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THE ARMY VS. THE INDIANS VS. THE SETTLERS: The South Florida Frontier Between the Seminole Wars

Dr. Joe Knetsch

One of the constant themes of Florida frontier history is the continued threat of violence. Either real or imagined, the threat of a painful death at the hands of unknown assailants, normally alleged to be Indians, loomed in the background of every settlement on the frontier. The acts of providing settlers with ammunition, weapons and constant patrols put the U.S. Army in the middle of all potential outbreaks. Therefore, any act, or reported act, of violence by the remaining Indian population had to be investigated, thwarted or rebuffed, and the settlers reassured that the incident was either false or isolated. The Army’s predicament on the southern frontier of Florida between the Second and Third Seminole Wars becomes obvious with the study of many of the remaining documents. There was, to be sure, some violence caused by Indians straying outside of the 1842 boundary, however, some of the violence was not directly caused by this group but by whites hoping to manipulate the Army into a position of removing the remaining Indians, by force if necessary.

The Armed Occupation Act of 1842, had not yet passed when new settlers began arriving in historic Manatee County. The most notable group was the colony of Colonel Samuel Reid, on the Manatee River. The well-connected Reid recruited from his fellow Middle-Floridians a colony of thirty-two people (fifteen white males, ten black males, two black females and four black children) and settled on lands previously scouted on April 16, 1842. The colony was supplied with ten muskets, twenty musket flints and two hundred "Ball Buckshot & Cartridges." In reporting on the arrival of the colony, General William Worth commented: "the land is of Superior quality & from the character of the Gentlemen concerned, there is certainty of success."1

The success of the Manatee colony was further assured by the arrival of other, some prominent, men from Middle Florida. They brought with them money, influence, connections to the political elite and some business acumen that many of Reid’s settlers did not have. The names of the Bradens, Gamble and others ring back the notable figures of early Manatee. As Janet Snyder Matthews has accurately recorded, this era also brought H. V. Snell, William Whitaker and Manuel Olivella into the land of historic Manatee County. This leadership core, including Reid, meant that the area was blessed with men of wisdom and connections which would allow the area to grow and prosper, even in the face of renewed Indian danger.2

The end of the Second Seminole War did not, however, bring peace to the Florida frontier. The tensions between the U.S. Army, some of the settlers and the Indians remained to incite many plans, plots and acts of violence. Accounts of Indian-related violence appeared frequently in the newspapers of the young territory. On June 13, 1843, for example, the Tallahassee Sentinel reported that in Alachua County: "Another Indian Outrage . . . We are all in arms again on account of the Indians.” Wrote a correspondent from Newnansville, "On Monday, two Indians entered the house of Mr. Gideon Hague, situated near San
Felasco Hammock, and, attacking his wife, left her for dead. Herself, child and a small negro girl were the only persons at home. The girl escaped with the child and gave the alarm to the family of Reuben Hague, residing about a half mile distant . . . An attack that far north of the Manatee settlement, in an area supposedly safe from harm and devoid of Indians, increased the feeling of vulnerability for everyone on the frontier. Further afield, early the next year, on the waters of the Choctawhatchee Bay in the Florida Panhandle, the reports of further Indian massacres could not have set well with those concerned with the security of the exposed settlements further south.

The policy of the Federal Government at this time did not sit well with the settlers, who had hoped that the Army would finish the job of removing the last of Florida’s native population. In July of 1843, General William Worth, commanding in Florida, wrote the following to Major Wright, then commanding at Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay:

The Indians in Florida are permitted to reside temporarily in that portion of the Territory included within the red lines represented on the Map herewith furnished, where they are to remain and not to leave, except to visit this Post for the purpose of trading or other business. They are to keep at peace with the whites, and for depredations which may be done them by the whites, they are to complain here, where justice is to be done them; for depredations to them on the whites, their chief is to notice it by promptly punishing those of his people concerned . . . . There are but few Indians in the Territory and it is the desire of the Government, as soon as it can be done without the risk of renewing difficulties, to remove them West. To this they are greatly opposed and are suspicious of our wish to entrap them and force their removal. As long as they are suspicious, it will be difficult to carry out the wishes of the Government, but their suspicion may be gradually removed by constantly observing towards them an apparent indifference, making them no presents, asking few questions, respecting their people, never persuading them to visit here, and permitting them to purchase of the trader whatever they may wish and can pay cash for, including powder and whiskey for which written orders are given . . . A trader is appointed who is required to keep on hand all articles usually wanted by the Indians, to purchase their skins, to sell at reasonable prices and in all respects to deal fairly and honestly with them; the Commanding Officer will have to look to this matter frequently . . . In order to verify our information as to the number of male Indians the commander will keep a roll of all who may present themselves; this must be done without their observation as it may excite suspicions . . .

Thomas P. Kennedy was given many of the normal articles of trade from the Disbursing Agent, S. G. Capers, on August 10, 1843. These articles of trade included 2,000 common "Sigars," 35 pounds of tobacco, 98 Indian shawls, 32 camp kettles, 210 yards of calico, and numerous other articles, but, noticeably lacking in this list are powder and whiskey. The trade was to be carried on in Tampa, however, this arrangement soon became too risky for all parties and Kennedy opened his store on Charlotte Harbor.

The Army also attempted to manipulate the Indians in the selection of a leader. It was thought that the old policy of divide and rule would benefit the policy of removal of the Indians to the west. Worth wrote to Colonel
William Belknap on December 13, 1843, about his concerns with the policy, then being followed by the Colonel: "I have some doubts as to the policy of fermenting a rivalry between Bowlegs & Assinwah for the chieftancy; and simply because the one or the other might seek the ascendancy by a war movement - this doubt aside, a rupture between them would be our gain . . . On all these matters I can but throw out hints & suggestions as every movement must be the result of circumstances - where they indicate a decided course and time permit send me an extra express - on such occasions allow no letters to be sent except those that are private & official to my self or staff - thus only can we keep our operations duly secret."7  The policy was calculated to cause dissent and diversion, thus making the opportunity for the Army to deport the Indians west that much easier. Divided, the Indian leadership probably realized that the tribes stood little chance of remaining in Florida, therefore, in the long run, this policy did not work to the advantage of the Army.

That settlers were moving into the southern portion of the territory and, especially, into the area of Charlotte Harbor was noted in a report of a scouting expedition by Lieutenant W. C. Browne. On May 24, 1844, Browne wrote that "La Costa Grande" island was inhabited by five people trading with Mobile and New Orleans, via the schooner The Water Lily, commanded by a Captain Berry, whose three children also lived with him on the island. A Captain Dewey, a New Englander, lived at "White Point" and near the head of Boca Grande, a certain gentleman named "Dexler" and a discharged soldier named Dunston lived by fishing and trapping under a company headed by Proceus, later a partner of John Darling in Tampa. Browne also noted the residence of Primo, described as a Spaniard, who lived on Pine Island and that an Irishman named MacKay and a citizen of Tampa named Stacks lived on "Matallachee Key" (Little Pine Island). He also noted that Sanibel and Captiva both had old settlements on them, but were unoccupied at the time.8 It is obvious that when Kennedy moved his store and trading post to the area, he was not alone and may not have been the only "trader" trading with the Indians.

(Note: There is no corresponding endnote 8 at the end of this essay)

Rumors of war soon, however, began to rumble over the frontier of southwestern Florida. On August 5, 1844, General Worth wrote to his commander at Tampa, Captain Montgomery, the following: "I desire you to cause the enclosed communication to be forwarded with the least avoidable delay to Colonel Reid, by the Star, if at Tampa, and not urgently employed - instruct the messenger to await for Colonel Reid's answers if he be found at his residence . . . I have further to desire that Mr. Kennedy, the Trader, and the Deputy Marshall, Mr. Ferris, may be sent to the residence of each settler on the Alafia, Simmons Hammock, Thlonotossassa, indeed all in the vicinity with a view to information on the following points . . . Have you in any instance been molested in person or property or in any way inconvenienced by the Indians since your residence? Have you entertained or had good reason to entertain apprehension from these people? On their way to Tampa to trade, have they in any case been rude and insulting - or otherwise?" Worth also wanted information from Reid on the shape of the colony in respects to crops and "prospects generally."9  The reason for the urgent dispatches was an attempt by supporters of David Levy, then Delegate to Congress, to stir up rumors of a renewed Indian war. As Worth's assistant, Captain John T. Sprague wrote to Montgomery: "Should it be known
to citizens the object of this information was to disparage infamous reports to renew the war, fabricated by the Delegates friends, the information sought would in many instances be given with reluctance."10 On August 9, 1844, Ferris and Kennedy were requested to perform their duty and ordered to return their responses to Fort Brooke.11

Throughout the remainder of 1844 and into 1845, the Army was busy putting down the rumors of war and trying to regulate trade with the Indians. Charlotte Harbor, close to the boundary of Indian territory, was an area of special concern because of the settlers and traders reported by Lieutenant Browne. There was even an attempt by the Territorial government to set up a customs office at that location, but this was opposed by General Worth and others.12 They were very concerned with removing the "intruders" who were already doing an illegal business in the vicinity.13 It comes as no surprise that the Army encouraged and provided for the moving of Kennedy's store to Charlotte Harbor in early 1845. As Worth noted to Belknap: " . . . urge [upon the Indians] the advantage of a trading establishment on the waters of Charlotte Harbor & distinctly to understand that no trading can be allowed except by the regular trader we shall send there; that if any other whites go there, we shall send soldiers to remove them, the whites."14

March 3, 1845, Florida was admitted to the Union as an equal state, and with it, new political forces arose to cause renewed friction between the three groups. The power of statehood which added two Senators and a member of Congress increased Florida's political clout. This augmented the pressures now being exerted by civilian authorities to get the Indian population removed. Florida's first governor, William Moseley, was in constant correspondence with the Army officers in Florida and Washington during his years in that post. Writing, for example, to Captain John T. Sprague in St. Augustine, the governor stated: "I feel myself constrained to add that I am fearful the policy of the Government set forth in your communication will ultimately prove unsuccessful."15 Such was the tenor of the official correspondence coming from the new office of Governor of the State of Florida.

The year 1845 also saw, again, renewed efforts by certain, unnamed individuals to spread the rumors of Indian troubles. Again, Worth wrote to Belknap; "The Indian story which you refer to & which I suppose you saw in the News was known to be false in every particular. Colo. Washing' n the Surveyor has just returned & denies every syllable of it - a drunken scoundrel of his party had come in and, as previously directed brought an 'Indian Story.' What a set of villains!"16 In one of the more telling letters of the Belknap correspondence, Worth let his feelings show to the fullest: "The St. Augustine News which I seen or read & have sworn I never will: but I am told it contains two most scurrilous & abusive articles or letters from Tampa of yourself & command. You have traitors in yr camp. I suspect the man Brown - Kennedy's partner from the language quoted to me - as for instance 'my wharf &' the other Brown in my opinion or perhaps Byrne would not hesitate to do the same thing. It is known indeed avowed this News was bought up when Levy was here for the express purpose of attacking the Mily."17 Indeed, the commanding general of the U.S. Army in Florida was accusing the Senator from the state of fomenting the constant attacks on the military by the local press; no clearer picture of the distrust between the
political and military personnel in Florida could be drawn than that just quoted.

The boundary set up to separate the Indians and whites was to be a twenty mile zone around the area designated as Indian Territory. Although the occupation of this area was to be of short term, no one knew exactly when the Indians would be ready to emigrate to the west. Roughly this area included much of the lower Peace River Valley over to the Kissimmee River and down it to Lake Okeechobee. At no point was there to be any territory recognized as Indian which had direct access to the ocean. The old fear of rearmament from Cuba or the Bahamas remained strongly embedded in the military and civilian mind. Interestingly, General Worth, upon seeing the area on a map from the Surveyor General of Florida, Valentine Conway, immediately expressed his displeasure with it, as it encompassed some lands already surveyed and settled upon by whites. Conway wrote to Washington for additional instructions and the corrected line was delineated on a new map.18

But the problems still remained for the Army in patrolling the area and keeping the whites and Indians apart. The Indians, by almost all accounts, intended to remain peaceful and caused little trouble. John T. Sprague wrote to Captain John H. Winder, commanding at Fort Brooke, on January 10, 1846, that this was, indeed, the total intent of Bowlegs and his followers which he had learned at a meeting at Kennedy's Charlotte Harbor store.19 Just two days after penning the above letter, Sprague again wrote to Winder, this time complaining of "intruders" with the Indians along the southwest coast. He claimed these intruders were "adventurers and speculators" who were idle and profligate and who were manufacturing "Indian signs" in hopes of exciting a new war, in the name of personal profit.20 Keeping the "idle and profligate" from the Indian territory remained a major problem until the final outbreak of the Third Seminole War in 1855.

That problems loomed with the civil authorities was behind much of the correspondence of 1846. Governor Moseley was in almost constant touch with Captain Aaron Jernigan who led the militia units in the area south of Fort Gatlin, in central Florida. From the correspondence between these two, it is obvious that the Indians were mistrusted and constantly "spied" upon and that the Government, represented in Florida by the Army, was viewed as weak regarding removal. On February 24, the Governor thanked Captain Sprague for his reassurances, "that no act of hostility need be apprehended from the Indians." However, he did not believe that the situation would remain so for long and noted that every incident reported would be followed up by Captain Jernigan or some other "responsible person."21 On the same day, he also wrote to Jernigan in a much stronger tone. "It is, I assure you Sir, a matter of deep regret to me; that these savages have not long since been removed west of the Mississippi. I am quite inclined to the opinion; per the information from Capt. Sprague; that no hostile attacks from them may be expected, nevertheless their residence among us, is well calculated to keep alive passions & prejudices which would doubtless long since have subsided, had they have been removed."22 These pieces of the general correspondence indicate that the State's governor and his associates did not consider the policy advocated publicly by the Army as adequate to the situation.

After constant reports of Indian depredations, various attacks on wagon masters, mail riders, etc., the general state of
affairs continued to decline. Indians, it was reported, who had camped on Lake Istokpoga (Highlands County) had badly mistreated the negro of a Mr. Hancock. Senator James D. Westcott of Florida wrote to President James K. Polk insisting that Captain Sprague had underestimated the size of the Seminole population greatly and that they were more powerful than the Army was willing to admit. Sprague, himself, was doubting the trustworthiness of the Seminoles and wrote to William Medill of the Department of Indian Affairs that they were, "more subtle, or vindictive, and inimical to the whites," than any other tribe in the United States. Trader John Darling, soon to enter into a partnership with Thomas Kennedy, wrote from the Charlotte Harbor store: "I have been some time at this station as agent for the Seminole Trader trading with the Indians, and I have seen enough of them to induce me to think that the policy at present pursued by the General Government, if the purpose is removal, ought to be changed." He then continues and directly attacks Captain John Casey: "The Indians are now permitted and encouraged to go out of the Reservation for the purpose of trade, ostensibly, but in reality to enable the Seminole Agent to keep up a quasi communication with them without personal inconvenience to himself. You are aware that the present Agent is an officer in the United States Army, and in command of troops at Fort Brooke." These representative reports and observations continued to fan the flames of possible war on the Florida frontier, and the motives of those involved did not appear pure and devoid of personal interest.

The great Indian Scare of 1849 brought out more intense passions and tensions on the Florida frontier. The murders on Indian River and at Paynes Creek heightened the call for renewed warfare against the Seminoles and Miccosukees. The scare depopulated the Indian River settlements, the New River Settlement and much of that originally found on the Miami River. In a word, it nearly depopulated southeastern Florida and made the impact of the Armed Occupation Act nearly void in that region.

The impact on the Sarasota-Manatee area was also devastating at first. As Janet Snyder Matthews has written, the settlements were in a panic and a meeting was called to discuss the matter and decide on the appropriate course of action. Volunteer units were called up by the Governor and H. V. Snell, and Joseph Woodruff, of Sarasota Bay, signed up to serve under Manatee merchant, Henry S. Clark, although this unit was not officially mustered into service. Unfortunately, the Army sent a Lieutenant J. Gibbon to reassure the settlers that all was well. His men, however, appeared at the Manatee settlements on "ordinary draft mules" and presented anything but a quick response unit capable of delaying or destroying attacking Indians. Captain John C. Casey, in writing to Adjutant General R. Jones, noted that his guides had found the usual signal for a peace parlance, a white flag made of feathers and tobacco with white beads, left by the Indians on an elevated point on Sarasota Bay. His commanding officer, Brevet Major General D. E. Twiggs, an old veteran of the Indian Wars, wrote on August 27, 1849:

Some days previous to my arrival a white flag was found at Sarasota, as has already been reported to the department by Captain Casey. Yesterday I sent a company to the Manitu river. On reaching the district bordering on the river, from which the inhabitants fled, two white flags were found at Mr. Addison's, at the head of the river, and signs of the tracks of two ponies.
Nothing had been injured on the premises, and nothing but a few pounds of flour taken from the house; indications from which something favorable may be hoped, in the expected meeting of Captain Casey and the chiefs.31

This revealing passage indicates that the settlers on the Manatee had, like most others in the exposed positions, left for the safety of the nearest fortifications. Indeed, as early as July 25, 1849, just four days after the Payne’s Creek murders, Casey noted in his diary, "people forting."32

By September 6, 1849, Casey was reporting to his superior officer, Major W. W. Mackall, that he had heard from Bowlegs and that the latter regretted the recent murders and that every effort would be made by the tribe to bring the guilty parties, whom were identified as five young Seminoles from the Kissimmee River area, to justice as soon as possible. Casey also noted that Sam Jones had contacted Bowlegs urging him to take the lead in keeping the peace with the whites. Casey then reported the good news, that the guilty parties had been overtaken on their way to the settlements by Chitto Hajo. The Captain stated: "The chiefs all disavow and regret these murders; and all the Indians are averse to hostilities. They are satisfied with their country, and with the treaty under which they are living; and they now earnestly desire to do justice in this matter." Broken sticks were exchanged at the end of the September 18-19th conference and peace soon prevailed again on the frontier.33

Casey’s efforts to meet with Bowlegs and resolve the problems met with great success and at no time did he bring up the question of removal. Yet, he was deeply troubled by the knowledge that General David Twiggs would bring up emigration at the next conference, calling this an, "apparent breach of faith."34

In his remarkable letters from the Florida frontier, Brevet-Major John C. Pemberton reported that the subject of removal was brought up with Bowlegs at the next conference. Twiggs traveled to Charlotte Harbor in mid-October to personally receive the prisoners who had perpetrated the murders on Indian River and Payne’s Creek. He took into custody three live prisoners, the hand of another (killed while attempting to escape) and a promise to capture the fifth culprit. After securing the prisoners, Twiggs brought up the eminent emigration, to which the Indians "expressed great surprise & showed great sorrow." Having just demonstrated their desire and faithfulness to the cause of peace, this reaction is understandable. Pemberton struck the final note by observing that the remainder would now resist any attempt at removal and predicted a "long and wearisome war" before they would finally capitulate.35

The reports of violence on the frontier continued, however, to flow back to the Governor, now Thomas Brown. One of the typical letters read like the following:

Sir, rumors say the Indian hostilities has been recommenced. Six waggons or teamsters has been Killed on Rout from Fort Mellon to Fort Frazer on the Kissimme the truth I cant vouch for but I fear it is tru for the Indians has not met Gen Twiggs. Sir I merely request that you would commission me and Lieut William Kendrick Lieut Horn has left the Dist.36

Indeed, the frequent reports of violence to teamsters, mail riders, etc., lead one to wonder about the political machinations going on along the frontier, especially when
the rewards were a captaincy or some other officer's rank in the local militia. Some, like John Darling, actually were reported to have attempted to thwart negotiations, but were stopped by cooler heads.37

The immediate result of the Indian Scare of 1849, was the establishment of a line of fortifications, if they can be called such, along the southern frontier. Camp Gamble was occupied near the Gamble plantation on the north side of the river and another unit was stationed at Dr. Braden's place on the south side. Little was done from these "posts" and the incidents of the earlier part of the year were soon over and life went ahead. In some instances, soldiers were simply put up in local homes and plantations, such as those reported by Brevet-Major Pemberton. The Major's wife gave birth to a ten-pound baby girl just shortly after leaving the house of a "Presbyterian parson" whose house was the last one of the Manatee River settlement.38

The panic, which had been complete at one stage of the Scare, did not fade from the memories of those who lived through it and caution was now the watchword for everyone.39

The political leaders, although happy at the end of the immediate crisis, wanted more troops deployed, hoping to entice the final battles that would lead to removal. In this hope they were disappointed. On August 7, 1849, Secretary of War George Crawford, wrote to the Governor, "I think that the force which is in process of being placed on the Southern Settlements of the Peninsula, will be adequate to their full defense. That force, when assembled, will, in numerical Strength, be quadruple that of the Indians. You propose to raise a force, which would be greater than the entire force of the Indians. I confess I do not see the propriety or necessity of employing the volunteers of Florida, and without which, I could not advise the President to muster them in the Service of the United States." This letter effectively ended the hope at that time of raising the troops for the final push.40

The outline of a plan by the Army for securing the frontier settlements, of course, had already been in the works. On October 3, 1849, this plan was sent to Washington by General Twiggs. Again, the central role of the Manatee settlements comes out clearly in this document. "Preparatory to a movement into the Indian country," Twiggs wrote, "I would make every effort to secure the frontier settlements against an eruption of the savages. To do this, I should propose a line of posts from the Manatee to the Indian river, passing between Kissimmee on the South and Cypress lake on the north. On this line of 200 miles, posts of two companies each, 10 miles apart, would be required, making 40 companies. Also depots at Miami, New and Indian rivers, St. John's on the east, Manatee, Charlotte Harbor and Caloosahatchee, on the western side of the peninsula..." Twiggs also noted that the garrisons would comprise about thirteen companies, including a mounted force of 300 men. He continued by detailing the type of boats to be used in Florida's shallow creeks and rivers. The naval force, as used in the last war, was not efficient enough and would not be needed. Fighting the Indians of Florida, who gave no pitched battles and fled at the approach of every force, Twiggs declared, "Your numbers, then, must make up for his intelligence and fleetness."41 The plan, it is clear, was similar to one developed toward the end of the Second Seminole War by General Worth.

Throughout the 1850s, until the outbreak of the Third Seminole War in 1855, the tensions continued to mount. A general policy of continued pressure on the Indians
was fully implemented. The U.S. Deputy Surveyors were ordered into the "neutral ground" to lay out public lands as a signal to the Indians that civilization, as the whites knew it, would soon be encroaching on their land. The Army continuously sent in reconnaissance missions (called surveys by some) to map out the hiding places and growing fields of the Indians. Lieutenant Hartsuff was on one such mission when his troops were attacked, beginning the last of the Seminole Wars. The State legislature regularly passed bills prohibiting trade with the Indians and resolutions calling for immediate removal. The Third Seminole War was no accident. It was a fully contrived exercise of continual pressure to force the final issue of removal. Few on the South Florida frontier were surprised when the war finally did come; most, it may be assumed, were relieved.

ENDNOTES

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3 Tallahassee Sentinel, June 13, 1843, 3. Tallahassee Sentinel, February 6, 1844. Discusses the murder of one man and a negro woman by renegade Creeks twelve miles west of St. Andrews Bay, which makes the description nearer to Choctawhatchee Bay. These Creeks remained on the run until mid-1847.

4 William Worth Belknap Papers, Folder 13, Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey. Memorandum for Major Wright, dated "July 1843".

5 Belknap Papers. Folder 13. List and signed receipt by Thomas P. Kennedy, dated August 10, 1843.

6 Belknap Papers. (No folder or box indicated). Letter of December 13, 1843. Worth to Belknap.

7 Belknap Papers. (No Box or Folder numbers) Letter of May 24, 1844. Lt. W. C. Browne to Belknap.

8

9 Belknap Papers. (No Box or Folder Number) Letter of August 5, 1844. Worth to Montgomery, commanding at Tampa.

10 Belknap Papers. (No Box or Folder Number) Letter of August 6, 1844. Captain J. T. Sprague to Captain Montgomery.

11 Belknap Papers. (No Box or Folder Number) Letter of August 9, 1844. Montgomery to Thomas P. Kennedy and Ferris.


13 Belknap Papers. (No Box or Folder Number) Letter of September 10, 1844. Worth to Belknap.


16 Belknap Papers. (No Box or Folder Number) Letter of July 7, 1845. Worth to Belknap.

17 Belknap Papers. (No Box or Folder Number) Letter of July 13, 1845. Worth to Belknap.

18 Territorial Papers, Volume XXVI, 1076-82.

Archives. Letter of January 10, 1846. Sprague to Winder.


23 Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1876. Letter of July 19, 1847.

Ibid., Letter of January 10, 1848. Westcott to Polk.


30 United States Senate Executive Document No. 1. 31st Congress, 1st Session. 1849.

31 Ibid., 119.

32 John C. Casey Diaries (United States Military Academy Library, West Point, New York, CU 551) Entry for July 25, 1849, in Book labeled "1849". The author would like to thank Mr. Alan Aimone of the Academy for his kind assistance in researching and copying the necessary parts of the diary for this article.

33 Ibid., 121.

34 Casey Diaries, entry for October 8, 1849.