Much has been written about the impact of Cuban Americans on U.S. policy toward Cuba. From scholarly and journalistic accounts a portrait emerges of a single-minded ethnic enclave whose power has commandeered (some would say hijacked) Washington’s decisions vis-à-vis the island. The geographic heart of the politics shaping U.S. relations with Cuba is the city whose name has become code for Cuban American control: Miami. To say Miami is to say Cuban Americans.¹ Both terms are interchangeable in the public imaginary; both carry multiple, and at times paradoxical, connotations. Power and geography have thus converged in a manner that seems to doom U.S.-Cuba relations to physical and political immutability. Geography becomes political destiny. But is it? And if so, is it as fixed as landmasses? Does the political geography of South Florida condemn U.S.-Cuba relations to continuity?

While the policy circuit between Havana and Washington usually runs through Miami, it would be an error in judgment not to note the alternating currents flowing through it over time.² Geographic dimensions, including demographic concentration of

¹ Did you intend MiHavana here, as in text? Yes
the ethnic group in South Florida, have been necessary conditions to explain the decisive role Cuban Americans have played in U.S. foreign policy, but they are far from sufficient to explain the group’s capacity for political influence or the variations thereof. Particularly in the past decade, significant shifts in social and political patterns have taken place in South Florida—some of which point to greater direct connections between the region and the island, an emerging network that excludes Washington.\(^3\) As Miami and its Cuban American population have changed, so has the outlook for relations with Cuba. The city is no longer the same place it was in the 1980s or 1990s. Although Cuban Americans continue to hold significant power in political and economic sectors, Greater Miami is not exclusively a Cuban enclave. It is now a pan-Latin entrepôt, the gateway to the Americas, and with aspirations of becoming a global city.\(^4\) The Latinization of Miami and the city’s expanded financial role would argue for relations with Cuba sometime in the future. Moreover, the social and demographic profile of the Cuban American community has experienced significant shifts in the past decades, resulting in redefined political contours that point to a new outlook as well. In tandem with exogenous factors, both national and international in scale, endogenous changes within Cuban Miami are ushering in a new era in the
history of Cuban-U.S. relations. A new regional political, cultural, and economic geography is in the making.

Explaining Cuban American Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy

Cuban American influence over U.S. policy came of age in 1980 with the establishment of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) under the leadership of Jorge Mas Canosa, a wealthy Miami businessman. The early 1980s were propitious for the Cuban American lobby. The advent of Ronald Reagan’s presidency at the beginning of the decade opened the ideological doors to Cuban Americans who supported the president and who were aligned firmly with his cold war redux. By that time Cubans in Miami had garnered the economic and local political clout that enabled them to follow the Jewish example and become a major ethnic lobby group, specifically in the foreign policy arena.

The success of the Cuban American effort can be explained by four interrelated factors operating in tandem:

Convergence with the presidential worldview:
Cuban Americans were staunch supporters of President Reagan’s international policies, especially his global anticommmunist crusades. As a result, not only did they find a warm reception in the White House for their Cuban cause, but CANF lobbied in favor of a number of other foreign policy issues on the
president’s agenda, including U.S. involvement in the Central American conflicts.  

*Geographic concentration, single-issue constituency, and a one-party minority:* The political “trifecta” of geographic concentration of a single-issue constituency with broad partisan uniformity has tended to exaggerate the perception of Cuban American power. Their demographic concentration in South Florida gave the group electoral influence that was perceived as critical to win office, even at the national level. Politicians of all stripes courted Cuban American votes; to do so, they had to toe a hard line toward the Castro regime—the political litmus test that all politicians had to pass with flying colors. Cuban Americans’ overwhelming predilection for the Republican Party (due to its hawkish disposition in international affairs and the Kennedy administration’s blunders in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion) provided them with a partisan foothold that served them well. The Republican Party of South Florida, in need of new blood in the 1970s and 1980s, welcomed Cuban Americans and embraced their cause. Eventually three Cuban Americans from Miami and one from New Jersey (a Democrat) would serve in the U.S. Congress. Despite the group’s overwhelming Republicanism, politicians of all stripes courted Cuban American voters. To do

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2 Their . . . politicians implies the politicians are overwhelmingly Republican.
so, they had to support the U.S. embargo and oppose normalization of relations.

- **The politics of passion:** In Cuban American political culture no other issue has mustered the emotional charge that relations with Cuba has. Such intensity is at the heart of the politics of passion. The politics of passion is a manner of relating to political issues that are deemed foundational, moral, and absolute—never to be compromised.\(^\text{10}\) The politics of passion vests politics with ethical transcendence by converting the mundane into a Manichaean struggle for the ultimate good.

This sort of passion can be leveraged as a source of political capital insofar as it can be deployed effectively to mobilize groups and to channel resources toward a particular goal.

- **Effective lobbying strategy and the power of the dollar:** While motivated by passion, CANF (and its political action committee) was a pragmatic lobby that established a strong organization which partnered with other groups, stayed on message, supported the president on a number of political fronts, and made financial contributions to leaders on both sides of the congressional aisle. Under the leadership of Jorge Mas Canosa, a master at combining pragmatism with passion, CANF was guaranteed to be effective. However, barring the economic gains of Cuban Americans, specifically the financial wherewithal of the businessmen who created CANF and their generous
contributions to the organization and political campaigns, the efforts of the group would not have mounted to much. In sum, CANF became a consummate player in the political lobby game by mixing passion with dollars and effective organization.\textsuperscript{11}

These four factors in tandem explain the relative success the Cuban American lobby garnered in a relatively short time. But success came at a cost. The public perceived, rightly or wrongly, that U.S. policy toward Cuba was in the grip of Cubans from Miami, an image which Cuban Americans themselves were eager to exploit for political purposes. The image of power became, itself, quite powerful.

The Paradox of Control

Over time Cuban Americans became represented in paradoxical terms of control. On the one hand, this paradox of control depicts the Cuban American community as an all-powerful political actor that holds the reins of decision making in U.S. policy toward Cuba. From this vantage point the community is in control of the decision to isolate and pressure Cuba through the embargo and other punitive measures. Cuban Americans, crafty masters of the lobby game, hijacked U.S. foreign policy. If it were not for their political influence, Washington would be free to alter its course vis-à-vis Havana in a rational and prudent direction that would better serve the national interest. The only force keeping the United States from normalizing its
relations with Cuba after the cold war is the recalcitrant Cuban American minority in South Florida. Miami is the locus of power brokerage. To get to Havana from Washington, one must pass through Miami. But the Cuban American gatekeepers do not allow reformers of the status quo to pass through. They are firmly in control.12

On the other hand, the paradox of control portrays Cuban Americans as being out of control, teetering at the edge of irrationality, incivility, and un-American-ness.1 Operating on the border of America, Miami, they are trigger-happy, ready to shoot down anyone who opposes their position on U.S.-Cuba relations. They are all too eager to take to the streets, to bend the rules of the political game, and to act in an uncivil manner that approximates derangement. From this perspective, Cuban Americans seem to be driven by an illogical (and even un-American) passion that challenges law and order, undermining the American way.13 Miami is the new frontier where civilization and barbarism encounter each other--Miami is not America. Because of Cuban Americans, Miami is out of control. To get Miami back, Cuban Americans must be put in their place.

Both sides of the paradox represent Cuban Americans as monolithic and omnipotent--a force to be reckoned with, to be challenged and reined in. The paradox of control ironically
extends the power of Cuban Americans, who loom very large on the
screen of U.S. politics. As with all stereotypes and paradoxes,
elements of truth reside in these interpretations, but both
sides of the paradox of control neglect the steady dynamics of
change within the Cuban American community.

Sources of Change

The pillars of Cuban American power have experienced
alterations that are threatening their foundations. During the
past fifteen years, a significant process of transformation has
been unfolding in the Cuban American community, resulting in
significant demographic, political, and cultural shifts. The
factors propelling the shifts are both endogenous and exogenous
to Cuban Miami. The result is that the traditional politics of
passion of the Cuban exiles is eroding slowly, being replaced by
the politics of affection and the politics of the dollar. By the
politics of passion I am referring to the tendency in Cuban and
Cuban American political culture to define politics as a
struggle between good and evil, a battle for absolute moral ends
within a polarized postrevolutionary context. Although this
Manichaean proclivity predates the 1959 revolution, it has
thrived since the revolution and is typical of exile politics.
The politics of passion finds fertile ground in polarized
settings, such as the one that has permeated U.S.-Cuban
relations and Cuban American affairs.¹⁴
A number of factors point to a softening of passion and a strengthening of the politics of affection—the functional connections and affective networks binding families and friends across the Florida Straits—and to the advent of the politics of the dollar. With increased commerce between the United States and Cuba, the rise of U.S. business lobby groups as important political actors interested in Cuba, and the hundreds of millions of dollars in remittances flowing from families in South Florida to loved ones on the island, the politics of the dollar are starting to play a role in defining U.S.-Cuban relations. While passion is fading, the politics of affection and the dollar are flourishing, ushering in a transformation of Cuban American politics. Nowhere else are these changes as evident as in Miami. In fact, Miami (and Cuban American politics) have changed more than official policies in Washington or Havana. Surprising as it may seem, Miami and Cuban Americans are at the vanguard of change in U.S.-Cuba relations.

After All These Years: Fading Passion

Old political forces are passing and new ones are venturing onto the U.S.-Cuban bicoastal landscape. The patriarchs of Cuban and Cuban American politics are dead or dying. With the exit of Jorge Mas Canosa from the Cuban American scene and the near retirement of Fidel Castro, a real and symbolic changing of the guards has occurred. With biology taking its toll, a younger
crop of leaders has emerged, fissures have erupted in once seemingly monolithic elites, and generational cleavages have surfaced. Alternatives to the traditional policy prescriptions have come to the fore.

The disappearance of the patriarchs who toed the extremist line of confrontation opened the way for relatively moderate leadership and for new power contenders to unfurl the banners of alternative policies. After Mas Canosa’s death, CANF split into a hard-line faction (The Cuba Liberty Council) and a moderate one that kept the name of the foundation and is at the helm of the organization.\textsuperscript{16} Without charismatic leaders flaming the fire, the politics of passion tends to flicker and become difficult to sustain (this has taken place in the diaspora as well as on the island). In some quarters—especially older cohorts—passion still rules. Given the right conditions, a minority can always try to reignite the fires of passion.

The CANF, once the preeminent and hegemonic organization, now has to compete with both hard- and soft-line organizations. It no longer commands the dominant position it once did. New groups that advocate for a pragmatic line of critical engagement with the island have been formed, such as the Cuba Study Group.\textsuperscript{17} The founders of the Cuba Study Group are from the same elite sector that founded CANF—businessmen and wealthy professionals—reflecting a split in the political and
economic elite of Cuban Miami. A series of polls have shown that a generational shift is also occurring. Younger Cuban Americans express more divergent political positions than their older co-ethnics. The younger cohorts are less likely to support the embargo and less likely to base their vote in local elections on the Cuba issue. The younger generations have formed a number of political organizations that challenge the influence of CANF and of the older generations. Raíces de Esperanza, for example, brings together young Cuban professionals and students from a wide range of the political spectrum. The group fosters connections with counterparts on the island and embraces a multiplicity of perspectives regarding policy choices. Raíces epitomizes a different manner of conducting politics in Cuban Miami. Like other organizations, Raíces has learned a lesson from CANF: how important it is to lobby Washington, although Raíces’ primary focus is not necessarily the White House or Congress, but the people of Cuba.

During the past years the focus of attention of Cuban American organizations, including CANF, has shifted. Although they have not abandoned lobbying on Capitol Hill, they have redirected time, effort, and resources to political actors inside Cuba. The center of gravity of Cuban American politics has shifted as a result, from Washington to Havana. Again Cuban

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4 The accent is inconsistent on the website. Did you deliberately omit it? No.
Miami is at the forefront of this change. The community is engaging increasingly with their fellow Cubans on the island in multiple ways—economic, political, social, cultural, and personal.

All Cuban American political groups have found partners inside Cuba, including, but not exclusively, among the dissident and human rights organizations that have sprouted there since the 1980s. This reorientation in the focus and locus of politics is not to be underestimated, for it signals that change in Cuba can come from within, not from without. This recent realization tends to marginalize Washington. To get to Cuba, Miamians do not need to go to Washington first. From the perspective of many Cuban Americans, Washington no longer holds the key, or at least not the only one, to unlock the future of the island nation.

Relations with Congress and the White House are not the sine qua non of effective political organizing that they used to be; political connections with activists on the island are indispensable. The belief that political change is likely to emerge from within Cuba is widespread in the diaspora. Surveys have shown that over time a greater percentage has come to believe that transition will be led by leaders living inside Cuba, not those living outside the island, and not by Washington either.
Political variegation in Cuban Miami is clearly expressed in popular attitudes and electoral behavior. Over time public opinion has become more diverse and nuanced. Support for the embargo has eroded from an overwhelming majority to less than half of the Cuban Americans surveyed in 2008. At the same time the percentage of Cuban Americans supporting diplomatic contacts, cultural engagement, travel to the island to visit friends and relatives, legalization of remittances, humanitarian aid, and commercial transactions between the United States and Cuba has increased dramatically. Age and years in the United States explain much of the variation and shift in attitudes: younger Cuban Americans advocate flexible approaches as do recent arrivals from the island to South Florida. The latter are committed to maintaining ties with loved ones, and they wish to visit them and assist them by sending remittances. In this sense, they are acting similarly to other Latin American migrants. And like other Latino voters, Cuban Americans are questioning their traditional support for the Republican Party. Party affiliation among younger Cuban Americans and recently naturalized citizens is experiencing important reorientation. Fewer Cuban Americans than before are identifying with the Republican Party, and more are opting to declare themselves Independent.
Although the electoral politics of Cuban Americans is still dominated by earlier exiles who are naturalized U.S. citizens, the trend manifesting among the more recently naturalized citizens represents a significant challenge to the grip of the Republican Party over this influential group of voters. While the majority of Cuban American voters continues to identify itself as conservative (despite a small decrease in that identification), the conservative label hides liberal (and Democrat-like) preferences. Deeper analyses have revealed that Cuban American Republicans espouse positions in the areas of social welfare and health that render them anything but staunch conservatives. They resemble Democrats in their political preferences on key domestic issues, which is not at all surprising if one understands Cuba’s progressive political culture.

What continues to connect Cuban Americans to the Republicans is an effective party machine and the belief that Republicans are tougher in international affairs and hence more likely to take a strong stance against the Castro brothers. However, even in these two areas serious fissures are developing, specifically because younger voters are not voting based on Cuba-centered issues and because the harsh words of the George W. Bush administration toward the Cuban government were not matched by deeds. On the contrary, trade with Cuba
increased despite the opposition of Cuban American Republicans. The Republican Party is split between competing constituencies: businessmen seeking markets and Cuban Americans opposing commercial relations with the island. The chasm is unresolved.

On the contrary, as decisions about dealing with Cuba are made in the future, these irreconcilable differences will tend to push both sides farther apart.

The Failure of Old Politics

In no small measure changes within the Cuban American community are the result of the failure of the traditional policies that both Washington and Miami have advocated in relation to Cuba. The embargo and the host of policies intended to exert pressure on the Cuban government have not produced the desired outcomes of democratic change. With time the peoples on both sides of the Florida Straits have encountered each other and have found a wellspring of connection amidst the political divide. Human connections resulting from family travel and limited but impactful cultural engagement have provided new sources of politics at the subnational level. The reencounters of the Cuban people have laid the foundation for a revised set of political assumptions that have redefined the politics of Cuban Miami. The process started in the mid- to late 1970s when President Jimmy Carter eased travel restrictions. What later, under President Clinton, became known as the “people to
people” policy contributed to a reencounter of Cubans in and outside the island that has not been mediated exclusively by the politics of revolutionary polarization. Pope John Paul II’s trip to the island in 1996 also legitimized travel to the island for religious (and often conservative) Cubans in the diaspora. The pope, in a symbolic move, opened a moral door to the island. From then on relations between Catholic parishes have been strengthened. Travel to the island allows for the discovery of a vibrant society that exists within the parameters of a one-party system and the human connection beyond political litmus tests. Moreover, suffering has brought Cubans together. The precipitous decline of the Cuban economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s pulled at the heartstrings of Cuban Americans. Remittances flowed to the island, reaching up to one billion dollars according to some observers. Humanitarian aid was also sent to the island after natural disasters.

The failure of the old politics has also challenged political organizations and different U.S. administrations to search for alternative policies, which helps explain the changes in political choices of institutions such as CANF. In part, the choices were made possible by an altered political landscape in Cuba, specifically the genesis of civil society represented by human rights, dissident, and opposition groups.
By 2009--the fiftieth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution--changes within and without the Cuban American community put into question the future of its effective power over U.S. policy on Cuba and the policy’s multiple components. A new administration in Washington is a harbinger of at least changes around the edges of the policies. President Obama not only has a different worldview than that of President Reagan and Bush, he has clearly positioned himself in a more flexible spot regarding the future of relations with the island. While additional changes are expected, within the first six months of his administration he delivered on one of his campaign promises, to make travel and remittances to Cuba by Cuban Americans much easier. Moreover, President Obama owes little to the conservative side in the Cuban American community, which did not vote for him. Rather, he needs to reward those younger and more progressive Cuban Americans that supported his election.

With the advent of the Obama administration there has been the beginning of an important realignment in the convergence of the presidential worldview with that of Cuban Americans in Miami who favor a new action plan vis-à-vis the island. But to expect that ideological commonality between the president and a sector of the Cuban American population will in and of itself transform U.S. policy is unrealistic. Despite how influential Cuban Americans have been in the past, they have never been the sole...
actors--and in the absence of Cuban Americans, the United States would continue to find raisons d’état to try to isolate and pressure Cuba. Even in times of close ideological convergence between the White House and CANF, President Reagan took actions that did not prompt with the organization’s blessing. The Clinton administration--which had crafted a shrewd two-track policy toward Cuba (hard on the government, soft on the people) that found considerable support among Cubans in Miami--decided to return to his father in Cuba, Elián González, the six year-old boy who survived a shipwreck in the Florida Straits while attempting to flee the island with his mother. This was a decision that the majority of Cuban Americans rejected. In short, convergence with the presidential worldview is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an ethnic group to influence U.S. foreign affairs.

Diversity within the community in terms of political preferences as well as the multiplicity of Cuban American lobby groups on the Hill will tend to erode the influence of the group as competing interests might cancel each other. In recent years, three institutionalized tendencies are operating: a reformed CANF (lobbying for a modicum of changes in travel and a more critically engaged policy), the Cuban Liberty Council (the conservative splinter group from CANF which continues to lobby...
for the maintenance of the embargo and travel restrictions), and the Cuba Study Group (which advocates a multilateral policy of engagement with Cuba).

Concurrent with the changes, a level of continuity is discernible among the Cuban American members of Congress, all of whom carry considerable influence over this issue and all of whom advocate for toeing a tough line vis-à-vis Havana. The gap between the officials representing Cuban Americans in Washington and the popular attitudes on the ground has widened. Congressional representatives espouse policy preferences that seem divorced from the real if subtle variations occurring within communities of Cuban origin. With the incorporation, through naturalization, of more recent arrivals into the electoral system, the tendency will be for the gap between elected officials and the grassroots to close. The congressional races in November 2008 were the first truly competitive ones in which the Cuban American community participated in the past decades. Longstanding Republican incumbents were given a run for their money by Democratic rivals who, among other policy differences, advocated for a different approach to Cuba.

With the emergence of new political actors from within the Cuban American community, the recent advent of business interests into the debate over relations with Cuba (and the pressure within the Republican Party to accommodate the requests
from farming constituencies in particular) represents one of the single most important factors in the future redefinition of U.S. policy. During the eight years of the Bush administration, the United States became one of the island’s top trading partners.

Due to geographic proximity, commercial relations are bound to increase over time. The politics of the dollar are here to stay.

MiHavana or HavanaMia: The Emergence of a New Economic, Cultural, and Political Geography

While both the Obama and the Raúl Castro administrations are skittish (for different reasons) about moving steadily down a path to diplomatic normalization, in the short to medium term one can expect a thaw in terms of greater flexibility of cultural and educational travel. Regardless of the timing of an official rapprochement, subnational forces are pushing to create a condition of normalcy between the two nations, led in some important ways by Cuban Americans in Miami. No other community in the United States is so intimately engaged with Cuba on an everyday basis as are Cuban Americans (they travel, they call, they e-mail, they send money transfers, they keep abreast of developments inside the island). No other city in the United States is so connected to Havana and the island as is Miami.

Flights to Havana take off every day from Miami International Airport. During any week, Cuban artists are performing or exhibiting their work. In Miami, Cuba matters. With time, the
patterns of change evident in the Cuban American community indicate the coming of a new day for Cuban-U.S. relations. That day will be marked by new politics, less passion, more affection, and more dollars—with similarities, perhaps, to a well-established old marriage.

Despite the embargo, dollars are flowing between the United States and Cuba through state-to-state channels as well as subnational ones. Trade has increased dramatically in the past several years, and remittances to the island have continued to flow, if at a decreased rate due to Bush administration restrictions and the economic crisis in the United States. With the rise of economic linkages and transnational networks, a new economic and political geography is in the making.27 Transnational connections based on love, kinship, humanitarian concerns, religion, professional affiliation, and cultural interests are being strengthened. Official bilateral cooperation on a number of issues (immigration, weather, drug interdiction) continues to take place. Both serve to create a baseline for confidence building and greater collaboration in areas of mutual interest.

I foresee the day when Miami and Havana are the bicoastal cities leading a hub of economic, social, and cultural connectivity. Bonds based on love, money, and culture will create dynamics that bring these two cities together, contouring
a new functional geography marked by connection rather than
disconnection. This new sociocultural, economic, and
transnational political subregion—call it MiHavana or HavanaMia
(depending on which coast you are standing on)—will operate in
an integrated fashion reestablishing a new borderline.28
Commerce, tourism, arts, families, and ideas will travel freely
back and forth between the shores, connecting two cities, two
centers of population and two nations.29 But not all will be
happiness in this dawning day. The emergence of a new regional
geography brings with it the potential for economic growth and
social mobility. In the process, some will benefit but others
will not. Inequality will rise.30 The politics of the dollar
makes friends and enemies as well. The future of U.S.-Cuban
relations will tend to be that of intimate but contentious
partners. The role that Cuban Americans will play in MiHavana
will contribute both to the intimacy and the contention.

Notes

2. For a historical overview of the connections
between Cuba and North America see L. A. Pérez, On Becoming
Cuban.
4. On the emergence of the “global city” see Brenner and Keil, Global Cities Reader.

5. Torres, In the Land of Mirrors, 115.<n>20.

6. García, Havana, USA, 147.


8. Ibid., 116.<n>19.

9. At the time of writing, six Cuban Americans are serving in the U.S. Congress: Senators Marco Rubio (R-Florida) and Bob Menendez (D-New Jersey); Representatives Mario Diaz-Balart, David Rivera, and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (all R-Florida); and Representative Albio Sires (D-New Jersey).


11. Pérez-Stable, The United States and Cuba, 76.<n>80. See also Torres, 140.<n>48.


13. Ibid., 92.<n>93. Also see Torres, In the Land of Mirrors, 158.


15. Mas Canosa died in November 1997. Raúl Castro became president of the National Assembly in February 2008 after effectively assuming the presidential duties in 2006 due to Fidel Castro’s illness. In April 2011 Raúl Castro was elected
first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba.

17. Ibid., 100–102.
21. In the 2008 poll 21 percent of respondents identified themselves as registered Independents. Of that number, 27 percent were in the 18–44 age group. In comparison, 52 percent of respondents identified themselves as registered Republicans. Of that number, 66 percent were in the 65 and older age group. See CRI, "FIU Cuba Poll," 2008, 3–6.
23. Ibid., 70–71.
<nts>24. Ibid., 112, 114, 121.
<nts>25. Ibid., 80<sup>83</sup>.
<nts>26. Ibid., 87.
<nts>27. Torres, *In the Land of Mirrors*, 169<sup>70</sup>.
<nts>28. Ibid., 198<sup>200</sup>.
<nts>29. On the changing notion of internal frontiers see Dilla Alfonso and Cedano, *Frontera en transición:*, 13<sup>16</sup>, 23<sup>26</sup>.
<nts>30. On the “reappearance of marginality” and frontiers within Havana, see Dilla Alfonso and Villalona Núñez, *Ciudades fragmentadas*, 141<sup>45</sup>.