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Gender and the Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention

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This article addresses the implications of recent gender research for the definition of the crime of genocide and our understanding of it as an historical process. It proposes that gendered violence is a central defining component of the crime. Going beyond a discussion of rape and sexual violence, it argues that a gendered understanding of atrocity in general offers important tools for an early warning system that should be incorporated into the research methodology and reporting strategies of the United Nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC), human rights organizations, and government agencies and intelligence services. Briefly examining the cases of Darfur and Srebrenica, the article demonstrates how gender-neutral conceptualizations of the crime fail to recognize and adequately account for the specific sorts of violence that are often the most immediately indicative of the crime of genocide, and how this failure can inadvertently contribute to or perpetuate strategies of genocide denial.

Key words: gender, sexual violence, women, early warning, prevention

Gender-based violence, particularly mass rape, has become a core element of scholarly, legal, and activist approaches to genocide over the past ten years. There are many reasons for this, including the ubiquity of sexual violence during the Bosnian, Rwandan, and Darfur genocides; the activist efforts of international feminists; the existence of women judges on international courts; and key legal findings, particularly the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s (ICTR) Prosecutor v. Akayesu decision, which established the myriad ways in which sexual violence can be a tool of genocide. This article will explore some of the less-developed implications of gender-sensitive research for future study of the subject. I will focus principally on how gender research can productively engage our understanding of genocide as a historical process, how it can contribute to our conceptualization of the groups being targeted, how it can shape ideas of perpetrator intent, and, finally, how it can impact the way we define the crime. The upshot of the discussion presented here is that a gendered understanding of atrocity offers important tools for an early warning system, tools that should be incorporated into the research methodology and reporting strategies of the United Nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC), human rights organizations, and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as government agencies and intelligence services.

The study of gender and genocide began with the study of women, whose particular stories had been largely excluded from scholarship on the Holocaust and genocide up to the 1980s. Since then, the process of inclusion has not been an easy one. Bringing women back into the narrative required scholars to argue for the material relevance of women’s experiences. For doing this, they were at first sometimes accused of fomenting unnecessary discord between the sexes—as if the horror of genocide made gendered inquiry somehow irrelevant or even unseemly. Then, as gender research became more accepted by mainstream scholarship, feminist inquiry was occasionally accused of
ignoring altogether the suffering of men and boys as well as the participation of women as perpetrators of genocide. Unfortunately, such criticisms of feminist approaches to conflict studies have tended to place gender analysis within a competitive framework, in which the respective fates of men and women are weighed in accordance with their perceived severity. Just as feminists once argued (rather indisputably) that women’s lives were being ignored by male scholars, critics of feminist scholarship began to argue that men’s fates were now being ignored it turn.

It has been crucial, of course, to unearth men as gendered subjects too, in order to fully understand the complex ways in which gender informs the genocidal process. Of particular importance has been Adam Jones’s work on the ways in which men, especially civilian men of “battle age,” are victimized in times of genocide. In “root and branch” genocides they are often the first group to be separated out and massacred, paving the way for the murder of women, children, and elderly men. In more common articulations of genocide, however, they can be the only group slated for outright massacre, while women, children, and elderly men suffer a range of alternative fates involving rape, sexual exploitation, torture, forced maternity, murder, and expulsion. Equally important has been the attempt to bring to light the ways in which women are perpetrators of genocide. This latter subject in particular requires greater empirical and theoretical development. However, despite drawing attention to these very important lines of inquiry, namely the victimization of men and the role of women in perpetrating genocide, critiques of feminist inquiry have had a tendency to reject or ignore the gendered relations of domination permeating all levels of patriarchal society, and informing therefore the context in which male victimization and female perpetration occur. The subtle argument sometimes seems to be that (civilian) men suffer the worst fate because they are so often targeted for direct killing. This position casts men and women as two opposing sides within a single victim group, and overlooks thus a key characteristic of genocidal violence: the targeting, through various means, of relations of affinity within victim groups in order to render these groups vulnerable to eventual elimination as historical agents.

Focusing in particular on the supposedly harsher fate of men can and often does have the effect of once again marginalizing the experiences of women. Moreover, this action tends to lead to definitions of genocide that prioritize the “strictly murderous dimension,” usually understood as outright massacre, above all else. This seriously underestimates the severity of rape and other forms of sexual torture during genocide, their life-long effects, and the number of women and girls who die over time as a consequence of sexual violence. One side-effect of the competitive framework model in genocide studies, then, could be the failure within the genocide prevention community to apprehend genocidal processes in their early stages, before arriving at mass murder; it could also unproductively muddy the waters in cases where women and children have been “allowed” to continue living after suffering severe trauma, intended by the perpetrators of genocide as part of an overarching plan to destroy a group.

Thankfully the study of gender has now become an established and respected subfield within the genocide studies community, and competitive frameworks are gradually giving way to more sophisticated analyses appreciative of the fact that the power of gender analysis lies not in prioritizing one victim group over another, but in helping us to better understand the crime and better devise protocols for preventing and responding to it. It is therefore a propitious time to begin to draw out the implications of gender
studies for our broader understanding of genocide as a process: its roots, its immediate causes, its shape, its aftermath, and ultimately, its definition.

Although it is often assumed that gender research is limited to the stories of women, or to sexual violence, the gender question in genocide goes well beyond the experiences of women and girls, the perpetration of gender-based crimes (against both men and women), or even the comparative study of the experiences of men and women. Rather, it involves examining the network of gendered relationships that go into creating groups, whether in the objective world or in perpetrator subjectivity, and how ideas about creative power inform annihilative violence. Gender follows the crime from its long-term origins to short-term facilitators, to immediate indicators, to intervention, to justice, and to reconstruction after the fact. The gendered study of genocide therefore involves considering the simultaneous operation of gender within several different layers that contribute to the perpetration of the crime. These layers include the gendered concepts through which perpetrators understand power; the gendered ways in which they define both their own group and the group(s) they are targeting; the gender dynamics that organize the economic, political, social, and familial spheres within perpetrator and victim societies; the gendered strategies pursued in the course of group destruction; the influence of gender on conceptions of self and on experiences of conflict among perpetrators, victims, bystanders, and witnesses; the gendered nature of international representations of and responses to a conflict; the use of gender in propaganda and in denial strategies; the gendered inflection of justice systems; and so forth. With the exception of extensive studies on the Holocaust, most of these topics have yet to be researched in great detail.

The growing number of gender-sensitive studies of genocide has added tremendously to our understanding of the crime and has challenged some of our thinking about its definition. Gender in fact goes to the very heart of the crime of genocide. Because gender studies raise questions about the biological and cultural reproduction of groups, the construction of group identities, and the formation of perpetrator ideologies and perpetrator intent, any study of genocide in one way or another addresses gender, whether explicitly or implicitly. Because gender considerations open up for reflection the horrifying details of the crime scene, they also force us to reconstruct and catalog with excruciating specificity the crimes that were committed against each single member of a community and demand that we think anew about the nature of the crime. When considering all these things, genocide begins to emerge as in fact a highly gendered crime.

Bringing the Women (and the Men) Back In

Most recently, the study of women and genocide has tended to focus on the phenomenon of mass rape. The genocides in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur have forced the international community to change the way mass rape is perceived and understood. In each case mass rape was clearly used as a systematic tool of genocide. After much lobbying by feminists and women’s NGOs—such as the authors of the CUNY Clinic Memorandum and the participants in the Women in the Law Project (WILP) of the International Human Rights Law Group—ad hoc tribunals began to prosecute rape as a war crime, crime against humanity, and a crime of genocide, establishing important legal precedents that were incorporated into the statute of the ICC. The full and dramatic story of the surfacing of rape as a serious international crime in the past two decades has still to be written, but several shorter studies have sketched its general outline.
The near ubiquity of mass rape during genocide raises important questions about its historical origins, perpetrator intent, and, ultimately, about what constitutes the crime of genocide. As Cynthia Enloe pointed out almost two decades ago, “We cannot completely understand any war—its causes, its paths, its consequences—unless male soldiers’ sexual abuse of women on all sides is taken seriously, described accurately, explained fully, and traced forward and backward in time.” The same could be said of genocide. Focusing on rape in genocide puts gender-based violence front and center in our analysis, pointing in new directions both forward and backward in time. It highlights a common experience of women victims, drawing their reality into our representations. The implications of this for genocide studies have only begun to be explored.

Although we commonly refer to “rape” in the singular, there are many crimes of rape that happen during genocidal processes. There are those rapes that are not part of an overarching plan but are instead the consequence of opportunity and impunity (often referred to as wartime rape); there is systematic mass rape, forced maternity, rape as a means of murder, and sexual torture, gang rape, coerced rapes between family members, sexual mutilation, forced prostitution, sexual slavery, rape in rape camps, women forced to “marry” génocidaires, and so forth. We need to be specific in the way we speak of sexual violence during genocide, examining each case and each type for its particular relationship to genocidal intent. The purpose would not be to rank types of rape in terms of degrees of severity, but rather to better understand the words and actions of different groups of perpetrators so that we can begin to interpret rape’s multiple functions during genocidal processes. Complicating our view of sexual violence, and understanding the implications of this for research on the origins and the function of mass rape during genocide, has the potential to yield important insights into its perpetrators.

For example, to the extent that it has been addressed, it is generally assumed in cases of genocide that the rape of women and girls in the targeted victim group is a secondary phenomenon to the ideological hatred of the group: that genocidal ideology came first, followed by the use of rape as one tool among many. In many cases, such as the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda, mass rape was indeed both systematic and intentional—implemented from the top down for the purposes of destroying the Bosniak and Tutsi communities as such. In other cases, however, such as the Armenian Genocide, new research has suggested that much of the sexual violence attending the genocide was not centrally directed or part of the genocidal plan, but that certain perpetrators may in fact have joined the killing voluntarily, not out of a general hostility to Armenians but primarily because it gave them license to commit rape. According to Henry Theriault, in certain cases “rape was not a tool of genocide; genocide was a tool of rape.” This would mean that a violently masculinized atmosphere of impunity might be a strong recruitment strategy available to génocidaires.

If indeed some (and the Armenian case would suggest many) men can be recruited to commit genocide because it provides an extended opportunity to commit rape and other sexual tortures against women and girls, then the history of genocide will also have to be written within the framework of violent masculinity and patterns of violence against women more generally. As Theriault has noted, “If a preexisting structure of gender domination and violence can contribute to genocide, then intervention against gender domination and violence might help prevent or at least mitigate genocide by undercutting the ability of the main perpetrators to execute their plans.” Gender-based violence will not simply be an aspect in the story of genocide itself, but also a key
component in how we understand the emergence of genocidal ideologies and societal vulnerabilities over the longue durée. A central question of this research would be whether there is a specific kind of violent masculinity—symbolic or actualized in the physical world—that makes societies more receptive to genocidal ideas.

Even in cases where much of the rape is committed outside the bounds of a direct order from superiors, there are in almost all genocides specific sorts of rape that involve the intentional brutalization—and often, subsequently, the murder en masse—of entire families and communities. These ritualized forms of rape as total destruction raise two important questions. First, in what ways might the historical investigation of specific types of masculinity help explain the co-incidence of genocidal ideology among the architects of genocide and the genocidal rape rituals of foot-soldiers in instances where there has been no specific training or indoctrination ordering rape? Do some perpetrators interpret genocidal language and policies in terms that encourage the performance of genocidal rape rituals? The second question raised by these genocidal rape rituals concerns what, exactly, the perpetrators are targeting. Rape, when used as a tool of genocide, targets women both as individuals and as members of a specific group. Two threads from peacetime thus weave their way into the tactic of mass rape: group hatred and misogyny. The history of genocide should explore the contribution made by each to genocidal ideology and implementation. But there is yet another apparent target to genocidal rape, and that is life-giving. The elaborate rape rituals and ritual rape spaces that perpetrators create are potent symbolic spaces in which to enact the annihilation of a people. Usually going beyond the rape and gang-rape of individual women, genocidal rapists prey on the social context in which they find their victims, exploiting the symbols and relationships available to them to intentionally exert maximum damage to the woman or girl, to the community, to the group’s regenerative capacity, and perhaps even to its invisible spirit. Thus, in genocidal contexts we frequently encounter cases of public rape, particularly in front of family members, as well as instances of rape coerced between family members, rapes involving sexual mutilation and torture, and rapes attended by the murder of a victim’s family members. The intention seems to go well beyond compromising the physical and psychological ability of women and girls to carry children. It seems to puncture—to wound—that invisible space inside a woman’s body, the source of the group in the first place. Could that be the message transmitted by the perpetrators’ use of sharpened sticks to rape and kill Tutsi women during the Rwandan Genocide in 1994?

As some perpetrators seem to know, when female victims are allowed to live, the consequences of sexual violation extend well beyond the genocide. The long-term physical, psychological, and socio-political effects of wartime rape are well-known, though still in need of further study—particularly in terms of remediation. Protocols need to be created to address the specific circumstances of genocidal rape and related atrocities. In many cases women rape victims are rejected by their families and communities, are unable to find work, and remain left to raise children born of war alone and in abject poverty. We also know that in post-genocide societies women face increased vulnerability to rape, sexual exploitation, and domestic violence from their old tormenters, from other perpetrators still walking free, from international peacekeepers, from liberating armies, and from men in their own communities and families. There is even some evidence that the sexual abuse of children increases after genocide. Explanations for this trend range from the wartime brutalization and humiliation of men to the persistent
patriarchal dehumanization of women, and to the culture of impunity that comes with the breakdown of traditional social institutions and mores. Each of these suggests a different shape and chronology to the history of genocide than we might assume, should we fail to take women’s stories into consideration.

This is especially true with regard to where we decide to locate the end of the crime in our narratives. Women continue to die long after genocide from suicide, honor killings, HIV, and other illnesses that are the direct result of genocidal atrocities including rape. They are frequently ostracized from their communities and completely alone in the world, raising children born of war, or caring for children orphaned in conflict. Women in post-genocide societies are often very poor, lacking access to jobs, resources, land, and basic services. Although in places like Rwanda post-genocide conditions can offer new opportunities for female political engagement, by and large women survivors of genocide are marginalized from their own communities and from public life. For those women whose children were killed in front of them (often because they were trying to protect their mothers), the genocide never truly ends. Choman Hardi has written, regarding women survivors of the Anfal Genocide of Iraqi Kurds, “For the women in this research, the aftermath of this catastrophe is as much a part of the Anfal story as the facts and figures that make up the grand narrative.”

Bringing women back into scholarly representations of genocide favors those definitions of the crime that do not limit the genocidal element to physical killing. Women and girls often die as a consequence of gang rape and sexual mutilation, but they are less frequently slated for direct massacre en masse. Given the apparent ubiquity of mass rape during genocide, even during the Holocaust, it is hard to see how we would carve off this aspect of the crime as inessential to our genocide determinations. And yet this is what often happens, as is the case with Bosnia. Definitions that focus too much on massacre—mass bodies, mass graves, distinct moments of mass murder—erase almost completely the history and experience of women victims and therefore obstruct deeper and more penetrating understandings of the crime.

To include women’s experiences in our definition of genocide is to recognize something that the perpetrators of genocide have known for centuries: that one can destroy a group by destroying that group’s ability to reproduce. What this means in each instance will differ according to the perpetrators’ specific beliefs regarding reproduction and the way in which they define their target group, but it is not unthinkable that future genocides might be committed primarily through the use of sexual violence and related atrocities. Some of the fighting forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo seem already to be implementing strategies that resemble genocide-by-rape.

The social aspect of genocide thus takes on an added importance when we consider in particular the way that so many women victims have experienced it. Definitions that include concepts like “social death” (Daniel Feierstein), the destruction of “social power” (Martin Shaw), and “the interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members” (Helen Fein) incorporate (in my opinion) the ground-level realities of this crime for men and women, boys and girls, individuals, families, and collectivities much more effectively that those definitions that get caught up in the numbers and the identities of those killed. They come closer to capturing what this crime essentially is, and arguably remain, as Martin Shaw has argued, more true to the spirit of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) and the work of Raphael Lemkin.
Research on the mass rape of women during conflict, and the attention now being paid to this phenomenon by policymakers and NGOs, has gradually also brought out new evidence regarding the frequency of rape, sexual exploitation, and the sexual torture of men. Treating women as gendered subjects of history has amplified the level of attention paid to men as gendered subjects as well. This has made it possible for researchers and the international community to perceive male civilians as victims in entirely new ways, outside of the image of impregnability favored by militarized masculinist and nationalist narratives. Scant existing research on male victims of wartime (and genocidal) rape and sexual torture suggests that the post-genocide experiences of these men are very similar to those of women victims. Clearly, then, we need to factor the experiences of both men and women survivors of rape into our understanding of the crime and into the protocols we devise to address its long-term effects.

All of this points to a key feature of sexual violence during genocide: that it is intended to desecrate the ways that members of collectivities—male and female—are bound together and thereby to permanently destroy their capacity to rebuild themselves as stable and active collective agents in human history.

**Reading Genocide from the Bottom Up**

One thing that becomes apparent when we centralize gender-based violence during genocide is just how multifarious (and creative) are the means by which perpetrators engage in the destruction of a group. Culture-specific studies of all those tiny-but-essential details of the crime scene need to be undertaken in order to round out our understanding of genocide. As the discussion thus far has indicated, the rape of women during genocide is attended by multiple other crimes committed against the women themselves and their family members, many of whom are men. Taken together, these make up what I have called “life force atrocities”: that is, ritualized atrocities targeting the life force of an entire group by destroying the physical integrity of its individual members, the emotional and spiritual bonds that exist between family members, and symbols of group cohesion, such as religious and intellectual leaders.

If we understand genocide as the intent to destroy a group specifically by destroying its source of life, the shared pattern of cruelties that we see in practice across genocides would begin to make more sense. Gendered studies of genocide must therefore go beyond gender-based violence—including rape and sex-selective massacre—to truly grasp the extent to which ideas about gender are implicated in the crime. When communities are assaulted by forces with genocidal intent, individual members are usually targeted based on their (perceived) symbolic status within social and biological group reproduction. These perceived statuses are unequivocally gendered: men are assaulted as protectors, fathers, husbands, heads of families, political leaders, religious icons, leading intellectuals, past, present, and future patriarchs. Women are assaulted as mothers, wives, daughters, bearers of future life, protectors of children, providers of food, and so forth. The stereotypical gender roles that determine the exact nature of life force atrocities will vary with respect to the cultures committing the genocide, and perpetrators will draw on their own emotional and social experiences when devising ritual tortures, but by and large we can identify patterns across various different instances of the crime.

By giving us the means to begin to identify some of these gender relational atrocities during genocide, research on gender has also given us powerful tools to read genocide from the bottom up. This may be one of the greatest contributions it has made to genocide prevention efforts. Because gender operates in ways that are often unspoken,
Gender research requires that we interpret the nature of the forces and processes we study through myriad means that go well beyond the language of the actors involved. In a genocidal context, such a method involves searching for patterns that may not be immediately evident and certainly are not clearly articulated by perpetrators.

Such a contextualized approach was taken by the US Atrocities Documentation Team (ADT), sent in 2004 to refugee camps in Chad to document the experiences of survivors of the violence in neighboring Darfur, Sudan. The genocide determination that resulted from this research, while not explicitly based on gender criteria, was sophisticated in its understanding of the multiple ways in which gendered strategies, specifically widespread and systematic sexual violence, can be exploited and deployed by perpetrators in committing the crime. Interviewers in the field even updated the code list of crimes printed on the ADT questionnaire to account for things like mosque burning and the disembowelment of pregnant women. The ADT methodology seems to have signified a return to contextualized understandings of the crime, considering the experiences of victims and the ground-level behavior of perpetrators alongside statements by the purported architects and the general political and historical context of the conflict. The latter two elements—statements by leaders and macro-political contexts—have dominated debates about genocide in the past decades, largely because they are assumed to more clearly indicate the presence or absence of what counts as “genocidal intent.” The price of an exclusive focus on large-scale, elite, largely male, and highly reflexified phenomena is that the substantive experience of the victims—who occupy the space in which genocide occurs and are the bodies on whom the crime is committed—becomes lost in a sea of abstractions. As a consequence of this form of debate the term “genocide” is often treated as little more than a political or legal label, rather than something real in and of itself.

Rituals targeting people specifically in terms of gender and family roles are defining characteristics of violence in Bangladesh (1971), Bosnia (1992–1995), Rwanda (1994), Sudan (the past decade), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (the past decade and a half). In every commonly recognized case of genocide we can find these scenarios in the testimony of survivors. Perpetrators seem to have uncannily similar ideas about what most deeply and terribly destroys a person, a family, a community, and a group. So we need to better understand what lies behind these rituals. And we need to find ways of using these rituals to ask new questions about the crime we are studying. The stories, often told by solitary survivors, are, in all their horror, also gifts. In them, perpetrators overplay their hands; they risk letting us in on their secrets, on the deeply seated and perhaps only vaguely recognized reasons for their terrible actions.

Unfortunately, human rights reports frequently fail to contextualize crimes and instead tend to disaggregate related crimes according to the gender and sometimes the age of the victim. We will be told that X number of men were killed, and X number of women raped, with special mention of the murder and rape of small children and the elderly. It is essential that we find ways to bring the narrative link between atrocities back into our statistical reporting strategies, since this genocidal narrative can help us identify genocidal intent among perpetrators.

Gender and Genocide Determinations
Localized life force atrocities seek to destroy a deep cohesion within family units that, during genocidal processes, stand in for the cohesion of a more extensive group. Recognizing this logic can help us to begin making determinations that start with the facts on
the ground, using the UNCG as a guide to the organization of these facts, without relying on our own abstract interpretations of its wording to make the case. Daniel Feierstein made this point quite elegantly when he wrote, regarding the question of genocide against political groups, that “the crime is not defined by the identity of the victim . . . but by the characteristics of the material action which is carried out.”

A good deal of pertinent information concerning this material action can be unearthed through gender-sensitive research, creating maps of affinity and atrocity to help us understand what perpetrators might have thought they were doing. Even in cases where the objective target of genocide was a political, social, or economic group, we know that génocidaires tend to view their victims as organic collectivities and persecute families based on the alleged status of one of its members. In Argentina (i.e., during the Dirty War, which has just recently been analyzed in terms of genocide), for example, Interior Minister General Diaz de Bessone framed the target of state violence in the following way:

Founding a new republic is no easy matter. . . . The armed forces must be sufficiently alert, determined and resourceful to act simultaneously as an efficient fighting force against guerrillas and terrorists; an efficient surgeon that will remove the evil from all social classes and walks of life; and last but not least, parents of the new republic, strong, united, just, free, supportive of others, clean, exemplary. . . . But it is only fair to point out that since no national project was outlined beforehand, little has been achieved so far to accomplish the remaining objectives, which are to defeat not only the guerrillas but subversion “in toto,” so laying strong foundations for the birth of the new republic.

As Feierstein points out, the general is here framing the counterinsurgency as a war on the “forces of evil,” as “a clearly defined ‘surgical operation’ on previously defined sections of the population whose disappearance is meant to have an ‘irreversible’ effect on Argentinean society.” There is a gendered link between this plan to achieve the partial destruction of the Argentinean national group by carving out its “evil” and “subversive” elements and the atrocities committed against “suspect” families and networks. Judging from Díaz de Bessone’s understanding of the conflict, these families were the cosmic and reproductive opponents of the new national family to which the armed forces—“parents of the new republic”—were supposed to give birth. The torture of family members was a way for junta members to perform—in a site-specific, localized way—the broader genocidal intent to excise the generative units of opposition from the nation. It is as if annihilating one family makes room for the birth of the new, national family. The co-incidence of statements like the one above and a pattern of life force atrocities strongly suggests genocide, even when all the reports have yet to be written; all the individual human lives have yet to be murdered; all the bodies have yet to be buried and, if found, exhumed and identified and counted. Promptly identifying these crucial indicators would be one way of recognizing the potential for genocide within what is thought to be a brutal counterinsurgency.

Interior Minister General Díaz de Bessone’s preoccupations are shared by most perpetrators of genocide. These preoccupations include biopolitics, family dramas, the generative power of violence, and the use of familial terminology to describe political parties. In such cases, the armed forces, the party, the executive branch of the state, or the individual torturer plays the role of the generative unit—the parent—giving birth to
something new and better through the total destruction of other generative units, not simply in physical terms, but affectively and spiritually as well. The precise relationship of these life force atrocities to cases of genocide needs to be investigated in more depth. We should be curious about why the parental theme crops up so much in the language of the architects of genocide. Is it merely a byproduct of their embrace of the rhetoric of extreme nationalism? Or do they see or experience their killing as an act of creation akin to fathering children?

Whatever the case, since there is such a strong correlation between the existence of life force atrocities and the existence of a genocidal logic to violence and persecution, attentiveness to these crimes can help us avoid the pitfalls created by the constraints imposed through the four protected categories in the UNCG, namely, “national, ethnical, racial and religious” groups. Before trying to determine whether the victims conform to these criteria, it might be more useful to determine whether people are being subjected to the types of atrocities that are common during genocides, especially before there are high numbers of dead.

Focusing on the presence of gendered atrocities and identifying those patterns in them that are correlated most directly with genocide would provide another empirical means of identifying situations in which genocidal violence is present, without having to make an airtight argument for the existence of genocide in its comprehensive and totalizing sense. We may even be able to identify potentially genocidal cadres within armed forces, or among the supporters of specific political parties, by documenting who has engaged or is engaging in ritual atrocities that appear to target a group’s life force. If a small group of people, whether part of an armed force or not, commits life force atrocities during occupations, riots, communal violence, or more limited patterns of warfare, these actions tell us something important about how things might progress and offer up new and crucial research agendas involving chains of command. At the very least, we will know better who to watch in order to prevent the generalization of specific atrocities into genocide somewhere down the road.

Identifying potentially genocidal violence in its early stages is important for many reasons. Genocide, unlike conflicts with more limited and strategic goals, is a type of violence that has ever-expanding horizons once it becomes the organizing principle of a conflict. History has shown that perpetrators tend to enlarge their list of targeted victim groups as their power and reach grow. Furthermore, societies and groups that have faced genocide in the past have required particular sorts of interventions after the fact, both to rebuild a social fabric whose core institutions were targeted for destruction and to prevent the re-ignition of genocidal violence, either by the old perpetrators or by descendants of the victims.

### Gender and Genocide Denial: Darfur and Bosnia

Apart from the clear benefit of gender analysis to genocide prevention mechanisms, rethinking genocide in gendered terms can help cut through some of the ideological layering that has made genocide determinations so particularly fraught since the 2003 US war in Iraq. The current political debate about the use of the term tends to cluster around a few controversial cases, notably Bosnia and Darfur. These cases are accepted as genocides by the vast majority of genocide scholars, but opposition to the use of the term has come from high places and has been quite visible and vocal. Much of this opposition comes from the left of the political spectrum and is a direct response to what is considered to be a double standard used by the United States and its allies in their
deployment of the term. These works show little concern for the evidence and none for the experiences of the many victims in these regions. Genocide is merely a label here.

More seriously, the political scientist Mahmood Mamdani, in his work on Darfur, has argued against the applicability of the term genocide largely because he believes that those advocating for its applicability to the situation there are not using the term consistently; if they did, he argues, they would also use it with reference to Iraq and Afghanistan. There are many threads to Mamdani’s argument, and in making it he offers a serious and enlightening study of the historical dynamics of identity and conflict in Sudan. His book seeks to show that the conflict in Darfur should more properly be considered a counterinsurgency, not unlike the wars being waged by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. Mamdani’s book, however, is surprising in its failure to take seriously the atrocities suffered by the victims of Janjaweed attacks, even if he does not consider these crimes to amount to genocide. When we begin to look at the nature of the atrocities committed in Darfur the differences between counterinsurgency as such and genocide become clear. What matters so much is not the objective, or even the subjective, definition of the groups of people involved, but rather the excruciating detail with which perpetrators go about destroying everything sacred and meaningful to their victims, particularly family bonds. This takes Darfur beyond any reasonable characterization as counterinsurgency + generalized atrocity. In Darfur, as in Bosnia, the death toll may fall well short of the mass killings that attended key twentieth-century genocides; nevertheless, the focused assault on generative symbols and relations of affection and loyalty—all those deep recesses of the human heart and soul—is evidence of genocide that I find most difficult to refute and which ultimately makes the case for the applicability of genocide in both instances.

Mamdani relies quite a bit in his argument on the report of the UN’s Commission of Inquiry (COI), which found the same evidence as the US Atrocities Documentation Team but came to the conclusion that the crimes did not amount to genocide; yet this too is not dispositive. The COI used a very limited definition of genocide, confining it to cases in which the intent is the annihilation of a group in its entirety.

The ADT discovered a systematic pattern of attack that was sustained across hundreds of villages in Darfur, involving encirclement by mounted Janjaweed militias, strafing and bombing from Antonov bombers and helicopters belonging to the army of the Government of Sudan (GoS), murder and disappearances of men and boys, sexual exploitation of women and girls, and the wholesale destruction of property and food and water supplies. Mamdani does not engage with these findings analytically or explain why they do not point to genocide, as argued by the US Department of State legal team. Indeed, he dismisses one of the key findings in both the ADT and the COI investigations that—in concert with all the others—seems to point most directly toward genocide: evidence of systematic mass rape. To critique the inclusion of this charge in the ICC arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir, who is charged with conspiracy to commit genocide among other things, Mamdani writes, “To claim that ongoing rape in the [internally displaced person] camps is the result of of official government policy is to ignore the simple fact that rape occurred in all camps, those controlled by the government and by the rebels.”

Mamdani’s statement about rape is misleading. In his efforts to normalize and depoliticize the conflict in Darfur he has ended up undervaluing, indeed entirely neglecting, the stories of women and girl survivors, which are so valuable precisely because
they give us access to the behavior of perpetrators during the moment of attack. Simply because rape occurs in many different contexts and is committed by many different types of men does not mean that mass rape by one particular group, such as Janjaweed militias or GoS soldiers, is not itself part of a genocidal strategy. But, even more important than such an obvious point is the narrative framework in which these atrocities take place. These were frequently not rapes in the generic sense that Mamdani seems to use the term. Survivors of the attacks in Darfur describe a multi-pronged strategy of attack on villages in which rape occurred alongside a host of ritualized atrocities all aimed at destroying the life foundations of a group—the family unit, the connection to land and community, and the future social and biological reproduction of the group. These atrocities included eviscerating pregnant women, raping women and girls in public, mutilating victims of rape and sexual violence, raping women and girls with sharp objects, killing infants (especially infant boys), murdering men, humiliating and torturing village leaders, and cruel performances involving family members, all while screaming racist epithets at the victims.41

These types of atrocities are common to all other genocides and place Darfur clearly within the ranks of genocidal violence. These atrocities share a genealogical link with the type of violence that has attended every other known case of genocide in past centuries. When such atrocities all begin to point toward the five elements of the crime enumerated in the UNCG,52 then a working genocide determination seems entirely reasonable.

The key to understanding how gendered violence and life force atrocities work together in a genocidal strategy is of course to examine how they contribute to the destruction of the group as such. A recent work in criminology, Darfur and the Crime of Genocide, makes fruitful use of the ADT interviews to reconstruct the crime scene in several settlements in Darfur, generating data for shifts in the family size of respondents as a consequence of the attacks and creating charts of the age and gender of people killed and missing. On this latter point, the authors discovered that the groups with the greatest number killed (and missing) were composed of young men between the ages of 15 and 29 and girls between the ages of 5 and 14. They note that “about a third of both the young adult males and the preadolescent girls are represented among the dead or missing.”42 This suggests that young men were not simply being killed as potential combatants, a common defense against genocide charges; the presence of such a high number of young girls alongside the high number of young men seems to point to an attempt to destroy the ability of the group to organize and reproduce itself in the future. When placed along other evidence of atrocity patterns and more macro-level indications of intent, such crime scene statistics are invaluable.

Gender data underscore the importance of empirical evidence in making genocide determinations. Overarching schemas and analytical abstractions cannot replace this evidence in our attempts to understand the genocidal process or make determinations about its existence. Legal, political, and rhetorical arguments can be made to support all sorts of positions in regard to the crime. The debate about its nature goes right back to the debates about the wording of the UNCG. This is why the ADT’s atrocity statistics are such an important innovation in the struggle against the crime. They allow us to navigate through the heavy storm of ideology and politics and enter the moment of victimization. By categorizing crimes that together are suggestive of genocide, they offer us an empirical means of determining whether what we see could in fact be—or become—the crime of crimes.
As Mamdani and others emphasize, it is true that in Darfur a great number of women and children have been allowed to survive after experiencing or witnessing rape, murder, and the destruction of their families and communities. The absence of the annihilation of most members in some villages targeted (though many villages were completely destroyed) challenges one of the most common working definitions of genocide: genocide as mass killing. Defining genocide simply as mass killing, however, becomes very difficult when one takes seriously the issue of gender and gender-specific acts of violence. Studies that have considered the experiences of women and girls alongside men and boys have shown that a common pattern in the early stages of genocide is the systematic execution of male members of a community alongside the terrorization, sexual exploitation, torture, and expulsion of women, children, and the very old. When we limit our definitions to killing alone we can end up artificially separating processes that are part of the same phenomenon.

The consequence of this could be that massacres of men and boys are defined as genocide, while the attendant rape, torture, and expulsion of the women and girls who were their mothers, wives, children, girlfriends, colleagues, and so forth are either ignored entirely or described as something other than genocide, such as ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or uncategorized atrocities. This approach is clearly inadequate and inaccurate, for it is unlikely that perpetrator intent can be broken up in a similar fashion. Furthermore, the evidence contained within witness testimony shows time and again that perpetrators understand quite well the meaning and function of peoples’ family and community relationships and that they appear to intend to use these relationships in gender-determined ways in order to destroy a group. Nevertheless, the survival of women and children—even when they have been forced out of a territory—is often indicated as evidence that the sex-selective massacre of men and boys cannot be construed as genocide, since the community was not slated for physical annihilation in its entirety. This latter approach assumes that genocidal massacres must include victims of both sexes indiscriminately in order to prove intent. It also potentially underestimates the long-term destructive trauma caused by systematic and intentional harm to the expelled women and children as well as the effect that the massacre of men and boys can have on a community’s reproductive capacity.

The best example of a case that has raised the two issues above is the 1995 Srebrenica massacres of over 8,000 Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) men and boys by Bosnian Serb forces under the command of Ratko Mladic. These massacres were determined by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to constitute genocide. Its finding was upheld by the International Court of Justice.43 As in the case of Darfur, most genocide scholars view the Serb war in Bosnia to have been a genocidal assault on Bosniaks. Even when the status of the war as a whole is in doubt, scholars tend to accept Srebrenica as an instance of genocide. However, because the ICTY has been conservative in its use of the term, and because the nebulous concept of “ethnic cleansing” has confused characterizations of the war in Bosnia as a whole, Serbian attacks on Bosnian populations between 1992 and 1995 have not been determined in a court of law to fit the definition of genocide. This has opened up ample space for confusion, and one rarely sees reference to the “Bosnian Genocide.” The conflict in general is instead referred to as ethnic cleansing and civil war. With the exception of the massacres at Srebrenica after 13 July 1995, most of the atrocities committed by Serbs in the
course of the war have been punished as crimes against humanity and war crimes rather than genocide, with public perception following suit.

Paying attention to the experiences of women and the gendered dynamics of the Serb onslaught on the UN safe haven can help us maneuver through this difficult definitional terrain. When we examine from a gendered perspective what went on in Srebrenica from the fall of the enclave on 11 July 1995 to the forced relocation of women, girls, and very young boys two days later (an occurrence that directly preceded the start of the massacres), we can see that there are several threads connecting the massacres at Srebrenica in 1995 to a systematic Bosnian Serb policy that had been pursued since the outbreak of war in 1992. The case of Srebrenica in fact demonstrates how important it is that we consider the testimony of women survivors of violence in making our determinations about what is and what is not genocide, and in thinking about which conflicts are likely to have genocidal outcomes. Their testimonies, because they are often the lone survivors of massacres, offer us evidence that is just as important as final body counts in establishing genocide and genocidal intent. Specifically, their testimonies can establish a systematic pattern of atrocity aimed directly at the institutions, symbols, and relations of reproduction as well as the biological capacity to reproduce.

Two examples of the testimony of women survivors demonstrate the kinds of life force atrocities that were committed in Srebrenica before the massacres. Ramiza Gurdić gave the following testimony to the Dutch law firm Van Diepen/Van der Kroef, which is representing the surviving victims of the Srebrenica massacres in a suit against the Government of the Netherlands and the United Nations for failing to protect civilians in the UN safe haven:

At one time, I saw how a young boy of about ten was killed by Serbs in Dutch uniform. This happened in front of my own eyes. The mother sat on the ground and her young son sat beside her. The young boy was placed on his mother’s lap. The young boy was killed. His head was cut off. The body remained on the lap of the mother. The Serbian soldier placed the head of the young boy on his knife and showed it to everyone. . . . The woman was hysterical and began to call out for help. . . . The Serbs forced the mother to drink the blood of her child. Chaos broke out among the refugees. 44

Another survivor, Munira Štabašić, tells us,

There was a girl, she must have been about nine years old. At a certain moment some Chetniks recommended to her brother that he rape the girl. He did not do it and I also think that he could not have done it for he was still just a child. Then they murdered that young boy. 50

These are just two of many stories describing specific atrocities witnessed by survivors of Srebrenica. Rarely, however, do such stories work themselves into narratives and analyses of the crime. Certainly, they are not part of dominant images of the Srebrenica massacre. The fact is that during the two days preceding the evacuation of an estimated 23,000 women and children many women and girls as young as nine were raped by Serb forces. They were frequently killed afterwards. Young girls and boys, including infants, were murdered, often by having their throats cut in front of their families. Pregnant women were eviscerated. Boys and men were picked out of crowds of families seemingly at random, dragged off never to return. These atrocities—targeted
as they were at family bonds—need to find their way into scholarly, legal, and public images of Srebrenica.\footnote{53}

We need to know details surrounding the separation of women and men before the Srebrenica evacuations and deportations because they demonstrate the extent of relational and familial persecution carried out by the perpetrators. This, in turn, would suggest that Bosnian Serb forces sought to compromise and destroy the most important unit of group cohesion: the family. These are not instances of random and excessive violence perpetrated in a madhouse. The atrocities committed against family members—\textit{in front of one another}—are some of the strongest indicators of genocidal intent. They suggest something much more malicious than an attempt to rid Serbian forces of a military foe. Indeed, they conform to several elements of the crime as articulated in the UNCG. These atrocities only come to light in the testimony of those who survived, the majority of whom are women and girls. The stories and their implications are not considered by legal scholars who argue against the finding of genocide in the case of Prosecutor \textit{v. Krstic} tried by the ICTY.\footnote{45}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The specific types of atrocities committed in Argentine prisons, the Srebrenica enclave, and villages in Darfur could serve to specify exactly which atrocity crimes have a high risk of turning into genocide.\footnote{46} The Srebrenica massacres, for example, came on the heels of over three years of violence and ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Bosnian Serb forces against Bosnian Muslims, including several special forces that seem to have operated with orders from Slobodan Milošević in Belgrade.\footnote{47} We can trace back from the atrocities committed in Srebrenica on 11 and 12 July 1995 to similar atrocities committed in eastern Bosnian towns from April 1992 through July 1995. The atrocities we see in Srebrenica can also be linked to atrocities in the various Serb-controlled concentration and rape camps that operated in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. When we draw lines from one atrocity to another across time and space we begin to see the dense tapestry of genocide in Bosnia above and beyond the evidence provided by single cases of massacre, murder, rape, and ethnic cleansing. It therefore becomes difficult to cordon off the Srebrenica massacres as only one case of genocide within a wider war characterized by other things.\footnote{48}

Atrocity statistics that are sensitive to the contextual frame in which discrete crimes are committed point to the usefulness of an approach to genocide that understands the crime spatially, not only in terms of the geography of the attacks, but also in terms of the geography of atrocity. Data and maps (similar to Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s for Darfur) could be created for those specific types of atrocity that have a high correlation with the crime of genocide. If, early on in a conflict, we could see a map of the specific types of atrocities reported by witnesses—such as public rape or the evisceration of pregnant women—this would help onlookers determine whether a conflict might be threatening genocide and, if so, which participating group or cadre is of particular concern to the international community. If we could begin to correlate the specific types of atrocity that are highly suggestive of genocide with specific ways of envisioning reproduction, women’s sexuality, men’s power, and so forth, we may begin to tease out the very specific types of thinking—genealogies of atrocity—that can lead to genocide way down the road.

In our new century most of us will probably be drawn into a terrible position as witnesses to genocide, if only by virtue of the international media. The first and most
fundamental question is, How can we know genocide before it announces itself with mass graves, and how can we aid others to identify genocidal situations in crises and conflicts at an early stage? A great deal of work has been done on this already, but we are still at the beginning of an effort to develop effective early indicators, as is evidenced by the endless debates over definitions that followed the US recognition of genocide in Sudan in 2004. By considering the small, yet momentous, gendered details in the space of genocide—such as the pre-massacre killing spree of 11–13 July in Srebrenica and similar atrocities committed by Serb forces in Eastern Bosnia for three years beforehand—we can refine what it is we are looking for, with ramifications both for the ways that we define genocide and work toward its prevention. To borrow from Jacobo Timerman, the stakes are, as they always have been, nothing short of rescuing civilization as we know it from those who would bring about the disappearance of the universal, human family.  

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**Notes**

1. I would like to thank the editors of this volume, as well as Benjamin Forgey, for their vital comments and help in the editing of this article.


4. See, for example, Adam Jones, “Does Gender Make the World Go Round? Feminist Critiques of International Relations,” *Review of International Studies* 22.4 (1996): 405–29 and Jones, “Gender and Ethnic Conflict in Ex-Yugoslavia,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17.1 (1994): 115–34. Although Jones is sensitive to and aware of the multifarious ways in which women are victimized in genocide, his definition of the crime, based on Steven Katz’s, depends on the crime of murder and therefore does not incorporate mass rape as a central, determining, element: “[Genocide is] the actualization of the intent, however successfully carried out, to murder in whole or in part, any national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups are defined by the perpetrator, by whatever means.” My emphasis. See Jones, *Genocide*, 18.

5. A comprehensive synopsis of this work can be found in Jones, “Gendering Genocide,” 465–9.


I am borrowing the “relational” designation from Jones, “Gender and Genocide,” 25.

A recent example of this tendency is Edward Herman and Scott Peterson, John Hagen and Wenona Rymond-Richmond, There are many reports on the speci Mamdani, For information on the ADT and the COI see especially Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen, ed., For a rudimentary treatment of this theme, see Elisa von Joeden-Forgey, See for example atrocities witnessed by Jacobo Timerman and related in Feierstein, I am borrowing the contextual approach, see Martin Shaw, “Neglected Foundations: Genocide as Social Destruction and Its Connections with War,” in What is Genocide?, Shaw rightly credits Helen Fein with continuing Lemkin’s tradition of incorporating a wide range of destructive social and biological policies and actions into a definition of genocide.


There is a great deal of work emerging on this topic. See for example Norman Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010).


Ibid., 505.

See for example atrocities witnessed by Jacobo Timerman and related in Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number, trans. Toby Talbot (New York: Knopf), 146–58.


Mahmood Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror (New York: Double-day, 2009), 63.


Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors, 271–2.

There are many reports on the specific atrocities committed by the Janjaweed and the Government of Sudan in Darfur. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan,” in Sudan 16,5 (New York: HRW, 2004).


49. Timerman, *Prisoner*, 149


52. The five elements are as follows: “(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” See *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, 9 Dec. 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, Article II, [http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/357?OpenDocument](http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/357?OpenDocument) (accessed 14 Feb 2012).

53. One of the few scholarly studies of the experiences of survivors of Srebrenica—most of whom are women—is Selma Leversdorff, *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide: The Women of Srebrenica Speak* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 2011). Her work demonstrates how important it is that women’s experiences be taken seriously in efforts to define and understand mass atrocity.