
12-21-2020

Failure to Protect?: Applying the DRRI-2 Scales to Rwanda and Srebrenica

Elizabeth Mason
Freie Universitaet Berlin

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp>

Recommended Citation

Mason, Elizabeth (2020) "Failure to Protect?: Applying the DRRI-2 Scales to Rwanda and Srebrenica," *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal*: Vol. 14: Iss. 3: 27–47.

DOI:

<https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.3.1741>

Available at: <https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol14/iss3/6>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal* by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Failure to Protect?: Applying the DRRI-2 Scales to Rwanda and Srebrenica

Elizabeth Mason
Freie Universität Berlin
Berlin, Germany

Introduction

In 2007, The Mothers of Srebrenica, an organization which represents 6,000 women whose family members were massacred at Srebrenica in 1995, filed a civil action in the District Court of the Hague against the United Nations (UN) and the Dutch Government. The Mothers of Srebrenica trial brought international attention to the role in which UN peacekeepers stationed at Srebrenica played in the massacre of over 8,000 Bosniak men and boys by the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) under the command of General Mladić.¹ During the same period, the actions of peacekeepers in Rwanda, particularly those of Lieutenant Luc Lemaire, who by withdrawing the 90 UN troops under his command, abandoned 2,000 Tutsi refugees to be murdered by the Interahamwe,² begged the question of what role UN peacekeepers played in the genocides.³ Were the UN peacekeepers helpless bystanders or were they a culpable party that had the ability to stop massacres but instead made a conscious decision to allow them to take place?

This article reanalyzes both the situational and operational factors on the ground that influenced the decisions of UN peacekeepers during their deployments in Srebrenica and Rwanda. By approaching these events from a mental health perspective, it is shown that there are numerous factors which gravely impacted the mental state of UN peacekeepers. These factors, when combined with the operational limitations which peacekeepers faced, were ultimately detrimental to their ability to take any serious action to prevent genocide from taking place. I take a more in-depth look at the aspects of their experiences which the peacekeepers themselves report as significant or defining factors of their deployment and analyze them using the diagnostic questions asked of returning veterans found in the Deployment Risk and Resilience Inventory (DRRI-2) Scales.⁴ The DRRI-2 Scales are an instrument used to assess veterans' risk of or resilience against developing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) following their deployment. The use of these scales will aid in shedding new light on the daily conditions that the UN peacekeepers operated under and which only eyewitnesses who lived these experiences can describe how they impacted their mental wellbeing and the agency they felt they could exercise. This article sheds light on previously under-explored stressors that

¹ "UN and the Netherlands Are Sued Over Srebrenica Killings," *The New York Times*, June 4, 2007, accessed November 8, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/world/europe/04iht-serbs.4.5992698.html>.

² The Interahamwe was one of the extremist groups, comprised of younger men, who participated in the Rwandan Genocide. See Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 54.

³ Journalist Chris McGreal pinpoints one of the key arguments against UN peacekeeping in Rwanda and Bosnia. He states "[t]here were good reasons to question the point of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s and to wonder if it was not costing as many lives as it was protecting by offering an illusion of security. The murdered Tutsis at the school might have stood a better chance if they had fled to Uganda." This typifies the criticism that UN enclaves in fact did not provide an area where refugees could expect safety, but instead concentrated them to make them an even easier target for the perpetrators who knew that the UN peacekeepers protecting their targets would not open fire on them due to the rules of engagement dictated to them by the UN high command. See Chris McGreal, "What's the Point of Peacekeepers When They Don't Keep the Peace?: From Rwanda to Bosnia, Haiti to Congo, Failures Raise Questions About Future of United Nations Blue Helmets," *The Guardian*, September 17, 2015, accessed November 4, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/17/un-united-nations-peacekeepers-rwanda-bosnia>.

⁴ To view the diagnostic questions used to understand soldiers' experiences before, during and after deployment, please refer to Dawne Vogt et al., *Deployment Risk and Resilience Inventory-2 (DRRI-2)* (Boston: National Center for Posttraumatic Disorder (PTSD), 2012), accessed November 27, 2019, <https://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/assessment/documents/DRRI2scales.pdf>.

would have influenced the heavily criticized decisions of both UN commands in Rwanda and Srebrenica in not doing more to prevent injury or death to civilians.

Before discussing at length the impact which the specific conditions of their deployment had on the agency of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia and Rwanda, it is important to outline the orders which dictated their actions and which they were expected to carry out as soldiers no matter the conditions they faced. For the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Srebrenica, their mandate was outlined in three UN Resolutions: Resolution 819—issued April 16, 1993, Resolution 824—issued May 6, 1993, and Resolution 836—issued June 4, 1993. These resolutions outline that the UN peacekeepers were to ensure that Srebrenica and the surrounding area be established as a safe zone⁵ where the ill and wounded could be transported from and to ensure both through forces on the ground and through negotiations undertaken at higher levels that humanitarian aid could reach the enclave unhindered.⁶ In Resolution 836, the security council also condemned all efforts by the Bosnian Serb forces to ethnically cleanse the city of Bosniaks.⁷ Therefore, the mandate for UN troops in Srebrenica was to protect the safe zone, to ensure that humanitarian aid was able to reach the safe zone and it was implied, although not explicitly stated that UN troops should prevent evacuations of civilians by Bosnian Serb forces.⁸ Finally, only in the last resolution issued, UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 836, were UN troops authorized to use force in Bosnian safe zones. Use of force was only authorized in cases of self defense, in response to bombardment or armed incursion of the safe zone by any party involved, or if those parties obstructed the transport of supplies to safe zones.⁹

Particularly for the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, the growing political concerns of the UN, which will be discussed at greater length later in this article, played a decisive role in the creation of both situational and operational factors which compromised the success of UN peacekeepers in carrying out their missions and ultimately put them at greater risk. Initially, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) established in October 1993, was deployed to see that the Arusha Peace Agreement was adhered to.¹⁰ This mission was a challenge for peacekeepers from the beginning due to the presence of Hutu-extremist elements in Rwanda, the political instability of the Hutu-ran government, and doubts within the UN that the Rwandan government could successfully implement a transitional government.¹¹ The early Arusha peacekeeping mission was tied to political progress and peacekeepers on the ground were confronted by early 1994, with a rapidly devolving political situation culminating in the assassination of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, reigniting civil war.¹² With the targeting and murder of Belgian peacekeepers and mounting international pressure, this prompted the UN to make the decision to withdraw the bulk of UN forces in Rwanda on April 21, 1994.¹³ UN troops remaining in Rwanda were mandated not only to contribute to a cease-fire agreement, but to also establish safe zones and provide security for the humanitarian aid being delivered to civilians. Most pertinent to our discussion, UN forces in Rwanda were indeed mandated, unlike in Srebrenica, to “contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda.”¹⁴

⁵ United Nations (UN), *Security Council Resolution 819 (1993)*, April 16, 1993 (UN Doc. S/RES/819), 2, para. 6.

⁶ UN, *Security Council Resolution 836 (1993)*, June 4, 1993 (UN Doc. S/RES/836), 3, paras. 5, 10.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1, paras. 5–6.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 3, para. 9.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Michael Barnett, “The Politics of Indifference at the United Nations and Genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia,” in *This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia*, ed. Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. Meštrović (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 141.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, 142.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 145.

¹⁴ UN, *Security Council Resolution 918 (1994)*, May 17, 1994 (UN Doc. S/RES/918), 3, paras. 2–3.

Since its first appearance as a psychological diagnosis in 1980, PTSD has come a long way in terms of recognition as a diagnosis and also in its connection with earlier descriptions of stress-related disorders including the diagnosis of shell shock during and after World War I.¹⁵ However, it is only with recent conflicts in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 21st century that PTSD has become a part of the public and psychiatric discourse prompted by research with veterans particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom.¹⁶ One characteristic of PTSD is that its onset is dependent on external events. This defining feature of the disorder has led to a debate over the validity of PTSD as a diagnosis, questioning if the disorder, which originated in the context of military psychiatry, has become an overapplied social construct.¹⁷ However, especially for historians who study war, genocide, and displacement, the reciprocal relationship between the psychological factors that drive human agency and their impact on history demands further exploration. We would be dipping into the role of a psychologist if we tried to suppose knowing the inner motivations of a person. What we can reveal as historians are the events and pre-conditions that impact the agency of historical actors. By looking at decision formation and analyzing the agency of historical actors through the lens of mental health, historians have a new tool to understand the factors which impact that agency. This article analyzes the accounts given by the UN commander in Rwanda, Roméo Dallaire, the UN commander at the École Technique Officielle (ETO), Luc Lemaire, the Dutch Commander in Srebrenica, Thom Karremans, and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) volunteers at the UN compound in Srebrenica to better understand, given the circumstances under which the UN peacekeepers were working, what can we as fellow human beings have expected from these men?

The tool that I will use to better understand the multi-layered sources of stress which characterized the experiences of UN personnel in Rwanda and Srebrenica are the DRRI-2 Scales. These scales function as a series of questions that allow veterans post-deployment to identify on a number scale how much or how often they were exposed to certain deployment-related factors. These factors either put war veterans at risk, as in, they put stress on the mental health of the individual, or help them to be resilient, providing mental support against developing PTSD.¹⁸ These scales were modified in 2012 to address a wider range of both intrapersonal factors, such as sexual harassment and also increased concerns, particularly for soldiers deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, of insurgency warfare and exposure to nuclear, biological and chemical agents. I have chosen the DRRI-2 Scales because it is the most detailed assessment of a veteran's deployment experiences, especially in exploring the relationship with the development of PTSD and witnessing the consequences of war.¹⁹ This includes witnessing

¹⁵ See Nancy C. Andreasen, "Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A History and a Critique," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 1208, no. 1 (2010), accessed May 8, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05699.x>.

¹⁶ For a more complete overview of PTSD as a Diagnosis, please refer to Nancy Andreasen's article cited above. Ibid.

¹⁷ This refers to a response to the criticisms that Derek Summerfield presents in his paper where he argues that the diagnosis of PTSD is currently being used by anyone who seeks to medicalize their traumatic experiences or seeks compensation for "relatively commonplace events" such as accidents, muggings, or difficult pregnancies. Summerfield even goes so far as to refer to this system as a "trauma industry." See Derek Summerfield, "The Invention of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Social Usefulness of a Psychiatric Category," *BMJ: British Medical Journal* 322, no. 7278 (2001), 96, accessed June 28, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.322.7278.95>. However, Summerfield's standpoint was highly criticized by Shalev et. al. in their article "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder" where they criticise any medical professional that questions the existence of a disease or disorder rather than trying to relieve the patient of their pain. See Arieh Y. Shalev et al., "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder," *BMJ: British Medical Journal* 322, no. 7297 (2001), 1302, accessed November 21, 2018, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25467014>.

¹⁸ Dawne Vogt et al., "Deployment Risk and Resilience Inventory-2 (DRRI-2): An Updated Tool for Assessing Psychosocial Risk and Resilience Factors Among Service Members and Veterans," *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 26, no. 6 (2013), 716-717, accessed November 27, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1002/jts.21868>; Dawne Vogt et al., *Manual for the Deployment Risk and Resilience Inventory-2 (DRRI-2): A Collection of Measures for Studying Deployment-Related Experiences of Military Veterans* (Boston: National Center for PTSD, 2012), accessed November 27, 2019, <https://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/assessment/documents/drri2manual.pdf>.

¹⁹ The other alternative for a set of risk-assessment scales would be the Critical Warzone Experiences (CWE) scales.

injury or death to civilians, mass displacement, the destruction of homes and communities, and the desperation of those people affected by the conflict. With their mandate to protect and provide relief to civilians, the UN peacekeeping forces' reason for being there was not to combat an enemy force as with a soldier under normal rules of engagement, but to create the conditions for or help to maintain peace.²⁰ For this reason, scales which do not explore these experiences would not be of use for the purposes of this research.

The revised DRRI-2 Scales were created to address the shift in warfare specifically experienced by the United States military in the Middle East from the Gulf Wars to the more recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan following September 11, 2001.²¹ The subsequent changes were to address that the sustained conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan represented a shift towards insurgency warfare, which involved smaller groups of paramilitaries who could be dispersed among the civilian population. For this reason, for troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, missions could quickly shift from humanitarian missions to delivering lethal force.²² From this brief overview of the background of the DRRI-2 Scales, there are a few obvious limitations in applying these scales to understand the risk and resilience factors present for UN troops in Rwanda and Srebrenica. The first and most obvious being that the UN rules of engagement limited the use of force to such a degree that it was rarely, if ever, used.²³ So, while their mission could shift between providing humanitarian aid and protection to coming under heavy fire, UN troops were not at risk of causing accidental civilian deaths by mistaking them for enemy targets, unlike US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.²⁴ Another key limit in the application of the DRRI-2 Scales in Rwanda and Srebrenica is that the scales do not capture to what extent decisions made at a higher level by UN headquarters in New York impacted the success of missions on the ground. The indecisiveness and lack of international support in terms of firepower or pressure from the UN high command and from its member states during both peacekeeping missions was a critical operational risk factor which amplified the isolation and sense of unattainability for UN troops in both locations to carry out their respective mandates to protect safe zones and to safeguard civilians. This lack of support of relief forces, firepower, and a united diplomatic and military response were not inhibiting factors, or certainly not to the degree seen in Rwanda and Bosnia, for the deployments focused on in either the original DRRI or the revised DRRI-2 Scales.

Despite these limitations, using these scales for the purpose of compiling information regarding the deployment experiences of UN peacekeepers suits the scales' original intended function. The DRRI-2 Scales were created not as a diagnostic tool themselves, but to "provide a research inventory of risk and resilience measures" to assess deployment-related factors and what their implications are for the long-term health of veterans and servicemen.²⁵ However, creating or using such a catalogue of experiences based on their implications for an individual's mental wellbeing is often overlooked in historical approaches as a key force behind historical agency. It is these personal and unseen consequences of experiencing traumatic events that often give way to the large-scale events that shape history.

In Rwanda and Srebrenica, the massive operational restrictions stemming from the higher echelons of the UN was a decisive factor which greatly restricted the actions that UN peacekeepers in Rwanda and Srebrenica could take to protect civilian lives. However, what

²⁰ Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide*, 46.

²¹ Vogt et al., *DRRI-2: An Updated Tool*, 710–711.

²² Ibid.

²³ Barnett, *The Politics of Indifference*, 154–155.

²⁴ Though UN peacekeepers did not have a high risk of accidentally firing on and killing civilians within those limited parameters, in both cases of the evacuation of the UN safe zone in Srebrenica and in Rwanda, the UN withdrawal from the ETO were both decisive actions which directly lead to civilians being murdered. It is beyond the scope of this article to compare the mental health implications of those two actions, but it is certain that UN peacekeepers would have felt some degree of responsibility for those civilian casualties even if they were not the perpetrators.

²⁵ Vogt et al., *Manual for the DRRI-2*, 2–3.

remains under explored in the historical analysis of these events is how those operational restrictions and higher level “politics” of UN peacekeeping limited the perceived or actual decisions that peacekeepers could take at the time to prevent genocide. By reflecting on the daily conditions, experiences, and limitations described by UN commanders on the ground in Rwanda and Srebrenica through the questions presented in the DRRI-2 Scales, we can better understand their impact on agency.

The revised DRRI-2 shows six categories out of a total of seventeen which have the highest correlation with the development of PTSD. These are: *Difficult Living and Working Environment* (56%), *Perceived Threat* (55%), *Postdeployment Stressors* (55%), *Postdeployment Social Support* (46%), *Combat Experiences* (45%) and *Aftermath of Battle* (43%).²⁶

For the purposes of my research, I will focus on what the DRRI defines as “mission-related factors”—these are factors which have the potential to cause stress during a soldier’s deployment.²⁷ Of those six critical sections, I will also limit my focus to the question sections that have been discussed at length by Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire, (then) Lieutenant Luc Lemaire, and Colonel Thom Karremans and clearly constitute defining aspects of their respective deployments with the UN in Rwanda and Srebrenica.²⁸ Therefore, I will not be including the section that focuses on *Postdeployment Social Support*, nor will I discuss the section on *Postdeployment Stressors*. Furthermore, I will not be analyzing several questions from the section on *Combat Experiences* (Section D of the DRRI-2). This is due to the fact that questions 1, 2, 8, 12, 13, 16, and 17 of this section ask if soldiers were involved in scenarios where they fired their weapon, launched an assault on enemy troops or otherwise used violence to subdue a perceived enemy threat.²⁹ These questions are therefore irrelevant to the UN peacekeeping forces in Rwanda and Srebrenica, as they were under strict orders not to use force to achieve their mission.³⁰ Additionally, a further four questions in this section that ask whether or not soldiers witnessed a member of the unit of civilians being seriously wounded or killed are discussed at length under the sections *Perceived Threat* and *The Aftermath of Battle* (which has been identified in this article as *Post-Combat Experiences* and therefore will not be discussed at length in the *Combat Experiences* section). I will also note for each section discussed in this article, if any further questions are not relevant to this research and why, the most notable being questions relating to exposure to nuclear, biological and chemical agents (NBCs).

Difficult Living and Working Environment

The first section I will be exploring is Section C of DRRI-2, which focuses on the environment in which soldiers were deployed and the conditions of their daily lives during deployment. It is by analyzing the accounts of the day-to-day environment that the UN personnel in both Rwanda and Srebrenica had to operate in and the questions asked by DRRI-2 Scales that we can gain some understanding about how those conditions impacted the mental state of UN troops. Section C focuses on analyzing aspects of the deployment environment and living conditions which after a period of time would have a negative impact on someone’s mental health. These include questions such as: Could you sleep? Did you have enough food? Was the climate of deployment uncomfortable? Could you shower when needed and were you living in sanitary

²⁶ Vogt et al., *Manual for the DRRI-2*, 16, table 5.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 3–4.

²⁸ Hereafter referred to as (General) Dallaire, (Lt.) Lemaire and (Col.) Karremans.

²⁹ Vogt et al., *DRRI-2*, 5.

³⁰ However, it is also noted that the CWE scales provide a condensed measure of perceived danger during deployment which tended to focus more on direct exposure to combat, which also proves problematic as the UN soldiers in Rwanda and Srebrenica were under a strict order to not fire their weapons unless their own lives were at risk. See Karen-Inge Karstoft et al., “Perceived Danger During Deployment: a Rasch Validation of an Instrument Assessing Perceived Combat Exposure and the Witnessing of Combat Consequences in a War Zone,” *European Journal of Psychotraumatology* 9, no. 1 (2018), 3, accessed November 16, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1080/20008198.2018.1487224>.

conditions? Were you allowed do the things needed to get your job done? Could you get as much privacy as you needed?³¹

In Karremans' testimony against VRS General Ratko Mladić at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in July 1996, he describes the conditions of the UN enclave in Srebrenica as it was cut off by the VRS blockade one year before, from April to July 1995.³² Karremans' testimony reveals that if he or the other Dutch soldiers in Srebrenica filled out Section C of the DRRI-2, many of their responses would reflect a high degree of exposure to adverse conditions in their living and working environment. Karremans' testimony describes an atmosphere of desperation experienced by UN troops in the final weeks before the forced evacuation from the Srebrenica enclave. He describes that due to the blockade, refugees under their care were starving and without adequate medical attention while UN troops lived off their combat rations for a considerable period of time.³³ Their ability to perform necessary daily tasks such as showering or more critically, carrying out their mandate to provide aid and relief to Bosnian refugees were crippled by the fact that they operated without electricity for weeks. This lack of electricity was compounded by the fact that the Dutch battalion also experienced heavy rain which lead to cold, damp conditions and also several roads leading into the enclave became impassable.³⁴ Finally, in terms of humanitarian aid being allowed into the enclave, the period between April and July of 1995, represents a distinct break with the ability to negotiate the entry of humanitarian aid that the UN and other relief organizations in Srebrenica previously enjoyed. Karremans makes it clear that the freedom of movement agreement for humanitarian aid decided in 1993 no longer applied to Srebrenica by this period.³⁵ This, compounded with impassable roads and lack of fuel for vehicles, meant that UN troops were physically trapped inside the Srebrenica enclave. Furthermore, the restriction of movement meant that for the UN soldiers inside the enclave, there was a critical lack of supplies, of personnel, and also no relief troops for current UN personnel who had been trying to improvise under the critical conditions inside the enclave.³⁶ Finally, before Karremans' first meeting with Mladić on July 11, he acknowledges in his ICTY testimony that he and the other UN troops in Srebrenica had had no sleep for the previous five days. This was due to the intensified shelling of the city by the VRS and the resulting displacement, death and injury within the enclave and in the surrounding area.³⁷ With the retreat of UN troops and refugees to the Potočari enclave, living conditions were very similar in that they were exceptionally overcrowded; there was little water in hot conditions and UN convoys which provided the only chance for medicine, food or even for timely evacuation on the ground, were not allowed through Bosnian-Serb blockades.³⁸

³¹ Ibid., 4.

³² It is important to note that Karremans' account of the UN enclave from April to July 1995 represents a period where negotiations between the UN and VRS to allow for free movement of supplies and electricity into the enclave had broken down. This represents a critical period where Bosnian Serb forces intentionally created a very desperate situation inside the enclave to leave the UN troops with no other choice but to retreat from Srebrenica. During the overall period of UN presence inside the enclave from 1993 to 1995, there were indeed other periods of power cuts and lack of supplies but often, the UN was able to negotiate humanitarian aid to be allowed back into the camp. *The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić*, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), July 4, 1996, IT-95-18-R61, 636–637.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 637.

³⁵ Ibid., 636.

³⁶ Ibid., 637–638.

³⁷ Ibid., 645.

³⁸ Cedric Ryngaert, "Peacekeepers Facilitating Human Rights Violations: The Liability of the Dutch State in the 'Mothers of Srebrenica' Cases," *Netherlands International Law Review* 64 (2017), 510, accessed April 18, 2020, <http://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-017-0101-6>.

Karremans' account of the daily conditions within the Srebrenica enclave is supported by various personnel with MSF.³⁹ Those working for MSF describe the logistical nightmare of trying to provide food, medicine, and adequate shelter for the enclave which was critically overpopulated with refugees and consistently bombarded by heavy artillery fire from Bosnian-Serb forces.⁴⁰ There are numerous references to the VRS barring vital humanitarian aid from entering the city, amounting to as much as seventy percent of supplies not reaching the enclave.⁴¹ MSF coordinator, Eric Stobbaerts, estimated that the city was filled with almost four times its pre-war population.⁴² He also describes that the only food available in the Muslim enclaves were flour, oil, tinned meat, and powdered milk, causing severe immune and nutritional deficiencies.⁴³ What the MSF testimonies do is help to give an idea of how the environment created by the Bosnian-Serb blockade and bombardment of the city impacted Karremans' ultimate decision to allow the forcible displacement of the Muslim population from the city in July 1995.⁴⁴ It is also important to note, unlike the timeline of events in Rwanda, which constituted a much shorter timeframe, the city of Srebrenica experienced these conditions in increased severity over a period of three years.⁴⁵ This of course, constitutes a prolonged exposure to increasingly desperate conditions in the city as evermore refugees fled to the enclave, more people became injured due to shellings and a critical lack of shelter, food and water. The threat in Srebrenica that existed for months, if not years, prior to the UN's withdrawal, was that people were being left to starve, freeze, or die of disease and the UN, due to the Bosnian-Serb blockade, could do little logistically to fulfil their mandate to maintain the safe zone.⁴⁶ To give an idea of just how injurious the daily conditions were to the health and life were of those within the Srebrenica enclave, it was calculated by the Court of Appeals which retried the Mothers of Srebrenica case in 2007, that the victims of the Srebrenica massacre had a mere *thirty percent* chance of survival if they had been able to remain within the UN enclave after July 12, 1995.⁴⁷ This horrific reality of daily life in the UN enclave in Srebrenica left Karremans with little choice but to withdraw on July 11. It is made clear through the MSF reports already discussed in this section, that Karremans and the UN personnel under his command faced grave challenges in protecting human life within the enclave due to the obstacles that were present in providing adequate humanitarian aid and adequate living conditions.⁴⁸ As will be discussed in the following section on perceived threat, the chance of successfully carrying out their mandate only would have continued to decrease for

³⁹ Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) International Movement, *MSF and Srebrenica:1993–2003* (MSF: 2015), 28–29, accessed June 28, 2020, accessed June 28, 2020, https://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/2019-04/MSF%20Speaking%20Out%20Srebrenica%201993-2003_1.pdf.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 36–37.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 40.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 36.

⁴³ For Stobbaerts' account of the Srebrenica enclave in November of 1994, see MSF International Movement, *MSF and Srebrenica: 1993–2003*, 36–37. For further details of the conditions regarding displaced persons at the enclave, see *Ibid.*, 28–30 and 37–38.

⁴⁴ In addition to the overall conditions described in the previous paragraph, please see MSF's additional descriptions of the VRS shelling of the city and the surrounding area and the resulting mass casualties in the days leading up to the UN withdrawal from Srebrenica. See *Ibid.*, 48–49.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴⁶ *The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić*, 638. For additional information on conditions inside the camp please refer to the citations in footnote 42.

⁴⁷ Ryngaert points out that even though the Court of Appeals put a percentage on the likelihood of survival inside the enclave for the purposes of determining the state of the Netherland's liability for damages to the victims of the Srebrenica massacre, this percentage should be valued as an informed estimate. It is impossible to know exactly what would have happened to those Bosniak men who were murdered if they had remained within the UN compound. See Ryngaert, *Peacekeepers Facilitating*, 460–461.

⁴⁸ *The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić*, 638.

peacekeepers as and if more shelling had occurred directly targeting the enclave following the initial barrage on July 11.⁴⁹

Regarding the conditions of the UN enclaves in Rwanda, Dallaire reported that UN enclaves in Kigali already began to run out of food in April.⁵⁰ They also reported that water was an ongoing struggle as more people, especially wounded people, flooded in.⁵¹ It is also evident from Dallaire's documentary, that UN safe areas, for example the one at Amahoro Stadium in Kigali, became, in his words, "like a concentration camp."⁵² Amahoro Stadium at its most critical point, swelled with an estimated twelve thousand people seeking the protection of UN troops. Dallaire describes that people were being protected by the UN who surrounded the stadium, only so they could die inside due to lack of food and water.⁵³ Furthermore, Dallaire described the horrendous smell which was a result of having nowhere inside the stadium for the dead to be buried.⁵⁴ For the most part, in terms of movement on the ground, UN troops in Rwanda, unlike in Srebrenica, did have the freedom of movement necessary to accomplish daily tasks.⁵⁵ However, Dallaire reports that when it became clear that the United States, Canada, and even the UN were not willing to lend any support to the mission in Rwanda, it gave a complete sense of isolation to the mission. Without any support, Dallaire reported that he felt surrounded.⁵⁶ The sense of isolation and being surrounded by the enemy that Dallaire described became literal as the Interahamwe took, at one point, three sides of the city of Kigali.⁵⁷ This sense of isolation to the UN missions in both Srebrenica and Rwanda was also a critical factor in increasing the perceived threat to peacekeepers and will be discussed further in the following section.

Based on the accounts provided by Karremans and Dallaire which describe the conditions and environment they experienced during their respective deployments in Srebrenica and Rwanda, it is likely that they and other personnel under their command would acknowledge to having high exposure to the stressors presented in questions 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, and 14.⁵⁸ Furthermore, due to the intense shelling of both the UN enclave in Srebrenica and the UN Headquarters in Kigali, Karremans, Dallaire, and most likely many of the men under their command would indicate, in answering question 8 of Section C, that they suffered frequent exposure to loud noises during their deployment.⁵⁹ The frequency of bombing or shelling on UN enclaves will be discussed at length in the following section on perceived threat. The comparison of DRRI-2 and the accounts of Karremans and Dallaire show that they were exposed to many stressors that originated from the daily environment in which they worked. Their descriptions show that they were in extremely uncomfortable conditions for months on end and that environment also became increasingly restricted as a physical space. Therefore, it

⁴⁹ Ibid., 640.

⁵⁰ Roméo Dallaire and Brent Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2005), 263–264.

⁵¹ Note: This also implies that water was limited for the UN personnel inside the enclaves, both for showering and more importantly, drinking. Dallaire describes that water was rationed for UN troops to a single glass a day for washing. For description see Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 263–264.

⁵² Peter Raymont, dir., *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Journey of Roméo Dallaire* (White Pine Pictures and Investigative Productions Inc., 2004), 00:54:55, accessed November 4, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9CAOnJrxmKk>.

⁵³ Ibid., 00:55:05.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 00:54:59–00:55:45.

⁵⁵ Dallaire comments in his biography: "Driving under a fire is unnerving to say the least, especially in an unarmored vehicle, but it would become a daily experience." This would indicate that even though there was a certain level of risk attached, UN personnel and vehicles had the access and ability to move about on a daily basis. For quote, see Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 265.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 00:48:38.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 00:52:27.

⁵⁸ Vogt et al., *DRRI-2*, 4.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

is only logical that Karremans, Dallaire and any peacekeeper holding a position of command in Rwanda and Srebrenica would not entertain any options that would either prolong or intensify the desperate conditions that they were working in. This includes the decision made by Karremans to agree to a withdrawal of UN troops from the Srebrenica-Potočari compound on July 21, 1995.

Perceived Threat

Section G of the DRRRI-2 titled *Deployment Concerns*, focuses on the dangers that soldiers felt they were exposed to during their deployment.⁶⁰ There are several questions in this section that focus on biological concerns such as infectious disease, medicines available, and exposure to NBCs which, from Karremans, Lemaire, and Dallaire's accounts of UN deployment in Bosnia and Rwanda, are not discussed as primary points of concern. Due to that fact, I will not discuss threat of infectious disease or exposure to NBCs as stressors that impacted the spectrum of action in which the UN operated in. However, what UN peacekeepers' accounts can attest to is the perceived threat from shelling, direct threats including assassination and in the case of Rwanda, other artillery such as Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), from various elements present in the two conflict zones. Through Dallaire and Karremans' testimonies, it is apparent that even as a peacekeeping force, the lives of UN peacekeepers faced numerous threats during their deployment.

Karremans and the UN peacekeeping force in Srebrenica were aware, due to the restriction of movement in or out of the enclave due to bad weather and the Bosnian Serb blockade, that if the city was shelled, they would not be able to organize a timely evacuation.⁶¹ Karremans' ICTY testimony demonstrates that he felt the conditions inside the enclave were inhumane and that due to the restriction of movement in or out of the enclave, refugees and UN personnel alike, were trapped inside the enclave.⁶² Beginning on July 6, 1995, the city came under direct assault by the VRS under the command of General Mladić. The area surrounding the enclave fell under heavy shelling from the artillery which completely surrounded the city. This lasted until July 11 when the UN enclave itself was shelled directly, constituting an immediate threat to the lives of all inside the enclave.⁶³ The shelling between July 6 and July 11 displaced an estimated 40,000 refugees,⁶⁴ roughly 19,000–25,000 of which fled to the Potočari compound approximately six kilometers northwest of the city.⁶⁵ It is important to note that even if the defense of the Srebrenica enclave was no longer attainable, that upon leaving, the UN's mission was compromised not only in terms of their ability to protect refugees, but also by moving to a position which rendered them more vulnerable to attack.⁶⁶ In terms of UN troops being able to respond with use of force to VRS attacks, the only option for Karremans at Srebrenica was to request close air support from NATO. During the period between July 6 and July 11, NATO only provided close air support starting at 2pm on July 11.⁶⁷ However,

⁶⁰ Ibid., 8.

⁶¹ See Karremans' statement regarding no freedom of movement either for his battalion or the general population, *The Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić*, 636.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid., 639–640.

⁶⁴ MSF International Movement, *MSF and Srebrenica: 1993–2003*, 53.

⁶⁵ *The Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić*, 640–641.

⁶⁶ It is also noted by Ryngaert, that upon leaving the Srebrenica enclave, UN peacekeepers no longer had jurisdiction over refugees formerly in the Srebrenica enclave who did not remain with UN forces during the evacuation. These circumstances did contribute to the massacre of refugees from the Srebrenica enclave who did not go with UN troops to the new enclave at Potočari and instead attempted to hide in the surrounding area. See Ryngaert, *Peacekeepers Facilitating*, 503–504.

⁶⁷ *The Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić*, 642–643.

Karremans testified that he felt NATO support was “too little, too late” and in fact, lead to further aggression and threats made by General Mladić to shell the enclave at Potočari.⁶⁸

There are also numerous examples of threats and intimidation tactics which contributed to the perceived threat to the Dutchbat. In one of their meetings, General Mladić directly threatened to shell UN troops and the thousands of refugees under UN protection if Karremans was not able to stop NATO air strikes against the VRS.⁶⁹ Karremans’ testimony also indicates that he felt Mladić had the military capability to carry out this threat and that there was no safety from Bosnian Serb shelling either at Srebrenica or later at the enclave at Potočari.⁷⁰ During their first meeting and even before, via radio communication, General Mladić indicated that if the air strikes against his troops were not stopped, he was willing to directly shell the UN compound and the immediate surrounding areas which risked not only mass refugee but UN casualties as well.⁷¹ Mladić’s threat of shelling is also further confirmed by the Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) report on Srebrenica. The NIOD report states that the VRS’s mortars and guns were directly visible from the entrance gate to the Potočari compound and would have caused “carnage among densely packed masses of refugees.”⁷² These numerous factors left Karremans and the other UN troops both powerless and extremely vulnerable to attack because they had no effective means with which to engage the VRS if fired upon.⁷³

At the critical point of evacuating refugees out of Potočari beginning on July 12, Dutchbat troops have been accused of “aiding” the separation of male refugees which ultimately allowed for the massacre of one hundred to four hundred men from the Potočari compound.⁷⁴ Very much so, the VRS forces controlled this event. Not only by design, through ensuring that they provided the only transportation which could access the compound, but also by disarming UN troops during the evacuations. Going beyond simply forcing peacekeepers at gunpoint to discard their weapons and flak jackets, one VRS soldier “demonstrated” that the UN flak jackets could not stand up to their armor-piercing rounds.⁷⁵ So not only was there physical disarming of UN troops, this one instance served as a further psychological reinforcement that even if they had this protection (which had now been removed from them), UN troops did not stand a chance in a combat situation against the VRS. If they did not comply with the evacuation of refugees under VRS terms, even if they witnessed the separation of able-bodied men from refugee line-ups, there would be no barrier to them being eliminated should they resist.⁷⁶

In Rwanda, General Dallaire believed the Interahamwe were emboldened by stories of how the UN presence as a peacekeeping force sent to protect the civilian population in Bosnia was essentially disregarded by Bosnian Serb forces. Dallaire also felt that the Interahamwe’s use of intimidation in attacking and even killing UN personnel was also a viable tactic to encourage

⁶⁸ Ibid., 643–644.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 644.

⁷¹ Ibid., 653.

⁷² Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, *Srebrenica: Reconstruction, Background, Consequences and Analyses of the Fall of a ‘Safe’ Area* (Amsterdam: NIOD, 2002), accessed April 19, 2020, http://publications.niod.knaw.nl/publications/srebrenicareportniod_en.pdf.

⁷³ Keeping in mind that the means by which Karremans and the Dutchbat had to mount a military response to any VRS heavy artillery attacks was by requesting close air support, it is the repeated failure of NATO to respond to these requests that resulted in the Dutchbat being left powerless and vulnerable against the VRS. As previously discussed, Karremans described the NATO air strikes on the afternoon of July 11th as “too late and too little” and in fact, Karremans describes them as a factor which put UN soldiers and refugee lives at greater risk because of the response they provoked from General Mladić. See *The Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić*, 643.

⁷⁴ New York Times, *UN and the Netherlands Are Sued*.

⁷⁵ NIOD, *Srebrenica*, 2046.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 2060.

UN forces to withdraw rather than risk casualties.⁷⁷ Therefore, unlike in Bosnia, the Interahamwe had no hesitation in directly targeting UN personnel with bombs, grenades, land mines and other forms of firepower. In his documentary, Dallaire casually laughs during his ten-year anniversary return to Rwanda “[e]ven driving down this road without someone taking pot shots at you is already an improvement.”⁷⁸ Dallaire also noted the fear among UN staff at headquarters in Kigali when the building came under direct bombardment with grenades and machine gun fire starting in mid-April 1994. These bombardments carried on for months and extensively disrupted the day to day workings of the UN forces, as all personnel were forced to retreat to the ground floor of the UN headquarters building during the bombardments.⁷⁹

Based on Dallaire’s account of the UN mission in Rwanda, there was an omnipresent threat to life due to unidentified persons, but almost certainly the Interahamwe, who fired at UN trucks whilst out on the streets performing their duties and also direct bombardment on the UN headquarters in Kigali. Another example of intimidation tactics used by the Interahamwe which was perceived as a threat to peacekeepers’ safety were described by Lemaire at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1997.⁸⁰ In his testimony, Lemaire commented that during the period where refugees were gathering to the UN safe zone at the ETO (also referred to as the Don Bosco School), there was a constant presence by the Interahamwe monitoring their activities.⁸¹ He noted that they would watch the enclave from the crossroads 300-meters up the road from the school; and as time went on, those groups got bigger, up to fifteen people sometimes with weapons. In addition, vehicles full of Interahamwe would regularly drive by. Gunfire could be heard regularly in the area and was attributed to murders being committed by the Interahamwe. Lemaire himself described the presence of the Interahamwe as “being surrounded.”⁸² For Lemaire, it is quite possible this perception of being surrounded was fueled even further by the fact that unlike in Somalia, where Lemaire and a portion of his men had served, when enemy individuals approached in close proximity, UN troops could not fire at them if necessary.⁸³ In his ICTR testimony, Lemaire describes that the rules of engagement for Rwanda put peacekeepers in close proximity to paramilitary forces, particularly at roadblocks, in highly threatening situations and that due to the rules of engagement, they were forced to yield in these situations. Lemaire felt that the new rules of engagement, which only allowed for use of force in cases of legal self-defense, resulted in less effective ways for the UN to carry out their mission and defend themselves. In this case, this change in the rules of engagement particularly if any UN troops had served in Somalia where they were heavily equipped and were authorized to use force if necessary, made the perception of being surrounded as powerful as if they had actually been encircled by paramilitaries.⁸⁴

In addition to the threat that shelling posed to the lives of UN troops, another added piece of leverage that General Mladić and the VRS took over Karremans and the UN command was that they secured UN hostages.⁸⁵ The timeframe in which those hostages were taken indicates that this move was strategically planned by the VRS. Between July 8 and July 10, General Mladić attacked numerous UN checkpoints near the UN enclave at Srebrenica, so by the time Karremans was ordered to his first meeting with Mladić, Mladić had 55 UN soldiers as hostages.⁸⁶ Naturally, the meetings with Karremans are significant because during those

⁷⁷ Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 240.

⁷⁸ Raymont, *Journey of Roméo Dallaire*, 00:04:34.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 00:49:12; Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 308.

⁸⁰ *The Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda*, Rutaganda—Redacted Transcript of 01/10/1997, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), October 1, 1997, ICTR-96-3-TRA001504/1, 26–27.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 27.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 11–12.

⁸⁵ *The Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić*, 675.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

meetings on July 11 and 12, Karremans was informed that all Bosniak refugees would be forcibly evacuated from the region.⁸⁷ Furthermore, the targeted massacre against Bosniak men and boys also began on July 12, two days after the UN hostages were secured. It is highly likely that if General Mladić's intention to remove or ethnically cleanse the area of all Bosniak Muslims had been compromised, the lives of those UN hostages would have been under grave threat.⁸⁸ Therefore, it is clear that the lives of Karremans, his men stationed at the enclave in Srebrenica, and the hostages, who were also under Karremans' command were under grave threat by the VRS. By July 12, 1995, Karremans found himself and his unit surrounded, unable to carry out their orders, with no hope of backup or support and limited to no supplies. This fundamentally influenced his decision to comply with the forced evacuation of the remaining refugees by the VRS. This decision could be viewed as a withdrawal to a defensible location in order to save *some* of the refugees Karremans was charged with protecting. It is clear that at Srebrenica and possibly more so at Potočari, due to the operational constraints, rules of engagement and enemy threat, he would have had minimal success in protecting civilian lives or ensuring the safety of his men otherwise.⁸⁹

In Rwanda, based on the accounts of Dallaire and supporting insight given by his Executive Assistant in Rwanda, Major Brent Beardsley, the perceived threat posed by the Interahamwe and other extremist factions, originated from the fact that they, in a matter of a day, were able to execute a series of seemingly well-planned murders of any government officials who could have soothed the mass tensions that had come to a head after the assassination of President Habyarimana.⁹⁰ This included both Hutu moderates and Tutsis within government of which extremist forces within the military knew exactly where they and their families could be found and murdered within days, if not hours, of the President's assassination.⁹¹ Furthermore, extremist propaganda made it clear that there was a distinct anti-Belgian sentiment among the Interahamwe and other factions.⁹² This resulted in a situation where, unlike in Bosnia, UN soldiers were not just taken captive, they were tortured and killed. On April 7, 1994, ten Belgian peacekeepers were murdered by Major Bernard Ntuyahaga of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), despite the warning sent by Dallaire on January 11, 1994 to UN high command in New York expressly stating that there was a plot to murder Belgian troops.⁹³

The murdered Belgian peacekeepers had been sent by Dallaire to guard the house of the Rwandan Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingimana, where they were disarmed and transported to

⁸⁷ Ibid., 679–680. The timing of the capture of the 55 UN hostages is, of course, suspicious as it directly proceeded Karremans and Mladić's first meeting. The timing would suggest that the hostages were clear leverage so that there would be no further air strikes and no resistance as the area was ethnically cleansed through the forced evacuation of Bosniak refugees.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 644.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 669. Another note regarding UN hostages captured by the VRS: A further twelve to fourteen UN troops who were stationed along the evacuation route were also captured by the Bosnian Serb Army on July 12 and held for two days. It is unclear if they were taken as hostages or for another target purpose, possibly to divert certain trucks for the VRS to remove Bosniak men and boys for supposed interrogation. However, it is likely that the true intent was to kill some if not all males found with this diversion of vehicles. See also Ibid., 667.

⁹⁰ In the case of the assassination of several Hutu-moderate government officials, these murders were planned and executed specifically by the Presidential Guard. See Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 232.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² One example of such propaganda was reported by Dallaire following the murder of the ten Belgian peacekeepers, where extremist radio broadcasts painted Belgian peacekeepers as being responsible for President Habyarimana's assassination. See Ibid., 240.

⁹³ Refers to the report sent by General Dallaire in January 1994 which stated that not only Hutu extremist elements in Rwanda were planning and had the capability to murder large numbers of Tutsi civilians but also states: "Belgian troops were to be provoked and if Belgian soldiers resorted to force a number of them were to be killed and thus guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda." See *The Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda*, Fax Dated 11 January 1994 from General Dallaire, UNAMIR, Kigali Addressed to Major General Baril, United Nations, New York, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, January 11, 1994, ICTR-96-3-672, 1.

Camp Kigali and were murdered by Ntuyahaga the same day.⁹⁴ Dallaire's command was heavily criticized for not taking some kind of action to extract the Belgian hostages on April 7. However, Dallaire felt that he was in an impossible position. Dallaire believed if a UN force had gone in to rescue the ten Belgian peacekeepers being held hostage, he estimates that would have risked "twenty, thirty casualties and on top of that, they could just blast the shit out of my headquarters and my mission would have been over."⁹⁵ This indicates that Dallaire did not feel at the time that he had the manpower or the firepower to launch a rescue operation without risking casualties or opening himself up to an attack on his headquarters due to a lack of presence there. Furthermore, he felt that such a mission would not, due to the likely loss of life, be supported by the UN high command and its member states.⁹⁶

The Interahamwe eventually became so emboldened that they threatened Dallaire himself as the Force Commander of UNAMIR in Rwanda and issued daily death threats that if he were seen by the Interahamwe, he was to be immediately stopped and killed. This not only threatened the life of Dallaire himself but also, he reports that any UN soldiers who fit his vague description were targeted and some narrowly escaped being killed before Dallaire could pull them off the streets.⁹⁷ The murder of the ten Belgian peacekeepers, the threats to numerous peacekeepers while carrying out missions, and targeting Dallaire himself, indicates that UN troops had numerous reasons to perceive a grave threat to their own lives during their deployment in Rwanda.

Not only is it evident that the perceived threat to the safety of UN peacekeepers on the ground greatly limited the range of decisions that Dallaire felt he could make, it also directly impacted the perceived range of options that the UN and the international community had to intervene and to stop the genocide.⁹⁸ In its conception, the murder of the ten Belgian peacekeepers on April 7, 1994 was intended to and ultimately lead to the withdrawal of UN forces from Rwanda.⁹⁹ As a political officer with the UN during the genocide, Michael Barnett even went so far as to postulate that the UN took no affirmative action because of the risk it posed to the UN's reputation by becoming further embroiled in an "ethnic conflict that spelled little possibility of success and only danger and failure."¹⁰⁰ Two weeks of deliberation, debates, statements, and recommendations for action suggested by Dallaire resulted in the opposite of any affirmative action; instead, the result was the withdrawal of bulk of UN peacekeepers from Rwanda on April 21, 1994. This decision made it very clear that the influence or action that the UN would exercise to prevent violence undertaken by the Interahamwe against Tutsi civilians in the months to follow would be very limited.¹⁰¹ Barnett maintains that the UN's decision to maintain only a small token peacekeeping force was not made to protect civilian lives or to prevent genocide, in fact, it greatly limited the operational capabilities of peacekeepers on the ground. The small UN force who remained past early April 1994, remained to preserve self-interest, to symbolize their continued concern and even to mask their unwillingness to send in an intervention force.¹⁰² The lack of communication, withdrawal of the bulk of the UN peacekeeping force and indecisiveness of the UN and its member states would have most

⁹⁴ "Kigali Genocide Memorial," Visit Rwanda, accessed April 10, 2019, <https://www.visitrwanda.com/interests/kigali-genocide-memorial/>.

⁹⁵ Raymont, *The Journey of Roméo Dallaire*, 00:23:39–00:24:36.

⁹⁶ Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 240–241.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 380–381.

⁹⁸ Barnett, *The Politics of Indifference*, 144.

⁹⁹ This intent was made clear to Dallaire via his informant Jean-Pierre. He explained that extremists saw the Belgian troops as the "backbone" of the UNAMIR mission and if they could force the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent, the UN mission would collapse. See Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 143–144.

¹⁰⁰ Barnett, *The Politics of Indifference*, 144.

¹⁰¹ Raymont, *Journey of Roméo Dallaire*, 00:20:17–00:22:24.

¹⁰² Barnett, *The Politics of Indifference*, 145–146.

certainly increased the perceived threat and actual threat of the Interahamwe to Dallaire and UN troops on the ground.

During this period of indecision, lack of communication and endless political deliberation by the UN high command after the murder of the Belgian peacekeepers, Dallaire recounted the event of the Belgian withdrawal from the ETO on the outskirts of Kigali.¹⁰³ Today, this event is one of the most well-known examples of how the perceived threat of the Interahamwe felt by UN peacekeepers directly lead to actions taken by peacekeepers to withdraw or remain passive in protecting Rwandan civilians during the genocide.¹⁰⁴ On April 11, 1994, 2,000 civilians who had gathered at the school with the belief that they could expect protection under the UN were murdered by the Interahamwe after Lemaire withdrew the Belgian-UN troops under his command. As commanding officer, Lemaire requested permission to withdraw to the airport.¹⁰⁵ Dallaire also believed that Lemaire purposefully did not inform either his commanding officer in the Belgian forces or Dallaire that they were protecting Rwandan civilians at the site.¹⁰⁶ In describing the circumstances which Lemaire's troops operated under at the school and what led to their withdrawal, Lemaire addressed numerous factors that presented a real threat to the troops under his command. These factors included the severe lack of personnel, the change in the rules of engagement, namely the order to not fire their weapons except when being fired upon and a lack of armored vehicles, heavy weaponry, and anti-tank missiles.¹⁰⁷ Lemaire believed all these elements played a role in why his troops could not be effective in stopping massacres already taking place in early to mid-April.¹⁰⁸ It is also important to note that while Lemaire's decision to withdraw knowingly was undertaken at the cost of refugees' lives, it is in part, a consequence of the orders guiding UNAMIR forces in Rwanda at the time. Peacekeepers' role at this time was primarily to monitor and report the situation on the ground, act as mediators and to help uphold the Arusha Agreement under UN Resolution 872¹⁰⁹ and its extension under UN Resolution 909.¹¹⁰

In Rwanda, UN peacekeepers faced an added difficulty in identifying who was a member of the Interahamwe. Major Beardsley referred to it as the "third force."¹¹¹ The Government of the Rwandan Republic and the rebels, known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front were considered the first and second forces, the third force that Beardsley refers to was the Interahamwe. The first two powers in Rwanda agreed for peace with the Arusha Accords signed in 1993; however, the Interahamwe were described by Beardsley as the "youth-wing extremists" that were determined that the Arusha Agreement would not be implemented.¹¹² Dallaire confirmed that during the Rwandan Genocide were as young as fourteen and fifteen years old.¹¹³ Thus, this indicates that members of Interahamwe were not a clearly defined

¹⁰³ Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 289–290.

¹⁰⁴ McGreal, *What's the Point of Peacekeepers?*.

¹⁰⁵ Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 289–290.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 290. There is no question that Lemaire would have been ordered in one form or another to withdraw as all Belgian troops were being withdrawn from Rwanda, but the question remains: Did Lemaire consciously or unconsciously omit the fact to his commanding officer that he was guarding Rwandan refugees? What would have influenced him to do so?

¹⁰⁷ In Somalia, according to Lemaire, UN troops were permitted to fire their weapons in cases when enemy forces were warned and did not comply; so, for example, they could destroy roadblocks if they were not removed upon request before coming into a close proximity. Lemaire perceived this as an important factor as he also testified that his men due to these changes in the rules of engagement, put themselves at daily risk when they were forced to yield to threats and intimidations at roadblocks where they were in very close proximity to the enemy. See *The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda*, Rutaganda—Redacted Transcript, 36–37.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 30–31.

¹⁰⁹ UN, *Security Council Resolution 872 (1993)*, October 5, 1993 (UN Doc. S/RES/872), 2.

¹¹⁰ UN, *Security Council Resolution 909 (1994)*, April 5, 1994 (UN Doc. S/RES/909), 2.

¹¹¹ Raymont, *Journey of Roméo Dallaire*, 00:10:22–00:10:55.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 00:13:53.

enemy military force. They were a fraction of the local population, and when not in the Interahamwe's brightly colored uniform, they were not readily identifiable as an enemy when in plain clothes, especially because they could include children among their ranks. These were local people, in many cases that turned against members of their own communities. In Lt. Lemaire's testimony, he points out that in the days following President Habyarimana's assassination, the UN command could not identify exactly who ordered the killing of the Belgian peacekeepers. Lemaire states that "these potential enemies could be FAR troops, gendarmerie elements or civilians who were working for Interahamwe because these people on several occasions individually or in groups in a joint manner put our troops, the Belgian troops in difficulty."¹¹⁴ Finally, he also discusses the challenges his troops faced in protecting the refugees at the ETO. Lemaire believed that due to one significant aspect of the Rwandan Genocide, namely neighbors attacking neighbors looking to "settle their scores," that paramilitaries would risk invading UN safe zones if it achieved the purpose of massacring those inside whom they felt had wronged them.¹¹⁵

Based on the testimonies of Dallaire, Lemaire, and Karremans, it is likely that the Dutch army stationed at Srebrenica-Potočari and the UN troops in Kigali, Rwanda would have responded negatively to all questions in Section G of the DRRI-2 that do not pertain to NBC's, disease or pesticides comprising the following questions: 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12.¹¹⁶ It is clear that the UN felt that due to their lack of firepower and heavy artillery and additionally, the superior tactical positions that the VRS and the Interahamwe had, that the decisions the peacekeepers could make were greatly limited. Furthermore, in Rwanda, UN peacekeepers faced the added difficulty of the enemy being sometimes previously unidentified or non-uniformed children, but who, nevertheless, were a threat to the lives of UN peacekeepers.¹¹⁷ These stressors therefore indicate that decisions made by peacekeepers to protect civilians despite the risks to their own lives, were made through UN peacekeepers putting their exceptionally vulnerable circumstances aside. It also should not be taken lightly that in both cases where UN troops have been internationally accused of abandoning refugees to be massacred during the UN withdrawals from Srebrenica-Potočari and from the ETO school in Rwanda, that there was not simply a perceived threat, but a real and compounded threat to life.¹¹⁸ In both cases, the enemy used hostages, direct threats, and showcased their immediate armed presence by positioning themselves just outside the enclaves for all to see. Every day the UN spent being exposed to these stressors would have also been spent dealing with the reality that at any time, they would have no realistic way to defend themselves or the people under their blanket of protection. Furthermore, both UN forces had no reasonable expectation of rescue if the situation against them turned violent. This is a situation that few soldiers in modern military conflicts, let alone civilians have practical experience with.

Combat and Post-Combat Experiences

Section E of the DRRI-2 is concerned with post-battle experiences. Its goal is to ascertain to what degree a soldier was exposed to the suffering or death of civilians or fellow military personnel. The questions asked in this section take such lines of inquiry as to whether or not a veteran witnessed the death or dismemberment of either fellow soldiers or civilians, if they witnessed civilians begging, saw civilian homes or communities that had been destroyed, or if they handled human remains.¹¹⁹ Both Karremans' and Dallaire's forces were deployed to Rwanda

¹¹⁴ *The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda*, Rutaganda—Redacted Transcript, 130–131.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 135.

¹¹⁶ Vogt et al., *DRRI-2*, 8.

¹¹⁷ Raymond, *Journey of Roméo Dallaire*, 00:13:53.

¹¹⁸ McGreal, *What's the Point of Peacekeepers?*.

¹¹⁹ Note: This overview generalizes the lines of inquiry for all questions in section E, aside from questions 11 and 12, which are not relevant to the experiences described by peacekeepers in Rwanda and Srebrenica. See Vogt et al., *DRRI-2*, 6.

and Bosnia due to the presence of or perceived risk that mass human suffering was either imminent or already occurring in those regions as a result of civil war. This section will explore the instances where both UN forces, in their efforts to maintain UN enclaves or safe areas for displaced civilians, witnessed numerous examples of human suffering and death in their respective regions of deployment. In the case of Dallaire, he witnessed personally the aftermath of the murders of his own troops by the Interahamwe and assisted in the removal of disfigured civilian remains in Kigali.¹²⁰

At the UN enclave in Srebrenica, the experiences of the UN were defined by the goal of the Bosnian Serb army to displace the Bosnian Muslim population and through depriving them of food, electricity, and medical supplies to force both the Muslim civilian population and peacekeeping operations to leave the region.¹²¹ While we do not have a direct account from Karremans himself on his personal experiences witnessing the aftermath of targeted attacks intended to displace and kill Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, we do have an idea of what those working in the Srebrenica enclave would have witnessed regarding this based on MSF accounts.¹²² It is almost inevitable that UN troops stationed in Srebrenica witnessed the displacement of thousands of people as the enclave was overwhelmed with displaced civilians either from the surrounding area or whose homes were destroyed by the shelling of the city. An area before the war which housed approximately 6,000 people now held around 23,000.¹²³ MSF reports emphasize that these displaced civilians were entirely dependent on aid rations for survival, but also critically lacked water and adequate shelter from the heat or from the cold.¹²⁴ With only a fraction of aid shipments being allowed in by VRS, it is impossible to imagine that UN personnel stationed at Srebrenica did not witness instances of civilians begging for food or other assistance as MSF was operating under the protection of the UN within the enclave.¹²⁵ Furthermore, due to the shelling of the enclave, the evacuation to the enclave at Potočari and finally, the penultimate forced evacuations of all Bosnian Muslims to Tuzla, civilians seeking UN protection lost their homes, their belongings, and experienced their communities destroyed—not once, but multiple times.¹²⁶ This indicates that UN personnel stationed at Srebrenica would likely indicate a strong exposure to questions 1, 2, and 3 of section E which ask if they witnessed civilian suffering as an aftermath of war.

Stobbaerts also indicates that UN troops would have been exposed to severe injuries to civilians or civilian casualties. The MSF report indicates that by April of 1993 alone, five doctors at the hospital in Srebrenica had already performed almost four hundred amputations.¹²⁷ The MSF team at Srebrenica received a steady stream of war-injured people throughout the over two-year period that they were posted in the area. However, when the enclave itself was targeted with heavy artillery, both the MSF team and UN personnel became direct witnesses to civilians being injured or killed. On July 6, 1995, a total of six rockets, 150 artillery, tank bombs,

¹²⁰ After the bodies of the ten Belgian peacekeepers were recovered, Dallaire personally visited the morgue to view the bodies. See Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 258. For further examples, see Raymont, *Journey of Roméo Dallaire*, 00:52:50–00:53:06; and Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 348.

¹²¹ *The Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić*, 635–636.

¹²² For examples of accounts where MSF describe the number of wounded and providing medical relief following instances of shelling or other attacks, please see MSF International Movement, *MSF and Srebrenica: 1993–2003*, 48 and 51.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 36

¹²⁴ Note that two press releases from MSF, the first from December 19, 1994 and the second from July 12, 1995 solidify this overall picture of the conditions displaced civilians faced in the Srebrenica enclave. See *Ibid.*, 37. See also *Ibid.*, 56–57.

¹²⁵ For example, looking at the MSF press release from December 19, 1994, it describes that with the amount of food being allowed into the enclave, refugees were only receiving approximately 905 calories per day in the Srebrenica enclave, less than half of the normal recommended requirement. See *Ibid.*, 37.

¹²⁶ For the MSF description of the shelling of the city of Srebrenica and the mass evacuation to Potočari please refer to *Ibid.*, 52–53. For further details on the forced evacuation of refugees to Tuzla please see *Ibid.*, 55.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 21–22.

mortar bombs as well as countless shells were dropped on the city of Srebrenica, with two rockets exploding directly within the UN compound. By the end of the day, MSF reported that thirteen people were injured and four had been killed.¹²⁸ This demonstrates that UN personnel in Srebrenica, though perhaps not as closely as MSF doctors and staff, would have also been exposed to civilians and possibly even their own personnel, being severely wounded, disfigured, or killed, especially when the enclave came under direct attack. These situations are represented by questions 4, 5, 10 and (possibly) question 7 of Section E of the DRRI-2.¹²⁹

In Rwanda, unlike in Srebrenica, it is confirmed by General Dallaire that UN troops were also directly involved in the removal of bodies and regularly witnessed the aftermath of massacres against civilians. In his documentary, Dallaire discusses how the smell of corpses that had been left to rot in houses and scattered on the streets all over the city became so overwhelming that the UN could no longer do their job at headquarters due to the smell. In his biography, Dallaire describes the smell of the bodies and lingering aftermath of the massacres that were already taking place within the first five days of the genocide. He describes his memory of this in vivid detail: “The odour of death in the hot sun; the flies, maggots, rats and dogs that swarmed to feast on the dead. At times it seemed the smell had entered the pores of my skin.”¹³⁰ In order to continue on their duties, the UN had to gather the bodies from the area surrounding the UN compound and burn them only a short distance away from headquarters.¹³¹ Another instance where the UN forces in Rwanda directly witnessed the aftermath of an attack on civilians was on May 1, 1994, at the protected site of the Sainte Famille church in Kigali. At Sainte Famille, a bomb fell in an area where thousands of civilians were seeking refuge in a UN protected part of the church compound. When Dallaire and his men arrived after the bomb fell, they witnessed a scene of devastation—“[s]evered limbs and heads, children ripped in two, the wounded turning their bewildered eyes toward you at the moment at which you can actually see the life expire from them, the smell of burnt explosives mixed with burning blood and flesh.”¹³² Hundreds of civilians turned to Dallaire for answers, rescue, and for the UN to protect them. These two accounts are some examples of numerous instances where General Dallaire and his men directly witnessed the destruction of homes and communities, saw the severe disfigurement of civilians, the bodies of dead civilians, and were involved with the removal of human remains. This indicates that Dallaire’s immediate command in Kigali would have also responded negatively to questions 3, 8, 9, and 13 of Section E of the DRRI-2.¹³³

One instance described by General Dallaire also indicates that he and other UN troops under his command would also respond affirmatively to many questions in Section D of the DRRI-2 titled *Combat Experiences*. In his biography, Dallaire describes an attack on a UN patrol in June 1994. Dallaire was called to an incident where two of his men had been wounded when their vehicle was believed to have hit a landmine and were then fired on again while trying to extract themselves from the vehicle.¹³⁴ Later, the wounded UN troops were detained by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), who were allies of the UN in stopping the genocide. The UN soldiers were robbed by members of the RPF and one UN soldier was minutes from being taken away and killed. Later, the more severely injured soldier, Major Manuel Soza, became the

¹²⁸ It is also important to note that the MSF team logbook noted that “[t]he number of dead people will be probably much higher since they don’t arrive at the hospital.” See *Ibid.*, 48.

¹²⁹ Vogt et al., *DRRI-2*, 6. In Rwanda, as shown with the previous discussion of the conditions at the Amahoro Stadium and Sainte Famille safe zones (see following paragraph), the UN peacekeepers deployed in Rwanda would have experienced similar suffering among civilians due to the aftermath of war. Therefore, they also would then express similar responses to questions 4, 5, and 10 as the Bosnian UN peacekeepers.

¹³⁰ Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 289.

¹³¹ Raymont, *Journey of Roméo Dallaire*, 00:52:50–00:53:06.

¹³² Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 348.

¹³³ Vogt et al., *DRRI-2*, 6.

¹³⁴ Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 423–424.

twelfth UN soldier to die during his deployment in Rwanda.¹³⁵ It was later confirmed by RPF leader and future President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, that the attack on Dallaire's men had been carried out by the RPF, which constitutes as "friendly" fire.¹³⁶ This incident from June 1994 and Dallaire's previous wry comment indicating the frequency of shots fired at UN vehicles in Kigali, indicate that certain UN personnel in Rwanda would likely report exposure, if not frequent exposure, to the situations indicated by the following questions in Section D of the DRRI-2: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11.¹³⁷

The situations discussed in this section involving the exposure of UN troops in Rwanda and Srebrenica to the suffering, injury, and death of civilians as well as fellow peacekeepers have various implications for their mental wellbeing. One implication is these experiences can trigger a sense of danger and heightened risk reminding peacekeepers that they worked in a daily environment where the risk to their own life was quite high. Furthermore, every dead, maimed, desperate, displaced, starving, or dehydrated individual could also be a reminder of the failure of UN troops in carrying out their mandate to protect and preserve lives within the safe zones. Herein lies one of the great limitations of not having a set of scales like the DRRI-2 Scales specifically tailored to UN peacekeeping missions. With both sets of DRRI scales having been written to assess the impact of conditions and circumstances faced by the US military in the Middle Eastern theatre,¹³⁸ there are numerous aspects of the scales which are not applicable or do not adequately address key deployment-related factors which were also a source of stress and therefore limited the range of decisions possible for UN peacekeepers. One example discussed in this section is the politics of preservation that stemmed from UN use of force in Somalia, particularly with the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, which lead the UN security council to review the authorization to use force to coerce cooperation.¹³⁹ The negative impact of the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia heavily dictated a change in the rules of engagement that peacekeepers would be expected to operate under in Srebrenica and Rwanda, which was namely, to use persuasion rather than force to achieve their missions.¹⁴⁰ However, Lemaire expressed several times in his ICTR testimony that he felt the change in the rules of engagement and the unwillingness of the UN to heavily arm its troops in Rwanda had a profound negative impact on their ability to carry out their mission and stop the genocide.¹⁴¹ Lemaire also describes that he felt Dallaire's recommendations as to the number of troops needed and critical recommendations to the UN in New York to change the rules of engagement to allow the peacekeepers to intervene and stop the distribution of weapons were ignored.¹⁴² Fundamentally, the unwillingness of the UN to allow for use of force in certain situations and the numerous examples of the UN and member states' failure to provide timely military support when requested left peacekeepers surrounded and unable to adequately defend themselves if they came under attack.¹⁴³ The overriding political concerns of the UN and its member states in the 1990s provided an insurmountable obstacle to the success of peacekeepers in protecting safe zones and the people within them. These types of stressors have the possibility for many individuals to develop feelings of self-doubt, a negative view of the UN whom they looked to for leadership, support, relief and the blanket blue helmet protection, hopelessness, exhaustion, hyper-vigilance, and of course, fear for their safety which would have all greatly impacted their decisions in the field. Without the security or even possibility of relief

¹³⁵ Ibid., 424.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 431.

¹³⁷ Vogt et al., *DRRI-2*, 5.

¹³⁸ Vogt et al., *DRRI-2: An Updated Tool*, 710–711.

¹³⁹ Barnett, *The Politics of Indifference*, 151–152.

¹⁴⁰ Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 264.

¹⁴¹ *The Prosecutor V. Rutaganda*, Rutaganda—Redacted Transcript, 46.

¹⁴² Ibid., 43–44.

¹⁴³ Note that Lemaire particularly connects this lack of military support to the fate of the refugees at the ETO. See Ibid., 30–31.

forces, adequate weapons, or supportive military maneuvers and under the kinds of daily conditions described in this article, can we have reasonably expected peacekeepers to have made different decisions that would have prevented genocide from taking place? Could we have expected them to remain in indefensible areas, surrounded by enemy fire and where peacekeepers themselves were, on certain occasions, directly targeted and would have been killed if they had taken any action to prevent massacres from occurring? Was it possible to expect this under conditions which are known to make soldiers in other cases, who are able to use force if necessary, seriously vulnerable to developing serious and long-term mental health problems?

Conclusion

The DRRI-2 Scales and other diagnostic tools for assessing risk or resilience to developing PTSD provide an invaluable tool for researchers seeking to better understand the human agency behind traumatic events such as genocide. By applying the DRRI-2 Scales to the experiences of UN peacekeeping forces in Rwanda and Srebrenica, we can better understand how the daily conditions during their deployment negatively impacted their mental state and the range of perceived options they could take under those conditions to protect civilian lives. Through analyzing those daily conditions and comparing them to various questions from the sections of the DRRI-2 Scales that specifically focus on deployment stressors, we are able to break down the experiences that the UN peacekeepers had during their deployment to understand their cumulative negative impact on the mental health of peacekeepers. However, the use of these scales does have certain limitations in terms of how much they can contribute to understanding the particular conditions and limitations that peacekeepers faced in Rwanda and Srebrenica. What it should prompt however, is the development of certain frameworks of analysis that consider factors such as daily living conditions, sustained exposure to combat environments, exposure to injured or wounded persons, operational limitations, and perceived threat to life when judging those who witness acts of violence, massacres, or genocide taking place. We expected the UN peacekeepers in Rwanda and Srebrenica to have stopped or prevented acts of genocide, but was it actually possible for them even as soldiers to achieve this under those circumstances? In truth, we expected trained soldiers with inadequate ability to subdue enemy threats in highly dangerous, stressful, and ultimately indefensible positions to somehow overcome these circumstances and make decisions that would have put their lives and possibly the lives of those under their protection at risk with little chance of success.

It is clear that the mental health of UN peacekeepers, which shaped the decisions they made on the ground, faced multi-layered and persistent sources of stress that had to be managed on a daily basis. The eyewitness testimonies explored in this article have shown the daily conditions in which UN peacekeepers operated was a persistent source of stress. These included lack of water, food, sleep, freedom of movement, and also exposure to horrendous smells, including that of rotting corpses and loud noises from artillery fire. UN peacekeepers in Rwanda and Srebrenica were forced to try to carry out their mandate whilst operating under these conditions for months on end with no relief and no area to retreat to for rest. Additionally, UN personnel were faced with the daily reality that carrying out their mandate to protect put their own lives directly at risk. In Bosnia, the primary threat to life for UN peacekeepers was mainly the bombing or shelling of the surrounding city, later escalating to target the UN enclave itself. In Rwanda, threats to life came from numerous sources including the bombing of the UN headquarters, land mines, and deliberate targeting of UN peacekeepers on patrol and other daily threats and intimidation. In both cases, UN peacekeepers were also taken hostage for purposes of gaining leverage over UN decision-making; however, in Rwanda, peacekeepers were executed as a further threat to the remaining peacekeepers and to prompt the withdrawal of international troops. Additionally, the safety of UN peacekeepers and those they sought protect were under constant threat due to the fact that both peacekeeping operations were undermanned, under-equipped, and were greatly restricted in the acts they could take to defend themselves, the safe zones, and the civilians inside. Finally, UN peacekeepers regularly

saw the severe injury, desperation, death, and displacement of civilians who were the victims of civil war and genocide. They faced the daily reality of only being able to partly carry out their mandates to protect and help civilians due to numerous operational constraints and lack of support from the higher echelons of UN command and its member-states. In the case of Rwanda, UN peacekeepers witnessed and even were forced to handle the corpses of murdered Rwandans and in some cases, their own men, with shocking regularity and intensity. It is my opinion that anyone seeking to critique the actions or non-actions of UN peacekeepers in Rwanda and Srebrenica should re-examine their conclusions based on the current research and headways made in understanding the implications of multi-layered stress that soldiers to varying degrees experience in conflict zones and the risk that this poses to the mental health of the individual.

Bibliography

- Andreasen, Nancy C. "Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A History and a Critique." *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 1208, no. 1 (2010), 67–71. Accessed May 8, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05699.x>.
- Barnett, Michael. *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002.
- , "The Politics of Indifference at the United Nations and Genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia." In *This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia*, edited by Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. Meštrović, 128–162. New York: New York University Press, 1996.
- Dallaire, Roméo and Brent Beardsley. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2005.
- Karstoft, Karen-Inge, Tine Nielsen, and Anni B. S. Nielsen. "Perceived Danger During Deployment: A Rasch Validation of an Instrument Assessing Perceived Combat Exposure and the Witnessing of Combat Consequences in a War Zone." *European Journal of Psychotraumatology* 9, no. 1 (2018), 1–11. Accessed November 16, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1080/20008198.2018.1487224>.
- McGreal, Chris. "What's the Point of Peacekeepers When They Don't Keep the Peace?: From Rwanda to Bosnia, Haiti to Congo, Failures Raise Questions About Future of United Nations Blue Helmets." *The Guardian*. September 17, 2015. Accessed November 4, 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/17/un-united-nations-peacekeepers-rwanda-bosnia>.
- Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) International Movement. *MSF and Srebrenica:1993–2003*. MSF, 2015. Accessed June 28, 2020. https://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/2019-04/MSF%20Speaking%20Out%20Srebrenica%201993-2003_1.pdf.
- Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies. *Srebrenica: Reconstruction, Background, Consequences and Analyses of the Fall of a 'Safe' Area*. Amsterdam: NIOD, 2002. Accessed April 19, 2020. http://publications.niod.knaw.nl/publications/srebrenicareportniod_en.pdf.
- Raymont, Peter, dir. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Journey of Roméo Dallaire*. White Pine Pictures and Investigative Productions Inc., 2004. Accessed November 4, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9CAOnJrxmKk&ab_channel=Hearts.and.Minds.
- Ryngaert, Cedric. "Peacekeepers Facilitating Human Rights Violations: The Liability of the Dutch State in the 'Mothers of Srebrenica' Cases." *Netherlands International Law Review* 64, (2017), 453–535. Accessed April 18, 2020. <http://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-017-0101-6>.
- Shalev, Arieh Y., Juliet Cohen, Simon J. Ellis, Andrea Litva, Grant J. Devilly, Tom Clark, Casimiro Cabrera-Abreu, Annie Hargrave, and Derek Summerfield. "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder." *BMJ: British Medical Journal* 322, no. 7297 (2001), 1301–1304. Accessed November 21, 2018. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25467014>.

- Summerfield, Derek. "The Invention of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Social Usefulness of a Psychiatric Category." *BMJ: British Medical Journal* 322, no. 7278 (2001), 95–98. Accessed June 28, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.322.7278.95>.
- The New York Times, "UN and the Netherlands Are Sued Over Srebrenica Killings." June 4, 2007. Accessed November 8, 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/world/europe/04iht-serbs.4.5992698.html>.
- United Nations. *Security Council Resolution 819 (1993)*, April 16, 1993. UN Doc. S/RES/819.
- . *Security Council Resolution 824 (1993)*, May 6, 1993. UN Doc. S/RES/824.
- . *Security Council Resolution 836 (1993)*, June 4, 1993. UN Doc. S/RES/836.
- . *Security Council Resolution 872 (1993)*, October 5, 1993. UN Doc. S/RES/872.
- . *Security Council Resolution 909 (1994)*, April 5, 1994. UN Doc. S/RES/909.
- . *Security Council Resolution 918 (1994)*, May 17, 1994. UN Doc. S/RES/918.
- Visit Rwanda, "Kigali Genocide Memorial." Accessed April 10, 2019. <https://www.visitrwanda.com/interests/kigali-genocide-memorial/>.
- Vogt, Dawne, Brian N. Smith, Daniel W. King, and Lynda A. King. *Deployment Risk and Resilience Inventory-2 (DRRI-2)*. Boston: National Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), 2012. Accessed November 27, 2019. <https://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/assessment/documents/DRRI2scales.pdf>.
- . *Manual for the Deployment Risk and Resilience Inventory-2 (DRRI-2): A Collection of Measures for Studying Deployment-Related Experiences of Military Veterans*. Boston: National Center for PTSD, 2012. Accessed November 27, 2019. <https://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/assessment/documents/drri2manual.pdf>.
- Vogt, Dawne, Brian N. Smith, Lynda A. King, Daniel W. King, Jeffrey Knight, and Jennifer J. Vasterling. "Deployment Risk and Resilience Inventory-2 (DRRI-2): An Updated Tool for Assessing Psychosocial Risk and Resilience Factors Among Service Members and Veterans." *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 26, no. 6 (2013), 710–717. Accessed November 27, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jts.21868>.