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## **Nexus between Intelligence Education and Intelligence Training: A South African Perspective**

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## **Nexus between Intelligence Education and Intelligence Training: A South African Perspective**

### **Abstract**

This paper examines the nexus of intelligence education and training from a South African perspective with the focus on current practices in light of the country's transition towards democracy. A brief overview is provided on the history and development of the South African intelligence community with specific focus on the civilian intelligence services from the period prior 1994 to date (2015). The main focus, however, is on intelligence education that is currently available from training institutions and universities in South Africa as registered with the Department of Higher Education as well as private training institutions on the one hand, and the intelligence training practices within the statutory intelligence environment on the other. To this extent, the relations between academic institutions and the intelligence structures in terms of education and training within South Africa are perused against other practices within the African continent and internationally. The approaches to the study of intelligence are also addressed within this paper.

Likewise, the *how*, *what* as well as *to whom* - pertaining to intelligence education and training availability and accessibility to students and practitioners within South Africa, is reviewed and analysed with the focus on making recommendations for the enhancement and improvement thereof to enable a focus on preparing the next generation of professional intelligence officers.

## Introduction

Intelligence is not just any government activity – along with other security functions – it has a “peculiarly intimate relationship to political power.”<sup>1</sup> Each state furthermore practices intelligence in ways which are specific to that nation, which is dictated by the type of political system, ideological outlook and culture that formulate its views on national threats against which the intelligence regime is implemented. Similarly, it bears the fruits of or scars inflicted by previous regimes – be it a democracy or non-democratic regime. This would also impact on the form and type of intelligence training and/or education in a specific country. South Africa is in this regard not an exception to the rule and the history and development of its intelligence also contributes to current intelligence training and education practices. It is therefore required to provide a brief reflection of the history and development of intelligence in South Africa<sup>2</sup> which would also serve as additional background to the current situation.

### **An Overview of the History and Development of Intelligence in South Africa**

Very few publications exist on South African intelligence services and, according to this research, almost none covering the history and development thereof. Nonetheless, intelligence remains an area of interest not only for scholars and academics, but also its practitioners – although it is commonly claimed that the latter, by their nature, resist theory. The development of intelligence is linked to the following five time periods of historic and political significance, namely: Early developments and the Zuid Afrikaansche Republic - ZAR (1652 to 1910), the Union of South Africa (1910 to 1961), the Republic of South Africa (1961 to 1978), the securitisation of South Africa (1978 to 1995), pre and post negotiations in South Africa (1995 to 2009) and lastly the period 2009 to 2014 that is reflective of the newly established State Security Agency (SSA).

#### *1652 – 1880: Early Intelligence Developments in South Africa*

The present day civilian intelligence regime in South Africa reflects the evolution of intelligence in the rest of the world and is also embedded in a strong history with the development of military activities since its early colonial period. It was only with the establishment of the Republic that South African intelligence came into its own and developed into police, military and civilian structures. The origins of intelligence in South Africa could be traced back to activities such as *scouting* against any possible threats of hostile natives by soldiers at the garrison at Cape Castle in 1652 which was

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<sup>1</sup> Peter Gill,, “Knowing the Self, Knowing the Other: The Comparative Analysis of Security Intelligence,” In Loch Johnson (ed), *Handbook of Intelligence Studies* (New York: Routledge, 2007): 82-90.

<sup>2</sup> Based on research conducted within a master’s degree in Political Sciences completed in 2014 at the North West University in South Africa by the author under the supervision of Professor Andre Duvenhage. Matthias A. Van den Berg, *The Intelligence Regime in South Africa 1994-2014; An Analytical Perspective* (Unpublished Magister Dissertation North West University, 2014): 1-174, available at: [dspace.nwu.ac.za/handle/10394/13438](https://dspace.nwu.ac.za/handle/10394/13438)

built by the Dutch under the auspices of Governor Jan van Riebeeck.<sup>3</sup> Subsequent European settlers were allotted farms by the colonial authorities in the regions around Cape Town in the beginning of 1657 and by the early 1700's, the colonialists had begun to spread into the hinterland.<sup>4</sup> From the 1770's colonists also came into contact and in conflict with Bantu-speaking chiefdoms and intermittent warfare ensued. *Scouts* and *messengers* were employed by the colonialists as well as by the Xhosa's and Zulu's (the latter had a professional *corps or impi* of spies) during this time period to either protect their homesteads or help during skirmishes for land and cattle.<sup>5</sup>

During the period between 1815 and about 1835, intelligence remained loosely focused on the concept of scouting for the purpose of security and defence. Meanwhile, as explained in the SA Yearbook,<sup>6</sup> in the mid 1830's, a large number of the original colonialists, mainly referred to as Voortrekkers, felt a growing dissatisfaction and alienation from the British imperialism, migrated north beyond the borders of the Cape, in what became known as the Great Trek. The Voortrekkers later established the Transvaal and Free State Republics adjacent to the British Natal and Cape colonies. Albeit, more formalised intelligence activities, linked to military actions, were to follow especially after the discovery of diamonds, with Britain annexing the Kimberley area in 1876 and the Transvaal in 1877. This led to the First Anglo-Boer War that lasted until British withdrawal in 1881. Intelligence was still restricted to small-scale and mostly uncoordinated utilisation of scouts by both sides of the war. This was to change with the discovery of the Witwatersrand goldfields in 1886, which signified the emergence of the modern South African industrial state. With the need for deep-level mining and the resulting influx of English-speaking immigrants or foreigners (known as "Uitlanders") on the goldfields and their accompanied political demands for equal rights, the political climate also changed within the Zuid Afrikaansche Republic (ZAR).

Linked to this was the political aim of Cecil John Rhodes in the Cape Colony to extend British imperialism from Cape to Cairo,<sup>7</sup> against the background of the fact that the British Empire was regarded as the "super-power" of the world during this time period. In contrast to the claims by O'Brien<sup>8</sup> that South Africa did not possess a national intelligence service until its establishment as a republic in 1961, the changed political situation and the looming threat of British imperialism, subsequently impacted on the role of intelligence<sup>9</sup> within the ZAR and led to the first institutionalised intelligence in Southern Africa.

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<sup>3</sup> Saffer Wiki. South African Army Intelligence Corps History (2012), available at <http://www.justdone.co.za/> and South African Defence Force Military Intelligence (Sentinel Project), available at: <http://www.sadf.sentinelprojects.com/mf/m:history>

<sup>4</sup> History. (South African Government Online. 2012) available at: <http://www.info.gov.za>

<sup>5</sup> Jeff Peires, "Pre-Colonial and Anti-Colonial Intelligence Operations of Xhosa Kingdoms, (1700-1900), Unpublished Manuscript (2007), available at: <http://www.intelhistoryXhosa>

<sup>6</sup> South Africa. *South African Yearbook*, 2011/12. (Pretoria: South African Government Information, 2012), available at: <http://www.info.gov.za>

<sup>7</sup> Hendrik Kamffer, *Om Een Scherpe Oog In't Zeil Te Houden: Die Geheime Diens in Die Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek*, (Potchefstroom University for CHE, Thesis Phd Unpublished, 1999): 71-71, available at: [dspace.nwu.ac.za/handle/10394/3141](https://hdl.handle.net/10394/3141)

<sup>8</sup> O'Brien, Kevin A. *The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005* (London: Routledge, 2011): 13.

<sup>9</sup> Kent defines intelligence in three distinctive contexts namely; a kind of knowledge, a type of organisation and the activity pursued by the organisation. Godson also adds that intelligence is at

### *1880 – 1910: The ZAR Geheime Dienst*

The main purpose of the ZAR Secret Service was to obtain information on the activities and sentiments of foreigners working in the Witwatersrand area, as well as weapon shipments for their support in an attempt to overthrow the Kruger regime; obviously with the support of Britain through Rhodes's assistance. The formation of the ZAR Geheime Dienst or Secret Service is commonly attributed to the then State Secretary of the ZAR, Dr. W. J. Leyds. However, the person who took the first actions in the inauguration of a secret service was advocate Ewald Esselen who, as newly appointed State Attorney (May 1894), appointed two members during June and July 1894 as agents to investigate anti-ZAR sentiments.<sup>10</sup> The agents were placed within the detective branch of the then police service and within this unit the secret service saw its beginnings and its official inauguration on 30 December 1895.<sup>11</sup> However, the political climate changed towards the end of 1899 with the determination of Sir Alfred Milner, then British High Commissioner in South Africa, to establish British rule throughout the continent which eventually forced the ZAR to declare war against the British in October of that year – which was also the start of the Second Anglo Boer War.

Nevertheless, during the initial stages of the war, the agents of the Secret Service functioned beside scouts of the Boer Commando's on the battle front. However, as the war evolved, the Scout Corps and their specific focus on tactical military intelligence became more relevant and resulted in the steady withdrawal of the Secret Service agents from their headquarters in Pretoria. Another influential factor was the collapse of state administration and the subsequent invasion of Pretoria in June 1900 and as stated by Van den Bergh (1974): "After the fall of Pretoria ... De Geheime Dienst disappeared as a unit and, perhaps with poetic justice, died as it was born, in obscurity." The ZAR Secret Service is, however, the first statutory intelligence service within South Africa – having its roots deeply established within that of a police detective unit, similar to the origins of most intelligence services in the rest of the world.

### *1910 – 1961: Intelligence in the Union of South Africa*

With the end of the Second Anglo Boer War and the subsequent formation of the Union of South Africa after the signing of a peace treaty in May 1902, civilian intelligence remained on the backburner for some time and the presence of institutionalised military intelligence dominated this function. This was also the case in the rest of the world, especially due to both World War I and II. However, in the

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once knowledge, organisation and process (or activity). This is also referred to by Shulsky and Schmitt as making the full concept of intelligence much richer. Intelligence organisation refers to the structure or intelligence community while intelligence activity is what they do and the intelligence information (knowledge) is what they produce according to Herman. Godson, Roy, (ed) *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's*. (Washington D.C.: National Strategic Information Center, 1983):5; Herman, Michael, *Intelligence: Power in Peace and War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 2; Kent, Sherman, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1953): ix; Shulsky, Abram N. & Schmitt, Gary J, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, 3rd edition, (Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2002): 1.

<sup>10</sup> Van den Bergh, Gert N, "Secret Service in the South African Republic, 1895-1900," *Military History Journal*, (2), (December, 1974): 1.

<sup>11</sup> Kamffer, Om Een Scherpe Oog In't Zeil Te Houden, 52-55, 92.

period just after the formation of the Union, the military forces present at that time were combined into one structure - the Union Defence Force (UDF) under the newly elected minister of Defence, General J.C. Smuts.<sup>12</sup> For this reason,<sup>13</sup> July 1912 has come to be generally accepted as the birth date of the UDF. Interestingly, as the Union was a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations from its establishment in 1910 until 1961, it received its intelligence from British Intelligence Services. Even the Union Defence Act of 1912, in terms of which the Union Defence Force came into being, made no provision for its own intelligence service. However, for most of this time period, South Africa, as a dominion of the British Empire, received intelligence from them. On 1 November 1940, the SA Intelligence Section was formally established as the SA Intelligence Corps which assisted the British forces during World War II (WWII).<sup>14</sup>

The Special Branch of the South African Police was established in 1947, after a visit by officials to Britain to study the Special Branch of Scotland Yard.<sup>15</sup> Drawn from the detective service of the South African Police, the Branch acted as an elite political police. Africa<sup>16</sup> explains that in its internal security function, the Special Branch was engaged in tactical intelligence activity. The support from British intelligence services to the Union collapsed after the independence declaration of the Republic of South Africa and its subsequent withdrawal from the Commonwealth. With no foreign intelligence support, the South African military leaders realised that the country would have to provide its own intelligence requirements to a greater extent. Thus, as described by Potgieter,<sup>17</sup> the Division Military Intelligence (DMI) was established on 2 February 1961.

#### *1961 – 1978: The Republican Intelligence and the Bureau for State Security*

During the period from 1960 (the effective beginnings of both SA's post-colonial intelligence history and the violent struggle against apartheid) to the 1990's (the decade in which the transition to post-apartheid SA began), South Africa could be perceived as a security state and was depicted as such most of the Cold War era. After the creation of an independent military intelligence capacity within the South African Defence Force (SADF), Genl. Van den Bergh was appointed as head of the Special Branch in 1963 and established a unit named as Republic Intelligence (RI), which was claimed to be responsible for effectively countering any internal political resistance within South Africa.<sup>18</sup> In this context, then Prime Minister B. J. Vorster gave his Security Advisor Genl. Van den Bergh the instruction to set up a central

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<sup>12</sup> As acknowledged by the SADF Sentinel Project and Africa, Sandy E, (ed), *Changing Intelligence Dynamics in South Africa*. (Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform. Cranfield, UK.: Cranfield University, 2009): 62-70 and Potgieter, H.J. *Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to the Security of the State of Pretoria*, (Government Printer, 1970): 37-38.

<sup>13</sup> As supported by Dorning, W.A. "A Concise History of the South African Defence Force (1912-1987)," *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*, 17(2) (1987):1-24.

<sup>14</sup> It must however, be stated that the entire activity of the SA Intelligence Corp, was only of a operational and tactical combat related nature and that strategic intelligence was still being supplied by Britain. Potgieter, Commission of Inquiry, 7.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 78.

<sup>16</sup> Sandy E. Africa, *Policy for Managing Access to Intelligence Information in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. (Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, Unpublished Thesis PhD, 2006): 74.

<sup>17</sup> Potgieter, Commission of Inquiry, 7-9 and SADF Sentinel Project..

<sup>18</sup> O'Brien, *The South African Intelligence Services*, 24 and Potgieter, Commission of Inquiry 9.

intelligence organisation in 1968.<sup>19</sup> This saw the birth of the Bureau for State Security (BOSS), which was officially formed in May 1969 with no executive powers. The mandate of this department was to investigate matters affecting the security of the state, to correlate and evaluate information collected and, where necessary, to inform and advise government, interested government departments and other bodies.

Former members of the police and military were recruited into the Bureau, which gave it a typical police agency character.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, the South African society became increasingly militarised<sup>21</sup> in the 1970's and 1980's with the era which culminated in an action of a Total National Strategy by Government against the so-called "Onslaught" from communism.<sup>22</sup> The *Information Scandal* in 1978 (where covert funds were used to influence perceptions of South Africa overseas by purchasing media outlets and publications) led to the end of Vorster's premiership and the rise of Defence Minister P. W. Botha to the leadership in 1978. Prime Minister Botha appointed Kobie Coetsee (Deputy Minister of Defence and National Security and later of National Intelligence) to head a Commission of Inquiry to examine options to rationalise the intelligence functions and determine a future course for the strategic intelligence brief.<sup>23</sup> This brought the era of BOSS to an end and opened a new era with the restructuring of the civilian intelligence regime.

#### *1978 – 1995: National Intelligence Service*

With the resignation of Genl. Van den Bergh as Head of BOSS, the name of the Bureau of State Security was changed to that of the Department of National Security (DONS) on the first of September 1978. Again on the first April 1979, DONS underwent a name change to that of the National Intelligence Service (NIS)<sup>24</sup> and the subsequent appointment on 1 June 1980 of Dr Neil Barnard (a professor at the University of Orange Free State) as Director-General.<sup>25</sup> Obviously events in the international arena also impacted on the developments within South Africa, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the ultimate end of the Cold War Era. Similarly in response to the rising tide of

<sup>19</sup> Potgieter, Commission of Inquiry, 12.

<sup>20</sup> O'Brien, *The South African Intelligence Services*, 65.

<sup>21</sup> Africa, Sandy E, The South African Intelligence Services: A Historical Perspective in Changing Intelligence Dynamics, In Africa, S. & Kwadjo, J, (eds) *Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform* (GFN-SSR) / African Security Sector Network (ASSN), (Birmingham, UK.: Department of International Development, 2009): 61-94.

<sup>22</sup> O'Brien, *The South African Intelligence Services*, 50-51 ; O'Brien, Kevin A., Commissions of Inquiry in South Africa's Intelligence History 1960-2005 in Farson, A. Stuart & Phythian, Mark, (eds.) *Commissions of Inquiry and National Security: Comparative Approaches* (ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2011): 221-249; Frankel, Phillip, H, *Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984)

<sup>23</sup> O'Brien, *The South African Intelligence Services*, 64.

<sup>24</sup> NIS was mainly structured in Chief Directorates based on the following functions namely; *Foreign and Domestic Collection*; Counterintelligence - Offensive counterespionage and defensive security function; *Technology* – Chemical Section including deciphering, Photographic section and a Technical Section for mechanical capabilities, an Interception of Communications Section that includes satellite and HF, a Transcription and Translation Section, a Cryptography unit for decrypting, communication and crypto-analysis, and a satellite communication interception capability; a *Research and Analysis* Chief Directorate responsible for intelligence products and a *Corporate Resources* structure for Human Resource Management, Auditing, legal matters and Strategic Management Planning. South Africa. National Intelligence Service, Public Report, 1969 to 1994: National Intelligence Services 25 Years. (Pretoria: National Intelligence Service (NIS), 1994): 19-34.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 15 and O'Brien, *The South African Intelligence Services*, 66.

resistance, the international community strengthened its support for the anti-apartheid cause and sanctions and boycotts were instituted against South Africa, both unilaterally by countries across the world and through the United Nations (UN).<sup>26</sup> In September 1989, FW de Klerk replaced PW Botha as State President (following his stroke), and as stated by Africa,<sup>27</sup> and announced at the opening of Parliament in February 1990, the unbanning of the liberation movements (ANC, PAC and SACP) and release of political prisoners, among them, Nelson Mandela. These conditions, according to Africa,<sup>28</sup> led to the return of leaders of the exiled ANC to the country, which paved the way for negotiations. This was followed by the signing of the Groote Schuur Minute in May 1990 by the ANC and Government.

This was also the beginning of a negotiated peace settlement – led by secret talks from spies on both sides (ANC-DIS and NIS), that according to O'Brien<sup>29</sup> and Africa<sup>30</sup> culminated in a new political dispensation that came after the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations, the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) and subsequently the Government of National Unity (GNU). After a lengthy negotiation process, South Africa's first democratic election was held on April twenty-seventh, 1994, the date the new interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa came into effect. This Constitution gave South Africa nine new provinces in place of the previous four provinces and 10 "homelands," and provided for the GNU to be constituted by all parties.<sup>31</sup> The NIS, however, remained the intelligence service for the new South Africa until January 1995.

#### *1995 – 2009: Post-Apartheid South African Intelligence (NIA, SASS, NCC, NICOC)*

Statutory and non-statutory intelligence structures amalgamated into newly formed structures integrating the NIS, the ANC-DIS, the Transkei Intelligence, the Bophuthatswana Internal Intelligence Service, the Venda National Intelligence Service and the PAC-PASS<sup>32</sup> with Joe Nhlanhla as Deputy Minister of Intelligence within the Justice Ministry (Dullah Omar as Minister) into the following structures: the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) was established with a domestic security intelligence focus and a service responsible for a foreign intelligence focus; the South African Secret Service (SASS) and a technical capability within the National Communication Centre (NCC) as mandated by relevant legislation. Several policy changes and subsequent restructurings followed which included the creation of a Ministry of Intelligence in 1999 as well as the establishment of an Academy for Intelligence. Change was inevitable and another amalgamation process started in 2009.

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<sup>26</sup> South Africa. History. South African Government Information. (*South African Government Online*, 2012), available at: <http://www.info.gov.za>

<sup>27</sup> Africa, *Policy for Managing Access to Intelligence Information*, 83.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, 91.

<sup>29</sup> O'Brien, *The South African Intelligence Services*, 177.

<sup>30</sup> Africa, *Changing Intelligence Dynamics*, 70-71.

<sup>31</sup> With the election, Nelson Mandela became President and De Klerk a vice-president. the ANC emerged from the election with a 62% majority. The main opposition came from the NP, which gained 20% of the vote. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) received 10% of the vote. The NP withdrew from the Government in 1996.

<sup>32</sup> O'Brien, *The South African Intelligence Services*, 207 – 208.

### *2009 – 2015: The SSA*

Jacob Zuma was inaugurated as President of South Africa after the fourth democratic elections on May ninth 2009 and shortly thereafter announced several changes to current government departments.<sup>33</sup> These included a review of the structures of the civilian intelligence community and the subsequent creation of the State Security Agency (SSA)<sup>34</sup> through a Presidential Proclamation. A phased approach was followed to bring together the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the South African Secret Service (SASS), the South African National Academy of Intelligence (SANAI), the Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd (ESC) and the Office of Interception Centres (OIC). The creation of a Deputy-minister for State Security followed in 2014. As explained, the civilian intelligence service of South African – the SSA – has its roots deeply embedded within its origins within a police intelligence structure.

This nevertheless, brings the position of intelligence education and training to the fore.

### **Early Developments in Intelligence Education and Training**

The need for improving the military knowledge and qualifying military leaders for their task in South Africa was realised at the very outset. Thus it was that the Dutch East India Company that decided in 1786 to establish a training centre in South Africa for military cadets, selected from the local population with an instruction to Governor van der Graaff to establish a Militaire Kweckschool. However, the school did not reach the stage where it functioned properly nor focussed on any intelligence related training, and closed soon afterwards.<sup>35</sup> The next moves towards the establishment of a military college in South Africa were taken after the Union in 1910 when the S.A. Military School was established on 1 July 1912 at the Old Presidency in Bloemfontein. This was not a military college in the true sense as those of Woolwich and Sandhurst in England, West Point in America, Kingston in Canada and Canberra in Australia. Nevertheless, following the outbreak of the First World War, the establishment was closed to be re-established in 1920 in the now familiar stone building at Roberts Heights (or more commonly known as Voortrekkerhoogte in Pretoria) and designated the South African Military School.

Initial intelligence training in the early years of statutory intelligence, when South Africa was a dominion of the British Empire, took place under the auspices of the British Military Intelligence structures. This situation continued from 1910 up to the declaration of South Africa as an independent republic in 1961. The then Military

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<sup>33</sup> South African Yearbook, 2011/12.

<sup>34</sup> South Africa. Amendments of Schedules 1 and 3 to the Public Services Act, 1994 (Act No. 103 of 1994), (Proclamation no R 59 of 2009) *Government Gazette*, 531:5, 11 Sept. 2009 (Regulation Gazette no. 32566). It provided for the following structure: the former National Intelligence Agency (NIA), which is now the Domestic Branch of the State Security Agency; the former South African Secret Service (SASS), which is now the Foreign Branch; the former South African National Academy of Intelligence (SANAI), which is now the Intelligence Academy; and the National Communications which comprises of the Communications Centre (NCC), Office for Interception Centres (OIC) and Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd (COMSEC).

<sup>35</sup> Gomm, Neville, "The South African Army College," *Military History Journal* vol 2 no 3 (June 1972): 1.

Intelligence within the former South African Defence Force (SADF) took command and control of intelligence education and training. With the establishment of the Division Military Intelligence (1961) several officers were sent on course to Britain, France, Germany and the USA.<sup>36</sup> During 1975 the DMI was deployed to the Radcliff Observatory at Fort Klapperkop – Pretoria where the Military Intelligence College was also established to conduct intelligence training. In 1980 the Army established a specific intelligence corps and subsequently an intelligence school in Kimberly in the same base as the Danie Theron Combat School (established in 1968) and eleventh Commando (established in 1973) as the training wing that was disbanded in 1982. The same year the SA Intelligence School was established and provided training in collection, security, communications and counterintelligence to military personnel. In the 1990's the Intelligence School moved to its current base in Potchefstroom.

Intelligence training within the South African Police Services received much less attention in comparison to practices within the military environment. Although the first established statutory intelligence service in South Africa saw the light within the then detective branch of the police, very limited information is available regarding intelligence related training. This also seems to be the case within the later established Special Branch except for counter subversion training received from the British MI5. However, the focus of the police services in South Africa is currently more towards crime prevention and the practice of crime intelligence, for that purpose. To this extent the South African Police Services has a Crime Intelligence Academy in Pretoria to provide training for members working within that environment.

However, the civilian intelligence in South Africa was initially slow in establishing their own intelligence training structures. It seems that apart from intelligence training received abroad, the BOSS mainly employed experienced military and police officers within their ranks and did not have a specific dedicated intelligence training unit. This was to change with the establishment of the NIS in the eighties and the subsequent inauguration of an Intelligence Academy situated outside of Pretoria, called the Farm. Intelligence training was however restricted to members within the NIS with the focus on intelligence tradecraft. As also described by Mc Carthy,<sup>37</sup> the initial practice within the former NIS was to recruit graduates from various universities within South Africa. He also argues that the initial focus within the civilian intelligence was on intelligence collection and investigations with a lesser or limited focus on academic insight or scientific analysis.

After the first democratic elections in 1994, the internal service NIA and the external service, the South African Secret Service (SASS), initially received intelligence training from the Intelligence Academy until restructuring in 2003 with the inauguration of SANAI, as an independent training institute directly under the Intelligence Ministry. The South African education environment also changed with the introduction of a National Qualification Framework (NQF)<sup>38</sup> similar to other countries in the world. The Department of Basic Education (DBE) was formed when

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<sup>36</sup> Wall, D, "Introduction to Military Intelligence" available at: [sadf.info/MilitaryIntelligenceIntroduction.html](http://sadf.info/MilitaryIntelligenceIntroduction.html)

<sup>37</sup> Mc Carthy, Shaun, "The Relationship Between Academic and Intelligence Communities in Post-Apartheid South Africa," (*South African Defence Review Issue no 13*, 1993), available at: <https://www.issafrica.org/pubs/asr/SADR13/McCarthy.htm>

<sup>38</sup> South Africa. National Qualifications Framework (NQF). (2015), available at : [www.saqqa.org.za/](http://www.saqqa.org.za/)

the then National Department of Education was split into two: DBE and the Department of Higher Education and Training.<sup>39</sup> DBE has been tasked with overseeing primary and secondary education in South Africa. The South African Qualification Authority (SAQA)<sup>40</sup> was established to oversee the development and implementation of NQF. This brings the current intelligence training and education practices in South Africa to the fore.

### **Intelligence Training and Education within South Africa: Current Practices**

The introduction of the NQF as a single integrated system comprised of three qualification

sub-frameworks: General Further Education and Training (UMALUSI),<sup>41</sup> the Council for Higher Education (CHE)<sup>42</sup> and the Quality Council for Trades and Occupations (QCTO).<sup>43</sup> The NQF consists of ten levels which is divided into three bands; Levels 1 to 4 equate to high school grades nine to twelve or vocational training, five to seven are college diplomas and technical qualifications, seven to ten are university degrees. This could be delineated as follows:

<b>Sub Framework</b>	<b>NQF Level</b>
Umalusi	Levels one-four (ABET and Pre-school, Primary School, Secondary School - Grade 1 – 12 )
Council for Higher Education (CHE)	Levels six-ten (Higher diplomas, First degrees, Honours, Masters and PhD Universities)
Quality Council for Trades and Occupations	Levels one-eight (Certificates, Occupational Certificates and Diplomas Colleges)

The challenge within this system is to be able to provide intelligence education, apart from the existing intelligence training. The latter is currently restricted to the SAQA/NQF level four-dix with statutory qualifications ranging from certificates, national certificates to diplomas for members of the intelligence community (military intelligence, crime intelligence and civilian intelligence). These qualifications, as registered within the SAQA, are only provided on a limited scale by entities within the intelligence community with the focus on skills training rather than intelligence education. The current status of intelligence education is even not enhanced with the

<sup>39</sup> South Africa. Department of Basic Education and Departement of Basic Education and Department of Higher Education and Training (2015), available at:

<http://www.education.gov.za/TheDBE/AboutDBE/tabid/435/Default.aspx>

<sup>40</sup> South Africa. South African Qualification Authority (SAQA). (2015), available at:

<http://www.saqa.org.za/show.php?id=5661#sthash.rMKf2IE8.dpuf>

<sup>41</sup> South Africa. General Further Education and Training (Umalusi). (2015), available at:

<http://www.umalusi.org.za> Umalusi takes care of one of the nation`s most treasured assets - the standards of general and further education and training, hence its name, which means `herder` or `shepherd` - in Nguni culture the person who is the guardian of the family`s wealth.

<sup>42</sup> South Africa. Council for Higher Education (CHE). (2015), available at: <http://www.che.ac.za/>

<sup>43</sup> South Africa. Quality Council for Trades and Occupations. (QCTO). (2015), available at: <http://www.qcto.org.za/>

recent establishment of the opening of the Police University in Paarl – Western Cape, which in partnership with the University of South Africa, presents a Bachelor of Police degree to members of the SAPS. To this extent their curriculum does not make any provision for intelligence studies – albeit crime intelligence education.

Similarly, the curriculum of the Bachelor degree in Military Science offered by the Military Academy<sup>44</sup> (established in 1950) at Saldana Bay, also does not accommodate for any intelligence subjects. The only university to present the subject intelligence within an existing degree was the former Rand Afrikaans University (RAU) during the early nineties as part of a Honours degree in National Strategy. Limited attention was also given to intelligence as part of curriculum models in security studies presented by UNISA and UP. The unfortunate situation in South Africa is that no tertiary institutions, including private institutions, currently caters to or presents intelligence studies as a subject or degree. This is apparent even in light of different cooperation agreements between the intelligence and tertiary institutions. The only options available to practitioners of intelligence to further their academic qualifications are to study intelligence at the post-graduate level within a masters or PhD programme within Political Science, International Relations or Security Studies. This situation is mainly due to a gap in direct relations between intelligence agencies in South Africa and academic institutions – as is the practice in the USA, UK, Australia, Canada and other countries in the EU. The reason for this could be ascribed to an over-emphasis on secrecy and the need to know principle on the one hand, and the lack of understanding of the true value of intelligence education to the intelligence practitioners, on the other.

Furthermore, to the nexus between intelligence training and intelligence education is the prevailing thinking (as evident in the history and development of South African Intelligence), that the training of officers in in-house intelligence skills programmes is preferred above the recruiting of potential candidates who obtained professional qualifications through intelligence education programmes. On a lighter note, it seems that this is mainly due to the notion that intelligence officers, by nature, resist any theory. In addition, the practice of recruiting members with existing qualifications ranging from the Social Sciences (law, humanities and political science) and Natural Sciences (engineering and technical), vis-a-vis recruiting members with professional qualifications in Intelligence Studies (which is non-existing), also contributes to the slow pace of developing intelligence education in South Africa.

## **Conclusion**

In summary, it seems that the situation is no different in other countries within the rest of the continent, even despite efforts by the African Union to address intelligence education. These efforts include intelligence training initiatives planned by the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA), which was established in 2004 by Security Heads of African countries to address security challenges on the continent, as well as an attempt by Southern African Development Countries (SADC) to provide intelligence training amongst each other.

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<sup>44</sup> The Military Academy was initially established in partnership with the University of Pretoria and currently with the University of Stellenbosch. The Military Academy also presents post graduate degrees on masters and Ph D levels.

The only exception to the lack of formal intelligence education programmes is the Robert Gabriel Mugabe School for Intelligence (RGMSI) in Zimbabwe which presents a two-year diploma and four-year degree to intelligence and security officers in association with the Bindura University. The specific content and curriculum of these programmes, however, is not widely known, as well as its impact and contribution, towards the development of intelligence education. The nexus between intelligence training and intelligence education is apparent on the continent.

Given the fact that South Africa, Southern Africa and the rest of the continent experience a gap in intelligence education, this situation offers various opportunities for the development of applicable intelligence education programmes through the establishment of partnerships between intelligence agencies and relevant tertiary institutions. This would not only contribute to the enhancement of current skills and education of intelligence practitioners, but would also contribute to the improvement of intelligence practices in addressing security and intelligence challenges on the continent. Such efforts could also contribute to the theory and development of Intelligence Studies as an academic sub-discipline, thereby addressing the nexus between intelligence training and education.