The Hardships and Inconveniences: The Manatee River Forts during the Seminole Wars

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Descriptions of the land in Florida found in the promotional brochures of the mid to late nineteenth century tell of a new Riviera or "The Italy of America" or some other such romantic vision. One would hardly suspect that the vision presented in these fanciful writings of the early advertisers would somehow be a misrepresentation of the truth. Convincingly, they often told of a verdant land being exposed for the first time to the pulse of civilization and capable of growing any number of exotic tropical fruits which would readily find a market in the thriving industrial towns of the northern cities. It would be very apparent to anyone who came to this new Canaan that the land was very well worth fighting for and the Seminoles, notorious murderers and lazy savages, had every reason to attempt to prevent the progressive forces of Anglo civilization from seizing this Eden and making it their own. Indeed, why let any group of uncouth Indians prevent the settlement of this new land by those wishing to plant oranges, enjoy walks on the beaches and generally bring culture to the wilderness?

Those who served the forces of "civilization" in places like Forts Armstrong, Myakka, Starke, Crawford, Hamer or Camp Smead found that romance was far from the reality of the frontier. Life was difficult, tenuous and often short. A raid by hostile Indians could bring instant death, loss of property and life savings or the end of a dream. The reality of intolerable insects, dangerous reptiles, crowded conditions, constant fear and an unpredictable nature made life in these outposts almost insufferable to those forced by circumstances to endure these hardships. The constant demands for food, water and fuel meant a daily exposure to possible death. The often overcrowded area meant short tempers, instant rivalries and the threat of violence, domestic or otherwise. Culture and civilization were far from the reality of these outposts of defense.

As those who have read Janet Snyder Matthews’ Edge of Wilderness or heard Dewey Dye, Jr. back in January of 1967 know, there was only one "permanent" fortification on the Manatee River during the Second Seminole War, it was called Fort Starke and was situated near the mouth of the Manatee River. It was established on November 25, 1840, and abandoned on January 5, 1841.1 This fort served as a jumping off point for expeditions up the Manatee River and its tributaries. Dewey Dye, Jr. reports that the Post Returns for this installation indicate that it was manned by officers and men from the U. S. Army First Infantry, headquartered at Fort Armistead on Sarasota Bay, and commanded by Captain A. S. Miller. Companies B, E and F comprised the garrison and totaled about 140 men. Dye also speculates that no actual construction of a fortification took place and that the position was simply referred to as a "post", indicating no permanent buildings.2 The river had been visited many times by the military prior to the establishment of this post.

One of the first such scouts took place on March 18, 1836, very early in the Second Seminole War. The expedition from the U. S. Ship Vandalia produced no results and...
the report of the territory along the river is bereft of information describing the physical nature of the area. The only indication of the topography is found in the following:

"In conformity with your orders of the 16 inst., directing me to reconnoitre an Indian encampment in the neighborhood of the Manatee river etc., I have to inform you that I landed the same evening, within one and a half miles of the spot where the Indians were supposed to be encamped. Our forces amounted to twenty five men including Lt. Smith from your ship, Doctor Rassler and the Seamen from the Vandalia, it was nearly dark before we arrived on the spot where Mr. Johnson saw the Camp the day before, we strictly examined the ground and the adjacent wood, but could not discover either Indian or Cattle, but we saw evident indications of a recent encampment, such as prints of Indian feet, tracks of Cattle, etc. We remained in the wood until seven in the evening, at 8 we arrived on board. Yesterday morning we again landed our whole force and commenced our march into the wood, taking a Southerly direction, after passing the ground that we visited the day before, we fell in with Indian and Cattle trails of recent date, all of which evidently tending in the direction of Sarazotta having an Indian guide with us we concluded to march on, and did so until we found ourselves ten miles in the interior of the wood. Men and Officers being completely jaded down, deemed it prudent to commence our retreat on the cutter. We arrived on board at 6 P.M."

The march brought the command through woods on the southern bank of the river, however, because the exact location is not known, it would be nearly impossible to pin-point the spot today. The ground covered must have been soft and the going slow, because the normal distance covered by an army command in that day was anywhere from twelve to sixteen miles. However, the only true notation seen is that they went south through woods and no species is identified.

Although not the only reconnaissance of the Manatee River area during the war, it is one of the more complete reports found to date. The major reason that fewer scouts were sent via the Manatee is that the Indians were farther away from that area than any other in South Florida. If one reviews the correspondence, it is easily seen that the highest concentrations of the Seminoles and their allies were in the Big Cypress, around Lake Okeechobee, near the coontie grounds on the southeast coast and along the Kissimmee River. None of these positions is accessible by taking the Manatee River or any of its tributaries. This leads to the question, why establish Fort Starke so late in the war in an area not frequented by the Indians or their allies.

It can be seen from the report of November 24, 1840, that a concern of the army was the gathering of Indians along the islands of the coast. This short report simply noted that: "The 1st Regt. is scouting along the Gulf shore below Tampa with boats accompanied by a steamer and two schooners." Four days later, the 1st Infantry arrived at Fort Starke: "B, E, & F companies 1st Infty arrived here this morning, bad weather having delayed them. The Boat did not arrive at Fort Armistead until 24th inst. & was dispatched the next morning." read the official notification from Major Dearborn. The Major then continued his report: "I reconnoitered the country from Ft. Armistead some ten or a dozen miles on my first arrival, and since the last rain. The country was wet on my first excursions, and is now mostly over-flowed. One of the Indians who accompanied me as a guide says that we will
be obliged to swim two creeks with our horses on the trail leading to Peace Creek, and so far as I went the water was half-leg deep most of the way, and a very blind trail that the Indian was unable to follow." The watery way from anywhere to Fort Stark and the remainder of the territory made life difficult and lead to charges that the area may have been unhealthy, or "miasmatic" in the language of the day. However, the real reason for the fort's founding is found shortly thereafter in a letter of December 11, 1840: "It is the direction of the Commanding General that during the present cessation of operations in your district, a detachment under a competent officer be employed to stake out the inner passage leading to Fort Armistead, and any other channels which it may be deemed expedient to indicate in that manner. From their superior durability cedar stakes should be employed, if practicable." Thus, the only reason for the founding of Fort Starke is the protection and scouting out of a route via an "inner" passage from Tampa Bay to Fort Armistead, on Sarasota Bay. This passage being established and staked out, the fort was soon disbanded.

The navigability of the Manatee River made any form of reinforcement in the area relatively easy. This was early recognized by everyone and may be the reason Indians did not establish themselves on the river after the occupation of Tampa Bay by the United States Army at Fort Brook. The early settlers of the area certainly noted the ease of communication available via the river and almost everyone of those who settled under the Armed Occupation Act of 1842, chose sites on or near the river's banks. The success of the early settlers depended greatly upon the ease of shipment and receiving of goods and materials. That the area attracted the such capable leaders and plantation men as the Gambles, Gates and Bradens is ample indication of this ease of communication.

The almost constant threat of Indian attack made the Manatee frontier highly susceptible to rumor of same and led to much correspondence between the settlement and Tampa Bay, the regional headquarters for the army. Through most of the year 1846, these communications were carried on with the colony's leader, Sam Reid. His passing in 1847 meant the leadership fell upon the capable shoulders of Josiah Gates and Robert Gamble. These men, along with Joseph Braden, carried on communication with the major State and army leaders in Tallahassee and Tampa. Yet, some of these very same leaders, like Senator James D. Westcott, also kept the tension at a near fever pitch with their questioning of the army's representatives in the area. Trader John Darling, then at Charlotte Harbor and later at Payne's Creek, also brought doubt on the army's judgement, directly attacking the personal motives of Indian Agent John Casey. By 1849, enough of this type of material and rumor had spread that suspicions were running high.

In that year, two incidents, well known and discussed by Dr. James Covington and others, took place at Indian River and Payne's Creek which set the whole country on fire with war fever. The incident, which cost the lives of Captain Payne and others brought about a nearly full-fledged Indian war on the frontier. Only quick response by Billy Bowlegs, agent Casey and others prevented the final eruption at that time. On the Manatee frontier, the scare led to the establishment of Camp Manatee, Forts Myakka, Crawford and, most importantly, Hamer. The Post Returns from all of these encampments indicate that Fort Hamer was the nerve center for response to this crisis. Mail for all of these places was delivered to Hamer for distribution, Court Martials were held there and when the two remaining
posts, Crawford and Myakka, were abandoned, their companies were sent to Hamer. When the army left Fort Hamer, in October of 1850, the stage was set for the next move in the game to remove the Seminoles from Florida, namely the petition drive and public meetings requesting State action.

Fort Hamer, always an object of interest to Manatee citizens, has not been precisely located by proper archaeological and historical research, at this time. Many claim to know the exact location, and they may be very correct. However, for our purpose, the situation of the fort being approximately fifteen miles west of Fort Crawford, on the south bank of the river and about ten miles up river, near the head of steamboat navigation, will suffice. What exactly did this outpost look like and what were the conditions under which men and women lived in or near this forth Dewey Dye, Jr. reports finding Lieutenant Hayes’ report to the Quartermaster General in which the following description is found:

". . . a hospital building had been completed (by April 1850), 60 feet by 25 feet, containing three airy wards with ceilings 11 feet high. He reported that porches extended the whole length of the hospital building, in front and rear. Ends of the front porch had been enclosed to make two shed rooms, one a dispensary and the other, the store room. He also reported he had completed a hay house that had been erected to the dimensions 80 feet by 21 feet, height 15 feet. He also reported that three sheds had been completed and it looks like a ram of log houses under construction to accommodate a garrison of three companies . . . He also reported [says Dye] that the beams, rafters and heavy timbers were cut from the nearby pine woods." How does this compare to other forts constructed in Florida during the Seminole Wars The buildings at Fort Pierce were reported as being an officers quarters measuring 124 feet by 18 feet covered with boards, three log enclosures covered by tarpaulin which measured 30 feet by 15 feet each and a hospital which occupied a space 28 feet by 16 feet. The area was generally open, no walls, and had only one blockhouse upon which stood the artillery pieces) and some rough-hewn pickets, loosely spaced. Fort Drane, one of the main fortifications at the beginning of the Second Seminole War, simply took the existing buildings of General Duncan Clinch’s plantation, surrounded them with a "picketification" and used the main buildings, redbugs, fleas and all, for the officers and troops. Historian Albert Manucy has described the construction of fortifications used in Florida in the following manner:

"To build such a fort, you simply obtain a few hundred trees, cut them in 18 foot lengths, and split them up the middle. Then you set them into the ground side by side like a fence, fasten them together with timbers, cut loopholes eight feet from the ground and build firing steps under the loopholes for the riflemen. Outside you dig a ditch that served as a kind of moat. You hung a strong gate, and your fort is practically finished."

Michael Schene, whose work on Fort Foster is well known by Florida historians, also noted the large need for trees used by the construction of forts similar to those described by Manucy. He added that the long poles were split, sharpened to a point and placed into the ground so that ten to fourteen feet were left above the level of the surrounding turf. Arthur Franke, in his work on Fort Mellon, described the fortress as having a three storied blockhouse in the
center surrounded by and enclosure. As seen on any map of the forts during these wars, the most common plan, and it became the symbol for a fortification, was a rectangular or square structure with two blockhouses at opposite corners. Not surprisingly, none of these types describe exactly what Fort Hamer must have looked like as detailed by Lieutenant Hayes.

It has long been a popular misconception that all forts basically looked the same and provided the same protection. As can be seen from the above, this is definitely not the case in Florida. From the open air style found at Fort Pierce to the tight, blockhouse-enclosure type of Fort Mellon, Florida's fortification differed widely. Perhaps the greatest reason for this diversity is the availability of useable wood. In areas where pine and hardwood are plentiful, the enclosure type of fortification was used, whereas in neighborhoods where such wood was scarce or expensive to procure, the more open style was adopted. This would help to explain the rich variations found in Florida fort construction.

Life for those living at the fort may have been a bit dull and routine, once the pattern had been set. Troops were constantly on rotation scouting the territory for possible Indian signs and keeping whites from the designated "Indian Boundary". If the post were to be permanent, there would have been regular gardening to attend to, as, by an 1819 law, permanent military installations were required to have a garden to provide vegetables and grains for the troops. However, as Fort Hamer was not regarded as a permanent post, this probably did not happen. Which meant that subsistence for the troops and those dependent on them had to be shipped into the area and stored, which was probably the purpose of the large "hay building" constructed by Lieutenant Hayes.

It is notable that the location of the fort, as noted by Ms. Matthews in her book, was at the head of steamboat navigation for the river. This reinforces the conclusion that the materials were shipped in and stored at Fort Hamer, which then distributed the materials and rations needed to Forts Crawford and Myakka. Shipping rations and materials to other posts meant that the army, most likely, had to construct the roads to these outposts. It is significant that George Cordon Meade, the leader of Union troops at Gettysburg, when constructing his maps of southern Florida in 1850-51 noted that the road from Fort Crawford to Fort Myakka, a distance of between 16 and 17 miles, was a "good road" while that headed east from Fort Crawford needed a lot of work to make it usable. Road duty, like gardening, was part of the required work routine found at most military posts.

One of the major reasons for the location of Fort Hamer, as just noted, was its position at the head of steamboat navigation. It must be noted, regardless of the fertility of Manatee's fabled lands, that forage and food were very expensive in Florida and that it was cheaper to have it shipped to the military posts from places such as Baltimore, Philadelphia and elsewhere. During the Second Seminole War, for example, one consignment to Florida was described as follows:

"I herewith transmit a statement showing the quantity of Forage shipped to several depots in Florida since the 26th ultimo. Captain Crossman reports that he is now loading a vessel with Hay at Boston destined for Tampa which will carry 700 bales, and one for Savannah which will carry 800. Captain Tompkins is loading a vessel at Philadelphia with Forage which will carry from six to seven hundred bales of hay and 6 to 8 thousand bushels of grain. Captain Dusenbery has taken up a vessel for the
same depot which will carry about 7000 bushels of grain and will sail in a few days; and Captain Hetzel is now loading a vessel at Alexandria for Saint Marks which will carry about 8000 Bushels of grain and is expected to sail on the 12th instant.

These large quantities of forage and grain indicate some of the problems of supplying troops for campaigns in Florida. The major reason for these shipments is the relatively undeveloped state of agriculture in the state in the 1840s and 1850s. The concentration on cotton in the northern tier of counties and the disorganized state of affairs in the southern portion caused by the wars, or threats of war, made these types of shipments a necessity.

The forts also provided medical treatment, such as it was, to the surrounding population. Although this was not the recommended way to get medical attention and the army did not encourage the practice, it was fairly common to have the post surgeon look at the local populace when time and facilities warranted it. One of the reasons for this was to check this group for possible communicable diseases which may infect the fighting force. The rate of sickness at many of the posts in Florida was the major factor in closing most of the installations during the so-called "sickly season", i.e. the rainy season. Fort Hamer was served by an "Assistant Surgeon", the title given to doctors who did not have enough time in the army to rise to the rank of surgeon, which Dr. William Strait, who has written extensively on medical history in the Sunshine State, informs me, could take as many as ten to fifteen years. Thus, when Assistant Surgeon Sloan replaced Assistant Surgeon Ballard on March 24, 1850, this did not mean that the post, and surrounding population, received less competent medical attention than a station with a full-fledged surgeon.

One of the major problems on the frontier posts was that caused by alcohol. Not only did the troops have to guard against unscrupulous whites illegally selling liquor to the Indians, but they had to also attempt to control the sale of same to their colleagues. Most everyone has read or heard of the problems suffered by U. S. Grant while stationed on the isolated California frontier, yet the same problems occurred many times in Florida. Although I have found no specific references to Fort Hamer or the other Manatee posts, one can assume that the problem was evident here as elsewhere. During the preceding war, Fort Micanopy had a severe problem with local grog shops, run by former soldiers. In the rather unique journal of Bartholomew M. Lynch, edited as the "Squaw Kissing War", this literate common soldier tells numerous tales of officers, under the influence, beating recruits for no reason and constantly covering up for each other. At Fort Stansbury, outside of Tallahassee, in 1843, Lt. Colonel Ethan Allen Hitchcock, then of the 3rd Infantry, noted the reasons for asking the discharge of twenty-eight men of his command. His reasons included: "habitual drunkard", "intemperate and uncleanly in his habits", "An incorrigible Drunkard", "A common Drunkard, broken down in health and from that cause", and "Drunkenness and bad conduct, being one of the greatest smugglers of whiskey extant." These incidents of the life of a frontier outpost give ample example of the problems created by alcohol and the boredom of post routine.

Violence to persons, too, was found in every post on the frontier of Florida. It is inconceivable that the Manatee forts escaped this plague. Hitchcock noted that one of the reasons for his dismissal of one of his troops
was, "for the murder of a fellow soldier". Lieutenant Colonel William Whistler reported that, in January of 1842, "Sir, Private James Steck of C Compy 7th Infty murdered his wife on the 11th Inst. for which crime he has been turned over to the civil authority." For such a crime, he continued, "I have to request that he be discharged [from] the service." The almost constant threat of violence between regular troops and the local militia forces has been well documented by James M. Denham and needs no further comment here.

However, more pleasant past-times also found their way into the life enjoyed by the frontier soldiers and local inhabitants. Fishing in the river seems to have been universal wherever in Florida a post was established near water. Hunting in the woods, too, was enjoyed by many, although sometimes with additional adventure. George Ballentine recorded the following in his memoirs:

"Having so much spare time on hand, our men frequently took long rambles in the woods, especially during the fine dry weather; and on these ocassions, for some time after our arrival in Tampa Bay, there was a danger of getting so utterly lost in the woods, as not to be able to find the way home; thus incurring the serious risk of dying of starvation. An occurrence of this description happened shortly after our arrival . . . A young man belonging to our company had gone out shoot one day, by himself, and in his eagerness for the sport he had gone a considerable distance away from the path, without having paid sufficient attention to the direction in which it lay, to be able to find it again . . . . After a few hours search, he was discovered about six miles from the garrison, and within a mile from the footpath. He was very nearly exhausted when found by the party, and but for measures taken by the lieutenant, it is probable that he would have soon died of sheer hunger and fatigue . . . "

These instances are well known and documented by many of the soldiers who left memoirs and letters, e.g. George McCall and Alexander Webb, and need no further elucidation.

The area of the Manatee River presented many opportunities such as those described above, however, as soon as the Scare of 1849 was over, the attention of the citizens returned to the ever present "danger" of a serious outbreak of hostilities. This was not long in coming with, in late 1855, the attack on Lieutenant Hartsuff's command in the famed banana patch of Billy Bowlegs. Once again the call came for the establishments of fortifications along the Manatee River. In early 1856, Hamlin V Snell's home was burned: "We have reliable information direct from Tampa," the Alligator Advertiser reported on March 13th, "that in the early part of last week, twelve Indian warriors attacked the premises of Hon. H. V. Snell at Sarasota, about sixty miles south of Tampa, and nine miles from the Manatee settlement. A man named Cunningham was in the house at the time the attack was made, and was killed; a negro man preparing dinner in the kitchen made his escape. Mr. Snell happened to be out, at the time, and upon discovering the smoke of his burning residence, fled to Manatee." Shortly thereafter, the home of Asa Goddard, located near the headwaters of the Manatee, and within two miles of "Capt. Addison's fort", was plundered and burned. The John Craig home, nearly one-half mile away was also robbed of its remaining contents. Less than a year later, Captain Clarke, of the 4th Artillery, found signs of fresh inhabitation on an island at the mouth of the Little Manatee River and again sent out the alarm. The war was again active on the
Manatee frontier and the call for protection came fast and loud. The result was the establishment of Fort Armstrong, Camp Smead, on the 2nd of September in 1856.33 Most of the Manatee settlers appear to have scrambled for the protection of the post(s). When the army threatened to leave the area, for lack of Indian signs, William H. Johnson took pen in hand and wrote to Washington to protest. "If all the troops are withdrawn from here," he noted, "the whole frontier from the Gulf to the Atlantic will be sacrificed beyond a doubt, all the settlers here have gathered together at different Posts along the frontier, have been away from their homes since January 1856, believing that the Government would move with energy against the Indians, and that they would all be permitted soon to return to their homes, but now after enduring all the hardships and inconveniences of a Camp life for Sixteen months we are told that all the troops are to be withdrawn, and we the poor sufferers to take the best care of ourselves that we can." He went on to encourage the government to allow the volunteers to remain on duty to protect the settlements until "Maj. Blake tries his experiment with Billy Bowlegs", which he doubted would succeed.34

Not all of the Manatee settlers agreed with Johnson’s assessment of the situation and also took their pens in hand to counter his opinions.

"The undersigned having been informed that the residents at the settlement on the Manatee River are petitioning for a guard of Regular Soldiers to be stationed at that place, beg leave to state (1) That nearly, if not quite all of the said residents; are now paid by the United States for protecting themselves at home & have their horses fed also, (2) That we do not believe that there is the least apprehension of any danger from Indians on any part of said River, (3) That we are residing on much more exposed situations on, or near, said River, having no neighbors near as some having families, two having stores with goods & owning land & negroes, & hitherto no guard has been furnished us, Nor do we now consider any necessary, But if Regulars are to be sent to this River, we ask that a fair proportion of them be stationed with us in order that we may derive a fair proportion of the profits to be made out of them, as they can be of no other use on the River."35

This letter was signed by Joseph Atzroth and others residing at the mouth of the river at what he sarcastically called "Fort Atzroth". The fact is, Atzroth may have been closer to the truth of the matter than is generally accepted, because, most of the action was taking place in the Everglades and along the Peace River frontier, not near the settled areas of the Manatee, at least after the beginning of 1856. This debate may warrant more investigation.

The land of the Manatee River attracted many during the 1840s and 1850s despite the trouble with the Seminoles. 2nd Lieutenant F. M. Follett, 4th Artillery, described the land he saw at the time as he scouted the lands of Manatee in early 1857 as mostly pine barren with an undergrowth of saw palmetto and an occasional sawgrass pond. He mentioned only two hammocks of hardwood and notes that they were not of great extent, the largest being only one thousand yards across. The description is one of rather plain land, monotonous to a point.36 Yet this land attracted some of the most important men in Florida during the Territorial period and continued, under Snell and Gates, to provide the leadership for southern Florida into the days prior to the outbreak of the War Between the States.
What the army missed in its reports was the obvious fertility and potential of the area for crops like sugar, tobacco and citrus. Although Braden and Gamble surely provided excellent examples of successful plantation agriculture on the Manatee, the army hardly reports anything on their efforts. The life on the frontier may have dulled their senses to the potential greatness that lay ahead for the Manatee River so preoccupied were they with just trying to survive in the new environment we know as the Manatee frontier.

ENDNOTES


4 Ibid. 48.


7 Ibid. Letter of December 11, 1840. W. W. Bliss to Major Dearborn.


11 James Covington. "The Indian Scare of 1849." Tequesta. 1961. This is the best and quickest source of information regarding these events. For Manatee County specifically, see Janet Snyder Matthews’ fine work, Edge of Wilderness: A Settlement History of Manatee River and Sarasota Bay (Tulsa: Caprine Press, 1983) pp. 181-203.

12 See Post Returns. Fort Hamer. Roll 1514. The first return in this series begins in December 1849, two months after Camp Manatee was established, and it was disbanded in October of 1850. The notations along the bottom under "remarks" indicate the date that the forces at Crawford and Myakka were sent to Hamer.

13 Matthews. 199.


26 Ibid.


30 *Floridian & Journal* (Tallahassee) Saturday, March 15, 1856.

31 *Floridian & Journal* (Tallahassee) Saturday, April 26, 1856.


