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Rodney E. Dillon Jr.

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THE BATTLE OF FORT MYERS

by Rodney E. Dillon, Jr.

The southernmost land battle of the Civil War took place in the isolated backcountry of southwest Florida, far from the bloodstained fields of Virginia, Tennessee, and Georgia. Here, around the Union outpost of Fort Myers, site of the present-day city, Federal and Confederate troops clashed in a day of spirited, if inconclusive, fighting. Although its details have remained a source of contention through the years, this engagement stands as one of the most interesting and dramatic events of the war in southern Florida.

Though most of south Florida’s sparse population initially supported secession and the southern cause, the Federal presence had been strong in that region since the beginning of the war. Two of the largest coastal fortifications in the United States were located at the southern tip of the state—Fort Taylor at Key West and Fort Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas. These strategic facilities had been secured and reinforced before the first shots of the war had even been fired, and they were occupied by Federal troops throughout the war.¹

From the outbreak of hostilities, Confederate sympathy in Key West, then Florida’s second largest city, was resolutely suppressed by Federal military and civil authorities on the island.² In 1862, Key West, which had served as a United States naval base for forty years, became the headquarters of the East Gulf Blockading Squadron, which patrolled the Florida coast from St. Andrews Bay to Cape Canaveral.³ Between 1861 and 1863, forces from the blockading squadron launched raids at Clearwater Harbor, the Pinellas peninsula, Tampa Bay, Charlotte Harbor, and the Manatee and Caloosahatchee rivers. Tampa itself was bombarded by Union gunboats four times, and skirmishes took place at the Hillsborough and Myakka rivers.

Several Confederate units had been recruited from Hillsborough, Manatee, and Polk counties in the early months of the conflict.⁴ As the Confederacy mobilized, however, most of these troops left the area to join the large armies in Virginia and Tennessee. By the end of 1861, it was apparent that south Florida would never be a Confederate stronghold. Tampa was protected by a small garrison at Fort Brooke through much of the war, but the defense of the area to the south was largely left to scattered guerilla bands.⁵
By the second half of the war, south Florida was primarily important to the Confederacy as a supplier of foodstuffs, particularly cattle, for the hungry southern armies. In December 1863, 1,500 head of cattle per week were reportedly driven from the lower part of the state to the armies in the field. Isolated from the mainstream of the war, cut off from natural sea routes by the blockade, and hard pressed by inflation, conscription, and taxation, southern Florida was also a refuge for deserters, conscription evaders, and Union sympathizers. Fort Myers, a Seminole War outpost established in 1850 and abandoned eight years later, was reactivated by the Federal army in January 1864. At the time, it was the only Union base on the mainland of south Florida. The Federal government established such a base to encourage Union sympathizers to enlist, break up cattle drives in the Charlotte Harbor area and as far north as practical, enlist able-bodied blacks in the United States service, blockade vessels with cattle.

These Federal efforts were slow starting, but Fort Myers was an active military post by the spring of 1864. The fort consisted of numerous buildings, including a hospital, commissary building, barracks, bakehouse, wharf, and two guardhouses, all of which were surrounded by pickets and earthworks. Many of the structures remained from Seminole War days, while others were constructed by the new occupants. The wharf, hospital, and officers’ quarters lined the bank.
of the Caloosahatchee River, with other structures forming a semi-circle to the east and south around the parade ground.\textsuperscript{10} The breastworks were seven feet high and approximately fifteen feet wide at the base. They covered a crescent-shaped area extending from just east of the hospital, near the present Edison Bridge, to about 500 feet below the wharf, at present Monroe Street.\textsuperscript{11}

Deserter, evaders, and Unionists who gradually straggled into the fort were at first organized as the “Florida Rangers.” In February 1864, they were incorporated into the Second Florida (Union) Cavalry. Regular Federal volunteer infantry companies from district headquarters in Key West also frequently garrisoned the fort.\textsuperscript{12} Federal troops stationed at Fort Myers systematically
raided cattle from the surrounding countryside, and many refugees who refused to be recruited into the Union army, nevertheless cooperated in these cattle raids. The Union details and refugee bands drove the captured herds down the Caloosahatchee Valley to Fort Myers and then on to Punta Rassa, where they supplied the Federal blockading ships. Punta Rassa soon became a busy enough depot to warrant construction of a wharf and large barracks.\(^\text{13}\) For the Confederates, the situation was serious enough that, on May 21, Florida Governor John Milton notified Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory of the deserters’ “many depredations” in the southwestern portion of the state, “the principal source of meat supply for the Confederate forces.”\(^\text{14}\) During the summer, troops from Fort Myers and Punta Rassa participated in raids far up the Gulf coast.\(^\text{15}\)

Aware of the danger to their supplies, Confederate authorities sought to protect the south Florida cattle herds from Union and deserter raids. If possible, they also hoped to capture Fort Myers. Federal activities in Georgia, South Carolina, and along the St. Johns River thwarted attempts to send Confederate troops from northern Florida into the region in April and May, but details of commissary agents, local pro-Confederate guerrillas, and cattle drivers detached from the South’s Army of Tennessee continued to provide a degree of protection and engaged in occasional skirmishes with Union troops and their refugee allies.\(^\text{16}\)

By the fall of 1864, southern authorities and sympathizers had organized these men into a unique force designed to protect cattle herds, procure beef for the Confederate armies, and combat the deserter problem. This organization, the Cattle Guard Battalion, had the support of officials throughout the area in which it operated, particularly in the vital south Florida cattle country. Efforts were made to recruit all available men for the cattle guard.\(^\text{17}\) Most were local stockmen and farmers who knew the country well and were unlikely to desert since they remained in their home territory where they could look after their own families and property while in the service. The battalion was placed under the command of Major Charles J. Munnerlyn, a regular Confederate officer and former Confederate congressman from Georgia. When Munnerlyn was promoted to colonel in December 1864, William Footman was appointed major in the cattle guard. The Cattle Guard Battalion consisted of nine companies and patrolled a 300-mile line stretching from upper Lafayette County to the Lake Okeechobee region.\(^\text{18}\) It rounded up cattle, defended the coastal salt works, and skirmished with deserter bands and Unionist refugees.\(^\text{19}\)
Despite the valiant efforts of the Confederate cattle guard, Federal blockading forces, occupation troops, and refugees continued to exercise power in south Florida during the second half of 1864 and early days of 1865. By 1865, outcome of the war was increasingly evident, but south Florida Confederates remained determined to continue their resistance and to eliminate Fort Myers, a major source and symbol of Union power in southern Florida.

In February 1865, as the Cattle Guard Battalion was enjoying some success in its battle against deserters and Federal cattle raiders, rumors circulated that Fort Myers was to be reduced and perhaps even abandoned. Naturally, new hopes were raised for the outpost’s capture. Cattle guard forces under Major Footman left Tampa in the second week in February, and began an elliptical march of over 200 miles to Fort Myers. The original Confederate plan was to take the Union fort by surprise. Attacking cattle guard forces consisted of two companies of horsemen from the Tampa Bay area, commanded by Captains John T. Lesley and James McKay, Jr., as well as men from the Peace River area of Polk County, under Captain Francis A. Hendry. Two accounts written later by Confederate participants agree that Footman’s force was made up of approximately 200 men, although the Union defenders of Fort Myers estimated the southern party at 400 or 500. The Confederates were armed with a brass fieldpiece, either a six-pound or a twelve-pound gun. On February 19, they arrived at Fort Thompson, a deserted Seminole War outpost on the Caloosahatchee River between Fort Myers and Lake Okeechobee at present-day La Belle. Here they left their supply train, planning to approach and attack Fort Myers without warning before daylight. Lieutenant Francis C. M. Boggess, who accompanied the expedition, later recalled that “on the night that their anticipated attack was to be made it rained until the water was knee deep over the entire country.”

These conditions slowed the Confederate advance. By early morning, February 20, the southern force, still a few miles from Fort Myers, captured the Federal outside pickets, a corporal and three privates from the Second Florida (Union) Cavalry, on the Fort Thompson Road. The capture of these pickets may have formed the basis for an obviously exaggerated account in which ten Confederate horsemen under Lieutenant William Marion Hendry were said to have captured ten Federal pickets without firing a shot, at Billy Creek on February 19. It is likely that the actual capture did take place at Billy Creek, which runs several miles east of the fort, and that it occurred before dawn on February 20.

Nearing the fort, the Confederates came upon a pond which was used by the Union soldiers and refugees to wash their clothes. This pond was probably located at the corner of present-day Thompson and Fowler Streets. Sighting a Federal laundry detail, the Confederates attacked this position, killing a black sergeant and capturing five other men. They then approached Fort Myers. Sergeant Thomas Benton Ellis, a Confederate participant, later stated that by this time there was still a chance for a successful surprise attack, as the Federal garrison was “not expecting danger.” A Federal officer stationed in south Florida during the war later wrote that the Confederates “arrived near the fort at midday and were wholly unexpected.” However, the fort’s commander, Union Captain James Doyle of the 110th New York Infantry, reported that Footman’s force was sighted a few minutes after noon and that the garrison was “instantly under arms and posted.”
Whether or not the Federal garrison was aware of the Confederate advance, Major Footman abandoned his plans to rush the fort and instead sent in a surrender demand. The presence of wives and children of the refugee soldiers accounted for this decision. Under a flag of truce, a courier carrying the demand, which called for the Union surrender within twenty minutes, approached to within 500 yards of the fort. There he was met by Federal Captain John F. Bartholf of the Second United States Colored Infantry. Bartholf delivered the message to Captain Doyle and returned in five minutes with Doyle’s refusal. Even if the Federals had known of the Confederate approach that morning, the delay caused by the surrender demand gave them further time to prepare resistance, and Major Footman would be severely criticized for this action.

A little over 250 men, including Companies D and J of the Second Colored Infantry, Companies A and B of the Second Florida Cavalry, detachments from the 110th New York Infantry, and armed civilian refugees, guarded Fort Myers. Additional troops were reported absent from the fort, conveying equipment to Federal steamers at Punta Rassa. According to some accounts, Fort Myers was, in fact, being evacuated at the time of the Confederate attack, and all men and supplies were being transferred to Punta Rassa. Captain Doyle’s official report mentioned the supply depot at Punta Rassa but made no reference of any intended evacuation. A preponderance of evidence indicates that at this time the fort was being reduced but not yet abandoned. Apparently because of the reduction, arms and ammunition at the fort were scarce. Captain Doyle reported that there were “not seventy-five serviceable muskets” available between the two companies of colored troops. Ammunition was down to approximately thirty rounds per man, and the only artillery available consisted of two fieldpieces. Thus, the Federal defenders were not much better equipped than their Confederate opponents.

At 1:10 in the afternoon, Major Footman opened fire on Fort Myers with his artillery piece from a distance of approximately 1,400 yards. The Federal guns returned the fire with skill and accuracy, “compelling the enemy to move his battery three times.” A skirmish line composed of men from the Second Florida Cavalry and commanded by Lieutenant William McCullough, then formed a semi-circle around Fort Myers, firing at the Confederate position. A portion of the refugee cavalry dismounted and backed the Federal cannons, which were manned by soldiers from the Second Colored. According to one report, the black soldiers were “in the thickest of the fight” and urged their commanders to let them take the offensive. On horseback, meanwhile, the skirmish line covered the flanks through the bushes and trees from the front of the fort back to the Caloosahatchee River. At the same time, Captain Doyle dispatched six armed horsemen, probably men from the Second Florida, to round up and secure Federal cattle and horses which were grazing outside the fort. The cattle were feeding near the pond where the initial attack had occurred, and because of a shortage of stored feed, many of the garrison’s horses had been turned loose to graze in the surrounding areas.

Although Federal cannon fire had forced the southern gunners to change their position on three occasions, the little artillery duel remained more or less a stalemate. During the bombardment, the Confederates fired approximately twenty shells, with no substantial results. Major Footman, sighting the Union herding party, led part of his force off in pursuit. Two of the Federals were captured, and the remaining four were forced to abandon their mounts in a nearby swamp and escape on foot to Punta Rassa, from where they returned the following day. Upon the approach of the Confederates, most of the cattle scattered in the woods, evading capture; but, seven horses,
in addition to those abandoned by the fleeing herdsmen, were reported missing and were probably seized by the Southerners. At nightfall, Captain Doyle reinforced his skirmish line and directed the men at Fort Myers to remain armed and on alert. Major Footman, sensing the futility of further efforts, ordered his force to fall back. By now, several cattle had been procured by the hungry Confederates who slaughtered and ate them. Following this meal, the southern force resumed their withdrawal through the woods, reaching the Fort Thompson Road some five or six miles from Fort Myers, and camping there for the night. On the following morning, February 21, Footman held a council of war to determine strategy. It was probably at this time that the major, as Sergeant Ellis later reported, lined up his command and proposed returning and launching an open charge on the Federal position at Fort Myers. Footman asked all men in favor of such a charge to stay in line and those opposed to it to step forward. Only one man stepped to the front. Despite this brave show of support, Footman decided to continue the retreat north to Fort Meade, explaining to Sergeant Ellis that no “good general” would risk having his men slaughtered. The deluge of more rain, which worsened conditions in the already flooded countryside, appears to have also been a factor in his decision. Lieutenant Boggess credited the weather with “saving the lives of many,” adding that an attack “would have had no effect on the result of the war.”

That same morning, Captain Doyle, discovering that the Confederates had fallen back, sent out a mounted scouting party, which ascertained that the Southerners were “in full retreat toward Fort Thompson.” As Doyle reported, he “did not have a cavalry force sufficiently strong to pursue them.” It took Footman’s troops all day to reach Fort Thompson; another day was consumed crossing the flooded Caloosahatchee, where only one skiff was available to ferry the entire command. Lieutenant Boggess later stated that “the whole thing had been a failure and with no bread or anything to eat but beef and parched corn. The whole command was demoralized.”

Surveying the former Confederate position, Captain Doyle reported finding “bandages, splints, lint, and hastily constructed litters . . . also pieces of wearing apparel covered with blood, which seems to show that they suffered from our fire.” Nearly one month after the fight, on March 18, the New York Times reported the Confederate loss as “twenty to forty men and several horses,”
but this estimate seems exaggerated. Confederate accounts of the battle fail to mention southern casualties. The Federal defenders lost one man killed and eleven captured, as well as several horses and cattle.41

The military situation in southwest Florida following the attack on Fort Myers was little different than it had been before the fight. The Federal presence in the area remained unchallenged, and Union activity along the Gulf coast continued through the closing months of the war. The little battle had demonstrated that the Confederate cattle guard, while effective in protecting livestock and opposing small-scale Federal and deserter expeditions, lacked the power to dislodge the Union forces from south Florida.

News of the Fort Myers battle, which reached Key West late in the evening of February 21, spurred the launching of a Union amphibious expedition up the Gulf in the succeeding weeks. A stated objective of the campaign was “to cut off the force of the enemy sent to the Lower Peninsula.” By February 25, when the expedition sailed into Cedar Key, it was evident that this would be impossible. After the retreat from Fort Myers, the companies comprising Footman’s cavalry force had separated and returned to their local cattle guarding duties. The dispersal of the Confederate force in south Florida destroyed Federal hopes to crush entirely resistance in that region, but, by demonstrating the difficulties sparse southern forces were having covering the large area, it convinced Union commanders of the feasibility of an alternative plan—an attack on middle Florida from St. Marks. Following the defeat of this Federal offensive at the Battle of Natural Bridge on March 6, the northern soldiers returned to their posts in south Florida, and Ft. Myers was disbanded.42

Despite the abandonment of the fort, the last weeks of the Civil War brought little change to south Florida. The Cattle Guard Battalion continued its efforts to protect the area through the spring, but even the most staunch Confederates appeared resigned to the fact that their cause was lost. For most Floridians, the surrender at Appomattox on April 9 signalled the end of the war, and the last Confederates in south Florida formally surrendered on June 8.43

Fort Myers once again lay deserted by soldiers and civilians alike. In the months immediately following the war, settlers from as far away as the Manatee River and the Pinellas peninsula sailed down the coast in small sailing vessels and dismantled most of the fort’s buildings. They brought the wood back with them to rebuild homes, barns, and fences which had been destroyed in the bitter guerrilla fighting which had characterized the war in southwest Florida. Within a year's time, however, settlers returned to the Caloosahatchee Valley, this time to stay.44 Although Fort Myers ceased functioning as an actual fort, it had played a small but unique part as the site of one of south Florida’s most notable battles, the southernmost land battle of the Civil War.


8. H. W. Bowers to George Drake, August 6, 1864, p. 405.


11. H. W. Bowers to George Drake, August 6, 1864, p. 405.


18. H. W. Bowers to George Drake, August 6, 1864, p. 405.


22 Ellis, “Diary,” p. 10; Boggess, Veteran of Four Wars, p. 69; Doyle to Tracy, February 21, 1865, OR, ser. 1, vol. XLIX, part 1, p. 53.

23 Boggess, Veteran of Four Wars, p. 69.


25 Grismer, Story of Fort Myers, p. 81.

26 Doyle to Tracy, February 21, 1865, OR, ser. 1, vol. XLIX, part 1, p. 54; Boggess, Veteran of Four Wars, p. 69; Fort Myers News-Press, October 4, 1979.


28 Doyle to Tracy, February 21, 1865, OR, ser. 1, vol. XLIX, part 1, p. 53.


30 New York Times, March 18, 1865; Doyle to Tracy, February 21, 1865, OR, ser. 1, vol. XLIX, part 1, pp. 53-54; Grismer, Story of Fort Myers, p. 82.

31 Doyle to Tracy, February 21, 1865, OR, ser. 1, vol. XLIX, part 1, p. 54, John Newton to C. T. Christensen, March 19, 1865, pp. 61-62; Grismer, Story of Fort Myers, p. 82.

32 Doyle to Tracy, February 21, 1865, OR, ser. 1, vol. XLIX, part 1, p. 54; New York Times, March 18, 1865; Boggess, Veteran of Four Wars, p. 69.

33 Doyle to Tracy, OR, ser. 1, vol. XLIX, part 1, pp. 53-54; New York Times, March 18, 1865.

34 Doyle to Tracy, February 21, 1865, OR, ser. 1, vol. XLIX, part 1, pp. 53-54; Boggess, Veteran of Four Wars, p. 69.

35 Ibid.


37 Boggess, Veteran of Four Wars, p. 70.

38 Doyle to Tracy, February 21, 1865, OR, ser. 1, vol. XLIX, part 1, p. 54.

39 Boggess, Veteran of Four Wars, p. 70.

40 Doyle to Tracy, February 21, 1865, OR, ser. 1, vol. XLIX, part 1, p. 54.

41 Ibid., pp. 53-54; New York Times, March 18, 1865; Boggess, Veteran of Four Wars, p. 69.


43 Ellis, “Diary,” p. 11; Boggess, Veteran of Four Wars, pp. 72-74; Newton to Christensen, June 10, 1865, OR, ser. 1, vol. XLIX, part 2, p. 984.
Grismer, *Story of Fort Myers*, p. 86.