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The Peacekeeping Information at UN Level

Tiziano Diamanti

Introduction

Since their official constitution in Great Britain (1909), the Secret Services had represented one of the main instruments in support to the State national security and their national strategic policy.¹ In the contemporary history, it is believed that Secret Services are the center of gravity for the open and classified information flux in order to possess a clear picture of the situation analysed more complete than what achievable by private similar Organizations (*think tank*, private security companies). Moreover, they are also dedicated to plan and perform psychological operations (Psyops) and deceptive plans according to the national interest. On the other hand, we should not believe that the Secret Services are just a simple instrument into the hands of the decision-maker, being conversely the memory of the deepest and covert history of a nation-state. Their real and effective power is also variable according to the political system in place; specifically, the Secret Services maintain a huge power within dictatorships and lesser into a democratic system.²

Therefore, the Secret Services are an inseparable part of an organised political system like a Nation State, which represent nowadays the main actor of the international arena according to the realist theory. Thus, they change accordingly as the state changes but also as the geopolitical context changes too. It was due to the last radical transformation at the end of the 1980s that drove the international system into an imperfect unipolarism headed by the U.S. from a perfect bi-polarism, and later towards a current multi-polarised environment, that rose up the need to reshuffle the national intelligence communities worldwide. This process started at the beginning of the 21st century triggered by the al-Qaeda terrorism attack to the twin towers in New York and against the Pentagon on September 9, 2001. However, since the first half of the 1990s, when the threat to the national and international security was clearly evolving, several Intelligence Communities understood the need to adapt the system. We are not speaking just about a new type of armed conflicts from inter-states to intra-states ones or freedom/separatist movements against state power, but also about the transformation of the terrorist threat from a political/religious domestic one to a more trans-national based on cultural or religious differences.³ Moreover, the same globalization, although beneficial in the technological field for the human welfare, made more and more connected and transversal the internal and external affairs of a nation-state and/or the international organizations, stepping up new threats related to this new international system, like primarily the so called *cyberterrorism* or *cyber-warfare*.

¹ The Secret Service Bureau (SSB) was the first Agency created for the national security funded by State finances. Prussia followed with the constitution of the GNDH (Geheime Nachrichtendienst Des Heeres) in 1913. Dr. Massimo BONTEMPI, "Intelligence. National and International history", Lesson paper presented at the Master in Economic Security, Geopolitics and Intelligence for SIOI, Rome, Italy, September 2012.

² Giannulli, Aldo, *Come funzionano i Servizi, Introduzione* (Rome: Ponte alle Grazie, 2009),18-24.

³ It is clear the United Nation and its General secretary policy regarding the Peace-Keeping missions. During the bipolarism there were just 14 mono-dimensional missions interpositions or observers; 47 missions authorised from 1990 up to date with 16 still running (4 still during the cold war era), available at: <http://www.un.org>; Vittorfranco Pisano, "Contemporary terrorism: domestic and international threat", lesson paper presented at an Advanced Course for the University of Hugo Grotius, Milan, Italy, 2010.

The evolution of the global threat, since the beginning of the 1990, did not caused just the reshuffle of the national intelligence apparatus but pushed for the development of a more integrated intelligence systems worldwide especially supporting the increasing use of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions to address international security. The already existing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) structure become an essential element for the conduction of the most prominent *Peace Support Operations* (PSO), however NATO is not an Agency under the control or guidance of the UN but merely a regional organization capable to take over a crisis management, according to Article 53 of the UN Chart, from the UN Security Council (UNSC). Thus, the United Nations started to understand the importance to built up their own information apparatus to address the threat and awareness issue during the missions carried out without the support of regional Organizations (blue helmet missions). At the same time, the UN decision-makers started to understand the need to have the knowledge of a crisis situation to better decide and guide the UN system towards a policy of crisis mitigation. Within this context, the UN Secretary General is the main customer of an effective UN information capability.

This paper intends to analyze the information system developed at the UN level to create a *Peace Keeping Information* (PKI) capability. At the same time, it will be useful to consider also some problems concerning the main reasons why the PKI was never developed properly at UN level.

It has to be specified, finally, that this paper is based exclusively on open sources (OSINT: documents, websites, meeting with experts not belonging to the intelligence field) reducing *de facto* the complete accuracy of what written and explained regarding the UN information sytem in place/under development. On the other hand, the historical perspective of the information problem inside the UN are based on a sufficient and quite reliable amount of information.

Generally speaking, the *Information Peacekeeping* is the systematic usage of the information and the information technology to achieve political gains without the use of violence.⁴ The three elements at the basis of the above activity are the open source intelligence and/or the grey literature (*collection* and analysis made by private contractors often not free on the market), the information technology and the electronic security implemented by operational security (OPSEC) developed for the EAD systems. More specifically, Info PK can permit:⁵

- Political decisions based on an acquired knowledge of the situation under scrutiny;
- A good information management;
- A strategic planning dedicated to achieve a consensus through specific operations.

According to Alvin Heidi Toffler, U.S. writers and journalists, fathers of the Information Peacekeeping concept, the information within the current PK is a substitute of the richness, the violence, the money, the working force, the time and space.⁶ To better counter-balance

⁴ It is easily understandable that this concept is complementary to the Information Warfare itself; both are based, although with different *outcomes*, on the *effect based Operation* and are both part of the *Information Operations*.

⁵ Steele, Robert David, *Intelligence* (Catanzaro, Italy: Rubettino, 2002), 257-258.

⁶ Born the October 4, 1928 in New York, Alvin Toffler is a thinker, together with his wife, of the futurist ideology. Founder of USA *Fortune* magazine, he created in 1996 the Toffler Foundation (<http://www.toffler.com>) promoter of the information concept as technology innovation in the 21st century. Among his papers he preview the globalization, the cyberspace, the digitalization of the State apparatus, and the

the three new type of enemy, the “bad guys with a low technology capability”, the “prophets with a low technology capability”, the “prophets with a high level of technology skills” it is necessary to increment esponentially the exploitation of open sources and the *foreign area expertise*.⁷

Figure 1: OSS.net Information Peacekeeping Logo



Information Peacekeeping

Through Collective Intelligence



The focus on Information and the applied information technology was considered by the UN while developing its own Information capability based on the *Information Operation* strategic concept. The latter sees at its basis the *Information Warfare* and the *Information Peacekeeping* but at its peak the open sources. The above triangle (Figure 1) is not distinguishing between civil and military operations in accordance with the evolved concept of the *Peacekeeping Missions* into a peace support operation (PSO). In fact, the most relevant aspect is that the *Information Operations* in the 21st century are more and more considered less military in terms; on contrary, civilian operators has to develop a military discipline while approachiong and conducting the same Info Ops.⁸ The center of gravity (CoG) is the civilian component of a PSO not just as an OSINT producer but even as user. Within this context, the problem concerning the secrecy and the classification of the information has to be evaluated constantly but reduced in importance progressively while moving from an Information Warfare system to a Peace-Keeping Information one.

Thus, the *Information Peacekeeping*, embraced strongly by the UN to maintain the impartiality required by the International Organization, is mainly centered on the OSINT activity, the *Key Leaders Engagements*, the subject matter experts' network and the *Human Terrain Teams*. What above is crucial to differentiate the UN information activities from the

cloning of living beings. Member of several Associations and think tank, he is even an Offical od the french Art and Literature Orden. Currently he is living in Bel Air-Los Angeles.

⁷ The first class is materialised by the Criminal non structured Organizations, the terrorist cells and the narco-traffickers; the second group is considered made by ideological groups, religious or ethnic ones not capable to accept the normal intertrnational relations; the third classi s composed by informatic terrorists, Organized Crime Organizations/Terrorist Organizations also trained to perform the economic espionage; Steele, *Intelligence*, 258-259.

⁸ Steele, *Intelligence*, 261.

normal information collection carried out by military or civilian Intelligence Agencies (producing highly classified information).

Peacekeeping Information

Definition

While the Information PK develops and applies the proven process of intelligence to define challenges, identify options for national, public or organizational stake-holders, the PKI develops and applies the proven process of intelligence to merely support the decision making process of the Secretary General, the field commanders and the tactical one deployed on the field. Thus, the former was the ground that allowed the UN to develop the latter. Therefore the *PeaceKeeping Information* is characterised by:

- An extensive use of the OSINT;
- The focus on the *force protection*;
- The intent to increase as much as possible the information sharing with NGOs-IOs-local actors;
- The protection of the international interest and not the national one;
- The adoption of the operational concept of reactivity into crisis situations (l'Information Peacekeeping is instead proactive)⁹.

Current Development of the System

It was Kofi Annan, according to the August 21, 2000 Brahimi Report that tried after several failures to implement a sort of information structure at UN level proposing the constitution of the ISAS (*Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat*) under the direct command of the Executive Committee for Peace and Security of the Secretary General's Secretariat.¹⁰ Although a further failure, the UN continued to pursue the desire to form an independent Information capability to support directly the blue helmets looking at the already developed capabilities at NATO level but employable just according to the Article 53 of the UN Charter. Still referring to the Brahimi Report, within UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) mission, it was constituted at the strategic level (New York HQ) that the Strategic Military Cell (SMC) inside the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), responsible to supervise the mission from 2006 to 2010.¹¹ This initiative, strongly supported by Italy and France and *lead nations* in UNIFIL II, was developed specifically due to the lack of Command and Control (C2) demonstrated during the past UN missions. The SMC should have worked as strategic direction to the Force Commander and to allow the DPKO to be supported by the expertise of officers belonging to the major troops contribution countries

⁹ Robert David Steele, "Peacekeeping Intelligence & Information Peacekeeping," *OSS.net* (April 21, 2005): available at: http://www.oss.net/extra/news/index.html@module_instance=1&id=2679.

¹⁰ "Peacekeeping forces must have intelligence capabilities...and better information gathering, analysis and strategic planning" Brahimi Report 21 August 2000, available at: www.UN.org; Walter Dorn, "United Nations Peace Keeping Intelligence," *Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (London: Oxford University Press, 2010).

¹¹ The first Commander of the SMC was LTG Giovanni Ridinò (italian) who assumed the leadership on August 2006; on March 2007 he was replaced by MG Bruno Neveux (french). L'hand-over/take over between Italy and France at the SMC and at the Operational Command happened just one time till when MG Graziano (italian), replacing the first UNIFIL II Commander (french MG Pellegrini), remained in place as UNIFIL II Commander and SRSG up to 2010; Ronald Hatto, "UN Command and Control capabilities," *International Peacekeeping Journal* 16:2 (April 2009).

applicable to all the military branches (intelligence too).¹² So it was given importance to the information activity.¹³ This supervision was particularly important to cover the Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets within the crisis establishment of the UNIFIL II mission. However, the SMC did not represent a model for the UN to further develop an information capability but just the volunteer of some nations to have a strategic command in New York to administrate the UN deployment in Lebanon.

Finally, in 2007 a joint study between the UN Security General (SG) and the Office of Military Affairs at the DPKO proposed the constitution of the so called *Military Information Analysis Service* (MIAS). Although the experiment was a success in UNIFIL, several under developed countries continued to express doubts about such projects; thus even the latter proposal was rejected.¹⁴

At the same time in 2006, the DPKO in accordance with the Secretary General created a sort of system that became, later on, the core of the UN Information apparatus. This new structure encompassed three units:

- The JMAC at the tactical-operational level, implemented in 2006;
- The *Research and Liaison Unit* at the strategic level, implemented in 2007;
- The *Assessment Team* at the strategic level too, created in 2010.

Ethics and Intelligence at UN Level

“[n]ot knowing what was really going on. The UN treats intelligence gathering with great suspicion, because it is deemed to be spying on member states. We once found ourselves in a situation where BBC World Service was telling us what was happening 200 metres away from our own headquarters, That was really frustrating.”¹⁵

*MG (CAN) Lewis MacKenzie
First UN Commander of UNPREDEP*

The historical problem related to the Intelligence activity at UN level is centered around the concept of **impartiality**, proper to the organization itself and to its blue helmets. In fact, the Intelligence was always considered as an instrument to empower a Nation State and/or representing “*first line of defence*”; so forth, the concept was in complete antithesis to the impartiality and **transparency** associated to a UN mission. For the reason above, it rose up the issue if have or not a proper Information apparatus for the goodness of the international

¹² A part from the representatives coming from the major TCC like Italy, France, Spain, within the SMC there were elements of the P5 in order to maintain a political control over the mission from the UNSC; Fatemeh Ziai, “A review of the UN Peacekeeping Initiative in 2009,” paper presented at the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations (November, 9 2009), available at: http://www.challengesforum.org/cms/images/pdf/Backgrund%20Study_A%20Review%20of%20UN%20Peacekeeping%20Initiatives%20in%202009_9%20November%202009.pdf.

¹³ Lucia Marta, “The UNIFIL II mission in Libano: the Italian contribution,” Paper for the Elcano Royal Institute of International and strategic studies (2009), available at: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=146423>.

¹⁴ Jacob Ravndal, “Developing Intelligence Capabilities in support of UN operations,” *NUPI report for Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* (2009), available at: <http://english.nupi.no/Publications/Books-and-reports/2009/Developing-Intelligence-Capabilities-in-Support-of-UN-Peace-Operations.-An-Institutional-Approach>.

¹⁵ de Jong, Robert David Steele and Wies Platje, *PKI: emerging concepts for the future* (Oakton Virginia: OSS International Press, 2003), Chapter.1.

system. In particular, both the Commanding officers of a UN PSO and the UN Secretary Generals had often opposed the idea of the PKI development. Specifically, the 1984 UN manual for the *Peacekeeper* stated the firm refuse for the International Organization to enhance an Intelligence system for the peacekeeping missions stressing out the negative consequences of the Intelligence considered too much linked to espionage.¹⁶ This prejudice was reaffirmed strongly by the humanitarian sector of the UN represented by the UNHCR, UNDP or UNICEF worried about their personnel physical security if associated to the intelligence activity.¹⁷

As indicated above, the same parties involved in a crisis area were always suspicious over UN personnel acting as information collectors as well as worried that mission's units could have diffused sensible information to the Mission HQ influenced by a national interests as it was seen during the Bosnia intervention (UNPROFOR). In other contexts, neighbouring countries (i.e. Israel) expressed concerns about the level of procedural protection of UN acquired information and about the necessity to have a structured information system (i.e. UNIFIL D).¹⁸ In the last five years, the United Nations were able to established an information apparatus thanks to the acceptance of a more pragmatic vision regarding the "right war" and the right consequent use of of information assets. Therefore, in order to permit to the UN Security Council (UNSC) to use military action as last resort or to fulfill the mandate assigned to a force by a UNSC resolution, the information capability started to be considered a need for the PSO to:

- Evaluate the necessity of the use of a military force;
- Permit the use of force in accordance with the concept of the right war as described by the UN Chart;
- Re-establish the peace and democracy;
- Protect the *peacekeeper* and the local population;
- Allow specific military operations able to hit the recognised opposing forces;
- Prevent and inform about possible new threats in order to reduce consequently the same military instrument;
- Counter the intelligence activities performed by the conflicting parties and dedicated to stop or undermine the peace process;
- Support the operational planning and the strategic security reform within the crisis areas;
- Favor the implementation of programs like the DDR or SALW.

At the end, it seemed that it was understood the information activity could have enhanced the possibility of success and/or contribute to reduce the same use of the military favoring other processes like the mediation/negotiation. This new approach was the one that is currently developing inside the UN to support the SG as well as the force commanders deployed on the ground.¹⁹

¹⁶ Jacob Ravndal, "Developing Intelligence Capabilities in support of UN operations."

¹⁷ de Jong, Steele and Platje, *PKI: emerging concepts for the future*, Chapter.1

¹⁸ It was always considered the role of the personnel assigned to Intelligence functions within UN and their grade of loyalty towards their Nation State; de Jong, Steele and Platje, *PKI: emerging concepts for the future*, Chapter.14

¹⁹ Ibid, Chapter.6; (Renaud Theunens, the author is a promoter of the JASIC concept – Joint All Source Intelligence Cell, a system able to collect all the information acquired not just by intelligence assets but also by other actors like the CIMIC, PIO, etc).

Thus, the problems concerning the ethics and rightness of the Information action performed during a UN mission it has been addressed, since the new millenium, in a way to highlight the advantages for UN personnel without creating troubles to the impartiality concept of the International Organization. Therefore, the UN leadership identified all the possible activities feasible to differentiate the PKI from the normal Intelligence collection of the National Security Services.

What was considered permissible was called “white intelligence” specified as such:


- Direct *peacekeeper* observation;
- Ground and aerial observation;
- Use of video surveillance sensors visibly and/or acoustic ones;
- Use of IR and X-ray sensors if authorised;
- Collection activities carried out in a visible way by an identifiable UN personnel thorough informants and contacts not considered sources, the latter run by HUMINT operators;
- Use of public documents or open sources.

From the white intelligence it has been well distincted the grey and black activities running across the passive covert surveillance, Human Intelligence (HUMINT), communication interception, the use of confidential documents acquired by covert activities, and clandestine operations.²⁰ In conclusion, it seems that the development of an information capability within a PSO could be accepted, even by the parties in conflict, (this is not the case of the *Peace Enforcement Operations*), when it is directed to the force protection and conducted overtly during the normal peacekeepers’ duties.²¹

Figure 2: Peacekeeping Intelligence Leadership Digest.

²⁰ Walter Dorn, “United Nations Peace Keeping Intelligence” *Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (London: Oxford University Press, 2010).

²¹ The Canadian Intelligence doctrine for PKOs specifies the open modus operandi the iompartiality on the use of the acquired information, the non disclosure of such information to the belligerants or third parties involved. Thelo scopo esclusivoain scope of such intelligence is to understand the military capabilities of the parties to enhance the UN force protection; de Jong, Steele and Platje, *PKI: emerging concepts for the future*, Chapter.18; Ibid, Chapter.17



Advantages of an overt information collection are enormous for UN. In particular, this type of activity is;²²

- More acceptable;
- Not threatening the conflicting parties or the host Nation;
- Less misunderstandable and less dedicated to national interests;
- Useful during the “*confidence building*” process;
- Facilitating the credibility of the same information collected;
- Less time and cost consuming. On the other hand, the *overt Information* presents some disadvantages like;
- A worse protection of the source and consequently a smaller amount of information;
- The identification of weaknesses of the UN contingent;
- The absence of real preventive advantages to be used within the military context;
- The possibility to being influenced by manipulation or disinformation;
- The lack of capability to select the most sensible information to be shared with other Agencies;
- Problems concerning deep analysis. Consequently, the UN have to evaluate continuously the type of information collection from mission to mission to reduce the above problems but taking into account: The “*need to know*” of the UN personnel;
- The approval of the political body of the UN;
- The formal authorization of the parties or the Host Nation;
- The legal implications considering the local or international laws;²³
- The timings and costs behind the development of information capabilities.

²² de Jong, Steele and Platje, *PKI: emerging concepts for the future*, Chapter.19

²³ It is the case of Article 2 of the UN Chart that states: *nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within domestic jurisdictions of any state...except for the enforcement measures under Chapter VII*. This is just to underline how much the UN take into consideration the legal aspects connected with the national sovereignty especially when the intelligence has a role within the environment. In particular, the SOFA (Status of Force Agreement) agreed for the personnel employed within a UN mission has several exemptions but forcing always the peacekeeper to respect all the local laws and rules.

Intelligence Organization at the UN Level

The development of an Information capability, after the several restrictions and disagreements, was possible thanks to the increasing interest among the *Non Alligned Movement* (NAM) and their progressive involvement into the PSO.²⁴ When the opinion of the Secretary General and the NAM positively started to accept the concept of information and to control its evolution within the UN Institutions, like the Secretariat and the General Assembly, it was possible to implement an effective structure.²⁵

Structure – JMAC (Joint Mission Analysis Center)

The Information system supporting the UN missions is centered around the JMAC, created under the Policy Directive of the UN-DPKO dated July 1, 2006 and further specified with the UN-DPKO Policy Directive dated 2010. From both strategic directives followed the *Guidelines* for JMAC published in 2010 as an operational instrument to implement this entity within the *Multi-Integrated Peace Support Operations*. The first directive, stated the possibility for the UN to built up at mission level HQ a *Joint Operational Center* as well as the JMAC. Both Units referring directly to the *Head of Mission* (HoM) through the *Chief Of Staff* (COS) or the Deputy HoM, saw assigned several information, cooperation and liaisioning functions supporting the *decision making process*. Those duties take into account not just all the UN assets deployed on the ground but even non UN local assets or Institutions like NGOs. Specifically, the JMAC become responsible for the collection and analysis activity with the following dedicated actions:

- Information management;
- Information collection in a tempestive, accurate and complete manner;
- Current and basic analysis, development of trends and provisional scenarios;
- Production and distribution of the documents produced.
- Moreover, the JMAC is the unique Unit at operational level to deal with the liaisioning and integrating, where possible, different military, civilian and police information units within the PSO mission.

Finally, the JMAC is placed under the strict monitoring of the mission COS together with the General Inspector of the DPKO at strategic level.²⁶ However, it is a mistake to believe that the JMAC resolved all the issues connected with the Information support to the HoM. In particular, the Unit is extensively affected by several problems concerning the willing of the UN SG to implement its effectiveness. The same figure of the JMAC Chief often represented a limitation of the Unit due to a lack of intelligence expertise or professional management skills. The role of the JMAC Chief is also important if we consider he is in charge to recruit all the JMAC staff after the selection made by the DPKO.²⁷ Some procedures had been developed to improve the quality of the personnel assigned to the JMAC since 2009 like, for example, the development of training courses currently ongoing in Oslo by the *Norwegian Defence International Center* at the *Norwegian Defence and Command Staff College*. The 2010 guidelines focalised on the training process in favor of the JMAC, giving notions about

²⁴ Jacob Ravndal, “Developing Intelligence Capabilities in support of UN operations.”

²⁵ Ibid, Chapter 2.

²⁶ UNDPKO Policy Directive for JOC and JMAC, July 1, 2006, signed by Jean Marie Guehenno, USG/DPKO

²⁷ Clear was the case of the MONUC JMAC Chief in 2006, an academic Professor or the case of the MINURCRAT JMAC Chief, a journalist; Jacob Ravndal, “Developing Intelligence Capabilities in support of UN operations,” Chapter 4.

the intelligence cycle and management as well as the correct information handling and distribution.²⁸

Research and Liaison Unit (R&L)

In 2007 the UN created the R&L at strategic level inside the DPKO. According to some open information this Unit should be responsible for the coordination of all the structures dedicated to the Information activity in favor to the United Nations. Moreover, the unit should also have the task to produce long term strategic analysis for the SG. In order to accomplish such mandate the R&L is focused on:

- OPEN Source Intelligence;
- Collector of all the JMAC reports and producer of a “strategic daily report” for the Secretary General;
- Liaison among several UN Agencies, NGOs, IOs and the same Security Services of the member States.

However, the R&L has still problems about poor qualified personnel assigned as well as a lack of numbers itself (just 4 officers in 2009).²⁹

Assessment Team (A-Team)

This Unit, in a developing phase, should be assigned to cover the strategic Military Information needs to fill the gaps between the information analysis within the PSO context at operational level and the geopolitical scenario, framework of a UN mission. Therefore, the A-Team should be complementary to both the JMAC and the R&L; it should address the *data mining* of OSINT and the liaisoning activities with UN Agencies, Regional actors, member States involved directly or indirectly to the UN mission. So, more than the threat assessment and the production of the indicator of threat list, the A-Team should also produce Regional Special Reports. Specific requirements for the above Military Information Capability already exist within the *Current Military Operations Service (CMOS) of the DPKO’s Office of Military Affairs*. However, the CMOS is working more supporting the tactical level than the A-Team covering the operational-strategic one.³⁰

The implementation of the *Assessment Team* started in May 2009.

The Core of the UN Intelligence, the Jmac in Details

The JMAC studies and analyses the threat level for the mission represented by unconventional factors, non-State actors, sectarianism, the operational environment itself, and the proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

²⁸ Data released by official UN statements regarding the Guidelines for Joint Military Analysis Centres directive, February 1, 2010, signed by Alan Le Roy USG/DPKO, and not for publication due to a classification.

²⁹ The information regarding the R&L are restricted by classification so the data reported had been extrapolated by indirect sources like the one following in note that acquired those data due to direct interviews with UN personnel working into the Unit or within the DPKO. Jacob Ravndal, “Developing Intelligence Capabilities in support of UN operations,” Chapter 4.

³⁰ Jacob RAVNDAL, Developing Intelligence Capabilities in support of UN operations, NUPI report for Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2009, accessed on December 8, 2012. <http://english.nupi.no/Publications/Books-and-reports/2009/Developing-Intelligence-Capabilities-in-Support-of-UN-Peace-Operations.-An-Institutional-Approach/chapter 4>

However, the JMAC is not a mandatory unit for every UN PSO because its constitution has to respect at least four of the below characteristics:

- A preminent military mandate;
- The presence of a DDR program;
- Highly volatile security context;
- Lack of collaboration assured by the Host nation with the UN mission;
- Presence of international actors within the context of the mission or hostile or capable forces;
- Existence of a regional or internal conflict.
- If four of the above bullets exist, the JMAC will be formed after the approval of the DPKO but just in case a proposal comes out from the HoM. In case of an affirmative process, the JMAC structure can vary from place to place according to the mission mandate and the operational environment.

The JMAC is called to provide:


- *Mission Threat Assessments*;
- *Warning notes*;
- *Periodical Awareness Briefing*;
- *Incident Analysis*;
- *Trend Analysis*;
- *Intelligence profiling*;
- *Provisional scenarios*;
- *Risk Mapping through Risk Grading Matrix*.
- In conclusion, the JMAC moves across current information production type, basic one, statistics, early warning information and long term assessments³¹.
- The final distribution, a part from the HoM, is delivered to:
- The *Mission Leadership Team (MLT)*;
- The *Mission Security Management (MSM)*;
- The *UN Country Team (UNCT)*;
- Other Agencies involved in the mission; then, the HoM will use the JMAC documents to prepare his periodical reports to the UN HQ in New York.

Below is a chart released by the DPKO regarding the JMAC (Figure 3):³²

³¹ OSDIFE Course, Peace Keeping Intelligence, Organization of the PKI at UN level, May 2012, University of Tor Vergata.

³² www.un.org

Figure 3: JMAC Structure.



Issues Related to the Intelligence Capability of the United Nations

The Information capability of the United Nations is more dedicated to beneath the international security than to support the national interest of a member State. However, there are several issues about the member States of the UN:

- The no voluntee of some of them to develop and support this capability for crisis response operations especially when the national interest is minimal. This is the case of minor countries or the developing ones not able to exercise a proper foreign policy;
- The fact related to the possible spread of the information acquired in favor of the UN to all the member States; thus, major countries have no interest to provide significant data or just sanitised ones in order to reveal their real intelligence collection's capability as well as analytical one;

- The UN official distrust towards an integrated information system, considered easily manipulated by major States and representing a possible vehicle of disinformation or deception for the DPKO.³³

To the above situation it has to be added the prudery of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) States to implement an effective information apparatus because too much into the hands of the major nations. Moreover, some developing countries not run by extensive democratic systems see the UN information capability as a direct threat against the regime. Within this context the several past rejections made by the NAM states inside the General Assembly towards the constitution of a strategic information system can be understood. Often, the budget issue has been used to undermine each project.

However, several troop contribution States started to manifest the need of a capacity able to provide the general picture of the operational environment of a crisis area at low cost in terms of money, assets and time. Consequently, the process of implementation of such architecture remains connected to the willing of the States participating to a mission and to the sensitiveness of the major world powers.³⁴ So that, it is the concept of “policy gains” that guided some nations to act to organise and finalise the PKI at the UN level; at the forefront there was the Norway that is currently the main responsible of the pre-deployment training for the personnel assigned to the JMAC.

Another issue was specifically procedural and it was defined as “*Institution Resilience*”. In particular, the term refers to the possibility that the countries with the veto right within the UNSC could block initiatives for the constitution of an information apparatus in the framework of an already authorised mission; it refers also to the veto right of the member States of the Advisory Committee on Administrative & Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), the fifth Committee and the *Special Committee on Peace Keeping Operations* of the General Assembly. As a third case there is the possibility for the parties involved in a conflict or for the *host nation* to do not authorize information activities performed by the blue helmet in case of PSO other than peace enforcement. This is specifically the case when aerial surveillance or communication intelligence (COMINT) is denied.

Still within the procedural context, a second issue is given by the “*institutional bureaucratic resistance*” i.e. when the liaison and the information sharing intra-agencies is missing. This situation exists at UN level when non-government organizations (NGOs) for competitive reasons are not providing information to the Head of Mission (HoM) / Special Representative of the Security General (SRSG).

There is also the “*organizational culture*” issue i.e. the already reported ethic dilemma.³⁵ Since the 60ties the internal barriers had been partially addressed when:

³³ See the declarations of a former Military Advisor of the SG, MG Frank Van Kappen, who accused the R&L to have manipulated the perception of the DPKO or the case study of the WMD evidences presented by Colin Powell to justify the need of a military intervention in Iraq, another clear example of manipulation of the UN by a world power.

³⁴ At the moment, countries like USA, UK, France, Canada and the Netherlands as well as the EU Institutions had stated their adversity to an effective Intelligence apparatus at UN level. Jacob Ravndal, “Developing Intelligence Capabilities in support of UN operations,” Chapter 5.

³⁵ Jacob Ravndal, “Developing Intelligence Capabilities in support of UN operations,” Chapter 5.

- Some member States actively interact with the UN at information level for national benefits and interests;
- Some member States evaluated, from place to place, mission to mission, the need to have an information capability within the UN mission or supporting the Special Representatives of the SG.

Another factor that push the UN member States to reach an agreement about the information system for the international security was proposed by some external institutions not related to specific governments or by some important personalities at world level.³⁶ This activity defined as “*Institutional/Individual Entrepreneurship*” is based on reports, papers, studies, policy papers that time by time have influenced the stakeholders at national and United Nation level. A clear example was Patrick Cammaert, Netherland Major General, who as military advisor for the SG and during his duty as HoM of UNMEE, UNTAC, UNPROFOR always lamented an information capability. Still during the Peacekeeping Intelligence Conference held from 2-3 December 2004 in Stockholm, the general officer stressed the importance of developing an information system to be used by the blue helmets.³⁷

Finally, even the external environment was an important trigger during the *cursus historicum* of the Information structure of the UN in both a positive and negative way. In fact, the “*Threat balancing*”, as it is defined this issue, acted exponentially after the 9/11 attacks to increase the threat perception of the terrorism at international level pushing the UN authorities and member States to increase their voluntee to develop an effective Information apparatus still compelling with the impartiality and transparency principles of the UN Charter. This was particularly true for the NAM states more and more involved into the peacekeeping mission context even outside the African continent. It was this specific situation that brought the UN, at the beginning of 2009, to give the green light for the constitution of the A-Team.³⁸

Conclusion

The paper in subject highlights how an information capability at UN level is possible although difficult to implement. Considering the different approach emerged by the developing countries within UN and their increasing involvement into PK missions, who will be in charge to improve the PKI could encounter less reluctant actors while deciding the path to follow. However, a central issue for all the UN policy-makers will continue to see the demistification of The intelligence concept as an unethical and almost dirty activity not affordable by an international organization.

Within this context, the role of the OSINT will improve constantly as well as the liaisoning activity between UN officers and other actors active into a crisis area. A more transparent information about the Information structures developed by the UN could improve the understanding of the importance of this activity by the world public opinion. In fact, the lack

³⁶ Let's think to the Brahimi report or to the figure of the Secretary General that became very important positively or negatively while deciding the constitution of the Information Units. Another example was the *speech* of the Norwegian Ambassador to NATO and former SRSG in Bosnia, Kai Eide, speaking about the need to possess an Infromation structure at UN level in order to be more independent from Regional Organizations like NATO and the several national caveats limiting the effectiveness of the situational awareness and consequently the decision making process.

³⁷ Steele, *PKI Conference in Sweden*.

³⁸ Jacob Ravndal, “Developing Intelligence Capabilities in support of UN operations,” Chapter 5.

of information about those activities and regarding the three main articulation of the information apparatus, is just a way to create more misconcept and misunderstanding about the real benefits coming out by the Information management for the personnel assigned to a UN mission and the key leader of the international organization as well. The transparency principle is a basic rule for the United Nations and could be adaptably applied to the information environment as already done within the same member states (see, for example, the recent developments into the anglosaxon system).

At the end, the Intelligence/Information as “public tool” more than an instrument into the hands of a Government, reaching to achieve national interest not always in line with the public one, is at the basis of the so called “revolution of the Intelligence affairs” important for the development of whatever structure at UN level.³⁹ A new *public intelligence* would be able to guarantee a functional allocation of the resources needed and the efficient decision making process to authorise where, when, how intervene to reestablish the international security. This capability could enhance the centrality of the UN, more and more important since the end of the cold war, limited currently by the expansion of several capacities like the Information management one merely into the hands of the Nation States and given to the UN by specific and particular calculations. Moreover, the latter still remain unwilling to share properly information outside specific known groups like the *five eyes* or the well broadly extended NATO network.

Therefore, the implementation of the PKI will continue to be affected by numerous difficulties due to the costs and the lack of support coming from member states especially the most developed considering the low income and advantages foreseen. Within more regional organizations, apart from NATO, like the European Union (EU) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) / Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) an integrated information capability is easier to achieve although not perfectly structured. It is the global asset of the UN as the international organization that is the main problem affecting the constitution of an effective PKI. The perfect knowledge of this situation at the UNSC level is extremely important when authorizing an intervention into a crisis area and deciding whether to give a mandate to a regional organizations like NATO (ex-Art 53) or to create a blue helmet contingent.⁴⁰

³⁹ “especially important will be our establishment of longer term perspectives that hold policymakers accountable for foolish decisions with very bad consequences far out in the future, and our provision of useful intelligence to the public that will help citizens demand responsible decision-making with respect to public health, the environment, water and energy scarcity, cultures of violence, and other non traditional threats to the future of our children”; de Jong, Steele and Platje, *PKI: emerging concepts for the future*, Chapter 13; (Robert Steele is also a supporter of UNODIN – United Nation Open Decision Information Network- a global network able to collect, analyse and distribute information and documents to provide the needed picture to UN leadership).

⁴⁰ Jacob Ravndal, “Developing Intelligence Capabilities in support of UN operations,” Chapter 6.