

## Book Reviews

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## Book Reviews

***Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5.* By Christopher Andrew. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009. ISBN 978-0-307-26363-6. Illustrations. Notes. Appendices. Sources Cited. Index. Pp. xxiii, 1032. \$40.00.**

Christopher Andrew of Cambridge University is the author of fourteen previous books and is noted as Britain's leading expert on the history of Intelligence. His reputation for scholarly expertise in that field led Britain's Security Service (MI5) to grant him the unprecedented archival access necessary to write this work marking MI5's 2009 centenary. The result is 851 pages of printed text with another few hundred pages of notes, many of which contain narrative that is informative in its own right. In short, this is a detailed history of the Security Service, at times highly entertaining and informative, always even-handed and well-written, but nonetheless a tome that is not for the reader with merely casual interest in the subject.

From its inauspicious beginnings in 1909, the organization that ultimately took the nomenclature MI5 found its compass throughout World War I. The threats of German military espionage and invasion plans at that time were highly overrated since there existed only a German naval espionage network in Britain, yet the Secret Service Bureau, as it was then known, performed admirably in stemming the flow of secret information. In the postwar era, focus shifted to the Bolshevik threat, and by 1924 MI5 "began unraveling the first major Soviet espionage network to be detected in Britain" (152). Throughout those early years, however, various government agencies jockeyed for primacy in the realm of counterespionage. One important case in 1931, in which it was discovered that Scotland Yard's Special Branch had been penetrated by Soviet intelligence, led to the mission of "countering civil as well as military Communist subversion" being transferred to MI5 (159).

Successes against Soviet penetration were mitigated starting in 1934 with the Soviet recruitment of Kim Philby. He and four others, known as the Cambridge Five because of their association with that university, probably comprised the most competent group of spies ever recruited by a foreign intelligence service. Their access was so great and the information provided by them so valuable that a paranoid and suspicious Soviet intelligence apparatus at one time concluded they were double-agents. The resultant, clumsy mishandling of them diminished their usefulness somewhat.

After a rough start in the run-up to World War II, when the Foreign Office largely rebuffed MI5's intelligence warnings of Hitler's true intentions, the agency went on to win its greatest victories when extensive deception operations met unprecedented success. Nazi spies in Britain were quickly rounded up, neutralized, or used in "Double-Cross" operations. One of the most interesting and unusual deceptions was Operation Mincemeat, in which a cadaver dressed as an English soldier was deposited off the coast of Spain with a briefcase stuffed with disinformation chained to its wrist. The seemingly outlandish ploy was swallowed fully, causing the Germans to shift troops to Greece to counter an anticipated invasion actually destined for Sicily. Similarly, so effective was the deception operation surrounding the D-Day invasion that the Germans kept twenty-two divisions tied up near the Pas de Calais in anticipation of the *real* invasion by the non-existent First U.S. Army Group.

The early Cold War period took some wind out of the sails of MI5's deception operations against Britain's former ally. In classic British understatement, one high-ranking official opined that "it would be extremely difficult to 'do it again' on the Russians" (318). The 1951 defections of two of the Cambridge Five further reduced the prospect of successes. Instead, success in ferreting out Soviet agents came as a result of VENONA, the painstaking and lengthy deciphering of thousands of intercepted Soviet messages sent between 1940 and 1948. Some of the startling revelations were the level of Soviet penetration of the United States' own Office of Strategic Services—forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency—as well as of high levels in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Administration. But, despite some successes, the West continued to struggle against Soviet intelligence initiatives throughout the Cold War. It was not until 1971's Operation Foot that Soviet espionage operations were severely and more or less permanently disrupted in Britain by the mass expulsion of known or suspected intelligence officers.

Andrews not only traces the growth and development of MI5, but the political and legal climate that fostered it. Home Office Warrants, for example, permitted the monitoring of mail and telephone intercepts, yet that prerogative and many of the powers with which the agency was invested had no basis in law. Still, the government was slow to react, and it was not until the late 1980s that legislation was passed to authorize the surreptitious entry of premises and eavesdropping measures.

Andrews also discusses the role of women in the organization, first as key secretarial staff and much later as operatives in the surveillance branch. Women eventually were permitted to handle agents starting in 1978, and by 1992 a woman was appointed to head MI5. Andrews also pays some

attention to the social atmosphere within MI5 and the class backgrounds of its members. Apparently it has traditionally been characterized by a genteel environment, with one 1953 recruit being told that one of the best things about working there was that "the percentage of bastards is extremely low" (832).

Perhaps one of the most interesting chapters is entitled "The Transformation of the Security Service," in which he describes the 1990s move out of the shadows into public view, including the first open advertisement for recruits in 1997. As his description of events moves into more recent years, Andrews acknowledges that MI5 was a latecomer to the threat of Islamic terrorism. Once aware, however, extensive counterterrorist experience with the Provisional Irish Republican Army likely allowed MI5 to step out smartly on the issue of homegrown terrorist threat. Operation Crevice successfully warded off attacks against several public venues. Returning to earlier techniques, MI5 today maintains regional offices responsible for close liaison with local police. Interestingly, Andrews attributes some modern systemic deficiencies in intelligence operations to something he terms "Historical Attention Span Deficit Disorder" HASDD (849). In essence, that is a failure to appreciate the events of the past, to learn from them, and to avoid the same mistakes in the present time. He perceives a "greater continuity between past and present threats to national security than is often supposed" (850). While acknowledging that some future threats will be unpredictable, Andrews contends that security services will be best served with a long-term perspective based on knowledge of the past.

Overall this is a first-rate historical treatment of one arm of Britain's intelligence apparatus. The book is comprehensive in its treatment of the subject—so much so that this brief review can do little justice to its scope—and despite being officially sanctioned by MI5, it is impartial and fair, displaying beauty marks and warts alike. It is a book well worth the read, both as an interesting story and in an effort to reduce our own HASDD.

*Edward J. Hagerty, Ph.D., Book Review Editor, Journal of Strategic Security.*

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***Red November: Inside the Secret U.S.-Soviet Submarine War.* By W. Craig Reed. New York, NY: William Morrow Publishers, 2010. ISBN 978-0-06-180676-6. Maps. Photographs. Notes. Index. Pp. 386. \$27.99.**

In W. Craig Reed's *Red November* he sets out to produce a history of the US-Soviet Submarine operations starting with USS Blenny's (SS-324) foray into post-World War II submarine espionage through the public outing of cable tapping operations in the mid 1980s. Writing a coherent narrative involving vignettes covering over thirty years of operations involving thousands of sailors and national security professionals is difficult, and in the end, the author mostly succeeds.

In *Red November's* introduction, Reed acknowledges Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew's *Blind Man's Bluff*, published in 1998. The Sontag/Drew book was released with plenty of publicity, appeared on "60 Minutes," and was a *New York Times* bestseller for several weeks. Reed notes that the book was not only informative and interesting, but also substantially accurate. Nonetheless, he criticizes the book for lacking detail about the top-secret Holystone and Ivy Bell programs and admonishes the authors for the exclusion of two programs, Boresight and Bulls Eye. Therefore the expectation is that his book, given an additional decade of time, would be a more comprehensive account of the events over that time period. What frustrates the reader is *Red November's* rehashing of events documented in *Blind Man's Bluff* without adding significantly to the research in this field. As you read the book, what jumps out at the reader is that this variance in depth of research is driven primarily from the author's own experience. The author's father served a key role in two aforementioned programs (Boresight and Bulls Eye) that *Blind Man's Bluff* ignored. William J. Reed served as Master Chief and eventually as a Lieutenant at the Navy Security Group (NSG) in Washington DC, and the chapters concerning his career are the most detailed in the book.

Highlighting another problem with the book is this dubious problem of injecting the author into the narrative of a history. Early in the book we track the author's father's rise with the NSG from the shores of the Bosphorus to the installation of many of the Boresight stations globally. It reaches its climax with the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the author's extensive interviews with both American and Soviet sub commanders build a unique narrative and is the highlight of the book. He honors the participants on both sides for their professionalism and bravery in the face of impossible situations. Additionally, the highlight of LT William J. Reed's life is described in detail, when in the heat of the crisis he personally briefs President John F. Kennedy. This shift from unique, interesting discus-

sions of well-documented events (Cuban Missile crisis from the Soviet submarine commander's point of view) to the loving tribute to the author's father is jarring to say the least.

Pacing is another problem with the book. Certain events, like the Cuban Missile Crisis and the events leading up to it, are described in minute detail in 150 pages, but then the narrative glances over a decade of history in fewer than fifty pages. In this overview of the late 1960s and early '70s, he quickly includes the most controversial of events in the conflict, the sinking and attempted recovery (by the US) of *K-129* and the sinking of the *USS Scorpion*. Many books have been written about these events, but *Red November* highlights only a handful of facts: the late arrival of a damaged *USS Swordfish* in Yokosuka after the *K-129* sunk off Hawaii and some cause and effect rhetoric that implies that the *Scorpion* was sunk in response.

The author served in the US Navy in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a Fire Technician and diver-photographer aboard submarines. Again the narrative becomes focused and detailed, this time on deep-sea diving and salvage, and on a deck plate view of life aboard a submarine. This section also describes the beginning of the installation of decompression chambers and swimmer delivery vehicles on submarines to add in intelligence gathering missions conducted underwater. While *Blind Man's Bluff* focused more on the submarine operations from the Captain's chair, *Red November* goes into details of the actual diving operations, including a scary story of a collision with a Victor III off Vladivostok.

Throughout *Red November*, the effect of spies on the conflict is highlighted, a point that was somewhat missed in *Blind Man's Bluff*. The Walker spy ring is the most famous, and for a reason: an isolated Chief Warrant Officer with unsupervised access to reports from Boresight and other programs was able to show the Soviets the degree to which the US was able to track their submarines, thereby reducing the West's nuclear advantage. Another spy, Ronald Pelton, was instrumental in revealing the existence of the underwater recording pods installed on Soviet communication lines. The fact that the Soviets spent only several million dollars on a handful of spies in order to usurp billions of dollars spent in research and development in underwater technology is staggering to contemplate.

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The chief criticism of the book is not of what is actually on the page, a family's history in the Cold War aboard submarines; the problem lies with the way the book is marketed as being more comprehensive than it is. I would recommend it for historians of the Cuban Missile Crisis or those interested in deep-sea diving and salvage; the rest of the book reads like an abridged version of the superiorly-researched *Blind Man's Bluff*.

*Lieutenant Commander David B. Gray, USNR.*

***Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis.* By Richards J. Heuer, Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2011. ISBN 978-1-60871-018-8. Pp. 343. \$52.95.**

Everyone likes to talk about intelligence analysis, but very few are involved in doing it; and of those few, only a handful know how to do it well, and an ever fewer number have acquired an overview of the entire intelligence community. This book is by two persons who have been involved in intelligence analysis their entire professional careers; and who, having reached the heights of the intelligence establishment, are able to look across the entire community and recognize its strengths and weaknesses.

To start with, Richards Heuer is the author of *The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, still one of the greatest classics of intelligence literature. Randolph Pherson spent more than twenty-eight years at CIA doing intelligence analysis. Both are involved in a multitude of training and education efforts for the intelligence community.

*Structured Analytic Techniques* can best be described as a handbook of practical methods of intelligence analysis. It is a "how-to" book. It is immediately obvious to the reader that this guide is based on years of experience by persons who have on a daily basis used these techniques.

Each chapter describes one tool, and each tool is laid out in exactly the same way. There is a discussion of when to use the tool, the value that it adds to the analytical process, the potential pitfalls that might be encountered by a team, followed by a precise discussion of the methodology itself. When useful, there are a variety of sample figures showing how the data in the method is organized and presented. Each chapter wraps up with a brief discussion of how the method relates to other techniques, and then a summary of the origin of the technique. Each section also contains useful outside references, including sources of supporting software.

The discussion on the origin of the techniques always amazed me. These techniques are borrowed from some of the strangest places, such as the ancient legal briefs used for the "argument mapping" tool. There is no pride of authorship in intelligence analysis; no matter where a technique comes from, if it is useful, it is used.

One of the key techniques is the "Analysis of Competing Hypotheses" (ACH) technique. This is a core tool that has been developed over the years. The book comes with pointers to free ACH software that can be downloaded to aid the student (or researchers) in using ACH. Pherson



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Associates is also working on a "Te@mACH" product that will enable analysts from different locations to participate simultaneously in an ACH exercise.

Approximately fifty different analytical techniques are presented and described in detail. They are divided into eight general groups: decomposition and visualization (Gantt charts, process maps, network analysis, mind maps, etc.); idea generation ("starbursting," brainstorming); scenarios and indicators; hypothesis generation and testing (deception detection, ACH, argument mapping); assessment of cause and effect (outside-in thinking, prediction markets; role-playing); challenge analysis (devil's advocacy, What If? analysis, high-impact/low-probability analysis); conflict management (adversarial collaboration, structured debates); and decision support (force field analysis, pros-cons-faults-fixes, SWOT). In addition, at the end of the book is a giant overview chart that shows how these different techniques fit together and interact with each other.

The book ends with a thoughtful essay on intelligence reform and the need for better use of tools, particularly collaboration among different teams.

*Structured Analytic Techniques* should be on the desk of every single person involved in intelligence studies. Professors, students, practitioners, even policymakers should each have a copy. The techniques illustrated in this book should be a lingua franca of every trainee, and familiarity with them should serve as the entry point for anyone interested in intelligence.

*Edward M. Roche, Ph.D., J.D., Henley Putnam University.*

***The Iraq Effect: The Middle East After the Iraq War.* By Frederic Wehrey, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Jessica Watkins, Jeffrey Martini, and Robert A. Guffey. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2010. ISBN 978-0-0883-4788-5. Figures. Tables. Notes. Sources cited. Pp. xxviii, 187. \$40.00.**

The ongoing Iraq war is now in its seventh year with no end in sight. Endless policy debates, media barrages, second guessing, and speculation have created so much "white noise" that strategists, policymakers, commanders, and decision makers have an overwhelming overload of information to process. Into this breach the RAND Corporation, under the auspices of Project AIR FORCE, offers *The Iraq Effect* to cut through the discord and cacophony to offer a range of analytic solutions. The book examines the "Iraq effect" in terms of how the 2003 U.S. invasion has impacted local pro-Washington regimes, anti-terrorism initiatives, and Iranian influence in the Middle East. The authors discuss the myriad issues confronting the U.S. and then offer a bank of solutions to help steer Washington's defense and national security policy deliberations forward.

The authors discuss how the removal of Saddam Hussein from power upset the regional balance of power between Iran and its Arab neighbors. While Saddam was feared, hated, and not trusted, his presence kept Iran at least partially contained in the minds of the Gulf rulers. With Saddam's fall from power, Gulf Arabs began to perceive that Iran now had less restraint in its regional attempts to spread Shi'a influence and doctrine throughout the Middle East.

In the face of resurgent Iranian regional intentions, Gulf regimes have responded in various ways: some have attempted to engage Iran, some have hedged their bets, and others have tried to balance their foreign policy objectives between Iranian and U.S. interests. This is due to a duality of perception between the "bad Iran" and the "good Iran." The "bad Iran" is a destabilizing factor, which seeks to forward its interests in Iraq, the Gulf, and the Mediterranean. The "good Iran" is the one that defies the U.S. and Israel. Although Gulf states are wary of Iran, they are also uncertain of U.S. intentions. They fear that while Washington currently has an antagonistic relationship with Tehran, they also fear that the U.S. may eventually affect a rapprochement and leave their Gulf allies adrift. Due to this perception of mixed signals, the Gulf states also look to Russia (for political alliances) and China (as a customer for energy security) as potential strategic partners, not to replace Washington, but rather to augment it.

From the Arab viewpoint, the U.S. got sidetracked in Iraq, and this gives the Gulf sheikhdoms some latitude in the area of human rights and domestic liberalization (prior to the Iraq war, Washington was pushing its Arab allies to liberalize, democratize, and emphasize human rights). With the Iraq effect, Washington seems less interested in human rights and more interested in regional balances of power vis-à-vis Iran. As the U.S. places more equity into counterterror initiatives, Arab allies find that emphasis a convenient way to get more U.S. funding, as well as justify human rights oversights in the names of fighting extremists.

Washington's Arab allies view the U.S. desire for democracy as a destabilizing factor in the region. They point to Iraq's partisan and sectarian violence being, in their eyes, a result of U.S. democratization efforts, and they do not want that same instability in their own countries. Over two million Iraqi refugees have flooded into Jordan and Syria, stressing the socioeconomic infrastructures of both countries. This has led to more stringent immigration laws in Damascus and Amman. It has also caused the largest refugee crisis in the Middle East since the 1948 war that created the state of Israel and caused a series of Palestinian refugee crises.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq was initially a boon for al-Qaida (AQ) in that AQ could use the presence of foreign military forces to garner support and rally a defensive jihad against occupying crusaders. Over time, however, AQ's brutal tactics, bloody modus operandi, and indiscriminate attacks against civilian targets alienated many would-be supporters. Shi'a insurgents, supported by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), have realized great strides in their technological innovations of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) ambush techniques.

The authors offer a variety of recommendations for the U.S. The first is that Washington pursue a strategy that allows regional allies to hedge their bets with Iran while simultaneously encouraging positive Iranian behavior. This recommendation takes into account the understanding that collective security based on the structures that formed Cold War alliances will not work in this new paradigm.

The authors also suggest that Washington engage in confidence-building measures and multilateral security to provide a buffer between Iran and its Gulf neighbors. These measures would include counterterrorism and counter-narcotics initiatives, as well as maritime security agreements. The authors also recommend an indirect line of communication between Israel and Iran, which is unrealistic and naïve.

A solid recommendation is for Washington to renew and strengthen its ties with Ankara. This serves a number of strategic purposes: U.S.-Turkey ties were very strong before the Iraq war and have suffered since 2003. A renewal of those ties would serve the interests of both countries. Turkey could also serve as a communications bridge to Syria and Iran if needed. Stronger ties with Beijing and Moscow are also advocated as possible means to build alliances in the region based on mutual interests.

The authors encourage Washington to push for political reform in the Arab world, yet at the same time caution that many regimes in the region use counterterror initiatives to justify human rights abuses. They also support the notion that Washington should provide assistance to Iraqi refugees to generate good will. The final recommendation is for the U.S. to engage in a strategic communications campaign to highlight AQ's failures in Iraq.

*The Iraq Effect* is a solid analysis of where the U.S. is in Iraq and where it should go from a policy standpoint. It has more utility for the strategic planner than for the tactical decision maker. Its analytic approach is ideal for intelligence analysts and planners, but is less utilitarian for operators or tactical decision makers.

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