foreseeable future (Youngers, 2004).

In 2002, America interfered in local Bolivian politics in a less violent way:

Prior to election day, the U.S. ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel Rocha, warned that if Morales were elected, or his Socialists included in a coalition government, Washington would close its markets to Bolivian textiles and natural gas - comments that were roundly denounced by politicians from all of Bolivia's numerous parties (Langman, 2002)

Several commentators have pointed out that the US ambassador was Morales’s greatest campaigner.

More recently, with America’s goals in Bolivia proving more and more elusive, repression is increasing. In April, 2004, several cocaleros reported being tortured and forced to sign pre-written false statements accusing their political leader, Evo Morales, of murdering Bolivian soldiers (www.narconews.com).

The Andean initiatives potential dangers to the consolidation of civilian rule initially generated opposition among many Latin American governments. However the US congress put its full weight behind ensuring the use of US diplomatic and economic leverage to coerce cooperation from reluctant drug war partners. In 1986, it enacted a “certification” requirement for drug producing and transport countries (Youngers, 2004). In 1995, in a report to the US congress, President Clinton criticized four countries for not doing enough in the War on Drugs – Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru – but asked for congressional certification necessary for US aid on the grounds of “vital national
interest”. That is, Clinton realized that it would be counter productive to cut aid to drug producing countries. The four countries reacted with indignation and called for a hemispheric summit on drug policy (“Closing Ranks”, March 16, 1995). However, America refused to enter into such a discussion.

As the prohibitionist policies of the 1980s failed, the USA implemented a new program called Plan Colombia. Most sensationally, this involved billions of dollars to fight drug dealers, aerial spraying of crops in the Andes, shooting down suspected drug-courier planes, encouraging crop substitution for coca growers and offering military support to Colombian para-militaries (many of which have been accused of human rights abuses). Perhaps foreseeing a quagmire, the Clinton Administration placed a cap of 4000 American “advisers”.

In one tragic implementation of this policy, a suspected drug-plane was shot down over Peru in April, 2001. Instead of carrying drugs it was carrying two American missionaries and their infant child (Kellogg, 2002). Other reports have found that some peasants agree to replace their coca with cocoa only to have their new legitimate crops sprayed with herbicides by American planes. Further, many people are worried about the environmental impact of spraying.

Approximately 65% of America’s federal drug control budget for FY 2002 is allocated for supply-side efforts. Colombia is the third largest recipient of US foreign aid with nearly $1 billion a year given to the Colombian armed forces. In 1999, the US trained a total of about 13,000 Latin American military and police, either in the region or on US bases (including the former School of the Americas in Georgia). The nature of this training is questionable as Youngers notes: “The jungle warfare-type training that DOD provides to Latin American security forces is not well suited for drug control efforts, which should be oriented toward sound investigations and criminal prosecutions”.

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Further afield, America has also put pressure on Australia to tow the line with its drug policy. According to Albrechtsen (2004) this pressure started over 50 years ago. The Australian government banned the importation of heroin in 1953 under pressure from the WHO, which in turn was under pressure from the USA (Mandelson, 1993).

According to a contemporary news report (“Concern at Australia”, 1953), heroin was removed from the list of free life saving drugs under the federal health scheme because international organizations were becoming concerned with the high consumption rate in Australia. However, the newspaper also reported the head of the national medical association saying that at first they opposed the ban. “Heroin addiction is not a problem in Australia” and that a ban is “a distinct departure on the part of the government because it interferes with the doctors right to prescribe whatever drug he thinks is most suitable for his patient” yet due to concerns that overseas in America “dope peddlers peddle sweets loaded with heroin among the teenagers” the medical association changed its stance and supported the legislation. Another medical authority, who wished to remain anonymous, said it was wrong to ban a drug which had been useful for over half a century, “the bureaucratic banning of a drug is not something that should go unchallenged.”

Lastly, Professor R.H. Thorpe, Professor of Pharmacology at Sydney University noted the international pressure on Australia, “heroin is banned in 47 countries, including the United States,” he said, “if you take whisky from people addicted to it, they will take gin or methylated spirits. If you take one drug from them, they will take others. But if heroin can be suppressed in all decent countries the manufacture of it is likely to cease”.

According to Mandelson (1993), the following year newspapers were outraged. A tabloid, The Sun, wrote, “In the opinion of an overwhelming majority of medical men …the political decision was more than a major mistake. They claim it was a blunder that is causing indescribable agony” (p.129). In 1956, the medical association in Australia
held a plebiscite of its doctors and only one state was in favor of continuing the ban. As the spokesman of one branch concluded, “the government has only blindly followed the lead of the United States” (p.130). The Sydney Morning Herald editorialized that the government had been over-influenced by the WHO and not enough by local medical opinion (Mandelson, 1993).

Whilst heroin addiction may not have been a problem in the early 1950s, it certainly was in the late 1990s. Australia followed the rest of the world in signing the 1961 and 1971 UN treaties, and heroin addiction doubled every ten years (Wodak, 1991). Starting to question the wisdom of prohibition, several states began to consider a trial of distributing heroin. Gardner (2001) reports however that, through backroom pressure, the US sabotaged the 1997 Canberra heroin prescription trial. Members of President Clinton’s cabinet threatened to ruin the Tasmanian opium industry if any of that opium was used in a prescription trial. Soon after, the Prime Minister vetoed the trial because he felt it would send the wrong message to children.

**Insurgent Consciousness: The Perception of Transnational Repression in Consumer Countries**

A growing social movement is arising on every continent criticizing the War on Drugs. The various members and groups which make up this social movement make many claims about the negative consequences of the War on Drugs in the hope to garner support for their stated aims (i.e. to raise insurgent consciousness). They claim that the increasing repression being directed at drug users is causing many problems in many developed countries. They claim that drug prohibition has caused the number of drug users and the amount of drugs produced around the world to increase. Ergo, drug overdoses are increasing. Prison populations are exploding, violence and crime is increasing, disease and health problems are exacerbated, human rights abuses are becoming common place in the drug war, drug users are being ostracized from society and all of this is coming at a gigantic cost to taxpayers.
Drug law reform activists claim that possibly the worst impact of drug prohibition is the fact that drug consumption continues to increase. Drug dealers charge very highly for the risks they run. Because their choice of occupation could lead them to being murdered, violently attacked, or arrested, they mark up the price of their commodity hugely – as does every link in the heroin distribution chain. This huge profit motive results in dealers encouraging (perhaps “pushing”) users to use more and non-users to become users. The huge profits also attract others to become dealers who in turn encourage more heroin use. In Australia in the 1930s, during the Depression – a time of expected increase in drug use - there was about 5,000 opium smokers (Lonie, 1979). In 2001 – a time of relative economic prosperity - there was an estimated 100,000 heroin addicts and 300,000 opiate users (Totaro, 2000). Wodak (1991) estimates that the number of opiate addicts in Australia has doubled every decade since the 1960s and is currently increasing at an increasing rate. This point is best demonstrated by Miron and Zwiebal (1995) in “The Economic Case Against Drug Prohibition” which states, “Perhaps the most incontrovertible effect of prohibition is an upward shift in the supply curve for drugs” (p. 177).

Drug law reform proponents argue that those heroin users lucky enough to survive their several daily fixes face many secondary health problems. The high price of heroin makes it near impossible to afford decent living conditions or even adequate amounts of food. It is often used in dirty places which causes disease and syringes are often shared which spreads disease. It is often used in a hurried manner which can cause damage to veins and flesh. The adulterants present in much illegal heroin cause many problems as well, including blood clots and abscesses (Hando, Hall, Rutter, & Dolan, 1999). In the US in 1997, where the draconian drug laws include no state funded needle exchange, over 1/3 of AIDS cases reported to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention were attributed to injecting drug use (Stein, 2000). In a reply to a letter by Congressman Souder which
criticized needle exchange (Souder, 2004), several researchers wrote to the National Institute on Health claiming that prohibition of needle exchanges caused many problems:

In our opinion Mr. Souder's views do a grave disservice to the community in attempting to refute international research that supports the effectiveness of needle exchange programs in reducing the risk of blood borne diseases. As investigators of the ALIVE and needle exchange evaluation studies in Baltimore, MD, our group has published numerous reports that showed that the Baltimore needle exchange program (NEP) is associated with lower HIV incidence over time, reduced frequency of drug injection, less needle sharing, greater admissions to drug abuse treatment programs and fewer discarded needles on the street” (Strathdee, Vlahov, Celentano, & Nelson, 2004).

Many drug law reform activists claim that drug prohibition is responsible for a very large increase in violence and homicides in developed countries (see Figure 3.1). Often, only the toughest criminals survive the competitively violent world of drug dealing which means that drug distribution has become dominated by very unpleasant people. These people often have violent battles, or gang wars, to control the lucrative drug trade. “There seems to be considerable consensus that much of drug-related violence today is linked to the distribution rather than the use of drugs” (Shelley and Wright, 1995). Then there are police raids – another form of violence in society – where police risk their own lives, those of innocent bystanders and the drug dealers, in a vain attempt to clear society of heroin (see especially, Law Enforcement Against Prohibition; http://www.leap.cc/).

Further, activists claim that drug prohibition has led to a huge increase in crime in the wider community such as property theft and armed robbery. The heavily inflated cost of heroin means that many users are forced to commit crime to pay for their habit. Don Weatherburn, head of the NSW Bureau of Statistics was quoted in *The Australian* (17 June 1999) saying “The increase in armed robbery is a national problem almost certainly driven by the national growth in heroin use.” Heroin addicts are also responsible for approximately 80% of property crime (Bell, 1997). These crimes have a devastating impact on society from the unfortunate victims to the fact that everyone pays higher insurance premiums. The other common way for heroin users to raise money for their habit is prostitution. Street prostitutes are often drug addicts who are forced to sell their
bodies to pay the huge cost of an addiction to an illegal substance (Stein, 2000). Such activities often result in drug users being ostracized by their family and non-drug addicted friends and mainstream society (Kubler, 2001).

Activists claim that another result of drug distribution being controlled by illegal dealers is that they prefer to sell very potent substances. The more potent the substance the easier it is to smuggle and the more it is able to be sold for. This has led to most opiate addicts transferring from the very safe (virtually impossible to die of overdose) opium smoking to the very dangerous and more addictive heroin injecting. It also partially explains the crack epidemic America experienced in the 1980s. Further, due to the repression many drug users have experienced, they are less likely to call authorities for help in the event of an overdose. Wodak (1996) details the problems experienced in Hong Kong after opiate use was outlawed in the 1940s. Within a decade heroin injecting had replaced opium smoking and was beginning to spread to more and more people. This trend has been repeated all over the world. In 1964, in Australia, there were four fatal

Figure 3.1: US homicide rate (Gray, 1998)
overdose attributed to opiates (Hall, 1999). In 1974 there were 70 (Wodak, 1999). The year 1999 had 960 (Totaro, 2000).

Activists try to appeal to the wider community by emphasizing the imprisoning of people who are sympathetic. The prison population of the USA has just recently surpassed two million inmates. One group in particular (www.novembercoalition.org) attributes this to the War on Drugs. Over half a million of America’s prison population are guilty of non-violent drug crimes and many more are people committing property crime to pay for their drugs (Human Rights Watch, 2001). In the USA, in the year 2001, 700,000 people were arrested for marijuana offences – 89% of which were charged with possession (Marijuana Policy Project, 2002).

Drug prohibition has also resulted in police powers continually being increased and expanded. Paradoxically, drug prohibition has also resulted in massive amounts of police corruption. The end result has been corrupt police with wide ranging powers. The fact that drug using, buying and selling are all consensual activities makes it hard for police to catch people in the act. According to Gray (1998) almost all drug arrests in the US involve illegal searches. Recently, the New South Wales (NSW) Premier introduced new laws to give police the power to search almost any house (although he used the term, “Drug House”) they choose and imprison people at will. Nick Meagher, President of the NSW Law Society, called it “Nazi-style legislation”, adding, “They are saying you are guilty unless you can prove yourself innocent” (Lagan, Stevenson & Jacobson, 2001). These laws were introduced just four years after the release of the Woods Royal Commission into Police Corruption (1996). Justice Woods found that police corruption was rife in the NSW service and that over 80% of it was caused by drug prohibition.

Drug law reform activists commonly attempt to tie the War on Drugs into a civil rights issue. Drug prohibition has been a huge impediment to racial equality around the world. At every level of the criminal justice system, members of minority groups are more likely
to be treated harshly. Because drug use is so widespread, police can almost choose who to arrest. According to the Race and Prisons website, in the USA, black people make up less than 10% of drug users yet over 50% of people in jail for drug related offences. Another example of the law being discriminatory is mandatory sentencing. Meierhoefer (1992, p.20) found that “Four years later following the implementation of harsher drug sentencing laws, the average federal drug offense sentence was 49% higher for blacks”. Human Rights Watch (2000) stated, "The racially disproportionate nature of the War on Drugs is not just devastating to black Americans. It contradicts faith in the principles of justice and equal protection of the laws that should be the bedrock of any constitutional democracy.” Some activists – including Arianna Huffington, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Drug Policy Alliance - are more blunt, often saying, “The War on Drugs is the new Jim Crow” (see Huffington, 2000; Boyd, 2001; Scotti and Kronenberg, 2001)

Last but not least, developed countries are paying huge amounts of tax dollars on the War on Drugs. In the USA, the Federal Government alone pays over $20 billion a year with state governments paying another $20 billion on the War on Drugs. Activists have set up a website called the War on Drugs Clock which continually ticks over to show the expense of the War on Drugs (www.drugsense.org/wodclock.htm). In Australia, the New South Wales Attorney General, Nicholas Cowdery (2001) estimates that the cost of trialing and imprisoning drug offenders is over $AUD1.2 billion per year.

**Insurgent Consciousness: The Perception of Transnational Repression in Producer Countries:**

Drug law reform activists in producer and consumer countries often claim that the War on Drugs is causing many problems in producer countries. They claim that the impact of transnational repression on developing countries has been, primarily, to increase the amount of drugs in the world. This has had a dreadful impact on the economies of many producer countries as a large amount of their peasant crops are illegal and not subject to
tax. The transnational repression is also having a large impact on the implementation of democracy in many countries and continued violence, war and human rights abuses.

Drug law reform activists often claim the War on Drugs has been lost and that illegal drugs are more available now than ever before. United Nations estimates show opium production is currently (as it always seems to be) at a world time high (Penington, 1999). Similarly cocaine production has been constantly increasing over the past few decades. Once again, the gigantic profit motive that prohibition creates only encourages more and more farmers in producer countries to grow illegal crops.

Healy (1991) and Estellano (1994) document the importance of coca to Bolivia’s economy. Cocaine generated more income in the early 1990s for Bolivia than all legal exports and foreign aid combined. Estellano (1994) and Mason and Campany (1995) go so far as to say that the capitalist/neo-liberal system itself encourages peasants in Bolivia to produce cocaine. The Colombian economy receives about $3-4 billion each year from drug capital (Akiba, 1997). In Afghanistan, heroin accounts for 50% of the economy (Smith, 2004) and in neighboring Tajikistan, the heroin trade that comes from Afghanistan is ten times as big as the entire legal economy (McDonald, 2004). As further criticism of the War on Drugs, Akiba (1997) says that many peasants who voluntarily eradicated their crops ended up suffering severe economic hardship. Mason and Campany (1995) argue that this leads to peasants supporting insurgent guerillas in Peru and Colombia who protect them from the local and international attempts to eradicate their crops. Support for national governments is further eroded due to the repression they exercise in the name of the War on Drugs (Leeds, 1996).

Activists claim that this huge illegal economy has very negative consequences for many developing countries. Despite the huge amount of income generated in these countries by illegal drug production, none of it is taxed. Instead, the money goes to drug dealers who become very wealthy and powerful. This leads to corrupted and weakened local
governments, judiciaries and police forces. Leeds (1996) documents the terrible impact the corruption and violence of police and government forces, combined with the violence of drug dealers has on the democratization of Latin American countries. Similarly in central Asia, the huge profits from drug distribution can benefit terrorism. A *Time* Magazine reported on drug trafficking in Afghanistan, (McGirk, 2004, p.41) “The emergence of Khan's network reflects the challenges the U.S. still faces in Afghanistan as the U.S. struggles to hunt al-Qaeda's leaders, disarm Afghanistan's warlords and shore up President Hamid Karzai against a revived Taliban-led insurgency. The renewed trade in opium has worsened all those problems”.

As evidence of the destabilizing effect drug money can have on producer countries, Wodak (1996, p.36) lists some horrifying statistics. “In Colombia in the first five years of the 1990s, more than 1500 politicians and union leaders, over 1000 police officers, 70 journalists, four of six Presidential candidates in 1990, an attorney general and a governor have been killed.” The War on Drugs may be a metaphor in the western world but it is very real in other places.

Drug law reformers often argue that a further restraint on democracy is that, following brutal military rule in many Latin American countries, the USA is supporting militaries before civilian control has had time to exert its authority (i.e. at a time when it is crucial to curb military behavior) (Youngers, 2004). In 2000, there was a military coup in Ecuador and in 2002 there was nearly a military coup in Venezuela. Further, Youngers claims that Washington is at least indirectly fuelling human rights violations and, in Colombia, contributing to the region’s most brutal counterinsurgency campaign. The Bolivian counter-narcotics police are trained and funded by the US government and commit a litany of abuses. Massive sweeps lead to arbitrary detentions and 60% of those detained claim to have been threatened during their arrest and 44% tortured and/or beaten. Other arrests are not arbitrary but “intended to suppress peaceful and lawful protest activity” (Human Rights Watch quoted in Youngers, 2004). In October, 2000, the
military fired indiscriminately at a protest by coca growers killing two civilians, wounding 78, illegally detaining 48 and torturing 16 (Youngers, 2004).

Conclusion

Since the early 20th century, drug policy has been an international matter. This approach has become increasingly transnational and increasingly repressive. Beginning with early treaties and then the League of Nations’ early attempts to control drug distribution, international drug policy continually became more repressive and by the end of the century, several United Nations treaties attempted to eradicate drug production, distribution, and use. Due to the lack of success of these treaties, the USA took an increasingly unilateral approach to drug production, particularly in Latin America, culminating in the current Plan Colombia which is extremely repressive.

This increasing repression has created conditions in many countries which a growing number of people are finding unacceptable. There is a growing perception that drug prohibition has been a cause of increasing dangerous drug use, spreading disease, increasing violence and crime along with police corruption and prison populations in consumer countries. Added to this, is the perception that in producer countries, drug prohibition is increasing the size of drug crops, destabilizing economies and threatening democracies due to increasing militarization.

The next two chapters are a case study of two drug law reforms in two very different countries – Bolivia and Australia. The chapters explore the evidence to see whether a transnational social movement which finds the War on Drugs unacceptable has had an impact on these law reforms.

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1 One other example of transnational repression occurred in this area. In a shrewd political move, the Premier of NSW organized for a Catholic order of nuns, The Sisters of Charity to operate the medically supervised injecting center. This
move helped counter criticism of the center. However, the Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith issued orders from Rome forcing the nuns to withdraw from the project. In a press release the nuns said, “We are also very disappointed that we were not asked by the Vatican to provide information on the proposed trial injecting service. Our commitment to further research and strategies to combat drug addiction is strengthened by the fact that the Vatican’s determination was based on practical concerns, rather than an in-principal objection.” The Vatican has since ruled that even though injecting centers save lives, it is immoral to assist a person’s drug addiction.

2 Although this section primarily deals with Latin America, transnational repression is further extending into Asia. Amnesty International recently criticized Thailand for executing, without trial, over 2,000 suspected drug users in an attempt to make the country drug-free in three months. Burma’s abysmal military regime is supported and funded by Australia and America in its anti-narcotic efforts. George Bush congratulated the Taliban in May, 2001 for its efforts in eradicating opium in Afghanistan and gave them $43 million as a reward (ironically, his administration later accused drug users of funding terrorists).
Chapter Four

Heroin Laws in New South Wales, Australia

Introduction

Australia pursued a drug policy of “harm reduction” in the 1980s yet it still was firmly rooted in the prohibitionist mould. In the 1990s, with some activists feeling that the harm reduction policies did not go far enough, illegal shooting galleries were established. As these were clearly outside the law and presented tremendous risk to the organizers (from authorities and from drug users) these should be considered as social movement activity. These illegal galleries contributed to a Royal Commission recommending the government establish a legal safe injecting facility (SIF) but the government rejected this idea. Some activists, feeling that all options had been tried, established a mock SIF to ensure that such facilities were on the agenda at an upcoming parliamentary “drug summit” (where both houses of parliament were devoted to the issue of drug policy for a week). Subsequently, the drug summit passed a resolution to establish a legal SIF and a few months later the parliament reformed the drug laws to allow the trial.

The local social movement in Sydney and Australia can be seen to be part of a transnational social movement. Safe injecting facilities, as were present in Sydney, are present throughout Europe and North America. Legal SIFs are also currently running in almost 30 cities around the world and activists in Sydney repeatedly used them as evidence to further their own cause. Transnational activists also wrote letters to newspapers in Australia encouraging the country to make drug law reforms. Lastly, the International Harm Reduction Association (IHRA) provides activists with a transnational network to exchange ideas. However, there is little evidence to suggest that this
transnational social movement had an impact on the eventual drug law reform in New South Wales (NSW).

The Social Movement in New South Wales

Wodak (1996) gives a brief history of the Australian Government’s decision to adopt a harm-reduction approach to drug use (as opposed to “zero tolerance”). It began during the 1984 federal election after the prime minister (a notorious alcoholic) cried on television when asked about his daughter’s heroin use (Manderson, 1993). From 1985 – after a Special Premiers Conference on Drugs - the Prime Minister and all state health ministers declared harm minimization as the official national drug policy. Whilst the government still adopted prohibition (87% of its drug budget was spent on criminal justice and border patrol), two central aspects of this approach were needle distribution and methadone maintenance because these did not violate UN treaties. Wodak (2003) says that civil disobedience played a role in forcing the Australian government to adopt harm minimization but it was poorly documented.

Although Australia allowed needle distribution and methadone maintenance, many activists felt that a wider harm minimization approach was needed. They acted outside the law by operating illegal shooting galleries (Van Beek, 2003, p.626-7) (Wodak, 2003, p.610). Van Beek and Wodak document how in the early 1990s, an increasing number of commercial sex industry establishments started renting rooms for the purpose of injecting drugs and providing clean injecting equipment. They would also check the rooms for overdoses, in which case they would call an ambulance. The police, in conjunction with local health officials, recognized the public health benefits and developed guidelines that allowed these premises to continue. By the mid 1990s, the Kings Cross neighborhood in Sydney had 12 such facilities. Although these centers were set-up by strip-club owners for profit, they can be seen as sustained activity in conflict with an unsuccessful law – especially the participation by health officials.
By the end of the 1990s, activists had seemingly become disillusioned that all avenues for drug law reform were being exhausted. According to drug law reform activists (Kidman, 1997), 24 out of 26 Australian government enquiries into drug policy had suggested moving away from prohibition but these were rarely implemented. In 1979, the Australian Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drugs (the Williams Report) found itself recommending the same ideas (that drug use is a medical problem, not a criminal justice one) of a former commission. “If the Commission is proposing a policy that is not novel the question that inevitably must be answered is why it has not worked before. The answer is that is has not really been tried” (quoted in Hartland, McDonald, Dance, & Bammer, 1992, p.177).

By the late 1990s, two major events further dispirited activists. The first was when the Prime Minister personally intervened in a proposed Canberra heroin trial in 1997. The chief of the local government in Canberra strongly pressed for a heroin prescription trial and in 1997 a meeting of federal, State and Territory health, police and justice ministers voted in favor of the trial (Ferrari, 1997). Yet a few weeks later, the Prime Minister announced that his government would not provide the money and would not allow the importation of heroin into Australia (Reuters, 1997). The second event occurred in 1998. In 1996, the Wood Royal Commission into police corruption in NSW discovered that the illegal shooting galleries were operating in Sydney. Whilst he heard that the galleries had saved thousands of lives, he also discovered that corrupt police were selling heroin on the premises so they were shut down. He recommended a parliamentary inquiry into establishing a legal SIF because a SIF might reduce police corruption and reduce overdose deaths. However, in 1998, the parliamentary inquiry voted 6:4 against a trial SIF despite activists thinking they had made a very strong case for one (Wodak, 2003). Drug law reform proponents increasingly felt that the government was ignoring reasoned scientific debate, so several members of the Sydney community decided to try an exercise in civil disobedience. They set up an illegal SIF in a church.
Alex Wodak, president of the Australian Drug Law Reform Foundation, Ann Symonds, co-founder of Australian parliamentary Group for Drug Law Reform, the Reverend Ray Richmond, a member of the International Harm Reduction Association and parents of drug users or deceased drug users established an unsanctioned SIF in May 1999. Despairing at the large number of overdoses in Kings Cross, they called it “The Tolerance Room” in response to the Prime Ministers avowed allegiance to a policy of “Zero Tolerance” (Wodak, Symonds, & Richmond, 2003, p. 614). It was this civil disobedience exercise that put SIFs firmly on the agenda of the 1999 “Drug Summit” (Van Beek, 2003, p. 627).

On May 4, when the T-Room opened in the Rev Ray Richmond’s church, he told the press, “Sometimes you have to run foul of the law; that is why in Western democracies the church and State are separated … if our people are removed or intimidated, others will take their place. If there is no response from the Government, the service will open again. If we are closed down, we will open again.” The newspaper report also concluded that “The injection room … forms part of a strategic move by church, health and social activists in Sydney to place the issue on the agenda of the drugs summit” (Totaro and Humphries, 1999b).

The organizers acknowledging that the very limited facility would do little to address the concerns related to drug use in Kings Cross and the facility was only to serve as a symbol of civil disobedience. No doubt, this symbolism was accentuated by the fact that it was held in a church with a reverend keen to continue the tradition of sanctuary. Despite this historical tradition, police raided the premise three times and on the third, arrested the clergyman and three drug users. A magistrate cleared all charges.

The publicity surrounding the T-Room forced the NSW government to include the consideration of a trial SIF at the upcoming drug summit. Pleased with this outcome the organizers decided to close the T-Room permanently. “As an agent for social change, the
T-Room succeeded in keeping the issue of a trial [SIF] on the table, thus enabling another review to take place. The facility also served an educational function, teaching the public (and also perhaps policy makers) that hygienic, sanctioned, and supervised injecting rooms were a legitimate and far superior alternative to unsupervised, unhygienic, and unsanctioned shooting galleries” (Wodak et al, 2003, p.617).

Byrne (2001) discusses briefly the sustained push for a “heroin trial” in Australia. Groups such as Families and Friends for Drug Law Reform mounted a heavy publicity campaign (in the form of letters to the editors of newspapers). Alex Wodak has written many letters to newspapers and on occasion been invited to write op-ed pieces and appear on TV news shows. Another notable letter-writer has been Tony Trimmingham, the father of a deceased heroin addict and founder of Parents for Drug Law Reform. His letters made such an impact on the local Sydney newspaper that they featured him in a TV commercial explaining his preferred heroin policy - government regulation and distribution.

It is clear that this social movement, and especially the exercise in civil disobedience, had an impact on the eventual drug law reform. On 8 February, 1999 the Illawarra Mercury wrote that NSW Premier, Bob Carr “a long-time opponent of heroin trials and legal shooting galleries – warned against adopting untested solutions to drug problems … he said, ‘The difficulty is that some of the new solutions people enthusiastically promote could be even more disastrous” (“Govt Plans Drugs Debate”, 1999). In April, when the Premier announced the drug summit, there was no mention of trial SIFs. Yet the Tolerance Room opened on May 4 and on May 6, 1999 Carr was still holding firm in his opposition. According to the Sydney Morning Herald (Totaro and Humphries, 1999a), “Mr Carr signaled that the Government was unlikely to legalize shooting rooms for heroin addicts, whatever the outcome of the NSW Drugs Summit … ‘The starting point has to be our resolution to get people off the drug, not to sustain them in a crippling
dependence on it,’ Mr Carr said”. However, by this point Carr had acknowledged that the summit would have to discuss the issue.

From May 17 - 21, 1999 both houses of NSW parliament devoted an entire week to the issue of illicit drugs. This became known as the “Drugs Summit”. Experts and speakers with different opinions addressed the parliament for the week and towards the end of the week votes were held on 168 resolutions. Although the Government (and especially the conservative Opposition) were under no legal obligation to pass the resolutions into law, the fact that they had called the summit as an election promise, placed a lot of pressure to do so. The most radical resolution - to administer heroin to addicts – was rejected by a vote of 78-67. Yet two other proposals were passed overwhelmingly: to establish a medical facility to supervise heroin injection; and the decriminalization of possession of 15 grams of marijuana.

And it was at the summit where the Premier softened his approach to reforming drug laws. The Sydney Morning Herald of May 23, 1999 (Humphries and Totaro, 1999) claimed, “The Premier has conceded that his position on drug law reform has softened as a result of the Drug Summit”. It quotes the Premier as saying “it took something to persuade me to a position to say we will not veto” heroin safe injecting rooms. Further, the article said, the “‘weight of the scientific presentation’ [by drug law reform activists] to the summit could not be overlooked in its potency to persuade him and other MPs that the arguments for alternative policies were worthy of at least serious consideration by his government”.

On the 18th of November, 1999, the Drug Summit Legislative Response Bill passed through New South Wales parliament. This bill amended the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 to allow the licensing and use of a single medically supervised injecting centre for the self-administration of prohibited drugs for a trial period of 18 months. It also amended the Bail Act 1978 so as to provide that a court may impose bail conditions requiring an accused person to undergo drug or alcohol treatment (i.e. not be
sent to prison). In 2002, when the 18 months was up, the parliament passed the *Drug Summit Legislative Response Amendment (Trial Period Extension) Bill 2002* which allowed the trial to continue for another 12 months. And a year later, parliament passed *Drug Summit Legislative Response Amendment (Trial Period Extension) Bill 2003* which allowed the trial to continue until October 31, 2007.

In more recent events, on May 26, 2004, Sydney’s Lord Mayor and Member of State Parliament, Clover Moore, told a parliamentary inquiry to decriminalize heroin or risk riots in the predominantly Aboriginal part of the city. According to the *Sydney Morning Herald*, Moore told the inquiry that she supports decriminalization of heroin, “Yes, and the community I represent says ‘yes, yes, yes!’” (“Make drug legal”, 2004). The next day, the Premier, Bob Carr, said he was open to the idea of opening a second injection center in the city but “a precondition would be unanimity among Aboriginal leadership and the police that this is the way forward” (Saunders, 2004). It should be noted that the riots Moore warned of would probably be related to many grievances of Aboriginal people and not solely heroin legislation.

**The Transnational Social Movement**

The social movement which brought about drug law reform in NSW did not occur in a vacuum. As the illegal galleries were operating in Sydney during the 1990s, there were also illegal galleries operating throughout Europe and Canada. Once the push for a legal SIF intensified in Sydney, activists began to cite figures from legal SIFs in Europe, particularly ones operating in Switzerland. Further, activists from around the world wrote letters to Sydney newspapers encouraging them to push ahead with the SIF. Lastly, the International Harm Reduction Association has provided like-minded activists with a network to discuss ideas. Throughout this section, it is also shown that the Sydney experience is now influencing similar struggles in Canada. It is possible that the SIF in Sydney has helped establish a similar facility in Canada which in turn may open up further opportunities in Australia.
As mentioned above, Wodak (2003) says that civil disobedience played a role in Australia adopting a harm minimization policy in the 1980s. Kubler (2001) briefly talks about harm reduction advocates in Switzerland also using civil disobedience in the 1980s to bring about drug policy reform. In 1985, the surgeon general in Zurich threatened to withdraw the license of any health professional who sold or handed out syringes to drug users. The major cantonal medical corporation called for civil disobedience and 300 practitioners signed a declaration stating they would hand out needles in spite of the ban. They were soon joined by chemist shops. In December, a federal commission of drug experts suggested that the cantons make clean injection materials readily available and in June 1986 the cantonal parliament passed an initiative forcing the surgeon general to allow free distribution of needles.

As in Sydney, an illegal injecting center had been running in Vancouver throughout the 1990s. Although such an operation clearly put the organizers at risk of arrest and drug related violence, activists operated an illegal center for almost a year and claim that up to 200 heroin and cocaine addicts a day frequented the building. The site was well advertised with volunteers putting posters up in the area and the police were “somewhat tolerant” of the site because of the hundreds of people dying of overdoses in the city at the time (Howell, 2002). The center even hosted guest lecturers including the then-coroner Larry Campbell, now the city’s Mayor, who encouraged the social movement: “I told them they should organize and I didn’t want to see them in my morgue”. Similar illegal shooting galleries are operating all over Europe. Due to the confidential nature of their services, such galleries have not formed a strong network, yet they do represent a social movement operating on several continents.

An example of transnational contention occurred in Vancouver when activists in the city opened a renegade heroin injection site (similar to the one in Sydney). The *Globe and Mail* newspaper reported a social worker saying, "If you look at every place where safe-
injection sites have been established (27 countries around the world), they have all required actions of civil disobedience” (Gill, 2002). Following a November election which the newspaper described as the first in Canada based on drugs – the incumbent Mayor and challenger both supported supervised injecting sites although the incumbent did not run because he lost the support of his party – it seemed that such an act of civil disobedience would not be required. However, frustrated that it was taking too long for the city to implement its promise (at the cost of lives), in April 2003 an unsanctioned shooting gallery was set up and the Mayor ordered the police to not interfere.

Activists are using these transnational examples to promote their own goals. In Australia, drug law reform advocates commonly sited heroin trials in Europe to argue that local trials were a good idea: “Why have the Netherlands, Germany, Spain and other countries commenced or planned heroin trials or are considering doing so? Why did 71 per cent of Swiss voters in a national referendum in September 1997 support retention of the option of heroin prescription for treatment refractory heroin injectors?” wrote Wodak (1999) in Canberra’s largest newspaper. Subsequently, activists in Vancouver would cite Sydney as evidence that their city needed a heroin trial. Now in Montreal, activists are using the worldwide trend to mount an argument for a heroin trial in their city. Thomas Kerr, director of Health Research and Policy at the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network wrote in the Montreal Gazette, “Bustling urban centers around the globe have dramatically reduced the social and economic impact of open drug scenes … for example, 26 cities in Europe, one city in Australia and recently Vancouver have opened safe-injection facilities” (Kerr, Palmer, & and Jurgens, 2003).

Activists are beginning to mobilize across borders. A growing trend is for activists to write letters to newspapers in foreign countries asking them to resist the US and UN pressure to wage a War on Drugs. It is not unusual for Americans to write letters to Australian newspapers encouraging them to continue their drug law reforms and ignore
the pressure from their own country. William A Rhode MD, of Boston, USA wrote to the *Canberra Times* on 24 November, 1999:

“Your recent publications concerning drug-law reform, treatment diversion, and safe-injection houses have been followed closely by the US drug-treatment community… Only when the public demands a medical 'cure' to addiction, just like AIDS or cancer, will there be effective means to stop this epidemic. In the meantime, the legal and legislative establishments are going to continue having a field day making money off the poor untreated addicts. Perhaps if you looked at Scotland or Switzerland, you would find much more effective solutions. In the US this appears impossible just too much money and too large an Establishment benefiting from the status quo. I hope Australia won't fall prey to the same dilemma. Eventually it will bankrupt all of you. Don't get fooled over the contretemps concerning one legal shooting gallery. That's just the death knell for the Establishment. At this distance, I am praying for more sanity from Australia.”

In an op-ed piece in the *Sydney Morning Herald* on March 6, 2000, Dr Ernest Drucker, Professor of Epidemiology and Social Medicine at Montefiore Medical Centre/Albert Einstein College of Medicine in New York, wrote:

In my own country, command centre of the global ‘War on Drugs’, even such a debate would be impossible and the actual implementation of such programs [heroin trials] still unthinkable … But the US is not content to impose this insanely self destructive approach upon its citizens alone. We insist that other nations do likewise and toe the line of ‘zero tolerance’ …the stunning success of your approach to AIDS (Australia having averted an epidemic among its drug users) is one of the things that has drawn me back here – to learn from your fine public health professionals and emulate their programs wherever possible in the US … So now that the nation's first injecting room is soon to open in Kings Cross ( with others to follow in Victoria and elsewhere ), I am once again filled with admiration for Australia's compassionate pragmatism in drug matters. And its courage to do the right thing - even in the face of strong outside pressures to abstain from the sort of harm-minimization strategies that have already saved thousands of Australians lives. Good on you!

This letter writing effort may have had an impact on journalists, who apparently took a similar angle in their reporting. David Marr, an Australian journalist was quoted in the *St Petersburg Times* as writing in an Australian newspaper during the legislative debate over the trial SIF, “… this country is not free to take radical action to solve its drug problems. Wherever a nation breaks ranks, the US will be there, cajoling or threatening” (quoted in Taylor Martin, 2001).
There is evidence that such anti-Americanism is creeping on to the Letters pages of American newspapers. On March 11, 2003 the New York Times published a letter from an Australian criticizing American tobacco policy (Mostyn, 2003), “How can America justify destroying other country’s drug crops and then exporting its own crops, which kill millions worldwide?” On June 24, 2004, Robert L Cohen M.D., former director of Rikers Island medical services wrote to the New York Times advocating harm reduction measures in US prisons, “A policy of harm reduction through distribution of clean needles and decriminalization of drug use as practiced throughout Europe would have prevented the spread of these often fatal illnesses to hundreds of thousands of men and women in American jails and prisons.”

One international group that brings together drug law reform activists is the International Harm Reduction Association (IHRA). Less radical and extreme than groups advocating full legalization and the repeal of the UN conventions, the IHRA is a more pragmatic group that advocates harm reduction methods within the current prohibitive regime. Although, many members of the group advocate a legalization/regulation policy (for instance, the president is Dr Alex Wodak, an organizer of the illegal SIF in Sydney), it is not a stated aim of this group. This allows the IHRA to maintain legitimacy with many national governments. The IHRA’s mission statement remains relatively vague to help it maintain the middle ground among drug law reformers (who often differ wildly on preferred drug policy). It does claim however, to promote human rights, to foster dialogue with international organizations, encourage discussion about the relationship between drug policy and public health outcomes, promote dialogue with the criminal justice system regarding the interaction between public health and public order, promoting regional harm reduction efforts, and to support international needle exchange activities.

One example of how the IHRA allows members to exchange ideas occurred when Vancouver’s Mayor, Larry Campbell, addressed the International Conference in April
and planned to talk about the process the city had to go through to open a supervised heroin injection site. “I’ll talk about the transition from recognizing we had a huge problem to the citizen involvement, political involvement and how we went about solving the concerns of the citizens” (Carrigg, 2004). Further, according to Carrigg, “Campbell said the key belief Vancouver and Australia have in common when it comes to drug issues is the philosophy that arresting drug users does not solve the problem” … and although Campbell did not have time to visit the injecting center in Sydney he would meet with the site’s managers. “We’ll compare notes to see what they are doing that is working that we’re not [doing] and vice versa” (quoted in Carrigg, 2004).

Conclusion

The drug law passed into effect in NSW in October 1999 to implement an SIF came about as a direct result of the “Drug Summit” held in the state’s parliament in May of that year. The issue of an SIF was clearly raised because of a civil disobedience exercise in that same May which forced the summit to discuss and seriously consider such a facility. The civil disobedience exercise was a product of frustrated activists who were angered by Australian governments continually thwarting attempts at liberalizing drug laws.

Put in a transnational context, it can be seen that there is a growing movement to reform drug laws. Illegal shooting galleries are operating all over the world. These galleries represent a movement operating outside of the law. The ideas behind them are spreading around the world through conferences, publicity, and interactions between organizers. To a limited extent, this represents the early stages of a transnational social movement. There is also a group of people campaigning across borders to try and reform drug laws in as many places as possible and increase recognition of the transnational nature of the repressive War on Drugs. This increased awareness should increase the size of the social movement.
In some places these illegal shooting galleries are putting pressure on authorities to legalize and regulate them. In Sydney, this was clearly the case with the Wood Royal Commission (1996) which forced the government to consider the issue. These illegal galleries also paved the way for the eventual civil disobedience exercise which led to the legal SIF. In turn, these legal SIFs are providing activists around the world solid evidence to advance the case for local legal SIFs.

It is probably fair to conclude that a local social movement - the illegal galleries in Sydney in the 1990s and especially the well publicized civil disobedience shooting gallery - had a large impact on reforming the drug law. It is much harder to conclude that a transnational social movement had a large impact on the drug law reform. Whilst similar social movement activities were happening in North America and Europe at the same time, whilst Australian activists did point to such activities and whilst activists from these countries did write letters to Australian newspapers, the impact on the eventual law reform was probably quite limited. There is no evidence that the lawmakers were responding to a transnational social movement when they changed the law.
Chapter Five

Coca Laws in Bolivia

Introduction

It is commonly believed that coca has been used in Bolivia since 3000 B.C. Chewing of the coca leaf has been associated with mundane every-day uses and also with spiritual and religious significance. With the arrival of the Spanish colonialists, the spiritual importance of coca was downplayed whilst its importance to the labor force was increased. To this day however, despite colonial efforts and more recently US and UN efforts, coca is still used regularly in Bolivia.

Bolivia’s coca farmers – known as cocaleros – have had a huge impact on Bolivian politics over the past 20 years. Since the early 1980s Bolivia’s coca farmers (the source ingredient for cocaine) have developed into a political force in Bolivia, organizing large demonstrations, road-blocks, hunger strikes and “chew-ins”. As America’s intervention in Bolivia has increased so has the cocalero’s appeal and support. As Bolivia’s government has increasingly acceded to US demands, the cocaleros have increasingly gained more power. It is an amazing battle for control of Bolivian politics between the world’s only superpower and a group of well-organized peasants.

The cocalero social movement has been a factor in the government allowing some coca to be grown legally and used for traditional purposes. The cocaleros have also forced the government to reform some of the very punitive drug laws. More recently, the government promised to expand the amount of legal coca growing zones and last year the cocaleros played a major role in forcing the president into exile.
The cocaleros can be seen to be part of a growing transnational social movement. A similar movement is sprouting in neighboring Peru. And across Latin America a growing movement for drug law reform is mobilizing. In Washington, some advocacy groups have spoken out in support for their claims. Even further a field, legislation to allow the importation of coca leaves has passed through European parliaments.

**History of Coca Use in Bolivia**

Cassman, Cartmell, and Belmonte (2003) claim there is substantial archeological evidence for the pervasive and generalized use of coca as far back as 3000 B.C. The evidence suggests that coca was used as a sacrifice to the sun, sea, earth, and many other sacred supernatural beings. However, there is also evidence that coca had a material as well as spiritual component. Coca was also used as a stimulant, hunger suppressant, and medicine. Cassman et al conclude that “coca in prehistory held dual characteristics: it was equally mundane and sacred” (p152).

The Spanish conquerors were quick to realize that coca leaves could help laborers work longer and more efficiently. “Therefore, coca played a vital role in the economy of the new mercantile capitalist system” (Cassman et al, 2003, 154). In fact, coca production had to be greatly increased to support early Spanish mining activities. However, in 1552 and 1567, at the first and second conventions of Lima, eight prohibitionist clergymen urged the total eradication of coca feeling that coca usage was the main obstacle to the conversion of Indians from idolatry to belief in Christianity. In 1569, Phillip II decreed that coca could be used by the indigenous population for anything but idolatry.

According to the Andean Information Network (2004), “The production of the coca leaf with few limitations was legally accepted until 1988” when Law 1008 was introduced (see below). Law 1008 was passed by the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) government of Victor Paz Estensoro, who had first come to power in the 1950s on a wave
of indigenous support. Gitsnacht (2004) notes the irony that in 2002 an MNR President would be forced to resign by this same constituency.

The Social Movement in Bolivia

Healy (1991) gives a detailed account of the “Political Ascent of Bolivia’s Peasant Coca Leaf Producers”. Peasant sindicatos were first organized in Bolivia in 1953 as part of the national agrarian reform program. They were established to help new settlers claim virgin forested farmlands and to address a wide range of community development needs. During the 1960s the first federation of sindicatos emerged in Chapare (the main coca producing area in Bolivia) and by 1991 there were 40,000 peasant families belonging to 160 local sindicatos, under the umbrella of 30 sub-federations organized into five federations. Approximately 85% of the Chapare sindicatos come under the jurisdiction of two federations.

It was only in the 1980s that sindicatos acquired their national reputation through their opposition to, and mobilization against, those state policies designed to control coca leaf production. Chapare peasants participate in frequent sindicato meetings at the local level and then send delegates to the congresses of the federations to “devise their political strategies, exchange information about government activities, and choose direct-action tactics to thwart state efforts to control their means of livelihood” (Healy, 1991, p.89).

Neo-liberalism played a major role in the rise of the cocaleros. The year 1985 saw the election of Victor Paz Estenssoro who administered the “shock therapy” to reduce hyperinflation with the New Economic Policy (NPE). This neo-liberal program abolished subsidies, liquidated social gains, closed-down state owned companies (including the huge tin producer which employed over 20,000 people), and proclaimed the liberalization of the economy. Critics claimed the impact of neo-liberalist reforms were devastating. To wit, the state-owned tin mining company. According to Arganaras
tin mining in Bolivia was in decline but the international banking community forced the government to close it completely in 1985 leaving 23,000 workers unemployed (Healy, 1991). Estellano (1994) also claims that the majority of peasants were seriously affected by the free importation of agricultural products concluding, “the capitalist system itself encourages ever-increasing investment in cocaine production” (p. 40). The closing down of the tin mines eradicated the most powerful workers union in the country whilst increasing the number of people whose livelihood relied on coca. At the start of the 1980s the Chapare federation of sindicatos was an obscure grassroots organization. By the end of the decade, several Chapare sindicato federations had entered the vanguard of the peasant organizations for the whole country and even, arguably, for the entire national trade union movement.

By 1988, estimates suggested that over 200,000 Bolivians made their living from farming coca and at least 300,000 more worked in the underground economy generated by the coca trade (out of Bolivia’s total population of 7 million) (Kawell, 1989). In the weeks leading up to the congressional vote on the Ley de le regimen (the coca law) in 1988 there were many protests in Bolivia. In one protest, a crowd of several hundred gathered at the drug police post in Villa Tunari. After asking permission to enter the eradication program office located on the site 12 people were shot by local police (although protesters claimed that the DEA was involved) In another protest at the time in Cochabamba, several thousand protestors yelled, “Gringos out of Chapare! Gringos out of Bolivia!”(Kawell, 1989). Kawell states, “US attempts to impose its drug control policy in Bolivia have provoked bitter opposition from the well organized coca farmers unions, as well as from large sectors of the Bolivian people”(p.25).

On 18 April, 1995 the government declared a three month state of siege in response to widespread social protest over coca eradication efforts. Throughout the 1990s, Ledebur (2002, p2) described the situation as “Conflict and social unrest stemming from the
application of United States antidrug policy in the Chapare region generally occurs in recurring cycles of protest, repression and temporary conciliation.”

More recently, the situation has intensified. In January, 2003, 11 people were killed in Chapare in violent confrontations between cocaleros armed with dynamite booby traps and pre-World War II Mauser rifles, and police and soldiers, armed with tear-gas and M-16s. In March, 33 more people were killed in La Paz in a clash between police and soldiers.

This violence resulted in Eva Morales and Felipe Quispe putting aside their differences (see below) to achieve the more important aim of defeating the government. Together they formed a "staff of the people" and threatened nationwide roadblocks unless President Sanchez de Lozada resigned (Araquipa, 2003). Quispe issued a statement on February 12, 2003. This is an excerpt:

… after a detailed evaluation of the inability of the government to create a peaceful living conditions among Bolivians and better distribution of wealth, the Confederation of Unions of Farmers and Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB) has made the decision that the only way to defend democracy, demand the rights of indigenous people and the workers salaries, is to DEMAND THE IMIDIATE RESIGNATION of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and simultaneously CALL FOR A CONSTITUANT ASSEMBLY, which will enable the construction of a new social pact between Bolivians, between indigenous and mestizos, campesinos and city folks, and between all Bolivians with dignity, who are not disposed to continue being cheated, or living under the constant threat of death. Because of the urgency and risk to the lives of Bolivians, we order every regional federation to:

1). immediately organize a blockade of roads, and, gradually, a national economic blockade (Huanca, 2003)

In March, 2003, The Guardian (Hodgson, 2003) reported that the vice minister of social defense, Ernesto Justiniano said the government, “following a wave of social unrest which left scores dead and nearly toppled the government”, would launch a six month study to determine the scale of the nation’s legal coca consumption and subsequently allow farmers outside the traditional area to grow small crops of the plant. The Guardian said that the US may cut $50m in aid and quoted a US official as saying, “Our policy is
very clear and it remains clear. Any proposal that would legitimize or legalize any coca which is illegal would be a violation of Bolivian law and a violation of international treaties to which Bolivia is a signatory” (Hodgson, 2003). *The Boston Globe* reported that a US Embassy official said, “It clearly sets a bad precedent. Once you permit any legalized coca, it would probably multiply and never stop” (Lindsay, 2003). *The Chicago Sun Times* (Novak, 2004) suggested that many in the US intelligence committee were worried that Bolivia was becoming an “ungoverned” area, “They fear that Colombia’s narcoterrorists will switch their growing and processing operations to Bolivia, making irrelevant US counter-drug policy in Colombia”. A further challenge to Bolivian drug policy was seen when former US president, Jimmy Carter, met with Evo Morales to tell him he supported a pause in Chapare coca eradication while the United Nations studies the program (Novak, 2004).

According to the *New York Times* (Rohter, 2003), President Sanchez de Lozada visited the White House in 2002 and told President Bush that he would push ahead with a plan to eradicate coca but he needed more support from Washington or else, “I may be back here in a year, this time seeking political asylum”. By October, 2003, he was indeed in America after being toppled by a popular uprising in Bolivia. Although US officials interviewed by the *Times* tried to downplay the importance of drug issues, many analysts claimed the coca problem was “intimately tied to the broader issues of impoverishment and disenfranchisement that stoked explosive protest in the months leading up to Sanchez de Lozada’s downfall”.

The protests which led to Sanchez de Lozada’s resignation were spurred by several interrelated issues. Although he tried to de-legitimize the protestors by calling them “anarchist narcos” (Adams, 2003), many analysts suggested the protestors were motivated by more than drug law reform. Many analysts suggested that the major factor in Sanchez de Lozada’s downfall was his plan to export gas through a Chilean port - “The factor which, above all others, brought together the many strands of opposition last year,
was opposition to the government's plans to export natural gas to the US” (“Talk of Plots”, 2004). As mentioned above, neo-liberalism had some devastating consequences in Bolivia throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Many leaders of the protests which resulted in Sanchez de Lozada’s resignation demanded that the gas industry be re-nationalized and were angry at the perception of foreign companies stealing their natural resources (“An Angry People”, 2003). Other analysts have suggested that a combination of issues motivated the protesters – from land reform for peasants, to pensions for the elderly, to better wages for workers (Plummer, 2003).

A referendum in July 2004 regarding the future of the country's vast natural gas reserves gave new President Carlos Mesa a mandate to export the gas (Hall, 2004). Although there were many critics of the wording of the referendum, this might suggest that natural gas did not play as large a role as first thought (see also Vargas, 2004). Clearly, some of the protestors were more concerned with Sanchez De Lozada’s capitulation to American drug policy. Dionisio Nunez, interviewed by the Times said that their party, MAS, intended to demand that the new government modify the laws against coca cultivation and expand the areas where it is legal to sell coca leaves. “A new president can’t return to a policy of repression and militarization … there has to be a change, to a policy that is truly Bolivian, not one that is imposed by foreigners with the pretext that eradication will put an end to narcotics trafficking.”

US Congress was told the following dubious information:

Morales and the leader of the coca growers’ union took advantage of economic dislocation and led the cocalero protests that forced President Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada from power on October 17. President Sanchez had been a key ally of the United States in the eradication of cocaine production. Yet he was ousted in a movement reportedly supported by European activists and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. The coca growers union leader then told Sanchez’s vice president and successor, Carlos Mesa, 90 days to implement the cocaleros’ agenda to resume large-scale production of the raw material for cocaine. The union leader threatened to continue a wave of violence against Bolivian society and the government if newly-installed President Mesa failed (Waller, 2003).
How Did The Cocaleros Garner So Much Support?

Firstly, representatives of the Chapare federation have stressed the cultural importance of coca. Protecting coca is protecting Bolivia’s culture. This appeals to many parts of Bolivia which don’t produce Coca but have traditionally chewed it. Further, it taps into the indigenous pride resonating across the Americas. The coca issue can be seen as yet another struggle between the government and the long persecuted natives. The cocaleros have successfully used nationalism to their advantage.

This is further evident in another of the cocaleros rallying points – anti-Americanism. The cocaleros could point to the presence of the DEA in Bolivia, America’s military activities in the country, America’s support of Bolivia’s military, and crop spraying by American planes as evidence of their “anti-imperialist” argument (Healy, 1991). In addition, the Chapare federations felt entitled to a position of greater leadership within the national organizations because they consider themselves to be most aggressively protecting Bolivia’s national sovereignty. This garnered support from leftist parties (including the Communists) in Bolivia which issued a formal statement in 1989 “declaring that coca-leaf producers should be considered the vanguard of the Bolivian labor movement since their interests conflicted most directly with those of the US government”. Further, the document said, “They [the USA] say that in order that there be no more coca in Bolivia, we must extinguish the Andean culture for, to the extent that this culture exists, there will always be coca” (Healy, 1991, p105). The Boston Globe recently quoted Eva Morales who said, “The War on Drugs is failing, there is a legal market, legal consumption for coca here. It could be industrialized, and this is what the United States doesn’t understand. They think they can spend billions of dollars to reach zero coca, but this isn’t a solution” (Lindsay, 2003).

The cocaleros also made their case in terms of economic benefits. Whilst Bolivia stayed in a prolonged recession, coca provided many jobs to locals of Chapare, but also for
many migrant workers from other areas. The devastating affects of the IMF structural adjustment program on peasant agriculture in the mid 1980s only increased the importance of coca to the economy. The increase in migration to the coca-growing regions further increased their power at the national level.

Lastly, Healy talks of the Chapare peasants’ political skill in exploiting other issues, particularly the environment. Despite the fact their coca farms cause great harm to the environment, the *cocaleros* have been able to force the government on to the defensive by “incessant hammering” (p.96) on the ecology issue of herbicide spraying. This resulted in the Ley de la Regimen article which bans herbicidal spraying. The environmental issue is very valuable overseas in garnering support against US policies in Latin America.

Equally important to the cocalero’s garnering support has been their repertoire of contention. Road-blocks have been common in Bolivian politics; mass demonstrations are common to social movements around the world. Hunger strikes are radical yet also common. Most interesting are the “chew-ins” which are part of a growing worldwide new mode of contention.

According to Healy (1991) roadblocks have been a common mode of contention in Bolivia for a long time. The *cocaleros* have used this traditional mode of contention to garner nation-wide support. Through roadblocks the *cocaleros* made great progress in the 1980s. In 1983 and 1987 *cocaleros* organized large roadblocks with the participation of many peasants in non-coca producing areas. In 1983, they pressured the state into signing numerous decrees, including the “free marketing of the coca leaf”. Conversely, when peasant groups organize road blocks in non-coca producing areas, often aspects of the cocalero’s agenda form part of the demands. In 1987, to protest the draft proposal of the 1988 anti-coca laws, the *cocaleros* were able to enlist the participation of university students and employees, miners, factory workers, and schoolteachers.
Mass demonstrations are another historical mode of contention in Bolivia. Estellano (1994, p.44) talks of a “collective tradition of social participation in the history of the struggles of Bolivia’s poor” which began with resistance to the Banzer dictatorship. The same masses frustrated the coup of 1979. These battles ultimately opened the way for democracy. Mass demonstration have occurred often in Bolivia with the cocaleros organizing such protests in the small towns of Chapare and the cities of Cochabamba and La Paz. These demonstrations have also used a mode of contention common in the past 40 years – the sit-in at government offices.

Perhaps a more extreme form of contention – although still a common one - is the hunger strike. Peasant leaders throughout the country went on a hunger strike in January 1989 to protest the government’s announcement of the new coca-leaf law which planned to eradicate the coca leaf in ten years. By participating in this protest, as with the other protests, peasant leaders from non-coca producing areas were able to add their own specific grievances whilst simultaneously strengthening the cocaleros’ claims.

However, the most dynamic and interesting mode of contention used by the cocaleros is the “Chew-in”. Adapting to the worldwide phenomenon of “teach-ins”, “sit-ins” and the like, the cocaleros have adapted this worldwide new mode of contention to their own circumstances. The chew-in celebrates the traditional uses of the coca leaf and often includes thousands of representatives from many areas. They often consist of mass rallies and parades with coca leaf costumes, militant speeches, marching bands, anti-US rallies, avid coca leaf chewing and displays of colorful textiles.

The chew-in also represents an important part of any social movement – symbolism. As mentioned above, the cocaleros have been very effective in garnering support based on cultural heritage and the coca leaf has become a symbol of Bolivian culture and history. Often, costumes and wreaths made of coca leaves are used by the cocaleros to make a
point. Sometimes such wreaths are worn in parliament - evidence of how successful this use of symbolism has become. Evo Morales has been quoted as saying, “There is a unanimous defense of coca because the coca leaf is becoming the banner for national unity, a symbol of national unity in defense of our dignity. Since coca is a victim of the United States, as coca growers we are also victims of the United States, but then we rise up to question these policies to eradicate coca” (Beaumont, 2003).

Another important part of the cocalero’s success has been their leadership. The *cocaleros* have a clearly visible leader, Evo Morales. However, there are leaders of other social movements - Leonida Zurita Vargas, an indigenous woman, and Felipe Quispe Huanca, another indigenous leader - who have also greatly helped the *cocalero*’s cause.

Evo Morales has become the clear leader of the *cocaleros* movement. In the lead up to the 2002 Presidential election, US Ambassador to Manuel Rocha told Bolivians that if Morales was elected President, his country would cut all aid to the country. According to Gomez (2002), Morales’s party circulated a poster in Bolivian cities with an enormous photo of Morales in the middle. Above, in enormous letters: "Bolivians: You Decide. Who's in Charge? Rocha or the Voice of the People." The poster had a huge impact and hundreds of thousands more had to be printed than had been planned on.

Eva Morales almost won the 2002 Presidential election. He narrowly lost with 20% of the vote compared to the Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada’s 22%. (He became a congressman with 86% of his district’s vote (Gomez, 2002)). Of course, with such success in the campaign, Morales has been noticed by more mainstream politicians. Juan del Grando, Mayor of La Paz, has said of Eva Morales and the Coca Growers Federation, “The emergence of new political and alternative movements despite their scant participation in political life marks the start of a new way of conducting politics which responds to the legitimate demands of the marginalized majorities” (Vanden, 2003, p.1).
Indeed, now 30% of congress is in indigenous hands (Gomez, 2002) and MAS controls the second highest amount of seats in Bolivia’s congress (Langman, 2002).

One personality who is evidence of the cocalero’s wide reaching appeal is Leonida Zurita Vargas, secretary general of Bartolina Sisa, the National Federation of the Women’s Peasant Movement and president of the Six Federation of Coca Growers in Bolivia. According to Vargas, change is only possible through coalitions. "We have to fight for making alliances. We have to fight for the poor … Neo-liberalism has brought war, a War on Drugs. Now it's a war against terrorism. Still, the bullets are getting to us," Vargas said. "We are fighting on two levels - for our land, the 'mother of life', and for coca leaf which is part of our culture, part of our heritage" (Olson, 2003).

Felipe Quispe Huanca is another indigenous leader in Bolivia. Leading an uprising from 1990 – 1993 resulted in his imprisonment for five years. Executive Secretary of the United Confederate Syndicate of the Farmworkers of Bolivia which served as the voice of the main group of displaced Indians. In 2002, he founded the Pachakutic Indigenous Movement (MIP), which aimed to get indigenous people elected to Bolivian Congress. In August, he himself was elected. In a recent speech, Quispe supported the coca growers whilst distinguishing them from narco-traffickers and cocaine users. At the same time, though, he recognized the corruption in Bolivia being caused by the War on Drugs, claiming that the traffickers were in cahoots with many high-level politicians (Saytanides, 2003).

Quispe is described as unusual in Latin American politics because he is fighting for the right of his ethnic group (the Aymara – of whom Evo Morales is one) to secede from Bolivia (“Bolivia’s Internal Divides”, 2004). In the 2002 election, MIP won twice as many seats as Morales’s MAS in the Aymara heartland. In fact, Quispe is so dedicated to the cause of secession that he resigned from his seat in parliament earlier this year to more fully devote himself to the issue.
Law Reforms

On July 19, 1988, Law 1008 was passed by the Bolivian congress. It provides the judicial basis for the War on Drugs in Bolivia and defines the legal status of coca cultivation and its relationship with the illegal drug cocaine. According to Bolivian judges, the law was drafted by US advisers. Law 1008 presumes the guilt of the accused which allows courts to prohibit bail so that a person is imprisoned for the duration of their trial. Under article 116, reports by anti-narcotics officers are taken as pre-constituted proof that is automatically admissible at trial. Further, under Law 1008, the decision to go to trial was entirely in the hands of prosecutors. Lastly, all illicit coca is subject to forced eradication. Dubberly (1995, p.278) wrote in the American Bar Association: Inter-American Legal Materials, “Many of the criticisms voiced against Ley 1008 are justified. The law, as written, contains provisions which some jurists find unconstitutional; and as practiced it appears to contribute to possible human rights violations. Certainly, as applied, the law can be brutal and unfair”.

However, the cocaleros managed, with their social movement activity in the lead up to the passing of Law 1008 to force the government to establish 3 zones of production which allows up to 12,000 hectares to grow coca for local consumption. This coca can be used for tea, chewing, and traditional ceremonies. It should be noted that 1988 also marked the year that the Single Convention (1961) had sought to eradicate all traditional uses of coca from the planet.

Further reforms to the law occurred on February 2nd, 1996, when President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada signed into law legislation which attempted to reform some of the controversial aspects of Law 1008. The law was intended to alleviate the long detention periods Bolivians suffer while awaiting trial (people had been jailed for up to 5 years before acquittal). It also allowed judges to reduce or dismiss charges brought by prosecutors, it also established territorial jurisdiction for drug courts which meant that
accused people would face trial where the crime was allegedly committed (whereas before, they could be tried in any part of Bolivia).

A further law reform occurred on February 9, 2002. The Supreme Decree 26415 was passed on November 27, 2001 and it put an end to the sale of coca leaf in previously legal markets. After a particularly contentious January 2002, *cocaleros* and the government arrived at an agreement with the mediation of the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office, the Catholic Church and the Permanent Human Rights Assembly. *Cocaleros* halted their roadblocks and the government agreed to suspend Supreme Decree 26415 for three months, carry out investigations of those killed in January and release jailed union leaders. The 90 Day suspension of the decree expired on May 9, 2002 but the Bolivian government stated that it would not re-enact the decrees during the current administration (Lebedur, 2002).

On October 7, 2004 the *cocaleros* achieved one of their biggest victories to date. They forced the government to sign an agreement allowing a further 3,200 hectares of legal coca in the cochabamba region. According to Contreras’s (2004) report, “point four of the new agreement reads: ‘the reduction of all coca crops the Tropic of Cochabamba to no less than 3,200 hectares is agreed upon, until the results of the Study of the Demand for Legal Coca Consumption are known’”.

The report quotes Evo Morales as saying, “There is joy throughout the Chapare, because if we calculate it, this allows every coca-growing family one cato of coca. This is the product of many years of struggle with previous governments, who were subject to the will of the United States Embassy”. The report concludes that “Morales said that this agreement with the government has essentially broken Law 1008, the Bolivian ‘Regulation of Coca and Controlled Substances Law’ that has been in effect since 1988, and that the coca growers have been trying to change ever since.”
The Transnational Social Movement

In Latin America, the cocalero movement is spreading from Bolivia to Peru. According to Muller (2003), last June fifty peasants met with Peru’s President and its Drug Tsar and made an agreement which was signed by both sides. However, due to pressure by the US government, the Peruvian government reneged. In April 2003, a large demonstration in Peru of cocaleros marched to the national capital, Lima, and met with President Alejandro Toledo. This followed strikes, protests, and roadblocks that had occurred earlier. The chief demands by coca farmers include the suspension of forcible coca eradication, a larger quota of legally grown coca, subsidies for alternate crops and freedom for their jailed leader, Nelson Palomino. As further evidence of the social movement broadening its coalition, the New York Times reported that in Peru the discontent in coca growing regions is benefiting the Shining Path. Michael Shifter, of the policy group Inter-American dialogue told the Times, “Right now Shining Path is strongest in coca growing areas. To the extent that the US pushes on [coca] eradication targets without any kind of flexibility, it makes people there much more amenable to turning to violent protest or insurgent groups like the Shining Path” (Rohter, 2003).

Hill (2004) in his testimony to US congress agreed, “Peru’s large indigenous population remains relatively politically inactive and has not been mobilized to the extent seen in Bolivia … Ominously, SL [Shining Path] has now adopted the FARC (Colombian rebels) model of protecting narcotics traffickers in exchange for funding”. US Drug Czar, John Walters, stated that Bolivia and Peru had suffered setbacks in their anti drug efforts. “[Colombian] President Uribe is the model for Bolivia and Peru to follow … the issue for them is how to reduce the drug problem, which is being used to feed political uprising” (Ledebur, 2003).

In Colombia, a presidential candidate in 2002 declared that if he became president he would legalize drugs (he finished third). Senator Naomi Sanin, another presidential
candidate, called for an international conference to address failed anti-drug strategies. In August 2001, a bill was introduced to legalize the cultivation, production, distribution and consumption of psychoactive substances under the control of a state monopoly. Another bill was introduced to suspend chemical eradication of Colombian coca and opium poppy fields and to exempt small farmers who grow the crops from criminal charges. Finally, during the Thirty-first General Assembly of Governors, 4 of the governors requested that the central government lead a broad international debate on drug legalization (Tokatlian, 2002).

There is a growing drug law reform movement across Latin America and evidence of resource mobilization. In fact, February 2003 saw the first conference entitled “Out From the Shadows: Ending Prohibition in the 21st Century” in Merida, Mexico. Over 300 academics, activists, government officials and legislators attended. Amongst the participants were members of congress from six countries – Bolivia, Costa Rica, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Italy (Saytanides 2003).

A report on the DRCNet website (“Out From the Shadows”, 2003), one of the major sponsors of the summit, said that a major hurdle that needs to be overcome [in the mobilization of a hemispheric social movement] is the North American emphasis on libertarianism and the Latin American emphasis on community. Ethan Nadelmann touched on how the drug law reform movement in North America focuses on libertarian principles whilst the Latin American movement focuses on concern for community and anti-imperialism.

However, the report continues, “But ideological and other divisions at Merida should not be overstated. Most of the conference, both in formal sessions and informal conversations, centered on addressing the concrete problems of creating a hemispheric movement for regulation and legalization”. According to Daugirdas (2003), Ethan Nadelmann at the conference suggested that the best approach is not to forge solidarity,
but rather to remain decentralized. “Although there is a growing transnational movement for drug policy reform, Nadelmann believes it cannot succeed as such, but rather as a collective of nationalist movements”.

The DRCNet report concludes:

“But all in all, conference attendees seemed uniformly happy to be there and pleased with the results. They were, after all, present at the birth of what promises to be a vigorous and growing hemispheric drug reform movement that can play a vital role in a global effort to end prohibition in the 21st century.”

Further north, the cocaleros found advocates in Washington repeating their demands. In November 2003, the Washington Office on Latin America (Ledebur, 2003) issued a special update on Bolivia saying:

“His [Sanchez de Lozada] fall from power in October should serve as a wake up call to Washington, which has largely ignored the crisis brewing in its own backyard … The socio-economic situation in poor countries like Bolivia is further exacerbated by rigid US drug control policies. US inflexibility on meeting coca eradication targets has left many rural Bolivian families without income, has generated social conflict and violence, and has contributed to Sanchez de Lozada’s increasing lack of legitimacy… Washington should make two contributions:

- The US government should provide significantly more economic assistance to Bolivia for development efforts, and do so without linking it to anti-drug objectives.
- The US government should also waive coca eradication targets for 2003 and support Bolivian government efforts to:
  - Negotiate the terms under which any future coca eradication will be carried out
  - Carry out an independent study of the legal coca market; and
  - Reform anti-drug legislation as deemed appropriate or necessary by Bolivian actors

A further indicator of the cocaleros transnational impact is that they are being talked about in US Congress. General James T. Hill, Army Commander of the United States Southern Command, testified before the House Armed Services Committee of the United States House of Representatives on March 24, 2004. In his testimony he explained his version of the situation in Bolivia over the past year:

There are legitimate and historic grievances, manifested partially in tension over indigenous traditions that revolve around growing coca in limited amounts as part of their
native culture. Yet the limited amounts never seem to stay limited, and the cocaleros who seek expanded rights to grow coca certainly envision the profits from illicit narcotics rather than the practice of ancient traditions. These cocaleros have found leaders who have tapped into indigenous and other social tensions. Indigenous groups, working with the labor unions and others, mounted violent protests last October that led to the eventual resignation of then President Gonzalo Sanches de Lozada. If radicals continue to hijack the indigenous movement, we could find ourselves faced with a narco-state that supports the uncontrolled cultivation of coca … Bolivia bears very close scrutiny in the upcoming year.

One last transnational impact that the cocaleros have had has been to force their government to represent their interests at the UN. According to the Washington Times (Andrade, 2004) the Bolivian government was planning a proposal to be presented at the UN General Assembly meeting in Vienna in April, to legalize coca. According to the newspaper report, Evo Morales “maintains that if the international campaign succeeds in its objective, the Bolivian coca growers would be free to export their product. Whether the UN General Assembly is willing to agree is another matter”. Bolivia and Peru delegations had already called for a discussion of decriminalization at the UN throughout the 1990s (Jelsma, 2003).

Even further a field, there appears to be a small movement in Europe to legalize coca and allow its importation for use in teas and for chewing. However, like the peasants in Bolivia, European activists blame the US for thwarting their attempts. Oomen (2003) told the Vienna Civic Center:

One experience we had in 1995, during our first campaign to legalize coca, was in the Luxembourg parliament at the Chambre des Députés. One member proposed a parliamentary resolution to ask the government to allow the import of coca leaves and inoffensive derivate to the country. The resolution was approved unanimously in the session of 22 February 1995. The next morning the US Embassy called the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg to ask if the deputies had gone crazy.

**Conclusion**

Clearly, there is a social movement in Bolivia caused by the global War on Drugs. The cocaleros often demonstrate and protest against the War on Drugs which they see as
primarily the result of United States pressure. This social movement has been able to reform drug laws. Bolivia passed a very repressive drug law in 1988 yet some articles in this law were not prohibitionist. The article which allowed legal coca to grow in certain areas was a clear result of the growing power of the cocaleros social movement. Further reforms in 1996, 2002, and 2004 can also be seen to be caused in large part by this powerful national movement.

The impact of a transnational social movement on Bolivia’s coca laws was probably very limited. The transnational movement is only in its infancy. However, as the transnational movement grows it may provide Bolivia’s cocaleros with a larger opportunity structure. For instance, if Colombia were to pass laws legalizing drug production, the USA may re-think its entire Latin American drug policy. However, for Bolivia to achieve any meaningful drug law reforms it may require a transnational movement putting pressure on Washington (in Washington).
CONCLUSION

Introduction

This chapter begins by assessing the evidence on the hypothesis and concluding that there is little evidence to suggest that a transnational social movement caused drug law reforms in Australia and Bolivia. The second section gives some detail on what my thesis reveals about the nature of transnational social movements and some of the problems facing the transnational drug law reform movement. This is followed by some recommendations on how the movement can organize more effectively to achieve drug law reforms. These findings are then applied to International Relations theories where I conclude that my case studies vindicate the realist paradigm. The chapter ends with my recommendations for further research on this topic.

Did a Transnational Social Movement Cause Drug Law Reforms?

The two case studies on coca law reform in Bolivia and heroin law reform in Australia found no substantial evidence that a transnational social movement was a causal factor. However, there is evidence that a transnational social movement is growing in resistance to the global War on Drugs.

Studying a timeline of when contentious social movement activity occurred in relation to drug law reforms and comments by lawmakers, little evidence can be found that a transnational social movement had any impact on the local social movement activity or the subsequent law reform. The case studies presented the evidence that lawmakers responded to a local social movement in each case but there is no evidence that
lawmakers responded to a transnational social movement. Further, there is no evidence that any transnational social movement activity preceded or caused a drug law reform.

I intended to do a third case study on marijuana laws in North America, but decided that it would have little impact on the conclusion because the findings would be quite similar. As the literature on transnational social movement theory and resistance to globalization predicted, my findings support the idea that global forces (i.e. the War on Drugs) are impacting on similar social movements arising in various locations. Much of the literature also focuses on the difficulty in organizing a transnational social movement and my findings further substantiate these ideas.

It should be noted however, that a transnational social movement is growing in resistance to the War on Drugs. Since the 1980s, forms of resistance have occurred in European, Canadian and Australian illegal safe injecting facilities which ultimately resulted in the legal reforms to legally sanction such facilities in Europe, Vancouver and Sydney. Similarly, the indigenous social movement which has spread throughout North America and South America had an impact on the Bolivian cocaleros taking pride in their culture of coca. Although neither of these transnational movements had a direct impact on the law reforms, it is possible the reforms would not have happened without the transnational movements.

**The Nature of Transnational Social Movements**

This thesis can elucidate the nature of transnational social movements. Firstly, the concept of transnational repression may become a useful tool in analyzing transnational social movements. Further, the two case studies show that it is extremely hard to organize a transnational social movement and for such a movement to have an impact on domestic policies. Some of the problems which can be identified in the transnational social movement for drug law reform are a lack of agreed goals, a lack of communication, and a lack of solidarity.
One aspect of this thesis which may further transnational social movement theory is the concept of transnational repression. The War on Drugs may be part of Peck and Tickell’s (2002) concept of roll-out neo-liberalism where repression has spread from government to government to contain the people dispossessed by globalization. This transnational repression may suggest that transnational social movement theory needs to go back to the basics, so to speak. Just as early social movement theory focused on an aggrieved population, it may become an essential part of transnational social movement theory to identify a transnationally repressed populace. Where transnational repression can be identified (for instance, in the case of gay people, religious minorities, the environment), the beginnings of a transnational social movement may be sown. Tarrow (1998) theorizes that when there is severe repression, social movements are less likely to organize and solidarity is harder to form. Although according to Lovemen (1998) severe repression may work in the movement’s favor.

Firstly, there is a lack of disagreement on goals and aims. This is a problem which will affect many transnational social movements (Giugni, 2002). Different people and different groups have vastly different aims within the drug law reform social movement. Many participants in Australia simply had the goal of reducing heroin overdose deaths on the streets of their own city without making the connection with the wider War on Drugs being fought around the world in places such as Bolivia. Similarly, participants in Bolivia are not concerned that activists in Australia are blaming the War on Drugs for causing overdose deaths in Australia. This has meant that activists in Australia have done little to help the coyleros and vice versa despite the fact they are both campaigning against the War on Drugs.

An integral aspect of a transnational social movement is communication networks (Routledge, 2003). A reason that the transnational social movement had little impact on drug law reforms may be that the reforms studied here occurred from the late 1980s to the
late 1990s and perhaps transnational forces were not as strong then as they are today and might be in the future. To date, there has been little effort to coordinate protest activity from one country to another. As Routledge discusses, a large part of the problem is the imbalance between access to technology in the Developed and Developing Worlds. Transnational social movements need to find ways to overcome this imbalance and ensure that activists from all parts of the world have fair and equal participation. If participants feel that their concerns are being neglected they will be unproductive members of the social movement.

There also appears to be a lack of solidarity amongst the various movements that make up the transnational social movement. This lack of solidarity may be caused by the large distances which separate the activists – the tyranny of distance. A factor may be an ignorance that other similar movements are happening in different countries (a lack of insurgent consciousness as defined by Bluthenal (1998)). Lack of solidarity may be caused by a lack of identity, affinity, and reciprocity - communication and networking between activists from country to country on how they can help each other (Waterman, 2002).

A further impediment to solidarity may be the different nature of social movements in developing and industrialized countries. In under-developed countries, a traditional definition of a social movement – that it involves a large group taking to the streets, risking life and limb, in sustained contention with elites and the state – may still apply. However, in modern industrialized states with more effective communication networks, where a much smaller group can advocate social change through a variety of methods, a new definition of social movement may be needed. Lifestyles in modern industrial countries may not facilitate ongoing contentious activity, but they do allow more refined efforts, such as letter writing and email campaigns.
This would indicate that although movements in economically developed countries can communicate more easily with one another, other factors (such as the growing middle-class) hinder the formation of transnational social movements. Conversely, movements in less economically developed countries may lack the resources to communicate across borders but because contentious activity is more widespread, they are able to have an equal impact. This dichotomy may explain why a transnational social movement appeared to have little impact on drug law reforms in both an industrialized and a less developed country.

**How Can A Transnational Social Movement Further Develop For Drug Law Reform?**

Having identified the problems facing the transnational social movement it could be helpful to see what advice the theorists may offer to solve them. According to the literature I reviewed, the movement needs to establish a set of goals, to strengthen networks among activists, to develop insurgent consciousness, to develop an innovative repertoire of contention, and it needs to take advantage of the political opportunity structure when it opens.

One of the most important early steps for a social movement to take is to establish a clearly defined set of goals that the majority of participants agree on. As mentioned above, this can present a major problem for a social movement which can remain locally based or gain greater solidarity by creating a more universal politics that transcends narrow solidarities (Routledge, 2003). Although there is widespread disagreement on what drug policy would be most effective (for instance, many people support marijuana law reform but not heroin law reform) agreement should be possible on several points. Firstly, many movement participants agree that incarceration should not be used for non-violent drug offences. Secondly, there needs to be widespread agreement on targeting the three UN conventions which affect activists in all countries (and advocate punishment for drug use). Third, widespread consensus can probably be reached amongst activists in
most countries that American military intervention in foreign countries should be discontinued.

To establish a set of goals, a good communication network is necessary (Routledge, 2003). The IHRA conferences and the Out From the Shadows conference are good beginnings but they also represent one of the central problems identified above. The IHRA is primarily concerned with heroin injecting whilst the Out From the Shadows conference, based in Latin America, was primarily concerned with coca and cocaine. There needs to be an organization that is broader and opposed to the whole War on Drugs to bring the various local social movements together.

To increase insurgent consciousness it is necessary to make it widely known that there is a growing social movement working for drug law reform (Fireman and Gramson (1979)). Drug law reformers need to make it more widely known to the huge number of illegal drug users that they are working hard to change the laws to prevent them from going to jail. Although the notorious problem of free-riders needs to be overcome, activists need to clearly announce to as wide an audience as possible the benefits of drug law reform.

Another important part of social movement formation is developing an innovative repertoire of contention (Tarrow, 1998). In regards to a transnational social movement, this requires the diffusion of ideas. This has already been seen with the chew-in the cocaleros have developed which has been adopted from sit-ins and teach-ins. Further, at the marijuana march I attended in Vancouver, 2002, activists adopted a similar tactic by openly smoking marijuana in defiance of the many attendant police. Perhaps, the illegal SIF which opened in Sydney was a similar tactic as activists condoned heroin injection on the premises. This repertoire of contention needs to be developed and encouraged although the political opportunity structure does not presently allow it.
Activists need to recognize openings in the political opportunity structure (Tarrow, 1998). Drug law reforms are occurring in many locales and nation-states on a continuing basis and these need to be widely publicized so that other countries know it is possible. When drug law reforms occur, it opens the political opportunity structure. This partly explains how the activists in Sydney could open an illegal safe injecting facility as the opportunity structure had been opened when Australia adopted an official policy of harm reduction. Similarly, the cocaleros can march down the street in the thousands chewing coca because they have forced the political opportunity structure in that country to open to the point where they won’t be persecuted for it. By recognizing these openings in the political opportunity structure, activists were able to cause drug law reforms. Activists need to continually press to open the political opportunity structure and perhaps widespread visible non-violent drug use is an appropriate method (this would perhaps represent the triad of Chin and Mittleman (2002) by turning infrapolitics into counter-hegemony).

The transnational social movement also needs to recognize opportunities to open the political opportunity structure. For instance, 2008 marks the deadline for the United Nations latest attempts to eradicate drugs from the planet. As this will clearly fail and as many activists see the United Nations as the major obstacle to broader law reforms, drug law reformers need to be prepared to capitalize on the failure and use it to demonstrate the futility of the War on Drugs. The year 2008 will also mark a presidential election in the USA – the other major force behind the War on Drugs. It is important the social movement make drug law reform an issue at this election to combine with the perceived failure of the United Nations.

**Relevance to IR Theories**

As discussed briefly in the introduction, the realist paradigm would predict that a transnational social movement would have little impact on local and national drug law reforms. The realist paradigm would predict that states, and especially strong states,
would ignore such a movement and continue to do what best served its own interests. Further, the realist paradigm suggests that international bodies are often dominated by strong states to further their own interests and international bodies do not represent smaller, weaker states.

It would come as no surprise to a realist theorist that a transnational social movement has had limited impact on reforming local and national drug laws. The pressure of the USA and UN has resulted in prohibitive drug laws in the countries studied and a transnational social movement has not been able to reform these laws. The networks created by grassroots organizations and the diffusion of ideas these networks facilitate have been no match for the brute force of state power holders. Even when social movements have been able to cause a drug law reform in one area – e.g. Sydney’s heroin safe injecting facilities - the change in state policy has had little impact on other states’ drug policies.

It should also be noted that a Marxist approach would also predict that the relations between activists in producer and consumer countries would have difficulty in organizing their efforts together and this has so far been the case.

**Recommendations for Further Research**

I believe that the hypothesis, “transnational social movements have caused drug law reforms at the local and state levels”, is a strong one. Social movement theory has been inadequate in measuring the impact of social movements and this problem may be exacerbated with transnational social movement theory. Measuring the change on a tangible such as public policy can be an effective way to measure social movements’ impact.

To further this study of a transnational social movement’s impact on drug law reforms it may be interesting to review Giugni’s (2002) suggestions. He suggests to: identify similarities across nation-states; look for possible explanatory factors; formulate clear and
testable hypotheses; test the hypotheses on different movements and in different circumstances. I think this thesis has followed the four steps and is a good beginning.

Further research may perhaps look more at a pluralist public policy perspective and try to assess the influence of a transnational social movement compared to the other forces in public policy (e.g., media, lobby groups (especially those lobby groups campaigning for drug prohibition), electorates, bureaucracy). Burstein (1999), Wald et al (1996), and Culverson (1996) all look at local social movements within a public policy approach but no study has yet been done on a transnational social movement within a pluralist theory of democracy.

Further study would also benefit from conducting interviews and surveys with participants in the social movement. It would enable the researcher to gauge the opinion within the social movement about whether they were a transnational social movement or not. It would be particularly interesting to gauge the responses from developed countries compared to the responses from less developed countries. It would also offer a wide variety of answers on the impact that participants thought their movement was having on a transnational scale and give evidence of individuals’ personal aims within the movement.

One can only feel that transnational social movements are constantly growing and their impact on international relations will grow too. Further study may benefit from tracking the changes from the early days when transnational social movements appear to be having little impact to perhaps the day in the future when they are a force to be reckoned with. If the War on Drugs is to be repealed one day, a transnational social movement may be instrumental.
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