2007

A Maslovian approach to the motivations of Shakespeare's transvestite heroines in The Two Gentlemen of Verona, As You Like It, and The Merchant of Venice

Angela Eward-Mangione

University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd

Part of the American Studies Commons

Scholar Commons Citation


This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
A Maslovian Approach To The Motivations Of Shakespeare’s Transvestite Heroines In

The Two Gentlemen Of Verona, As You Like It, and The Merchant of Venice

by

Angela Eward-Mangione

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
of Master of Liberal Arts
Department of Humanities and American Studies
College of Arts and Sciences
The University of South Florida

Major Professor:  Sarah Munson Deats, Ph.D.
                      Joanne Waugh, Ph.D.
                      William Morris, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
May 29, 2007

Keywords:  transvestism, modern motivation theory, holistic psychology, third force psychology, early modern england

@2007, Angela Eward-Mangione
Dedication

To my adoptive father, James “Jim” Eward (1939-2005).
Acknowledgements

This thesis represents the culmination of academic achievement, as well as personal growth and maturity. I must first thank my husband for the countless days, hours, weeks, months, and years he helped me grow. He always encouraged me to pursue my dreams and did anything possible to assist: cleaning, cooking, running errands, washing my car, picking up ink cartridges or computer paper, offering a shoulder to cry on, and much more. I feel blessed to have the opportunity participate in the deep, meaningful, and truly equal partnership we share. As the brilliant Rainer Maria Rilke poetically expounds:

The point of marriage is not to create a quick commonality by tearing down all boundaries; on the contrary, a good marriage is one in which each partner appoints the other to be the guardian of his solitude, and thus they show each other the greatest possible trust. A merging of two people is an impossibility, and where it seems to exist, it is a hemming-in, a mutual consent that robs one party or both parties of their fullest freedom and development. But once the realization is accepted that even between the closest people infinite distance exists, a marvelous living side-by-side can grow up for them, if they succeed in loving the expanse between them, which gives them the possibility of always seeing each other as a whole
and before an immense sky. (Translated from the German by Stephen Mitchell)

I would like to modify this slightly, and thank my husband for not only seeing me as a whole before a sky—but as the sky of infinite space, and, for loving the clear-blue shades, stormy clouds, and dark nights that continuously dance and trade places as we journey through life together.

I thank all who contributed to my proposal and this manuscript, including Sara Crawley in the Women’s Studies Department, as well the members of my examining committee who also criticized and improved this manuscript: Sara Munson Deats, Joanne Waugh, and William Morris. Dr. Deats first inspired me as an undergraduate and her love for Shakespeare and teaching still amazes me. As a graduate student, her outstanding scholarship, teaching, editing, and encouragement grounded me in critical theory, as well as in the background information on early modern England that became essential for all my future work up to and including this thesis. Joanne Waugh acted as my mentor, as well as my course advisor. She always gave me the guidance I needed, while allowing me the flexibility I required for growth. William Morris first influenced me as an undergraduate. His lectures always left me spell-bound and inspired me to learn more. I thank these three scholars, mentors, and outstanding teachers.

It is extremely difficult for me to express in words how significantly Martin Schönfeld in the Philosophy Department affected my personal and academic life. He is entirely brilliant, endlessly patient, genuinely caring, fantastically sensible, and consistently sound. I am not certain I would be here right now were it not for the patient
counseling and teaching he so generously provided. I would also like to thank Rick Wilber in the Communications Department for his fastidious guidance and attention. I met Rick at a Tampa Writer’s Alliance Meeting in 2006, and he did not hesitate for a moment to advise me in my writing and academic career. This benevolence is inspirational! Marc Olmsted, a fine Buddhist poet in San Francisco, California also significantly contributed to my development and success. Always encouraging me to keep working on my thesis while also tutoring me long-distance in my professional and creative writing, Marc remains a tremendous influence in my life—academically speaking, as well as on my personal path of awakening. I also thank Steve Shealy, PhD for his talented skills as a therapist, professional, and community leader. When things seemed stressful and overwhelming, he was always there to guide me back to my true self. I thank my best friend Lila Potter, MA for cheering and inspiring me, and for perpetually continuing our tradition of accepting each other for who we are. This seed was planted when we initially met in Kindergarten at age five, and has continued to blossom ever since. Together, we have weathered tests, courses, papers, stress, successes, happiness, failures, tears, smiles, marriages, break-ups, lost jobs, new jobs, and more. Best friends like this are hard to come by these days, and I am deeply grateful for her and wish her luck as she pursues a PhD in Business. I would also like to thank Paul Linn for taking the time to help me see things more clearly. I am so grateful for his wisdom, compassion, and teachings. His courage and authenticity inspire me. I remember my first teacher, Gabriel Horn (White Dear of Autumn), with gratitude.
Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my late adoptive father for cultivating and encouraging my love for learning. When I was young, we sat in our living room and read encyclopedias together. We also watched TV Shows about history, the arts, and religion. We never talked much until our final days together, but we always shared this bond—this love of life and learning, and appreciation and reverence for All that is. I am sorry he is not here to see the finished product of this work, but am grateful to feel his presence whenever I wish. His death remains my greatest teacher to this day; its lesson: “Live life fully, and as though this day may be your last,” is indeed credible and guides me in every moment.
# Table of Contents

Abstract ii

Chapter One: Introduction 1

Chapter Two: Motivation Theory 14

Chapter Three: Abraham Maslow 21

Chapter Four: Julia/Sebastian in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* 37

Chapter Five: Rosalind/Ganymede in *As You Like It* 45

Chapter Six: Portia in *The Merchant of Venice* 56

Chapter Seven: Conclusion 67

Works Cited 71

Bibliography 76
A Maslovian Approach to the Motivations of Shakespeare’s Transvestite Heroines in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona, As You Like It*, and *The Merchant of Venice*

Angela Eward-Mangione

ABSTRACT

“Motivation” is the force that drives an individual to perform a certain action. Abraham Maslow (1908-1970), an American psychologist profoundly influenced by the existential and teleological paradigms, expounded a motivation theory that remains precise and replicable, as well as applicable to other spheres of study, including the humanities. Indeed, psychology experts and non-specialists are by and large familiar with Maslow’s Pyramid of Human Needs. Moreover, despite the abundance of literary criticism that utilizes Freudian-based theory to analyze the motivations of literary characters, critics have largely neglected the use of other paradigms, including Maslow’s. In this thesis, I use Maslow’s texts as support for identifying the motivations of women characters who dress as men in Shakespeare’s dramas. I also simultaneously employ Maslow’s theory to illuminate the parallels in these characters’ motivations and the varying need levels that Maslow develops in his hierarchy. After a comprehensive review of the literary criticism that addresses the dramatic motif of cross-dressing in early modern England and an extensive explanation of the history of motivation theory up to and including that of Abraham Maslow, I treat the following plays by William
Shakespeare: *The Two Gentlemen of Verona, As You Like It*, and *The Merchant of Venice* in conjunction with Maslow’s Pyramid of Human Needs. Through this analysis, I demonstrate that Julia cross-dresses to satisfy needs on the level of Love/Belonging; Rosalind cross-dresses for reasons that correspond to the Safety level, then to the Esteem level; and Portia demonstrates motivations that correspond to Maslow’s Love/Belonging and Esteem levels.
I. Introduction

Cross-dressing was a familiar practice in the medieval and Renaissance periods in the West. In her 1990 dissertation for Yale University, Clothes Make the Man: Female Transvestism in the Middle Ages—a work later published by Garland Press—V.R. Hotchkiss examines a plethora of diverse medieval texts showcasing women who utilized gender disguise to participate in activities customarily reserved for men: monastic life, ecclesiastical governance, travel, business, rescue missions, and warfare. As Hotchkiss notes, “Female transvestism occurs so frequently in medieval texts that feminine stereotypes, roles in literature, and the perception of women in the Middle Ages warrant reexamination in light of it” (4). K.V. Crawford addresses the Renaissance and later periods in her Ph.D. Thesis for Harvard University entitled, The Transvestite Heroine in Seventeenth-Century Popular Literature (1984), in which she traces the history of attitudes toward transvestism in the West, links this history with various concepts of androgyny, examines an eighteenth-century transvestite’s autobiography, explores the meaning of masculinity and femininity in seventeenth-century England, considers the roles of women in the political and religious movements of the period, discusses the controversy over fashions in clothing, and scrutinizes the transvestite heroine in Shakespearean and non-Shakespearean drama. The English viewed transvestism as a controversial subject during this time because Biblical and societal law forbade this practice. In the Hebrew Bible (Christian Old Testament) Deuteronomy 22:5 prohibits a
All this said, the beged ish (man's clothing) question becomes more complicated as we begin to consider the Pandora's box-o'gender. While the issues raised by the modern transgender movement have different implications for the lives of many of our fellow human beings, the questions such as What is a man? What is a woman? and How do we know? are ancient. The rabbis of the Talmud recognized as many as seven genders and debated the status, responsibilities and roles of each one. But what the rabbis of the Talmud did not anticipate is the phenomenon of more and more people who argue that gender can be chosen. (Ruttenberg, 1)

The English legal ramifications of transvestism have roots in the medieval era. Jeanne d’Arc (ca. 1412-1431), perhaps the most thoroughly documented medieval transvestite, stood trial and faced execution for charges of transvestism. This legal stance still existed during the Renaissance and informed morally critical anti-theatrical polemics—evidenced by several circulating tracts in early modern England. Tract authors disseminated these texts within the broader context of a politically and religiously rooted distrust in the public performance of plays. David Bevington, in his introduction to The Complete Works of Shakespeare, notes:
From the 1570s onward, and even earlier, the city fathers of London revealed an ever-increasing distrust of the public performance of plays. They fretted about the dangers of plague and riotous assembly. They objected to the fact that apprentices idly wasted their time instead of working in their shops. And always the municipal authorities suspected immorality.” (xliii)

English preachers also thundered against drama, and pamphleteers of the era denounced all matters pertaining to the stage: Stephen Gosson in *The School of Abuse, Containing a Pleasant Invective Against Poets, Pipers, Players, Jesters and Suchlike Caterpillars of a Commonwealth* (1579); Philip Stubbes in *The Anatomy of Abuses* (1583); and William Pyrnne in *The Players’ Scourge or Actor’s Tragedy* (1633). As Bevington explains, Gosson, a playwright-turned-clergyman censured plays as “‘the inventions of the devil, the offerings of idolatry, the pomp of worldlings, the blossoms of vanity, the root of apostasy food of iniquity, riot and adultery…Players are masters of vice, teachers of wantonness, spurs to impurity, the sons of idleness’” (Gosson qtd. Bevington, xlv). However, Gosson did not initiate the stage controversy. The tirades against the stage date back at least to the time of Plato, and other pamphleteers had verbalized arguments and printed diatribes a year or more before Gosson left the playhouse to attack it. William Ringler develops this point in his biography and critical study of Gosson:

From the time of the earliest dramatic performances to the present there have always been some people who objected to them. Plato expelled the
tragedians from his ideal state, the Church Fathers inveighed against the
demoralized performances in the Roman amphitheaters, and in the late
Middle Ages criticism was leveled at the miracles and the mysteries. At
some periods this criticism reached considerable proportions, at others it
was insignificant; but at no time when the drama existed was it entirely
absent. (54)

However, Gosson undoubtedly popularized the attack and attracted considerable attention
to the debate over the Renaissance theater, which regularly featured actors who on the
stage transgressed a multitude of political, social, and legal boundaries normally enforced
in early modern England, such as stealing and murder. The stage also offered a sphere in
which lowborn actors could impersonate kings and queens, as well as cross-dress.
Consequently, actors could transcend the normal restrictions placed on social mobility.

Since Elizabethans associated professions outside the home and all higher social
ranks with men, London pamphleteers considered women who cross-dressed as men
morally and socially subversive. These women presented a violation of the Biblical
injunction against cross-dressing and threatened the state’s social hierarchy. Although
published in the early part of the seventeenth century, Hic Mulier also addresses the
anxiety over the behavior and attitudes of women—partially reflected in their donning of
men’s clothes in the society of early modern England. A letter by John Chamberlain, the
prominent epistolary historian of the court of James I (dated January 25, 1620), describes
a strangely vehement reaction of James to the shifting attitudes, behaviors, and dress of
women:
Yesterday the bishop of London called together all his clergie about this town, and told them he had express commandment from the King to will them to inveigh vehemently against the insolencies of our women, and theyre wearing of brode brimed hats, pointed doublets, theyre hayre cut short or shorne, and some of them stilettos or poniards, and such other trinckets of like moment; adding withal that if pulpit admonitions will not reforme them he would proceed by an other course; the truth is the world is very much out of order, but whether this will mende it God knows.”

(Baines, vii)

As Barbara Baines explains in her introduction to *Three Pamphlets on Jacobean Antifeminist Controversy*, “the change in women’s dress was such a serious matter because it reflected or suggested an alteration in the way women conceived of themselves in relation to men. Since in the Renaissance sexual identity was based on a complementary sexual polarity, the Renaissance man no doubt felt threatened by this change” (viii).

Despite the changes that occurred during this period, however, many aspects of early modern life remained constant, such as the social hierarchy and oppression of women endemic to English society. As Sara Munson Deats elucidates in *Sex, Gender, and Desire in the Plays of Christopher Marlowe:*

During the so-called “Renaissance” in England, a married woman could not own property, indeed had no legal identity separate from her husband…a man could legally beat his wife almost to death as long as he
wielded an instrument of chastisement no thicker than his thumb, and, a
woman who fled from an abusive husband could be whipped, branded and
even hanged as a vagrant. (50)

We must acknowledge the English social matrix before we consider the treatment of any of the issues—including cross-dressing—in Renaissance drama. This context includes the banishment of women from the stage, which explains why boy actors played the role of female actors and consequently identifies another circulating prejudice in early modern England not always shared by continental counterparts during this epoch.

Many literary critics have addressed the cultural phenomenon and dramatic convention of transvestism by focusing on other aspects of this subject. One group of critics concentrating on the homosexual possibilities of Shakespeare’s cross-dressed characters includes but is not limited to Lisa Jardine in “Boy Actors, Female Roles, and Elizabethan Eroticism” (1991), Valerie Traub, in Desire and Anxiety: Circulations of Sexuality in Shakespearean Drama (1992), and Denise Walen in “‘Lust-Exciting Apparel’ and the Homosexual Appeal of the Boy Actor: The Early Modern Stage Polemic” (1995). As I previously observed, women did not act on stage in early modern England. Therefore, adolescent boys cross-dressed to perform the role of female characters. Consequently, a boy actor courting, kissing, or having a romantic relationship with another boy actor possibly constituted homosexual behavior, even though the “boy actor” intended to play the role of a female character and the playwright in question intended to create a female dramatic character. Despite the certainty with which the playwright knew a cross-dressed boy actor would play the role of a female character,
most of us would agree, for example, that Shakespeare intended for Desdemona to serve as Othello’s female wife. Traub initiates her discussion of Shakespeare’s homoeroticism by overlooking this point, among others:

The phenomenon of boy actors playing women’s parts in Shakespearean comedy has engendered analyses primarily along three axes. The boy actor: (1) is merely a theatrical convention in the lineage of medieval drama; (2) is a political convention specifically necessitated by the determination to keep women, excepting Elizabeth I, off any public stage or platform; or (3) is an embodiment of the meta-dramatic theme of identity itself: always a charade, a masquerade, an other…I want to argue first that the practice of employing boys to act the parts of women was not merely a dramatic convention, nor was it solely a patriarchal strategy.

(Traub 117)

Traub cites Stephen Orgel in “Nobody’s Perfect: Or Why Did the English Stage Take Boys for Women” to support her dismissal of the patriarchal aspect of this dramatic convention—the desire to keep women out of public view. As Orgel points out, when in 1599 the Spanish government banned women from the Spanish stage, “the spectacle of transvestite boys was found to be even more disturbing than that of theatrical women, and the edict was rescinded four years later” (Orgel 7-8). Traub suggests that the dramatic practice of transvestism continued in early modern England because it enabled Elizabethans to explore their homoerotic desires and fantasies (118). I agree that it is impossible to ignore the erotic aspects that surround the dramatic convention of cross-
dressing in early modern England—particularly in Shakespeare’s plays. However, I propose that Shakespeare’s plays likely contain an equal number of heterosexually oriented erotic puns and innuendos. Thus, I do not deem a singular focus on aspects we today would term “homosexual” as necessary. Moreover, I do not find the practice of ignoring the patriarchal aspects of the edict against cross-dressing completely convincing.

Clearly, other aspects of this convention such as the patriarchal society and the oppression of women endemic to this society are relevant. A second group of critics, concentrating on the manner in which cross-dressing challenged or denaturalized gender roles and cultural constructions of masculinity and femininity, includes Juliet Dusinberre’s, *Shakespeare and the Nature of Women* (1975); Nancy K. Hayles’ “Sexual Disguise in *As You Like It* and *Twelfth Night*” (1979); Shirley F. Staton’s “Female Transvestism in Renaissance Comedy, ‘A Natural Perspective, That Is and Is Not’” (1981); Robert Kimbrough’s “Androgyny Seen Through Shakespeare’s Disguise” (1982); Marianne Novy’s *Love’s Argument: Gender Relations in Shakespeare* (1984); Catherine Belsey’s “Disrupting Sexual Difference: Meaning and Gender in the Comedies” (1985); Phyllis Rackin’s “Androgyny, Mimesis, and the Marriage of the Boy Heroine on the English Renaissance Stage” (1987); Jean Howard’s “Cross-dressing, the Theater, and Gender Struggle in Early modern England” (1988); and David Cressy’s “Gender Trouble and Cross-Dressing in Early modern England” (1996). As Howard notes, when considering the social phenomenon of cross-dressing, its meaning varies “with the circumstances of its occurrence, with the particulars of the institutional or cultural sites of its enactment, and with the class position of the transgressor” (418). Howard argues that
the preachers and polemics who maintained a steady attack on the practice of cross-dressing during this period signal “a sex-gender system under pressure” (418). She also suggests that “cross-dressing, as a fact and as an idea, threatened a normative social order based upon strict principles of hierarchy and subordination, of which women’s submission to man was a chief instance, trumpeted from a pulpit, instantiated in law, and acted upon by monarch and commoner alike” (Ibid). I agree with Howard’s interpretation and believe her essay fully situates the cultural and dramatic practice of cross-dressing within the framework that is essential to any study of this phenomenon.

A third group employing audience-response approaches to analyze Shakespeare’s cross-dressed characters includes Peter Hyland in “Shakespeare’s Heroines: Disguise in the Romantic Comedies” (1978); Laura Levine in “Men and Women’s Clothing: Anti-theatricality and Effeminization from 1579 to 1642” (1986); Stephen Orgel in “Nobody’s Perfect or Why Did the English Stage Take Boys for Women?” (1989); and Ursula Heise in “Transvestism and the Stage Controversy in Spain and England, 1580-1680” (1992). Additionally, Michael Shapiro synthesizes the ideas of several of these critics in *Gender in Play on the Shakespearean Stage: Boy Heroines and Female Pages* (1994) (Perry 2-5). Heise suggests that English women’s absence from the English stage points to a unique social practice in England but a “general attitude” toward issues of gender and sexuality shared by Spain during this time (360-361). According to Heise, the English and Spanish preoccupation with gender invites four areas for investigation: 1.) Why Spanish society permitted women on stage when English society did not; 2.) Why English society accepted boys in drag when Spanish society ultimately outlawed them;
3.) What preoccupations were at stake in the attempted repression of the female transvestism so popular with audiences in both countries; 4.) Why transvestism, in general, was so popular with both of the English and Spanish audiences (359-360). As Heise observes, “there are no specific laws or forms of social organization” that would explain the convention of English society preferring transvestite boys over women, and Spanish society preferring transvestite women over boys (360). Moreover, even though Spain’s final resolution of 1600 granted women permission to act, “a much more heated controversy over gender and theatre” ensued, including a memorandum from the Council of Castile—the governing body in Spain under Charles V—that prohibited the use of transvestite boys on stage, outlawed the practice of actresses dressing as men and prescribed that actresses wear long skirts and “adopt male attire only from the waist up—keeping their legs and feet decently covered” (Ibid)—and also required that actresses be accompanied by their husbands or fathers (359-360). Based on her comparative analysis of both countries, she observes a “preoccupation over how to keep women’s sexuality under control,” and the belief that “insufficiently controlled female sexuality is considered a hazard for the stability of social order” (361).

Significantly, Heise’s work focuses on early modern England’s alleged attempt to control female sexuality and examines restrictions enforced upon women toward this end, while Traub’s work suggests that cross-dressing as a dramatic convention facilitated the exploration of homoerotic desire and anxiety. It seems that the former perspective infers that cross-dressing as a dramatic practice is inhibiting, while the latter approach finds its nature permissive. I suggest that a holistic approach to this subject enables us to
appreciate its various facets and the differing implications that co-existed within the related social structure of early modern England. This viewpoint also respects the comedic aspect of this subject. When watching a play and seeing a boy dressed as a woman strut the stage, Elizabethan audience members likely laughed as much as they (allegedly) contemplated threats to the patriarchal hierarchy or delighted in homoerotic exploration. Moreover, many theorists view comedy in particular as “the topsy-turveydom of carnival,” and consider Shakespeare’s transvestite heroines and the “transgressions” associated with their gender and sexuality as “a way of letting off steam” (Gay 2). According to this viewpoint, the audience enjoys these fantastical disruptions, and then, after the carnival event, “settles back happily into the regulated social order of patriarchy” (2).

A fourth approach, to which I wish to contribute, acknowledges the existing framework and all of its integral aspects within which the cultural and dramatic practice of transvestism occurred within, but addresses the practice itself from a philosophical and psychological perspective. Belsey’s “Disrupting Sexual Difference: Meaning and Gender in the Comedies” (1985) aligns with the philosophical category, since she relies on Ferdinand de Saussure’s theories to demonstrate that Shakespeare’s transvestite heroines arrest the perceived “meaning” of sex and gender. Bono’s “Mixed Gender, Mixed Genre in Shakespeare’s As You Like It” also offers an excellent example of psychologically based criticism. Bono adapts the object-relations theory of Nancy Chodorow—an interdisciplinary scholar who defines herself as a humanistic psychoanalytical sociologist and a psychoanalytic feminist—to develop a feminist,
psychoanalytic approach to the study of Shakespeare’s transvestite characters. Traub’s work, *Desire and Anxiety*, also employs psychoanalytic methods, although Traub uses this approach to interrogate feminist and new historical methods and consequently synthesize “the psychic and the social, the individual and the institutional” along with an analysis of Shakespearean drama (i). Currently, no other psychological or psycho-philosophical scholarship exists which provides a comprehensive examination and analysis of Shakespeare’s transvestite heroines. In this thesis, I attempt to formulate such an approach. Rather than focusing on the *end result* of these heroines’ behavior—their challenges to the patriarchy and blurring of gender and identity, for example—I consider the possible *motivations* of these fascinating and dynamic women. Since psychological criticism tends to treat “characters” as credible human beings; we should analyze these characters from as many illuminating angles as possible. This approach is not uncommon within literary studies. When we study *Othello* for instance, we ruminate over the motivations of Iago, Othello, Desdemona, and other characters within the play. Scholars still argue over whether or not Iago represents the Vice from the medieval morality play, or if his envy for Othello provides a humanly credible motivation for his behavior. Conversely, we continue to contemplate whether shame, despair, or cowardice motivates Othello’s decision to commit suicide. In *Hamlet*, we seek to understand what motivated Ophelia’s suicide—her love for Hamlet, or dejection, or despondency? We ask what motivated King Lear to treat Cordelia so harshly in the opening act of the play, and we are not entirely sure what motivated Macbeth to kill Duncan. Lovers of the theater have always sought to discern the motivations of dramatic characters. In the next chapter, I
will discuss “motivation” in more detail, and provide a brief history of the full range of motivation theory.
Chapter II: Motivation Theory

Scholars of philosophy and laymen alike commonly view “motivation” as what drives an individual to perform a certain action. Phrases such as “Police Search for Motive” regularly appear in print media or online headlines worldwide. However, the quest to understand this subject readily exists outside the criminal sphere. Lascaux, a complex of caves in southwestern France, contains some of the earliest known art—dating back to somewhere between 13,000 and 15,000 BC, perhaps as far back as 25,000 BC. Philosophers, anthropologists, and other historians continue to speculate on the motivations for the cave paintings. Some scholars maintain that humans are “social animals,” and these scholars suggest that the Lascaux cave art signifies the expression of humanity’s social aspect. Others, such as Henri Édouard Prosper Breuil—a French archaeologist, anthropologist, ethnologist, and geologist—interpret the paintings as “hunting magic” intended to increase the number of animals within close proximity. Another theory, more modern in origin, interprets the art as the work of Cro-Magnon shamans. According to this perspective, shamans retreated into the caves, entered into a trance state, and then painted images of their visions. A desire to draw power from the caves’ walls might account for the Shamans’ motivations; we do not know this for certain.

As a result of the curiosity we perpetually demonstrate in understanding what propels our actions, philosophers and psychologists have consistently sought to formulate
paradigms, models, and explanations for motivation. What is motivation? Does motivation exist within us, outside of us, or is it a synergistic process between self and environment? Prior to a more detailed discussion of motivation in general and of why I choose to examine the motivations of Shakespeare’s cross-dressing heroines in particular, I must first offer a brief history of the full range of motivation theories. As R.J. Rummel notes in *The Dynamic Field of Motives, Attitudes, and Goals*: “What drives us, what motivates us to behave as we do and how does this motivation work, have been of utmost importance to humankind throughout our history.” (175)

Although Rummel’s work seeks to provide an analysis of the causes or motivations for violence and war, his discussion of motivation provides a comprehensive survey of how philosophers and collective societies—particularly our Western society—have viewed and treated this psychological drive. Prior to his in-depth investigation of the four principal perspectives on motivation that I will discuss later—the hydraulic, tension-release model; the behavioral paradigm; the existential view; and the teleological perspective—Rummel includes brief commentary on pre-modern views of motivation:

The ancient Greeks saw us as driven by our spirit (such as courage) and our base desires, with reason mediating between. The Hindus saw us as motivated by self-preservation, self-expression, sex, gregariousness, and an impulse to knowledge. Medieval scholastics thought we were driven by faith, reason, and our low appetites. (175)

Rummel initiates his discussion of the four primary modern paradigms of motivation by acknowledging the philosophical transition that occurred during and after
the early modern period, and which consequently influenced these models:

With the dethronement of revelation in the West and emphasis on the data of experience, we became viewed as either a machine reacting to external stimuli or a being motivated at the most basic level by the desire to avoid pain and seek pleasure. (175)

This radical philosophical shift inaugurated a dramatic alteration in the way that Westerners approached ontological and epistemological questions. Consequently, future philosophers began to view humankind in increasingly mechanistic terms. As an example, Freud’s “hydraulic,” tension-release model suggests that motivation constitutes the increase of psychic tension which must then be relieved through related or substitute behavior (175-176). We refer to this as the hydraulic model of motivation because “pressure at the motivational end gets transmitted to pressure at the behavioral end of the psychological process, which may be relieved through appropriate behavior or unconscious mechanisms (dreams, displacement)” (176). The dynamic of this Freudian mechanism may be represented by the following: (build up of energy)→(urge)→(behavior aiming to discharge energy, which equals pleasure)→(satisfaction of urge).

According to this view, avoiding pain (psychic energy overload) and seeking pleasure (discharge) are the chief motivations of organisms. Freud offers a psychology that treats the patient as a self-contained unit. Ultimately, the ego—or captain of the ship—fulfills the controlling function of the mental apparatus and controls the access to motility (The Ego & the Id, 57), or discharge. In The Question of Lay Analysis, Freud associates the Ego’s task with the aversion of mishaps: “to mediate between the pretensions of the Id,”
the realm of passions, and “preventions of the outer world” (Dictionary of Psychoanalysis, 66).

In contrast, the Behaviorist paradigm, also influenced by the New Philosophy and Science of the modern era, explains action from a stimulus-response perspective. Ivan Petrovitsi Pavlov, a Russian born physicist who studied pharmacology and physiology in Saint Petersburg won a 1904 Nobel Prize for his contributions to Physiology and Medicine, although Behaviorism originated with the work of an American psychologist named John B. Watson. Pavlov received the most notoriety for his experiments with dogs. Originally, he sought to investigate their gastric function by externalizing a salivary gland, which allowed him to collect, measure, and analyze the dogs’ saliva produced in response to food under varying conditions. Pavlov observed that the dogs displayed a propensity to salivate before research assistants actually delivered food to their mouths. Consequently, he decided to investigate their secretion and carried out a long series of experiments in which he manipulated the stimuli that occurred before the presentation of food. Psychologists and most laymen know that Pavlov realized he could make the dogs salivate by simply manipulating the stimuli; the visual presence of food was not necessary. Accordingly, he focused on observable behavior. The assumption underlying this and the behaviorist paradigm as a whole posits that behavior is measurable and quantifiable as opposed to an “inner” mental life which (allegedly) is not.

According to behaviorist model, the environment determines behavior and all behavior is learned. In contrast, the existential paradigm “developed in part over dissatisfaction with the behavioral and especially the Freudian pleasure principle” (177).
Martin Heidegger, Martin Buber, and Jean Paul-Sarte associated themselves with this movement. Rummel correctly identifies *meaning* as the key existentialist concept:

What is important in motivation is the way a person as an individual sees and confronts the world, the *meaning* the world has for him. The explanation of motivation then lies not in past reinforcement or in past energy overload, but in our present involvement in the world and our view of that involvement. (177; emphasis added)

Heidegger refers to this “being in-the-world” as “Dasein” in *Being and Time*. According to Heidegger, human beings are events motivated by future goals, not objects that experience psychic build up or are solely determined by their environment. Heidegger’s perspective collapses the “inner” versus “outer” dichotomy that divides itself between the Freudian and Behaviorist models. Sartre, a seminal influence in the existentialist movement and leading figure in existential phenomenology, developed a philosophy that retains Heidegger’s focus on purpose and intentionality yet further emphasizes a future goal. Robert G. Olson summarizes Sartre’s view in “The Three Theories of Motivation in the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre:”

Human existence is being-for-itself in that it is fundamentally characterized by finality, purpose, or intention, human conduct being motivated by future goals...man’s behavior cannot be motivated in any essential sense by the exterior world or past events because Sartre in moments of anguish encountered the exterior world as it is—in its full gratuitousness, contingency, or “absurdity.” (176; 178)
As Olsen notes, Sartre offers three theories of motivation, not just one. I view Sartre’s tri-fold motivation theory as a three-dimensional concept, which requires an extensive explanation that I do not have space to expound upon here. To briefly summarize: 1.) According to Sartre’s first dimension of motivation, the motive is, in itself, a “negative quantity” (Sartre in Olsen 178-179) because it can only be understood by its end—“which is not what it is and which is what it is not.” Consequently, each individual establishes his or her own project of being, and within that project each action counts (181); 2.) A basic or universal structure pervades each individual’s project that also motivates an individual (181-182); 3.) Each individual always retains the propensity for cosmic revolt or salvation: “Man is capable of refusing to be an accomplice of the cosmic process; man may defy God and the values which haunt him. In doing so, he finds his salvation” (184). Clearly, Sartre’s motivation theory requires more explanation, but even my brief account here reveals its focus on meaning, as well as its radical difference from the hydraulic, tension-release model and the behaviorist paradigm.

The fourth motivation paradigm that Rummel reviews, the teleological model, most closely aligns with Maslow’s work. Rummel relies on the work of Alfred Adler, an Austrian medical doctor and psychologist who founded the School of Individual Psychology, to explicate this paradigm. As a practicing physician in 1902, Adler was invited to join Freud’s psychoanalytic circle. Soon, he became a prominent member of the group but eventually developed “irreconcilable theoretical differences” with Freud, primarily regarding Freud’s objective approaches to physical processes, as well as the nature of our drives (179):
Freud saw Eros, or the love instinct, as the basic life force bound up in the libido. The aim of Eros is ultimately to establish greater unities in the world and to preserve them, and includes such instincts as the preservation of the species and self-preservation. Adler saw instead that we are motivated by a superordinate dynamic force, a basic goal which directed our behavior and brought together our drives, such as those Freud subsumed under Eros. (178)

Initially, Adler’s primary goal was a superordinate aggressive drive; he later reinterpreted this as masculine protest. Consequently, after his break with Freud he interpreted the primary human goal as the striving for perfection (178). Striving directs us toward a goal as opposed to throwing us back upon a past incident, tension, or childhood experience; this accounts for its teleological nature. Although self-created and perhaps not fully conscious, this striving serves as a final cause and a key to comprehending individual behavior and problems (178). According to Adler, a feeling of inferiority always gives rise to striving, or what Adler also calls a “spring to action”—“the source of our movement toward the goal” (180). Holism informs Adler’s viewpoint, and Maslow wholeheartedly agreed with this holistic perspective.

These then are the four central theories of motivation: the hydraulic, tension release model; the behavioral paradigm; the existential view; and the teleological perspective. Now that I have provided a brief history of motivation theory, including the holistic, teleological perspective in which Maslow situates himself, in my next chapter, I will discuss Maslow’s psychological theories in more detail.
Chapter III. Abraham Maslow

In this chapter, I shall briefly explain how Maslow’s humanistic psychology differs from the hydraulic/tension-release, behaviorist, and existentialist views, and aligns with the teleological model that I describe in my previous chapter. I shall explicate Maslow’s Pyramid of Human Needs and review exceptions that Maslow notes and will conclude this section by identifying potential challenges to Maslow’s humanistic psychology and motivational theory.

I would like to initiate this project by emphasizing the influence that Maslow wielded on many fields, including psychology. He founded two psychological schools—humanistic and transpersonal—and scholars frequently apply his theories to other areas, including consumerism, business and management, health, music, and the psychology of women. An array of titles invoke Maslovian theory: (Humanistic and Transpersonal Psychology) Challenges of Humanistic Psychology by J.F.T. Bugental (1967); The Third Force: The Psychology of Abraham Maslow by F. Goble (1970); “On self-Actualization: A Transambivalent Examination of a Focal Theme in Maslow’s Psychology” by M.B. Smith (1973); No Boundary and The Atman Project by Transpersonal philosopher Ken Wilber (1979, 1980); (Education) Human Teaching for Human Learning by G. Brown (1971); Four Psychologies Applied to Education by J. Canfield and M. Phillips (1975); Toward Humanistic Education: A Curriculum of Affect by G. Weinstein & M. Fantini (1970); (Business and Management) Existence, Relatedness and Growth: Human Needs...
in Organizational Settings by C.P. Alderfer (1972); Transpersonal Management: Application of Psychological Principles in a Business Setting by G. Beauchamp; Management and Motivation by V. Vroom & E. Deci (1982); (Humanities) “Paintings and Poetry: A Teaching/Learning Experience in Self-Actualization” by Patricia L. Musick (1977); (Society and Culture; Sociology) “Maslow’s Need Hierarchy and the Adjustment of Immigrants” by Seymour Adler (1977); “Managerial Motivation in Kenya and Malawi” by Peter Blunt and Merrick Jones (1984); and “The Self-Actualizing Socially Conscious Consumer” by George Brooker (1976). These titles represent a small sample of works that apply Maslovian theory. As Robert Frager so eloquently states in his forward to Motivation and Personality:

Abraham H. Maslow was a man who dared to listen deeply to himself and to his unwavering belief in the positive potential of the human species…Esquire’s 50th anniversary issue featured articles on the most important American figures of the mid-twentieth century. The editors chose Maslow as the most influential psychologist and also as one of the most important contributors to our modern view of human behavior.

(Maslow xxxiv)

Maslow’s conception of human experience and the many theories that comprised his view are far too extensive to detail here. However, Maslow’s theories consistently stress four key points:

1. Human beings have an innate tendency to move toward higher levels of health, creativity, and self-fulfillment.
2. Neurosis may be regarded as a blockage of the tendency toward self-actualization.

3. The evolution of a synergistic society is a natural and essential process. This is a society in which all individuals may reach a high level of self-development, without restricting others’ freedom.

4. Business efficiency and personal growth are not incompatible. In fact, the process of self-actualization leads each individual to the highest levels of efficiency. (xxxv)

Although each of these findings serves as central aspects within Maslow’s psychology, I will concentrate on the first point—the “innate tendency” to move toward higher levels—which Maslow suggests motivates us as human beings. First, Maslow’s re-evaluation of “instincts” and their erroneous application to psychology illuminates a primary way in which he distinguishes himself from the paradigms of Freudian psychoanalysts and Behaviorists psychologists. While Maslow argues that some human “needs” are purely instinctive, he does not believe that instincts conform to simple behaviorist theory (Motivation and Personality, 48). Maslow also suggests that “too many writers used the world instinct indiscriminately to cover need, aim, ability, behavior, perception, expression, value, and emotional concomitants, singly or in combination” (48). He describes the result of this Freudian and Behaviorist error as “a hodgepodge of loose usage in which almost every known human reaction was characterized as instinctive” (48) and proposes that the literature based on these mistaken
foundational points inhibits our correct understanding of human behavior. Maslow disagrees with the Behaviorists’ view of environment as the sole influence from which motivation arises and personality forms: “Sound motivation theory must then take account of the situation, but must never become pure situation theory, that is, unless we are explicitly willing to give up our search for an understanding of the nature of the constancy of the organism in favor of understanding the world it lives in” (11). Maslow further develops this point by viewing behavior and motivation theory as separate projects and emphasizing that “behavior is determined by several classes of determinants, of which motivation is one and environmental forces another” (11). Therefore, he proposes that the Behaviorist paradigm can co-exist with his theories of motivation: “The study of motivation does not negate or deny the study of situational determinants, but rather supplements it. They both have their places in a larger structure” (11).

Accordingly, Maslow’s holism suffuses his view of humankind, and he lists this attitude as the first of seventeen propositions for correct motivation theory:

1. Holistic Approach
2. A Paradigm for Motivational States
3. Means and Ends
4. Unconscious Motivation
5. Commonality of Human Desires
6. Multiple Motivations
7. Motivating States
8. Satisfactions Generate New Motivations
9. Impossibility of Listing Drives

10. Classifying Motivation According to Fundamental Goals

11. Inadequacy of Animal Data

12. Environment

13. Integrated Action

14. Unmotivated Behaviors

15. Possibility of Attainment

16. Reality and the Unconscious

17. Motivation of Highest Human Capacities

(Motivation and Personality 3-31)

In Motivation and Personality, Maslow theorizes about human needs according to a Pyramid-based Hierarchy. This Hierarchy consists of five levels listed here in the successive order in which he formulates them: Physiological, Safety, Love/Belonging, Esteem, and Self-Actualization. Maslow refers to needs on the Physiological, Safety, Love/Belonging, and Esteem levels as D-Needs, or Deficit Needs. He reserves the label B-Needs—Being-Needs—for the Self-Actualization echelon. As Maslow explains, it would be impossible to construct a comprehensive list of all the fundamental physiological needs. He clarifies, “A person who is lacking food, safety, love, and esteem would most probably hunger for food more strongly than for anything else…all other needs may become simply nonexistent or be pushed into the background” (15-16).

Conversely, Maslow asks, “What happens to their desires when there is plenty of bread and when their bellies are chronically filled (15-16)?” According to Maslow, the satiation
of one level of needs allows other (higher) needs to emerge, and then these, rather than the physiological hungers, dominate the organism. If the physiological needs are well gratified, a new set of needs roughly categorized as “safety needs” (security; stability; dependency; protection; freedom from fear, anxiety, and chaos; need for structure, order, law, and limits; strength in the protectors; and so on) emerge (16). This process may progress through all the varying need levels: “And when these in turn are satisfied, again new (and still higher) needs emerge, and so on (17).” According to Maslow, Love level needs entail giving and receiving affection. “When they (Love level needs) are unsatisfied, a person will feel keenly the absence of friends, mate, or children. Such a person will hunger for relations with people in general—for a place in the group or family—and will strive with great intensity to achieve this goal” (20). Maslow asserts that little scientific information about the Belongingness need exists, but that “we know in a general way the destructive effects on children of moving too often; of disorientation; of the general over-mobility that is forced by industrialization; of being without roots, or of despising one’s roots, one’s origins, one’s group; of being torn from one’s home and family, friends, and neighbors; of being a transient or a newcomer rather than a native” (28). Maslow divides Esteem Needs into two subsidiary sets: “first, the desire for strength, achievement, adequacy, mastery and competence, confidence in the face of the world, and independence and freedom; second, the desire for reputation or prestige, status, fame and glory, dominance, recognition, attention, importance, dignity and appreciation” (21). As he explains:

Even if all these needs are satisfied, we may still often (if not always)
expect that a new discontent and restlessness will soon develop, unless the individual is doing what he or she, individually, is fitted for. Musicians must make music, artists must paint, poets must write…What humans can be they must be…This need we may call self-actualization. (22)

The term “self-actualization” was originally coined in the twentieth century by Kurt Goldstein. Goldstein received his MD from the University of Breslau in 1903 and taught at the Neurological Institute of the University of Frankfurt, where he met founders of Gestalt Psychology. Later, he traveled to New York City in 1935 and wrote *The Organism* (1939), and *Human Nature in the Light of Pathology* (1963). Goldstein suggests that the only “drive” of the human “organism” is “self-actualization.” Maslow characterizes Self-Actualization as a B-Need, or Being-Need, unlike other needs that correspond to D-Needs, or Deficit Needs. Maslow observes nineteen characteristics of self-actualizing people:

1. Perception of Reality (an unusual ability to detect the spurious, the fake, and the dishonest in personality, and in general to judge people correctly and efficiently)
2. Acceptance (a relative lack of overriding guilt, of crippling shame, and of extreme or severe anxiety)
3. Spontaneity (behavior marked by simplicity and naturalness, and by lack of artificiality or straining for effect)
4. Problem Centering (strongly focused on problems outside themselves…problem centered rather than ego centered)
5. Solitude (can be solitary without harm to themselves and without discomfort)

6. Autonomy (relative independence of the physical and social environment)

7. Fresh Appreciation (appreciate again and again, freshly and naively, the basic goods of life, with awe, pleasure, wonder, and even ecstasy, however stale these experiences may have become to others)

8. Peak Experiences (a fairly common experience for our subjects, though not all)

9. Human Kinship (a deep feeling of identification, sympathy, and affection for human beings in general)

10. Humility and Respect (can be friendly with anyone of suitable character regardless of class, education, political belief, race, or color)

11. Interpersonal Relations (capable of more fusion, greater love, more perfect identification, more obliteration of the ego boundaries than other people would consider possible)

12. Ethics (not chronically unsure about the difference between right and wrong in their actual living)

13. Means and Ends (means and ends are clearly distinguishable)

14. Humor (does not consider funny what the average person does; what they consider humor is more closely allied to philosophy than to anything else)
15. Creativity (shows a special kind of creativeness or originality or inventiveness that has certain peculiar characteristics)

16. Resistance to Enculturation (resists enculturation and maintains a certain inner detachment from the culture in which they are immersed)

17. Imperfections (occasionally capable of an extraordinary and unexpected act of ruthlessness)

18. Values (a firm foundation for a value system developed by their philosophical acceptance of the nature of self, human nature, social life, and of nature and physical reality)

19. Resolution of Dichotomies (dichotomies are resolved; polarities disappear; many oppositions thought to be intrinsic merge and coalesce with each other to form unities)

(128-149)

Maslow’s further development of this concept in Chapter 11: “Self-Actualizing People: A Study of Psychological Health,” Chapter 12: “Love in Self-Actualizing People,” and Chapter 13: “Creativity in Self-Actualizing People” provides a more sophisticated level of detail which exceeds the space I have to expound on it. Significantly, however, Maslow does not suggest that one’s possession of self-actualizing characteristics necessarily points to the individual as self-actualizing. In Farther Reaches of Human Nature, Maslow describes the most important aspect of self-actualizing individuals:

Self-actualizing people, are, without one single exception, involved in a cause outside their own skin, in something outside of themselves. They
are devoted, working at something, something which is very precious to them—some calling or vocation in the old sense, in a priestly sense. They are working at something which fate has called them to somehow and which they work at and which they love, so that the work-joy dichotomy in them disappears. (43)

Indeed, Maslow’s most poignant explanation of what self-actualization truly means—the joining of an individual with his or her innate or God-given purpose and the consequential living out of that purpose—more fully elucidates Maslow’s nineteen characteristics of self-actualizing people. Perhaps Maslow observes these qualities in self-actualizing individuals because the self-actualization process creates, demands, and fosters these characteristics. Maslow also asserts that self-actualization is not a final destination or achievement within a life journey. Rather, he suggests that self-actualization is a process of choices: “Self-actualization is an ongoing process; it means making each of the many single choices about whether to lie or be honest, whether to steal or not to steal at a particular point, and it means to make each of these choices as a growth choice” (45; emphasis added).

According to Maslow, the motivations for behavior may be described as an ongoing process and aesthetically represented with a Pyramid containing hierarchical echelons. The intrinsic dynamic of hierarchy is “upward,” although “downward” regressions are possible. For example, if individuals’ needs correspond with the Esteem level, but their social situation suddenly falls into chaos and they experience threats to law and order, then they may regress from higher needs to safety needs. A crucial point in
Maslow’s theory is that Being-Needs cannot *come into focus* until other Deficit-Needs are met. Another critical clarification: Maslow’s hierarchy does not suggest that a particular need be one hundred percent satisfied before another need emerges. “Coming into focus” and “dominating” serve as more appropriate descriptions of how given needs appear to us in experience, rather than terms like “satisfaction” and “emergence,” which invoke sharp demarcations:

> In actual fact, most members of our society who are normal are partially satisfied in all their basic needs and partially unsatisfied in all their basic needs at the same time. A more realistic description of the hierarchy would be in terms of decreasing percentages of satisfaction as we go up the hierarchy of prepotency. For instance, to assign arbitrary figures for the sake of illustration, it is as if the average citizen is satisfied perhaps 85 percent in physiological needs, 70 percent in safety needs, 50 percent in love needs, 40 percent in self-esteem needs, and 10 percent in self-actualization needs. As for the concept of emergence of a new need after satisfaction of the prepotent need, this emergence is not a sudden, salutatory phenomenon, but rather a gradual emergence by slow degrees from nothingness. (28)

In this thesis, I will treat the following plays by William Shakespeare—*Two Gentlemen of Verona, As You Like It,* and *The Merchant of Venice*—in conjunction with Maslow’s Pyramid of Human Needs. To date, no critics have employed Maslow’s theory to study Shakespeare’s cross-dressing heroines, although Rudolf M. Dekker in *The
Tradition of Female Transvestism in Early Modern Europe includes an entire chapter on “Motives and Tradition” in his study of the cultural phenomenon of transvestism during this era. Dekker also cites and expounds motivational categories that appear interesting in light of my project: “Romantic,” “Patriotic” and “Economic” (25-40). Prior to my initiation of the final task in this endeavor, however, I will briefly review the hierarchical exceptions that Maslow observes, as well as challenges to his theory and psychological paradigm as a whole.

As Maslow states, “We have spoken so far as if this hierarchy were a fixed order, but actually it is not nearly as rigid as we may have implied. It is true that most of the people with whom we have worked seemed to have the basic needs in about the order that has been indicated. However, there have been a number of exceptions” (26): 1.) Individuals who place value on self-esteem over love; 2.) “Apparently innately creative people” in whom the drive to creativeness supersedes all others; 3.) People who experience deprivations of certain levels for long periods of time and are victim to a loss or permanent disappearance of certain goals; 4.) Psychopathic persons who (allegedly) demonstrate a permanent loss of the love needs; 5.) Persons who experience an overabundance of certain needs for long periods of time and consequently undervalue those needs in the future, even in the face of their eventual deprivation; 6.) Individuals who want the more basic need over a second need if both are deprived, but whose behavior appears to demonstrate the opposite; 7.) People such as martyrs, for instance, who may demonstrate a capacity for “increased frustration tolerance,” which appears on the behavioral level as if they are willing to give up everything for the sake of a particular
ideal or value (27). This last case should be understood in light of Maslow’s belief that persons who have been satisfied in their basic needs throughout their lives develop a propensity to withstand opposition, “swim against the stream of public opinion,” and “stand up for the truth at great personal cost” (27).

I will not discuss Maslow’s exceptions to the hierarchy in detail as space does not allow such an undertaking. What emerges as clear, however, is Maslow’s anticipation of challenges to his hierarchy and his pro-active development of responses. Moreover, although my thesis does not depend on the legitimacy of Maslow’s motivation theory to accurately assess this aspect of human behavior, it is important to bolster its philosophical framework by anticipating additional potential arguments against Maslow’s Pyramid of Human Needs. Unfortunately, the most immediate challenge to Maslow’s hierarchy is the mysticism he seems to project onto women: “Women are really kind of perpetual miracles. They are like flowers. Every person is a mystery to me, but women are more mysterious to me than men” (260). Additionally, Maslow puzzles over this difference while penning a journal entry in 1962, “Only the woman needs to be loved, first and foremost” (Lowry, 251). I answer this challenge by noting Maslow’s historical placement in the United States between the mid-thirties and late sixties, observing that Maslow may mirror the misogyny that existed in his social era. However, I also suggest that Maslow’s personal inability to understand women does not undermine the validity of his paradigm of needs, nor does it preclude the motivations of literary characters, including those of Shakespeare, from conforming to the echelons in his Pyramid of Human Needs. Freud has been accused of a similar essentialism, yet literary critics have found his
psychological paradigm, whereby gender and sex are linguistically and socially constructed, as an effective tool in analyzing literary figures, including those of Shakespeare.

I would like to conclude this chapter by addressing two additional challenges to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs: interviews with select Nazi Concentration Camp survivors and the work of Edwin Nevis. In “Human Reciprocity Among the Jewish Prisoners in the Nazi Concentration Camps,” Shamai Davidson, a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst who co-founded the Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide in Jerusalem with Elie Wiesel and Israel W. Charney, states that “interpersonal bonding, reciprocity and sharing, were an essential source of strength for ‘adaptation’ and survival in many of the victims…it was their interpersonal support that sustained the motivation to carry on with the struggle to live” (2; emphasis added). Leo Eitinger graduated from Masaryk University of Brno with a degree in Medicine (1937) and fled his town in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire to Norway in 1939 to escape the Nazis. After spending a year underground—following the Nazi occupation of Norway in 1940—he was arrested and charged with the “crime” of being born Jewish. Originally deported to the Auschwitz camp and later moved to Buchenwald, he accounts for one of twenty three survivors in the seven hundred and sixty two initially deported there. After returning to Norway, Eitinger specialized in psychiatry—victimology and disaster psychiatry in particular. Eitinger, when discussing reasons for survival in concentration camps in Concentration Camp Survivors in Norway and Israel, notes of the survivors:

Their “being together” had been significant, either because they were
helped by others who were with them or because they themselves had to think of others…Even though this help was often of a minimal and/or symbolic nature it seems to have contributed in a decisive way toward the individual’s ability to retain part of his personality and self-respect and this is given considerable importance in relation to the capacity for survival. (79)

Clearly, these studies challenge Maslow’s work since they provide evidence of humans deprived at the Physiological and Safety level(s) in the most extreme manner possible, yet motivated at higher levels such as Love/Belonging and Esteem. I respond by suggesting that the Nazi Concentration Camps produced circumstances so radically outside the norm, that a comparative analysis with persons outside such fundamentally inhumane circumstances is questionable.

The last challenge I will identify is based on the work of Edwin Nevis, the president and founder of the Gestalt International Study Center. Nevis taught organizational management in a program in Shanghai, China in the early eighties. While in China, Nevis observed the management style of the Chinese and noticed that it demonstrated a need hierarchy that differed from that of Maslow. This prompted him to formulate a new paradigm—Nevis’s hierarchy of needs: Belonging, Physiology, Safety, and Self-Actualization. Moreover, Nevis proposes that in Chinese culture, “Self-Actualization” relates to societal contribution (Nevis 249-264). In answer to Nevis, I would respond: 1.) Nevis’ work is interesting, credible, and noteworthy, but hardly the product of a general psychological study; 2.) China is a Communist State—one could
easily discern how society members might view “Belonging” as most important, and would relate “Self-Actualization” to societal contribution; 3.) Nevis’s study presents more of a challenge to the form of Maslow’s hierarchy than the content or intrinsic dynamic. Ultimately, Nevis’s and Maslow’s sample populations are radically dissimilar and several variables in this cross study differ, including the political and societal climate. Despite the social restrictions placed upon the sample population I will use in my thesis—Shakespeare’s cross-dressing heroines—the political climate in early modern England is more akin to the democratic society that Maslow studied than the communist milieu of Nevis’s study.

Now that I have explicated Maslow’s holistic psychological perspective, and explained how he accounts for human motivation, I will proceed to illustrate how Maslow’s motivation theory illuminates the actions of a select group of Shakespeare’s cross-dressing heroines.
Chapter IV: Julia/Sebastian in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*

*The Two Gentlemen of Verona* contains one cross-dressed male/female character, Julia, who appears to love Proteus, one of the two gentlemen of Verona whom we meet in the first scene. Indeed, Shakespeare’s introduction of Julia showcases a character solely fixated on love. Julia’s first line, “But say, Lucetta, now we are alone, Wouldst thou then counsel me to fall in love?” (1.2.1-2), presents the driving force of her behavior that will remain consistent throughout this play. Maslow cursorily identifies Love level needs as “those that involve giving and receiving affection” (Maslow, 20) but makes it plain that these needs are not synonymous with sex (21). Julia appears quite engrossed in conferring and accepting affection from the moment that we meet her. William E. Stephenson, in “The Adolescent Dream-World of the Two Gentlemen of Verona,” contrasts the maturity levels of Proteus and Valentine versus those of Julia and Silvia: “The young girls of the play, Julia and Silvia, are each mature enough to fix their affections on one boy. But Valentine and Proteus, as Shakespeare shows, are still at the age of being in a dream of generalized romance, vaguely though passionately ‘in love with love’” (166). Stephenson’s description of Julia supports my initial assessment of her as fixated on love. As I will develop throughout this chapter, Julia’s primary drive never changes throughout the play, despite the various difficulties, challenges, and heartaches that she faces along the way.

Julia’s love-driven motivation faces its first impediment in Act 1, Scene 3, when
Antonio, Proteus’s father, decides to send Proteus to Milan to join Valentine. Consequently, Act 2, Scene 2 depicts ostensibly inseparable lovers, Julia and Proteus, exchanging rings and kisses. These scenes support Stephenson’s interpretation of Julia as solely concentrating her energy and affections on Proteus. Considering the love that they appear to show for one another in this scene, Act 2, Scene 4 surprises us: Proteus joins Valentine and the Duke in Milan; we learn of Valentine’s apparent love for Silvia, the Duke’s daughter; and, upon his arrival, Proteus seems mesmerized by the beautiful Silvia as well (2.4.196-203). Meanwhile, in Verona, Julia’s love for Proteus motivates her to begin a journey to Milan. Lucetta urges Julia to wait for Proteus’s return (2.7.14), but Julia likens her love for Proteus to a fire that words cannot quench: “The more thou dams’t it up, the more it burns…I’ll be as patient as a gentle stream and make a pastime of each weary step, till the last step have brought me to my love” (2.7.24; 35-36). Julia’s lines exemplify Maslow’s description of someone whose Love level needs face impediment: “When they (Love level needs) are unsatisfied, a person will feel keenly the absence of friends, mate, or children” (Maslow 20).

Yet, when Lucetta asks Julia what “habit” (apparel) Julia will put on for the journey, Julia resolves to dress “not like a woman,” and bases her decision on a desire to thwart “loose encounters of lascivious men” (2.7.39-41). Indeed, Julia demonstrates a concern for her safety, but our attention to this point should not lead us to misinterpret the “Safety Needs” as Maslow outlines them. Julia voluntarily elects to travel to Milan as a result of her love for Proteus; no events actually occur that threaten her safety. While Maslow does ascribe “security; stability; dependency; protection; freedom from fear,
anxiety, and chaos; need for structure, order, law, and limits; strength in the protector; and so on” as aspects that comprise the Safety Need Level in his Pyramid of Human Needs, he also explains that the safety needs “may serve as the most exclusive organizers of behavior, recruiting all the capacities of the organism in their service” (18; emphasis added). Maslow also believes that the safety needs emerge from some situations in which we demonstrate a common preference for the familiar over the unfamiliar, or within our tendencies to rely on philosophy or religion to organize our conception of the universe into a coherent and comprehensible whole (19). Otherwise, Maslow views the need for safety as “an active and dominant mobilizer of the organism’s resources” only present in a case of true emergency such as war, disease, natural catastrophe, a crime wave, societal disorganization or chaos, neurosis, brain injury, breakdown of authority, or a “chronically bad” situation (19). Based on Maslow’s explanation of the Safety level, we cannot conclude that Julia experiences threats to her safety that cause safety needs to emerge as the dominating force behind her motivation. Rather, I argue that Julia primarily cross-dresses in order to join her beloved Proteus, and that safety is a secondary although still important consideration.

Significantly, in Act 4, Scene 2, Julia enters as a cross-dressed page named Sebastian who does not appear threatened in any way. Outside of Silvia’s window at night, Thurio waits to woo Silvia with musicians, but Proteus unexpectedly appears and declares his love for Silvia in front of Julia/Sebastian. (4.2.23). The scene ends with Julia’s expression of dismay: “It has bene the longest night that e’er I watched, and the most heaviest” (4.2.136-137). Clearly, Julia experiences a challenge to her love-driven
pursuit when she encounters Proteus wooing Silvia. What will continue to motivate her cross-dressing now? Peter Lindenbaum’s “Education in The Two Gentlemen of Verona” describes Julia as “a girl disguised as a page attempting to test or win her beloved’s affection” (229; emphasis added). His assessment suggests two possible motivations for Julia’s cross-dressing: the desire for esteem or the desire for love. After this scene, we must surmise that if Julia wishes to test Proteus, he fails the test quite miserably. Also, if Esteem level needs drive Julia, her disguise has proved totally unsuccessful. Indeed, we may wonder why Julia does not unveil herself to Proteus at this juncture, and either berate him or beg for his benevolence. However, rather than confront Proteus, Julia follows Proteus back to the Host’s inn. Proteus, mistaking Julia/Sebastian for a boy page, beckons to her and entreats her to deliver a ring—the ring that Julia gave to him upon their parting in Act 1—to Silvia in exchange for Silvia’s portrait. Again, nothing within this scene indicates a threat to Julia’s safety and it seems impossible to argue that she attempts to win Esteem by carrying out Proteus’s request to woo Silvia. Julia unambiguously clarifies her motivations: “Alas, poor fool, why do I pity him that with his very heart despiseth me? Because I love him, I must pity him…Yet will I woo for him, but yet so coldly” (4.4.92-95; 205; emphasis added). Driven by this motivation, Julia woos Silvia on Proteus’s behalf. Silvia acts as the object of the Petrarchan Lover’s obsessions\(^1\); like the Petrarchan Lady, she articulates her disapproval of Proteus’s wooing

---

\(^1\) The Elizabethans did not view “love” as did Abraham Maslow; instead the Ovidian, Platonic, Courtly, Petrarchan, and Neo-Platonic traditions pervaded their attitudes toward love. The antithesis of the Ovidian tradition—the Platonic convention derives from the concept of spiritual love, as described by Socrates in Plato’s *Symposium*, as a source of inspiration and elevation. Plato represents this type of love through the metaphor of a ladder—with physiological instincts and gratification at the bottom and spiritual love at the top. The “beloved” in this paradigm does not reside on the top rung, but instead serves as a rung that the seeker ultimately leaves behind in his spiritual quest. The tradition of Courtly Love focuses on the female’s physical beauty. The pursuer perceives her as an object of worship and enacts courtship conventions through ritualistic behavior. Although the lady remains an object of worship, the goal of Courtly Love is physical consummation. The Petrarchan Tradition maintains the primary components of the Courtly Tradition, but merges them with Neo-Platonic spirituality. Thus the lady is loved for the very purity that prohibits physical consummation and, by
in light of his romantic relationship with Julia and friendship with Valentine. Sadly, however, Julia does not gain Esteem from this dialogue. Rather, this scene ends with Julia’s increased determination to do anything necessary to obtain Proteus’s love, including modifying her appearance to look aesthetically akin to Silvia:

Unless I flatter with myself too much.

Her hair is auburn, mine is perfect yellow;

If that be all the difference in this love,

I’ll get me such a colored periwig.

(5.1.186-189)

The angst that accompanies Julia’s disguised love-driven-pursuit of Proteus culminates in her fainting in Act 5, Scene 4—following Proteus’s attempted rape of Silvia—and the revelation of her true identity:

Behold her that gave aim to all my oaths

And entertained ‘em deeply in her heart.

How oft hast thou with perjury cleft the root!

O Proteus, let this habit make thee blush!

Be ashamed that I have took upon me

Such an immodest raiment, if shame live

In a disguise of love.

It is the lesser blot, modesty finds,

---

definition, Petrachan love is unreciprocated. Neo-Platonism revives the Platonic conception of love-as-ladder but does not reject sensual love as a partial means to ascension. Therefore, this mutual love, although primarily spiritual, may also include physical love. The collective presence of these five traditions pervades the Elizabethan love conventions, and this brief survey seeks to elucidate the Elizabethans’ complex perception of love.
Women to change their shapes than men their minds (5.4.101-110; emphasis added).

Julia’s description of her cross-dressing attire as a “disguise of love” buttresses my assertion that Julia only cross-dresses to satisfy needs on the Love/Belonging level of the Maslovian hierarchy. While readers or spectators probably deem Julia and Proteus’s sudden reconciliation suspicious, they should also find some delight in their reunion, since Julia’s devoted and dogged search does achieve its goal—Love and Belonging. Indeed, since the text never suggests a deprivation of Julia’s Physiological level needs, nor points to any immanent threats to Julia’s Safety level needs, nor showcases any desire on Julia’s part to satisfy Esteem level needs, we can only consider Maslow’s Love/Belonging and Self-Actualization levels to explain Julia’s motivations for cross-dressing in this play. The text details several scenes in which Julia declares Love as the driving force behind her behavior, and a number of literary critics support this assessment as well. Moreover, according to Maslow’s motivation theory, needs of a higher echelon do not come into focus until lower level needs find satisfaction. Therefore, Julia never offers herself as a candidate for Self-Actualization; Love/Belonging level needs drive her throughout the entire play.

A review of the exceptions that Maslow lists to his own hierarchy and a consideration of whether or not Julia seems to align with one or more of these exceptions also supports my argument. Obviously, Julia does not meet Maslow’s first exception, “individuals who place value on self-esteem over love” (Maslow 27), since the text makes it plain that Julia values love much more than her own self-esteem as she
continues to pursue Proteus despite his pursuit of Silvia. Although Julia’s cross-dressing could be construed as creative, her persistent devotion to her Love/Belonging level needs negates the possibility of her meeting Maslow’s second exception, “apparently innately creative people in whom the drive to creativeness supersedes all others” (27). Maslow lists the third exception to his hierarchy as “people who experience deprivations of certain levels for long periods of time and are victim to loss or a permanent disappearance of certain goals” (27). Although Julia may appear deprived of her Love/Belonging level needs, those needs appear to remain important to her; they certainly do not disappear at any point throughout the play. Since I argue that Julia’s motivations for cross-dressing (a practice she engages in throughout almost the entire play) correspond to Maslow’s Love/Belonging level, I would insist that Julia certainly does not represent Maslow’s fourth exception, “psychopathic persons who demonstrate a permanent loss of the love needs.” Fifth, the text does not cite evidence that Julia has experienced an overabundance of a certain need for a long period of time, and that Julia consequently undervalues that need. Sixth, Julia does not demonstrate an example of an individual who wants “the more basic need over a second need if both are deprived, but whose behavior appears to demonstrate the opposite” (27). One might assert that both of Julia’s Love/Belonging and Esteem levels are deprived, but Julia continues to pursue the satisfaction of her Love/Belonging level needs, even in the face of insults to her Esteem. Seventh, while Julia does demonstrate a capacity for “increased frustration tolerance,” she is certainly not “willing to give up everything for the sake of a particular ideal or value” (27) and she never exemplifies the characteristics of a martyr; rather, she appears
as a young woman mature enough to fixate her affections on one boy, as Stephenson notes in his commentary. Although my review of Julia’s motivations may seem somewhat cursory, I argue that her motivations are quite straightforward throughout the entire play and do not leave much room for debate.

*The Two Gentlemen of Verona* offers an example of a cross-dressing character whose motivations correspond to only one hierarchical level. In my next chapter, I will explore another play—*As You Like It*—in which I find a correlation between outward behavior and inner motivation that corresponds to Maslow’s Safety and Esteem levels.
Chapter V: Rosalind/Ganymede in As You Like It

As You Like It features two cross-dressed male/female characters, Rosalind and Celia. Although I may periodically discuss both characters’ practice of cross-dressing, I will concentrate on Rosalind’s cross-dressing and corresponding motivations. In Act 1, Scene 2, Rosalind’s mood is melancholy, and rightfully so. Duke Frederick has usurped the throne from his older brother, Duke Senior—Rosalind’s father—and Duke Senior has fled to the Forest of Arden. After Celia convinces Rosalind to try to be merry, Rosalind asks, “Let me see, what think you of falling in love?” (1.2.24). This line—in Act 1, Scene 2—bears a striking resemblance to two lines in Act 1, Scene 2 of The Two Gentlemen of Verona, when Julia queries, “But say, Lucetta, now we are alone, Wouldst thou then counsel me to fall in love?” (1.2.1-2). Shakespeare’s development of Rosalind’s love query continues later in this scene when Rosalind appears to show affection for Orlando as soon as she meets him, particularly after learning that Orlando is the son of Sir Rowland. At this point, theater spectators may wonder if a love story similar to that of The Two Gentlemen of Verona will unfold. Will Orlando leave for a journey as Proteus did? Will Rosalind cross-dress to join him in a foreign land? Indeed, Orlando embarks on a journey within this play, as does Rosalind, but, as we shall see, both expeditions are forced flights, not voluntary expeditions.

Indeed, contention brews in this cantankerous court; we unexpectedly learn of Duke Frederick’s displeasure with Rosalind at the end of Act 1, Scene 2 (268-274).
This conflict rapidly escalates: In Act 1, Scene 3, Duke Frederick banishes Rosalind from the court and gives her ten days to travel at least twenty miles outside the vicinity or die (1.3.41-43). Although Rosalind attempts to reason with Duke Frederick—asking him to cite the “fault” behind her offense—Duke Frederick defends his decree: “Thou art thy father’s daughter. There’s enough” (1.3.56). Celia attempts to reverse her father’s decision, but proves as unsuccessful as Rosalind in changing Duke Frederick’s mind (1.3.63;70-74). Since Rosalind must travel at least two miles per day (by foot we assume) for the next ten days or face capital punishment, I assess her Safety level needs as indisputably compromised. As I clarified in my review of The Two Gentlemen of Verona, Maslow ascribes “security; stability; dependency; protection; freedom from fear, anxiety, and chaos; need for structure, order, law, and limits; strength in the protector; and so on” as needs that comprise the Safety Level (Maslow, 18). Clearly, an assessment of the predicament in which Rosalind finds herself reveals many of the needs that Maslow ascribes to the Safety Level as radically jeopardized.

Already separated from her natural father, Rosalind now faces exile or death. Barbara Bono, in “Mixed Gender, Mixed Genre in Shakespeare’s As You Like It,” observes the “lack of protection” Rosalind already experiences as a result of her father’s exile (199). Moreover, Edward I. Berry in “Rosalynde and Rosalind,” describes Rosalind as “under the sentence of death,” and “without a father or lover” (51). Although Bono focuses on the problematic nature of Rosalind’s identity and Berry concentrates on Shakespeare’s changes in his source, both Bono and Berry observe the immanent threat to Rosalind’s Safety level. Therefore, Rosalind’s decision to employ a man’s attire as a
safeguard—“Alas, what danger will it be to us, Maids as we are, to travel forth so far! Beauty provoketh thieves sooner than gold” (1.3.106-109)—takes place within the existing context of her jeopardized safety; her initial motivations clearly correspond to Maslow’s Safety Level. Celia, however, has not experienced any threats to her safety. Although Duke Frederick speaks sternly to her after she tries to defend Rosalind—“Thou art a fool. She robs thee of thy name, and thou wilt show more bright and seem more virtuous when she is gone. Then open not thy lips” (1.3.78-80)—he does not banish Celia from the court nor threaten her with death, even when she begs him to: “Pronounce that sentence then on me, my liege! I cannot live out her company.” Duke Frederick then replies, “You are a fool. You, niece, provide yourself” (1.3.83-85). Therefore, Celia’s decision to travel with Rosalind is voluntary, like Julia’s journey to Milan in The Two Gentlemen of Verona, and motivated, I suggest, by Love/Belonging needs.

After Rosalind and Celia change their clothing, these two cross-dressed characters reappear in Act 2, Scene 4 within the Forest of Arden. Significantly, their dialogue no longer focuses on safety and security, but on their physiological needs:

Rosalind: O Jupiter, how weary are my spirits!

Touchstone: I care not for my spirits, if my legs were not weary…

Celia: I pray you, bear with me. I cannot go no further…I pray you, one of you question yond man if he for gold will give us any food. I faint almost to death…

Rosalind: I prithee, shepherd, if that love or gold can in this desert place buy entertainment, Bring us where we may rest
ourselves and feed.

(2.4.1-3; 60-63; 67-69)

Rosalind and Celia’s motivations have not regressed to the Physiological level, however; once Corin reveals that his master’s cottage, flock, and pasture are for sale, neither Rosalind nor Celia continues to speak of their hunger or weariness. Bono observes that Rosalind’s safety is no longer at risk after she and Celia purchase the cottage: “Exiled by her tyrannous uncle, Rosalind assumes masculine disguise as a safeguard against female vulnerability in a threatening male world. Once she is safely installed in her cottage in Arden, however, there is in theory no need for her to maintain that role” (Bono 199-200). Bono bases her assessment on Rosalind’s reaction to hearing that Orlando is in the forest poeticizing her praises: she exclaims, “Alas the day, what shall I do with my doublet and hose?” (3.2.219-220), and bursts forth with a stereotypically female torrent of questions and effusions (200). As Bono notes, Rosalind now seems on the verge of discarding her masculine attire and becoming “the Renaissance total woman:” witty, but ultimately compliant (200). Although I do not agree that Rosalind’s purchase of the cottage in Arden necessarily secures her safety one hundred percent, I do agree with Bono’s observation that Rosalind’s reaction to Orlando’s presence in the forest is an indicator of her decreasing concern with safety. Indeed, once Celia reveals Orlando as the author of the love letters posted on trees throughout the forest, Rosalind seems completely focused on Orlando, not hunger, nor safety: “What did he when thou sawst him? What said he? How looked he? Wherein went he? What makes he here? Did he ask for me? Where remains he? How parted he with thee? And when shalt thou see him again?” (3.2.217-
Yet if Rosalind’s motivations for remaining in cross-dressed attire no longer correspond to the Safety Level of Maslow’s Pyramid of Human Needs, with what level do they most clearly align? This question becomes more urgent when Rosalind states in an aside to Celia, “I will speak to him (Orlando) like a saucy lackey and under that habit play the knave with him” (3.2.291-292). We question Rosalind’s/Ganymede’s motivations for having a conversation with Orlando while in disguise, and we puzzle over Rosalind’s motivations for asking Orlando what young man is carving the name Rosalind on trees throughout the forest (3.3.351-357) when she already knows. Moreover, we question why Rosalind claims to know the symptoms of those who have fallen under the spell of love (3.3.364-373) and assures Orlando that he does not exhibit any of these characteristics. Given the excitement that Rosalind shows upon hearing of Orlando’s presence in the forest, why would she try to convince Orlando that he is not in love with her? Likewise, why does Rosalind continue her charade and promise to cure Orlando of his love sickness? (3.3.414-415).

Since the text does not indicate that Rosalind’s safety is still in jeopardy, nor suggest that her physiological needs are still deprived, in analyzing Rosalind’s motivations, we can only consider the Love/Belonging, Esteem, and Self-Actualization levels at this point. According to Bono, Rosalind’s retained disguise allows her to test Orlando’s love within “the relatively non threatening limits of supposed male discourse about women” (Bono, 201-202). Moreover, Margaret Boerner Beckman, in “The Figure of Rosalind in As You Like It,” suggests that Rosalind has disguised herself “only because
she must find out whether Orlando really loves her” (44). Yet if Rosalind is “testing” Orlando, with what Maslovian echelon do her motivations align? I argue that if Rosalind’s motivations correspond to the Love level, and her needs align with “those that involve giving and receiving affection” (20), she would not send Orlando away and develop such a contrived plot to cure him of his love. What if she succeeds? Therefore, at this point, Rosalind appears motivated by needs that correspond to the first subsidiary set of Maslow’s Esteem level—those needs that involve the desire for strength, achievement, adequacy, mastery, competence, and confidence in the face of the world (Maslow 21). Moreover, I argue that, up until this point, Rosalind’s relationship with Celia satisfies her Love/Belonging level needs sufficiently for her Esteem level needs to become dominant.

Rosalind’s lament at Orlando’s absence from their appointment in Act 3, Scene 4, further supports my argument. Here, Rosalind regrets that Orlando fails to show up for their appointment, yet her question “But why did he swear he would come this morning, and comes not?” challenges Orlando’s integrity, not his affection. Orlando has already demonstrated his fondness for Rosalind by carving her name on trees throughout the forest, declaring and posting his love for her on trees, as well as swearing to Rosalind/Ganymede that he is in love. In answer to Rosalind’s question: “But are you so much in love as your rhymes speak?” Orlando replies, “Neither rhyme nor reason can express how much” (3.2.388-389). Yet in Act 4, Scene 1, Orlando arrives for his love lesson one hour late. Orlando begs for forgiveness but Rosalind/Ganymede responds, “Nay, an you be so tardy, come no more in my sight. I had as life be wooed of a snail” (4.1.49). Rosalind’s diatribe seems insulting, but she eventually relents and invites
Orlando to woo her and in a mock wedding in which Celia plays the priest, Orlando and Rosalind are married. Shortly following the wedding, however, when Orlando tells Rosalind that he must leave her for only two hours, Rosalind’s disposition radically changes again:

By my troth, and in good earnest, and so God mend me, and by all pretty oaths that are not dangerous, if you break one jot of your promise or come one minute behind your hour, I will think you the most pathetical break-promise, and the most hollow lover, and the most unworthy of her you call Rosalind, that may be chosen out of the gross band of the unfaithful.

Therefore, beware my censure, and keep your promise. (4.1.180-188)

Here, perhaps most clearly, Rosalind/Ganymede seems quite concerned with Esteem. Indeed, she states that if Orlando breaks his promise to her, that she will consider him “unworthy” of her. She acts as if Orlando must “earn” her affections, and seems to question esteem for herself (Ganymede) and by extension Rosalind.

In Act 4, Scene 3, after Orlando fails to return on time and Oliver recounts the story of the injury Orlando sustained rescuing his brother Oliver from a lion, Rosalind begins to demonstrate increasing concern and affection for Orlando. She asks several questions about the events that transpired as well as Orlando’s physical state. Ultimately, her concerns culminate in her fainting after Oliver gives her Orlando’s bloody napkin. Following this incident, Rosalind continues to show fondness for Orlando, lamenting: “O my dear Orlando, how it grieves me to see thee wear thy heart in a scarf!” (5.2.19-20), and (suddenly) no longer appears interested in testing him. After Orlando admits he is
tired of wooing a young man and wishes to pursue Rosalind, Rosalind assures Orlando that she will work magic at Aliena and Oliver’s wedding: “If you do love Rosalind so near the heart as your gesture cries it out, when your brother marries Aliena shall you marry her” (5.2.60-63). At this point, Orlando realizes that he wishes to satisfy his own Love/Belonging level needs, and Rosalind—now more forthright about her love for Orlando—probably becomes aware that she cannot give love to and receive affection from Orlando in her cross-dressed role as Ganymede. Yet what are Rosalind’s motivations for her next act as a cross-dressing magician? Why does she not simply “strip off her disguise” as Beckman asks? I suggest that Rosalind’s motivations continue to correspond to the Esteem level, despite her growing affection for Orlando. Indeed, if Rosalind’s primary motivation corresponded to the Love/Belonging level, she could have simply discarded her disguise when Orlando expresses his desire to pursue Rosalind instead of courting Ganymede. Rosalind probably finds that the practice of cross-dressing provides her with strength; achievement (uniting marriage partners, playing interior director); mastery of self and others, adequacy, competence (as a bride to be); and confidence in the face of the world (Maslow 21). Her promise to work “magic” relates to the role of director that she plays throughout Act 5, Scene 4, in which she reminds all parties of their agreements: that the Duke will allow Rosalind and Orlando to marry if Rosalind appears, and that Phoebe will marry Ganymede unless unexpected circumstances cause her to refuse, in which case Phoebe will marry Silvius.

In this final scene, Rosalind calls all the shots. Although I argue that Celia has fulfilled Rosalind’s Love/Belonging level needs up until this point, Rosalind knows she
will lose Celia to Oliver upon Celia’s forthcoming marriage. Rosalind loves Orlando, however, and wishes to marry him. Therefore, Rosalind can continue to satisfy her Love/Belonging level needs; she will simply transfer her affections from a sisterly love for Celia to a heterosexual union with Orlando. Rosalind arranges for her own marriage, but only on her own terms, as orchestrated through the play that she directs. She strips off her disguise and enters as her female self alongside Celia and Hymen, (the Roman god of marriage). Perhaps the removal of her double and hose and the donning of female attire signal her conforming to the stereotype of the early modern woman for whom love should be the center of her life; however, accepting marriage may not necessarily be tantamount to accepting subordination, and, given the personalities of the dynamic Rosalind and the more passive Orlando, this particular marriage may offer Rosalind fulfillment on the Esteem level as well as the Love/Belonging level. Nevertheless, since Rosalind at the end of the play has shed her cross-dressed attire, her final needs are outside the purview of this thesis. We surmise, however, that Rosalind continues to enjoy the satisfaction of her Love/Belonging level needs with Orlando, while also basking in the Esteem she has gained from teaching him how to act as a proper husband as well as playing interior director with several other characters in the play—up to and including her final cross-dressed performance as a magician.

A review of the exceptions Maslow lists to his own hierarchy, as well as whether or not Rosalind aligns with one or more of these exceptions, also bolsters my argument that Rosalind’s motivations originally align with the Safety Level, after which she ascends to the Esteem level. Again, as Maslow notes, the emergence of one level’s needs
over another is gradual, not sudden or sharply demarcated. First, let us ask whether or not Rosalind fits Maslow’s first exception: “Individuals who place value on self-esteem over love” (Maslow 27). Indeed, if Rosalind had showed more concern for the injury sustained to her self-esteem in Act 4, Scene 3—when Orlando fails to show up for their first appointment after their mock marriage—she would not have expressed such a concern for Orlando’s well-being or fainted when Oliver recounted Orlando’s injury. Regarding Maslow’s second exception, “Apparently innately creative people” in whom the drive to creativeness supersedes all others” (Maslow 27), Rosalind actually does display a tremendous propensity for creativity. If her drive for creativeness superseded all others, however, Rosalind would not have given up her role as director at the end of the play in exchange for marriage to Orlando. Moreover, Rosalind does not appear to meet the criteria for Maslow’s third hierarchical exception, “People who experience deprivations of certain levels for long periods of time and are victim to a loss or permanent disappearance of certain goals” (27). Although we might consider the banishment of her father from the Court a cause for permanent deprivation of her Safety level needs, Rosalind’s initial motivations for cross-dressing correspond to the Safety level; therefore, it is impossible to argue that the goal for safety permanently disappears from her psyche. Fourth, Rosalind does not reveal herself as a “psychopathic person” who (allegedly) demonstrates a permanent loss of the love needs. Maslow’s fifth exception, “persons who experience an overabundance of certain needs for long periods of time and consequently undervalue those needs in the future, even in the face of their eventual deprivation” (27) does not seem to apply here. On the contrary, when we meet
Rosalind, we find her quite melancholy and do not observe any evidence of over-satisfied needs. Sixth, Rosalind never showcases herself as an individual who wants a “more basic need over a second need if both are deprived, but whose behavior appears to demonstrate the opposite” (27). If both Rosalind’s Love/Belonging level and Esteem levels are impeded, and she yearns for the satisfaction of her Love/Belonging level needs while merely pretending that her Esteem level needs are more important, this does not account for her original decision to cross-dress and her corresponding motivation for securing her Safety level needs. Moreover, as I asked earlier, what if Rosalind/Ganymede succeeds in curing Orlando of his love sickness for her? In such a case, Rosalind would jeopardize her lower need. Seventh, Rosalind does not appear to fit the mold of a martyr; she never demonstrates a capacity for “increased frustration tolerance” for the sake of a particular ideal or value (27). I argue that her impatience with Orlando demonstrates the opposite.

In the next chapter, I will examine the most complex of Shakespeare’s cross-dressing female characters, one who, like Rosalind, also seeks fulfillment on more than one of Maslow’s hierarchical levels—Portia in The Merchant of Venice.
Chapter VI: Portia/Balthasar in *The Merchant of Venice*

*The Merchant of Venice* contains three cross-dressed male/female characters: Portia, Nerissa, and Jessica. In this chapter, I will focus on Portia’s motivations, which, I argue correspond with Maslow’s levels of Love/Belonging and Esteem. Portia initially appears in Act 1, Scene 2, and her first line, “By my troth, Nerissa, my little body is aweary of this great world” (1.2.1) gives us cause for concern. However, we quickly learn the reason for Portia’s justified lament: Portia’s dead father’s will prevents her from choosing a husband. Portia’s suitors must select amongst three chests of gold, silver, and lead; only the suitor who chooses the chest that contains her portrait can marry Portia (1.2.28-32). Our introduction to Portia leads us to believe that her Love/Belonging level needs are frustrated. How can she satisfy her Love level needs if her father controls her marriage from the grave?

Portia, however, completely controls the casket scene as a means to gratify her Love/Belonging needs. In Act 3, Scene 2, after the Prince of Morocco and Prince of Aragon choose the incorrect caskets, Bassanio arrives. Having already spoken of Bassanio somewhat fondly (1.2.118-119)—unlike her other suitors whom she openly criticizes—Portia entreats Bassanio to remain in her company before making his attempt: “I pray you, tarry. Pause a day or two before you hazard, for in choosing wrong I lose your company. Therefore, forbear awhile. There’s something tells me—but it is not love—I would hate to lose you; and you know yourself Hate counsels not in such
quality” (3.2.1-6). Desperately afraid she will have to marry a suitor she does not love and determined to select her own mate despite her father’s will, she gives Bassanio distinct hints concerning the correct casket, causing a song to be played that warns of relying on appearances and which contains a number of words that rhyme with lead:

Tell me where is fancy bred,
Or in the heart or in the head?
How begot, how nourished?
Reply, reply.
It is engendered in the eyes,
With gazing fed, and fancy dies
In the cradle where it lies.
Let us ring fancy’s knell.
It’ll begin it— Ding, dong, bell.

(3.2.63-72)

Recognizing the hint, Bassanio immediately responds with a long diatribe against “ornament,” or outward appearance, and immediately after chooses the correct casket. Thus, it is no accident or even insight on Bassanio’s part that causes him to select the correct casket; Portia’s intervenes to satisfy her own Love/Belonging level needs.

Yet plans for a double wedding—Portia and Bassanio; Nerissa and Graziano—suffer interruption when Lorenzo and Jessica arrive along with Salerio, who gives a letter to Bassanio, which details Antonio’s loss of his ships and Shylock’s intention to collect
his pound of flesh. Noticing Bassanio’s sudden change in disposition, Portia asks about
the letter: “There are some shrewd contents in yond same paper that steals the color from
Bassanio’s cheek...With leave, Bassanio; I am half yourself, and I must freely have the
half of anything that this same paper brings you” (3.2.243-244; 248-250). After Bassanio
confesses his role in Antonio’s fate, and Antonio’s responsibility (as the guarantor of
Bassanio’s loan) to Shylock for three thousand ducats, Portia promptly offers to pay
twenty times the loan’s sum. As Lars Engel suggests in “‘Thrift is Blessing:’ Exchange
and Explanation in The Merchant of Venice,” Portia discovers the homosocial aspect of
her marriage to Bassanio. Indeed, Bassanio courted Portia with Antonio’s credit, and
Engel brilliantly identifies the homoerotic overtones in Antonio and Bassanio’s financial
transaction (23-26). Yet after Bassanio reads aloud from Antonio’s letter: “If your love
do not persuade you to come, let not my letter” (3.2.320-322), Portia urges him to make
haste and travel to Antonio.

In Act 3, Scene 4, after Portia surrenders the management of her home to Lorenzo
and dispatches her servant Balthasar to deliver a letter to her cousin Doctor Bellario in
Padua, she unexpectedly announces her decision to cross-dress:

Come on Nerissa, I have work in hand that you know not of. We’ll see
our husbands before they think of us...but in such a habit that they shall
think we are accomplished with that we lack. I’ll hold thee any wager,
when we are both accoutred like young men, I’ll prove the prettier of the
two. (3.5.57-59; 60-64)

Portia promises to detail the rest of her plan once she and Nerissa are safely installed in
the coach. The full disclosure of the plan, however, and any possible motivations behind it take place off stage. What motivates Portia’s decision to cross-dress at this point? Since no textual evidence points to a deprivation of Portia’s Physiological or Safety level needs, we can only consider the Love/Belonging, Esteem, and Self-Actualization levels. Does the text suggest that a need to give and receive affection—indicative of Maslow’s Love/Belonging level—primarily dominates Portia? Indeed, when we initially meet Portia, she articulates a weariness of the world and her suitors. She does not ask a confidant what he or she thinks of falling in love, nor does she ask for advice on how to fall in love, as in the cases of both Julia and Rosalind from *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* and *As You Like It*. Nonetheless, Portia shows a preference amongst her suitors for Bassanio and manipulates the outcome of the casket ordeal, thus remaining true to her father’s decree while selecting her own mate. If her father’s will frustrates her Love/Belonging level needs, as I argued earlier, then Bassanio’s correct choice in the casket scene, under the guidance of Portia, lifts this impediment and allows for the potential satisfaction of her Love/Belonging level needs. Yet the delivery of Antonio’s letter to Bassanio abruptly interrupts this satisfaction. Therefore, we can still consider the possibility that Portia remains motivated by Love/Belonging level needs. Moreover, what of Portia’s Esteem level needs? As I explained earlier, Maslow divides Esteem Needs into two subsidiary sets: first, the desire for strength, achievement, adequacy, mastery and competence, confidence in the face of the world, and independence and freedom; second, the desire for reputation or prestige, status, fame and glory, dominance, recognition, attention, importance, dignity and appreciation” (21). Karen Newman, in
“Portia’s Ring: Unruly Women and Structures of Exchange in *The Merchant of Venice*” states that “Portia gives more than Bassanio can ever reciprocate, first to him, then to Antonio,” and relates Portia to Marcel Mauss’s “Big Man” of highland New Guinea as detailed in his *Essai sur le don* (Newman, 26). Marcel investigates the status of exchange in anthropology and describes the so-called “Big Man” as one “who is assigned in adolescence a *buanyin* or exchange partner, and, apparently against indigenous norms of social behavior, is trained to an entire system of exchange and gift-giving in excess of what can be reciprocated” (20). As Newman explains, “such behavior results in prestige and power” (20). Newman’s correlation of Portia as the gift-giver and Mauss’s “Big Man” implies that Portia acts to ensure needs on Maslow’s Esteem level, particularly since Newman relates Portia’s upcoming intervention in the Venetian court as a gift to Venice itself (26). Newman’s assessment coincides with that of Lars Engel, who analyzes Portia’s “gift” in light of the financial transactions within the play. As Engel observes, Portia “wisely chooses to follow (Bassanio) to protect her investment…to protect her status as a principal and to avoid becoming an object of homosocial exchange” (34).

At this point, it seems as if Portia is motivated by both Love/Belonging and Esteem level needs. Indeed, the “cloud” over her marriage threatens both her Love/Belonging and Esteem level needs. Will Portia’s husband ever offer all of his love to her if a torturous fate awaits Antonio with whom Bassanio has such a close relationship? I suggest that Portia decides to cross-dress and go with Nerissa to Venice in order to intervene in Antonio’s fate as well as to protect her assets. Also, Shakespeare
does not detail exactly how much time passes between when Portia, Bassanio, Nerissa, and Gratiano begin to make wedding plans and when Salerio delivers Antonio’s letter to Bassanio; it seems as if this takes place immediately after. Therefore, it is unlikely that Portia’s Love/Belonging level needs are fulfilled one hundred percent in Act 3, Scene 3, after Bassanio chooses the correct casket with Portia’s help. As I explained in Chapter III, Maslow’s hierarchy does not suggest that a particular need be one hundred percent satisfied before another need emerges. “Coming into focus” and “dominating” serve as more appropriate descriptions of how given needs appear to us in experience, rather than terms like “satisfaction” and “emergence,” which invoke sharp demarcations (Maslow 28).

Our attention to the Venetian court room scene, in which Portia appears as a doctor of the law, confirms this detailed assessment. As I previously explained, Portia’s full explanation of her and Nerissa’s cross-dressing scheme takes place offstage. Indeed, Portia simply reappears in Act 4, Scene 1, after the Duke reads a letter from Doctor Bellario (the cousin to whom Portia wrote a letter in 3.4) stating that his illness prevents him from attending upon the case and that Balthasar will preside in his place. It is assumed that Portia met with her cousin Bellario, a learned Doctor of law, and the two of them discovered the law that later convicts Shylock as well as working out the plan to trap Shylock through the letter of the law. Portia/Balthasar initiates Shylock’s trial by lecturing him on mercy for twenty-three lines (4.1.182-185). After Portia/Balthasar urges Shylock to show mercy, Shylock refuses and entreats Balthasar to “proceed to judgment.” Consequently, Portia declares a decree that initially surprises many readers: Shylock
shall have his pound of flesh (4.1.243). As Antonio prepares to die, and Shylock readies himself to carry out the long awaited sadistic act, Bassanio makes a statement that threatens Portia’s Love level needs: “Antonio, I am married to a wife which is as dear to me as life itself; but life itself, my wife, and all the world are not with me esteemed above thy life. I would lose all, ay, sacrifice them all here to this devil, to deliver you” (280-285). Ironically, Portia/Balthasar responds, “Your wife would give you little thanks for that, if she were by to hear you make that offer” (286), but continues to act as Balthasar despite Bassanio’s stated privileging of his homosocial bonds with Antonio over his heterosexual love of Portia. After declaring that Shylock may take his pound of flesh but not without spilling a single drop of blood (303-304), Antonio’s safety is immediately guaranteed. Portia/Balthasar’s next actions confuse many readers and spectators: after Shylock requests for his bond to be paid thrice—as Bassanio offered several times earlier and Shylock openly rejected—Portia accuses Shylock of conspiring to take the life of a Venetian citizen. In a merciless judgment, she awards half of Shylock’s estate to Antonio, the other half to the state, and Shylock’s life to the mercy of the Duke. The Duke pardons Shylock’s life and upholds Portia/Balthasar’s decree. Antonio offers his half to Lorenzo, requests that Shylock will all his possessions to Lorenzo and Jessica, and demands that Shylock convert to Christianity.

Does Portia cross-dress and perform these actions to receive power and prestige, as Newman suggests in her article? Does Portia act throughout the trial to restore her sense of importance, dignity, and appreciation? Is Portia protecting her endowment, as Engel suggests? What of Portia’s Love level needs? Bassanio’s previous comment,
“Antonio, I am married to a wife which is as dear to me as life itself; but life itself, my
wife, and all the world are not with me esteemed above thy life. I would lose all, ay,
sacrifice them all here to this devil, to deliver you” (280-285) presents a very serious
threat to Portia’s Love level needs. I argue that a combination of Love/Belonging and
Esteem level needs motivates Portia’s actions in the Venetian court. Throughout the play,
Portia faced two impediments to her Love/Belonging level needs: 1.) her father’s will;
2.) Bassanio’s homosocial bonds with Antonio. Portia manages to resolve both
dilemmas: first by helping Bassanio choose the correct casket, and second, through
saving Antonio’s life and consequently “buying him out.” Portia is also Marcel’s Big
Man; she gives Antonio a gift that can never be reciprocated—his life—and bestows gifts
upon Bassanio—first the ring, then the deliverance of his best friend. As Newman points
out, Portia’s final gift is to Venice: a new Christian (26).

Through her cross-dressed intervention in the Venetian court, Portia lifts the
second impediment to her Love/Belonging level needs, which allows her Esteem level
needs to more fully emerge. As Engel observes, Portia then enjoys the “delicious
opportunity to refuse her own money; she also has Antonio’s precious testimony that the
balance of erotic credit is now hers:”

_Ant._  And stand indebted over and above

In love and service to you evermore.

_Por._  He is well paid that is well satisfied.

(4.1.404-411)

The ensuing dominance of Portia’s Esteem level needs explains Portia’s request for
Bassanio’s ring at the end of Act 4, Scene 1; why else would she remain cross-dressed? In Act 4, Scene 2, Gratiano enters and gives Portia Bassanio’s ring and an invitation to dinner; Portia accepts the ring and rejects the invitation. Nerissa decides to see if she can also persuade Gratiano to give away his ring. Both women finally return to Belmont a full day ahead of their husbands, and change out of their disguise. After much comedic bantering back and forth between Portia and Nerissa, and Antonio and Graziano over the missing rings, Portia finally reveals that she was the lawyer in Venice and Nerissa the clerk. Portia reproaches the ringless Bassanio on his return to Belmont, and he replies, “Pardon this fault, and by my soul I swear I never more will break an oath with thee.” As Engel suggests, Portia uses the ring to teach Bassanio not to circulate her gifts (36). Moreover, since Portia’s acceptance of subservience in marriage is predicated on the gift of the ring and the understanding that Bassanio would never part with it, by giving the ring to an “unruly woman,” the cross-dressed Portia/Balthasar, Bassanio forfeits the ascendancy in marriage approved by the early modern patriarchy. Portia’s motivations for cross-dressing in this scene correspond with the second subsidiary set of Maslow’s Esteem level needs: “the desire for reputation or prestige, status, fame and glory, dominance, recognition, attention, importance, dignity and appreciation” (21). Ultimately, Portia dominates both Bassanio and Antonio, as Engel points out and as Newman supports with her assessment of Portia as The Big Man. Moreover, Portia receives recognition as worthy of respect, as well as the dignity and appreciation that Bassanio stripped from her when he betrayed her love in the courtroom. At the end of the play, Bassanio swears never to break an oath with her again, and Antonio, her rival,
promises to guarantee Bassanio’s faithfulness.

A review of the exceptions that Maslow lists to his own hierarchy and a consideration of whether or not Portia seems to align with one or more of these exceptions also bolsters my argument for Portia as a character who seeks to satisfy needs on the Love/Belonging and Esteem levels. It is difficult, if not impossible to argue that Portia does not meet Maslow’s first exception, “individuals who place value on self-esteem over love” (Maslow 27). Indeed, Portia does not appear to need any assuaging of her self-esteem; she seems driven by the goal of securing her husband from homosocial bonding (with Antonio) and protecting her endowment, even when her husband confirms his preference for Antonio in the Venetian court scene. Although Portia’s act of cross-dressing could be construed as creative, she does not appear to be one of “apparently innately creative people in whom the drive to creativeness supersedes all others” (27). Rather, her drive to eradicate the cloud over her marriage presents itself more vividly.

Maslow describes the third exception to his hierarchy as “people who experience deprivations of certain levels for long periods of time and are victim to loss or a permanent disappearance of certain goals” (27). The text never cites evidence for the deprivation of any of Portia’s need levels. While one might argue that her father’s will impedes her Love/Belonging level needs’ satisfaction, I demonstrate how the outcome of the casket scene assuages this. Maslow’s fourth exception, “psychopathic persons who demonstrate a permanent loss of the love needs” does not apply to Portia; clearly, Portia demonstrates the opposite of a psychopathic personality. She is aware, smart, and not afraid to do what she needs to do to satisfy her needs. Fifth, the text does not cite
evidence that Portia has experienced or experiences an overabundance of a certain need for a long period of time and that she consequently undervalues a need. Sixth, Portia does not demonstrate an example of an individual who wants “the more basic need over a second need if both are deprived, but whose behavior appears to demonstrate the opposite” (27). Indeed, Portia pursues the satisfaction of both of her Love/Belonging and Esteem level needs. Seventh, it is difficult if not impossible to argue that Portia appears similar to a martyr, or one “willing to give up everything for the sake of a particular ideal or value” (27). Portia is a satisfier of Love/Belonging and Esteem level needs par excellence. She gains everything and loses nothing in the process.
Chapter VII: Conclusion

At a high school in Cincinnati, Ohio, an instructor named Elisabeth Bookser designed an elective course titled “Poetry: Man and His Needs.” She states the goal of the elective course as follows: “to help students understand and appreciate what it means to be a human being by approaching poetry from the viewpoint of human needs: the need for physical security, for safety, for love and belonging, for esteem, for self-actualization, for beauty” (74). Bookser, a high school English teacher, designed this course around Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs, and selected various poems to illustrate each of Maslow’s need levels. It seems impossible to argue that only some human beings feel the need to satisfy their Physiological needs, Safety needs, and Love/Belonging needs. The starving seek food. We seek shelter and safety when natural disasters occur. The human organism strives toward self-preservation. Most humans also display the need for love and belonging. Setting aside the small percentage of the world’s population who live as loners and hermits, most of us seek to situate ourselves amidst a group of friends and other social associates with whom we identify. Moreover, most of us long for love—if not for romantic love, at least for some level of companionship. For those who manage to satisfy these need levels enough for other (higher) needs to emerge more fully and dominate, Esteem and Self-Actualization await. All of the “Deficit” needs—Physiological, Safety/Security, Love/Belonging, and Esteem—preserve our sense of “self.” Acts of self-preservation—whether searching for food, shelter, love, belonging,
dignity, or respect—are just that: actions that safeguard the self. Undoubtedly, only a small percentage of the world’s population is self-actualizers. How many people do we know who are truly engaged in a project outside of their own desires? Whom do we know who has answered a calling in a “priestly” sense, as Maslow describes? Indeed it is doubtful that we know many people who fit this mold; most of us remain ensnared in the desire to satisfy our Deficit needs. Obsessed with the somewhat boring and predictable details of our workaday selves and lives, we rarely imagine a life beyond the desire for these lower level needs. Perhaps this is why Shakespeare does not offer us a Self-Actualizing hero—cross-dressed or not.

Most critics have approached Shakespeare’s cross-dressing heroines by considering the end results or implications of their behavior. Hence, critics often find themselves in gender-fender-benders—obsessed with patriarchies, hierarchies, gender boundaries, polarities, and so on. How do Shakespeare’s cross-dressing heroines arrest the “meaning” of gender? Belsey questions. How do Shakespeare’s cross-dressing heroines reflect challenges to the patriarchy and hierarchy of the day, both Belsey and Howard query? Other critics, like Traub, point to the homoerotic insinuations of these cross-dressed characters’ behavior. Consequently, most critics writing about these characters have focused on the effect of their transvestitism on the audience rather than their motivations for donning male garb. My thesis offers a fresh alternative to the popular postmodern theory so prevalent today, which too often assumes the absence of essentialist and transhistorical qualities of human experience that each of us share and which the literature, drama, and art of each epoch always reflects. While some critics
may ask, “*Why* examine the motivations of Shakespeare’s cross-dressing heroines?” I ask, “*Why not* examine these motivations just as we do for other literary characters?” If we seek to understand what motivates Hamlet, Iago, Othello, Macbeth, or King Lear, why should we not do the same for Julia, Rosalind, and Portia?

I argue that Shakespeare’s cross-dressing heroines can be examined from a Maslovian psychological perspective in terms of what motivates their decision(s) to cross-dress, just as we analyze what motivates Hamlet to contemplate suicide, or what drives Macbeth to kill the King. Consequently, the most important inference one can draw from my thesis rests on my success in examining the motivations of these characters from both the “inside” and “outside.” “*How does Shakespeare explain behavior?*”

Theodore Mischel asks in his essay, “Psychology and Explanations of Human Behavior.” “Why, for example is Iago plotting against Othello?” The primary thrust of Mischel’s essay suggests that although Shakespeare provides the reasons or motivations for his characters’ behavior within his plays (the “inside” perspective), these actions or behaviors do not translate to general psychological laws (“outside” viewpoints or theories). According to Mischel, “inside” analyses assume the agent’s point of view within the play or novel and explain how, given the agent’s goals and what transpires within the text, a particular behavior was the thing for him or her to do. “Outside” analyses explain behaviors in terms of laws and dispositions, using psychological theories like Freud’s or Maslow’s that literary critics transpose onto characters. My assessment of these plays, based on Maslow’s holistic psychological theory, employs both an “inside” and “outside” perspective; indeed each viewpoint supports the other and collapses the
“inner” (Freudian) and “outer” (Behaviorist) dichotomy as do the existential and teleological paradigms.

Admittedly, Shakespeare’s plays may be interpreted in a variety of ways. My thesis does not seek to ignore, overlook, or refute post-modern assessments of these characters, including the popular feminist readings that view Shakespeare’s cross-dressing heroines in terms of how their behavior blurs sex and gender boundary lines and challenges the patriarchy of the era. Rather, I have simply suggested an additional perspective from which we can view these fascinating and dynamic women.
Works Cited


Beckman, Margaret Boerner. “The Figure of Rosalind in As You Like It.” *Shakespeare Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No.1; Winter, 1978.


Orgel, Stephen. “Nobody’s Perfect or Why did the English Stage Take Boys for Women?” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 88, 1989.


Staton, Shirley F. “Female Transvestism in Renaissance Comedy ‘A Natural Perspective, That is and is Not.’” *Iowa State Journal of Research*, Vol. 56; No. 1; August, 1981.


Bibliography


Landis, Joan Hutton. Reviewed Work(s): *The Two Gentlemen of Verona: An Annotated


Nicholson, Marjorie Hope.  The Breaking of the Circle: Studies in the Effect of the

Northbrooke, John. A Treatise wherein Dicing, Daunsing, Vaine Plaies, or Enterludes...are reproved. London: 1579.


Uytman, J.D. Alfred Adler: An Introduction to his Psychology. By Lewis Way. The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 31; April, 1958.


Wilber, Ken. The Pre-Trans Fallacy” in The Essential Ken Wilber: An Introductory
