"Until the land was understood;" Spaniards Confront La Florida, 1500-1600.

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Writing some years after the failure of Licenciado Lucas Vázquez de Ayllón’s 1526 colony (San Miguel de Gualdape) on the coast of what is today Georgia, the Royal Chronicler of the Indies, Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, recalled that while most of the colony’s survivors had nothing good to say about its site or their experience “some [of the survivors] liked the shape (la forma) of the region they had seen and said that, doing what was requisite for settling in that place, and with enough foods to last until the land was understood, [settlement] would not be a bad thing, because the climate (temple) there was better suited for Spaniards.”¹ What exactly does this statement mean? The colonists, after all, had spent at least two months on the southeastern coast of North America, surely enough time to become somewhat familiar with the resources of the area where they had been. Too,
they had sailed from Hispaniola with the knowledge of the interior that Ayllón and a Native American he called Francisco El Chicorano had spread at the Spanish Court in 1523. However, Francisco’s flight shortly after the expedition landed had cut off any possibility of his guiding them to the interior “kingdom” he had described. In short, the statement suggests that these survivors (or Oviedo) realized that neither their experiences nor Francisco’s reports were adequate bases for the founding of a successful colony. The “secrets of the land” had still to be discovered. But before passing to consider what the secrets were and how they were discovered, it will be worthwhile to unpack Oviedo’s statement.

The first part of the statement – “doing what was requisite” – reflects Oviedo’s moralizing comment that men like Ayllón who lacked military experience (he was a judge) were ill suited to undertake conquests and somewhat more charitable observation that different preparations needed to be made for “great undertakings” in northern areas where the “people are more ferocious and the land is colder” than in the southern areas already subjugated. The second phrase – and “with enough foods” – reflected the colony’s history, which was one of hunger even when surrounded by abundant natural foods.²
The final comment about the climate being better suited for Spaniards reflected not only the experience of late summer and early fall on the Carolina and Georgia coasts – including the passage of an early cold front – but also, I suggest, prevailing notions about climatic zones that derived from Ptolemy, the great Greek cosmographer. Ptolemy had observed that “all animals and all plants likewise, have a similarity under the same kind of climate or under similar weather conditions; that is, when under the same parallels [latitudinal bands], or when situated at the same distance from either pole.” This idea was one that Ayllón had used when propagandizing the discoveries his agent had made in 1521. He claimed, falsely, that they had been at the “height of the same degrees and identical parallels as Vandalian Spain” – that is Andalucia, which lies within Ptolemy’s tenth “parallel” or climatic band (between 36° and 38° 35’ North). In fact, the slaving voyage of 1521 that gave rise to his colonial venture had gotten no further north than 33° 30’ North. It is likely that the survivors who told Oviedo they thought the new land had possibilities understood that its climate, while closer to that of Spain than was true in the Caribbean islands, was not what Ptolemy’s ideas suggested should be the case. San
Miguel Gualdape was, after all, in the “parallel” just below the one that Ayllón had proclaimed.

Modern scholarship has proposed several locations for Ayllón’s colony, all but one of them on the coastal strand which consists of sandy barrier islands, back bays and marshes, river mouths and the sandy eastern margins of the mainland. The strand has abundant sources of proteins, especially fish and shellfish, but because of its acidic, sandy soils, is a poor place to grow maize or other carbohydrates. Edible roots and acorns (from which a meal can be made) do exist in small quantities, but local knowledge is required to identify them. Oviedo’s account of the colony confirms this picture. He says that the colonists at San Miguel found abundant fish and shellfish (probably in tidal channels in adjoining marshes), berries of several types, wild grape vines, and various birds and small mammals. Conspicuously absent from his account is any reference to native agriculture. And since it was early October according to our calendar when the colony was created, planting maize, European cereal grains, or manioc was out of the question. The expedition’s supplies of carbohydrates (wheat flour, and perhaps corn meal and casabi bread) mostly had been lost with the wreck of its largest ship approaching land further north. A search for
Native American stores of food quickly developed, with the predictable result: the local Native Americans turned hostile. Hunger and then disease began to kill.\textsuperscript{7} Faced with uncertain prospects of resupply from the Antilles, most of the surviving colonists were willing enough to abandon the enterprise following Ayllón’s death on October 18 [27\textsuperscript{th}].

Further south, Juan Ponce de León had encountered a similar ecology along peninsular Florida’s east coast in 1513, although he did not attempt to create a colony. And like Ayllón’s settlers, he encountered relatively small, widely spaced and hostile Native American settlements, mostly on the mainland at or near river mouths.\textsuperscript{8} On the west coast, Ponce had skirmishes with the Calusa in both 1513 and, fatally, in 1521, perhaps in the vicinity of Mound Key, but more likely a bit further south, in the general area of the Ten-Thousand Islands of southwestern Florida, whose ecology is quite different from the east coast’s barrier islands and back bays but just as limiting for Europeans because the area’s natural resources require local knowledge for maximum exploitation.\textsuperscript{9}

Ponce’s voyage of 1513 to the lower west coast of the peninsula was followed in 1519 by Alonso Alvarez de Pineda’s voyage along the Gulf Coast at least as far west as Vermillion Bay, Louisiana. It also returned a negative
image of the land, although his full report has not come to
light. What we know about what he found is in the contract
between his employer, Francisco de Garay, Governor of
Jamaica, and the Crown. After the briefest references to
the voyage and the chart and sailing directions it
generated, the contract says that “among other low, sterile
land that they [Alvarez de Pineda and his crews] discovered
touched the land of Florida that Juan Ponce de León
discovered.”

Writing in about 1540, Alonso de Santa Cruz, one of
the cosmographers of the House of Trade (Casa de la
Contratación) at Seville recorded what was by then the more
common opinion, that is, that the east coast of what is now
the United States from peninsular Florida to the Penobscot
River had “many islands... all deserted and of little benefit
[provecho], which were seen and discovered by the
Licenciado Ayllón.”

Four expeditions, four reports, all agreeing by ca.
1540 that coastal La Florida, and perhaps the entire
region, was apparently little populated, generally “low and
sterile,” and, consequently, “of little benefit” for the
Spanish empire. Or was it little populated and of little
potential benefit? There was, after all, Ayllón’s tale of a
king ruling a farming population that lived “politically”
in the interior.\textsuperscript{12} That story lived on in Peter Martyr’s Decades published in 1530 \textsuperscript{13} and was resurrected in Francisco Lopez de Gómara’s History of the Indies of 1552 in what I have elsewhere called the Chicora Legend.\textsuperscript{14}

Clearly neither southern Florida nor the lower East Coast of North America were unpopulated. Ponce de León had met hostile native peoples in Florida in 1513 at St. Lucy Inlet, Biscayne Bay and on the lower west coast. As for the rest of the Gulf coast, what we have of Alvarez de Pineda’s record of his voyage is silent on population until the narrative reaches the coast of New Spain.\textsuperscript{15} This silence about the west coast of Florida and the Gulf Coast does not mean he did not see Native Americans, just that the reports we have do not mention them. On the Atlantic coast, Ayllón’s explorers of 1525 found four different linguistic groups between the Cape of the Cross – the now eroded headland of Anastasia Island by St. Augustine – and Delaware Bay. Ayllón himself attempted to settle near the Native American population at Sapelo Sound, Georgia, and listed the names of eighteen Indian groups in the general area of the Santee River in his contract with the Crown.\textsuperscript{16} The bottom line was that none of these coastal groups seemed to be very large and none gave evidence of being part of a larger empire such as the Spaniards had found in
New Spain (Mexico) and would shortly find in Peru. Still, Ayllón’s tale of an interior “king” whose sway might have reached the coast offered some hope of large agricultural populations that could be added to the Spanish empire.

In its gross details, this picture of La Florida ca. 1540 was accurate. The ecology of the Southeast and, more particularly, the Florida peninsula, dictated that relatively small Native American populations would be distributed as indicated, given their subsistence technologies. The various terraces of the coastal plain are covered with acidic sands of low fertility interrupted here and there by the higher ground of hammocks. Rivers crossing the plain have often extensive, if flash-flood prone bottomlands and marginal swamps. Frequent lightening-caused fires and underlying hardpans maintained a pine subclimax forest – the famous pine barrens and pine flat woods – over most of the coastal terraces while hardwood forests dominated the riverine bottomlands. In many areas, coastal marshes partially fill the bays between the mainland and barrier islands. Native Americas took advantage of the juxtaposition of the rich maritime resources of those marshes, the agricultural potential of hammocks and riverine terraces that did not normally flood, and the hunting and gathering possibilities of the
flatwoods and slopes or ecotones between terraces. In Georgia, Sapelo Sound and the mouths of the various rivers that feed into the sounds behind the barrier islands offer this combination. In peninsular Florida, the mouth and much of the lower St. Johns River, Charlotte Harbor, and Tampa Bay and to a lesser degree the Jupiter Inlet and Miami areas offered particularly favorable environments. As Ponce de León and Ayllón’s explorers found, these few favorable areas supported multiple villages of several hundred persons each, sometimes organized into larger political units known to anthropologists as paramount chiefdoms. However, the agricultural and hence demographic potential of such places was limited.

The piedmont inland from the coasts of the Carolinas, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi and the Madison, Tallahassee, and Mariana highlands of northern Florida consist of rolling hills covered with soils of varied composition and color. More fertile than the coastal sands, they support mixed forests of oaks, hickories, and pines. The slopes have been credited with supporting up to 35 species of trees per acre along with a large variety of other edible and seemingly medicinal plants. Faunal life is also more abundant, although not all species are food.
In some respects a continuation of the piedmont, Florida’s central ridge is made up of two basic types of soils, both of which are moist to well-drained and of moderate fertility. Pines and various species of scrub oaks are the natural forest cover but other types of oaks and hardwoods occur where conditions are favorable. Rivers and streams drain away from the ridge and in a few areas create small flood plains that were especially useful for digging stick agricultural methods. Native Americans sited their villages near ecotones, sources of fresh water, and more fertile areas of soils. Further north, they favored Piedmont riverine terraces for agriculture and the adjacent uplands for village sites and sources of hunting and gathering resources. Throughout the Southeast, trade, often over very long distances, supplied flint and chert for projectile points and cutting tools and more exotic items such as copper, freshwater pearls and Ayllón’s “terrestrial gems” - almost certainly the quartz crystals found west of modern Charlotte, North Carolina.19

Such were the secrets of the land and the reasons for them. The story of Spanish exploration and colonization after 1530 and before ca. 1650 is one of the discovery of the details of this picture and of trying and failing to move Spanish settlement into the interior of the Carolinas.
region that Ayllón’s tale had first pointed to as an area that would better fit what had become the Spanish pattern of conquest, that is, the subjugation of large, centrally governed agricultural populations. Only after ca. 1610 did Spanish missionaries establish a presence on the Central Florida Ridge, and only after 1630 did they reach Apalachee’s better soils and large population. They never established a presence in the Piedmont. The small Spanish garrison at San Luís de Apalache in the late 17th century never became the nucleus for an expanding settlement.

The first intentional scouting of what lay inland was the Hernando DeSoto expedition’s epic exploration of the southeast from 1539 to 1543. A veteran of the conquests of Panama, Nicaragua and Peru, DeSoto knew that as a rule the larger and potentially richer Native American settlements did not lie on the coast. He also knew about Ayllón’s failed colony and, by a stroke of good fortune, about Pánfilo de Narváez’s accidental peregrination of 1528 up the west side of Florida’s central ridge and then westward by boat along the coast as far as modern Texas. The Florida part of the journey indicated that some small Native American settlements had limited stores of maize while the Gulf Coast voyage indicated widely scattered, hostile
Indian groups. DeSoto also may have known about Ponce’s misadventures.21

From these and perhaps other sources, DeSoto constructed his plan to move inland and follow the maize fields and native societies until he found mineral resources and/or areas of large agricultural populations suitable for a traditional conquest.22 This strategy was dictated as well by his contract with the Crown, which allowed three years of exploration before DeSoto had to designate the 200 leagues (about 620 miles) of coast that would define his colony.23

The survivors of DeSoto’s expedition reported the same largely negative impression of most of La Florida that the earlier coastal expeditions had formed although confirming Ayllón’s report of large populations in the interior. The towns of the western side of Florida’s central ridge and on its northern uplands, except for Anhaica, Apalache (modern Tallahassee), had proven disappointing, with only small supplies of food and no mineral wealth. The landing site, likely on Tampa Bay, seemed, in Rodrigo Rangel’s words “sterile, as in truth the coast is reputed to be.”24 The Gentleman of Elvas said that Peninsular Florida was “a lean land and most of it covered with rough pine groves, low and very swampy and in places having lofty dense forests, where
the hostile Indians wandered so that no one could find them." Only two places, Cofitachequi near modern Camden, South Carolina, and Coosa, in the ridge and valley terrain southeast of modern Chattanooga, were remembered by the survivors of the expedition as suitable for Spanish settlement. Many other chiefdoms of varied size and agricultural abundance had been visited, but none were so promising as those two places.

Coosa’s reputation did not survive the Tristan de Luna Expedition of 1559–1562. A scouting party of 200 men sent to Coosa from the expedition’s inland base at Nanipacana on the lower Alabama River initially reported that while the land between the coast and Coosa would be difficult to convert to Spanish farms and ranches because so little of the heavy forest that covered it had been cleared by the Native Americans, Coosa itself was as well supplied with food as the De Soto survivors had remembered. However, that report was quickly overridden by mutinous colonists anxious to return to New Spain. To justify the abandonment, the officers sent a mounted party to Coosa with instructions to report on “the insufficiency of the country” and withdraw the men already there. This mutiny sparked by dashed hopes of an easy life proved to be the prelude to the colony’s failure, which international events accelerated.
Luna’s expedition broke up not just because of its well-known loss of supplies to a tropical storm not long after arrival on the sandy shores of Pensacola Bay and the subsequent hardship, but also because Philip II ordered part of the party to go to the Point of Santa Elena on the Atlantic coast at 32 degrees North to prevent a reported Franco-Scots attempt to settle there and thus tap into the riches that might lie in the interior. Angel de Villafañe, who replaced Luna as the governor of the struggling colony at Pensacola, carried out that mission but he and his men later claimed that on the Atlantic coast below 35 degrees North “there is no land where settlement can be made nor a port suitable for it, nor native people who could be congregated nor joined to the Christian doctrine... nor in all that we have seen is found gold or silver or a good disposition of land for settlement which would serve and benefit Your Majesty.” There was, they concluded, no danger of a successful French settlement. Better prospects might lie north of 35 degrees North but exploration and settlement of that area should be from Spain, not New Spain.²⁸

So far as we know, that Franco-Scots expedition never sailed, but Jean Ribault did in 1562, and left men at Port Royal Sound, just north of the Point of Santa Elena and, by
his own telling, near “Chicore” – Ayllón’s Chicora. Reports of that French outpost and of the René de Laudonnière expedition to follow up on it, set in motion what became Pedro Menéndez de Avilés’s successful settlements at St. Augustine and Santa Elena (Parris Island, South Carolina). 29 Both were sited on the coast in locations whose low-fertility soils yielded limited harvests of maize, keeping the colonies dependent on imported foods or such tribute in maize as might be extracted from nearby Native Americans. Moreover, the Spanish settlement occurred at a time when the La Niña was common in the Pacific Ocean and producing repeated episodes of below normal rainfall over the Southeastern coast of North America. This weather pattern further restrained crop yields. 30

Although in time the Spaniards found they could grow various old world fruits and vegetables and limited crops of maize in the sands of St. Augustine and Santa Elena, their general experience there was often nearly as grim as the Jesuit Juan Baptista de Segura’s 1570 complaint that the 300 leagues (about 950 miles) of La Florida that he had seen were “one long pile of sand” and “the most miserable land ever discovered by man.” 31 That is, neither southwest Florida nor the coastal plain south of Chesapeake Bay could easily become the site of prospering colonies. The interior
was another matter, as Ayllón’s tales and DeSoto’s experience had suggested.

Menéndez de Avilés evidently knew of DeSoto’s Cofitachequi. Needing to spread the nearly 1,500 soldiers that Philip II sent to him with Sancho de Archiniega in 1566 (because of fears of a French return) among Native American towns so that they could be fed, he sent Captain Juan Pardo and Sergeant Hernando Moyano de Morales along trails to the northwest of Santa Elena to see the countryside, obtain the agreement of the caciques (i.e., chiefs) to gather and hold a maize tribute for possible Spanish use, and report in detail on the resources they found. ³²

Pardo made two expeditions into the interior, carefully recording the Native American villages he found, the gifts he gave to the caciques, and their swearing of obedience to the Spanish Crown. The results were Spanish forts at Joara (near modern Morganton, NC) and Olamico (an unknown location further east in North Carolina), several written accounts of the expedition, and Notary Juan de La Vandera’s very detailed description of the soils, clay that could be used for pottery and roof tiles, and how well maize and grape vines grew at every point along a route that reached almost as far as Coosa. ³³ In combination, the
various reports told of large populations, one or two paramount chiefdoms with mound-oriented ceremonial centers, and a land that was just as fertile as DeSoto’s men had remembered. The forts and Pardo’s agreements with the caciques of the Wateree River valley along the route to them could have been the basis for the land grant and marquisate that the Crown had promised Menéndez, but Native Americans attacked and destroyed the interior forts in the spring of 1568 just as orders were received to return Pardo’s surviving men to Spain.

Menéndez never had another opportunity to bring those inland Native Americans under direct Spanish control. He did not live long enough, nor likely would have had financial or human resources enough, to carve out that piedmont estate and settlement. The absence of tractable Native Americans in the interior and mineral resources to attract would-be settlers further restricted what he could have accomplished. Too, his activities in La Florida were in a period when the Crown no longer allowed either the enslavement or the forced labor of Native Americans, although as commoners most were expected to earn and pay a monetary tribute. And behind those restrictions was the constant threat that the French might begin trading for sarsasparilla with the coastal Indians, or even attempt a
new colony, unlikely as that might have been for a nation in the midst of its wars of religion. The strategic imperative to guard the exit to the Bahama Channel that had led Philip II to send and partially fund Menéndez meant that Spanish settlement continued to be confined to the coastal plain, the part of La Florida that was least able to support agriculture. And as Menéndez also discovered, that same area and its poor pasturage, insect pests, and animal and human predators also made cattle raising difficult.36

In the years after Menéndez’ death, his two small towns were consolidated at St. Augustine (1587) and only a few expeditions crossed the coastal plain in Georgia to the foot of the piedmont.37 The legend of “los diamantes” (“the diamonds”) - Pardo’s quartz crystals - lived on and there is some indication of growing Spanish-Native American trade that included the slowly emerging confederacy known to us as the Creek nation.38 And briefly in the 1645-1651 Governor Benito Ruiz de Salazar Ballecilla developed a ranch and wheat farm near the village of Asile on the fringes of Apalachee, proving that Spanish style agriculture, with Native American labor, could be developed on the better soils of the peninsula. But after his death, the Franciscans and the Cacique of Asile broke up the
enterprise. They replaced it with small scale food and peltry exports to Havana. Other ranches developed after about 1650, and especially in the 1680s, as continued declines in mission populations in north-central Florida (near modern Gainesville) left old fields open to become pastures. The development of a few other small-scale extractive industries such as naval stores in the 1680s suggested what might have been accomplished.\textsuperscript{39}

In sum, by 1600 Spaniards had discovered the “secrets of the land” but could not capitalize on them. The La Florida of the explorers, conquerors, settlers and missionaries was not “deserted and useless” as Santa Cruz had proclaimed, but it was not an easy place to establish a colony. The physical geography that restricted Native American settlement also restricted the Spaniards, the more so because their model of colonization was to superimpose themselves on indigenous populations, extracting subsistence and livelihoods from their agricultural and other labors. A relative lack of resources, except good soils in the interior, and of incentives to attempt settlement inland (as distinct from missions), dominance of office and opportunities by a few families,\textsuperscript{40} and the imperatives of Imperial policy toward Native Americans and the guarding of the strategic Bahama Channel further
restricted what Spaniards could do to assert control over the peoples they found in La Florida or take advantage of its natural resources. And those, ultimately, were the "secrets of the land" that doomed Spanish Florida to be almost a footnote to the story of Anglophone America.
Notes


2 Oviedo, *Historia General*, 3:625 (bk. 37, prohemio), 632 (bk. 37, chapter 3), 631 (bk. 37, chapter 3).


4 Hoffman, *New Andalucia*, 3-83 is an account of Ayllón’s activities; for these specific facts see pp. 21 and 10, respectively. Ptolemy’s bands were based on the lengths of the longest day as one went north from the Equator. Within the confines of the Mediterranean basin they made some sense but were arbitrary even so.

5 Martín Fernández de Navarette (ed.), *Colección de los viages y descubrimientos que hicieron por mar los Españoles desde fines del siglo XV* (5 vols.; Madrid, 1925), 3:84, 86-87, argued for a location near Cape Lookout even though he had access to almost all of the same documentary material that is now used to propose different locations; Johann G. Kohl, *The Discovery of the East Coast of North America*
(Portland, Maine, 1869), 247, 396-401, places Gualdape at Cape Fear; John G. Shea, “Ancient Florida,” in Narrative and Critical History of the United States, Ed. Justin Winsor (8 vols.; Boston, 1884-1889), 2:239, claimed a location at or near Jamestown! Woodbury Lowery, The Spanish Settlements with the Present Limits of the United States (1901-11; 2 vols.; Reprinted, New York, 1959), 1:155, 165, 448-51, placed the colony on the Pee Dee River, near modern Georgetown, SC; Paul Quattlebaum, The Land Called Chicora: The Carolinas Under Spanish Rule with French Intrusions, 1520-1670 (Gainesville, 1956), 10-11, 21-23, 126-29, argued for the same location. However, Hoffman, A New Andalucia, 317-21, after reviewing those and a few other theories and the documentary evidence concluded that it was at or near Sapelo Sound, GA (p. 321). Douglas T. Peck, “Lucas Vázquez de Ayllón’s Doomed Colony of San Miguel de Gualdape,” Georgia Historical Quarterly 85, No. 2 (Summer 2001): 193, has argued for a site at the mouth of the Savannah River. The arguments of Navarette, Kohl, and Shea can be dismissed as a misreading of Oviedo’s account (that the colony was north of the first landing site in 1526; he plainly says it was “west” meaning southwest). I do not find Lowery,
Quattlebaum or Peck’s arguments convincing. Shea’ location is the one not on the coastal strand.

6 Spain, like the rest of the western world, was still using the Julian Calendar, which was then about 10 days behind the solar year. The colony’s name, San Miguel (St. Michael the Arkangel) suggests a formal founding on September 29, which would be October 8 on our Gregorian calendars. The Gregorian Calendar reform took place in Spain in 1584.

7 Oviedo, Historia General, 3:628-33; Hoffman, New Andalucia, 73-74. Manioc (cassava), a staple on Hispaniola, requires at least a year to produce a crop of roots that could be processed into cacabí bread. For Native American subsistence strategies in this ecology see Lewis H. Larson, Aboriginal Subsistence Technology on the Southeastern Coastal Plain During the Late Prehistoric Period (Gainesville, 1980). He shows that the Indians not only exploited the maritime environment but also hunted and gathered in an annual round that took them into the interior, perhaps as far as the piedmont. Indians in the piedmont towns, dependent on agriculture for much of their subsistence also employed hunting and gathering to supplement maize and beans.
Anthony Q. Devereux, *Juan Ponce de León, King Ferdinand, and the Fountain of Youth* (Spartanbrug, SC, 1993), 113-16, esp. 115; see also 123, 127.

Devereux, *Ponce de León*, 129-135.

Cedula allowing Francisco de Garay to populate the province of Amichel..., Burgos, n.d., 1521, per Fernández de Navarrete, *Colección de los Viajes y descubrimientos*, 3:160, author’s translation. Robert Weddle, *Spanish Sea, The Gulf of Mexico in North American Discovery 1500-1685* (College Station, 1985), 100, conflates the cedula’s description of the richness of Amichel, the land on the Pánuco River, with the entire coast. In other respects, Weddle’s account is reliable.


This term “politically” was derived from Aristotle’s *Politics* and indicated rational self rule. It was a “buzz word” at the time because Native Americans not living “politically” were considered uncivilized and thus fair game for conquest and deprivation of their natural rights. For a discussion of the issues surrounding how the Spaniards should treat the Native Americans while insisting on missionary activity among them and trade, see Lewis


15 Weddle, *Spanish Sea*, 100, 104, corrects accounts that have Alvarez de Pineda entering the Mississippi.

16 The names were supplied by Francisco and other Native Americans, a classic example of how Spanish (and other Europeans) depended on Native informants for knowledge of areas they had not visited.

17 These slopes or ecotones provide variable moisture conditions and in consequence support a greater variety of floral and consequently faunal life than the areas below or above them.


these mines see Charles Hudson, *The Juan Pardo Expedition* (1990; Revised Ed. Tuscaloosa, 2005), 161-64, 189-190, 279-80.


21 Hoffman, *New Andalucia*, 29-32; Andrés Reséndez, *A Land So Strange; The Epic Journey of Cabeza de Vaca* (New York, 2007), 91-132, is an accessible account of the Narváez expedition’s journey. For more details see Rolena Adorno and Patrick Charles Pautz, *Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca: His Account, His Life, and the Expedition of Pánfilo de Narváez* (3 vols. Lincoln, 1999). Volume 1 is the text in transcription and translation; Vol. s 2 and 3 are commentary on various parts of the story and on the creation,

22 Charles Hudson, *Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun, Hernando de Soto and the South's Ancient Chiefdoms* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 468 (strategy). The four 16th century accounts of De Soto's adventure and a number of other documents and studies are in Lawrence A. Clayton, Vernon James Knight, Jr., and Edward C. Moore (eds.), *The De Soto Chronicles; The Expedition of Hernando de Soto to North America, 1539-1543* (2 vols. Tuscaloosa, 1993). These volumes have been reprinted in paperback format. Hereafter *The DeSoto Chronicles*.

23 Contract, 20 April 1537, in *The DeSoto Chronicles, 1:360*. The evident intention, based on Peruvian examples, was to fix the boundaries using latitudes much as was the case with the later English grants in North America.

24 Hoffman, *Florida's Frontiers*, 36-37; quote from Rodrigo Rangel's account.

26 Hudson, Knights of Spain, 172, locates Cofitachequi at the Mulberry site at the junction of Pine Tree Creek and the Wateree River; Coosa’s location and nature is in ibid., 203-204. For a discussion of the paramount chiefdom of Coosa see David J. Hally, “The Chiefdom of Coosa,” in Hudson and Tesser, The Forgotten Centuries, 227-253.


28 Hoffman, New Andalucia, 174-181; first quote p. 176, second pp. 180-81, both from a deposition at Mexico City, 3 March 1562.


Hudson, *The Juan Pardo Expeditions* is the best account of the expedition and the Native American polities encountered. It incorporates the various reports and modern archaeological and ethnographic materials. For Archiniega see Lyon, *Enterprise of Florida*, 143, 147, 165-66.
33 “The Short Bandera Relation,” in Hudson, Juan Pardo Expeditions, 297-304 (transcription and translation by Paul E. Hoffman). Moyano’s Joara fort was abandoned in the face of Indian hostility and the withdrawal of the Archiniega reinforcement during 1568. When the garrison withdrew from Joara, a number of Native American women, reported in other Spanish documents as the wives and servants of the soldiers, left with it.

34 For example, “Martinez Relation,” in Hudson, Juan Pardo Expeditions, 319-21, is an account sworn at Santa Elena, 11 July 1567, highlighting the agricultural potential of Joara as “good in itself for bread and wine and all sorts of herded animals ... because it is a level land and has many sweet rivers and good groves” of trees and “much game, deer as well as hares and rabbits and hens and bears and lions.”

35 Lyon, Enterprise of Florida, 51; Hudson, Juan Pardo Expeditions, 173-77.


39 Hoffman, *Florida’s Frontiers*, 119-20, 134; 136-37 (ranching; see also note 36, above); 172-73 (other industries).

40 See Amy Turner Bushnell, *The King’s Coffer; Proprietors of the Spanish Florida Treasury, 1565-1702* (Gainesville, 1981) for the story of the family that fought with governors for domination of the colony and its economic opportunities.