Othering Terrorism: A Rhetorical Strategy of Strategic Labeling

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Reel Bad Africans & the Cinema of Terrorism

Throughout Ridley Scott’s 2002 film *Black Hawk Down*, Orientalist “othering” abounds, mirroring the simplistic political narrative of the film at large. In this tired script, we (the West) are fighting to help them (the East Africans) escape the grip of warlordism, tribalism, and failed states through the deployment of brute counterinsurgency and policing strategies. In the film, the US soldiers enter the hostile zone of Mogadishu, Somalia, while attempting to arrest the very militia leaders thought to be benefitting from the disorder of armed conflict. Thus, from their strategic inception, the West is using legal, measured, state violence to create a space for the rule of law to flourish; the Africans are using paramilitary, sub-state violence in their beastly fights over food, and bloodthirsty pursuit of US soldiers who are just trying to help. In the climactic scene where the American protagonists eclipse their central challenge, we follow Sgt. Ruiz—and are reminded of his humanity and individual hopes and dreams—while helicopter-mounted mini guns strafe a rooftop killing scores of Somali citizens. In the epilogue, we are told “During the raid over 1000 Somalis die and nineteen American soldiers lost their lives.” This is followed by the names and ranks of the nineteen Americans. Of course, the Somali militia and civilians are unnamed, undifferentiated, and delegitimized as members of a regimented fighting force.

The film is an emblematic reminder of the Oriental construction of political violence enacted by the other, famously diagrammed by Palestinian theorist Edward Said, in his 1979 book, *Orientalism*. When an actor is readily othered, their violence is easily portrayed as terrorism. The Somali fighters are denied any semblance of (potential) political legitimacy—while the film portrays foreign intervention as ethically guided, brave, humanitarian patriotism. However, the film does not tell the story of the populist Somali militias that fought foreign invaders and expelled a potentially occupying force. In the simplified narrative of nation-state armies versus irregular militias, the indigenous population attacked foreign military forces using conventional (i.e., non-terrorism) guerrilla warfare methods, while the outsiders led an armed incursion (including the abduction of militia-affiliated individuals) into an area known to be hostile to foreign presence. In such conditions, it is conceivable (if not an outright obligation) to interpret Somali action as justified, if not strategic. As we are reminded in the final line of the film’s epilogue, “Two weeks [after the release of the US pilot captured after the crash] President Clinton withdrew Delta Force and the Rangers from Somalia.” Ironically, while *Black Hawk Down* remains Orientalist, intervention-justifying, patriotic cinema, the historical record, and specially the relatively large loss of life for US forces and Clinton’s rapid withdrawal, is still invoked as a mark of pridelful victory by modern day violent jihadists who seek to craft a narrative of their triumphs against Western-aligned forces. As the jihadi narrative goes: “We drove the French out of Algeria, the Russians out of Afghanistan, the Israelis out of Gaza…”

Despite frequent instances of terrorism in Western Europe, and despite protracted armed conflicts in a variety of locales (e.g., Northern Ireland, Basque region of France), when Hollywood chooses to use non-state political violence as a backdrop, it continually draws upon the exotic landscapes of an imagined Arabia. From Ironman’s (2008) genesis in an Afghan cave after being captured by Taliban-like fighters, to prominent battles in the Middle Eastern sand dunes featured in *Transformers* (2007), and the equally sandy landscape of Pakistan in *G.I. Joe: Retaliation* (2013), the pattern remains the same. As has been well documented in the 2006 documentary *Reel Bad Arabs*,

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1 I would be remiss if I did not mention that this section heading is directly taken from Jeremy Earp and Sut Jhally, *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People* (Northampton: Media Education Foundation, 2006) documentary.


4 Earp and Jhally, *Reel Bad Arabs.*
these popular films continue to portray the Arab/Muslim villain as incompetent, mustached, keffiyeh-clad, Kalashnikov-wielding bandits shouting in an incomprehensible, yet distinctly non-Western tongue. This is true in films where an imagined Arabia is the subject (e.g., *Black Hawk Down*), as well as those where it is used to show foreign locales of exotic intrigue (e.g. *Iron Man*, *Transformers*, *G.I. Joe*). The portrayal of a chaotic Libya in the film *13 Hours*—which was filmed in Malta nonetheless—plays heavily upon the mob mentality frame, displaying the savage viciousness of unnamed jihadists seeking to kill Americans. This is similar to the film *Rules of Engagement* (2000), which portrays the murder of Yemeni civilians by US forces protecting their embassy. Other recent films can be added to the list of fantastical, archetypical portrayals of the Middle East including (but certainly not limited to) *Three Kings* (1999), *Jarhead* (2005), *Munich* (2005), *Syriana* (2005), *Charlie Wilson’s War* (2007), *The Kingdom* (2007), *The Hurt Locker* (2008), *The Devil’s Double* (2011), *Special Forces* (2011), *The Dictator* (2012), *Zero Dark Thirty* (2012), *Lone Survivor* (2013), *American Sniper* (2014), and *The Wall* (2017). In these films, not only is an exotic Arabia the setting, but its seemingly inseparable violence is the main attraction. Thus, while *Black Hawk Down* is exemplary of the othering, exoticized narrative frame, it is far from rare. These constructions are dynamic, fictionalized projections that change with the times.

In a variety of films, not only is the othered, Orientalist landscape the setting, but it also forms the tone of that which is readily demonized. In the 2013 third installment of the Iron Man franchise, the Western, mechanized protagonist is seen hunting an archetypical terrorist villain known as the Mandarin, played by Ben Kingsley. The Mandarin blows up buildings, speaks through videotaped threats, and is seen traversing sandy landscapes holding a Kalashnikov amid brown individuals wearing turbans, hijabs, and other Eastern iconography. The Mandarin is quite literally wrapped in the trapping of Orientalism, costumed in a long flowing robe, wiry beard, and ponytail. He is undeniably sinister and Eastern; more Osama bin Laden-meets-sorcerer than one might imagine possible. In the original construction of the Mandarin, as seen in a 1964 comic book, he maintains the flowing green robes, and features a prominent Fu Manchu mustache and goatee optimizing a cartoonish evil.

![Figure 1. The Mandarin as drawn in 1964, from Marvel’s “Tales of Suspense #50.”](image-url)
In the film’s development of the modern Mandarin’s image, a fictionalized reel of jihadist propaganda is shown which includes what appears to be actual shots from Osama bin Laden-era al-Qaeda films, likely taken at the al-Farouq training camp near Kandahar before June 2001.

Figure 2. The Mandarin walks through a crowd of men in turbans and scarves holding AK-47s (1st Mandarin video).

Figure 3. The Mandarin fires an AK-47 next to men in turbans and scarves (2nd Mandarin video).

This seamless mixing of the historical (i.e., ~2001 bin Laden footage) and the fictional borrows the aesthetics of actual Salafi militants (e.g. weaponry, dress, rhetorical style), and repurposes them to create a villain who is part al-Qaeda (AQ) and part Taliban, but wholly evil. The viewer quickly learns that the Mandarin is actually an actor impersonating a terrorist, which makes his portrayal as an Asiatic mystic wrapped in an Orientalist costuming even more troubling. The Mandarin is quite simply a phony terrorist brought to life and made foreboding through the Oriental.

The Orient, by its very nature, is a construction, yet it is a dynamic space rife with contradictions and irregularities. Though uncommon, there are some exceptions to this flattened portrayal of the politically violent other in Hollywood film. The 2016 film *Eye in the Sky* takes place in an area outside
of Nairobi, Kenya, and dramatizes a drone strike by US-UK forces. The film’s central conflict surrounds the decision to fire missiles targeting a meeting between an al-Shabab (AS) “facilitator,” “trafficker,” two new recruits, and a woman described as a “senior al-Shabab operations planner, recruiter and trafficker.” The woman is a Caucasian, British citizen, and the wife of the trafficker. When the AS meeting is observed by intelligence sources, and the drone-based Hellfire airstrike called, the operation is challenged by the proximity of a nine-year old Kenyan girl from the town, who wanders into the blast range while selling bread outside the wall of the terrorists’ safe house. The film manages to create three-dimensional African characters while also avoiding scenes of sand dunes, mosque speakers, ululating niqabis, and the like. The filmmakers do this by contextualizing the daily life of the victims of state violence, and showing competent and professional African allies to the Western forces, including an informant, and a local military commander. Certainly, the film maintains the larger narratives of a white, Western, military force enacting necro/biopolitical power through extrajudicial killings, though it avoids the Orientalist mystique that is central to the aesthetic of *Black Hawk Down* and the common use of the Middle Eastern landscape as a site of intrigue for the West.

This is not to claim a monopoly on Orientalist othering of African deaths by some Western monolith. The April 2014 kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls by Boko Haram (BH) demonstrates the ability of Africans to do the same to their own communities. The kidnapping of the female school students in Chibok, Nigeria was popularized by Tweets originating from a Nigerian lawyer in Abuja, quickly amounting to the #BringBackOurGirls clicktivist campaign, complete with celebrity endorsements. Certainly, the kidnapping was a horrific crime by BH, and while religious communities, national governments, organizations, and individuals were quick to call for action, the age and sex of the victims (i.e., girls) was understood in a paternalism (i.e., our girls) reminiscent of an Orientalist other, one who is denied agency, identity, and dignity.

**Black Hawk Down, Orientalism & the Subaltern**

In Ridley Scott’s *Black Hawk Down*, the viewer is presented with a war narrative that exemplifies the means through which political violence is understood and given context. Throughout the film, while the viewer follows along the mission of US soldiers acting as a peacekeeping force in Mogadishu, the viewer is urged to emotionally connect to the many soldiers who carry out

![Figure 4. US air support spots the rooftop of Somali gunmen, shown as bright green spots, prior to strafing run.](image-url)
This depiction, however revolting one may find it, serves as an exemplary representation of the way in which non-white, non-Western, and non-Christian subjects are othered in the discourse of violence. In this frame—the dominant frame adopted in depictions of non-state violence—political violence broadly, and terrorism specifically, becomes something external; something the subaltern does to the colonial power, hegemon, power holder, and/or nation-state. Through repetition as a mechanism of naturalization, those viewing the products of Hollywood are accustomed to films that urge the viewer to identify with the white protagonist, while those archetypically cast as the villain are presented in a vastly different light. A postcolonial framework, informed by a scholar such as Franz Fanon, would understand the Somalian violence directed at US and multinational forces as the enacting of a shared identity—that of the colonized—in violent response to colonial domination. Fanon argued that the ‘violence of the colonized’ was inherently opposite from that of the colonizer, as the former was concerned with protecting and preserving life and liberty, and the latter, reproducing domination and death.

The presence of Western forces in Somalia is rationalized as interventionism for the sake of the Somali people; a mechanism to prevent bloodshed, genocide, and warlordism. The rhetoric deployed by advocates of such interventionism is often based in the rationality of a benevolent (white Christian) savior, such as former US President George W. Bush, who presented the US invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) as necessary for the protection of human rights in those nations. Similar arguments, based in a colonial, savior mentality were mobilized to justify the NATO bombing campaign in Serbia (1995) and the maintenance of a “no fly zone” in Libya during the ousting of Muammar Gaddafi (2011). These forms of humanitarian intervention recast colonial power structures as altruistic assistance. In his discussion of how interventionism can mirror this savior mentality, journalist and author Jordan Flaherty writes:

“Today’s saviors are kinder and gentler than the era of the Crusades. They are no longer launching mass genocide and calling it a gift. But they still hold on to that inherited tradition by believing in their own superiority and refusing to listen to those that say they want to serve.”

Thus, the soldiers flying in their Black Hawk above Mogadishu are not foreign invaders, colonists, or unwelcome interveners, but rather, they are warriors for human rights and justice that seek to save the citizens of Somalia from their own backwardness, brutality, and non-Western-ness. It is this reasoning which is inherently authoritarian, paternalistic, and devoid of any semblance of agency or self-determination for those being saved. The colonial motivation towards interventionism promotes a notion of security that is limited to state security, seeking to disrupt and discontinue the human-level, patchwork social safety nets established by communities existing within failing states. Critical conceptions of security can provide an anti-colonial challenge to a hegemonic rationality that places state security at the center. This further problematizes alternative approaches to security such as those based in environmental security, feminist security, or human security.

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10 Flaherty, No More Heroes, 17.


security, or as Ken Booth urges, focusing on not securitizing issues but politicizing security. The presence of US troops in the Horn of Africa constitutes a securitizing endeavor, wherein Western military forces spearhead a multinational program of pacification and stabilization—known as peacekeeping in the parlance of the United Nations. If we understand this interventionism and its motivational logic as a persistent yet obscured manner of colonial domination, then anticolonial “counterviolence” is legitimate and just within the logic of Fanonian self-determination. Such efforts to expel a foreign oppressor are typically enshrined in righteous legitimacy as the indigenous citizenry battles against a Goliath. If this frame is maintained—one that understands US peacekeeping efforts as a prong of Western colonialism—violence that aims to expel these foreign soldiers must be framed as appropriate.

However, this does not address the critical role of African perceptions of African violence as an integral feature of decolonization. If, in the case of Somalia, the anti-interventionist militias morph into a network of African jihadists (i.e., AS) frequently targeting other Africans, what does this say about how the colonial subject interprets violence enacted from within? If colonial logic allows anti-Western Somali violence to be understood as illegitimate, does this logic extend when that violence is redirected at Somali police, Somali soldiers, and Somali citizens? Within this classification—one which separates the colonized from the colonizer, the indigenous from the foreign—the most pervasive binary distinction is between the white and the non-white. Through this reasoning, the white, interventionist, inserts itself into a pre-pacified locale, and through military might directed by the state, seeks to remake the host society in rapid, violent surges towards a system based in the Western rule of law. In his discussion of the racialized enacting of colonialism and the resistance it fosters, Fanon notes this binary which encodes power through race, writing:

Looking at the immediacies of the colonial context, it is clear that what divides this world is first and foremost what species, what race one belongs to…The [non-white] serf is essentially different from, the [white] knight, but a reference to divine right is needed to justify this difference in status. In the colonies the foreigner imposed himself using his cannons and machines. Despite the success of his pacification, in spite of his appropriation, the colonist always remains a foreigner…The ruling species is first and foremost the outsider from elsewhere, different from the indigenous population, ‘the others.’

What is recurrent throughout the logic of colonialism and interventionist exceptionalism is the othering of the uncivilized hoards that constitute the black, unnamed bodies resting in piles in the streets of Mogadishu or other sites of non-whiteness, non-Christianity, and non-Westernness. Despite occurring in East Africa, Said’s Orientalist narrative is ever-present, as the enemy of the colonizing interventionist is shown as exotic and pre-modern due to their Muslimness, blackness, and their location within the so-called anarchy of Somalia’s warlord-driven society. This is not to claim originality in interpreting Scott’s film nor the larger counterinsurgency discourse through Said’s Orientalism. Numerous scholars have presented such arguments in other regional and nationally specific contexts such as those dealing with African, South Asian, Southeastern


©2019 Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 2 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.2.1704
Europe/Ottoman, and Afghan analyses. Said’s analysis of the romanticized mystification of the Middle East fits the Somali theater, as the audience of Black Hawk Down is treated to distant muezzins chanting the name of Allah, and wild bazaars where goods are traded in chaotic exchanges through bargaining. This Aladdin-like aesthetic recalls Scott’s other film, Kingdom of Heaven (2005), released four years after Black Hawk Down, and capitalizing on the civilizational clash between the Muslim armies of Saladin and their capture of Jerusalem from the European Christians.

In Black Hawk, the landscapes are brutal, uninhabitable scenes of smoky, sun-bleached disorder and poverty, shown through either the overwhelming commotion of overcrowded cities, or the mystical vistas of the uninhabited African deserts. Scott’s film is “particularly paradigmatic” of a hegemonic, Africanized, urban, other. The film serves as a George W. Bush-era update to the Vietnam War-era film, Apocalypse Now—drawn in part from Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness—a book frequently lamented by advocates of the postcolonial. Throughout Scott’s film, the viewer is shown a crowded and difficult cityscape inhabited by caricatures. In his review of Patrick Porter’s book Military Orientalism, Thomas Rid carefully deconstructs the image of the Easterner as “deceitful, cunning, irrational, emotional, chaotic, and spiritual [as] their violence [is] seemingly triggered by primordial ethnic or tribal hatred.” From the start of the film, as the camera pans outward from sand, the heavily color-saturated landscape is shown to host a shirtless man wrapping a body in a burial shroud while a musical score features intonations in a foreign tongue. The dead body is literally faceless, as it is shown sitting upright, wrapped in a white cloth and rope.

The Somalian characters in Black Hawk Down are shown repeatedly as a hoard, a mob, and a savage enemy. They are shown moving in a herd-like fashion towards a Red Cross Food Distribution Center in the first few minutes of the film, and later moving through foreboding streets to kill the besieged US soldiers. When the crowd reaches the food trucks, they are shown brutally competing and fighting while grain spills from bags and hungry men are beaten with large sticks by local guards. The scene is awash with shouting, and soon a man in a keffiyeh, working alongside Mohamed Farrah Aidid—a major leader of the paramilitary militia associated with the United Somali Congress—fires a truck-mounted machine gun into the crowd, killing and injuring around a dozen individuals. This violent brutality directed upon the African subjects by an African warlord acts to signal the domestic threat inherent in the East, and the challenges to deciphering good (African) from bad (African) for the external, Western actor. As John Hobson notes, drawing on Said, “In this Eurocentric imaginary, then, the line of civilizational apartheid separates the Western heart of light from the Eastern heart of darkness.” The Orientalist portrayal of the African protagonist imagines them as an other, battling against a Eurocentric, Christian, white hegemon who understands their invasion as an act of liberation. While the US soldiers have

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Asian Racialization in the Age of Terror” (The University of New Mexico, 2016), accessed October 16, 2018, http://digitalrepository.unm.edu/cgi_etds/92.


individual subjectivities, motivations, world views and personal histories, their opponents do not. They are cast as an undifferentiated, nonwhite subject, recalling the opaque crowd descriptors of disorganized bandits seen in the notion of Eric Hobsbawn’s “primitive rebel.” When the US soldiers hover above the embattled Somali crowd competing for Red Cross food rations, they express frustration that they are unable to protect the “unarmed civilians” from the “militia,” a display of the lawless and unruly nature of Somali life, versus the classically-liberal, rule of law, and careful diplomacy of the West. Such a frame serves to presumptively justify US-led interventionism in the Somali conflict, and to reinforce the “support the troops” narrative through “[a] now dominant form of Hollywood military myth making.”

The African Jihadist, English-Language Film Machine
In one sense, it is quite easy to cast critique in Scott’s film, as well as Hollywood in general. But it may surprise some to learn that while the Somali AS is the fictionalized subject in the 2016 film, Eye in the Sky, the organization’s most notable foray into film is actually through its own real-life productions. AS maintains one of the most sophisticated and discursively nuanced digital media platforms in the history of modern political violence. Al-Kataib Foundation for Media Productions, the media wing of AS, produces lengthy, high-definition, documentary-style videos crafting AS’s desired narrative. Between 2010-2017, I have documented at least seventy videos produced either in English, or with English subtitles by Al-Kataib. Many of these high-quality films are well over a half hour in length, and use modern methods of video manipulation (e.g., filters, effects), including high-definition, drone-based, and mobile-mounted (i.e., GoPro) cameras, multiple camera angles edited into a continuous shot, slow motion, manipulated color saturation and exposure, computer-generated images (CGI) overlaid atop video, and visually complicated, animated transition and title sequences. AS’s videos typically cover specific events (e.g. the attempt to free Denis Allex by DGSE Special Forces in January 2013, or the Westgate shopping mall attack in Kenya in September 2013) through their discursive reality. Film titles include “Mogadishu the Crusaders’ Graveyard” (2010), “Come to Glory” (2011), “Under the Shade of Shari’ah” (2012), “The Path to Paradise: from the Twin Cities to the Land of Two Migrations” (2013), “Beyond the Shadows: The Failed French Raid” (2014), “Westgate Siege: Retributive Justice” (2015), “An Urgent Plea: Message from a Ugandan POW” (2016), and “They Are the Enemy, So Beware of Them #8” (2017).

Figure 5. Al-Kataib advertisement, “The Westgate Siege Retributive Justice.”

27 Dawson, The Visual Economy of Urban Empire.
In one of these films produced in 2016 and titled “The Path to Paradise: From the Twin Cities to the Land of Two Migrations, Episode 2,” the filmmakers utilize well-known discursive markers, such as Malcolm X’s denouncement of pacifism, and American AQ spokesman Anwar al-Awlaki’s invoking of the Ku Klux Klan. These powerful speakers are introduced in the first few seconds, before leading the viewer through a rough history of African American resistance to recent police killings, highlighting uprisings in Ferguson, Missouri, and Baltimore, Maryland. Through the narrative formulated by social movements such as Black Lives Matter, AS adopts this social movement’s analytical and rhetorical frames using them to justify why Somali-Americans will never be truly accepted by the American state, and should thus return to Africa and join the jihad. One should consider what it means when a Somali jihadist group assembles the voice of Malcolm X calling the US a “racist society that was controlled by racists from the federal government right down to the local government” overtop images of Michael Brown, the beating of Rodney King, and other iconic images of police brutality directed against African American men. What does this mean for the future of a (discursive and rhetorical) battle for the “hearts of minds” of potential recruits for terrorism and their potential victims?

Image 6. Al-Kataib advertisement, “the path 2 paradise.”

In this film, AS discusses US race relations as the narrator calls the country a home of “injustice, intolerance and institutionalized racism,” referring to the “historical injustices [done to] the African American community,” adopting a vernacular and tone far more similar to social justice and progressive journalism than jihadist propaganda. The film continues:

The Black Codes and the Jim Crow Laws that justified racial discrimination, in the 19th and 20th century still exist today in more subtle forms, giving rise to consistent policies of discrimination, where black people are racially stigmatized, and often suffer a wide range of social injustices. Black people are often disproportionately targeted by law enforcement agencies, and are subject to racial profiling and police brutality; the consequences of which have had a devastating impact on the African American community and hindered their progress.28

The 50+ minute film includes footage from riots responding to police killings of African American men in 2014. The film then profiles several black men who made the trek from the US,

28 Al-Kataib Foundation for Media Production, The Path to Paradise: From the Twin Cities to the Land of Two Migrations, episode 2, 2016.
showing them fighting and dying in Somalia. Abu Muslim, the first man profiled, left Minnesota in 2008 to join AS. In the video, his journey is described as “from the basketball courts to the mosques of Minneapolis…for the lands of jihad [Somalia]…[as] For Abu Muslim, a man who has been through some troubled times, jihad was the door towards forgiveness, and thus he took his first steps towards sincere repentance.”

This is a recurrent and central aspect of the narrative crafted and directed to target African Americans and those of African dissent residing in the US. The message is clear, ‘America does not welcome you or treat you justly, so you should return to the African continent to live a truer existence beyond the confines of racism and colonialism. And, as a bonus, the decision to join this holy fight forgives you of any prior transgression and guarantees you a place next to God and paradise in the afterlife.’ When Abu Muslim is shown in Somalia, he is in training, wearing a military uniform and holding a rifle. The film then shows him speaking, along with a second man named Mohammed, whom he reports to have “grown up with” and played basketball with in the US, about his time with AS, stating:

we’re out here, I used to be [Mohammed’s] point guard but now, I’m his bodyguard! We’re having fun and everybody back home thinks we’re having a bad life and having bad dreams. But they got it all wrong because we’re living the best life and having the best dreams because all we dream about is attaining shuhada [martyrdom] and meeting Allah the Exalted.

In the story crafted by the narrator, both men achieved their goal of martyrdom soon after fighting on the front, and in doing so, completed their worldly existence to begin their existence in Paradise alongside Allah. This is a powerful, transformative, and redemptive narrative, made louder by an on-the-ground reality that increasingly understands the US as structurally biased against African American citizens. The direct recruitment of US residents by a foreign organization on racial, heritage, and ethnic lines is not new, as the Irish Republican Army would draw supporters from the US Catholic community for decades, but it is unique in that it offers participation in jihad as a means of overcoming — through a recuperation of social emancipation — institutionalized marginalization, and in doing so, intentionally conjures an anti-colonialist politic shrouded in terrorism.

These AS films serve to elevate the voice of the subaltern, though in this case, the Fanonian black body is engaging in terrorist-styled violence against the Somali, Kenyan, Ethiopian, Ugandan forces, and the multi-national, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). According to Achille Mbembe, a Cameroonian theorist discussing Fanon, such violence constitutes “the only way for the colonized to restore themselves to life was to use violence to impose a redefinition of the mechanisms through which death was distributed.” In this case, AS serves to redistribute death through terroristic and guerrilla-styled violence, and in doing so, allows the colonized a voice through bombs and bullets. Though it requires quite a bit of unpacking, one could consider the discursive realities constructed in the AS film a form of anti-Orientalism; a method of presenting a narrative style which appeals to a Western, English-speaking audience, while remaining distinctly Somali. The films are able to adopt a narrative structure and voice similar to classic documentaries, and in doing so, are less intimidating and alienating than Islamic State (IS) videos which remain decidedly exotic and Eastern—with frequent Quranic recitations, slow motion shahada [Muslim profession of faith] flags flying in the breeze, and through gunfire and brutal gore—justified through stark religious logics.

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
32 Mbembe, Critique of Black Reason, 166.
In a May 2014 video produced by Al-Kataib titled “Mujahideen Moments 5” (the fifth film in the series), groups of masked, armed, AS fighters carry flags and proselytize through rhyming couplets, reminding the youths in conclusion, “who’s missing [here] is you.” The poem reads, in part:

This is a message to the youth in the West,
A caring brother sends you a friend request,
A life full of struggle, complete test,
To choose the following options, which is the best.
Put your trust in Allah and take a shahada-fest.
A lone wolf mission, you know the rest.
Second option, you leave it all,
Your whole dunya [world] and backpack,
What do you need more?
Hijrah [migration to Somalia] and jihad is the smart call,
Just like the brothers at the Westgate Mall.33

The masked speaker reads his poem from a sheet of paper, offering the listener an explicit choice: either make hijrah, or stay in the US and organize your own attacks, referencing the Westgate siege, where over seventy were killed, as a model. The film ends by displaying an image of an airplane ticket issued by Al-Kataib Airlines, flying from Minnesota to Mogadishu. The ticket bearer’s name is listed as “you.” and the date written as 1435, from the Islamic calendar (this is 2014 in the Gregorian calendar). Above the ticket, the screen reads, “Next Flight to Mogadishu the only one missing is you.”

![Screenshot from Al-Kataib video, “Mujahideen Moments 5.”](image)

In this less than three-minute film, AS uses video to empower and activate individual Africans (i.e. African Americans, Somali-Americans residing in the US), linking their anger to engagement with an international armed conflict. In a postcolonial context, this serves as “rehabilitating”34 power denied to the othered, African, precariat. The film offers a typically disempowered community of adherents a shared identity. The decision offered to the audience is thus: Emigrate to Somalia and join the fight, or, stay in the land of racism and kuffar [unbeliever] and fight in our name, but justified through your lived experience of discrimination and state violence.

33 Al-Kataib Foundation for Media Production, Mujahideen Moments 5, 2014.
Though with less sleek professionalism and frequency, BH, has also recently been active producing English-subtitled videos, with at least six videos and one audio statement subtitled in English 2015-2017. This follows a larger trend in the production of jihadist video propaganda. The prolific video propagandists within the IS network have been generating video material with English subtitles since their rise in 2014. Other Syrian-Iraqi factions such as Al Muhajirun, Jabhat al-Nusrah/Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (AQ’s faction), and the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria, have regularly produced videos designed for English speakers. Of these, Al Muhajirun, which represents itself as an umbrella front for foreign fighters entering the region, produced thirteen videos subtitled into English 2015-2016, and the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria, an AQ-allied Uyghur jihadist faction, has produced thirteen English-subtitled videos 2016-2017. These Uyghur films possess a distinct aesthetic when compared to the videos produced by Sunni, Middle Eastern, and North African, Arab-led factions, and are an apt site for further research and inquiry.

Political Violence & the African Precariat
What defines the political violence of those in the so-called Oriental Third World resisting colonial domination, foreign occupation, and multinational intervention? In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon argues that colonial and racial violence functions to deny Africans recognition and human dignity, and in doing so, constructs them as “abnormal,” “inferior,” and thus precarious. With such a precarious subject, can we ascribe individualistic, rational motivations to those who are denied a unique identity? Is it possible to produce cultural artifacts, such as movies, that contain a white hero and a black villain, both of which are constructed through textured and nuanced portrayals? Is it even possible, to have a black-skinned hero when the subject is the African continent? Moreover, when examining policy implications, one can ask: What conditions must be met to provoke a US-led intervention if the colonized is consistently a black body enveloped in a colonial script? How does this constrain and limit not only representationism but action? Certainly, the killing of eighteen US soldiers in Somalia during the early days of Bill Clinton’s presidency soured American support for similar activities in Rwanda, despite the administration’s knowledge of the genocide. It is typically presumed that the aggressive, belligerent force will be dark and local, and the outside, liberating force will be white and foreign. Examples of such framing are common throughout Black Hawk Down, yet are sometimes challenged. In one such notable example, the Muslim, African, Arab liberators portrayed in the 1966 film The Battle of Algiers are cast against a villainous other, who in this case, happened to be a white, Christian, foreign army of French occupiers.

Despite rare exceptions, the general pattern remains the same. The audience is led to sympathize with white (Western/European) invaders portrayed as liberators, and cheer the deaths of brown and black “savages.” This patterned performance reinforces the notion of what constitutes the “precarious life,” put forward by Judith Butler. Butler invites the reader to consider a central question: Whose deaths are we allowed to mourn, and which deaths are we expected to accept without acknowledgment? Butler explains this philosophical uncertainty with a series of rhetorical questions, asking, “Who counts as human? Whose lives count as lives? And, finally, What makes for a grievable life?” Are we allowed to mourn those killed as a result of natural disasters or in apolitical criminal acts? What about those killed in acts of terrorism? Are we able to mourn the deaths of suicide bombers, airplane hijackers, and those killed in airstrikes carried out in response to sub-state aggressions? In his 1996 fatwa entitled “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” jihadist figurehead Osama bin Laden

36 Ibid., 178.
37 Though this author has not yet seen the film, the release of Black Panther (2018) may provide just that, as the film is said to take place in a fictionalized, African country known as Wakanda.
38 A term used repeatedly in such postcolonial texts as: Achebe, “An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad’s ‘Heart of Darkness’”, and its conceptual usage has been studied in film and literature, such as the work of: M. Daphne Kutzer, Empire’s Children: Empire and Imperialism in Classic British Children’s Books (London: Taylor & Francis, 2004).
40 Ibid., 20.
claims that “more than 600,000 Iraqi children have died due to lack of food and medicine as a result of the unjustifiable aggression (sanction) imposed on Iraq and its nation.”41 The fatwa summons the deaths of Muslims globally, claiming that “the Muslim blood became the cheapest” and noting that “their blood was spilled in” Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, Tajikistan, Myanmar (i.e., “Burma”), Kashmir, India (i.e., “Assam”), the Philippines, Indonesia (i.e., “Fattani”), Ethiopia (i.e., “Ugadin”), Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.42 Here it appears that bin Laden is invoking a discourse reminiscent to Butler’s, as a precarious existence translates to the ease through which Muslim lives are taken in violent conflicts; conflicts which the besieged understand as a war to “defend their existence against real or fancied threats of extermination.”43 Interestingly, though bin Laden rejects the ease through which his enemies take Muslim lives without cause or distinction, in his second fatwa, he calls on supporters to “kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.”44

It is not uncommon for sub-state conflicts occurring in Africa to be understood as aged, intractable, wars, and yet the African continent is not without traditional forms of terrorism. In 2016 alone, groups affiliated with the AQ network carried out at least 257 attacks occurring in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, the Ivory Coast and Algeria through the networks of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al Murabitoon, Ansar Dine, and the organizations’ respective battalions and fronts.45 In 2017, this number grew to 276.46 Terrorist violence has frequently spilled over these borders as well, and can be linked to the killings in many additional nations. The academic discourse and media coverage of terrorism occurring in Africa is often less frequent than scholarship focused on the Middle East, Asia, or Europe. While some networks are frequently discussed within the standard terrorist discourse—such as AS in Somalia and BH in Nigeria—those that transgress ethnic, clan, and tribal identities are often ignored politically or classified broadly as ethnic conflicts or civil wars.

This is not to downplay the effects of ethnic division, as armed groups are routinely “fragmented along ethno-political lines”47 such as in the case of the newly formed AQ umbrella organizations in the region of Mali. Causal analysis of these sub-state conflicts is often encumbered with a framing which sees African conflicts displaying ethnic identity as inherently-complex and intractable, or as the US Army reports in the case of BH, “persistent ethnic, regional, and religious divisions;

42 Ibid.
46 In March 2017, many of these organizations including Ansar Dine, Al Murabitoon, Katiba Macina, and AQIM Sahara branch announced a merger and reaffirmed their loyalty to the AQ franchise. The new organization is headed by a senior figure in Ansar Dine and is called Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimeen (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims).
47 “Analysis: Al Qaeda Groups Reorganize in West Africa,” FDD’s Long War Journal (blog), accessed March 15, 2017, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-al-qaeda-groups-reorganize-in-west-africa.php. This figure includes only those networks aligned with AQ, and excludes attacks carried out by non-AQ networks such as IS, which remain active in Libya (Wilayah Barqa), Egypt (Ansar Bait al-Maqdis/Wilayat Sayna), Algeria (Jund al-Khilafah), Somalia (AS, Jaba’a East Africa), Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad (BH).
corruption; and poverty gave [BH] rise.” Conversely, while some forms of political violence are depoliticized through the lens of Orientalism, other forms of criminal (i.e., non-political) violence are infused with radical politics precisely because the actors are black, Muslim, and marginalized. For example, consider the conflation of the actions of Somali pirates understood to be AS, or more generally, as an element of AQ. This transference of the fear of terrorism onto black-bodied pirates from a terrorism-prone region has been noted discursively by academics, media editorials, and other investigations. Furthermore, media coverage of actual African jihadists can reflect a double bias—one exhibiting both Orientalist and colonialist discourses. In one study of news coverage of BH, the author argues that descriptions of the group’s alliance with IS perpetuates a discursive construction of mimicry, where the subaltern (i.e., BH) is denied a sense of agency and self-determination, and instead presented as subordinate to a larger force (i.e., IS).

In many of these African, jihadist conflicts, the death tolls are high and the attacks frequent. Sites such as the Egyptian Sinai, Mali’s Azawad, Somalia’s Mogadishu, and Kenya’s Garissa University and Westgate Mall have been sites of mass violence. Atop such sites are a multitude of cities and towns in Nigeria and Niger where BH has reportedly killed hundreds, such as in Gamboru Ngala, Nigeria in 2014 (315 killed), Maimuguri, Nigeria in 2014 (212 killed), Konduga, Nigeria in 2014 (201 killed), Karamga, Niger in 2015 (230 killed), and so on. Of course, BH is not alone in its targeting of Africans. A truck bomb which detonated in Mogadishu in October 2017 allegedly by AS produced more than 500 causalities, including more than 300 deaths. These large-scale killings further complicate the discussion concerning where mass terrorist violence ends, and genocidal violence begins. If a non-state actor kills on the basis of religion or ethnicity in mass, what separates these from more systematized “crimes against humanity” such as those seen in Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda and Darfur?

It should be noted that although not on the African continent, the conflict in Yemen is grossly underreported, misunderstood and othered. Many have stated this is due to the conflict being overshadowed by the war in Syria, calling Yemen the “forgotten war.” The fighting is largely framed as a civil war between two factions: Sana’a-based Houthi forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the Aden-based forces loyal to Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, and supported by the militaries of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Senegal and Sudan (i.e. the Saudi-led coalition). The Houthis (officially known as Ansar Allah), are an Iranian-backed, Zaidi Shia-led, political and religious movement that emerged in the 1990s and

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54 Wyszomierski, Boko Haram and the Discourse of Mimicry.
55 Fatality data taken from the “Global Terrorism Database,” the University of Maryland, USA, accessed October 16, 2018, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
took state power in 2014. In addition to the Saudi-backed forces of Hadi, and the Iranian-backed forces of Saleh, both al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and IS have a presence, with the former controlling up to thirty-six percent of the country, and the latter claiming to have established a province there (i.e. Wilayah al-Yemen). The conflict has claimed an estimated 10,000 lives since 2015, and wounded 40,000.\textsuperscript{59} UNICEF estimates that 2.2 million children require humanitarian aid to prevent fatal malnutrition and disease, while more than three million Yemenis have been displaced. Many of these deaths have been the result of airstrikes targeting Houthi rebels carried out by the Saudi-led international coalition, which support from the US, UK, France and China. As these airstrikes have led to scores of civilians’ deaths—including the killing of 140 civilians attending a funeral in October 2016—at least one Yemeni official has called the actions “genocide” perpetuated by the Saudi-led coalition. The irony of identifying Yemen as a site of underreporting and misunderstanding in a brief aside, has not escaped this author, however it is beyond the scope of this article to expand the analysis further into the Arabian Peninsula.

These inquiries—from Somalia to Nigeria, and from Mali to Yemen—raise a key question: when does mass killing becomes genocide?, returning us to Butler’s argument, and the question of whose deaths we are expected to mourn. While victims of war and terrorism are labeled in such a way that presumes they \textit{will} be mourned, the victims of genocidal violence are often not. Of course, we are expected to mourn the 224 individuals killed in the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, but what about the 15,000-22,000\textsuperscript{60} Tamil Tigers killed during the fourth phase of the Eelam War (2006-2009), or the estimated 80,000-100,000\textsuperscript{61} killed in the larger 26-year conflict? What about the 167 Palestinians killed in 2012’s Operation Pillar of Defense, the 1,391 killed Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009), or the 2,104 killed in the 2014 Operation Protective Edge?\textsuperscript{62} What about the 200 Kurdish fighters killed in a single Turkish airstrike as they battled IS forces in northern Syria?\textsuperscript{63} What can these communities say about their own experiences? If one aspect of the violence is discursive—the construction of \textit{them} by a white, Western \textit{us}—how can understanding this relationship elevate the voices of those most afflicted; to recall Spivak’s question, \textit{Can the subaltern speak}? Moreover, what role does such a discursive analysis (one which positions the subaltern as the colonial victim), play within the process of decolonization?

If those questions do not contain obvious answers, consider the scores of BH militants killed by national armies. Below is a short list documenting ten incidents (2013-2016) where large numbers of individuals labeled as BH terrorists were killed as reported by international press:

- October 2013: At least ninety-five BH fighters killed by Nigerian Army.\textsuperscript{64}
- September 2013: Approximately 150 BH fighters killed by Nigerian Army.\textsuperscript{65}
- June 2014: More than 100 BH fighters killed by Nigerian Army.\textsuperscript{66}

• December 2014: Several raids by Cameroonian Army kill a least 94 BH fighters.67
• January 2015: At least 227 BH fighters killed by Chadian Army in a series of two raids (120 killed in one raid and 207 killed in the second).69
• February 2015: More than 300 BH fighters killed by Nigerian Army.70
• September 2016: Approximately 123 BH fighters killed by Chadian-Nigerian Army.71
• February 2016: Approximately 100 BH fighters killed by Cameroonian-Nigerian Army.72
• June 2016: Approximately 130 BH fighters killed by Chadian-Nigerian Army.73

In sum, from amongst these ten offenses targeting BH fighters, the armies of Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad killed at least 1,319 persons. If we accept estimates put forth by the US intelligence services, this could constitute more than twenty-five percent of BH’s total troop strength.74 In these killings, the individuals are rarely named, and their individual crimes are not mentioned, nor likely known. In death, they constitute a subaltern hoard, and the contents of unmarked graves. These persons serve as undifferentiated causalities of war, not unlike the “docile bodies” discussed by Michel Foucault, though in the African case, the utility of these bodies is precisely situated in their disposability, their ability to be utilized and discarded. For Foucault, the bodies of BH “soldiers” can model how the sovereign’s might is written atop the “pliable” terrorist body, “manipulated, shaped, [and] trained” via the discourse of state power. As Foucault reminds us, war can be a continuation of politics,77 and in the case of BH’s war with Nigeria, this politic ensures the continued devaluation of bodies which are denied security and marked for death.

Incalculably Precarious African Lives

Returning to Butler’s notion of a precarious life, she notes that those collectivities deemed to be dangerous—for examples on the basis of race or factional affiliation—are exempted from legalistic protections as well as affective mourning. In the case of aerial bombings targeting BH encampments, the need to individualize and distinguish combatants from noncombatants is disregarded. Butler writes that these “who are deemed dangerous” are [excluded from] the jurisdiction of the law, depriving them of the legal protections to which subjects under national and international law are entitled. There are surely populations that are not regarded as subjects, humans who are not conceptualized within the frame of a

74 This calculation is based on the estimation that BH maintains 4,000-6,000 troops, according to: Burns et al., Threat Tactics Report: Boko Haram, 4.
76 Ibid., 135, 136.
77 Ibid., 168.
political culture in which human lives are underwritten by legal entitlements, law, and so humans who are not humans.78

Disregard for the deaths of those labeled as African terrorists is not confined to the ranks of BH. The jihadist forces raging against the Egyptian state and citizenry in the Sinai—most notably Wilayat Sinai/Ansar Bait al-Maqdis/Ansar Jerusalem—have faced a similarly precarious framing.

In news and social media accounts, the deaths of hundreds of Sinai-based jihadist fighters are reported triumphantly, and devoid of empathetic concern. In December 2015, this network carried out a series of coordinated attacks involving reportedly more than 300 fighters, resulting in the death of twenty-one Egyptian soldiers. The fighting in the Sinai was said to be the biggest battle since the 1973 Yom Kippur War.79 During the Egyptian army’s counter-attack, army spokesman Mohammed Samir reported that 241 “terrorists in North Sinai” had been killed, many by artillery fire, in a five-day period.80 This statement, distributed by Samir on Facebook, included graphic images of the men’s slain bodies, many of which were disfigured, and according to media coverage, “mangled.”81 In recalling Butler, not only are these individuals denied rhetorical legitimacy in their deaths, but with their bloodied flesh displayed for the world to see, they are further disregarded as complete human beings deserving of dignity and the rites afforded to those who have died. Egyptian authorities later reported that the army had killed “nearly 500 militants in Sinai”82 in less than two years (July 2015-February 2017), providing yet another undifferentiated accounting of large-scale killing.

From BH in Nigeria, the many-named jihadists of the Sinai, and those in Somalia, the cheapening of African lives continues. In a final example, we can examine the March 5, 2016 airstrike carried out by US forces targeting AS’s Raso training camp, located about 120 miles north of Mogadishu. The Department of Defense described the strike—which involved drones and conventional air forces—as being carried out “in self-defense,” noting that the attack targeted “fighters who were scheduled to depart to camp [and thus] posed an imminent threat.”83 While the press statement does not give a death toll (or even an estimate), it notes the “removal of these fighters.”84 Despite not providing a causality number in the official release, in statements to media, the Pentagon is quoted as stating the figure as 150, “about 150,” or “more than 150” killed.85 AS for its part, reports that the 150-person claim is exaggerated, citing their losses at less than one hundred. An AS spokesman, Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab stated to Reuters: “The U.S. bombed an area controlled by al Shabaab. But they exaggerated the figure of casualties. We never gather 100 fighters in one spot for security reasons. We know the sky is full of planes.”86 Despite the factuality of either the US or AS’s reports, the malleability of such a figure and the unimportance with which fifty lives

78 Butler, Precarious Life, 77.
82 Ahram Online, 241 ‘terrorists’ Killed.
84 Ibid.
are recorded or disregarded speaks to the precariousness of black deaths. This case shows that whether it is over reporting or underreporting, the rule remains the same; black lives do not matter when it comes to accurate reporting of armed conflicts.

Within these historical vignettes, the slain black and brown bodies represent justified killings, as they are understood to be practitioners of unsanctioned, anti-state, terroristic violence, and as such, their deaths are not to be mourned, as their lives existed in a perpetual state of precarious insecurity. Within the discourse of terrorist-belligerent v. civilian-victim, the public is taught that to mourn the jihadists, is to displace empathy for their victims. We are expected to mourn the victims of the 2015 Baga massacre, in which BH fighters killed “over 2,000 people,” (January 3-7, 2015) in the state of Borno, according to Nigerian government spokesman Musa Alhaji Bukar. Thinking beyond the fighters presented as unmournable fatalities, what about those killed in the crossfire, or when civilian sites are confused for militant strongholds? On January 17, 2017, the Nigerian air force dropped bombs on a refugee camp in Borno, confusing it for a BH encampment. The attack or when civilian sites are confused for militant strongholds? On January 17, 2017, the Nigerian air force dropped bombs on a refugee camp in Borno, confusing it for a BH encampment. The attack occurred as aid workers were distributing food to residents. Exact numbers on fatalities were unclear, varying from fifty-nine to seventy-six. According to early reporting by the International Committee of the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders, the dead included six Red Cross workers. This example presents an interesting aside, as aid workers and refugees are killed precisely because they were perceived to be terrorists, and through this mistaken identification, their deaths are reimagined as tragic and deserving of recognition and empathy.

Reading the precarious lives discourse through the story of the African precariat demonstrates that those advocating (African) jihad are undeserving of mourning, yet their targets must be understood inherently as innocent, agency-less victims. This is true for individuals slain in the confusion; presuming they turn out to be unaffiliated with terrorism. Despite this standard frame, are there moments of exceptionality and destabilization to these roles? What about the suicide bomber who killed nineteen in a northeastern Nigeria marketplace? Does the life of that individual become more mournable when the reader learns the bomber was a ten-year-old female? When the issue of an actor’s agency is further muddied by accusations that child bombers are coerced and drugged, does this denial of self-determination allow the death of a child to be deemed sacrosanct and deserving of a spiritual peace? In the last few years, BH has rapidly adopted the use of child bombers, estimating an eleven-fold increase 2014-2016. Current research estimates that children

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87 This number is highly contested, but the inability for reports to come to a common agreement exemplifies the flexibility of reporting on African deaths.
89 This 2,000 person fatality claim is repeating in the US Army report detailing the activities of BH, see, Rick Burns et al., Threat Tactics Report, 8.
made up approximately twenty percent of BH’s bombers during this period, according to UNICEF.\(^96\)

As BH’s attacks continue, and their use of child and female suicide bombers continue to increase, does this change the means through which their violence can be read and their death’s quantified? Operating under traditionalist mores for recognizing and interpreting political violence, one is expected to mourn those killed by BH’s sieges, mourn but not empathize with the child bombers, and avoid recognizing the tragedy of slain adult-aged militants.

The Non-Precarious: When Terrorism is White and Christian

The discourse of the precarious subaltern, othered by their African-ness exists in stark contrast to the way in which this legalistic and corporeal reality is constructed in a white Western context. Shifting to a place closer to this author’s home, one can examine a host of incidents rife with definitional ambiguity. Within a US context, what sense can we make of the slain terrorist and the anti-colonial subaltern that is strangely familiar yet undeniably African? In testing the limits of such an analysis, one is tempted to interrogate the 1969 murders of Black Panthers leaders Fred Hampton and Mark Clark by Chicago police, or the Philadelphia police’s 1985 bombing of the MOVE Organization—an act which killed eleven Afro-centric revolutionaries including five children, and left more than 250 homeless. Of course, one could easily extend such an analysis into the realm of the Movement for Black Lives, and its efforts to create public space for the mourning of African Americans killed by police. In these cases, one’s willingness to mourn the dead is a likely predictor of that individual’s subjective political position vis-à-vis notions of identity politics and solidarity—in other words, it is the individuals who acknowledge that the patterned killing of young African American men by police is systemic who view these deaths as mournable.

Despite the regularity with which police murder African Americans, the vast majority of violence, both political and apolitical, is carried out by white American males, targeting other white American males.\(^97\) In a recent comparative analysis conducted by the Department of Homeland Security’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), “far-right extremists have killed twice as many people (272) as Islamist extremists (130)” from 1990-2016.\(^98\) This trend holds true for the killing of police as well. The report notes that during that period, right-wing militants killed fifty-seven officers (in forty-six attacks) while jihadists killed seven officers (in five attacks).\(^99\) This simple comparison demonstrates the oddity of the state’s insistence that its largest enemy is an Arab, Asian, or brown/black-skinned, Muslim; as an examination of the historical record shows the patterned lethality of white, Christian, American-born, males.

The influence of Orientalism, saviorism, colonialism, and endemic white supremacy are key elements in understanding the means through which political violence is labeled abroad, but they fail to explain the asymmetric manner through which it is applied in the West, when the terrorist embodies a non-precarious life, namely that of a white, (presumably) heterosexual, Christian, American-born, male, citizen. The questions of what forms are violence are deemed terroristic, and which slain persons can be termed victims, are largely matters of discursive construction. The decision to label a particular act, individual, or movement as terrorist, is more a question of

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\(^98\) This calculation controls for the right-wing and jihadist atypical outlier attacks which yielded high fatalities—the Oklahoma City bombings and the 9/11 hijackings.

politics, than the means through which a particular non-state actor chooses to strike. The decision to label is dependent on how that violence is constructed vis-à-vis systems of power, such as the state’s need to maintain a Weberian monopoly on violence. The discursive shift that occurred in the West in the period after the 9/11 attacks highlighted this trend. Not only did the FBI, the premier US federal policing agency, reframe its “primary function” from one of “law enforcement” to “national security,” but throughout the post-9/11 era, state-level rhetoricians described their ideological enemies (that we able to be othered) as terrorists, while others who adopted violent means of socio-political change were considered extremists.

In practice, when jihadists attack Americans they are terrorists, but when white, Christian, militia members host an extended armed standoff with US federal authorities—as Cliven Bundy and supporters did in 2014, and Ammon Bundy in 2016—they are termed extremists. This was not an isolated occurrence or the result of a rouge rhetorician. Consider the case of Frazier Glenn Miller, who attacked two Kansas City-area Jewish sites in 2014. Miller opened fire outside of a Jewish Community Center and a Jewish retirement home, killing three people, none of whom were Jewish. Miller is a former leader of the White Patriot Party (also known as the Carolina Knights of the Ku Klux Klan), and was found guilty in 1986 of operating a paramilitary training site for white supremacists. At that time, Miller produced up to 5,000 copies of a Declaration of War wherein he stated, “I Glenn Miller now this 6th day of April, 1987 do hereby declare total war… I declare war against Niggers, Jews, Queers, assorted Mongrels, White Race traitors and despicable informants.” In this declaration, Miller encouraged supporters to kill individuals, and awarded different points for each target class. African Americans were worth one point, Jews ten points, “influential Jews” twenty-five points, abortion providers twenty points, judges fifty points, and “informants and government witnesses” fifty points. In FBI and Department of Justice documents, Miller is described as an “active shooter” or “gunman,” and the attack, an “anti-Jewish hate crime.” In neither report is the word “terrorism” or “terrorist” used. Miller’s lethality, incitement to others, and explicit strategy of intimidating a segment of the civilian population defined by race, religion, and sexuality seems to evoke terrorism without much thought. However, Miller was charged with first-degree murder, aggravated assault, and discharging a firearm into an occupied building. Though he was outwardly political in his motivation, his actions were not contextualized as such, and in doing so, they failed to meet the discursive standard to be judged as terrorism. Furthermore, Miller is labeled through a descriptive account of his actions—“gunman” or “active shooter”—not based on a value judgment of those means, such as through the term terrorist. The use of a label that describes an action (e.g. bomber, gunman, arsonist) rather than one that denotes a value judgment (e.g. terrorist, freedom fighter, extremist) is common in state accounts of right-wing violence, and absent in their accounts of similar actions by Muslims, Arabs, Asians, Africans, and those able to be discursively othered.

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103 Ibid.


Compare Miller’s case to the arrest and prosecution of Christopher Cornell, a white, Christian-born, Muslim convert, and resident of Ohio, found guilty of conspiring to attack President Barak Obama’s 2015 State of the Union Address. Cornell was arrested after purchasing two semi-automatic rifles and 600 rounds of ammunition, reportedly bound for DC. Because Cornell was labeled as an agent of the IS, a State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, he was convicted of attempting to murder government employees and officials, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and attempting to provide material support of a designated foreign terrorist organization. His sentencing memorandum discursively labels him in its first sentence, which reads: “Beginning in 2014, Defendant Christopher Cornell...became a sworn follower and supporter of a foreign terrorist organization, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.”107 The document uses the words “terrorism” and “terrorist” twelve times in thirty-two pages including calling Cornell’s plans “a homeland terrorist attack”108 and comparing them to the bombing of the Boston Marathon in 2013; perpetrated by foreign-born jihadists, one of whom was a naturalized citizen and the other, a legal permanent resident whose citizenship was in process. While Cornell’s terrorist labeling and Miller’s “active shooter” labeling may be a matter related to the status of IS, it is reflective of an intentional rhetorical logic. Cornell’s case is therefore an interesting middle point, where a white, American defendant is charged with a terrorist-related infraction. However, while Cornell may be white-skinned and Christian-born, by converting to Islam and professing an allegiance with IS, he surrenders his white, Western privilege, allowing the state to frame him as the exotic other. In this logic, Miller and the Bundys remain extremists, despite their proven readiness to engage in violence targeting “government employees and officials.”

It is precisely Cornell’s desire to associate and align politically with a foreign, Oriental, othered entity that facilitates his labeling as a terrorist. In fact, the vast majority of those convicted of terrorism-related crimes by the US are Muslim non-citizens. In 2016, the Department of Justice Subcommittee on Immigration and the National Interest concluded that “at least 380 of the 580 [~66%] individuals convicted of terrorism or terrorism-related offenses between September 11, 2001, and December 31, 2014, were born abroad.”109 In reviewing the raw data used to draw these conclusions, it is easy to note the affiliation patterns of those convicted—jihadists from locations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia dominate the list. Commonly listed affiliations include IS, AS, various AQ and Taliban factions, Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed Shia forces, and Palestinian Islamists (e.g., Hamas) and their support structures. These networks are readily understood as terrorist as they are foreign (i.e., Middle Eastern, Asian, or African), and non-Christian. Rarely mentioned in the list of convictions are the many non-Muslim organizations engaged in terrorism, though the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Tamil Tigers (LTTE) do occur with relative frequency. In this study, with nearly sixty-six percent of terrorism convictions being delivered to foreign-born individuals, it certainly appears well-patterned that terrorism is something they do to us, not something we do to them. For the state, terrorism is something Muslims, Arabs, Asians, and Africans born outside of the US do to Americans. In rare cases, it is something traitorous Americans do to their countrymen, but these terrorist citizens are essentially stripped of their Americanness via their Muslimness, Arabness, Asianness, and Africanness. In this extensive listing of 580 terrorism cases,110 there are no individuals listed with associations to Aryan Nations, the Ku Klux Klan, various militia, sovereign citizen, or other neo-Nazi/white supremacist movement,111 and none associated with the anti-abortion assassin network known as the Army of God, who have

107 United States District Court For the Southern District of Ohio Western Division and Judge Sandra Beckwith, United States of America v. Christopher Cornell, Sentencing Memorandum, Southern District of Ohio Western Division, United States District Court, November 21, 2016, 1.
108 Ibid., 7.
110 This calculation controls for the right-wing and jihadist atypical outlier attacks which yielded high fatalities—the Oklahoma City bombings and the 9/11 hijackings.
111 For example, groups of this nature include: the Posse Comitatus, 3 Percenters, Citizens for Constitutional Freedom, Minuteman Project, Hutaree, FEAR militia, White Patriot Party, The Order and Oath Keepers.
been responsible for a campaign of violence dating back nearly forty years. In January 2018, in a report published by the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security, authorities repeated this claim, summarizing that “three out of four individuals convicted of international terrorism and terrorism-related offenses were foreign-born.”

**Terrorism as Labeling**

The way in which the *other* is constructed, and the prefigurative labeling which establishes the colonized as an *illegitimate* user of violent means, is a practice that finds its embodiment in the actions of soldiers, police, courts, prisons, and the rhetoric of politicians. Though non-state violence has never received the praise of the state, the post-9/11 environment highlighted this rhetorical process within a larger push towards the language of securitization. Butler notes how the labeling of terrorism in a post-9/11 environment amounts to the establishment or denial of legitimacy towards those who utilize violent means to create change. For Butler, terrorism is not a tactic nor a strategy, but rather a discursive fabrication, grounded in a rhetorical construct which dictates who can and who cannot resist within statist logic. Butler writes,

> in the present climate...various forms of political violence are called ‘terrorism,’ not because there are valences of violence that might be distinguished from one another, but as a way of characterizing violence waged by, or in the name of, authorities deemed illegitimate by established states...The use of the term ‘terrorism,’ thus works to delegitimate certain forms of violence committed by non-state-centered political entities at the same time that it sanctions a violent response by established states.113

While previous discussion has examined this asymmetry is effected by ethnicity, citizenship and religion, this irregular deployment of defamatory labeling is also present when actions are understood in terms of political ideology, especially in the case of the US. In this national context, the actions of the “left” and “right” demonstrate even more of an unbalanced practice than the labeling of foreign versus domestic-born individuals. To briefly explore this, one can examine numerous recent cases receiving international attention and discussion.

The self-described white supremacist Dylann Roof, was convicted in a thirty-three count indictment for the June 2015 killing of nine African American parishioners, shot inside of a church in Charleston, South Carolina, while attending a Bible study group. Roof maintained a white supremacist website, glorified the unrecognized state of Rhodesia (i.e., Zimbabwe), and claimed that he carried out his actions to initiate a race war. As Roof’s actions were by his own admission racially-motivated (similar to Miller), and designed to terrorize a community on that basis, they are clearly *terroristic* in nature, highlighting a rare exemplary use of such a definition. According to the criminal indictment, Roof “wanted to increase racial tensions across the Nation, and sought retribution for perceived wrongs he believed African-Americans had committed against white people.”114 The thirty-three charges levied against him are related to civil rights, hate crimes, and the use of a firearm. His charges include “Obstruction of Exercise of Religion Resulting in Death,” “Obstruction of Exercise of Religion Involving an Attempt to Kill and Use of a Dangerous Weapon,” “Use of a Firearm to Commit Murder During an In Retaliation to a Crime of Violence,” “Hate Crime Act Resulting in Death,” and “Hate Crime Act Involving an Attempt to Kill.”115 This frame, which presents Roof’s attack as employing racial-discrimination to violate religious freedom, is notable, as his crimes could have just as easily been framed as white supremacist terrorism in

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114 United States District Court for the District of South Carolina Charleston Division et al., *United States of America v. Dylann Storm Roof*.

115 Ibid.
rhetorical as well as legal terms, though at present.116 This presents its own legal challenges. While legislation has been created which links some manners of political violence as terroristic (e.g., see the discussion of the AETA which follows), at present, according to the Department of Justice’s counsel for domestic terrorism matters, there is no criminal statute outlining what acts can be charged.117

In a discussion of labeling, it is important to recall related histories of right-wing political violence, such as those targeting abortion providers. Since 1993, there have been eleven abortion providers murdered in the US, as well as twenty-six attempted murders by anti-abortion militants, largely claiming attacks under the Army of God moniker.118 In the most recent killing, Robert Lewis Dear opened fire inside of a Colorado Springs Planned Parenthood, killing two civilians and a police officer, and wounding nine others. Despite Dear’s frequent proclamations that his violence was motivated to “protect the babies,” and his self-description as a “warrior for the babies,”119 Dear was charged with 179 felony counts of murder and attempted murder, and was later found incompetent to stand trial due to his frequent outbursts of anti-abortion rhetoric. In an unusual example, Joseph Stack III deliberately crashed a small aircraft into a building in Austin, Texas that housed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Stack died in the attack, and the crash killed an IRS manager while injuring thirteen others. Stack authored a political suicide note prior to the crash, which blamed the IRS and used rightist conspiratorial language. Since he died in the attack, he was not charged, but imagine the discourse if he had survived. Now imagine that instead of Joseph Stack, a man named Mohammed or Khalid piloted their plane into a federal building in a suicide mission. Would they have been called a terrorist or an extremist? In 1997, when Timothy McVeigh was convicted of bombing the Oklahoma City federal building and killing 168 people, he was not charged under a terrorism statute, but was convicted of “destruction by explosive of a federal building, causing death and injury,” as well as multiple counts of murder, conspiracy, and the use of a “weapon of mass destruction.”

The “weapon of mass destruction charge” used again McVeigh’s is housed under the section of US law dealing with terrorism (Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 113B), yet the above mentioned cases beg the question: If the legislature and judicatory can work in tandem to enact a law like the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA),120 which prosecutes acts of vandalism by animal rights activists as federally-prosecuted acts of terrorism, why were the deaths of 168 people in Oklahoma City, or the murder of churchgoers, not juridically sanctified through similar means? The AETA has been used to prosecute activists accused of a variety of crimes including arson, vandalism, harassment, conspiracy, and the release of captive animals from breeding and slaughter sites. If state and federal versions of the AETA can be authored and passed criminalizing certain forms of political action—in this case any protest which financially damages an “animal enterprise”—why are similar means not used to discursively mark the actions of Miler, Bundy, Roof, Dear, or McVeigh? While it is true that US law does not charge individuals simply with “terrorism,” the case of the AETA, and the use

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116 It is worth noting that such rhetorical maneuvers have functioned differently in closely related political contexts. For example, the January 29, 2017 shooting inside of the Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec City, which killed six worshipers and injured nineteen others, was immediately described by Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as a “terrorist attack on Muslims,” and others, including Quebec’s Premier Philippe Couillard, labeled the act as “terrorism.” The shooter was charged with multiple counts of “first-degree murder” and “attempted murder,” and reportedly was motivated by white nationalist and anti-Muslim politics. Friends and colleagues report he was a supporter of the French rightist Marine Le Pen as well as right-wing American populist Donald Trump.


of “Terrorism Enhancements”\textsuperscript{121} to add additional penalties to leftist defendants, demonstrates the state’s ability and willingness to use such means when it serves their interests.

There is no correlation between cases where prosecutors utilized the AETA, and crimes that resulted in injury or death, though the AETA tends to be used in cases where actions are claimed under the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) moniker. According to FBI statements and Senate Hearings,\textsuperscript{122} the ALF and its allied networks (i.e., “eco-terrorists”) constitute the “number one domestic terrorist threat.”\textsuperscript{123} Throughout the entirety of AETA prosecutions, no victims were injured or killed, though property was damaged. Despite the non-lethality of their attacks, at least three individuals\textsuperscript{124} imprisoned for animal liberation actions have been incarcerated in Communications Management Units\textsuperscript{125}—maximum-security prisons with enhanced restrictions for terrorist entities. Eco-saboteur Daniel McGowan was sentenced with “terrorism adjustments”\textsuperscript{126} added onto his sentence as authorized by the USA PATRIOT ACT. Walter Bond was charged with violating the AETA for his animal rights-motivated arsons, and Andrew Stepanian was charged with an earlier version of the AETA, known as the Animal Enterprise Protection Act.\textsuperscript{127} In all of these cases, the men were juridically cast as terrorists, either through their charging statutes (e.g., AETA), sentence modifications (e.g., terrorism adjustments), and/or incarceration (e.g., in Communication Management Units). If the state has the willingness to create legislation and convict activists guilty of vandalizing an animal breeder’s home or setting fire to a leather retailer as terrorism, then why not the actions of Roof, Miller, Dear, Stack, or McVeigh? What does terrorism mean when it is applied between the words Animal and Enterprise, and not following apt descriptors such as “white nationalist” [terrorist], “anti-abortion” [terrorist] or “anti-tax” [terrorist]. How does this measured irregularity reflect larger trends in the application of terrorism as a label meant to other and deny the target empathy, political legitimacy and the ability to be mourned?

Conclusion

Critically, what fundamentally distinguishes the shooting of parishioners in Charleston or clients of a reproductive health center in Colorado Springs, from an AQ or IS plot to open fire at a party in San Bernardino, or a gay nightclub in Orlando? The San Bernardino shooters consisted of an American-born citizen of Pakistani dissent, and a Pakistani-born, lawful permanent US resident. Though they were lawful residents of the country, and not directed by a foreign terrorist


\textsuperscript{124} Daniel McGowan, Abdul Haqq (also known as Walter Bond), and Andrew Stepanian.


\textsuperscript{126} Immergut et al., \textit{Government’s Sentencing Memorandum}, 50–60.

organization—FBI Director James Comey described the couple as radicalized by the Internet, not
directed by IS. President Barak Obama called the attack an act of “terrorism” in an Oval Office
address. In his December 6, 2015 speech, Obama stated

...we have no evidence that the killers were directed by a terrorist organization overseas, or
that they were part of a broader conspiracy here at home. But it is clear that the two of them
had gone down the dark path of radicalization, embracing a perverted interpretation of
Islam that calls for war against America and the West. They had stockpiled assault weapons,
ammunition, and pipe bombs. So this was an act of terrorism, designed to kill innocent
people.\footnote{Barack Obama, “President Obama Addresses the Nation on Keeping the
American People Safe” (Oval Office address, Washington, DC, December 7, 2015),
accessed October 16, 2018, https://medium.com/@ObamaWhiteHouse/president-
obama-addresses-the-nation-on-keeping-the-american-people-safe-b4cfa8a0f143 - hi8iwhgym.}

In the case of the shooting at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, the FBI similarly called
the shooting an “act of terrorism and a hate crime.”\footnote{In these cases, the crimes were called terrorism and the perpetrators terrorists, but since the
individuals were killed in the attacks, there were no charges filed, and no opportunity to judge
how such a rhetorical frame translated into a juridical or corporeal reality. Compare this to the
frame used to portray Stack, the airplane suicide attacker who was similarly killed in his assault.
If the San Bernardino and Orlando shooters had been caught, would they have been charged and
sentenced like Roof, or reframed as somehow different, because their manner of violent extremism
was foreign-born, Eastern, and non-white? If the state is able to capture future shooters alive, will
we see their conviction based on newly crafted legislation styled after the AETA? From the case
history demonstrating the asymmetric manner through which the label of domestic terrorist is
applied in the US, it appears that in a legal sense, terrorism is something that animal rights and
environmental activists do, yet rhetorically and discursively, it is something Muslims do, while the
violent politics of white Christian rightists is called varying forms of extremism.

What differentiates the framing of “extremists” like Miller and Roof from “terrorists” like
the San Bernardino shooters appears to be the way the perpetrators’ ideology and subjectivity
is made to appear foreign, exotic, and fanatical. White supremacists or militant anti-abortionists
are understood to be simply hardcore believers disregard the law in favor of tactical efficacy,
while jihadists appear as apocalyptic savages who love to kill for a Godly reward—a logic we
are told is unredeemable and devoid of legitimacy. While the normative discourse on radicalism
condemns both ideological camps, it places white rightist violence on a continuum of force—
ranging from the legitimate to the illegitimate—and frames jihadists as myopically-religious to
the point of irrationality. The racial and ethnic undertones of this should be obvious. When the
perpetrator is non-Christian, non-white, Arab, Asian, African, or not American born, this completes
the explanation for most, and no further evidence is needed for a wholesale denial of the actors’
legitimacy. Through the histories of discourse, law, and rhetoric, this pattern is repeated with
near perfection: A neo-Nazi opens fire at a Jewish community center is termed an “extremist”
or “gunman,” while Arab, Asian, and Muslim practitioners of political violence are deemed
terrorists, especially when those individuals are understood to be foreign despite their place of
birth, immigration or citizenship status.

Finally, we return to the question of what constitutes a mournable life, and how have entire
segments of the human population been denied this grieving? Why do filmmakers lead viewers
towards emotional investment with white, Christian, protagonists who apprehend, maim, and kill
African, Asian, and Arabs with near universality? From the capturing of Iron Man by desert-dwelling
Muslims to Ridley Scott’s portrayal of the utter disposability of Somali bodies, the West has adopted
a decidedly distorted interest in the Oriental other. While the governmental rhetoricians and
corporeal stakeholders are quick to broadly defame, it is precisely these unmournable undesirables
spoken of with voyeuristic vitriol that hold our fascination. As we continue to consume a never-
ending stream of dramas cast in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and storytellers continue to expropriate armed conflicts as engaging backdrops for action sequences, we remain complicit in the co-construction of a narrative which is colonial, Orientalist, othering, and grounded in white supremacy. Until we can prefigure a world where the armed precariat can be understood as legitimately resisting with dignity, and those killed by the state can be mourned, the discursive construction of terrorism will continue to be reproduced in furtherance of state violence, relying firmly on an exoticized other.

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