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Anyone who has spent any significant time within any of the world’s best intelligence communities will have encountered the term, “Five Eyes.” My first exposure was early during intelligence school when my first assumption was “Five Eyes” was another high performance imaging satellite to memorize for a quiz. The actual truth reaches significantly further. Anthony Wells’ book, *Between Five Eyes* describes fifty years of intelligence sharing practices for U.S., Australian, Canadian, U.K. and New Zealand Intelligence agencies. The work begins with Wells’ personal experiences as a Ph.D. student and British Naval Surface Warfare Officer before expanding to include his more recent perceptions during a lifetime working as an intelligence professional. Never leaving behind his initial nautical focus, his experiences carry him through today’s challenges and include highlighting the author’s change from British military officer to an American citizen and paid political consultant. More of a treatise on how intelligence aids in creating solutions than a historical approach towards the Five Eyes partnership, the book mirrors the overall alliance through demonstrating potential greatness mired within the toil of daily life.

Pursuing a chronological path, Wells wanders from the partnership’s World War II beginnings as an outgrowth of Franklin Roosevelt’s and Winston Churchill’s Allied conferences. The need to overcome the Axis powers led to developing the now famous cryptologic projects originating at Bletchley Park and eventually to cracking the German’s Enigma machine as well as defeating the Japanese Purple code. Briefly touching on how U.S. defense restructured in 1947, the trail leads on to the creation of shared US and UK practices with the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1961 mirroring the UK’s Defense Intelligence staff in 1964, as well as creating paired naval intelligence organizations. Wells focuses on the National Reconnaissance Office’s contributions to satellite reconnaissance as a central block in the Five Eyes, but spends only a single line during the early development chapter on the relationship between the National Security Agency (NSA) and Government Communications Headquarters.
Collection from the satellite systems is an essential part of intelligence operations but focusing on collection over analysis and production leaves some gaps in transitioning to actionable intelligence. The book concentrates throughout on Wells’ personal experience with intelligence elements.

The journey begins during the author’s doctoral studies in the late 1960s, pursuing the historical effects of intelligence on the British military. Transitioning afterwards to sea duty, he followed that with working directly with American experts planning “Sea War 1985” as a UK liaison to help build a future naval warfare outlook. Despite leaving before completing the plan, he still managed to learn the importance of signals intelligence practices and coalition sharing as related to tracking difficult targets under challenging circumstances. Matching this experience with an English law degree, Wells highlights the three characteristics underpinning a lasting Five Eyes relationship: The need to be constantly prepared for a dynamic threat, the ability of alliances to strengthen responsiveness, and a commitment to allowing self-determination and self-government globally. Despite this second section’s concentration on intelligence developments from 1976 to 1983, more than two-thirds of the section discusses prior developments. After returning to England, Wells worked counter-intelligence practices rather than traditional ISR functions such as collection, reporting, production, or analysis.

The next section explores from 1983 to 2001, with the experience becoming less personal and more focused on global threat changes rather than Wells’ individual interaction. Disappointingly, the book increasingly emphasizes naval warfare developments rather than a holistic approach towards changing intelligence practices. For example, Wells highlights the Tomahawk missile as an example of the precision guided weapon primarily used during the initial Gulf War with 288 missiles fired at about 1,000 lbs each or 144 tons. This compares poorly to the close to 8,000 tons of precision munitions employed by the coalition air forces. Again, returning to naval practices despite significant world upheaval, the chapter’s largest portion discusses a Fleet Battle Experiment to integrate intelligence with the current command and control practices. Largely missing are any discussions of the Soviet Union’s downfall, engagement in Afghanistan, the Strategic Defense Initiative’s acceleration of space, or
even the ten years after the Gulf War spent enforcing Iraq’s Northern and Southern No-Fly Zones.

Moving on to events following the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, the book again wanders away from an intelligence focus to contemplate more esoteric discussions about privacy challenges, the emergence of cyber, Middle East policy, and intelligence separations. Many of these touch on intelligence practices but are more directly driven by each nation’s culture than any Five Eyes consolidated approach. Wells completely ignores the second Gulf War and the conflict in Afghanistan, and he just briefly mentions the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) resurgence. Even more interesting, he relates ISIS’ foundation to first Gulf War effects rather than Iraq’s American occupation from 2003-2011. Many analysts prefer to attribute ISIS’ rise to the inability of the Iraqi government to clamp down on internal militias once faced with a dedicated date for the American military’s withdraw. The final chapter considers future conflict areas without settling on any one area.

The intelligence discussions contained were enjoyable, but two areas proved disappointing after the *Between Five Eyes* marketing campaign: the lack of historical explanation about more recent developments and the emphasis on naval intelligence improvements. Numerous intelligence works exist from individual agencies’ perspectives such as James Bamford’s books on the National Security Agency, volumes of work on the Central Intelligence agency, or even Vasili Mitrokhin’s works with Christopher Andrew on the KGB, but this appears to be the first dedicated to the Five Eyes partnership. Each of the other volumes builds personal and episodic approaches to developing and employing intelligence. The wide scope attempted by Wells falls short of the mark for me. Perhaps a better approach would have been to limit the sub-title to, “Fifty Years of Naval Intelligence Sharing.” The overall descriptions are accurate and potentially useful for those new to the area, but lack the dedicated insight more experienced intelligence professionals might desire.

Overall, *Between Five Eyes* makes for a pleasant read without challenging any of the reader’s preconceptions about national alliances or intelligence integration practiced daily by each of these great countries. The chronological approach starts well, although the period after 1990 appears in five consecutive chapters. Dr. Wells perhaps should have pursued a
more topic-centric approach to deliver key aspects regarding how the different nations pursued partnerships across different areas. The book reads quickly, is exceptionally well-written as befits the author’s long academic experience and contains the occasional insight. Those less familiar with intelligence agencies will likely enjoy the discussion and I would recommend it to those just beginning their historical journey into global intelligence practices and strategies.

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