Subject of Conscience: On the Relation between Freedom and Discrimination in the Thought of Heidegger, Foucault, and Butler

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Subject of Conscience: On the Relation between Freedom and Discrimination in the
Thought of Heidegger, Foucault, and Butler

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
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DEDICATION

To her.
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ABSTRACT

Martin Heidegger was not only one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century but also a supporter of and a contributor to one of the most discriminatory ideologies of the recent past. Thus, “the Heidegger’s case” gives us philosophers an opportunity to work on discrimination from a philosophical perspective. My aim in this essay is to question the relationship between freedom and discrimination via Heidegger’s philosophy. I will show that what bridges the gap between Heidegger’s philosophy and a discriminatory ideology such as the National Socialist ideology is Heidegger’s conceptualization of freedom with the aid of a monolithic understanding of history—one that refuses to acknowledge the plurality and heterogeneity in the socio-historical existence of human beings. Accordingly, I will claim that the Heideggerian freedom depends on the social, if not literal, murder of the marginalized segments of a given society.

However, I will refuse to conclude that Heidegger’s philosophy is a Nazi philosophy and that it should never be appropriated as long as we want to purify our thoughts from discriminatory ideas. Rather, I will re-appropriate Heidegger, against Heidegger, to read and interpret Michel Foucault’s and Judith Butler’s philosophies. My aim here is to construct a social ontology that may justify anti-discriminatory policies. More specifically, through my Heideggerian readings of Foucault and Butler, I will argue
that one’s freedom is dependent on the cultural resuscitation of socially, and sometimes literally, murdered racial, sexual, ethnic, religious, and sectarian/confessional minorities.
INTRODUCTION

Martin Heidegger became the first Nazi rector of the University of Freiburg on April 21, 1933 and joined the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeitepartei (NSDAP) on May 1, 1933. After Germany’s defeat in WWII, he defended himself on many occasions by saying that he had been an apolitical thinker until his assumption of the rectorate; he accepted the post and then became a party member reluctantly just because he thought he could protect the university from political intrusions without turning his back to the “positive” aspects of the National Socialist movement. Even during his rectorship, he was an apolitical professor engaging in no political activity; and due to his lack of political understanding, it took him a year to realize that there was nothing positive in the movement. Moreover, immediately after his resignation from his post on April 23, 1934, but especially in his Nietzsche lectures beginning with 1936, he criticized National Socialism as harshly as possible. This is the story Heidegger has stuck with for more than twenty years. He narrated the same story before the Denazification Committee in 1945—while he was trying not to lose his professorship because of his Nazi past—in his 1966 Der Spiegel interview, and in “The Rectorate 1933/1934: Facts and Thoughts.”

In his “Facts and Thoughts,” Heidegger claims that even though he was reluctant to assume the rectorate, his predecessors, Joseph Sauer and Wilhelm von Möllendorf, convinced him to be the new rector of the university; but the real motivation
behind his decision was his desire “to save, purify, and to strengthen what was positive” in the new political movement in Germany (Heidegger 1985b, p. 486):

Von Möllendorf … wanted me to assume the rectorate. Similarly his predecessor, Sauer, tried to persuade me to assume the office in the interest of university. I hesitated as late as the day of the election and wanted to withdraw my candidacy. I had no contact with the relevant government and party agencies, was myself neither a member of the party, nor had I been active politically in any way (ibid., p. 481).

After he reluctantly assumed the office, Heidegger adds, he found himself in a situation where he had to make another reluctant move, namely, party membership. He accepted the membership on the condition that he would not be bothered by any real-political task:

During my first weeks in office, it was called to my attention that the Minister thought it important that rectors belong to the party. One day Dr. Kerber, then the County Leader, the Deputy County Leader, and a third member of the County Leadership appeared in my office to invite me to join the party. Only in the interest of the university… did I, who had never belonged to a political party, accept the invitation, but this, too, only on the expressly acknowledged condition that I would never take on a party office or engage in any party activity (ibid., pp. 492-493).

Similar to his reluctance to get involved in politics, Heidegger continues, the NSDAP, too, was reluctant to include Heidegger in the movement. The first conflict between Heidegger and the movement took place when Heidegger refused the posting of the “Jew Notice” in his university and told the student leader that “as long as I was rector, this notice would find no place in this university” (ibid., p. 491). This was the first clash of opinions between Heidegger and the fascist movement, which would be followed by Heidegger’s “heroic” confrontation with Nazism in his Nietzsche lectures: “In 1936, I began the Nietzsche lectures. Anyone with ears to hear heard in these lectures a confrontation with National Socialism” (Heidegger 1991d, p. 101). Similarly, in his letter to the editor of Süddeutsche Zeitung in 1950, Heidegger writes, “during the last ten years
of my academic teaching career up until the autumn of 1944, I was engaged in an increasingly sharp intellectual conflict with and critique of the anti-intellectual foundations of the ‘National Socialist world-view’” (cited in Ott 1993, p. 29).

However, thanks to the archival works of Victor Farias (1989), Hugo Ott (1993), and Rüdiger Safranski (1998), we know today that the Heideggerian version of the story is not entirely true. First of all, even before his assumption of the rectorate, in March, Heidegger became a member of “the Cultural-Political Working Community of German University Teachers”—a National Socialist clique within the official association of university staff, “the German Academics’ Association.” The clique was known for its members’ support for Gleichschaltung—i.e., alignment of public institutions with the totalitarian state ideology—for the introduction of the Führerprinzip into German universities, and for the ideological transformation of teaching (Safranski 1998, p. 235). Secondly, contrary to the Heideggerian version, neither Sauer nor von Möllendorf tried to convince Heidegger to assume the rectorate. As a matter of fact, the rector Sauer thought Heidegger was not ready to preside over the university when he was approached, in April, by a Nazi professor, Wolfgang Schadewalt, and asked to nominate Heidegger for the rectorate instead of von Möllendorf for the sake of a smooth nazification of the university.

Moreover, Heidegger and his Nazi friends’ political endeavors were not limited to the persuasion of Sauer. They also contacted government officials. As we read in a report of 9 April 1933—written by one of the Nazi professors present in a meeting with “the new Nazi Secretary for higher education at the Ministry of Home Affairs in Karlsruhe,” Eugen Fehlre, who visited the University of Freiburg to discuss the nazification of the
university—Heidegger was the favorite of the Nazi professors of Freiburg and the Ministry:

To take the first point raised at our recent discussion, concerning the alliance of National Socialist university teachers, we have ascertained that Professor Heidegger has already entered into negotiations with the Prussian Ministry of Education. He enjoys our full confidence, and we would therefore ask you to regard him for the present as our spokesman here at the University of Freiburg. Professor Heidegger is not a party member, and he thinks it would be more practical to remain so for the time being in order to preserve a freer hand vis-à-vis his other colleagues whose position is either unclear still or openly hostile (cited in Ott 1993, p. 144).

Although Heidegger’s first attempt to seize the rectorial power was unsuccessful, considering that it was von Möllendorf who became the new rector of the University of Freiburg on April 15, von Möllendorf resigned from his post five days after he assumed the office and opened the way to Heidegger’s rectorship. Whereas von Möllendorf was considered by the Nazis a liberal and, hence, a potential obstacle to the nazification of the university, Heidegger’s rectorship was welcomed insofar as he was the one who would help the Nazis introduce the National Socialist ideology into the university. In this respect, it is illuminating to compare the reaction of the unofficial National Socialist newspaper, *Der Allemanne*, against von Möllendorf with what was written in the same newspaper about Heidegger’s seizure of the rectorial power:

It is evident that the work of reconstruction can only be successful if all those in positions of responsibility set about their task with fierce determination and energy. But that task is doomed to failure if men with old-fashioned scruples and liberal views oppose the process of *Gleichschaltung*. ... In our opinion the appointment of a man who holds such views is entirely out of keeping with the spirit and aims of the national revolution. Neither can we imagine how a common ground of trust could ever be established between Professor von Möllendorf and the student body, which is overwhelmingly National Socialist in its sympathies. ... We urge Professor von Möllendorf to seize the opportunity—and not to stand in the way of the reorganization of our university system (Ott 1993, p. 145).

The way has thus been paved for the University, whose organization and teaching work with young scholars must be in harmony with the guiding principles of the State, to pursue its development along the one true path (ibid., p. 147).
Such enthusiasm in the face of Heidegger’s rectorship was felt not only by Heidegger’s Nazi colleagues or *Der Alemannen*. Even the government officials saw Heidegger as their trusted collaborator. Mayor Kerber, for example, wrote on April 24, 1933 that Heidegger’s being the new rector of the University of Freiburg, that is, his being the “Führer of the university,” was “part of the general ‘training’ program and showed that the teaching corps was actively working to further the National Socialist revolution” (cited in Farias 1989, p. 85).

Hence, Heidegger was neither reluctant to be the first Nazi rector of the University of Freiburg nor distrusted by his Nazi friends at least until his resignation from the rectorate in 1934. Rather, he was supported enthusiastically by his fascist environment. And he did not disappoint his supporters insofar as he worked for the introduction of the Nazi ideology, *Gleichschaltung*, and the *Führerprinzip* into his university. He led, for example, several student/work camps beginning with October 10, 1933, in which even the SS (*Schutzstaffel*) officials were giving lectures on the Nazi ideology and its racism, and even the student-participants were required to wear either the SA (*Sturmabteilung*) or the SS uniform (Faye 2009, p. 65). Moreover, in line with the ideology of the Cultural-Political Working Community of German University Teachers, of which he was an active member, Heidegger did his best to bring the German Academics’ Association into line with the totalitarian state ideology—especially when he sent a telegram to his *Führer* Adolf Hitler on May 20, 1933 regarding “the much needed realignment of the Association”: “I respectfully request postponement of the planned reception for the Board of the Association of German Universities until such time as the much needed realignment of the Association in accordance with the aims of
Gleichschaltung has been accomplished” (cited in Ott 1993, pp. 194-195). He also did his best as rector to introduce the Führerprinzip into the university—first, by not calling the university senate for months and, second, by helping to draft the university reform in Baden in line with the Nazi ideology. Thanks to Heidegger and his Nazi colleagues, the new university constitution came into force in Baden, according to which university rectors would be appointed as Führer of their universities by the Ministry of Education; that is, the university senate would be functionless (Ott 1993, pp. 198-199).

Heidegger’s contributions to the National Socialist cause were not overlooked by his contemporaries. They were appreciated by his Nazi friends and criticized by his non-Nazi enemies. The Denazification Committee, for example, was quick to realize that it was Heidegger who did what he could to introduce the Nazi ideology into German universities: “he played a very active part in reshaping the university constitution in line with the new ‘Führerprinzip’” (cited in Ott, p. 199). As Sauer wrote in his diary, “This was Heidegger’s doing. ‘Finis universitatum’: the end of the universities” (ibid.). Similarly, Nazi officials were quick to pay back the debt of gratitude to Heidegger for his sacrifices. Even after his resignation from the rectorate, Heidegger was among the candidates for presiding over a future “Prussian Academy of Professors,” which would never come to life. The project was to build an academy for the ideological education of university professors. That is to say, Heidegger was very close to being the intellectual/spiritual leader of the fascist movement in Germany. He was asked by Mayor Kerber to share his proposals and plans for the Academy. We learn from Heidegger’s letter of 28 August 1934 that “The creation of the school for professors is to be determined by its objectives: to educate professors with the will and the ability to develop
the German university of the future” (cited in Farias 1989, p. 197). Heidegger describes the ultimate goal of this education thus: “Given their specific task, they [i.e., professors] are to be National Socialist members. It is not enough that they be politically safe, responsible representatives of their disciplines, but they must also be National Socialist in spirit” (ibid., p. 199).

Thus, Heidegger was in close contact with the NSDAP and worked for the realization of the National Socialist revolution at least until mid-1934. However, this does not mean that Heidegger was fooled by the Nazis who hid their discriminatory ideology under the disguise of revolution. Although it is true that the most discriminatory and anti-Semitic aspects of the movement became publicized beginning with 1937/38—especially when the Jews were dismissed from all professions, denied “tax benefits” and “state aids,” and lost the state protection for their religious congregation; in other words, when they became outlaws once and for all—the NSDAP has never shied away from exhibiting its totalitarian/discriminatory face (Mosse 1978, p. 210).

The burning of the Reichstag on February 27, 1933, for example, gave Hitler the opportunity to embark on his Communist witch-hunt. On March 24, Hitler became the dictator of Germany having the authority to draft legislation without parliamentary approval. On March 11, in line with the “Jewish Boycott” directed by Hitler himself all over Germany, Mayor Kerber initiated the boycott of Jewish businesses, including those of lawyers and physicians, in Baden (Farias 1989, p. 84). On April 7, “the Law on the Reestablishment of a Permanent Civil Service” was introduced, according to which those “non-Aryans” who had assumed their public posts after 1918 were expelled, including but not limited to Ernst Cassirer, Hans Reichenbach, Max Horkheimer, and Theodor
Adorno. A day before, the Reich Commissioner of Freiburg, Robert Wagner, ordered—even though his decree would be abrogated later—the expulsion of all Jewish officials from their posts such that Heidegger’s own teacher and early mentor, Edmund Husserl, would temporarily lose his job (Safranski 1998, p. 253). On May 10, 20,000 books, written by Jewish writers, were set on fire in Berlin Opera Square where the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, gave a speech (Sluga 1993, p. 125). On July 14, any party other than the NSDAP was outlawed. And finally, on September 15, 1935—the same year when Heidegger was praising the “uncorrupted” version of the National Socialist movement by discoursing on “the inner truth and greatness of this movement” (Heidegger 2000, p. 213)—“Laws to Protect German Blood”—later to be known as the “Nuremberg Laws”—were introduced, according to which Jews were banned from marrying and even having extramarital sexual relations with Aryans (Mosse 1978, p. 208).

As a result, Heidegger was not only one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century but also a supporter of and a contributor to one of the most discriminatory ideologies of the recent past. Accordingly, “the Heidegger’s case” may function for us philosophers as a philosophical/historical case-study for working on discrimination. My aim in this essay is to question the relationship between freedom and discrimination. The first three chapters of the essay are reserved to Heidegger’s philosophy. In the first chapter, I will describe Heidegger’s understanding of freedom. In the second chapter, I will depict the conservative German world Heidegger was born into, and read Heidegger’s philosophy in the context of this world. Then, I will show why the hegemonic way of conceptualizing the relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and
the National Socialist ideology is wrong. In the third chapter, I will claim that what bridges the gap between Heidegger’s understanding of freedom and a discriminatory ideology such as the National Socialist ideology is Heidegger’s conceptualization of freedom with the aid of a monolithic understanding of history—that is, Heidegger’s dogmatic belief that there is one heritage of the West to be appropriated by Germans, and Germans only as the unique descendants of the ancient Greeks, in overcoming the unitary source of every shortcoming in the modern era, which would help the Westerners create a unique future, one that would refer to the elimination of everything modern. I will claim that it is this understanding of history that makes the Heideggerian freedom depend on the social, if not literal, murder of minorities, insofar as it refuses to acknowledge the plurality and heterogeneity in the socio-historical existence of human beings.

In the fourth section, I will focus on the philosophy of one of the most important Heideggerians of the twentieth century, namely, Michel Foucault. I will interpret Foucault’s philosophy from the perspective of Heidegger, and claim that Foucault’s understanding of the nature and possibility of freedom has the exact same structure as Heidegger’s except that Foucault rejects monolithicity. Accordingly, I will conclude that the Heideggerian/Foucauldian understanding of freedom is neither discriminatory nor non-discriminatory. But what makes it dependent on the murder of minorities is its being peppered with the monolithic conceptualization of history.

In the last chapter, I will read one of the most important Foucauldians alive, namely, Judith Butler, from the perspective of the Heidegger of Being and Time in order to construct a social ontology that may justify anti-discriminatory policies. Due to this reading, I will claim that one’s freedom depends on the resuscitation of socially-
murdered racial, sexual, ethnic, religious, and sectarian/confessional minorities. More specifically, I will claim that only in a radical democratic society, in which a never-ending commitment to resuscitate minorities prevails in order to make minorities capable of challenging the hegemonic understanding of what it means to be, what it means to think, and what it means to act intelligibly, is freedom a social possibility for human beings. Accordingly, I will conclude that fighting for freedom and fighting against discrimination are two sides of the same coin.
CHAPTER 1: HEIDEGGER AND FREEDOM

In their last meeting in Rome in 1936, Heidegger told his ex-student Karl Löwith that it was his notion of historicity/historicality (Geschichtlichkeit) that drew him to National Socialism. Regarding that meeting, Löwith reports the following:

On our way back, I tried to induce him to comment freely on it. I turned the conversation to the controversy in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, and explained that I agreed neither with Barth’s political attack nor with Staiger’s defense, in so far as I was of the opinion that his partisanship for National Socialism lay in the essence of his philosophy. Heidegger agreed with me without reservation, and added that his concept of ‘historicity’ formed the basis of his political ‘engagement’” (Löwith 1994, p. 60).

What is the relation, then, of the Heideggerian understanding of historicity to discrimination? What is the relation of the Heideggerian understanding of historicity to freedom? And, lastly, what is the relationship between the way in which Heidegger conceptualized freedom and his support for a discriminatory ideology such as the National Socialist ideology? In this chapter, I will only explain what the Heidegger of the late 1920s and 1930s understands by historicity and freedom. In the first two sections, I will focus on the Heidegger of the late 1920s. The last section of this chapter, on the other hand, is reserved to the Heidegger of the 1930s.

1 The original version of this and the fourth chapter is published in the following article: Heidegger and Foucault: On the Relation between the Anxiety-Engendering-Truth and Being-towards-Freedom, Aret Karademir, Human Studies: A Journal for Philosophy and the Social Sciences 36(3), Copyright © (2013), (Springer). See Appendix for copyright information.
1.1. Inauthentic Historicity

In Heidegger’s view, it is phenomenologically wrong to conceptualize human existence as the existence of isolated, individual minds or egos imprisoned in extended bodies that are exposed to social and natural forces. That is, for Heidegger, human existence cannot be understood with the aid of a Cartesian model, which presupposes that human essence exclusively consists of a set of cognitive processes. This does not mean, however, that human existence is reducible to its material basis as if human beings were “present-at-hand” entities, thanks to the chemical composition of which they are endowed with the faculty of reason as a distinguishing property with respect to other life-forms, other living “present-at-hand” entities. Rather, Heidegger believes, human beings are worldly entities. To emphasize the worldly character of human existence, Heidegger uses the term Dasein, i.e., being-there, for human beings. Accordingly, Dasein is not “the egocentric individual, the ontic isolated individual,” but “Being-in-the-world” (Heidegger 1962, p. 65; Heidegger 1984b, p. 137).

In Heidegger’s terminology, the world refers neither to the collection of intraworldly entities nor to the extended space, in the background of which isolated individuals find one another, but to the public world, to the socio-historically shared world as Dasein’s context of intelligibility. Heidegger says, “the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is Being-with Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [Mitdasein]” (Heidegger 1962, p. 155). Therefore, for Heidegger, there is no such thing as an isolated mind living in its private world that is waiting for being put in communication with the private worlds of other minds. For “What is first is precisely the world in which
one is with one another. It is out of this world that one can first more or less genuinely grow into his world” (Heidegger 1985a, p. 246).

More specifically, the world Dasein is born into, or as Heidegger likes to say, “thrown” (geworfen) into, is the shared context of intelligibility of a historical community that determines the parameters of intelligible ways of existence, intelligible patterns of conduct, intelligible modes of interpreting beings, and intelligible forms of self-understanding for human beings. To wit, it is the socio-historically shared world as the context of intelligibility that defines what it means to be, say, a woman, a German, or a philosopher, what it means to be a good lawyer or annoying noise, what it means to be a successful or wasted life; in short, as Hubert Dreyfus (2006) formulates it, “what it is for anything to be,” together with “a background understanding of what matters and what it makes sense to do, on the basis of which we can direct our actions” (p. 351). Put in Heidegger’s words, in every socio-historically shared world prevails an “understanding of Being,” of “that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which [woraufhin] entities are already understood” (Heidegger 1962, pp. 25-26).

Therefore, Being-in-the-world does not mean to be contained in the world as nature, but it means to be socialized into one’s culture, to be initiated into the norms, conventions, and standards of the public world, to be familiar with and to have the practical knowledge of what John Haugeland (1982) calls “The total assemblage of norms for a conforming community” (p. 17). To be Dasein, then, is to have an understanding of Being. To wit, “that which we call the understanding-of-being belongs to Dasein’s ontological constitution” (Heidegger 1984b, p. 16). As a result, Heidegger’s anti-Cartesian and anti-naturalist way of conceptualizing human existence is based on the
understanding of human beings as the *socio-historical products* of the processes of socialization, enculturation, and normalization. Heidegger writes,

In its factual Being, any Dasein is as it already was, and it is ‘what’ it already was. It *is* its past. … Whatever the way of being it may have at the time, and thus with whatever understanding of Being it may possess, Dasein has grown up both into and in a traditional way of interpreting itself: in terms of this it understands itself proximally and, within a certain range, constantly. By this understanding, the possibilities of its Being are disclosed and regulated. Its own past—and this always means the past of its ‘generation’—is not something which *follows along after* Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it (Heidegger 1962, p. 41).

Accordingly, Dasein becomes what it is by projecting itself upon the possibilities the world it is socialized into offers; that is, by projecting itself upon “possible ways for it to be,” or as Heidegger puts it in his 1927 lecture-course, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, upon “a possibility of being-in-the-world” (Heidegger 1962, p. 67; Heidegger 1982b, p. 278). To be more specific, Dasein acquires its identity by *performing* certain socio-historically possible roles in certain socio-historically possible ways, by appropriating certain social norms and conventions in taking its life-course into a socio-historically viable direction, by taking a socio-historically possible stance on its life as it lives, by interpreting its own self in socio-historically intelligible ways and by acting accordingly. The way Dasein lives its life and the way it relates to its Being by *performing* the social possibilities in certain ways make Dasein a particular type of individual. Dasein’s *performances* and stances in life add up to make each individual Dasein acquire its distinctive identity. That is to say, as Charles Guignon (1983) puts it, Heidegger believes “we are all composing our autobiographies as we live” (p. 93). In this respect, Dasein is, *always already*, “Being-towards-death” (Heidegger 1962, p. 294)—not in the sense of being towards the end of its mortal life, but in the sense of being towards the “final configuration” of its identity (Guignon 1983, p. 134). Hence, as Heidegger says

Since Dasein becomes what it is by projecting itself upon socio-historically possible ways of existence, since Dasein acquires its identity by projecting itself upon the final configuration of its life through *performing* “possible ways for it to be,” Dasein is never complete. It is always on the way to its completion. It is always “in its process of realization” (Heidegger 1984b, p. 139). That is, it is “already *ahead* of itself;” “beyond itself,” because “there is *constantly something still to be settled*” for Dasein as long as Dasein is alive (Heidegger 1962, pp. 236, 279). Thus, as Stephen Mulhall (2007) puts it, Dasein is “intrinsically non-self-identical” (p. 309). Accordingly, Dasein’s identity does not refer to the unconcealment of its ahistorical, asocial, self-identical essence, but to what Dasein is in the *process* of making of itself by *performing* socio-historically contingent possibilities in socio-historically contingent ways. To wit, Dasein’s essence is *performative*; it is the end-product of Dasein’s historically situated performances. There is nothing in Dasein that is not socially constructed and that is not interpreted from the perspective of socio-historically contingent patterns of interpretation and self-interpretation. In Heidegger’s words, “any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities” (Heidegger 1962, p. 185).

However, this does not mean that Dasein creates itself out of nothing. The performative character of Dasein’s essence does not refer to creation *ex nihilo*. For Dasein has to *cite* socio-historically contingent terms, conventions, norms, and roles to
acquire its essence. In Heidegger’s terminology, this means Dasein is guilty (schuldig). This is an original guilt that no Dasein can get rid of. To wit, “so far as any Dasein factically exists, it is also guilty” (ibid., p. 326). Dasein is, always already, guilty because it is, always already, alienated from itself. For Dasein becomes what it is thanks to the discretion of what is outside of itself. That is to say, Dasein acquires its identity by being socialized into an historically contingent world and by being initiated into the terms, conventions, norms, and roles that are not of its own making.

It is true that Dasein has no universal, ahistorical essence that forces Dasein to be what it is. In this respect, Dasein builds and has to build its identity on its own. It is the necessary ground of itself. But it is not the absolute ground because it always finds itself in a particular context of intelligibility and as a particular type of being, that is, as a placeholder of its sedimented identity, its not-yet-finalized but already cumulated self, habits, and preferences. Accordingly, Dasein has to take over its thrown, partially finalized identity to construct and complete its own self. However, whatever it does and the way it does what it does to build its identity are always contingent upon its historically contingent world and the historically contingent possibilities this world offers. Hence, Dasein’s existence is imbued with indebtedness (Verschuldung), insofar as Dasein owes (verschuldet) its very identity to what is outside of itself, to the socio-historically contingent possibilities. Heidegger writes, “Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities. It is never existent before its basis, but only from it and as this basis. Thus, ‘Being-a-basis’ means never to have power over one’s ownmost Being from the ground up” (ibid., p. 330).
Dasein has no power over its own self from the ground up also because it has to, in constructing itself, project itself upon some possibilities at the expense of not projecting itself upon others, even though it does not and will never have ahistorical, universal justification for its projections. That is, Dasein is absolutely powerless before the disturbing existential fact that “in having a potentiality-for-Being it always stands in one possibility or another: it constantly is not other possibilities” (ibid., p. 331). And there is nothing in Dasein’s own self that justifies Dasein’s choices regarding its futural projections. That is to say, for Heidegger, Dasein is “non-self-identical” not only because for Dasein to exist means to be incomplete, but also because it is originally self-alienated, it is existentially guilty.

As a result, Heidegger conceptualizes human existence according to the model of what we might call “event ontology.” For, as we have seen above, he takes Dasein not to be an unconcealment or instantiation of the universal, ahistorically self-identical human essence, but to be an historically situated existence that is headed towards its realization. That is, for Heidegger, Dasein’s existence is both embedded within a historical culture and directed towards its futural realization. Therefore, as Guignon puts it, Dasein’s existence refers not to a static presence, but to “an ongoing process pointing towards its realization and completion,” to “an unfolding life-story”—a story that unfolds itself from Dasein’s birth to death, i.e., from Dasein’s thrownness to its final configuration, from its historically situated, sedimented existence to its identity as the end-product of its socio-historically possible performances (Guignon 1983, p. 88; Guignon 1992, p. 132). Heidegger writes, “Dasein stretches along between birth and death”; “The specific movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along, we call its
‘historizing’ [Geschehen, happening]” (Heidegger 1962, pp. 425, 427). Heidegger calls this historically situated historizing character of human existence (das Geschehen des Daseins) Dasein’s “historicity” or “historicality” (Geschichtlichkeit) (ibid., p. 428).

However, Heidegger claims, Dasein’s everyday historization, its everyday state of Being-in-the-world, is not genuine. Since Dasein becomes what it is by being socialized into its public world, since it acquires its own identity by being initiated into the intelligible patterns of conduct, interpretation, and self-understanding of its shared life-world, that is, since, as Guignon puts it, Dasein’s “actions become meaningful and human to the extent that they instantiate common interpretations of what it is to be human” and “exemplify the taken-for-granted patterns and norms of the shared life-world,” Dasein is, proximally and for the most part, lost within its familiar environment, its reified context of intelligibility, its calcified tradition and traditional ways of Being-in-the-world (Guignon 1983, p. 108; Guignon 2006, p. 278). Put differently, since Dasein has to perform social possibilities as how One (das Man, the They) performs them in Dasein’s socio-historically shared world in order to acquire its intelligible identity, since, as Dreyfus (1991) puts it, Dasein is nothing but “an embodiment of the one,” Dasein has a tendency to lose itself in an anonymous existence, in the anonymity of conformism (p. 159). This is the reason why Heidegger says, “By ‘Others’ we do not mean everyone else but me—those over against whom the ‘I’ stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself—those among whom one is too” (Heidegger 1962, p. 154).

In Heidegger’s view, to be lost in one’s familiar world, to be vanished, as it were, in an anonymous existence, means to blindly embrace “that way of interpreting the world
and Being-in-the-world which lies closest”—one that “the ‘they’ itself prescribes”—as if it were natural and inevitable, as if it demanded absolute and almost automatic obedience, as if it did not require problematization and genuine interrogation (ibid., p. 167).

Heidegger writes, in its everyday, anonymous historization, Dasein
develop[s] the supposition that Dasein’s disclosedness, which is so available and so prevalent, can guarantee to Dasein that all the possibilities of its Being will be secure, genuine, and full. Through the self-certainty and decidedness of the “they”, it gets spread abroad increasingly that there is no need of authentic understanding or the state-of-mind that goes with it. The supposition of the “they” that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine ‘life’, brings Dasein a tranquility, for which everything is ‘in the best of order’ and all doors are open (ibid., p. 222).

Thus, in its everydayness, Dasein loses its distinctive individuality more and more. It does not stand by itself. It falls away from itself. That is, in its everyday historization, it is not itself at all. Hence, the conformist Dasein does not own itself but turns away from its own (eigen, authentic) self into anonymity. It is inauthentic. It is the They; more correctly, it is devoured by “the real dictatorship of the ‘they’.” Heidegger says,

This Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of ‘the Others’, in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the “they” is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking (ibid., p. 164).

Hence, inauthentic Dasein does not take the responsibility of constructing its identity as its own by genuinely choosing the social possibilities its world offers; that is, without taking them for granted. It chooses certain social possibilities in its futural projections not because it clear-sightedly commits itself to becoming a particular type of Being-in-the-world, but because the One presents those possibilities as worth choosing.
To wit, it does not choose itself, and it does not *choose to choose* the norms, conventions, and standards of its world from the perspective of what it *genuinely chooses* to become. Rather, it follows the One blindly; it *imitates* what One does almost instinctively. It *passively receives* what is handed down to it by the One. That is to say, “the particular Dasein in its everydayness is *disburdened* by the ‘they’” (ibid., p. 165). It loses its accountability and “its answerability” (ibid.). Heidegger writes,

> With Dasein’s lostness in the “they”, that factical potentiality-for-Being which is closest to it (the tasks, rules, and standards, the urgency and extent, of concernful and solicitous Being-in-the-world) has already been decided upon. ... The “they” even hides the manner in which it has tacitly relieved Dasein of the burden of explicitly choosing these possibilities. It remains indefinite who has ‘really’ done the choosing. So Dasein make no choices, gets carried along by the nobody, and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity” (ibid., p. 312).

Thus, in its inauthentic state of existence, Dasein does not realize that its world and the intelligible possibilities this world offers are neither natural nor inevitable, that they are insignificant in themselves, that they are historically contingent and without internal justification. It does not realize that what One does, that is, the taken-for-granted possibilities of Dasein’s socio-historical world, do not force themselves upon human beings, they do not demand unconditional obedience, but *Dasein itself has to choose* them in order to *become* what it is, even though it will never have universal, ahistorical justification for its choices, and even though it will never have the power to overcome its original self-alienation insofar as its choices are and will always be contingent upon the terms, norms, and conventions that are not of its own making. To wit, inauthentic Dasein suppresses the *existential truth* of its Being-in-the-world, namely, its contingency, performativity, and existential culpability. As Heidegger puts it, inauthentic Dasein “covers up its ownmost Being-towards-death,” its “authentic potentiality for Being its Self,” i.e., its performative identity as an historically situated, ongoing project to be
accomplished, as an always self-alienated, unfolding life-story to be completed (ibid., pp. 220, 295).

Accordingly, in Heidegger’s view, inauthentic Dasein pretends to have an already established essence, “such as substance” or some sort of ahistorical human nature that does not require Dasein to authentically project itself upon social possibilities in order to become what it is—as if Dasein were a “present-at-hand” entity like a stone or a tree with a fixed set of qualities (ibid., p. 365). In other words, inauthentic Dasein “gets its ontological understanding of itself in the first instance from those entities which it itself is not but which it encounters ‘within’ its world, and from the Being which they possess”; and, thereby, it soothes the anxiety (Angst) occasioned by Dasein’s non-delegable task to build its identity without having a universal or natural guidance, and without having the possibility of being the absolute ground of itself. Instead, inauthentic Dasein stays content with the familiarity and homeliness of its world and the comforting taken-for-grantedness of what One does (ibid., p. 85).

As a result, in its everyday, inauthentic historization, Dasein falls into the soothing, conformist anonymity, and “flee[s] into the ‘at home’ of publicness”; it “flee[s] in the face of the ‘not-at-home’,” “in the face of uncanniness which lies in Dasein” (ibid., p. 234). Hence, it flees in the face of its anxiety-engendering existential truth, and turns away from its authentic self. Therefore, inauthentic Dasein’s “turning-away of falling” does not refer to its mundane fears in the face of worldly entities, but is “grounded rather in anxiety” (ibid., p. 230). As Heidegger puts it in his 1925 lecture-course, History of the Concept of Time, inauthentic Dasein flees from “being-threatened” by anxiety, by “the phenomenon which we call dread [Angst]” (Heidegger 1985a, pp. 283, 284).
1.2. Authentic Historicity

According to Heidegger, it is only anxiety that can free Dasein “from its absorption in the ‘world’,” from being lost within its calcified context of intelligibility and reified social roles, from turning into a social automaton; that is, from its inauthentic historization (Heidegger 1962, p. 233). For thanks to anxiety, Dasein’s context of intelligibility, its meaningful context which provides Dasein with the intelligible possibilities of conduct, interpretation, and self-understanding, collapses. In other words, thanks to anxiety, Dasein’s world and the intelligible possibilities this world offers sink into insignificance. Dasein’s familiar world is disclosed in its utter meaninglessness, in its naked unfamiliarity. The world is still there for Dasein, but it has lost its unquestioned intelligibility. “The utter insignificance,” writes Heidegger, “does not signify that the world is absent, but tells us that entities within-the-world are of so little importance in themselves that on the basis of this insignificance of what is within-the-world, the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself” (ibid., p. 231). Hence, anxiety prevents Dasein from taking its world and the worldly possibilities for granted as if they were natural and inevitable, and, thereby, from being lost within its conformist anonymity.

Accordingly, anxious Dasein “enters into the existential ‘mode’ of the ‘not-at-home’”; it “feels ‘uncanny’” (ibid., p. 233). Deprived of the soothing tales of the conformist existence, that is, lacking the possibility of blindly appealing to calcified and reified interpretations of, say, what it means to be human and what it means to lead a meaningful life, Dasein is “disclosed to itself in some distinctive way,” in its naked facticity (ibid., p. 226). More specifically, what anxiety as Dasein’s “one of the most farreaching and most primordial possibilities of disclosure” reveals to Dasein is that
Dasein is contingent, performative, and existentially guilty (ibid.). Heidegger says, in anxiety, Dasein is disclosed to itself “as a naked ‘that it is and has to be’” while its “‘whence’ and ‘whither’ remain in darkness,” “as thrown Being-towards-death” (ibid., pp. 173, 395). In other words, since thanks to anxiety, Dasein loses the possibility of taking its world and the intelligible possibilities this world offers for granted, since it loses the possibility of finding comfort in what One does, and since it loses the possibility of interpreting its own self, without further problematization, by appealing to the calcified world ruled by “the real dictatorship of the ‘they’,” Dasein realizes that it is thrown into a historically contingent world and initiated into this world’s intrinsically insignificant terms, norms, and conventions. It realizes that it did not choose to be born into this world, even though it has to be in this world by performing historically contingent possibilities in historically contingent ways. That is to say, Dasein realizes that it has to build its identity on its own. However, neither its public world nor anything in its own self such as self-identical substance or ahistorical human essence will provide Dasein with intrinsically meaningful, universal justification for its performances and for its identity-constructions. Yet, Dasein has to make something of itself and what it does always refers to a social possibility, i.e., it is always contingent upon the terms, norms, and conventions that are not of Dasein’s own making. Heidegger writes,

In anxiety, what is environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away, and so, in general, do entities within the world. The ‘world’ can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of Others. Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about—its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities. Therefore, with that which it is anxious about, anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible (ibid., p. 232).
Accordingly, anxiety reveals to Dasein that Dasein’s identity does not refer to an unconcealment of its eternally fixed essence, but to an historically situated, originally self-alienated, unfolding life-story to be completed. To wit, anxiety frees Dasein not only from being lost within its calcified world but also for standing by itself, for taking the responsibility of constructing itself as its own, for choosing itself rather than blindly embracing what One does. In Heidegger’s words, “Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being—that is, its Being-free for the freedom for choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for the authenticity of its Being” (ibid.).

As a result, in Heidegger’s view, anxiety does not refer to an alien intrusion; that is, being-anxious does not refer to being possessed by what is outside of Dasein, but to the awakening of what is suppressed in inauthentic historization, to the disclosure of what Dasein truly is, namely, contingent, performative, and guilty. Heidegger says, in his 1929 inaugural lecture to the University of Freiburg, “the original anxiety in existence is usually repressed. Anxiety is there. It is only sleeping” (Heidegger 1993a, p.106).

However, it is important to keep in mind that, for Heidegger, anxiety is not a state of mind; it is not a psychological phenomenon. Heidegger’s aim in describing the nature of anxiety is not to depict “subjectively coloured experiences or epiphenomenal manifestations of psychological life” (Heidegger 1995, p. 283). Similarly, being-anxious, being-exposed to the anxiety-engendering disclosure of Dasein’s existential truth, does not refer just to being conscious of and knowledgeable in the properties of human existence. As Heidegger puts it in his 1929/30 lecture-course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, “to awaken,” as it were, anxiety “cannot mean simply to make
conscious” of that “which was previously unconscious” (ibid., p. 61). For being-anxious is a “fundamental attunement,” “a fundamental manner,” a “fundamental way in which Dasein is as Dasein” (ibid., p. 67). It is a way in which Dasein is Being-in-the-world, a way in which Dasein relates to its own Being and to other beings, including other Daseins. Heidegger says, “Attunements are the fundamental ways in which we find ourselves disposed in such and such a way. Attunements are the ‘how’ [Wie] according to which one is such and such a way” (ibid.).

Hence, being-anxious refers to leading a particular sort of life. It refers to be in a particular state of existence. As the term anxiety [Angst] in German traditionally refers to, it is to be in “a kind of state that is linked with uncertainty and with a sense of vulnerability” (Wierzbicka 1999, p. 136). Accordingly, being-anxious means to lead an insecure life, that is, to historize without suppressing the disturbing existential truth about human existence, without finding comfort in what One does, without reifying what is historically contingent and without naturalizing what is performative. It is to face one’s contingency, performativity, and existential culpability. Therefore, it is to live an unhomely, as it were, life, and to let the unhomely way of existence flourish in one’s Being-in-the-world, i.e., “to let it become awake” (Heidegger 1995, p. 61).

Heidegger calls such unhomely Being-in-the-world authentic. For him, authentic Dasein is the one which “‘choose[s]’ itself and win[s] itself,” rather than “lose itself and never win itself” (Heidegger 1962, p. 68). To wit, authentic Dasein is the one which takes the responsibility of constructing itself without pretending to have the absolute knowledge of “whence” and “whither.” It clear-sightedly, i.e., without being tranquilized by the soothing nature of the homeliness, commits itself to a social possibility, or to a set
of social possibilities, in order to build its identity as its own. Hence, authentic Dasein “choose[s] itself on purpose,” rather than blindly choosing, i.e., passively receiving, what is handed down to it—rather than being lost “in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon one” (Heidegger 1962, p. 308; Heidegger 1982b, p. 170). Thus, authentic choosing refers to “the choosing to choose a kind of Being-one’s-Self” (Heidegger 1962, p. 314). It involves a second-order choice. Heidegger calls such second-order choice “resoluteness.” To be resolute, then, is to commit oneself to certain social possibilities without suppressing one’s anxiety-engendering contingency, performativity, and existential culpability. It is to be “transparent” (durchsichtig) to oneself (Heidegger 1962, p. 187).

Not to suppress one’s contingency, performativity, and existential culpability means to realize that one has to build one’s identity by projecting oneself upon those historically contingent social possibilities that are not of one’s own making. It is to realize that one has no fixed essence, no universally valid, intrinsically sacred norm or convention at one’s disposal that forces itself upon human beings, that relieves one of one’s non-delegable, in Heidegger’s terminology, “non-relational” and “not to be outstripped,” task of Being-towards-oneself (ibid., p. 294). It is to realize that “all Being-alongside the things with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others, will fail us when our ownmost potentiality-for-Being is the issue” (ibid., p. 308). And since projecting oneself upon certain social possibilities refers to projecting oneself upon what is outside of oneself, that is, to the thrown-projection and thereby original self-alienation, authentic Being-towards-oneself, i.e., embracing one’s “ownmost potentiality-for-Being,”
is also to embrace one’s existential guilt; it is to listen to the voice of one’s “conscience.”

Heidegger writes,

The appeal [of conscience] calls back by calling-forth: it calls Dasein forth to the possibility of taking over, in existing, even that thrown entity which it is; it calls Dasein back to its thrownness so as to understand this thrownness as the null basis which it has to take up into existence (ibid., p. 333).

Accordingly, authentic Dasein is “wanting to have a conscience,” where “wanting to have a conscience” amounts to “a readiness for anxiety,” a readiness for the disturbing existential fact that Dasein has to take the responsibility of writing its life-story by taking over its historically situated, originally self-alienated, sedimented identity (ibid., p. 342). In his 1930 lecture-course, *The Essence of Human Freedom*, Heidegger conceptualizes such self-transparent and resolute taking-the-responsibility-of-oneself, via his peculiar reading of Kant, as “positive freedom.” Hence, positive freedom, for Heidegger, means to “give to oneself the law for one’s action,” instead of passively receiving what is inauthentically valued in one’s historical community; it means to be “capable of accountability” and “self-responsibility,” instead of being lost in anonymity; in short, it means to be “willing to take responsibility” for one’s self by constructing oneself as one’s own (Heidegger 2005, pp. 15, 182, 193).

However, it is important to keep in mind that, for Heidegger, creating-oneself-as-one’s-own refers neither to creation *ex nihilo* nor to blatant voluntarism. That is to say, the Heideggerian freedom is not the absolute freedom; being-authentic is by no means to be completely beyond the shackles of one’s traditional community. For Dasein is not “a free-floating ‘I’” (Heidegger 1962, p. 344). Rather, as we have seen above, it becomes what it is by being initiated into the norms, conventions, and standards of its socio-historically shared world. Therefore, Dasein is—be it authentic or not—destined to
interpret itself and other entities around it within the parameters of its everyday context of intelligibility. Heidegger writes, “This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the first instance, with never a possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all rediscovering and appropriating anew, are performed” (ibid., p. 213, emphasis mine).

Accordingly, in Heidegger’s view, to be authentically free, that is, to resolutely project oneself upon certain social possibilities in order to build oneself as one’s own without suppressing one’s contingency, performativity, and existential culpability, is to resolutely and clear-sightedly retrieve the traditional possibilities—not as taken-for-granted norms that require passive and blind reception, not as that which are demanded by human nature or ex rerum natura, in short, not as the loci of comfort, but as the offerings of one’s “heritage.” Heidegger says, “The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over” (ibid., p. 435). Retrieving or repeating the traditional possibilities resolutely means to treat one’s tradition and traditional world as those socio-historically contingent sources from which one can draw role-models or guidelines as the objects of one’s commitments in writing one’s life-story, in anticipating the final configuration of one’s identity:

The resoluteness … becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us. Repeating is handing down explicitly—that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there. The authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been—the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero—is grounded existentially in anticipatory resoluteness (ibid., p. 437, emphasis mine).
However, for Heidegger, repetition does not refer to imitation or blind conservation. For it has not only a “monumental” and “antiquarian” but also a “critical” aspect. That is to say, authentic repetition refers, on the one hand, to “the possibility of reverently preserving the existence that has been there,” reverently preserving “the ‘monumental’ possibilities of human existence,” of the ones that molded one’s socio-historical community into its present form (ibid., p. 448). But on the other hand, to reverently preserve is to re-appropriate what has been handed down to one critically and creatively in order to attack the calcified and reified status of what is taken for granted, in order to “loosen up,” that is, “this hardened tradition” (ibid., p. 44):

when one has, by repetition, handed down to oneself a possibility that has been, the Dasein that has been there is not disclosed in order to be actualized over again. ... Rather, the repetition makes a reciprocative rejoinder to the possibility of that existence which has been there. But when such a rejoinder is made to this possibility ... it is at the same time a disavowal of that which in the “today”, is working itself out as the ‘past’ (ibid., pp. 437-438).

The critical and creative aspects of repetition are the sine qua non for authenticity and freedom, because if the taken-for-granted context of intelligibility is not de-calcified and de-reified by critical and creative re-appropriations of the traditional possibilities, then what has been handed down to Dasein functions as self-evident, as ahistorical and asocial, as natural and inevitable such that Dasein’s tradition becomes not the source from which Dasein can draw guidelines to authentically compose its life-story but the locus of anonymity, conformism, and lostness. In Heidegger’s words,

When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial ‘sources’ from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite generally drawn. Indeed it makes us forget that they have had such an origin (ibid., p. 43).
Accordingly, authenticity/freedom is not about “what” one does; it is not about the “content” of one’s projections. Rather, it is about “how” one appropriates the traditional possibilities of Being-in-the-world. It is about the “style” (Guignon 1983, p. 140; Guignon 1985, p. 334). To wit, “authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon” (Heidegger 1962, p. 224). Put differently, freedom from being lost within the world one is born into and freedom for building one’s identity as one’s own, for the final configuration of one’s self, are not about turning away from the context of intelligibility one is socialized into, and thereby embracing unintelligibility, but about authentically historizing between birth and death. That is to say, for Heidegger, freedom is authentic historization. It is “authentic historicality” (ibid., p. 448). It is to commit oneself to a set of socio-historical possibilities in order to construct one’s identity as one’s own without finding comfort in what One does, without being lost within the taken-for-granted world and its reified possibilities, without suppressing one’s anxiety-engendering existential truth. It is to authentically repeat the traditional possibilities and, thereby, historize between one’s birth and death, one’s historical situatedness and completion, one’s past and future. It is, as opposed to inauthentic historization, which “only retains and receives the ‘actual’ that is left over,” to re-appropriate one’s heritage resolutely, creatively, critically, anxiously, and with self-transparency (ibid., p. 443).

Therefore, it is, instead of leading an inconsistent life by passively receiving what One does and what One values at the time, to find “the constancy of the Self” in a committed life, in the critical and creative continuity between the past and the future, in “steadiness which has been stretched along”—the steadiness with which Dasein as fate ‘incorporates’
into its existence birth and death and their ‘between’, and holds them as thus ‘incorporated’” (ibid., pp. 369, 442).

As a result, for the Heidegger of the late 1920s, and especially for the Heidegger of *Being and Time*, freedom is about creatively and critically repeating the socio-historical possibilities of existence in order to construct an authentic identity, and in order to question the self-evident status of the calcified, naturalized, and, hence, anxiety-soothing, as it were, norms and conventions. However, as we have seen above, the precondition of authenticity/freedom is the unconcealment of the anxiety-engendering truth that uncovers what is covered up in the inauthentic state of existence, namely, Dasein’s contingency, performativity, and existential culpability. But what is the source of anxiety? What leads one into the state of anxiety? The Heidegger of the late 1920s does not formulate an answer to these questions. He rather prefers to let anxiety remain as *mystical* as it can be. He claims, for example, “anxiety can awaken in existence at any moment. It needs no unusual event to rouse it” (Heidegger 1993a, p. 106). As we will see in the next section, for the Heidegger of the 1930s, on the other hand, anxiety is *engendered* by genuine repetitions—ones that are potential *paradigm-changing*, *world-transforming*, *calcification-dissipating* events. Thus, in the 1930s, the concept of repetition acquires *revolutionary* overtones. That is, the Heidegger of the 1930s conceptualizes repetition as what I will call *subversive repetition*—one that aims to transform the traditional world in order to open up a new context of intelligibility. Accordingly, in the next section, I will investigate the relationship between freedom, anxiety, truth, and subversion as is formulated by Heidegger in the 1930s.
1.3. Subversive Historicity

In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger claims that it is the art-work that “opens up a world,” a context of intelligibility that grants to a historical community a particular understanding of Being (Heidegger 1993b, p. 169). That is, the art-work “institute[s] the measure of the epoch” (Dastur 1999, p. 136). It is responsible for the unconcealment of Being to a historical people. Accordingly, it is the art-work that “opens up in its own way the Being of beings. This opening up, i.e., this revealing, i.e., the truth of beings, happens in the work” (Heidegger 1993b, p. 165). Hence, it is the art-work functioning, as Dreyfus (2006) puts it, as a “cultural paradigm” that generates, thanks to the understanding of Being it grants, a clearing, an open space, within which beings—be it human or not—acquire their intelligibility and intelligible identity (p. 354). In Heidegger’s words, the art-work “liberate[s] the free space of the open region,” and “Beings can be as beings only if they stand within and stand out within what is cleared in this clearing. Only this clearing grants and guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that we ourselves are not, and access to the being that we ourselves are” (Heidegger 1993b, pp. 170, 178).

However, Heidegger uses the art-work in his 1936 article just as an exemplar for world-generating works. For in his view, the world is opened up, and thereby the Being of beings is unconcealed, also by political, religious, and philosophical works—that is, by “the act that founds a political state,” “the essential sacrifice,” and “the thinker’s questioning” (ibid., pp. 186-187) In other words, as Heidegger argues in his 1935 lecture-course, Introduction to Metaphysics, the socio-historically shared world of a particular community, within which a particular understanding of Being prevails, is opened up not
only by “the work of the word as poetry” or “the work of stone in temple and statue,” but also by “the work of the word as thinking” and “the work of the polis” (Heidegger 2000, p. 204).

It is the genuine works in general, then, that structure the context of intelligibility, within the parameters of which beings are interpreted in particular ways, i.e., they become what they are. Heidegger writes, thanks to the work, “Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter into their distinctive shapes and thus come to appear as what they are”; the work “first gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves” (Heidegger 1993b, p. 168). Hence, it is the work that determines not only the intelligible ways of interpreting or conceptualizing beings as what they are but also the intelligible ways of self-understanding for human beings. Put in the terminology of Being and Time, it is the work that grants to Dasein those social possibilities upon which it can project itself in order to acquire its identity. Accordingly, it is the work that defines for the members of a historical community what matters and what does not, what is valuable and what is not, what is worth pursuing and what is not. In Heidegger’s words, the work “puts up for decision what is holy and what unholy, what great and what small, what brave and what cowardly, what lofty and what flighty, what master and what slave” (ibid., p. 169).

As a result, for Heidegger, there is no being that does not acquire its beingness, its intelligibility, and, for that matter, unintelligibility, within the context of intelligibility. To wit, there is no thing in itself. Not only what is conceptualized as inside but also what is regarded as outside the socio-historical context of intelligibility, indeed, the very distinction between what is historical and what is not, what is central and what is
marginal, what is phenomenal and what is beyond the domain of intelligibility, and what belongs to the nature of things and what is historically contingent, is always located within the socio-historically shared world, which is brought into existence by genuine works:

By the opening up of a world, all things gain their lingering and hastening, *their remoteness and nearness, their scope and limits* (ibid., p. 170, emphasis mine).

Thanks to this clearing, beings are unconcealed in certain changing degrees. And yet *a being can be concealed, as well, only within the sphere of what is cleared* (ibid., p. 178, emphasis mine).

Through the artwork, as Being that is *<das seiende Sein>*, *everything else that appears and that we can find around us first becomes confirmed and accessible, interpretable and understandable, as a being, or else as an unbeing* (Heidegger 2000, p. 169, emphasis mine).

However, it is important to keep in mind that, for Heidegger, the work does not create the world out of nothing. That is, the world opened up by the work is not a creation *ex nihilo*, a novelty of genius. For the work, in order to open up the world, has to *re-appropriate* what Dreyfus calls “the scattered practices of a group”; it has to *re-appropriate* the not-yet-unified background intelligibility of a historical community with its not-yet-fully-shaped understanding of Being. It unifies these practices and turns the unified whole into that which functions as a cultural paradigm, on the model of which the contours of the socio-historically shared world are structured, and the residents of this world are granted their “shared understanding of Being” (Dreyfus 2006, p. 354; Dreyfus 2007, p. 410). In Heidegger’s words, it is the work that “fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being” (Heidegger 1993b, p. 167).
Heidegger calls such background intelligibility “the earth.” Thus, in Heidegger’s terminology, the earth refers, as Gregory Fried (2000) points out, to the “historical givenness of meaning,” to the historical “givenness of the sense of Being” (pp. 56, 61). Hence, the world is a traditionally grounded world. It is rooted in its tradition and the traditional understanding of Being. Heidegger writes, the work “opens up a world and at the same time sets this world back again on earth” (Heidegger 1993b, p. 168). Similarly, the work owes its world-generating power, as it were, to the re-appropriation of what has been handed down to it by its tradition. In Heidegger’s words, “the work sets itself back into the massiveness and heaviness of stone, into the firmness and pliancy of wood, into the hardness and luster of metal, into the brightening and darkening of color, into the clang of tone, and into the naming power of the word” (ibid., p. 171). As a result, both the work and the world it engenders find their condition of possibility in the tradition they are rooted in. Both the world and the world-generating work are traditional possibilities.

However, according to the Heidegger of the 1930s, genuinely re-appropriating what has been handed down to one refers neither to passive reception, blind imitation nor to treating the traditional world as the source from which one can draw guidelines in creating oneself as one’s own, but to the transformative re-appropriation of the heritage with the aim of opening up a new context of intelligibility. To wit, it refers to the subversive repetition of the traditional possibilities—one that aims to leave behind what has become conventional, what has been calcified and reified through time. Heidegger says, “Repetition as we understand it is anything but the ameliorating continuation of what has been, by means of what has been”; it does not refer to “a new onset of mere restoration and uncreative imitation”; it “does not mean the stupid superficiality and
impossibility of the mere occurrence of the same for a second and third time” (Heidegger 2000, pp. 41, 133; Heidegger 2012, p. 45). Rather, “to repeat and retrieve” the heritage, the native ground, is “to transform it into the other inception”; it is to “conserve the familiar only in order to break out of it”; in short, it is to start “an upheaval and recreating of the customary” (Heidegger 1994, p. 39; Heidegger 2000, pp. 41, 174). This is the reason why Heidegger says, thanks to genuine repetitions, “each time a new and essential world irrupted” (Heidegger 1993b, p. 201).

The world-generating work, then, has not only a repetitive but also a subversive character. It is not only founded on its traditional ground but also determined to subvert it in such a way that new ways of existence and new ways of interpreting beings become possible. In other words, the work “opens it [i.e., Dasein] up to possibilities not yet asked about, futures to come <Zu-künften>, and thereby also binds it back to its inception that has been” (Heidegger 2000, p. 47). Accordingly, the subversively-repetitive work is a paradigm-changing, world-transforming event. For “What went before is refuted in its exclusive actuality by the work. What art founds can therefore never be compensated and made up for by what is already at hand and available” (Heidegger 1993b, p. 200). That is to say, subversive repetition destroys the taken-for-granted, calcified, and reified tasks, rules, and standards of the traditional world. It reveals the contingency, relativity, and non-inevitability of what has acquired the status of self-evidence through time. It decalcifies the familiar and “thrusts down the ordinary” (ibid., p. 200). It demolishes the familiar world, the calcified present, and its naturalized ways of existence, within which Dasein is, proximally and for the most part, lost. Heidegger says, “It is precisely the [calcified] present that vanishes in the [subversive] happening” (Heidegger 2000, p. 47).
In this respect, subversive repetition is an *anxiety-awakening* event. It reveals the *anxiety-engendering truth*, namely, the contingency and performativity of what is taken for granted, of what makes Dasein feel at home, of what soothes the original anxiety which lies in Dasein. Hence, subversive repetition refers to “the happening of uncanniness,” “the happening through which human beings become homeless” (ibid., pp. 175, 178).

As a result, for the Heidegger of the 1930s, *anxiety-engendering, truth-revealing* subversive repetition is the precondition of freedom, insofar as it is the subversive repetition that frees Dasein from being lost within its calcified world and reified possibilities, insofar as it prevents human beings from taking the reified norms, conventions, and standards of their hardened tradition for granted, and insofar as it frees them for creating their identities as their own without suppressing their contingency, performativity, and existential culpability. Therefore, for the Heidegger of the 1930s, *authentic historization* refers to the *subversive stretching along* between birth and death, to the *subversive unfolding* from the traditional world to the futural realization, which is based on the overcoming of the calcified present through genuine works that *preserve* the heritage of a historical people by *transformatively* repeating it. As Heidegger puts it, *authentic historization* is “the stirring, exciting, but at the same time conserving and preserving extension and stretch from the future into the past and from the latter into the former” (Heidegger 1994, p. 40).

Does this mean, then, that subversive repetition, *subversive historization*, can grant to Dasein its freedom *once and for all*? It is important to keep in mind that, similar to his conception of Being-towards-death, the Heidegger of the 1930s conceptualizes freedom according to the model of “event ontology,” as what we might call *Being-
towards-freedom. What this means is that, for Heidegger, freedom is not a present-at-hand entity one can possess. Rather, it refers to a process. That is, freedom lies in constantly repeating the traditional ground with the aim of overcoming it in order not to let the traditional world be calcified to the point of its anxiety-engendering truth, its historical contingency, is covered up. For Heidegger believes each world that is opened up by subversively-repetitive works is destined to turn into a familiar environment, whose norms and conventions are taken for granted by its residents, due to which Dasein forgets its performativity and existential culpability, unless its self-evident status is constantly questioned by anxiety-awakening subversive repetitions.

In Heidegger’s view, the world is destined to turn into a familiar environment because, first, the earth upon which the world is found is “the self-secluding” (Heidegger 1993b, p. 173). That is to say, the background intelligibility, which provides the world-generating work with the power of opening up a world and grounds this world as the open space of a historical community, can be represented only with the aid of intelligible, that is, worldly, patterns of interpretation and conceptualization, which are themselves conditioned by the background understanding of Being. In Heidegger’s words, “The rock comes to bear and rest and so first becomes rock” in the world that is opened up by the work; hence, “The work lets the earth be an earth” (ibid., pp. 171-172) To wit, the background intelligibility in itself is not representable; and, therefore, it is destined to be concealed from view as the ground on which every social possibility is based. Heidegger writes, “The earth appears openly cleared as itself only when it is perceived and preserved as that which is essentially undisclosable, that which shrinks from every disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed up” (ibid., p. 172).
Secondly, since humans are able to experience beings as what they are only if the world, and thereby the Being of beings, is unconcealed by the work, that is, only against the background of the event of the unconcealment, humans tend to forget that the beings they encounter in their everyday lives and the ways in which they interpret these beings have a socio-historically contingent, event-like origin. In other words, since the event of the unconcealment has to fade into the background for human and non-human beings to be disclosed, since every representation of beings presupposes and is conditioned by this event, the event of the unconcealment itself is “inaccessible to any representation” and, therefore, vulnerable to sink into oblivion (Heidegger 2012, p. 202). As Richard Polt (2006) explicates it, “The event of emergence is not itself something that has emerged; the source of openness is not itself open; the origin of givenness is not itself given” (p. 17).

Lastly, since the background intelligibility of the world and the event of the unconcealment are originally self-secluding and un-representable in themselves, humans tend to take for granted—and thereby to be lost within—the norms, conventions, and standards of their socio-historically shared world as if these norms and conventions were natural and inevitable, as if they were not conditioned by what is historically contingent, as if they did not require problematization and authentic re-appropriation. That is, “because the beginning is always the most concealed, because it is inexhaustible and withdraws, and because on the other hand what has already been becomes immediately the habitual,” humans tend to become social automata lost within their familiar environment (Heidegger 1994, p. 35). This is the reason why Heidegger claims that human beings are those entities “who on all ways have no way out, they are thrown out of
all relation to the homely,” who are doomed to be lost within their calcified world, unless that which grounds the world is subversively re-appropriated and the calcified world is thereby overcome (Heidegger 2000, p. 162).

Accordingly, in Heidegger’s view, “The inception is what is most uncanny and mightiest. What follows is not a development but flattening down as mere widening out” (ibid., p. 165). Although the world is opened up by subversively-repetitive, anxiety-awakening, calcification-dissipating works, the event of the opening is destined to give way to the calcification, reification, and familiarization of the world. Therefore, Heidegger claims, each and every world must be overcome through subversive repetitions of the heritage; each and every inception “must constantly be repeated and must be placed through confrontation into the uniqueness of its incipience. … This confrontation is original when it itself is incipient, but this necessarily as another beginning” (Heidegger 2012, p. 44). To wit, the traditional understanding of Being, the earth, must constantly be confronted through subversive repetitions in order to engender anxiety in the calcified world to the point of overcoming it. In Heidegger’s terminology, this means the “strife between world and earth,” the open space and the self-secluding, must constantly be incited by genuine works (Heidegger 1993b, p. 175). For if the traditional understanding of Being is not put in confrontation with the current context of intelligibility through subversive repetitions, if the strife between them is over, if the world or the earth dominates its opponent once and for all, human beings turn into social automata.

To be more specific, if the open space, the context of intelligibility, is taken for granted to the point of covering up its dependency on what is historically contingent, on
the traditional understanding of Being and on the event of the unconcealment, then the residents of this world forget their contingency, performativity, and dependency on what is outside of themselves. They begin to assume that they are the originators of the social possibilities and, hence, do not need to authentically appropriate that which is intrinsically insignificant and alien to them. They begin to assume that “it is they who have them at their disposal” to the point of covering up the original uncanniness which lies in the worldly existence of human beings (Heidegger 2000, p. 166). If, on the other hand, the earth dominates the world, the meaningful context of historical Dasein, then Dasein becomes the passive receptor, not the authentic appropriator, of what has been handed down to it by its heritage. Therefore, “The earth cannot dispense with the open region of the world if it itself is to appear as earth in the liberated surge of its self-seclusion. The world in turn cannot soar out of the earth’s sight if … it is to ground itself on something decisive (Heidegger 1993b, p. 174).

Thus, constant subversive repetition through strife-instigating works, through anxiety-engendering creations, in short, through subversive historization, is the sine qua non for human beings to be freed from being lost within their calcified world and to be freed for authentically owning themselves without suppressing their anxiety-engendering contingency, performativity, and existential culpability. This is the reason why Heidegger says,

When the creators have disappeared from the people, when they are barely tolerated as irrelevant curiosities, as ornaments, as eccentrics alien to life, when authentic struggle ceases … then the decline has already begun. For even an age still makes an effort just to uphold the inherited level and dignity of its Dasein, the level already sinks. It can be upheld only insofar as at all times it is creatively transcended (Heidegger 2000, p. 67, emphasis mine).
Accordingly, the idea of constant subversive repetition haunts Heidegger throughout the 1930s. As early as 1931, Heidegger claims that the present is “corrupt,” because “self-evidence” reigns in it. What is needed in the face of such corruption is a “Genuine historical return,” which refers to the “decisive beginning of authentic futurity”; in short, subversive repetition (Heidegger 2002, p. 7). However, for Heidegger, it is not only his present that deserves to be transcended through subversive repetitions. For what his present deserves is exactly what “every present as present deserves,” namely, “to be treated … as something to be overcome” (ibid.). Similarly, as late as 1938, in Basic Questions of Philosophy, Heidegger asserts,

in order to rescue the beginning [from calcification], and consequently the future as well, from time to time the domination of the ordinary and all too ordinary must be broken. An upheaval is needed, in order that the extraordinary and the forward-reaching might be liberated and come to power. Revolution, the upheaval of what is habitual, is the genuine relation to the beginning. (Heidegger 1994, p. 38)

As a result, for the Heidegger of the 1930s, freedom lies in de-calcifying subversive repetition, in subversive historization; that is, in subversive stretching along between the past and the future. To be more specific, Being-towards-freedom is to repeat the traditional possibilities of existence constantly and subversively in order to engender the truth-revealing anxiety, and in order to overcome the anxiety-soothing, calcified world. Hence, subversive repetition, for Heidegger, has no telos other than itself. No world is to be overcome according to the dictates of some universal criteria, but every world must be problematized through subversively-repetitive works, insofar as calcification, reification, and familiarization of the traditional possibilities are the only genuine stumbling blocks on the way to freedom.
CHAPTER 2: HEIDEGGER AND MODERNITY\textsuperscript{2}

Heidegger believes, as we have seen above, there is a fundamental relationship between his understanding of (subversive) historicity and his political choice in 1933. Then, what is the relation of the Heideggerian subversive repetition to the conservative ideology of the National Socialist movement? What is the relation of freedom from being lost within the calcified world to the Holocaust? What is the relation of subversive *historization* to the discriminatory ideology of the Third Reich? In short, what is the relationship between freedom and discrimination? Since we are asking these questions to find out the relationship between Heidegger’s *philosophy* and a discriminatory *ideology*, it would not be sufficient just to amass historical data to even begin to answer them. That is, since these questions are not only historical but also philosophical questions, we cannot *genuinely* ask these questions without having a philosophical perspective. Then, as good Heideggerians, we should not forget that every Dasein is an unfolding life-story. That is to say, Heidegger himself was not “a free-floating ‘I’.” He was, rather, an historically situated being, embedded within his culture and headed towards his futural realization. The Being of Heidegger, as it were, was an event. Heidegger was not blind to the implications of his situated, yet event-like, Being. He writes in his letter of 19 August 1921 to Karl Löwith, “I work concretely and factically out of my ‘I am,’ out of my

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intellectual and wholly factic origin, milieu, life-contexts, and whatever is available to me from these as a vital experience in which I live” (cited in Kisiel 1993, p. 7).

Therefore, to answer the questions we have asked above, we should first inquire: into what kind of world Heidegger was thrown and how did he experience this world? What was Heidegger’s heritage and how did Heidegger conceptualize this heritage? What was the nature of Heidegger’s future and upon what kind of future Heidegger was encouraging his fellow Germans to project themselves? That is, how did Heidegger experience his own past (that which is to be re-appropriated), present (that which is to be overcome), and future (that which is to be created); and how did he conceptualize the subversive historization of the German people, of which he was a proud member? In this chapter, I will try to answer these questions to question the relationship between the Heideggerian understanding of freedom and the discriminatory ideology of the National Socialist movement.

2.1. Heidegger’s Conservative World

Heidegger’s world was a product of quite a long dissatisfied desire for a unified nation. The anxious desire of Germans for unification was not soothed by the first two attempts: first, after the collapse of Napoleonic power, from the Congress of Vienna, instead of a unified nation, a Confederation of loosely connected states with their independent destinies came to life. Second, although those states were unified under Bismarck in 1871, the violent industrialization of Germany during this period produced nothing but the collapse of traditional lifestyles, self-alienation, and isolated individuals of self-interest (Mosse 1998, pp. 1-4). The rapid industrialization of Germany destroyed
the traditional German world and German lifestyle between 1870 and 1914 immensely. First, it transformed the German economy drastically, which had mostly been based on agriculture. Second, it engendered population increase about fifty percent in forty years and significantly increased the amount of immigration from loosely populated small German towns to overpopulated big cities. Third, it was responsible for the transformation of traditional farms into industrial loci of big factories and for the collapse of traditional occupations such as artisanship (Ringer 1990, pp. 42-43; Zimmerman 1990, pp. 5-8). Germans were not ready to deal with such rapid industrialization and its socio-political effects, insofar as in Germany, neither the traditional feudal structures were entirely left behind nor did a bourgeois revolution take place as in the case of other industrialized Western countries. Thus, Bismarck’s unification, associated with the industrialization of Germany, did not only fail to construct a unified nation but dragged Germans into even more alienation from their tradition, soil, and traditional community.

Germany’s defeat in WWI aggravated the social collapse Germany had been dealing with for a long time. For WWI brought to Germany nothing but poverty, unemployment, social conflict, and national humiliation engendered by the imposition of the Treaty of Versailles on Germany, whose German signatories would never be forgiven by the people. Both the expenses of war and post-war reparations crushed the socio-economic structures in Germany: “In July 1914, the American dollar had been worth 4.2 marks. The rate stood at 8.9 marks in January 1919, at 192 marks in January 1922, at 17,972 marks in January 1923, and at 353,412 marks by July 1923” (Ringer 1990, p. 62). Whereas beginning with 1924 the German economy began to heal its wounds, the 1929 economic crisis created an irreparable collapse of the German economy. Unresolvable
conflicts between different social strata both in the streets and in the parliament, which was having a hard time reconciling various interest groups, including anti-parliamentary parties of the parliament such as Nazis and Communists, ensued instantly. The impotence of the parliament occasioned mistrust among Germans to the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) in such a way that Germans became attached to anti-parliamentary, revolutionary parties more and more (Herf 1984, pp. 19-21; Zimmerman 1990, pp. 13-16). In his letter of 19 September 1960 to one of his students, Hans-Peter Hempel, who was having a hard time reconciling Heidegger’s greatness as a philosopher with his despicable political choice in 1933, Heidegger describes those days thus:

Your conflict remains unresolvable so long as you read, for instance, “The Essence of Reason” one morning and the same evening see reports and documentary film clips from the later years of the Hitler regime, so long as you are viewing National Socialism solely in retrospect from today and judging it with regard to what gradually came to light after 1934. At the beginning of the 1930s the class differences in our nation had become intolerable for any German with a sense of social responsibility, as had also Germany’s economic throttling by the Treaty of Versailles. In 1932 there were 7 million unemployed, who, with their families, saw before them nothing but hardship and poverty. The confusion stemming from these circumstances, which today’s generation can no longer even imagine, also spread to the universities (cited in Safranski 1998, p. 228).

Moreover, the German mistrust was not limited to the Weimar Republic but also directed to politics in general. Most people saw in the pluralist party system nothing but the battlefield of economic interests, egotism, and commercialism. Such mistrust was followed by a sort of messianic expectation. More and more Germans were waiting for a non-political, even authoritarian, Führer. Taking the relation of German politics to economy into account, their mistrust was not unwarranted. Beginning with the 1870s, Germany saw the formation of politically influential cartels and of various leagues, both on the part of employees and employers, going after their economic interests even in the
political arena. The Weimar republic was not well equipped to fight economic influences exerted on the political life (Ringer 1990, pp. 42-44).

Economic collapse, commercialism, egotism, and interest-politics influenced German intellectuals as well, such that even German academics were expecting the realization of non-parliamentary politics. Due to the economic crisis in Germany, academic research became a luxury and academics turned into unskilled workers with respect to their salaries. Rapid industrialization was responsible for the fall of the traditional pure-intellectualism ideal as well—considering that beginning with the late nineteenth century, technical institutions were allowed to give doctoral degrees, and new universities, modeled on “unscholarly” research institutions such as those of business or international trade, came to life. For German academics, this meant specialization, instrumentalism, and calculative thinking was sneaking in German universities. Thus, German academics regarded the transformation of the German intellectual life as an indication of spiritual collapse (ibid., pp. 42-80).

As a result, nineteenth and twentieth century Germany was in crisis in the eyes of most Germans due to its lack of unification, rapid industrialization, commercialization, technologization, and urbanization; in short, modernization. Against this background was born what we might call the völkisch ideology as the hegemonic conservative ideology of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany. A far range of disparate thinkers from Herder to Fichte, from Paul de Lagarde to Julius Langbehn, from the Nietzsche of The Birth of Tragedy to the twentieth century Nietzscheans such as Alfred Baeumler, from the nineteenth century new idealists such as Diederichs to the members of the Youth Movement, from the members of the famous Stefan George circle to the defenders of the
“ideas of 1914” such as Max Scheler, have defended, distributed, and developed völkisch ideas. In the face of their unsatisfied desire for unification and a unified nation, and in the face of further self-alienation and social division, they asked what defined, made unique, and worth praising the German identity, nation, destiny, and mission. That is, as Hans Sluga (1993) puts it, modernity in Germany gave birth to “the metaphysics of Germanness” (p. 123):

What made the Germans into a distinctive nation? Was it their history? Their culture? Their language? Their philosophy? Were the Austrians really German? Were the Catholics in the west and south German? Were the German Jews German? Were the Alsatians German? Over time philosophers, politicians, and others concerned with such questions repeatedly tried to define the German identity (p. 20).

Facing the lack of unification and de-unifying modernity, völkisch writers appealed to the Volk (people), tradition, common roots, language, or nature as unifying elements. They contrasted the ideal of “the rooted German”—rooted in the Volk, tradition, and nature; that is, rooted in the “organic” whole—to the self-alienated subject of modernity striving after material gain. Hence, they praised the life of peasants as opposed to city dwellers. They longed for the revitalization of the Volk and German heritage as opposed to the uprooting, individualizing, and, thus, self-alienating materialism, instrumentalism, technologism, commercialism, urbanization, and capitalism. They desired the preservation and regeneration of nature as landscape, tradition as heritage, Volk as the essence of contemporary Germans (Mosse 1998, pp. 1-30; Zimmerman 1990, pp. 8-13). In other words, they contrasted the authentic German Volksgemeinschaft (community of people) to the modern Gesellschaft (society). In the eyes of völkisch thinkers, Gemeinschaft was an organic community, grounded on the Volk, tradition, and nature. Its members were not isolated individuals but members of an
organic whole with a certain communal essence. They were not self-interested subjects but people of commitment and belongingness. *Gemeinschaft* was what Germans had and what they had to protect in the face of modernity. On the other hand, *Gesellschaft* was a society of atomistic individuals with no sense of community, commitment, and belongingness (Young 1997, p. 21).

Similar to the *völkisch* attempt to overcompensate for the absence of real unification by appealing to the spiritual one, *völkisch* thinkers tried to overcome the humiliation of a defeated nation—first to Napoleon, then to the Allies—by their exaggerated chauvinism. They thought Germans were the “primordial” people in the sense that they were speaking an original, uncorrupted, and even philosophical language. This was the reason why they were blessed with *Innerlichkeit* (inwardness). As the spiritual and inwardly people, endowed with a natural inclination to anything spiritual—be it art, philosophy, or morality—they were the only people who could save the world from materialism and corresponding spiritual collapse, as long as they protected their Germanness and did not succumb to the self-alienating modernity (ibid., pp. 14-15).

Moreover, not only their *Innerlichkeit* but also the geographical location of the German Volk made the task of saving the world Germans’ mission. For Germany was the center of *Mitteleuropa* (central Europe). In other words, Germans were located at the center of the world, and, therefore, only they could distribute the much needed healing powers to the world from the center. As Fichte once said, Germans were “in the centre of the civilized world, like the sun at the centre of the cosmos” (Fichte 2008, p. 170). Furthermore, the greatness of Germans was comparable only to the greatest ancient civilizations such as the Greeks or the Romans. As a matter of fact, every Greek and
Roman achievement—be it military or intellectual—was produced by Germanic heroes. *Völkisch* writers went so far as even to identify Germans with the Greeks. Thus, at the hands of *völkisch* thinkers, the Greeks became proto-Germans (Mosse 1998, pp. 68-71).

As a result, in the eyes of *völkisch* thinkers, the world, but especially Germany, was in crisis, and it was urgent to revolutionize the German spirit in order to protect the German *Innerlichkeit* and *Gemeinschaft* in the face of alien intrusions. However, such revolution was not possible due to the current political system in Germany, insofar as the current politics was an interest-politics. Therefore, a spiritual/educational revolution was required such that the new educational system would plant the sense of community, altruism, and belongingness into the people. It would save the state from being corrupted by interest-politics and, eventually, turn the state into not only a product but also the cultivator of pure spiritual ideals. Accordingly, the educational system had to be purified from its current shortcomings; that is, from the reign of positivism, utilitarianism, and specialization. Education must aim at the cultivation (*Bildung*) of the whole personality, rather than filling young minds with practical and worldly knowledge. Scholarship had to be rooted in the German mission and destiny, and students had to be re-integrated into the *Volk* and German heritage. Moreover, academic specialization had to be overcome. This does not mean that interdisciplinary studies had to be encouraged, but academic research and scholarship must be guided by a *holistic Weltanschauung*, and university education must give students an ability to view the world *holistically* from a certain philosophical viewpoint (Mosse 1998, pp. 149-170; Ringer 1990, pp. 253-304).
2.2. Heidegger’s Völkisch Philosophy

We need to interpret Heidegger’s philosophy, especially his writings and lecture-courses of the 1930s—and especially in order to understand the way in which Heidegger experienced his own present—against this background, considering that just like other völkisch intellectuals, Heidegger defended, distributed, and developed völkisch ideas. He thought Germany was in crisis due to the shortcomings of modernity. Accordingly, throughout the 1930s, he was opposed to the world of industrialization, urbanization, technologization, and instrumentalism. He believed modernity not only transformed the traditional German world but also brought about nihilism, spiritual collapse, and self-alienation. Heidegger’s contempt for what he took to be “the decadent present” can be detected from almost all of his writings and lecture-courses of the 1930s. As early as 1930, Heidegger says, “no age has understood so little of what is essential about things as our age”; for “this age,” i.e., the age of technology, consumption, and speed—“in spite of its greed for everything—resists what is simple and essential” (Heidegger 1988, p. 73). Similarly, as late as 1938, Heidegger calls the age of modernity and modern technology “the age of the total unquestionableness of all things and of all contrivances,” and claims that the contemporary West has “fallen into a situation where all goals are dubious and where all bustle and bother merely aim at finding a means of escape” (Heidegger 1994, pp. 13, 23).

Moreover, similar to the proposals of other völkisch writers regarding the nature and necessity of a völkisch revolution in the face of self-alienating modernity, Heidegger preached the necessity of a spiritual/educational revolution. That is, as a völkisch
philosopher, he was not content with Bismarck’s *political* unification of the German states:

I had something further to add on the internal causes of Bismarck’s political failure. We have learned that, besides a Führer, a people also needs a tradition. ... But the main reason is doubtless the fact that the *völkisch* character of the Second Reich was limited to what we call patriotism and fatherland. In themselves, these elements of the 1870-1871 unification should not be evaluated negatively, but they are totally insufficient for a truly *völkisch* state. Nor did they any longer have the least roots in the people (cited in Faye 2009, p. 141).

The Heideggerian critique of modernity, especially in the late 1930s, amounts to the critique of Will. For in the world of modernity, Heidegger believes, Being reveals itself as Will. That is, “in nature, art, history, politics, in science and in knowledge,” beings are interpreted as objects of *willful* manipulation at the disposal of the *willful* subject (Heidegger 1987, p. 19). Thus, Will refers to the willful way humans approach, experience, and conceptualize human and non-human beings. In Heidegger’s words, “It is the way we find ourselves particularly attuned to beings which we are not and to the being we ourselves are” (Heidegger 1979, p. 51).

Heidegger conceptualizes Will as “Being master out beyond oneself” (ibid., p. 63). That is, Will wills to reach what is beyond as to place that which is beyond under its control. It wills to incorporate what is beyond and unfamiliar in order to eliminate the alterity of what lies beyond its dominion. As Bret Davis (2007) puts it, it functions through “*ecstatic-incorporation*” (p. 9). In this respect, Will is always “will to power”; it is will to incorporate, control, and dominate. Will to power refers, in turn, to “will to will” and “power to power.” For there is no other way for Will to preserve itself, to preserve its dominion over its domain of control, than overpowering itself, than reaching beyond its domain of control and imposing its dominion from afar: “Power empowers solely by becoming master over every stage of the power reached” (Heidegger 1987, p.
Hence, Will’s willing that which is beyond amounts to Will’s willing its self-preservation. Therefore, Will always wills itself; it is self-willing, will-to-will. And accordingly, its will to power is to be more power; it is power-to-power. To wit, both the “enhancement and preservation” of power belong to Will’s essence (ibid., p. 197).

In the world of will to power, Heidegger continues, since Will wills to control that which is beyond and unfamiliar, beings are experienced as objects of representation, as that which are brought before the willful subject for utilization. Beings become familiar objects in the sense that they are classified, calculated, and arranged by and for the sake of willful subject’s desire for the preservation and enhancement of its power. Thus, the world is turned into a “picture” the willful subject is “acquainted with” and “equipped and prepared for” (Heidegger 1977c, p. 129). As a result, in the world of will to power, beings are conceptualized as malleable and calculable raw materials at the disposal of the willful subject. Accordingly, the subject becomes the sole authority in distributing existence to beings in the sense that, in the world of modernity, beings exist as long as they are classified, calculated, familiarized, and, thereby, transformed into raw material for willful manipulations. To wit, no being is allowed to be unless it is assaulted, i.e., turned into the object of utilization, “the object of assault,” by the requirements of modern subjectivity (Heidegger 1977b, p. 100).

Heidegger’s völkisch anti-modernism amounts to anti-technologism and anti-industrialization as well. In his view, in the world of “machination,” beings are put in service to the expansion and preservation of power. They are valued as long as they can be utilized for further power. Thus, they “are valued purely according to their estimated use-value,” according to whether they are “providable in production and
implementation,” whether they function as “material for further work, an impetus to progress, and an opportunity for expansion and augmentation” (Heidegger 1987, p. 175; Heidegger 2012, p. 86). Heidegger writes, “Everything ‘is made’ and ‘can be made’, if only the ‘will’ to it is summoned up” (Heidegger 2012, p. 86). Such willful frenzy is responsible for “the destruction of the earth” in the name of technological progress, “in the name of speed, calculation, and the claim of the massive” (ibid., p. 94). Heidegger goes even further and claims that “progress,” i.e., “discoveries, inventions, industry, machines,” does nothing but increases and veils the “uprootedness” of the modern subject (ibid.).

In his mature critique of modernity—and especially in his 1955 lecture, “The Question Concerning Technology”—Heidegger argues that in the technological era, even the subject-object distinction disappears. Every being, human and non-human alike, is regarded as a raw material for willful manipulation—“The current talk about human resources, about the supply of patients for a clinic, gives evidence of this” (Heidegger 1977a, p. 18). Thanks to modern technology, both human and non-human beings are interpreted as “standing-reserve” (Bestand). That is to say, “Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering” (ibid., p. 17). Although Heidegger does not directly defend a sort of pastoral life in the face of modern technology, the way he contrasts the technological way of experiencing beings with the world of peasants and with the more natural way of experiencing betray his affinity to the völkisch pastoralism. In this respect, two passages, cited below from his 1955 lecture, are illuminating:

The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such. But does this not hold true for the old windmill as
well? No. Its sails do indeed turn in the wind; *they are left entirely to the wind’s blowing*. But the windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it (ibid., p. 14, emphasis mine).

The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon [stellt] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy (ibid., p. 15, emphasis mine).

As a result, for Heidegger, in the world of modern technology, beings are objectified, calculated, stocked, organized, and prepared for further manipulation; and what lies beyond such processes sinks into oblivion. In this respect, the modern man completely forgets what is not objectifiable, what is, in Heidegger’s terminology, “mysterious,” namely, Being. Hence, in the modern world prevails “the exclusive preeminence of beings over Being” (Heidegger 1987, p. 164). Therefore, modernity is “The age of consummate *meaninglessness*” (ibid., p. 175). For in the age of modern technology, Will does not allow the existence of any non-objectifiable, meaning-bestowing mystery, cultural practice, or traditional heritage that is not turned into standing-reserve. Heidegger says, “the will to will absolutely denies every goal and only admits goals as means to outwit itself willfully and to make room for this game” (Heidegger 1991c, p. 82). In such a willful, yet meaningless, game, neither the spiritual ideals of one’s traditional heritage that determines what is worthy and what is not, nor one’s landscape, that is, one’s natural home that shapes its residents, is effective anymore. Instead, the modern world of technology and industrialization brings about “the darkening of the [traditional] world, the flight of the [meaning-bestowing] gods, the destruction of the earth [as landscape], the reduction of human beings to a mass, the hatred and mistrust of everything creative and free” (Heidegger 2000, p. 40).
Accordingly, Heidegger holds the völkisch belief that the world is in crisis due to the shortcomings of modernity, and that the world, but especially the German world, requires an anti-modern revolution, insofar as “everything essential and everything great,” as Heidegger argues as late as 1966, “originated from the fact that man had a home and was rooted in a tradition” (Heidegger 1991d, p. 106). However, this does not mean that a political revolution in the sense of transforming the bureaucratic structures of the society is sufficient to fight modernity. Hence, a spiritual/educational revolution is sine qua non.

The nature of the Heideggerian spiritual/educational revolution is delineated in the speeches and lecture-courses Heidegger gave in the early 1930s—especially in his Tübingen speech of 30 November 1933, in his rectorial address, “The Self-Assertion of the German University,” and in his 1933/34 lecture-courses. Heidegger opens his Tübingen speech with the sign of dissatisfaction in the face of Hitler’s political revolution: “According to the very words of the Führer, the revolution has reached its end and has become evolution. Evolution is to replace revolution. Yet, at the university, not only has the revolution failed to attain its goal, but in fact it has not really even begun” (cited in Farias 1989, p. 142). Moreover, in Heidegger’s view, not only the educational but also the political revolution cannot go further than transforming the inessential surface of the German world, unless the new generation is cultivated properly in line with a völkisch education. The first step for the realization of genuine revolution, for the genuine overcoming of modernity, is to know the new German reality and to commit to its realization. But what is the new reality? As Heidegger puts it in his 1933 The Fundamental Question of Philosophy, “The German people as a whole is coming to
itself, that is, it is finding its leadership. In this leadership, the people that has come to itself is creating its state. The people that is forming itself into its state … is growing into a nation. The nation is taking over the fate of its people” (Heidegger 2010a, p. 3). It is such fate that determines “the spiritual-popular mission” of Germans; and in the face of such historical happening, what needs to be done is to “awaken the knowledge of this mission” (ibid.). Such knowledge also refers to the knowledge of Germans’ future, that is, what the German Volk is going to become. In other words, knowing the mission of the German Volk means to “honor” the German past and “demand” the German future at the expense of fighting the decadent present to the point of overcoming it. Heidegger says, “This knowing demands what is not yet, and quarrels with what still is, and honors the greatness that has been” (ibid., p. 4). Such knowing—that is, “demanding,” “quarreling,” and “honoring”—is the precondition of becoming a real Volk. Hence, for Heidegger, Germans must know their fate and destiny in order to become the Germans they are. They must know what the German Volk is, what is its heritage, and what it wants to become. Accordingly, the German Volk must question its Being, i.e., ask “the fundamental question of philosophy,” insofar as philosophy “is the question of the law and structure of our Being” (ibid.).

However, asking the question of Being does not mean to speculate on the concept of Being, but to re-appropriate the Ancient Greek understanding and problematization of Being, considering that it is the Greeks who, according to Heidegger, gave “the first and only decision for the fundamental question of philosophy” in such a way that thanks to the Greeks, the destiny of the West is determined once and for all (ibid., p. 5). As a result, asking the question of Being is “to repeat and retrieve <wieder-holen> the inception of
our historical-spiritual Dasein, in order to transform it into the other inception,” that is, beyond the world of modernity (Heidegger 2000, p. 41). Hence, for the Heidegger of the 1930s, the question of Being is a political question. In his words, “Asking about beings as such and as a whole, asking the question of Being, is then one of the essential fundamental conditions for awakening the spirit, and thus for an originary world of historical Dasein, and thus for subduing the danger of the darkening of the world” (ibid., p. 52).

Heidegger believes it is only through such world-transforming, revolutionary repetition that a historical people (Volk)—in this case, Germans—can acquire and preserve its authentic identity. That is, the (German) Volk is an authentic Volk insofar as it commits itself to its traditional heritage in order to transform the calcified world it is born into. Thus, in Heidegger’s view, the authentic (German) Volk is not a present-at-hand entity but an historical unfolding, an event that unfolds itself from the Volk’s past to its future. To explain this, it is promising to review Heidegger’s 1934 Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language. Heidegger asks, “Who is a Self?” The Self, he claims, is not the individual “I” but the communal “We,” namely, “the Volk” (Heidegger 2009, p. 33). However, the identity of the Volk cannot be determined by academic speculation but by commitment: “‘What is this Volk, which we ourselves are?’ is a question of decision” (ibid., p. 60). That is to say, the authentic (German) Volk is the one which commits itself to its traditional heritage and, thus, appropriates its past as “that which continues to be effective, from earlier on still being somehow, which from earlier on still essences” (ibid., p. 88). In other words, the authentic (German) Volk is the one
which retrieves its traditional heritage resolutely, instead of interpreting its past as “that which goes by,” as that which is not effective anymore (ibid.).

However, retrieving the heritage resolutely does not refer to imitation but to creative and critical, even revolutionary, re-appropriation in the sense that the Volk, by taking over its heritage, opens up a historical world, within which it becomes what it is: “the Völker do not enter history, as if that were an available space in which they find lodging, a present-at-hand path, which they only would have to traverse, but ‘making history’ means: first to create the space and soil” (ibid., p. 74). Hence, the authentic (German) Volk is the one which re-appropriates its traditional heritage to the point of overcoming the world it is born into and, thereby, stretches along, that is, historizes authentically, between its past and future, between its embeddedness and completion.

Heidegger concludes, “we must experience ourselves as those who determine themselves from the future by essencing from earlier on by reaching out beyond themselves” (ibid., p. 102).

It is the youth, however, that has a special place in such historical unfolding. For the youth are not yet corrupted by the self-alienating powers of modernity. They are “those who are not yet worn out, those who by the roots of their being and their existence become one with the people, those who feel in themselves the elan toward the future, the need to begin by assault [Stürm]”—hence, the importance of educating the youth and revolutionizing the educational system (cited in Farias 1989, p. 144).

The new educational system, for Heidegger, must aim at cultivating the student’s whole personality in such a way that the student will not become an indifferent expert on an academic subject but a “worker” in the sense that the student will know the Volk,
become one with it, learn the blessings of comradeship, become an authentic member of the German *Gemeinschaft*, and be committed to the historical realization of the mission of the German *Volk* (ibid., p. 145). In other words, Heidegger agrees here with other *völkisch* writers that education cannot be limited to filling young minds with scholarly knowledge, but it must aim at holistic *cultivation*. That is, for Heidegger, as for other *Völkisch* thinkers, the student must be transformed from top to bottom. In this respect, as Heidegger argues in his rectorial address, the student must be re-integrated into the *Volk* through various services. First, the student must be bound to “the ethnic and national community [*Volksgemeinschaft*]” through “*labor service,*” where the student learns his/her German brothers and sisters’ way of life. Second, the revolutionized education must bind the student to “the honor and the destiny of the nation in the midst of the other peoples of the world” through “*military service.*” Lastly, “*knowledge service*” must equip the student with the knowledge of “the spiritual mission of the German *Volk*” (Heidegger 1991a, p. 35). Obviously, such education requires the transformation of what is generally understood by university education, scientific knowledge, science itself, and academic research. Heidegger claims, “Knowledge of the *Volk* that is actively involved with the *Volk*, knowledge of the destiny of the state that holds itself in readiness; it is these that, together with the knowledge of the spiritual mission, first create the original and full essence of science” (ibid., p. 36).

Moreover, Heidegger argues, the liberal understanding of university must be transformed in such a way that neither the teachers nor the researchers should become indifferent scholars, but both their teaching and research should be rooted in the traditional heritage and guided by the German mission and destiny; in short, they should
be “led by the inexorability of that spiritual mission which impresses onto the fate of the German Volk the stamp of their history” (ibid., p. 29). This also means the overcoming of what the German industrialization brought into the German academic life, namely, specialization. The new university should not be composed of “isolated fields,” but each field must originate from the same root, i.e., from “the world-shaping forces of man’s historical existence, such as: nature, history, language; the Volk, custom, the state” (ibid., p. 33).

As a result, both the way in Heidegger interprets his own present, that is, the arrival of German modernity, and his humble proposal for dealing with the self-alienating industrialization—and, as we will see below, the way in which he mixed his stance towards modernity with German chauvinism by appealing to the myths of Mitteleuropa, Innerlichkeit, and Greco-Germanic kinship—is völkisch. That is, just like other völkisch writers, Heidegger believed that the present, corrupted by the self-alienating powers of modernity, should be overcome through the re-appropriation of the German Volk’s heritage in order to create a new, namely, anti-modern, anti-industrialist, and anti-individualist, life-world. Hence, Heidegger, especially in the 1930s, conceptualizes the authentic subversive historization of the German people as a völkisch historization, as a revolutionary, yet anti-modern, unfolding.

2.3. Völkisch Historicity versus Nazi Revolution

In the first half of the 1930s, Heidegger took the National Socialist movement to be the only völkisch agent in Germany that was capable of overcoming modernity by revitalizing the German heritage; that is, the only völkisch agent that was capable of
starting the process of authentic/subversive völkisch historization. He stated in 1945, for example, “I saw in the movement that had gained power the possibility of an inner recollection and renewal of the people [Volk]” (Heidegger 1985b, p. 483). However, one does not need to review Heidegger’s post-war accounts to understand what he saw in the movement. Even in his 1933/34 lecture-course, he stated what he was expecting from his Führer:

If today the Führer speaks again and again of reeducation for the National Socialist worldview, this does not mean promulgating this or that slogan, but bringing forth a total transformation, a projection of a world, on the ground of which he educates the entire people. National Socialism is not some doctrine, but the transformation from the bottom up of the German world—and, as we believe, of the European world too (Heidegger 2010b, pp. 171-172, emphasis mine).

Considering that the National Socialist movement was a völkisch movement, or at least it had presented itself as one until 1936—i.e., until Hitler’s four year plan for the industrialization of Germany—it is understandable why Heidegger was enthusiastic about the new political movement in Germany. The NSDAP was speaking the same language as völkisch intellectuals, which is why most völkisch writers had no second thought about welcoming the nazification of Germany. The NSDAP promised Germans the re-integration of the Volk into the German heritage, mission, and destiny in the face of self-alienating industrialism, capitalism, interest-politics, and post-war class conflicts. It aimed to construct an organic society through nationalizing the masses and organizing one’s whole life in line with the totalitarian state ideology in such a way that there would be no distinction between the public and private spheres of life. Accordingly, it brought public institutions into line with an anti-modern and holistic worldview, and emphasized the virtues of belongingness and rootedness against the uprooting modernity (Mosse 1966, pp. xix-xli).
Moreover, in the eyes of most völkisch thinkers, the National Socialist movement, because of its educational program, was promising. The NSDAP was committed to overcoming intellectualism and its products such as disinterested teaching and research. They had to be grounded on the same root, namely, on the Nazi Weltanschauung as the carrier of the German heritage, mission, and destiny. Furthermore, education had to be confined not to the distribution of purely academic information, but the whole personality of the student had to be cultivated through imposing upon the student the sense of belongingness and comradeship (ibid., pp. 263-318).

Does this mean, then, that we can infer Nazism from Heidegger’s philosophy? Is it sufficient to show the völkisch character of both Heidegger’s philosophy and the NSDAP’s political ideology in order to give the verdict that Heidegger was guilty of Nazism not only personally but also philosophically? Is it possible, for example, to identify the Heideggerian völkisch historization with the National Socialist revolution? Is it not true, after all, that Heidegger’s political choice in 1933 was somehow related to his blind conservatism, or as Pierre Bourdieu (1991) puts it, to his intellectual alliance with so-called “conservative revolutionaries” defending “regressive ideas,” such as: anti-technologism, anti-industrialism, anti-utilitarianism, anti-positivism, anti-urbanization, anti-individualism, and a certain yearning for rootedness, simplicity, organic totality, and anti-modern educational reform (pp. 7-39)? Whether or not we can answer these questions, we are certain that for almost seventy years now, those Heidegger scholars who thought there was a close connection between Heidegger’s philosophy and Nazism mostly assumed that it was warranted to identify the völkisch ideology with the Nazi worldview such that the presentation of Heidegger’s völkisch affinities would be
sufficient to read Nazism into his philosophy. Such *insistence* on the identical nature of the *völkisch* ideology with the Nazi worldview is the reason why we should focus on and de-construct the hegemonic way of conceptualizing the relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and the National Socialist ideology, if we genuinely want to *question* the relationship between freedom and discrimination via “the Heidegger’s case.”

Karl Löwith, for example, claims that Heidegger’s *decisionistic* philosophy, as is exhibited in *Being and Time*, where Heidegger refuses to acknowledge any universal norm that may tell the individual Dasein upon which social ideal it should commit itself, is turned into *völkisch decisionism* at the hands of the Heidegger of the 1930s. That is, for the Heidegger of the 1930s, the German *Volk* has no source of moral judgment other than its traditional heritage, mission, and destiny. In Löwith’s view, it was such *völkisch decisionism* that was responsible for Heidegger’s political choice in 1933:

Those who reflect on Heidegger’s later partisanship for Hitler’s movement will find, in this first formulation of the idea of historical existence, the constituents of his political decision of several years hence. One need only abandon the still quasi-religious isolation, and apply authentic ‘existence’—‘always particular to each individual’—and the ‘duty’ [Müssen] which follows from it to ‘specifically German existence’ and its historical destiny, in order thereby to introduce into the general course of German existence the energetic but empty movement of his existential categories (‘to decide for oneself’; ‘to take stock of oneself in the face of nothingness’; ‘wanting one’s ownmost destiny’; ‘to take responsibility for oneself’) and to proceed from there to ‘destruction’, now on the terrain of politics (Löwith 1994, pp. 31-32).

Similarly, Ernst Tugendhat (1986) argues that since Heidegger does not specify an *ahistorical* criterion to distinguish those social and historical possibilities worth appropriating in constructing an authentic *Volk* from those that are not, since he “envisages no justification for why one of several historically given possibilities is chosen instead of another,” Heidegger’s narratives about the nature of authentic *historization* and of the re-appropriation of the heritage refer to “an irrational choice” that
does not “rest upon justification” and that is not “grounded in the question of truth” (p. 217). In Tugendhat’s view, such völkisch irrationalism is the ground from which Heidegger’s Nazism arises. Tugendhat writes, “Heidegger’s Nazism was no accidental affair, but that a direct path led from his philosophy—from its derationalized concept of truth and the concept of self-determination defined by this—to Nazism” (p. 217).

Richard Wolin (1990) accepts Löwith’s and Tugendhat’s accounts and claims that the fact that in Being and Time there is no place for universal norms as to save Heidegger from remaining “intellectually (and morally) defenseless against the ‘absolute historical evil’ of the twentieth century” is responsible for his Nazism (p. 118). Moreover, Wolin adds, Heidegger’s völkisch affinities are not limited to his writings of the 1930s, but even Being and Time is full of völkisch elements, such as the notions of “destiny,” “repetition,” “historicity,” etc. (p. 33). Victor Farias (1989) goes one step further and announces that “there is every indication in it [i.e., in Being and Time] of his later turn to National Socialism,” considering that in his masterpiece, Heidegger introduces the notion of “a (so-called) community of people [Volksgemeinschaft], with its own tradition and heritage,” which must be sufficient for anyone who wants to see the truth that Heidegger “comes close to the interpretations that circulated widely under National Socialism” (pp. 59, 64).

Similarly, Tom Rockmore (1992) claims that Heidegger’s “Nazism is concealed in his philosophy” (p. 10). For Heidegger forms his philosophy by using the same elements of the völkisch ideology as National Socialism, such as: “the historical realization of the German Volk,” “a metaphysical commitment to the German Volk,” “the concept of the spirit of the people [Volksgeist],” and “the essence of the German people”
Moreover, Rockmore continues, Heidegger’s understanding of authenticity is *völkisch* and, therefore, similar to National Socialist understanding, because authentic existence for Heidegger refers to “the repetition of a prior tradition,” and because “Nazism claimed to embody the values of the authentic German” (p. 47).

However, it is Emmanuel Faye (2009) who takes the most extreme position one can take regarding the relation of Heidegger’s philosophy to Nazism. Faye claims, “Heidegger devoted himself to putting philosophy at the service of legitimizing and diffusing the very bases of Nazism and Hitlerism” both before and after Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933 (p. xxiv). We learn from Faye that the basis in question, “the very foundation of National Socialist doctrine,” lies in such *völkisch* concepts as the “community of destiny” and the “community of the people,” namely, “the *Gemeinschaft* understood as *Schicksalsgemeinschaft* and *Volksgemeinschaft*” (p. 16).

However, it is wrong to *identify* the *völkisch* ideology with the Nazi ideology, and, by implication, it is wrong to *identify* the Heideggerian *völkisch* *historization* with the Nazi revolution, for several historical and philosophical reasons. *First*, beginning with 1936, Heidegger approached National Socialism critically, *just because* he thought the movement was not *völkisch* enough. Heidegger’s criticism was not unwarranted, considering that in the late 1930s, the basis of the Nazi ideology was what Jeffrey Herf (1984) calls “reactionary modernism”—more than it was the *völkisch* ideology. The reactionary modernist ideology was based on an attempt to combine German nationalism and its *völkisch* jargon with modern technologism. Just like *völkisch* writers, reactionary modernists such as Oswald Spengler, Ernst Jünger, and Werner Sombart were anti-modernist nationalists. Similar to the *völkisch* account of modernity, they thought the
contemporary world was conquered by technologism, industrialism, commercialism, liberalism, and capitalism. However, contrary to most, if not all, völkisch thinkers, they thought the shortcomings of modernity were not directly engendered by industrialism or technologism, but by liberalism, commercialism, finance-capitalism, and egoistic interest-politics. Hence, they were opposed to the völkisch pastoralism. Accordingly, they tried to do what seems to be un-doable: embracing modern technologism without acknowledging what is usually regarded as its twin brother, namely, modernity. In order to overcome the shortcomings of modernity, they proposed the re-integration of modern technology and German industry into the German Gemeinschaft and its political representative, namely, the state. Moreover, they not only acknowledged the intrinsic innocence of modern technologism but also mystified and aestheticized technology. In their eyes, technology was the agent of will imposing its forms on the formless and overwhelming nature. It was a product of aesthetic creativity, an expression of the Nordic Innerlichkeit. In other words, it was an indication of German creativity and productivity as opposed to the so-called Jewish finance-capitalism (pp. 1-48).

Heidegger was not indifferent to the reactionary modernist ideology. In his “Facts and Thoughts,” for example, he says he interpreted the modern world and its technologism, especially in the early 1930s, from the perspective of Jünger (Heidegger 1985b, p. 484). For Jünger, WWI teaches us that neither the recruitment of professional soldiers nor a limited budget utilized for waging wars can satisfy the hunger of contemporary wars, insofar as both the extent and the expenses of today’s wars are immense. Instead, contemporary wars demand the utilization and “total mobilization” of every social, economic, political, and technological resource, together with the total and
totalitarian organization of such resources. Of course, in such an age, distinguishing the private spheres of life from the public ones cannot be accepted—hence, “the increasing curtailment of ‘individual liberty’” (Jünger 1993, p. 127). Accordingly, the “aim” of total mobilization, Jünger argues, “is to deny the existence of anything that is not a function of the state” (ibid.). But this does not mean that Jünger is opposed to the age of total mobilization. Instead, his target is the völkisch pastoralism and its worship of anti-industrialist Gemeinschaft, together with the traditional ideal of pure-intellectualism, namely, Kultur: “Who would deny that ‘civilization’ is more profoundly attached to progress than is ‘Kultur’; that its language is spoken in the large cities, and that it has means and concepts at its command to which Kultur is either hostile or indifferent” (ibid., 133). He rather praises the virtues of urbanization, technologization, and industrialization. Moreover, he thinks what needs to be done in Germany is to accelerate the processes of industrialization, urbanization, and total mobilization if it is true that Germany lost WWI just because it was unable to mobilize every force and to place technology and armament industry in service of war. Accordingly, Jünger concludes, “the new form of armament, in which we have already for some time been implicated, must be a mobilization of the German—nothing else” (ibid., p. 139).

Heidegger and the NSDAP responded differently to Jünger’s call for total mobilization. For Heidegger, total mobilization was not a viable solution in the face of the shortcomings of modernity. As he puts it in his 1938 lecture, “The Age of the World Picture,” in order to overcome the shortcomings of modernity, “it is not sufficient to affirm technology, for example, or, out of an attitude incomparably more essential, to set up ‘total mobilization’ as an absolute once it is recognized as being at hand” (Heidegger
For “Total mobilization,” Heidegger claims, just like other shortcomings of modernity, is “a consequence of the original abandonment by being” (Heidegger 2012, p. 112).

For the Nazis, on the other hand, it was possible to combine German Innerlichkeit with technologism as long as the latter was not contaminated by Jewish finance-capitalism. In this respect, Hitler announced his four year plan for the industrialization of Germany in 1936, thanks to which German industry would be rationalized, German technology and rearmament would be one of the priorities of the state, Germany would be one of the most industrialized and technologically developed countries in the world, German technology would be saved from the shackles of Jewish finance-capitalism and re-integrated into the German Gemeinschaft (Herf 1984, pp. 201-208). In other words, as Michael Zimmerman (1990) points out, whereas the National Socialist movement had presented itself as the preserver of the non-industrialized German essence and heritage in the first years of Hitler’s seizure of power, the Nazi propaganda, beginning with 1936, was based on the veneration and aestheticization of modern technology (p. 104). As the Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels was one of the most powerful representatives of the NSDAP’s un-völkisch aim to industrialize Germany and to aestheticize technology. What he said in his address at the Berlin Auto Show in 1939 was the exact opposite of anything Heidegger believed in the 1930s.

We live in an era of technology. The racing tempo of our century affects all areas of our life. There is scarcely an endeavor that can escape its powerful influence. Therefore, the danger unquestionably arises that modern technology will make men soulless. National Socialism never rejected or struggled against technology. Rather, one of its main tasks was to consciously affirm it, to fill it inwardly with soul, to discipline it and to place it in the service of our people and their cultural level. National Socialist public statements used to refer to the steely romanticism of our century. Today this phrase has attained its full meaning. We live in an age that is both romantic and steellike, that has not lost its depth of feeling. On the
contrary, it has discovered a new romanticism in the results of modern inventions and technology. While bourgeois reaction was alien to and filled with incomprehension, if not outright hostility to technology, and while modern skeptics believed the deepest roots of the collapse of European culture lay in it, National Socialism understood how to take the soulless framework of technology and fill it with the rhythm and hot impulses of our time (cited in Herf 1984, p. 196).

Accordingly, Heidegger, as one of the “modern skeptics,” began to criticize National Socialism and its reactionary modernism. His first target was Nazi eugenics and scientific racism. Heidegger took them to be the instantiations of the corrupt age of modern technology and its underlying metaphysics: “Only where the absolute subjectivity of will to power comes to be the truth of beings as a whole is the principle of a program of racial breeding possible; possible, that is, not merely on the basis of naturally evolving races, but in terms of the self-conscious thought of race” (Heidegger 1987, p. 231). Thus, “the new ‘biologism,’” for Heidegger, was one of the “new variants of ‘metaphysics’ which become[se] ever cruder, more groundless, and more aimless” (Heidegger 2012, p. 180).

His second target was Nazi totalitarianism, i.e., the obsession with the absolute utilization of every force from the same source through unconditional planning and organization. In Heidegger’s view, the age of the obsession with “the completely equipped plan and certainty of all plans whatsoever in every area” was the age of “errring” that “knows no truth of Being” (Heidegger 1991c, p. 85). In this respect, even the Nazi “leadership” was an instantiation of the corrupt age of the oblivion of Being: leaders “are the necessary consequence of the fact that beings have entered the way of erring in which the vacuum expands which requires a single order and guarantee of beings. Herein [lies] the necessity of ‘leadership’” (ibid.). However, for Heidegger, such necessity could not hide its aimlessness insofar as, as we have seen above, in the age of the oblivion of Being
reigns nothing but meaninglessness—hence, Heidegger’s critical question: “The priority of procedures and contrivances in the totality of the rallying of all the masses and pressing them into service—toward what end” (Heidegger 2012, p. 112)?

As a matter of fact, Heidegger’s völkisch critique of National Socialism was not limited to his lectures of the late 1930s. Even before, Heidegger was not completely content with the un-völkisch aspects of the new political movement in Germany. In his 1935 Introduction to Metaphysics, for example, Heidegger attacks National Socialism by placing it next to his two mortal enemies, namely, positivism and Marxism, as another instantiation of the un-völkisch world of modernity. In the modern world of spiritual decline, Heidegger claims, “the disempowering of the spirit” has many aspects, one of which is the interpretation of “the spirit as intelligence” (Heidegger 2000, p. 49). Intelligence is conceptualized either as mental sharpness or as the ability to plan and organize. But in either case, interpreting the spirit as intelligence is an indication of the decline—regardless of whether it is a Marxist, positivist, or Nazi interpretation:

Whether this service of intelligence now relates to the regulation and mastery of the material relations of production (as in Marxism) or in general to the clever ordering and clarification of everything that lies before us and is already posited (as in positivism), or whether it fulfills itself in organizing and directing the vital resources and race of a people [as in National Socialism]—be this as it may, the spirit as intelligence … is spirit-less or even hostile to spirit (ibid., emphasis mine).

Moreover, Heidegger implies that modern Germany is no different than Russia and America with respect to the spiritual decline, considering that the spiritual decline and uprootedness of the world of machination reveal themselves not only in the American and Russian “frenzy of unchained technology” but also in everyday German life, insofar as even in Nazi Germany, “a boxer counts as the great man of a people” and “the tallies of millions at mass meetings are [regarded as] a triumph” (ibid., p. 40). As
Julian Young (1997) points out, Heidegger has the German world heavyweight champion, Max Schmelling, in mind when he refers to “a boxer.” And the triumphant mass meetings are the famous Nuremberg rallies, which were propagandized by the Nazis in the *Triumph of the Will* (p. 117). As a result, the first reason why it is wrong to identify the *völkisch* ideology with the Nazi ideology is that *völkisch* Heidegger himself was opposed, especially in the late 1930s, to the un-*völkisch* aspects of National Socialism, such as its obsession with eugenics, total mobilization, and mass-propaganda.

Second, Heidegger not only cast doubt on the un-*völkisch* aspects of National Socialism but also questioned the value of the National Socialist version of the *völkisch* ideology. The NSDAP defined the *Volk* through its natural qualities as if the *Volk* were a present-at-hand entity with its fixed, that is, racial, essence. For Heidegger, on the other hand, since humans are *historical* beings who are endowed with the understanding of Being, human existence cannot be understood through “an antiquated biology,” which presupposes that humans are biological beings with racial differences, who have an additional faculty with respect to other animals, namely, reason (Heidegger 2010b, p. 138). Heidegger believes such conception of human existence is a byproduct of modern subjectivism, insofar as it assumes that humans are *unhistorical, Cartesian* subjects.

In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger goes one step further and attacks the National Socialist version directly by asserting that the *völkisch* “worldview,” which takes the *Volk* to be “the goal and purpose of all history,” *together with its political instantiation*, that is, the compound of “cultural politics and ideas of a people,” is no different than “the kind of thinking that characterizes ‘liberalism’” (Heidegger 2012, p. 65). This does not mean, however, that Heidegger is opposed to the *völkisch* ideology per
For what he is critical of is not the idea of the *Volk*, but the idea of the *Volk with its fixed essence*—the static understanding of the *Volk*. Both the liberal and the Nazi thinking presuppose that “the human being can be taken as already known in essence,” and that humans are “fixed in their determinability” (Heidegger 2012, p. 22). In Heidegger’s view, on the other hand, the *Volk* has no fixed essence, but it is an indeterminable becoming, an unfolding event. For the genuine *Volk*, as we have seen above, becomes what it is within an open space, that is, within an historical world that is opened up through the re-appropriations of the *Volk*’s heritage via genuine works of art, philosophy, religion, or politics. In this respect, for example, the philosophical-work of the *Volk*, “The philosophy of a people,” refers, as opposed to the static understanding of the *Volk*, not to a work which supposedly reflects the natural qualities of the *Volk*, but to the one which “makes people people of a philosophy, [and] grounds them historically in their Da-sein” (ibid., p. 35).

Hence, for Heidegger, there is no *Volk* as a present-at-hand entity with its racial constants—one that waits for being empirically identified by Nazi or positivist observers. A *Volk* “as an existing one,” Heidegger argues, is an imaginary *Volk*, “an alleged people” (ibid., p. 35). This is the reason why Heidegger is opposed to the Nazi understanding of the *Volk* based on biological racism. And this is the reason why he attacks, in his 1933/34 lecture-course, one of the most widely recognized and read racist writers of Nazi Germany, Erwin Guido Kolbenheyer, by calling him Plato’s “cave dweller,” who is “bound to the shadows … as the only definitive reality” (Heidegger 2010b, pp. 159-160). As a result, for Heidegger, the *Volk* never is, but becomes and constantly transforms itself thanks to genuine works, whereas the Nazi version of the *Volk*, together with its racism,
is static. And since it is static, it is a stumbling block on the way to becoming, creating, and transforming. For a static and totalitarian worldview, Heidegger claims, “creating can never come to its own essence and become a creating beyond itself, because the total worldview would thereby have to put itself into question” (Heidegger 2012, pp. 33-34).

Moreover, similar to his understanding of the Volk, Heidegger conceptualizes the heritage of the Volk dynamically, which is the reason why it is impossible to tell once and for all who belongs to the Heideggerian Volk and who does not. Thus, it would be wrong to associate Heidegger’s philosophy with blind conservatism. It is true that, for Heidegger, the authentic Volk is the one which commits itself to its traditional heritage. But there is no such thing as present-at-hand heritage that can be actualized over again or re-presented by a political party. The heritage of the Volk, in Heidegger’s view, becomes what it is as long as it is re-appropriated from the perspective of what that Volk wants to become. Heidegger says, “We experience that which is essential only from the How and For What of our self-decision, who we want to become in the future” (Heidegger 2009, p. 99). However, “who we want to become in the future” cannot be determined ex nihilo as if human beings were worldless, Cartesian subjects. Therefore, “who we want to become in the future” is always contingent upon our traditional heritage: “the determination of this future … cannot be invented and concocted in a freely suspended manner. It determines itself, rather, from that which essences from earlier on” (ibid., pp. 99-100). Such determination, on the other hand, does not refer to blind imitation, but to subversive confrontation. “In the confrontation,” Heidegger writes, “the inheritance first becomes an inheritance”—and this, not through conservative preservation but through “removal from it” (Heidegger 2012, pp. 145, 155). As a result, Heidegger’s conservatism, if there is such
a thing, refers, as Fried (2000) emphasizes, to a “genuinely polemical revolution that preserve history through a completely radical confrontation with it,” to “a return that fundamentally alters what it comes back to” (pp. 76, 131).

Third, Heidegger was neither the first nor the last völkisch German who was opposed, or would be opposed, to the National Socialist version of the völkisch ideology. For example, as George Mosse (1998) points out, most members of the völkisch Youth Movement, who exalted and demanded the preservation of the essence of the German Volk, heritage, native landscape, and the fatherland as opposed to modernity and its products such as industrialization and urbanization, were opposed, at least until the Movement’s total nazification, to National Socialism because of the latter’s paramilitarism, racism, and violent patriotism (pp. 170-189). In other words, völkisch elements were so widespread in Germany that identifying the völkisch ideology with the Nazi ideology would help us do nothing but embark on an unreasonable and irresponsible Nazi-hunt in German history from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries on. In this respect, especially the philosophy of Johann Gottfried Herder is an illuminating example, considering that he was one of the first völkisch philosophers who determined the very jargon of the völkisch ideology, even though he was opposed to imperialism and aggressive chauvinism.

For Herder, each Volk is a product of its particular Volksgeist, which expresses itself in Volk’s language, art, and way of life. This is the reason why each Volk should preserve “its impress, its character,” and not be “mixed up with and top of each other” (Herder 2002, p. 385). Moreover, since each Volk has its own Geist, there can be no such thing as universal moral or scientific criteria for judging the moral or scientific products
of different Völker. Accordingly, Herder mocks “the universal, philosophical, human-friendly tone” of his contemporaries, insofar as they utilize the ideals of their Nationalgeist to judge the ethical principles of other Völker (ibid., pp. 297-298). It is such incommensurability of different Völker with each other that motivates Herder’s dislike toward chauvinism and racism. For “The negro has as much right to consider the white man a degenerate, a born albino freak, as when the white man considers him a beast, a black animal” (ibid., pp. 394-395). The völkisch character of Herder’s philosophy is the basis of his rejection of imperialism and slavery as well, insofar as colonization and slavery uproot the colonized and the enslaved Völker from their native soil. Herder asks, “What gives you the right, you despicable slave-drivers, you inhuman brutes, even to approach the lands of these unfortunates, let alone to tear them away from it by cunning, fraud and cruelty? For ages these regions were theirs by heritage; it belonged to them just as they belonged to it” (Herder 1969, p. 286, emphasis mine).

The fourth reason why it is wrong to identify the völkisch ideology with the Nazi ideology is already implicated in the third one: it is wrong to believe that the völkisch decisionism or relativism would render one defenseless in the face of Nazism. It is also wrong to believe that one should appeal to universal norms to set a bulwark against any genocidal ideology. Not only the fact that völkisch relativism was a bulwark for Herder himself against chauvinism and imperialism, but also the history of racial and sexual discrimination, together with the history of imperialist aggression in the name of so-called universally valid scientific or moral norms, is sufficient to see the naiveté of assuming that only universalism can save one from being an accomplice of the NSDAP’s genocidal crimes.
Against this background, it is illuminating to remember the story of “The German Philosophical Society” (Deutsche Philosophische Gesellschaft, DPG) and its famous member, Bruno Bauch. As Sluga (1993) reminds us, DPG was founded on the völkisch ideology, and mixed its völkisch character with the faith in ahistorical, “objective values.” Throughout the 1920s, DPG defended völkisch ideas—such as the pressing need to dissipate the crisis in Germany, inevitability of preserving and revitalizing the German essence, and the value of communal togetherness and belongingness—and thought that most of these ideas came to force in 1933 thanks to Hitler’s seizure of power (pp. 85-86). However, Bauch, as opposed to völkisch decisionists and relativists, believed that the unique value of the German race and way of life could be appreciated only by appealing to ahistorical, universal values. In this respect, for Bauch, “one could,” as Sluga formulates it, “not be a good racist and a steadfast antisemite without a belief in such values” (p. 214). As a result, one of the motivating forces behind Bauch’s loyalty to the National Socialist movement was the opposite of what made Heidegger, in the eyes of Bauch, “not a true National Socialist but a nihilist,” namely, universalism (Sluga 2001, p. 221).

But is it still not true that most völkisch thinkers were anti-Semites? And does this not show that there is something already wrong with the völkisch ideology? Be that as it may, völkisch anti-Semitism is the fifth reason why it is wrong to identify the völkisch ideology with the Nazi ideology. For, first of all, most völkisch thinkers were not racist in the sense of blood-racism, even though most of them were anti-Semites. Secondly, anti-Semitism in Germany was neither the product of völkisch ideology nor limited to völkisch thinkers. The nineteenth and twentieth century anti-Semitism was rather based on some
ancient myths rooted in the Middle Ages: “Accusations of ritual murder, the curse of Ahasverus the wandering Jew, and fantasies about the universal Jewish world conspiracy” (Mosse 1978, p. 113). From the Middle Ages on, it has been thought that the Jews celebrated their religious feasts by murdering Christian children and drinking their blood. Although the myth gradually lost its power and credibility in urban areas in Europe, it was revitalized over and over again in rural places thanks to the Catholic Church (ibid., pp. 113-114). Moreover, the biblical myth of the wandering Jew has always been behind the European Jews as their shadow. It was thought that the curse of Ahasverus, who was doomed to spend his life wandering as a result of what he had done along the path of Christ’s crucifixion, would always be on the Jews such that they would always be uprooted from and unable to be assimilated into the natives’ soil and heritage (ibid., pp. 114-115). The myths of the wandering Jew and Jewish world conspiracy helped nineteenth and twentieth century anti-Semites take the Jew to be the symbol of unproductive finance-capitalism. Jews were regarded as the uprooted and unproductive mass that would never be able to form an organic Volk rooted in the forces of nature and traditional heritage. Thus, overcoming the uprooting modernity and unproductive finance-capitalism was identified with the elimination of the “materialist” Jews. Moreover, the myth of the capitalist Jew was not only worshipped by the Christian Church or völkisch thinkers, but also taken for granted by some left wing ideologues and Communist leaders—usually but not always with a racist jargon—such as Karl Marx, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Alphonse de Toussenel, Karl Kautsky, and Heinz Neuman (ibid., pp. 150-168, 171-190).
As a result, although it has often been assumed that it is sufficient to point out the völkisch character of Heidegger’s philosophy to deduce Nazism from his thought, it is wrong to identify völkisch conservatism with the National Socialist worldview. However, this does not mean that the political implications of Heidegger’s philosophy should not be questioned. It also does not mean that Heidegger the man should be distinguished from Heidegger the philosopher once and for all. But it means that it is misleading, unfair, and irresponsible, for several historical and philosophical reasons, to question the relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and his political choice in 1933 under the assumption that nineteenth and twentieth century German conservatism is identical with the Nazi ideology.
Let me begin this chapter with a brief summary of the previous chapters. We have seen that, for Heidegger, one’s freedom lies in one’s authentic, that is, not only constant but also subversive, historization. To wit, in Heidegger’s view, authentic/free Dasein or Volk is the one which re-appropriates its past constantly and subversively in order to overcome the calcified present it is born into, and in order to open up a new world, a new future. We have also seen that Heidegger thought it was this conception of historization that was responsible for his political choice in 1933. However, since Heidegger was not “a free-floating ‘I’,” to understand the relationship between Heideggerian subversive historization and the Nazi revolution, we had to question the nature and Heideggerian interpretation of the German philosopher’s own past, present, and future.

Heidegger, just like other völkisch writers, believed that his calcified present, i.e., the world of modernity, was corrupted by the prevalent technologism and its underlying metaphysics such that it was urgent to subversively re-appropriate the heritage of the German Volk in order to create an anti-modern, anti-industrialist, and anti-individualist future. Does this mean, then, that Heidegger’s conservative philosophy, his understanding of völkisch historization, was the basis upon which Heidegger built his Nazism? As we have seen above, this is the hegemonic way of conceptualizing the relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and the National Socialist ideology. Therefore, it was inevitable

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for us to de-construct the presuppositions of this hegemony to clear the way to genuinely question the relationship between freedom and discrimination via “the Heidegger’s case.”

Since we have shown above that it is wrong to identify the völkisch ideology with the National Socialist ideology, and, by implication, it is wrong to identify Heidegger’s völkisch historization with the Nazi revolution, to understand the relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and the National Socialist ideology, what we need to do is to ask: what bridges the gap between Heidegger’s understanding of freedom and völkisch historization, on the one hand, and the discriminatory ideology of the fascist movement, on the other? Why did Heidegger think that his concept of historicity had something to do with the Nazi movement, even though he was aware of the discriminatory aspects of it? That is, I believe, Iain Thomson (2005) is right when he writes, “Although there is certainly no necessary connection between the concept of historicality and Nazism … Heidegger’s understanding of authentic historicity clearly did play a crucial role in ‘bridging’ the divide between philosophy and politics” (pp. 104-105). While for Thomson, to interrogate the nature of this “bridge,” we need to focus on the nature of Heidegger’s “university politics” (Thomson 2005 pp. 104-140; Thomson 2007, pp. 32-48), I think we should not divert our attention away from Heidegger’s understanding of subversive, yet völkisch, historization, but interrogate it even in more detail.

In this chapter, I will focus on the Heideggerian history of Being (Seinsgeschichte) to better understand the way in which Heidegger experienced his own past, present, and future, and the way in which he conceptualized the subversive/völkisch historization of the German people. I will claim that it is Heidegger’s monolithic understanding of völkisch historization that made the German philosopher not only
vulnerable to but also enthusiastic about a discriminatory ideology such as the National Socialist ideology. In other words, I will claim that one of the bridges, if not the most important one, between Heidegger’s subversive, yet anti-modern, historization and a discriminatory ideology is Heidegger’s dogmatic belief that there is one origin of the European world, one historical account of the West, one lineage of the Greco-Germanic people, one essential problem in the contemporary world, one solution for the shortcomings of modernity, and one center for the salvation of the Western world. For such dogma already leans towards the faith in the inevitability of marginalizing different recipes for the shortcomings of modernity, different sub-heritages, different ethnicities, and different ways of living and conceptualizing German life.

3.1. Monolithic Historicity

According to Heidegger, the history of Being is identical with the history of the West, insofar as each historical epoch acquires its characteristics thanks to the epochal understanding of Being, in accordance with which human and non-human beings are experienced in a particular way. Thus, only the epochal way Being reveals itself can ground the history, tradition, and self-understanding of historical peoples. In this respect, the epochal understanding of Being functions, as Reiner Schürman (1987) puts it, as “The epochal a priori” (p. 74). Be that as it may, Heidegger claims, Western history as a whole is founded on the Greek understanding of Being, which is shaped by the destiny-determining philosophers of the West, namely, Parmenides and Heraclitus, “the two greatest and most renowned thinkers of the early Greek period” (Heidegger 1994, p. 153). In other words, for Heidegger, Western history has a unique origin. It is this origin that
determines the nature of the entire historical unfolding of the Western world. Heidegger says, the Greek conception of Being, “though entirely flattened out and rendered unrecognizable, is the conception that still rules even today in the West—not only in the doctrines of philosophy but in the most everyday routines” (Heidegger 2000, p. 62).

In Heidegger’s view, the original Greek understanding of Being is based on experiencing beings as such and as a whole as phusis, as self-presencing. That is, for the Greeks, Being refers to “the unfolding that opens itself up, the coming-into-appearance in such unfolding, and holding itself and persisting in appearance—in short, the emerging-abiding sway” (ibid., p. 15). Put differently, (the Greek) Being is “the event of standing forth, arising from the concealed and thus enabling the concealed to take its stand for the first time” (ibid., p. 16). As Thomas Sheehan (1981) formulates it, (the Greek) Being is “the kinetic self-revelation of things,” that is, “kinetic autodisclosure” (pp. 540-541). In accordance with such understanding of Being, Heidegger argues, the Greeks experienced truth as alétheia, as the unconcealment of beings as such and as a whole. Thus, “[the Greek] Truth belongs to the essence of Being”—considering that “Insofar as a being as such is, it places itself into and stands in unconcealment” (Heidegger 2000, p. 107).

The Greek origin of the West, however, is also the origin of the gradual distortion of the original understanding of Being and, still worse, of the gradual forgetting of Being. For, first of all, although the Greeks experienced truth as un-concealment, they did not focus on the concealment itself. “[A]n explicit clarification of the hiddenness of beings,” writes Heidegger, did “not eventuate” in the Greek origin (Heidegger 2002, p. 90). Secondly, the original Greek understanding of Being was “already ambivalent in itself” (Heidegger 1995, p. 30). For phusis as self-presencing means not only the event of self-
presencing but also *that* which comes to presence. Heidegger says, “that which prevails, means not only *that which itself prevails*, but that which prevails in its prevailing or the *prevailing* of whatever prevails” (ibid., p. 30). Thus, in Heidegger’s view, the lack of a thorough thematization of the notion of (un)concealment and the original ambiguity in the notion of *phusis* are the original reasons why the original understanding of Being and truth became distorted in the very early stages of the Western civilization.

Especially with Platonism, Heidegger argues, the event-like character of *phusis* began to sink into oblivion. That is, Plato and his followers focused on *that* which is present at the expense of forgetting the *event* of self-presencing. For Heidegger, this was the beginning of the history of metaphysical thinking, which thinks Being without actually thinking it. For metaphysics questions the ground (“what is most eminently” *present*, that is, the original *being* as the primary cause of all *beings*) and the “most general” aspect (*being-ness*, what-*being*) of *beings* (Heidegger 2012, p. 164). Thus, Plato and his followers conceptualized Being in terms of *beings*, in terms of what is *constantly present* in *what* comes to *presence*. Moreover, since “this whole process of deformation and decline,” in which different epochs has named the *being-ness* of beings differently, was not only started by Plato but also caused, as we have seen above, by the original lack and ambiguity, Heidegger claims, the original distortion of the original understanding of Being was already, that is, potentially, present in the original understanding of Being: “In the first beginning, beings are experienced as *phusis* and are so named. Beingness as constant presence is still veiled therein” (Heidegger 2000, p. 15; Heidegger 2012, p. 153, transliterations mine).
As a result, due to the Platonic distortion, *phusis* gave way to *idea* (“that in which something shows itself *as it is,*” the form, what-being), and *alētheia* to “truth as correctness” (Heidegger 2010b, pp. 101, 119). In other words, thanks to Platonic *idealism*, truth is not about Being and its unconcealment anymore, but it is about reason and its correct representations; it is about whether the way in which reason represents *beings* corresponds to the way in which *beings* are:

Truth, which was originally, as unconcealment, a happening of the beings themselves that held sway … now becomes a property of logos. In becoming a property of assertion, truth does not just shift its place; it changes its essence. From the view of the assertion, the true is attained when saying hold on to that about which it is making an assertion, when the assertion directs itself according to beings. Truth becomes the correctness of logos (Heidegger 2000, p. 199).

For Heidegger, Platonic *idealism*, together with “the distorted essence of truth (correctness),” is the ground upon which the *entire* history of philosophy, together with its unabashed *subjectivism/representationalism*, is erected (Heidegger 2012, p. 179):

on the basis of this transformed concept of truth—in the sense of the correctness of an assertion or a representation—new basic philosophical positions arose with Descartes and Leibniz, with Kant and the thinkers of German idealism, and lastly with Nietzsche. All this occurred, to be sure, within a unanimity of thinking and in a unanimity of the guiding lines of inquiry, so that, e.g., in spite of the abysmal differences between the medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas and the last essential thinker of the West, Nietzsche, for both of them the same conception of truth, as a characteristic of judging reason, was authoritative (Heidegger 1994, pp. 93-94).

The Platonic distortion of the original understanding of Being and truth first gave way to the Christian understanding of Being: “With the help of what Plato’s doctrine of the ideas prepared, the Christian concept of God was conceived. This became the standard for the next millennia, for what is genuinely real and unreal” (Heidegger 2010b, 115). That is, “Beingness once became what *is* most eminently … and following this opinion beyng became the very essence of God, whereby God was conceived as the producing cause of all beings,” and, accordingly, the *being-ness* of beings was
conceptualized as createdness; that is, beings were experienced as “ens creatum,” created beings (Heidegger 2012, pp. 88, 191-192).

With the inception of modernity, roughly around the seventeenth century, Platonic idealism, together with its Christian counterpart, is transformed into modern subjectivism. The basis of such transformation lies in the fact that the European humanity is liberated from the shackles of Christianity, and thereby loses “the revelational certainty of salvation” (Heidegger 1977c, 148). In the modern world, the willful human subject occupies the place which was reserved to God throughout the Middle Ages. Heidegger writes, “the individual, the individual soul, the individual human, the ‘I’, is experienced correspondingly as what most eminently is, as the most real being” (Heidegger 2012, p. 166). Hence, the willful human subject becomes the sole distributor of salvation and certainty. It does this by turning what there is into an object of representation, i.e., object of calculation, categorization, and willful manipulation, and by remaining oblivious to what is, in principle, un-representable, namely, Being. Accordingly, the European humanity becomes even more oblivious to Being than it was in the Greek inception. For in the modern world, “Man [as a being among beings] becomes that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and its truth”; and what is not humanized and put in service of human will is irrecoverably lost in oblivion (Heidegger 1977c, p. 128). As a result, for Heidegger, in the world of modernity and modern technology—that is, in the world of humanization, representation, categorization, calculation, and willful manipulation—the absolute oblivion of Being prevails. Consequently, the modern Western world is dominated by nihilism, because Being means
nothing to the European humanity anymore due to its lostness in the web of utilizable beings. Heidegger asks,

But where is the real nihilism at work? Where one clings to current beings and believes it is enough to take beings, as before, just as the beings that they are. But with this, one rejects the question of Being and treats Being as a nothing (nihil). … Merely to chase after beings in the midst of the oblivion of Being—that is nihilism (Heidegger 2000, p. 217).

However, this does not mean that nihilism is just a modern phenomenon. For Heidegger believes the world of modernity and modern technology, in which representedness is taken to be the being-ness of beings, is the late-product of the original deviation from the original Greek understanding of Being. Hence, for Heidegger, the history of nihilism, which is the history of the oblivion of Being, corresponds to the history of Platonic idealism and its modifications, i.e., the history of Western metaphysics:

*meta-physics begins* with Plato’s interpretation of Being as *idea*. For all subsequent times, it shapes the essence of Western philosophy, *whose history, from Plato to Nietzsche, is the history of metaphysics*. And because metaphysics begins with the interpretation of Being as “idea,” and because that interpretation sets the standard, all philosophy since Plato is “idealism” in the strict sense of the word: Being is sought in the idea, in the idea-like and the ideal. With respect to the founder of metaphysics we can therefore say that all Western philosophy is Platonism (Heidegger 1982a, p. 164).

Nevertheless, although the nihilistic history of Western metaphysics unfolds itself from the Greek origin to the world of modernity and modern technology, it is the last episode of this history that is in complete darkness owing to the *absolute* oblivion of Being in the modern era. Accordingly, Heidegger claims, “Metaphysics is at an end” (Heidegger 2012, p. 136). For the Greek inception of the Western intellectual life, on account of incessant distortions and obliviousness, “no longer releases any possibilities for essential inquiry into the guiding question,” the question of Being (Heidegger 1984a, p. 205). Although Heidegger wavers about whether it is Hegel or Nietzsche who
represents the end of metaphysics, the end of metaphysics, together with the necessity of confronting and thereby overcoming this end, is a common theme of his writings and lecture-courses of the 1930s. In the early 1930s, Heidegger seems to take Hegel’s philosophy to be the representative of the “completion” (Heidegger 1988, p. 12; Heidegger 2010a, p. 10). According to his *Nietzsche* lectures (1936-1946), on the other hand, it is Nietzsche’s philosophy that corresponds to “the last fundamental ‘metaphysical’ position in Western thought” (Heidegger 1984a, p. 8).

Furthermore, Heidegger argues, the end of metaphysics is also the end of philosophy in general. For every genuine philosophical question is traceable to one and the same question of Being. And it is the metaphysical thinking that thinks beings as such and as a whole—“Metaphysics is thus the rubric indicative of philosophy proper” (ibid., p. 185). More importantly, the end of metaphysics is also the end of the Western history. For it is “Metaphysics [that] grounds an age, in that through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is essentially formed. This basis holds complete dominion over all the phenomena that distinguish the age” (Heidegger 1977c, p. 115). That is, as Thomson (2011) puts it, Heidegger embraces a sort of “ontological holism,” considering that in his view, the metaphysical understanding of what it means to be determines the nature of every being once and for all (p. 7). Accordingly, since metaphysics is no more capable of re-forming itself, the Western world as we know it, with its two-millennia-long history, is at an end, too.

As a result, Heidegger’s interpretation of history is *monolithic*. That is, for him, there is one historical story worth narrating about the West, namely, the history of philosophy. For every philosophical question is traceable to one question, the
metaphysical question of Being; and every historical epoch in the West acquires its entire characteristics thanks to one interpretation of Being as is peculiar to that epoch. Such history of the West has one origin, that is, the Greek understanding of Being. This origin brings about nothing but one historical development, that is, the history of the transformation, distortion, and gradual forgetting of the original understanding of Being. Such development has one end, that is, the world of modernity and modern technology. And, as we will see below, there is one source of the shortcomings of modernity, the Platonic deviation from the original Greek understanding of Being; there is one thing to do in the face of such deviation, asking the question of Being more originally than it was asked by the Greeks; there is one Volk which is able to fulfill such a task, Germans; and contemporary Germans are the descendants of one Volk, the Greeks.

As we have already seen, Heidegger believes that the deviation from and the distortion of the original understanding of Being, which starts the process of the gradual forgetting of Being, begins with Plato and his interpretation of Being as idea. Accordingly, in Heidegger’s view, every shortcoming of modernity is indirectly caused by Plato and what he is directly responsible for, namely, the oblivion of Being:

What already happens in Plato is the waning of the fundamental experience, i.e. of a specific fundamental stance [Grundstellung] of man towards beings, and the weakening of the word alètheia in its basic meaning. This is only the beginning of that history through which Western man lost his ground as an existing being, in order to end up in contemporary groundlessness (Heidegger 2002, p. 87, transliteration mine).

Therefore, for Heidegger, “everything [today] that calls itself ‘ontology’,” “all [contemporary] Christian and non-Christian metaphysics,” “every theory that adopts ‘values’, ‘meaning’, ‘ideas’, and ideals,” “likewise, the [modern] theories (positivism and biologist) that deny these,” and “any kind of ‘life’-philosophy,” are nothing but “forms
of Platonism” (Heidegger 2012, pp. 170-171). Even liberalism and Marxism are nothing but the aftereffects of the Platonic deviation. Heidegger says,

At this point, it is getting embarrassing that there are more and more people who believe they have discovered that liberalism must be refuted. Certainly it should be overcome, but only when we comprehend that liberalism is just a marginal epiphenomenon, a very weak and late one at that, rooted in great and still unshaken realities (Heidegger 2010b, pp. 93-94).

If liberalism is to be overcome, what needs to be done is to confront what is responsible for the possibility of existence of liberalism. The first condition for confronting liberalism, then, is to ask the question of Being and investigate the original relation of Being to truth. But to be able to ask such questions originally, “the great obstacle that opposes a genuine insight into the essence of truth” must be overcome (ibid., p. 93). In other words, Platonism and its product, that is, the history of metaphysics, must be de-structured. Only if the Platonic deviation is overcome may the Western world protect itself from the threats of liberalism and Marxism. Heidegger claims, “If there had been no doctrine of ideas, there would be no Marxism. So Marxism cannot be defeated once and for all unless we first confront the doctrine of ideas and its two-millennia-long history” (ibid., p. 118). Hence, for Heidegger, not only the Christian understanding of Being, technological nihilism, “the reduction of human beings to a mass,” modern subjectivism, rationalism, and representationalism, but also liberalism and Marxism are somehow related to the Platonic deviation. Heidegger does not shy away, in his Contributions to Philosophy, from bringing these diverse, and seemingly unrelated, elements of what he takes to be the history of Being by appealing to the most effective and politically loaded term of Nazi Germany, namely, Jewishness:

the final form of Marxism … has essentially nothing to do with Jewishness or even with Russianness; if an undeveloped spiritualism still lies dormant someplace, then that place is the Russian people; Bolshevism is originally
Western, a European possibility: the rise of the masses, industry, technology, the dying out of Christianity; insofar, however, as the supremacy of reason, qua equalization of everyone, is merely a consequence of Christianity, which is itself basically of Jewish origin[...]. Bolshevism is in fact Jewish; but then Christianity is also basically Bolshevist! Which decisions thereby necessary (Heidegger 2012, p. 44)?

Heidegger adds fascism to liberalism and Marxism in his “Facts and Thoughts,” and argues that they are nothing but the products of the history of the gradual forgetting of Being (Heidegger 1985b, p. 485). Even the world wars are made possible by this history: “The ‘world wars’ and their character of ‘totality’ are already a consequence of the abandonment of Being” (Heidegger 1991c, p. 84). And lastly, even the deterioration of the German academic life in the modern era is conditioned by the original deviation from the original Greek understanding of Being:

When in the business section of today’s newspaper “packing parcels” is listed as a subject “suitable” for a “science taught at the university level,” this is not simply a “bad joke”; and when one works to set up a “radio science” on its own, these developments are not a degeneration of “science”; rather, they are merely bizarre stragglers in a process that has been going on for centuries, a process whose metaphysical ground lies in the fact that knowledge and knowing are conceived of as techné early on as a consequence of the very beginning of Western metaphysics (Heidegger 1987, p. 20).

Hence, it is hard to disagree with Michel Haar (1999) and not to call Heidegger’s historical account of the beginning and end of the Western world an “inversion of Hegelianism” (p. 51). It is true that, contrary to Hegel, Heidegger does not presuppose any logical transition between historical epochs; he also rejects the possibility of absolute knowing. Yet, his historical story is a story of “evil telos” (ibid.); or as Hans-Georg Gadamer (1994) puts it, “negative teleology of the forgetfulness of Being,” insofar as the spiritual decline of the West in the modern era, for Heidegger, is already prepared in the original deviation and alienation from the original Greek understanding of Being (p. 161). Moreover, Heidegger assumes that he and his contemporaries live in prophetic times, i.e.,
on the verge of pure beginning—the beginning that reminds one of the Hegelian end of history. That is, since the Western world is already terminated in the very beginning because of the original forgetting of Being, and since the actual end of it reveals itself in the world of modernity and modern technology due to the reign of willful subjectivism, Heidegger claims, the contemporary West as a whole stands before two paths: it will either embrace its fall or transform itself completely into the second beginning. To wit, the European humanity is faced with a destiny-determining question: “the question of whether the modern era is grasped as an end and another beginning is sought, or whether the decline that has been in effect since Plato is perpetuated and insisted on” (Heidegger 2012, p. 106). In other words, as Davis (2007) points out, Heidegger succumbs to the “utopian will to decisive results” (p. 272). And since there is one and only one essential cause of the spiritual collapse of the Western world, the “utopian will” can be satisfied if and only if the original deviation and alienation from the original Greek understanding of Being is overcome by retrieving the origin, the destiny-determining Greek heritage of the West—hence, the necessity of asking the question of Being. Only by asking this question may the European humanity overcome the shortcomings of modernity, and bring about “the only other beginning arising in relation to the one and only first beginning” (Heidegger 2012, p. 7). In this respect, the question of Being is the destiny-determining question; it is “the question of all questions” (ibid., p. 11).

Thus, for Heidegger, re-appropriating the heritage means nothing but to ask the question of Being, which amounts to retrieving the original Greek understanding and problematization of Being. Retrieving the original Greek understanding of Being, in turn, is to understand Being kinetically. It is to conceptualize Being, similar to the Greek
understanding of *phusis* as self-presencing, as “*the event of grounding the ‘there’*,” as the *event* of the *origination* of the clearing, of the open space, through which a particular understanding of Being *is given* to a historical people and, accordingly, beings—be it human or not—*become* what they are, that is, *come* to their own (Heidegger 2012, p. 195). In other words, as Guignon (2001) points out, it is to overcome the two-thousand-year-old “substance ontology” due to which Being is conceptualized as *being*-ness, as constant presence, and to understand Being with the aid of “event ontology” (p. 36). Accordingly, in Heidegger’s view, “an originary re-asking of the question of being,” and retrieving the original Greek understanding of Being for that matter, does not refer to looking for and coming up with a new definition for the *being*-ness of beings, but to asking “how does beyng essentially *occur*” (Heidegger 2012, p. 173, emphasis mine).

As a result, Heidegger believes the European humanity must make a decision about its future, and from the perspective of this decision, it must re-appropriate its heritage in order to overcome the shortcomings of the calcified present. In other words, it must *historize* authentically; it must *subversively* unfold itself from its destiny-determining Greek heritage to its anti-modern future, i.e., from the first inception to the second inception. Yet, there is just *one* origin for it to re-appropriate, and there is *one* way of *historizing* authentically without being perished in the ruins of the already self-alienated Western world. Other than this *one* particular way, *absolutely nothing* can bring salvation to the modern Westerner. Accordingly, Heidegger argues, as late as 1951/52, that even WWII has changed nothing essentially with respect to the destiny of the West: “What did the Second World War really decide? (We shall not mention here its fearful consequences for my country, cut in two.) This world war has decided nothing—if we
here use ‘decision’ in so high and wide a sense that it concerns solely man’s essential fate on this earth” (Heidegger 1968, p. 66).

However, this does not mean that Heidegger proposes a solution for the darkening of the world *that can be carried out by just anyone*. For Heidegger has never lost his faith in the special place of Germans in saving the Western world from spiritual collapse. For him, *only* Germans, as the most *metaphysical* and *central* people, are endowed with the power of bringing salvation to the West:

this people, as a historical people, must transpose itself—and with it the history of the West. … Precisely if the great decision regarding Europe is not to go down the path of annihilation—precisely then can this decision come about only through the development of new, historically spiritual forces from the center (Heidegger 2000, p. 41, emphasis mine).

Moreover, Heidegger implies that retrieving the Greek origin and asking the question of Being in order to overcome the original deviation from the original Greek understanding of Being is to overcome *the self-alienation Germans have been exposed to for two thousand years*, considering that *the Greeks are proto-Germans*, or as Heidegger puts it in his 1933 lecture-course, their “ethnicity [*stammesart*] and language have the same provenance as ours” (Heidegger 2010a, p. 5). The Greeks, Heidegger argues, determined “the primordial laws of our Germanic ethnicity in their most simple exigency and greatness” (Heidegger 2010b, 72). Such greatness may be preserved only if Germans overcome the two-millennia-long self-alienation by re-appropriating *their ancestors’* original understanding and problematization of Being, and thereby follow their *unique* destiny. Heidegger says,

This means learning to grasp that this great inception of our Dasein has been cast out over and past us as what we have to catch up with—again, we do this not to contemplate Greek civilization, but rather fully to draw on the fundamental possibilities of the proto-Germanic ethnic essence [*Stammeswesen*] and to bring these to mastery (ibid., p. 71).
Heidegger has never abandoned his belief that the Greeks and Germans are somehow related. As early as 1930, he claims that “Only our German language has a deep and creative philosophical character to compare with the Greek,” which is a “philosophical” language (Heidegger 2005, p. 36). And as late as 1966, he argues that there is an “inner relationship of the German language with the language of the Greeks and with their thought” (Heidegger 1991d, p. 113).

Consequently, the Heideggerian version of historicity is monolithic. For him, there is one heritage to be re-appropriated and one genuine way of performing such re-appropriation. Similarly, there is one essential cause of the shortcomings of modernity and one solution to them. Lastly, there is one Volk which is capable of realizing this unique solution and one lineage of this Volk. Hence, the Heideggerian version of historicity is discriminatory. It already marginalizes different recipes for the shortcomings of modernity, different sub-heritages, different ethnicities, and different ways of living and conceptualizing German life. As we will see below, such differences became more and more troublesome for Heidegger in the early 1930s, insofar as his unique solution to the only problem of the West, which could be realized only by one ethnicity if and only if that ethnicity re-appropriated its unique essence and heritage, necessarily meant the suppression of the marginalized groups, their traditions, their sub-heritages, and their recipes for coming to grips with modernity. And considering that the preservation and re-appropriation of the unique essence, heritage, and origin of Germans is tied by Heidegger to the salvation of not only Germany or even the West, but also to the salvation of the world in general, the need for the homogenization of the German Dasein and the marginalization of what was regarded as un-German became more and
more pressing. Heidegger thought the destiny of the world as a whole would be determined by the German Volk and the way in which this Volk deals with the question of metaphysics: “the configuration of the Western intellectual world and thereby the world in general depends to an essential extent on the power and preeminence of this word [i.e., metaphysics] and its history” (Heidegger 1984a, p. 186, emphasis mine). Obviously, the wider the German task is, the more pressing is the need for preserving the German essence and heritage. Accordingly, even in the early 1940s, Heidegger was reminding his students of the necessity of preserving the monolithic German essence and heritage,

which necessitates the marginalization of what is regarded as un-German:

we need to know that this historical people, if the word “victory” is appropriate here at all, has already been victorious and is invincible, provided it remains the people of poets and thinkers that it is in its essence, and as long as it does not fall prey to the terrible—always menacing—deviation from and mistaking of its essence (Heidegger 1992, p. 77).

As a result, the Heidegger of the 1930s was waiting for an anti-modern revolution, which would take its guidance from the monolithic Germanic heritage, eliminate the shortcomings of modernity, preserve the German essence, purify the German lifestyle from its un-Germanic elements, create a new life-world for Germans thanks to which German existence would be transformed, the German Volk would historize authentically, and the West would be saved from total annihilation. In his view, at least in the years of 1933 and 1934, as we have seen above, it was the National Socialist movement as an anti-modern, heritage-respecting, and transformative movement that was capable of bringing about the necessary re-creation of the German world and the necessary revitalization of the German heritage. Moreover, since, for Heidegger, the heritage to be re-appropriated was monolithic, that is, not inclusive enough to acknowledge the multiplicity of sub-heritages in Germany, and since the preservation,
purification, and creative retrieval of this Greco-Germanic heritage was the only option available to Germans for saving the West from total annihilation, Heidegger found nothing wrong with the discriminatory projects of the Nazis, insofar as they were designed to marginalize potential candidates for shaping the German future and, thereby, deteriorating the Greco-Germanic heritage, such as: liberals, Marxists, Jews, and Catholics.

In the next section, I will show that Heidegger was not only comfortable with the homogenization of the German Dasein and the marginalization of minorities but also endorsed such homogenization and marginalization enthusiastically for the sake of overcoming what he took to be menacing to the monolithic essence, heritage, and historization of the German Volk.

3.2. Marginalizing Historicity

To understand Heidegger’s support for homogenization and marginalization, it is promising to review his relation to one of his contemporaries, who defends homogenization full-heartedly, namely, Carl Schmitt. For Schmitt, the basic political distinction, to which every political concept and every political action may be reduced, is the distinction between “friend” and “enemy” (Schmitt 2007, p. 26). The enemy does not have to be the moral, political, or economic opponent to be the genuine enemy, as long as it is “the other,” “the stranger,” “existentially something different and alien” (ibid., p. 27). The only precondition for regarding a collectivity of strangers as enemy is that there is a potential confrontation (polemos) between them and us that might end up with “physical killing” (ibid., p. 33). Accordingly, by confrontation, Schmitt refers to the possibility of
“the existential negation of the enemy” (ibid.). Moreover, he believes, the negation of the existentially alien segments of the people, namely, the internal enemy, is the sine qua non for the realization of genuine democracy. For every genuine democracy demands the “homogeneity” of the people, which necessitates the “elimination or eradication of heterogeneity,” that is, the marginalization of “something foreign and unequal that threatens its homogeneity” (Schmitt 1988, p. 9). Only if the people are homogenized through the marginalization of minorities may the people acquire their similarity to each other, and thereby eradicate the possibility of being tyrannized by the arbitrary and alien will of their political leaders. Such homogeneity may be acquired either by the “suppression or exile” of minorities or by utilizing more “radical means” (Schmitt 2008, p. 262).

Heidegger knew Schmitt both personally and philosophically. That is to say, he was familiar with Schmitt’s political thoughts and his support for homogenization and marginalization. He at least read the second edition of Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political. Schmitt, in turn, sent a copy of the third edition to Heidegger with a quote from Heraclitus’ famous fragment 53 on polemos. We learn from Heidegger’s letter of 22 August 1933 that Heidegger not only appreciated Schmitt’s peculiar interpretation of polemos, but he was also enthusiastic about working with him in forming the Faculty of Law in the University of Freiburg:

I thank you for having sent me your text, which I already know in the second edition and which contains an approach of the greatest importance. I would be most appreciative if I could speak with you about this viva voce some day. On the topic of your quotation of Heraclitus, I especially appreciated the fact that you did not forget the basileus, which alone gives the whole saying its full content, when it is fully interpreted. For years I have had such an interpretation ready, concerning the concept of truth—edeixe and epoixe [reveals and makes], which appear in fragment 53. But I now find myself also in the middle of the polemos, and the literary projects must give way. I would only like to say to you today that
I am counting very much on your decisive collaboration, when it comes to the entire rebuilding, from the inside, of the Faculty of Law, in its educational and scientific orientation. Here the situation is unfortunately quite hopeless. The gathering of spiritual forces, which should lead up to what is coming, becomes increasingly urgent. I conclude today with my friendliest salutations (cited in Faye 2009, p. 155).

However, Heidegger’s support for homogenization and marginalization is not limited to his letter, in which he indirectly acknowledges the value of Schmitt’s interpretation of the concept of polemos. He also appropriates the Schmittean reading without reservation, and thereby defends homogenization and marginalization directly, in his 1933/34 On the Essence of Truth. He says, polemos, as “the essence of beings,” refers not to “a competition in which two friendly opponents measure their strengths,” but to the “Struggle as standing against the enemy, or more plainly: standing firm in confrontation” (Heidegger 2010b, p. 73). The enemy is anyone who is menacing to the homogenous existence of the people: “An enemy is each and every person who poses an essential threat to the Dasein of the people” (ibid.). However, “The enemy does not have to be external,” it can be internal, but in either case it is crucial “to find the enemy, to expose the enemy to the light, or even first to make the enemy” (ibid.). As a matter of fact, “the external enemy is not even always the more dangerous one,” considering that the internal enemy can have attached itself to the innermost roots of the Dasein of a people and can set itself against this people’s own essence and act against it. The struggle is all the fiercer and harder and tougher, for the least of it consists in coming to blows with one another; it is often far more difficult and wearisome to catch sight of the enemy as such, to bring the enemy into the open, to harbor no illusions about the enemy, to keep oneself ready for attack, to cultivate and intensify a constant readiness and to prepare the attack looking far ahead with the goal of total annihilation (ibid.).

Thus, the precondition of preserving the homogenous essence of the German Volk, for Heidegger, is the elimination of the internal enemy, who is responsible for the
heterogeneity and, thereby, corruption of the essence of the *Volk*—hence, Heidegger’s cry: “either them or me; either to stand or to fall” (ibid., p. 75). Thus, it is not difficult to see why Heidegger did not lose his faith in the National Socialist movement’s potential, at least in the early 1930s, for projecting a world beyond modernity, for creating an authentic *Gemeinschaft* by overcoming the shortcomings of the modern world, that is, for starting the process of *völkisch historization*, even while his close students and colleagues were being forced to leave the country, Jewish students of his own university were being harassed daily, ethnic and sexual minorities all over Germany were being outlawed. After all, it was National Socialism that promised its supporters, at least until 1936, to eliminate the heritage-destroying products of modernity, such as: liberalism, Marxism, modern subjectivism, technologism, and industrialism. And after all, Heidegger was well equipped, thanks to his *monolithic* understanding of historicity, to ignore, if not enthusiastically welcome, the marginalization of minorities and their sub-heritages in exchange for the overcoming of the late-products of the original distortion of the original understanding of Being.

National Socialism promised its supporters to create an authentic *Gemeinschaft* by homogenizing the German Dasein and marginalizing minorities. National Socialism was committed to the purification of the German essence by removing the so-called un-Germanic elements from it. Heidegger was well aware all of the homogenizing and marginalizing intentions of the new political movement in Germany. For example, he knew that around his university town, the first concentration camps were being opened as early as 1933, which would welcome their first *not-yet-homogenized* residents.
Celebrating the opening of the second camp, for example, the official National Socialist newspaper, *Völkischer Beobachter*, announced the following on June 1, 1933:

After opening a camp at Heuberg some months ago for politically dangerous persons, we have now opened a second KZ [Konzentrationslager], also at Heuberg, for prisoners still held in the prison at Karlsruhe. ... These are all Communist agitators, Social Democrats, and pacifists, civil servants and members of Parliament—like all those who endanger public order and in whom one could not expect to see a change of heart even if they were to be freed. Civil servants and the police must keep under surveillance those who have been released *until they can show that they are now ready to become what they ought to be—Germans* (cited in Farias 1989, p. 83, emphasis mine).

Heidegger also knew that for National Socialism, the German nation would be reborn from the ashes of minorities. For example, in May 1933, Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, gave a speech during the famous book-burning event in Berlin, which was in complete accord with the NSDAP’s anti-Jewification policy: “Here we see crumbling the spiritual basis of the November Republic, but from the ashes will be born the new spirit, victorious. For this reason, do not see only a symbol of decadence in the flames, but rather the symbol of renaissance” (cited in Farias 1989, p. 166). Heidegger did not see “a symbol of decadence” in the flames. He rather took the Nazi state and its *Führer* to be the only interpreters of the German essence and heritage, whose re-appropriation would bring about the authentic *historization* of the German *Volk*. Accordingly, he regarded the Nazi state as “the historical being of the *Volk,*” as the preserver of this *Volk*’s heritage, mission, and destiny (Heidegger 2009, p. 140). Hence, he identified the re-appropriation of the German heritage with the commitment to the dictates of the Nazi state: “Doctrine and ‘ideas’ shall no longer govern your existence. The *Führer* himself, and only he, is the current and future reality of Germany, and his word is your law” (Heidegger 1965, p. 28).
It is true that Heidegger, as we have seen above, criticized the National Socialist movement, especially in the second half of the 1930s, by questioning the value of Nazi scientific racism, eugenics, cultural politics, mass-propaganda, totalitarianism, and total mobilization. But his opposition had nothing to do with the discriminatory aspects of the movement. For example, he saw nothing to criticize in the Reich Citizenship Law of 15 May 1935, due to which Jews lost their political rights. As a matter of fact, the official justification of this law, at least partially, was in the Heideggerian spirit. According to the official commentary, human beings were not free-floating, isolated subjects. Their identity was dependent on their belongingness to a homogenous community. Such homogeneity would be based on racial similarity. Therefore, it was wrong to have liberal assumptions and suppose that the isolated individuals were confronted by the state such that they had to be universally protected against the intrusions of the state power with respect to their inalienable, fundamental rights. Rather, both the state and the citizens were the products of the same homogenous community, and only the ones within the borders of such homogeneity might have been eligible for the political privileges granted by the state (Mosse 1966, pp. 319-336).

Instead of criticizing the Reich Citizenship Law, Heidegger defined, in one of his public speeches as rector, the concept of Volk in line with Nazis; that is, in such a way that the Volk became the container of German blood spread throughout Europe. In other words, Heidegger did not shy away from suppressing the anti-racist and dynamic aspects of his understanding of the Volk to support the National Socialist agenda, which was based on the social and literal murder of the marginalized segments of the German people. After all, for Heidegger, what was at stake was the overcoming of the history of
metaphysics through the re-appropriation of the Greco-Germanic heritage, which had nothing to say against the eradication of non-Greco-Germanic minorities and their sub-heritages. In his address of 22 January 1933, given before six hundred beneficiaries of the NSDAP’s labor service program, Heidegger told his audience that thanks to the program, the unemployed members of the Volk could be re-integrated into the Volksgemeinschaft. Yet, the authentic re-integration would require the knowledge of, among others, “to what point urbanization has brought the Germans, how they would be returned to the soil and the country through resettlement,” and “what is entailed in the fact that 18 million Germans belong to the Volk but, because they are living outside the borders of the Reich, do not yet belong to the Reich” (Heidegger 1991b, p. 56). In other words, for Heidegger, even those Germans outside Germany belonged to the Volk. Obviously, the implication here is that the criterion of belongingness to the Volk was either the blood or the common ancestry, which necessitated the expulsion of the non-Greco-Germanic citizens of Germany from the radius of the Volk.

Accordingly, Heidegger supported the discriminatory laws of the Nazi state, which were directed against the non-members of the Volk. For example, in his rectorial address, he claimed that the liberal understanding of freedom and so-called “academic freedom” had to be abandoned, insofar as they referred to “arbitrariness in one’s intentions and inclinations, lack of restraint in everything one does” (Heidegger 1991a, p. 34). Genuine freedom was about placing oneself under the law of one’s heritage. In this respect, the genuine freedom of German students was being realized in the Third Reich thanks to “the new Student Law,” which was supposedly reflecting the German heritage (ibid.). As Faye (2009) points out, the law Heidegger refers to was the law of 25 April
1933: the law “against the excessive number of enrollees in German schools and universities,” which was committed to, among others, reducing the number of Jewish students in German universities (p. 56). As a matter of fact, it was Heidegger’s one of the first “accomplishments” as the new rector of his university to satisfy the requirements of the law of his monolithic, and thereby discriminatory, heritage. As we read in Der Alemannet

The Academic Rectorate of the University of Freiburg announces the following: The solemn proclamation of the new student law, scheduled in the Prussian universities for the date of 1 May, will, in our university, in which the change of rector coincides with the beginning of the summer semester, be duly integrated with the celebration of the transmission of the rectorate (cited in Faye 2009, p. 56).

Similar support for the discriminatory laws of the NSDAP came from Heidegger’s wife. In her letter of 29 April 1933 to Frau Husserl, Frau Heidegger revealed her emotions, as she was commenting on the expulsion of Husserl’s veteran son from his post, regarding a discriminatory law of the new Reich, according to which those non-Aryan officials who were not war veterans would be expelled from their posts:

To all that, of course, must be added profound gratitude for the spirit of sacrifice displayed by your sons, and we are merely following the lead given by this new law (which is harsh but sensible from the German point of view) when we profess our total support and sincere regard for those who have given proof, by their actions, of their allegiance to our German nation in its hour of greatest need. So we were all the more shocked to read the recent press reports about your son at Kiel (cited in Ott 1993, p. 381, emphasis mine).

Furthermore, Heidegger did not only support the discriminatory laws of the Third Reich but also contributed, or at least tried to contribute, to the homogenization of the German Volk through the marginalization of minorities, such as Jews and Catholics. For example, we read the following in his letter of 2 October 1929 attached to Heidegger’s application for a grant for his student, Eduard Baumgarten, to the vice-president of the Emergency Association for German Science, Viktor Schwoerer:
what is at stake here is nothing less than the need to recognize without delay that we face a choice between sustaining our German intellectual life through a renewed infusion of genuine, native teachers and educators, or abandoning it once and for all to the growing Jewish influence [Verjudung]—in both the wider and the narrower sense. We shall get back on the right track only if we are able to promote the careers of a new generation of teachers without harassment and unhelpful confrontation (cited in Ott 1993, p. 378).

Hence, for Heidegger, the germanification, as it were, and the homogenization of German intellectual life were dependent on the marginalization of the so-called non-Greco-Germanic Jewish spirit, which was regarded by most German conservatives as the spirit of liberalism and capitalism (Mosse 1998, pp. 126-145)—two instantiations of the spiritual collapse according to Heidegger’s account of the history of the oblivion of Being. They were also dependent on the expulsion of non-Greco-Germanic Catholicism—another instantiation of the spiritual collapse—from the German university life. In his letter of 22 December 1933 regarding the evaluation of the candidates for “the chair of ecclesiastical history in the Catholic Faculty of Theology,” Heidegger implies that the chair must be eliminated once and for all, considering that Catholics, because of their commitment to the Catholic dogma, could not be integrated into the National Socialist state, which, as we have seen above, represents, at least for Heidegger, “the historical being of the Volk”:

As with all future nominations the first question that must be asked is this: assuming the candidates are equally well qualified in terms of their academic record and character, which of them offers the better guarantee that the National Socialist educational ideals will be implemented? Since Catholic dogma places the Church above the state, all Catholic education—in so far as it truly is what it claims to be—must necessarily subordinate the will of the state and the people to the will of the Church. Consequently the Church forbids its priest to be members of the Party. This is why it is ultimately pointless to try and rate the candidates in terms of their political merits (cited in Ott 1993, p. 245).

Moreover, non-Greco-Germanic Catholicism, whose will, in Heidegger’s view, was in necessary discord with the will of the people, must be socially murdered, that is,
expelled not only from the German academic life but also from the public sphere as such. Heidegger’s reaction against the suspension, only in one case, of the ban on “the Catholic student fraternities” tells a lot. In his letter of 6 February 1934 to the student leader Stäbel, Heidegger writes,

> Such a public victory for Catholicism in this of all places [i.e. Freiburg] must on no account be allowed to stand. It represents a damaging blow to our whole enterprise, *the worst that could possibly be imagined* at the present time. I have an intimate knowledge of the circumstances and personalities here that goes back many years[...]. People still haven’t realized how Catholics operate—and one day that will cost us dear (cited in Ott 1993, p. 246).

Thus, Heidegger not only defended but also contributed to the homogenization of the German Dasein and the marginalization of minorities especially in the early 1930s. Accordingly, he saw nothing wrong with the *discriminatory aspects* of National Socialism. Moreover, as we have seen above, his support for homogenization and marginalization was not unrelated to his *monolithic* understanding of historicity. Heidegger thought the authentic *historization* of the German *Volk* could be realized if and only if the German *Volk* re-appropriated its heritage and created an anti-modern world on the basis of this heritage. However, what bridged the gap between his philosophy and a discriminatory ideology was *not* his emphasis on the heritage of the *Volk*. It was his *monolithic* interpretation of this heritage, of the essence of the *Volk*, of the history and mission of the *Volk*, of the preserver and interpreter of the Being of this *Volk*. That is, for Heidegger, contemporary Germans had a *unique* origin, the so-called Greco-Germanic origin; and the alienation from this origin was responsible for the spiritual collapse in the *entire* world. Therefore, this origin *had to* be preserved and re-appropriated. The salvation of the world was dependent on this. That is to say, the German essence had to be *purified* from the corruption of its original distortion and from its non-Greco-
Germanic elements. In other words, Heidegger did not see that the German essence, heritage, mission, destiny, and, hence, *historization*, were dependent not only on Greco-Germans but also on Jewish-Germans, Catholic-Germans, Francophone-Germans, Slavic-Germans, together with their sub-heritages, customs, habits, and even dialects. Since Heidegger insisted that Germans had *one*, Greco-Germanic essence with *one* history, *one* source of corruption, and *one* recipe for purification, he already pointed towards the *inevitability* of marginalizing minorities.

Therefore, Heidegger’s recipe for authentic/subversive *historization* through the re-appropriation of the heritage was founded on the marginalization and even *criminalization* of anyone without the Greco-Germanic heritage, way of life, and political/philosophical stance, insofar as they were regarded as the stumbling-blocks on the way to the authentic/subversive *historization* of the German *Volk*. Put differently, although Heidegger believed that authentic historicity lies in not only subversive but also *constant* re-appropriation of the heritage, although he thought that both the heritage and the *Volk* become what they are through constant subversive repetitions, and although in his view the precondition of *Being-towards-freedom* is the de-calcification of the naturalized and familiarized presuppositions of the context of intelligibility one is born into, he has never abandoned his unquestioned presuppositions regarding the origin and nature of the Western civilization; he has never *subversively* repeated the *grecophilia* of his generation; and he has never opened his eyes to the plurality and heterogeneity of sub-heritages in Germany. That is, as John Caputo (1999) puts it, Heidegger has never questioned his calcified belief that “the Greeks are *the* beginning,” and never asked:

*Are not Jews and Christians part of the beginning? And why stop with Greeks? Did the Greeks drop from the sky? Why not Egyptians and Mesopotamians? Why is not Sanskrit Being’s primeval tongue? And why must everything since*
the Greeks be the loss of greatness? And if the great Greek beginning is questioned, then what remains of its metaphysico-political counterpart, the great German future? And if that is questioned, then must we not question a Party which is so single-mindedly dedicated to such a future (p. 69)?

As a result, Heidegger’s monolithic understanding of historization, i.e., his betrayal to the dynamic aspects of authentic/subversive historicity, is what bridges the gap between Heidegger’s philosophy and a discriminatory ideology such as the National Socialist ideology. Moreover, since, for Heidegger, as we have seen above, one’s freedom lies in one’s subversive historization, and since Heidegger peppers such subversive historization with the discriminatory implications of monolithicity, the Heideggerian freedom is dependent on the social, if not literal, murder of minorities. That is to say, the Heideggerian authentic/free Volk is the one which re-appropriates its unique heritage in order to create a homogenized world at the expense of the elimination of minorities and their ways of life from the social, if not material, world. In this respect, Caputo is absolutely right when he writes:

I would say, to use a military figure, that Heidegger betrayed the question of Being, that he handed it over to the enemy, enlisted it in the service (Dienst) of a people, that he conscripted and confined it to one people and one language (or two: Are Greek and German one or two?) He did the same thing to Greek tragedy; he made Sophocles wear a steel helmet. Let us say that our task today, like the allied armies descending on Freiburg … is to liberate the question of Being, to liberate Heraclitus and Aristotle, Aeschylus and Sophocles, from their German captors. Let us make the Germanness of Heidegger tremble, make it waver in insecurity, in order to liberate Heidegger from Heidegger, to turn Heidegger against Heidegger, and this by means of Heidegger himself (pp. 71-72).

In other words, what we need to do today is neither to label Heidegger’s philosophy as a Nazi philosophy nor to ignore the political implications of it, but to subversively repeat Heidegger’s thought. Accordingly, in the next two chapters of this essay, I will re-construct Michel Foucault and Judith Butler’s philosophies from the
perspective of Heidegger in order to construct a social ontology that may justify anti-discriminatory policies.
CHAPTER 4: HEIDEGGER AND FOUCAULT

In his very last interview, in 1984, Foucault states, “For me Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher. ... My entire philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger”; and then he adds, having Heidegger and Nietzsche in mind, “I think it is important to have a small number of authors with whom one thinks, with whom one works, but about whom one does not write” (Foucault 1980c, p. 250). Naturally, these lines have led some Foucault and Heidegger scholars to focus on the relationship between the philosophies of these thinkers. These scholars have found some parallels and possible interaction points between, for example, the way in which Heidegger describes the world of modern technology and the way in which Foucault describes modern power as “bio-power” (Dreyfus 2003), between Heidegger’s depiction of the way in which beings are conceptualized in the modern world as standing-reserve and Foucault’s depiction of the way in which human beings are constructed in the modern era as “docile bodies” (Dreyfus 2003; Hicks 2003), between Heidegger’s Being and Foucault’s “episteme” (Schwartz 2003), and between Heidegger’s Seinsgeschichte and Foucault’s genealogies (Maniglier 2013). However, Foucault’s last interview is not the only place where he refers to Heidegger as his mentor—a fact which has often been ignored. Foucault says in his 1981/82 lecture-course, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, there have not been that many people who in the last years—I will say in the twentieth century—have posed the question of truth. Not that many people have posed the question: What is involved in the case of the subject and of the truth? And: What is the relationship of the subject to the truth? What is the subject of truth, what is the subject who speaks the truth, etcetera? As far as I’m concerned,
I see only two. I see only Heidegger and Lacan. Personally, myself, you must have heard this, I have tried to reflect on all this from the side of Heidegger and starting from Heidegger. (Foucault 2005b, p. 189)

My aim in this chapter is to re-construct the relationship between Heidegger and Foucault from the perspective of subject-truth relation, and interpret Foucault’s philosophy from the perspective of Heidegger’s thought. How did Heidegger and Foucault conceptualize the relationship between truth and subject? More importantly, how did they conceptualize the relationship between truth, subject, subjective transformation, and freedom—considering that Foucault says, “if I know the truth I will be changed,” and believes that freedom lies in the possibility of self-transformation, “the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think”; that is, the possibility of creating and re-creating one’s self as if it is “a work of art” (Foucault 1989g p. 379; Foucault 1997c, pp. 114, 108)?

As we have seen in the first chapter of this essay, for Heidegger, the unconcealment of the anxiety-engendering truth is the precondition of freedom, or more correctly, *Being-towards-freedom*. *Being-towards-freedom*, in turn, refers to constantly and subversively repeating the traditional possibilities of *Being-in-the-world* in order to transform the calcified world one is born into, and in order to awaken the anxiety-engendering truth. Then, is it not true that Foucault’s conception of freedom is entirely different than Heidegger’s, insofar as the creation of the self as if it is a work of art seems to presuppose a *sovereign subject*, which has complete mastery over itself in such a way that it can create and re-create itself at will—as if it did not owe its very identity to the world it is born into? Is it not true that Heidegger was opposed to such subjectivism when he conceptualized Dasein as *Being-in-the-world*? Is it not true that Leslie Paul Thiele (2003) has a point when he describes the Foucauldian freedom as “the heroic, albeit
tragic task of creative self-mastery,” as “a highly individualistic (if not narcissistic) endeavor,” and when he points out its un-Heideggerian “subjectivist overtones,” its “(aesthetic) subjectivism” (pp. 228-229)? That is, is it not true that the task of interpreting Foucault’s philosophy from the perspective of Heidegger with a special emphasis on the way in which Foucault and Heidegger conceptualize the subject-truth-freedom relation is doomed to failure from the start? And if, on the other hand, the Foucauldian freedom is related to the Heideggerian understanding of freedom more than it prima facie appears to be, does this not show that the Foucauldian freedom, just like the Heideggerian understanding of freedom, requires the social, if not literal, murder of minorities?

In this chapter, I will show that just like Heidegger, Foucault conceptualizes freedom as Being-towards-freedom, which does not presuppose a sovereign subject with the power of creating itself ex nihilo, but requires anxiety-engendering, truth-revealing, calcification-dissipating, constant subversive repetition. To this end, I will describe, first, the Foucauldian understanding of power and resistance, and, then, the nature of his genealogies. In the last section of this chapter, I will point out the reasons why the Foucauldian freedom does not necessitate the murder of and discrimination against the marginalized segments of a given society as opposed to the Heideggerian understanding of freedom.

4.1. Power, Resistance, Genealogy

Foucault claims that the functioning of power cannot be understood through what he calls the “juridico-discursive” model, different versions of which are instantiated in the discourses of, for example, seventeenth and eighteenth century natural right theorists
and their modern successors, certain Marxists, twentieth century critical theorists such as Herbert Marcuse, and Reichean psychoanalysis. According to this model, power is an entity one can possess, transfer, or be deprived of. Thus, power becomes reified and thereby acquires the status of a natural, as it were, object in this model. Foucault says, “Power is the concrete power that any individual can hold, and which he can surrender, either as a whole or in part, so as to constitute a [political] power or a political sovereignty” (Foucault 2003, p. 13). In other words, the juridico-discursive accounts of power are based on the conceptualization of power according to “the model of a legal transaction involving a contractual type of exchange” between the possessors and non-possessors of power (Foucault 1980a, p. 88). For these accounts define power either as the right one possesses “in the way one possesses a commodity” through the transfer of which political power, that is, the sovereign right to rule, is established, or, as in the case of “the Marxist conception,” as reducible to class domination due to which the possessors of power rule over, manipulate, or suppress the non-possessors of power in order to preserve and expand the economic status quo (Foucault 2003, pp. 13, 14). Hence, in Foucault’s view, a certain “economism” reigns in the juridico-discursive model of power:

we have, if you like, in one case a political power which finds its formal model in the process of exchange, in the economy of the circulation of goods; and in the other case, political power finds its historical raison d’être, the principle of its concrete form and of its actual workings in the economy (ibid., p. 14).

Moreover, the juridico-discursive model is based not only on economism but also on the scheme of oppression, or as Foucault calls it, on the “contract-oppression scheme” (Foucault 1980a, p. 92). For in this model, oppression is defined as the (ab)use of power, as the state in which political power transgresses the boundaries of the contract—be it natural, social, or economic. However, regardless of whether power acquires the status of
oppression, the juridico-discursive model gives an account of the functioning of power by depicting political power as the incarnation of the “law that says no” (Foucault 1980b, p. 120). Hence, in this model, political power functions by “laying down the rule,” by determining what is “licit and illicit,” what is “permitted and forbidden”; that is, through “the function of the legislator” (Foucault 1978, p. 83). Accordingly, in this model, the primary tools of political power are taken to be the “mechanisms of law, taboo, and censorship,” the mechanisms of “rejection, exclusion, refusal, blockage, concealment, or mask” (ibid., pp. 83, 84). Thus, political power, or the possessor of political power, for the theorists of the juridico-discursive model, defines the rule, represses what is “natural” in human existence or what is regarded as detrimental to the lives of the privileged segments of a given society, protects the law, and continues the reign of repression through “the threat of a punishment” (ibid., p. 84). That is, the juridico-discursive power is “negative.” As Foucault puts it in his 1974/75 lecture-course, *Abnormal*, “we describe the effects and mechanisms of the power exercised … as mechanisms and effects of exclusion, disqualification, exile, rejection, deprivation, refusal, and incomprehension; that is to say, an entire arsenal of negative concepts or mechanisms of exclusion” (Foucault 2005a, p. 44).

Lastly, since, according to the juridico-discursive conception of power, power functions through suppression, prohibition, and exclusion, and since it always possesses the possibility of turning itself into oppression by transgressing the boundaries of the natural, social, or economic contract, resistance is often identified with the violation of the rule, with the elimination of prohibitions, and, thus, with the revitalization of what is repressed and rejected. That is, for the juridico-discursive accounts of resistance, what is
natural, essential, or prediscursive must be liberated from the shackles of oppression, coercion, and denial in order to resist power. Obviously, such accounts of power and resistance presuppose that

there exists a human nature or base that, as a consequence of certain historical, economic, and social processes, has been concealed, alienated, or imprisoned in and by mechanisms of repression. According to this hypothesis, all that is required is to break these repressive deadlocks and man will be reconciled with himself, rediscover his nature or regain contact with his origin, and reestablish a full and positive relationship with himself (Foucault 1998c, p. 282).

In Foucault’s view, on the other hand, power is neither an entity one can possess nor is it primarily dependent upon the mechanisms of suppression, oppression, and coercion. First, as we will see in the next section, it has a relational character. Second, beginning with the eighteenth century—i.e., thanks to the modern desire to regulate the population and its individual constituents rationally, the desire that is engendered by Western modernity and its socio-political effects such as industrialization, urbanization, increase in population and in its mobility, and increase in production and wealth—power functions as “governmentality,” as a way to conduct “the conduct of men,” but not through the mechanisms of law, repression, and coercion, but through “positive” technologies (Foucault 2008, p. 186). Foucault says, “We pass from a technology of power that drives out, excludes, banishes, marginalizes, and represses, to a fundamentally positive power that fashions, observes, knows, and multiplies itself on the basis of its own effects” (Foucault 2005a, p. 48).

To be more specific, in Foucault’s view, modern power as governmentality functions, at the macro level, by conducting the conduct of the population through the mechanisms of security (bio-power), and, at the micro level, by conducting the conduct of individuals through the mechanisms of discipline (disciplinary-power). The point of
application of bio-power, for Foucault, is the population—but not as the collectivity of isolated, legal subjects; rather, on the one hand, as a living entity the nature of which is dependent upon social, historical, economic, and climactic forces, and, on the other hand, as a source of production and wealth. Accordingly, the primary aim of bio-power is not to suppress the population by repressing or rejecting its natural forces, but “to improve the condition of the population, to increase its wealth, its longevity, and its health” as long as the population is a source of production—and this, not through staying ignorant to the nature of the population and its individual constituents, but through seizing the knowledge of this population, i.e., of its birth-rate, mortality-rate, crime-rate, its socio-cultural characteristics, life-expectancies, fertility, the nature of its soil, climate, and tradition (Foucault 2007, p. 105).

However, this does not mean that bio-power confines itself to the gathering of knowledge. It also acts on the population under the guidance of this knowledge. It imposes on the population, say, norms of “body hygiene, the art of longevity, ways of having healthy children and of keeping them alive as long as possible, and methods for improving the human lineage” (Foucault 1978, p. 125). Hence, it produces not only knowledge of but also certain tendencies, inclinations, and ways of life for the population under its management. It does this “by acting directly on the population itself through campaigns, or, indirectly, by, for example, techniques that, without people being aware of it, stimulate the birth rate, or direct the flows of population to this or that region or activity” (Foucault 2007, p. 105). As a result, in the eyes of bio-power, the population is that which is to be taken care of, to be secured from the threats of social, economic, and natural disasters. For instance, its “mortality rate has to be modified or lowered; life
expectancy has to be increased; the birth rate has to be stimulated” (Foucault 2003, p. 246).

The point of application of disciplinary-power, i.e., power as governmentality at the micro level, on the other hand, is the individual, or as Foucault puts it in his *Discipline and Punish*, “the body, time, everyday gestures and activities; the soul, too, but in so far as it is the seat of habits” (Foucault 1977, p. 128). Hence, the primary aim of this power is not to subject the individual to the law of the sovereign, but to train, normalize, and refashion him/her through the mechanisms of discipline, namely, constant surveillance, habit-imposition, and training. It is not to suppress the individual and smash his/her individuality, but to create “the obedient subject, the individual subjected to habits, rules, orders,” and to turn this individual into a “docile body,” into a rule-following, submissive, and manipulable body—a body which “may be subjected, used, transformed and improved” (ibid., pp. 128, 136). Hence, disciplinary-power does not confine itself to the punishment of those acts that breach the law of the sovereign. For its primary tool is not the law but the norm. It normalizes criminal personalities, abnormal desires, deviant individualities, and dangerous ways of life. That is to say, not only does it pass judgment on criminal acts, but “judgement is also passed on the passions, instincts, anomalies, infirmities, maladjustments” (ibid., p. 17).

Furthermore, in order to function properly, disciplinary-power needs to turn the individual into an object of observation, classification, and, thus, knowledge. It needs to turn the individual into an analyzable, classifiable, describable object, into a case study, as it were, without ignoring its individual peculiarities, its past, its development, and its relation to the norm. That is, “individualization” and “objectification” are the *sine qua non* for this power to normalize what it takes to be dangerous, abnormal, or deviant. An
example of such objectification and individualization would be the nineteenth century
construction of homosexuality as an object of knowledge—for psychiatry and
criminology, for example—and as a peculiar form of individuality with its *sui generis*
desires, drives, inclinations, and way of life. Foucault writes,

As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of
forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of
them. The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case
history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a
morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology.
... The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a
species (Foucault 1978, p. 43).

As a result, in Foucault’s view, power as governmentality, as opposed to the
juridico-discursive conception of power, is positive, because it is productive. It produces
the population as an analyzable, predictable, and healthy collectivity of individuals. It
produces docile bodies and normalized subjects. It produces desires, inclinations,
tendencies, and ways of life for both the population and its individual constituents. It also
produces knowledge. For it produces case studies, taxonomies, objects and domains of
knowledge. And lastly, it produces individualities; it produces subjective positions one
identifies oneself with in order to experience oneself as what one is, such as: abnormal,
homosexual, delinquent, or criminal. In short, power “produces things, it induces
pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourses” (Foucault 1980b, p. 120). It does not
repress what is prediscursive; it does not suppress what is natural in and essential to
human life. But it produces the very nature of that which it governs through the
mechanisms of security and discipline. Accordingly, Foucault says,

The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive
atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against
which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In
fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain
gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted
as individuals. The individual, that is, is not the *vis-à-vis* of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects (Foucault 1980a, p. 98).

But if it is true that power is productive, that it produces the individuals it governs and conducts the conduct of them, that is, if it is true that power functions as governmentality, then, Foucault suggests, resistance to power cannot be limited to the violation of the law or to the elimination of prohibitions. Rather, resistance lies, first and foremost, in de-constructing and re-constructing the self, in creating new ways of life and new ways of being, in transforming the way in which one thinks, acts, and is; in short, in creating and re-creating the self as if it is a work of art. Hence, treating the self as a work of art is not an aesthetic but a political occupation. It refers to “the will to discover a different way of governing oneself”—the will Foucault calls “political spirituality” (Foucault 1998f, p. 233). Similarly, by self-transformation, Foucault does not understand a sort of aestheticism but what he calls “counter-conduct” (Foucault 2007, p. 201). Therefore, self-transformation refers to the desire “not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures” (Foucault 1997a, p. 44). As a result, for Foucault, what one needs in order to resist power is “an ethic of the self,” an ethic of fashioning the self, which is “an urgent, fundamental, and politically indispensable task, if it is true after all that there is no first or final point of resistance to political power other than in the relationship one has to oneself” due to the fact that power functions as governmentality (Foucault 2005b, p. 252).

We need to interpret Foucault’s genealogies against this background. Foucault defines genealogy as “an ontology of ourselves,” “an ontology of the present” (Foucault 1997b, p. 95; Foucault 2010, p. 21). That is, genealogy is a historico-political tool for
inquiring into those events and power relations that are responsible for the construction of the modern self. More specifically, the aim of genealogical research is to figure out how and through which historical mechanisms we are constructed as who we are, as “subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying” (Foucault 1997c, p. 113). Hence, what Foucault aims by his genealogical investigations is to show that the way in which we act, think, and are, together with what is taken-for-granted, naturalized, and calcified in what we do, think, and are, is not natural but the product of power relations, not universal but historically contingent, and, most importantly, not inevitable but transformable. Therefore, as Colin Koopman (2013) puts it, “Foucault’s genealogies function under the rule of what might be called the anti-inevitability thesis” (p. 528). To wit, Foucault’s genealogies are committed to determine “in what we tend to feel is without history,” “in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints” (Foucault 1997c, p. 113; Foucault 1998d p. 369).

However, the goal of problematizing the naturalized and taken-for-granted possibilities of action, thinking, and being—put in Heidegger’s terminology, the calcified possibilities of Being-in-the-world—is not mere erudition but to engender anxiety by revealing the historical contingency, performativity, and heterogeneity of what is assumed to be self-identical. It is to attack what is calcified, what is acquired the status of self-evidence, and what thereby functions as the locus of comfort; that is, it is to de-calcify “those self-evidences on which our knowledge, acquiescences, and practices rest” (Foucault 1998f, p. 226). It is to show that “what appears obvious to us is not at all so obvious” (Foucault 1997d, p. 139). It is to de-reify the self-evident in order to make one
“‘no longer know what to do’, so that the acts, gestures, discourses which up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous” (Foucault 1989g, p. 284). Accordingly, it is to cause “paralysis” in unquestioned ways of Being-in-the-world (ibid.). As a result, the aim of Foucault’s genealogies is to awaken anxiety by unconcealing the anxiety-engendering truth that what is assumed to be natural in and essential to human existence is socio-historically contingent and the product of socio-historical mechanisms that are not under anyone’s control. Thus, just like the Heideggerian Angst, Foucault’s genealogical paralysis reveals the contingency, performativity, and original self-alienation of human existence.

Moreover, just as Heidegger takes the anxiety-engendering truth to be the precondition of freedom, so as Foucault believes that the genealogical paralysis is what frees one from being lost in the calcified present, and what thereby endows one with the possibility of self-transformation, with the possibility of creating and re-creating the self, by destroying the calcified and reified status of the taken-for-granted possibilities of existence, by revealing the socio-historically contingent and transformable character of the limits of the so-called human nature. That is, for Foucault, the genealogical paralysis, the unconcealment of the anxiety-engendering truth, is what “enables one to get free of oneself,” to get free from being lost in one’s calcified, sedimented self, and to get free for re-constructing one’s subjectivity as one’s own (Foucault 1985, p. 8). This is the reason why Foucault says, in his 1982 interview, “I know that knowledge can transform us, that truth is not only a way of deciphering the world[,] … but that if I know the truth I will be changed” (Foucault 1989g, p. 379).
Accordingly, Foucault’s genealogies are motivated by “a desperate eagerness to imagine it [i.e., the self], to imagine it otherwise than it is, and to transform it,” by the will “to learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently,” and by the desire “to become other than what one is” (Foucault 1985, p. 9; 1989e, p. 307; Foucault 1997c, p. 108). In Foucault’s view, it is such eagerness, such will, and such desire that makes an historico-philosophical endeavor genuinely critical—“Not a critical philosophy that seeks to determine the conditions and the limits of our possible knowledge, but a critical philosophy that seeks the conditions and the indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject, of transforming ourselves” (Foucault 1997e, pp. 152-153).

As a result, just like Heidegger, Foucault believes that it is the (genealogical) anxiety-engendering truth that makes freedom possible for human beings—considering that freedom lies in the possibility of self-transformation. Hence, as Eduardo Mendieta (2010) points out, the Foucauldian genealogy is “a science of freedom” (p. 113). For it aims to make us, by revealing the anxiety-engendering truth, “experience something that permits a change, a transformation of the relationship we have with ourselves,” and, thereby, “to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom” (Foucault 1997c, p. 114; Foucault 1998g, p. 244).

But can we really infer, from such structural similarities between the Foucauldian and Heideggerian understanding of the relationship between truth, freedom, and subjective-transformation, that Foucault is influenced by Heidegger? In order to answer this question, it might be promising to remember the structure of Foucault’s *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*. Foucault introduces the subject of his 1981/82 lecture-
course with a question: “In what historical form do the relations between the ‘subject’ and ‘truth’ … take shape in the West” (Foucault 2005b, p. 2)? Then he reads ancient philosophy, especially from Socrates on, as employing “the art, the reflected method for conducting one’s life, the technique of life”—the technique that is accompanied by a question: “How must I transform my own self so as to be able to have access to the truth” (ibid., pp. 177-178)? That is, philosophy, or as Foucault calls it, “spirituality,” was regarded by the ancients as a tool for creating and re-creating one’s being, for transforming one’s self, in order to reach the truth. However, self-transformation, Foucault continues, was possible if and only if the subject of self-transformation was already the subject of truth. In other words, one had to know the truth, say, of nature, soul, or gods, in order to be able to create and re-create one’s own self: “in the truth and in access to the truth, there is something that fulfills the subject himself, which fulfills or transfigures his very being,” which is “capable of producing a change in the subject’s mode of being” (ibid., p. 16, 238). Foucault believes such problematization of the relationship between truth, subject, subjective-transformation, and, hence, freedom, is present in nineteenth century philosophy, too:

Read again all of nineteenth century philosophy—well, almost all: Hegel anyway, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, the Husserl of the *Krisis*, and Heidegger as well. ... In all these philosophies, a certain structure of spirituality tries to link knowledge, the activity of knowing, and the conditions and effects of this activity, to a transformation in the subject’s being (ibid., p. 28).

In this context, Foucault states that the twentieth century has seen only two thinkers, Lacan and Heidegger, who have problematized the relationship between truth and subject, and that he has “tried to reflect on all this from the side of Heidegger and starting from Heidegger.” Therefore, we have every reason to assume that Foucault is influenced by Heidegger with respect to the relationship between the anxiety-engendering
truth and the possibility of freedom. Be that as it may, is it still not true that the Foucauldian understanding of freedom presupposes a sovereign subject, which can create and re-create itself in any way it wants—one that is clearly rejected by Heidegger?

As we will see in the next section, just like the Heideggerian understanding of freedom, the Foucauldian freedom does not presuppose a sovereign subject, and it does not refer to the sovereign self-creation ex-nihilo; but it amounts to the subversive re-appropriation of the socio-historical possibilities of Being-in-the-world. To appreciate this, however, we need to re-focus on the Foucauldian understanding of power, and question the relation of the Foucauldian power to the Foucauldian conceptualization of the Being of beings.

4.2. Subversive Repetition

Contrary to the juridico-discursive conception of power, Foucault claims that power is not an entity one can possess, transfer, or be deprived of. That is, “power is not a thing.” through the transfer of which political sovereignty comes into existence, or thanks to which the possessors of power suppress the non-possessors of it (Foucault 1997d, p. 134). Accordingly, by power, Foucault understands neither “a group of institutions” as the institutional incarnation and reification of an entitlement nor “a mode of subjugation,” “a general system of domination exerted by one group over another” (Foucault 1977, p. 92). Rather, in his view, power refers to “the multiplicity of force relations,” to the multiplicity of “warlike clash[es] between forces” (Foucault 1977, p. 92; Foucault 2007, pp. 15, 16). That is to say, Foucault does not conceptualize power according to the model of contract or with the aid of contract-oppression scheme, but “in terms of war, struggles,
and confrontation” (Foucault 2007, p. 23). Hence, as Jon Simons (2013) puts it, the Foucauldian understanding of power is based on a “relational conceptualization of power” (p. 307). As a result, in Foucault’s terminology, power is the name for the warlike network of force relations, whose modern mode of existence is governmentality—the network in which one can conduct the conduct of another through the mechanisms of security and discipline (Foucault 1997d, pp. 134-135).

However, for Foucault, the network in question is not monolithic. That is, force relations are neither univocal nor stable; rather, they are “mobile, reversible, and unstable” (Foucault 1998c, p. 292). Foucault writes, force relations “define innumerable points of confrontation, focuses of instability, each of which has its own risks of conflict, of struggles, and of an at least temporary inversion of the power relations” (Foucault 1977, p. 27). To wit, as Joseph Rouse (2005) points out, Foucault conceptualizes power not only relationally but also “dynamically” (p. 108). For the Foucauldian power refers to the multiplicity of force relations, to the network of the multiplicity of clashes between forces and counter-forces, strategies and counter-strategies, alliances and counter-alliances, whose nature, target, and place in the network cannot be fixed once and for all, but is always transformable and is always dependent upon the nature of their confrontation with other forces, strategies, and alliances.

Accordingly, in Foucault’s view, there is no subject, subjective position, strategy, or institution, in short, no force, that does not owe its very identity to the network of force relations. That is to say, what there is, for Foucault, first and foremost, is the dynamic, relational, unstable, and polyvocal confrontational process—“the moving substrate of force relations” (Foucault 1978, p. 93). Out of such substrate arise stabilities and counter-
stabilities; or as Foucault puts it, “institutional crystallization[s]” as they are “embodied [for example] in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies,” on the one hand, and “disjunctions and contradictions,” on the other (ibid., pp. 92-93). This is the reason why Foucault says, “The analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of domination are given at the outset; rather these are only the terminal forms power takes” (ibid., 92). Similarly, “there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary” (ibid., pp. 95-96). Instead, there are “mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society that shift about, fracturing unities and effacing regroupings” (ibid., p. 96). For both forces and counter-forces, or for the sake of convenience, both power and resistance, require one another; their nature, existence, and location—i.e., whether they assume the role of a revolutionary or counter-revolutionary—depend on the moving substrate of force relations, on the multiplicity of clashes, on the open-ended and transformable relations.

Hence, Foucault believes, there is no “Power—with a capital P—dominating and imposing its rationality upon the totality of the social body,” and there is no Resistance—with a capital R—of “the unhappy ones who are obliged to bow before power” (Foucault 1989d, p. 260; Foucault 1998e, p. 451). There is no contractual, dominational, or economic relation between the possessors and non-possessors of power as the Source of all clashes. There is no Subject of domination, and there is no Object of repression. There is no Class of exploitation, and there is no Class of revolution—but only the multiplicity of clashes, thanks to which contracts and laws, states of domination and resistance,
revolution and counter-revolution, subjects and objects, and conservative and revolutionary classes come into existence.

What are the implications, then, of such a conceptualization of power—power as the dynamic, confrontational, and unstable network of force relations? First, as we have seen above, forces and counter-forces, i.e., power and resistance, are dependent on one another. In Foucault’s words,

Where there is power, there is resistance[,] ... [T]his resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power. ... Their [i.e., force relations’] existence depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: they play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations. These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network (Foucault 1978, p. 95).

Therefore, as Christopher Falzon puts it, the Foucauldian power is “dialogical,” where dialogue refers to the “agonistic” clash of forces (Falzon 1998, p. 6; Falzon 2010, p. 238; Falzon 2013, p. 290). Second, power is “non-subjective,” insofar as power is not a commodity-like entity the sovereign subject possesses, but both the subject and the subjective positions one assumes in order to acquire one’s intelligible identity are the products of an open-ended, agonistic dialogue of forces, and insofar as no subject can take under its control the entire network of power due to the latter’s dynamic, relational, and polyvocal nature. Foucault writes, “neither the caste which governs, nor the groups which control the state apparatus, nor those who make the most important economic decisions direct the entire network of power that functions in a society” (Foucault 1978, p. 95). Lastly, power is “omnipresent,” not because the sovereign subject, the possessor of power, controls the entire network of force relations, but because, thanks to their open-ended, dialogical, and plurivocal nature, force relations are “produced from one moment to the next, at every point” (ibid., p. 93).
In accordance with such dialogical, non-subjective, and omnipresent character of power, Foucault claims that it is the network of force relations that constitutes the “grid of [cultural] intelligibility” in a given society (Foucault 1978 p. 93; Foucault 2003, p. 24). That is, as Dreyfus (2003), appropriating Heidegger’s terminology, puts it, force relations open up “a social clearing,” within which subjects are produced, subjective positions are defined, objects are classified, and domains of knowledge come into existence (p. 32). They open up “a field of possibles,” within which beings become what they are (Foucault 1997a, p. 66). They open up a “matrix of individualization,” within which human beings come to their own (Foucault 1998h, p. 334). Hence, as Thomas Flynn (2005) points out, Foucault is an “historical nominalist,” insofar as he believes that what we take to be natural, substantive, and ahistorical is a construct of the historically contingent clashes between forces (pp. 31-47). Put in Heidegger’s terminology—and this is exactly what Foucault does in the preface to his 1966 The Order of Things—it is the historically contingent clashes between forces that are responsible for beings’—be it human or not—acquiring their “mode of being,” their beingness (Foucault 1970, p. xxiv).

As a result, just like Heidegger, Foucault conceptualizes the world, i.e., the context of intelligibility as the social clearing, and the Being of beings for that matter, according to the model of event ontology. For him, just like for Heidegger, the world/clearing is not a collectivity of natural objects, and beings are not things in themselves. Rather, both the world and the Being of beings originate thanks to the dynamic network of force relations, thanks to the event of origination occasioned by warlike clashes, through which beings become what they are, that is, come to their own.
Foucault conceptualizes the Being of beings differently in different phases of his career. In the 1960’s, that is, in his so-called “archaeological” period, he conceptualizes the Being of beings as “The fundamental codes of a culture—those governing its language, its scheme of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices”; or as he puts it in the 1970 preface to the English edition of *The Order of Things*, as the “*positive unconscious* of knowledge” (ibid., pp. xi, xxii). For Foucault, the positive unconscious—put in Heidegger’s terminology, the background intelligibility of a historical community—consists of the “historical *a priori*” rules of formation (*episteme*), on the basis of which “ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed” (ibid., p. xxiii). That is to say, just like the Heideggerian Being as the epochal *a priori*, the historical *a priori* is the historically contingent ground upon which beings—be it human or not, be it present or re-presented—become what they are. Hence, historical *a priori*, as Foucault writes in his 1969 *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, is “not a condition of validity for judgements, but a condition of reality for statements”—insofar as the mode of being, object, subjective positions, and coexistence of statements find their condition of possibility in the epochal *a priori*. (Foucault 1972, p. 143)

Accordingly, Foucault’s historical investigations in the 1960s (archeology) are the studies of “archive,” where archive refers to “the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements” (ibid., p. 145). Therefore, archaeology does not take the objects of statements to be things in themselves, to be present-at-hand entities that are waiting for being re-presented by statements, to be natural objects that correspond to the phantasms of the knowing subject, or to those true propositions as the
cognitive images of what is perceived by the phenomenological subject. It, rather, studies multiple relations between systems of norms, forms of classification and categorization, patterns of moral and scientific behavior, social and economic processes, and the structures of those institutions in which the statements in question are produced, in order to determine “the body of rules that enable them [i.e., beings] to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance” (ibid., p. 53).

Accordingly, Foucault argues,

one cannot speak of anything at any time; it is not easy to say something new; it is not enough for us to open our eyes, to pay attention, or to be aware, for new objects suddenly to light up and emerge out of the ground. ... [For] the object does not wait in limbo the order that will free it and enable it to become in a visible and prolix objectivity; it does not pre-exist itself, and held back by some obstacle at the first edges of light. It exists under the positive conditions of a complex group of relations (ibid., p. 49).

Similarly, the Foucauldian archaeology does not presuppose the sovereignty of the subject of discourse, but studies the historical a priori rules of the emergence of those subjective positions one assumes to be the subject of true statements. It asks, “who is speaking? Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to use this sort of language (langage)? Who is qualified to do so” (ibid., p. 55)? It determines the nature of those “institutional sites” such as hospitals, universities, or laboratories from which the speaking individual derives the legitimacy of his/her statements (ibid., p. 56). It interrogates the positive unconscious of discourses to find out the nature of the background intelligibility that allows individuals to assume the role of “the questioning subject,” “the listening subject,” “the seeing subject,” or “the observing subject” (ibid., p. 58). As a result, in Foucault’s view, just as there is no object that is not conditioned by the historical a priori rules of formation, so as there is no “transcendental” or
“psychological” subject that does not find its condition of emergence in the epochal a priori (ibid., p. 61).

Accordingly, the Foucauldian archaeology does not take statements to be the externalizations of what is inside the phenomenological subject, to be little mirrors, as it were, that reflect the inside of the phenomenological subject into the world of appearances. But it inquire into those tacit rules and standards that are responsible for the emergence of the ways in which “intelligible” statements come together, the ways in which descriptive statements are articulated into tables of classification, the ways in which qualitative judgments are translated into quantitative statements, the ways in which statements are utilized—with the function, for example, of confirmation, corroboration, higher authority, or analogy—and the ways in which true statements are separated from the false ones (ibid., pp. 62-70). Lastly, instead of treating theories—be it scientific or not—either as the creations of ignorance or the products of objective observation, the Foucauldian archaeology focuses on the background intelligibility that determines the possibility and desirability of “certain organizations of concepts, certain regrouping of objects, certain types of enunciation, which form, according to their degree of coherence, rigour, and stability, themes or theories” (ibid., p. 71).

However, although the Foucault of the 1960s studies not only “discursive” rules and standards to determine the emergence of the mode of being, objects, subjective positions, and coexistence of statements but also their relation to “non-discursive domains (institutions, political events, economic practices and processes),” and although he believes the relationship between discursive and non-discursive domains does not refer to the relationship of exteriority, the relationship between isolated, non-intrinsically-
related fields, his works of the 1960s do not give much attention to non-discursive domains; and, therefore, they privilege what is discursive over what is non-discursive (ibid., pp. 179-180).

For example, in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, in describing the relationship between discursive and non-discursive domains, Foucault refers his readers to his 1963 *The Birth of the Clinic* (See Foucault 1973) and says, archaeology

wishes to show not how political practice has determined the meaning and form of medical discourses, but how and in what form it takes part in its conditions of emergence, insertion, and functioning. This relation may be assigned to several levels. First to that of the division and delimitation of the medical object: not, of course, that it was political practice that from the early nineteenth century imposed on medicine such new objects as tissular lesions or the anatomophysiological correlations; but it opened up new fields for the mapping of medical objects (Foucault 1972, p. 181).

Nevertheless, it is difficult to find such correlations in the other works of Foucault from the same period. The Foucault of the 1970s thinks that the lack of emphasis on the relationship between discursive and non-discursive domains in his archaeological period, that is, the absence of his later conceptualization of power as force relations in the 1960s, as that which open up the social clearing which defines the Being of beings, is what made his archaeological analyses incapable of giving an account of the emergence (“The problem of causality”) and historically transformable nature (“The problem of change”) of the epochal *a priori* (ibid., pp. xii, xiii).

Therefore, in the 1970s, that is, in his so-called “genealogical” period, Foucault emphasizes over and over again that what is discursive and what is non-discursive, power and knowledge/truth—truth, understood as “the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated”—are not only related to one another but also inseparable from one another (Foucault 1980b, p. 132). For, first of all, if it is true that, as we have
seen above, the primary mechanisms of power, those mechanisms that are utilized in modern force relations, are the mechanisms of security and discipline such as constant surveillance, normalization, classification, objectification, individualization, habit-imposition, and tendency-production, then power cannot function without knowledge, without the knowledge of that which is to be disciplined and normalized. It needs, for example, observational, statistical, psychological, pedagogical, criminological, and taxonomical knowledge. That is, it needs true discourses—not only to justify its biopolitical and disciplinary interventions but also to make them effective. Foucault says, “nothing can function as a mechanism of power if it is not deployed according to procedures, instruments, means and objectives which can be validated in more or less coherent systems of knowledge” (Foucault 1997a, p. 61). Second, as we have also seen, power is productive. It not only produces domains and objects of knowledge, it not only classifies, individualizes, and turns individuals and populations into analyzable objects of observation, but it also opens up a social clearing, within which beings and their representations become possible. As a result, power not only requires but also produces knowledge/truth.

Similarly, knowledge/truth not only necessitates but also engenders states of power. For, first of all, to be true, to be “an element of knowledge,” Foucault claims, is to conform to the historical a priori rules of formation; it is to “conform to a set of rules and constraints characteristic, for example, of a given type of scientific discourse in a given period” (ibid., 61). Second, to be true is not only to be part of a system of true discourses that “possess[es] the effects of coercion or simply the incentives peculiar to what is scientifically validated or simply rational or simply generally accepted,” but also to
function as the source from which life and death decisions regarding, say, penal guilt, biological danger, or legal liability, are derived (ibid., p. 61). As a result, in Foucault’s view, power and knowledge/truth are related to one another in a circular fashion. “We should admit,” writes Foucault, that

power produces knowledge; … that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. … [T]he subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations. In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge … but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge (Foucault 1977, pp. 27-28).

Foucault calls such “a nexus of knowledge-power,” in his genealogical period, the “regime of truth” (Foucault 2008, p. 19) Hence, the regime of truth, as Béatrice Han (2002) points out, is the genealogical term for what the Foucault of the 1960s calls historical a priori (pp. 7-9).

Lastly, in the early 1980s, that is, in his so-called “ethical” period—when he conceptualizes freedom as the possibility of self-transformation, as the possibility of creating and re-creating the self as if it is a work of art—Foucault adds a new element to his nexus of knowledge-power: “the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognizes himself qua subject”; in short, forms of subjectivity (Foucault 1985, p. 6). Forms of subjectivity, in Foucault’s view, are not separable from the nexus of knowledge-power, but they, together with the nexus of knowledge-power, constitute what Foucault calls “the games of truth.” “The games of truth,” those games which are founded on the “correlation between fields of knowledge,
types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture,” is the ethical term for the Foucauldian historical a priori in the early 1980s (ibid., p. 4).

We should keep in mind, however, that the Foucauldian “games of truth” does not refer to a fundamental change in Foucault’s thought, but to an attempt to fix a particular deficiency in his earlier works. In the 1960s and 70s, Foucault avoids interrogating the subject’s performativity and the ways in which the subject constitutes itself through social, ethical, or intellectual practices, in order to evade subjectivist accounts of human existence. However, such avoidance makes the Foucauldian subject appear to be an empty slide, a tabula rasa, which passively receives the imprints of the knowledge-power nexus. For the Foucault of the 1980s, on the other hand, the subject is not an empty slide; rather, the subject acquires its intelligible subjectivity, put in Heidegger’s terminology, by projecting itself upon socio-historical possibilities, upon forms of subjectivity.

Hence, as Dianna Taylor (2010) puts it, the Foucauldian subjectivity in the 1980s refers to “an activity that always takes place within a context of constraint” (p. 173). For the subject constitutes itself by socio-historically possible projections, by intelligible performances, by the practices of the self, such as: diet, meditation, jogging, fathering, or truth-telling, which are controlled and shaped by not only social norms but also institutions, such as: school, prison, army, or family. As a result, it is the nexus of knowledge-power-subjectivity that constitutes subjective experience. In Foucault’s words, it is “the games of truth and error through which being is historically constituted as experience”; that is, “a field of experience” comes into existence (Foucault 1985 pp. 6-7; 1998a, p. 117). Accordingly, the Foucault of the 1980s describes, in retrospect, the
nature of his earlier historical studies on madness, clinic, human sciences, prison, and sexuality by asking:

What are the games of truth by which man proposes to think his own nature when he perceives himself to be mad; when he considers himself to be ill; when he conceives of himself as a living, speaking, laboring being; when he judges and punishes himself as a criminal? What were the games of truth by which human beings came to see themselves as desiring individuals (Foucault 1985, p. 7)?

As a result, as Simons (2013) points out, there is a certain continuity between the way in which Foucault conceptualizes truth in the 1960s, power in the 1970s, and ethics in the 1980s; and, therefore, there is a certain continuity between the Foucauldian understanding of truth, of power and resistance, and of freedom (pp. 302-303). That is to say, throughout his career, Foucault has never allowed the emergence of the specter of the sovereign subject in his philosophy but conceptualized subjectivity—be it the subjectivity of the subject of truth, the subjectivity of the subject of power and resistance, or the subjectivity of the subject of freedom and self-transformation—as a situated subjectivity. And that is to say, Foucauldian subjects, the subject of self-transformation included, acquire their intelligible subjectivity thanks to the Being of beings, which is determined by the social clearing, by the knowledge-power-subjectivity nexus.

Accordingly, the Foucauldian subject has to project itself upon socio-historical possibilities, upon forms of subjectivity, regardless of whether it is determined to conserve or transform its sedimented identity, to bow before or resist power, to treat its subjectivity as an instantiation of the essence of human nature or as a work of art. That is, as Falzon (2010) puts it, the Foucauldian subject does not refer to “an irrational Sartrean subjectivism, but to a finite rational subject” (p. 228). I would say, it refers to the Heideggerian Dasein. For in Foucault’s view, even the aesthetic/political creation of the self does not refer to a sovereign creation ex nihilo. It rather refers to the appropriation of
the historically contingent games of truth. Similarly, re-creating the self as a work of art and transforming the self as the precondition of resisting power and as the precondition of freedom have nothing to do with aesthetic subjectivism. Rather, transforming the self means to *subversively re-appropriate* the social clearing one is born into, to *retrieve* the games of truth in order to attack the calcified and reified hegemonies—hegemonies, understood as the “institutional calcifications” of the social clearing, as those calcifications which try to reshape, homogenize, and articulate into their language the very clearing out of which they arise.

As a result, for Foucault, both hegemonic and subversive practices live on the same network. Both of them need to *repeat* the normative patterns of conduct, forms of subjectivity, and intelligible discourses to preserve or subvert the hegemonic articulation of the social clearing. That is to say, in Foucault’s view, there is no resistance, no self-transformation, and no freedom that is not based on the subversive *repetition* of the socio-historical possibilities. Foucault provides multiple examples of the dependency of subversive practices on the social clearing they are determined to subvert in his writings.

For example, for Foucault, sexual experience, or more correctly, experiencing oneself as the subject of sexuality, as the subject of different forms of sexuality, such as hetero-sexuality, homo-sexuality, or bi-sexuality, is made possible by the modern games of truth. Accordingly, Foucault believes, before the nineteenth century, it was impossible to have the concept of, say, homosexuality; and it was impossible to experience oneself as a homosexual—as an incarnation of a peculiar form of sexuality with *sui generis* desires, drives, and inclinations. Moreover, Foucault claims, it was the modern conceptualization of sexuality and homosexuality that made possible not only the
homosexual experience but also those conservative (i.e., hegemonic interpretations of the sexual games of truth) and subversive (i.e., marginalized interpretations) sexual practices of the nineteenth century. He writes in the first volume of The History of Sexuality, for example,

There is no question that the appearance in nineteenth-century psychiatry, jurisprudence, and literature of a whole series of discourses on the species and subspecies of homosexuality, inversion, pederasty, and “psychic hermaphrodisism” made possible a strong advance of social controls into this area of “perversity”; but it also made possible the formation of a “reverse” discourse: homosexuality began to speak in its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or “naturality” be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was medically disqualified (Foucault 1978, p. 101).

We should interpret the Foucauldian new ways of Being-in-the-world and new ways of sexual Being-in-the-world against this background. Foucault argues, for example, what homosexuals need today is not to discover the true nature of their sexuality, but to create new ways of acting, living, and desiring: “We don’t have to discover that we are homosexuals”; instead, “we have to create a gay life” (Foucault 1989h, p. 382). In Foucault’s view, homosexual sadomasochism (S/M) is an example of such a gay life. It is “a subculture” (ibid., p. 388). However, this does not mean that Foucault thinks homosexual S/M refers to a creation ex nihilo. For it refers not only to the subversion but also to the repetition of the hegemonic interpretation of the games of truth—those games of truth that are responsible for the construction of human beings as subjects of sexuality. That is, homosexual S/M refers to the repetition of the heterosexual articulation of the (sexualizing) games of truth. To be more specific, Foucault claims that both homosexuals and heterosexuals are socialized into a civilization that for centuries considered the essence of the relation between two people to reside in the knowledge of whether one of the two parties was going to surrender to the other, all the interest and curiosity, the cunning and manipulation of people was aimed at getting the other to give in, to go to bed with them (Foucault 1989f, p. 330).
Of course, in Christian West, public appearance, and thereby the possibility of courtship, the possibility of playing the games of domination/subordination publicly, was denied homosexuals: “Homosexuals were not allowed to elaborate a system of courtship because the cultural expression necessary for such an elaboration was denied them” (ibid., p. 329). Foucault believes homosexual S/M is a way of re-appropriating that which is denied homosexuals. To wit, homosexual S/M refers to the “transfer of strategic relations from the [heterosexual] court(ship) to sex”; it refers to the transfer of those games of pursuit/surrender and domination/subordination from before to in sexual relations (ibid., p. 388). Such transfer also refers to the subversion of the heterosexual articulation of the (sexualizing) games of truth that reduces bodily pleasure to sexual pleasure:

I don’t think that this movement of sexual practices has anything to do with the disclosure of the uncovering of S/M tendencies deep within our consciousness. ... The idea that S/M is related to a deep violence, that S/M practice is a way of liberating this violence, this aggression, is stupid. We know very well what all those people are doing is not aggressive; they are inventing new possibilities of pleasure with strange parts of their body—through the eroticization of the body. I think it’s a kind of creation, a creative enterprise, which has as one of its main features what I call the desexualization of pleasure. The idea that bodily pleasure should always come from sexual pleasure is the root of all our possible pleasure. I think that’s quite wrong. These practices are insisting that we can produce pleasure with very odd things, very strange parts of our bodies, in very unusual situations, and so on (ibid., p. 384, emphasis mine).

Similarly, “the so-called ‘sexual liberation’ movements,” Foucault argues, “must be understood as movements of affirmation ‘beginning with’ sexuality”; they are those “movements which take off from sexuality, from the apparatus of sexuality within which we’re trapped[,] ... [and which at the same time] are displaced in relation to sexuality, disengaging themselves from it and going beyond it” (Foucault 1989c, p. 217). The “feminist movements,” for example, with their socio-politically new ways of acting, thinking, and being, do not originate from the exteriors of the social clearing, the
(sexualizing) games of truth, but they owe the possibility of their very existence to subversive *repetition*, to the *re-appropriation* of that social clearing in which human beings are constructed as subjects of sexuality—the clearing that made both the construction and suppression of women possible:

For a long time they tried to pin women to their sexuality. They were told for centuries: “You are nothing other than your sex.” And this sex, doctors added, is fragile, almost always sick and always inducing sickness. ... But the feminist movements have accepted the challenge. Are we sex by nature? Well then, let it be but in its singularity, in its irreducible specificity. Let us draw the consequences from it and *reinvent our own type of political, cultural and economic existence*... *Always the same movement: take off from this sexuality in which movements can be colonized, go beyond them in order to reach other affirmations* (ibid., p. 218, emphasis mine).

This does not mean, however, that the Foucauldian subversive repetition is confined to sexuality. Foucault thinks, for example, throughout the Middle Ages, both the pastoral power and the counter-pastoral movements, both the pastoral attempt to conduct the conduct of men and the counter-conduct of the dissidents, both the Catholic Church and the Protestant churches, and, lastly, both the Protestant Reformation and the Counter Reformation, utilized the same “tactical elements,” such as asceticism, mysticism, return to the Scripture, and eschatology, which were the socio-historical possibilities for appropriation and re-appropriation within “the general horizon of Christianity” (Foucault 2007, p. 215). To wit, these elements were utilized, on the one hand, to calcify the pastoral power and, on the other hand, to subvert the dominant Catholic paradigm as the hegemonic interpretation of the religious, that is, Christian, social clearing.

Asceticism as a tool of the anti-pastoral counter-conduct, as a subversive repetition, as “an element of reversal by which certain themes of Christian theology or religious experience are utilized against … [the Catholic/pastoral] structures of power,” was used by the dissidents as an excuse not to follow the *worldly* orders of the Church,
insofar as asceticism required the renunciation of what is worldly, and insofar as the Church was a worldly institution (ibid., p. 207). Mysticism as the faith in “an immediate communication” that takes place between God and the soul, on the other hand, was utilized against the function of the pastorate as “the channel between the faithful and God” (ibid., p. 213). Similarly, return to the Scripture as the highest authority was used against the interventions of the pastoral power. And, lastly, eschatological beliefs such as the belief that “God will return or is returning to gather his flock” were utilized against the function of the pastor as the shepherd who conducts the conduct of men (ibid., p. 214). Foucault claims these socio-historical possibilities of the Christian games of truth were appropriated by not only those subversive movements that aim to attack the hegemonic articulation of the social clearing, but also by the hegemonic institution itself:

This appears very clearly in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when, threatened by all these movements of counter-conduct, the Church tries to take them up and adapt them for its own ends, until the great separation takes place, the great division between the Protestant churches, which basically opt for a certain mode of re-implantation of these counter-conducts, and the Catholic Church, which tries to re-utilize them and re-insert them in its own system through the Counter Reformation (ibid., p. 215).

As a result, for Foucault, both hegemonic and subversive practices are founded on the appropriation of the social clearing they are embedded in and they are determined to preserve or subvert. In this respect, the Foucauldian resistance to power as the re-creation of the self as if the self is a work of art, together with the Foucauldian understanding of freedom as the possibility of self-transformation, refers neither to sovereign creation ex nihilo nor to aesthetic subjectivism, but to the subversive re-appropriation of the socio-historical possibilities of Being-in-the-world. That is to say, just like the Heideggerian understanding of freedom, the Foucauldian freedom lies in subversive repetition. Hence, just like Heidegger, Foucault believes that freedom is not about the content; it is not
about which socio-historical possibilities, which ways of life, social norms, or discourses of truth are appropriated, insofar as the same social-clearing one is born into can be appropriated both subversively and hegemonically:

Discourses [or ways of life, or social norms, in short, socio-historical possibilities of existence] are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it. ... We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it (Foucault 1978, pp. 100-101).

Moreover, in Foucault’s view, it is such a subversive repetition, or more correctly, a set of subversive repetitions as de-calcifying, de-reifying, and de-familiarizing practices, is what “makes a revolution possible” (ibid., p. 96). That is, just as Heidegger believes that subversively-repetitive works have the potential to transform the world they are embedded in, so as Foucault thinks that subversive re-appropriations of the social-clearing have the potential to change the course of history. Accordingly, Foucault claims, history, or as he calls it, “the development of humanity,” consists neither in teleological progress nor in creative genius, but in repetition and interpretation, where interpretation refers to “the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game” (Foucault 1998d, p. 378).

4.3. Constant Subversive Repetition as Being-towards-Freedom

However, is it not true that the Foucauldian genealogy and archaeology, namely, his truth-revealing, anxiety-engendering, historico-philosophical discourses, presuppose the sovereignty of the subject—the subject of true discourses that is not conditioned by
the games of truth such that it can represent the nature of things without being constrained by extra-discursive elements of the socio-historical world? Is it not true that Foucault’s own discourses pretend to be independent of historical a priori rules of formation and historically contingent network of force relations? That is, is it not true that the specter of the sovereign subject haunts Foucault at the end?

Jürgen Habermas (1992), for example, claims that Foucault’s genealogies aspire to “true objectivity of knowledge,” even though they fail to satisfy the requirements of “true objectivity” due to Foucault’s belief in the omnipresence of power and in the interdependency between power and knowledge (p. 125). Similarly, Gary Gutting (1989) argues that “Foucault is not a ‘universal skeptic or total relativist,” because Foucault thinks his archaeologies, together with natural sciences, are independent of the historically contingent possibilities of the social clearing (p. 272). Dreyfus, on the other hand, in the preface to Foucault’s Mental Illness and Psychology, goes one step further and states that “Foucault remained throughout his life a scientific realist” with respect to natural sciences (Foucault 1987, p. x). For in Foucault’s view, natural sciences, together with his historical discourses, “tell [us] something like the truth about how things really are, even though they are produced and used in a social context” (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, p. 116).

However, Foucault’s truth-revealing, anxiety-engendering, genealogical and archaeological discourses neither pretend to unconceal the objective reality behind appearances by assuming the God’s point of view, nor refuse to acknowledge their embeddedness within the social-clearing, which is structured by not only historical a
priori rules of formation but also dynamic and polyvocal network of force relations.

Foucault says, in one of his interviews,

My book is a pure and simple “fiction”: it’s a novel, but it’s not I who invented it; it is the relationship between our period and its epistemological configuration and this mass of statements. The subject is indeed present in the totality of the book, but he is the anonymous “one” who speaks today in all that is said (Foucault 1989a, p. 24).

The “fictional” character of Foucault’s discourses refers to their subversively-repetitive nature. That is, as some of his commentators point out, by fiction, Foucault does not mean that he makes up his genealogical and archaeological histories, but, first, that the justifiability of his discourses lies in the fact that they are constructed according to those historiological and argumentative structures that are acceptable within the social clearing they are embedded in—rather than in the objectivist pretense to paint the picture of reality indubitably and without being constrained by the historical a priori rules that make historical and argumentative statements both intelligible and possible (May 1993, pp. 92-105; Rayner 2007, p. 60). Hence, Foucault’s discourses are based on the appropriation of socio-historically contingent possibilities. They are not independent of the games of truth he analyzes with the aid of his genealogical and archaeological tools. Foucault writes, “It would hardly behove me, of all people, to claim that my discourse is independent of conditions and rules of which I am very largely unaware, and which determine other work that is being done today” (Foucault 1970, p. xv).

Secondly, as Barry Allen (2010) puts it, “Foucault’s scholarly truthfulness,” the repetitive nature of his writings, is “tactical” (p. 153). For Foucault, instead of keeping his distance from modern force relations, wants to attack and subvert the calcified possibilities of acting, thinking, and being. This is the reason why Foucault says, “All my books ... [are] little tool boxes. If people want to open them, use a particular sentence,
idea, or analysis like a screwdriver or wrench in order to short-circuit, disqualify or break up the systems of power, including eventually the very ones from which my books have issued … well, all the better” (Foucault 1989b, p. 149). In other words, Foucault’s discourses are not designed to be independent of the network of force relations they depict. And this tactical, or more correctly, subversively-repetitive, character of Foucault’s historical writings are what gives them their “historicism”—historicism, understood as the acknowledgement of the intrinsic relationship between historical knowledge, on the one hand, and force relations as warlike confrontations, on the other:

History encounters nothing but war, but history can never really look down on this war from on high; history cannot get away from war, or discover its basic laws or impose limits on it, quite simply because war itself supports this knowledge, runs through this knowledge, and determines this knowledge. Knowledge is never anything more than a weapon in a war, or a tactical deployment within that war. War is waged throughout history, and through the history that tells the history of war. And history, for its part, can never do anything more than interpret the war it is waging or that is being waged through it (Foucault 2007, p. 173).

One example would suffice to understand the subversively-repetitive nature of Foucault’s historical discourses. In The Order of Things, Foucault studies the birth of philology, biology, and political economy by analyzing the Being of beings in the epistemes of the Age of Renaissance (16th-17th century), of the Classical Age (17th-18th century), and of the Modern Age (19th century). In his view, the mode of the Being of beings in the Age of Renaissance was “resemblance” in the sense that beings were classified, explained, and turned into objects of knowledge via resemblance. That is, the knowledge of beings was possible in the Renaissance episteme as long as words and things resembled one another, as long as they mirrored, as it were, one another. In the Classical Age, on the other hand, the Being of beings was taken to be “representation.” To be was to be represented, i.e., to be analyzed into basic components, thereby
classified, and inserted into the table of order and difference. “Man,” understood as the representing subject, did not and could not exist in the Classical episteme. In Foucault’s words, “Before the end of the eighteenth century, man did not exist” (Foucault 1970, p. 336). For in the Classical episteme, it was “language” that “names, patterns, combines, and connects and disconnects things as it makes them visible in the transparency of words. In this role, language transforms the sequence of perceptions into a table, and cuts up the continuum of beings into a pattern of characters” (ibid., p. 338).

In the modern episteme, however, that which lies beneath representations, that which makes representations and represented beings possible, that which is necessary for the representation of beings but is “always inaccessible” to representation, that which “drives down, beyond our gaze, towards the very heart of things,” began to be questioned (ibid., p. 259). That is to say, transcendental structures of living, linguistic, and socio-economic beings were the focus of biologists, philologists, and political economists, which found its philosophical counterpart in “the founding of a transcendental philosophy” (ibid., p. 265). Accordingly, “man” was born in the Modern Age both as an object and as a subject of knowledge, as an “empirico-transcendental doublet,” insofar as “man” as a living, speaking, and socio-economic being was the transcendental subject of knowledge in the sense that it was the producer of what was to be known (i.e., life, language, economy), and insofar as the same “man” was the object of knowledge in the sense that it was both the object of empirical discourses and the empirical product of biological, linguistic, and socio-economic structures that shape human life (ibid., p. 351). Foucault believes it was the birth of this “man” that made human sciences possible, that
“gave the human sciences their particular form,” and that caused certain discourses to lose their intelligibility and, thereby, get marginalized (ibid., p. 382).

In Foucault’s view, it was the same episteme that made “counter-sciences” possible, too. For “man” in the classical episteme was not only an empirico-transcendental being but also the one whose “thought” was mixed with a certain “unthought.” That is to say, since “man” was the transcendental subject of knowledge and at the same time an empirical object of biological, linguistic, and socio-economic constraints, it was not self-transparent to itself—considering that what is transcendental is beyond any representation, and that whenever “man” wants to represent itself, what is transcendental in its self, it has to utilize those linguistic and socio-economic tools whose empirical history constrains, precedes, and transcends any empirical “man” (ibid., pp. 359-360). Counter-sciences, such as ethnology and especially psychoanalysis, analyzed those pre- and transcendental-structures that mold the empirical “man” into what it is. Hence, they were the “sciences of the unconscious: not because they reach down to what is below consciousness in man, but because they are directed towards that which, outside man, makes it possible to know, with a positive knowledge, that which is given to or eludes his consciousness” (ibid., p. 413). They were those sciences which started the process of the death of “man,” of the belief in the sovereignty and self-transparency of “man” as the transcendental, founding subject.

Against this historical background, Foucault describes the nature of his anxiety-engendering, truth-revealing, historico-philosophical discourses, via a particular combination and rearticulation of counter-sciences, as we have seen above, as that which
are determined to reveal “The fundamental codes of a culture,” as that which aim to unconceal the “positive unconscious of knowledge.” Foucault writes,

One can imagine what prestige and importance of ethnology could possess if … it were deliberately to seek its object in the area of the unconscious processes that characterize the system of a given culture; in this way it would bring the relation of historicity, which is constitutive of all ethnology in general, into play with the dimension in which psychoanalysis has always been deployed. … [I]t would define as a system of cultural unconscious the totality of formal structures which render mythical discourse significant, give their coherence and necessity to the rules that regulate needs, and provide the norms of life with a foundation other than that to be found in nature, or in pure biological functions (ibid., p. 414, emphases mine).

Such formalist and ethno-psychoanalytic discourse would not refer to the creation of a novel discourse which would say what was unsayable in the modern episteme, but to the repetition of what made human and counter-human sciences possible. That is, it would interrogate those transcendental structures, i.e., historical a priori rules, which make possible the ways in which humans act and think; and it would appropriate the products of the Modern Age, i.e. it would appropriate the counter-scientific search of the unconscious. But it would also aim to subvert the very episteme it appropriates in the sense that it would attack the hegemonic articulation of it; that is to say, it would attack human sciences and their empirico-transcendental “man.” It would aim to destroy the very foundation of the modern episteme, which is responsible for the acceptability of some discourses and marginalization of others, namely, “man” as the transcendental, self-transparent, founding subject. Hence, it would be located “within the very tight-knit, very coherent outlines of the modern episteme”; but it would at the same time be “one way of bringing about its end” (ibid., pp. 416, 419). Accordingly, it would amount to the subversive repetition of the modern Being of beings.
As a result, Foucault’s truth-revealing genealogies and archaeologies, which aim to engender anxiety in the social clearing and in its hegemonic articulation in order to make self-transformation possible, and in order thereby to endow the modern subject with the possibility of freedom and resistance, are based on the subversive repetition of the social clearing. They are both subversive and historically situated. Accordingly, the subversive subject of these discourses is not the sovereign but the finite subject, one that finds its condition of possibility in the historical a priori rules and historically contingent network of force relations.

But before going further, we should keep in mind that the fact that Foucault analyzes “sciences of man” in his subversively-repetitive genealogical and archaeological writings such as philology or biology does not mean that he believes natural sciences “tell [us] something like the truth about how things really are,” that he is “a scientific realist” with respect to non-human, i.e., “real,” sciences. For Foucault is well aware of the fact that his genealogical and archaeological analyses may be extended to other areas too. Foucault writes, for example, in his “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” “mathematics … is linked, albeit in a completely different manner than psychiatry, to power structures, if only in the way it is taught, the way in which consensus among mathematicians is organized, functions in a closed circuit, has its values, determines what is good (true) or bad (false) in mathematics” (Foucault 1998b, p. 296).

Hence, for Foucault, there is no discourse that is independent of historical a priori rules and dynamic force relations—be it a discourse of nature, society, genealogy, or archaeology. In this respect, we should interpret Foucault’s rather bold passages on
power-knowledge and power-truth relations such as the following without restricting the scope of them to a particular set of discourses:

truth isn’t outside power or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, truth isn’t the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth—that is, the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances that enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault 1980b, p. 131).

But what does such a bold passage tell us about the tenability of Foucault’s understanding of freedom—considering that the passage cited above indicates that Foucault rejects the possibility of reaching those “universal, power-free” norms to evaluate different regimes of power-knowledge/truth, and of unveiling “the prediscursive human nature” with the aim of liberating the repressed humanity of humans that is supposedly veiled by force relations? Charles Taylor (1986), for example, claims that since Foucault believes power and knowledge/truth cannot be separated from one another, there is no space reserved in Foucault’s discourses to “The idea of liberating truth” that will “unmask” the illusions and manipulations of power so as to reach that which is to be freed from the shackles of oppression (p. 70). But, Taylor concludes, “To speak of power, and to want to deny a place to ‘liberation’ and ‘truth’, as well as the link between them, is to speak incoherently” (p. 93). Similarly, Nancy Fraser (1981) argues that Foucault’s philosophy is full of “normative ambiguities,” because Foucault, on the one hand, refuses to acknowledge the possibility of utilizing a power-free norm in order to separate what is right from what is wrong, but he, on the other hand, privileges resistance and self-transformation over submission and self-preservation. Fraser writes,
“Only with the introduction of normative notions of some kind could he begin to tell us what’s wrong with the power/knowledge regime and why we oppose it” (p. 126). Otherwise, Foucault would have to acknowledge, as Habermas (1992) puts it, that there is no genuine opposition to power, because “Every counterpower already moves within the horizon of the power that it fights” in the absence of power-free standpoints (p. 281).

These critics of Foucault, as Rouse (2005) rightly points out, presuppose that it is impossible to perform a socio-political analysis without assuming the standpoint of the sovereign subject, which can speak in the name of scientific or otherwise objective truth/norm that will resolve socio-political disagreements once and for all by telling us into what kind of society the truth/norm wants us to direct ourselves (p. 108). The embodiment, as it were, of this assumption is Michael Walzer. Walzer (1986) claims, “one can’t even be downcast, angry, grim, indignant, sullen, or embittered with reason,” unless one utilizes some norms and proposes an opposition to the current force relations, and, thereby, offers a new configuration of society on the basis of these norms (p. 67). Since Foucault does no such thing, he cannot fix “the catastrophic weakness of his political theory” (p. 67).

These critics, I believe, presuppose a static conceptualization of freedom such that the so-called discourse of freedom is taken to be that which destroys the repressive mechanisms of power by utilizing power-free, universal norms, and which thereby points out the path that leads to a promised land where the illusions and manipulations of power can be left behind once and for all. Accordingly, they miss the dynamic nature of Foucault’s understanding of freedom, which is based on the acknowledgement of human finitude. Foucault believes, as we have seen above, that the precondition of freedom is
the unconcealment of the anxiety-engendering truth, of the historical contingency of what is taken for granted, and of the performative character of our limits for self-transformation that are reified by the hegemonic interpretations of the “natural” ways of acting, thinking, and being. As we have also seen, in Foucault’s view, those genealogical and archaeological discourses that are supposed to unconceal this truth do not presuppose a sovereign subject, but are, always already, based on the repetition of socio-historical possibilities. That is, they are always finite, because they are already constrained by the games of truth they are determined to de-calcify, de-reify, and, thus, subvert. And since they are finite, their task to engender anxiety in the hegemonic articulation of the social clearing is a never-ending task. Put differently, the anxious task of the anxiety-engendering discourses is to perform “a permanent critique of our historical era,” a permanent de-calcification and de-reification of the ways in which we act, think, and are (Foucault 1997c, p. 109, emphasis mine). Foucault says,

It is true that we have to give up hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits? And from this point of view the theoretical and practical experience that we have of our limits and of the possibility of moving beyond them is always limited and determined, thus we are always in the position of beginning again (ibid., p. 115).

Permanent de-calcification and de-reification of the hegemonic articulations of the social clearing is the sine qua non for the possibility of freedom, for the possibility of self-transformation, because if the familiarized ways of acting, thinking, and being are not constantly problematized by anxiety-engendering practices, the social clearing becomes calcified, reified, and endowed with the power of offering itself as inevitable and non-transformable. This does not mean that, in Foucault’s view, every form of acting, thinking, and being is “bad”; but it means that “everything is dangerous, which is
not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do” (Foucault 1998b, p. 256). The danger in question is the danger of the calcification and reification of the social clearing in such a way that the hegemonic articulation of this clearing acquires the power to block, once and for all, the possibility of resisting, transforming, and re-mobilizing prevalent force relations; i.e., “stable mechanisms replace the free play of antagonistic reactions” (Foucault 1998h, pp. 346-347). Obviously, in such a state, “practices of freedom do not exist or exist only unilaterally or are extremely constrained and limited” (Foucault 1998c, p. 283). Accordingly, for Foucault,

a system of constraint becomes truly intolerable when the individuals who are affected by it don’t have the means of modifying it. This can happen when such a system becomes intangible as a result of its being considered a moral or religious imperative, or a necessary consequence of medical science (Foucault 1989f, p. 327).

The Foucauldian name for such an intolerable state is a state of “domination.” Foucault makes a distinction between power as the multiplicity of force relations, as the network of warlike confrontations between forces and counter-forces, as the “strategic games between liberties,” between power and resistance, on the one hand, and domination as the state in which the possibility of resistance and freedom is blocked because of the expansion, calcification, and reification of the hegemonic ways of acting, thinking, and being, on the other (Foucault 1998c, p. 299). Hence, for Foucault, where there is domination, there is no force relation, no power, and no resistance. In this respect, Foucault does not need to have a power-free, universal norm at his disposal that will allow him to separate “good” forces from the “bad” ones in order to be able to provide a viable socio-political analysis of modern force relations. For Foucault believes no force, no regime of truth, and no mechanism of power is *intrinsically* bad. That is to say, no
force needs to be problematized by subversively-repetitive discourses, and no hegemony needs to be resisted by subversively-repetitive self-transformations according to the dictates of some universal criteria. But every force needs to be problematized and resisted through the subversive repetition of socio-historical possibilities—in order not to let any force be calcified, reified, and, thereby, engender a state of domination. Foucault writes,

power relations are not something that is bad in itself, that we have to break free of. I do not think that a society can exist without power relations, if by that one means the strategies by which individuals try to direct and control the conduct of others. The problem, then, is not to try to dissolve them in the utopia of completely transparent communication but to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques, and also the morality, the ēthos, the practice of the self, that will allow us to play these games of power with as little domination as possible (ibid., p. 298).

Therefore, in Foucault’s view, one’s freedom refers to one’s freedom from domination, one’s freedom from the calcification and reification of the ways in which one acts, thinks, and is—the calcification and reification that are responsible for the elimination of the freedom for creating and re-creating the self as if it is a work of art. Hence, the Foucauldian freedom lies in not only subversive but also constant re-appropriation of socio-historical possibilities—especially in the face of the omnipresent danger of calcification, reification, and, thus, domination. That is, the Foucauldian freedom lies in constant subversive repetition. It is Being-towards-freedom. For freedom is not a thing one can possess once and for all, but, as Mendieta (2010) puts it, it is a state “to be achieved, sustained, preserved and wrested from the games of power in which it always circulates like blood in a living organism” (p. 123).

Foucault calls such never-ending, subversive task “a hyper- and pessimistic activism,” which refers to “absolute optimism” (Foucault 1998b, p. 256; 1998g, p. 294).
It is pessimistic because it does not endeavor to reach a point in which there will be no confrontation and no restriction. But it is also optimistic because it is motivated by the faith in the *possibility* of constant change and transformation, in the *possibility* of fighting states of domination, and in the *possibility* of, as James Bernauer and Michael Mahon (2005) put it, “a freedom that does not surrender to the pursuit of some messianic future but is an engagement with the numberless potential transgressions of those forces that war against our self-creation” (p. 164).

Moreover, if it is true that the precondition of freedom, of Being-towards-freedom, is the unconcealment of the anxiety-engendering truth, then the real task of Foucault’s truth-revealing, anxiety-engendering genealogies and archaeologies is not to “unmask” the illusions and manipulations of power, but to de-calcify and de-reify hegemonic forces in order to attack states of domination, and in order to prevent any force from turning itself into a subject of domination; that is, in order to preserve the possibility of freedom, resistance, and self-transformation. It is to call into question “domination at every level and in every form in which it exists, whether political, economic, sexual, institutional, or what have you”—and this, in order to de-freeze and re-mobilize states of domination back into dialogical, agonistic, polyvocal, and unstable force relations (Foucault 1998c, pp. 300-301).

Hence, Foucault’s call for resistance and self-transformation, his call for *constant* subversive repetition, does not refer to *transformation for transformation’s sake* in the absence of universal criteria. For the rejection of power-free and universal norms, the conceptualization of power as omnipresent and dynamic network of force relations, together with the acknowledgment of the omnipresent danger of domination as the
unquestioned pretense to speak in the name of unchangeable truths/norms, engender a non-reified standard: a standard of, as Steven Hicks (2003) argues, “otherness” (pp. 103-104). It is true that for Foucault, every force is dangerous; but those forces that eradicate otherness due to their reified status, and thereby eliminate the possibility of resistance and de-reification, are more dangerous than others. Put differently, those forces that are not open to agonism and dialogue are more threatening to one’s freedom than others (p. 315).

4.4. Freedom or Discrimination

As a result, just like Heidegger, Foucault believes that freedom is Being-towards-freedom. Being-towards-freedom, in turn, is to repeat the socio-historical possibilities of Being-in-the-world constantly and subversively in order to unconceal the anxiety-engendering truth, and in order to de-calcify and de-reify naturalized ways of acting, thinking, and being, which are the only genuine stumbling blocks on the way to creating and re-creating the self; in short, in order to save oneself from being lost within the calcified world and its reified articulations. As we have seen above, Heidegger conceptualized such constant subversive repetition as authentic/subversive historization. We have also seen, however, that the Heideggerian authentic/subversive historization played a crucial role in bridging the gap between his philosophy and a discriminatory ideology such as the National Socialist ideology. Does this mean, then, that the Foucauldian freedom, just like the Heideggerian understanding of freedom, necessitates the marginalization and social, if not literal, murder of minorities? That is, does Foucault’s understanding of freedom, too, entail discrimination?
As is argued in the third chapter of this essay, Heidegger peppered his understanding of authentic/subversive historization with the discriminatory implications of monolithicity—a dogmatic belief that there is one traditional heritage worth repeating, one motivation behind this repetition, one present to be overcome through such repetition, one way of performing this overcoming, one future such overcoming will aim, one Volk which is capable of realizing this unique future, and one lineage of this Volk—that is, one past, one present, and one future. It was such monolithicity that turned the Heideggerian freedom as constant subversive repetition into a discriminatory tool. Foucault, on the other hand, refuses to ground his understanding of freedom, of constant subversive repetition, on the monolithic conceptualization of the past, present, and future.

As we have seen above, Foucault states, having Nietzsche and Heidegger in mind, “it is important to have a small number of authors with whom one thinks, with whom one works, but about whom one does not write.” We should interpret this sentence not only as the acknowledgement of Foucault’s debt to Heidegger in constructing the relationship between subject, truth, and freedom but also as the acknowledgement of Foucault’s critical engagement with Heidegger throughout his career. For whenever Foucault attacks the monolithic conceptualization of the past, present, and future, he seems to have Heidegger in mind.

For example, as opposed to Heidegger’s dogmatic belief that the Greek understanding of Being constitutes the unique heritage of the European humanity, that this heritage is imbued with a potential degeneration, with the original forgetting of Being, which necessitates the absolute oblivion of Being in the modern era, and that what needs to be done in the face of such unstoppable degeneration is to subversively re-
appropriate the original Greek understanding and problematization of Being, Foucault says,

Nothing is more foreign to me than the idea that, at a certain moment, philosophy went astray and forgot something, that somewhere in its history there is a principle, a foundation that must be rediscovered. I feel that all such forms of analysis, whether they take a radical form and claim that philosophy has from the outset been a forgetting, or whether they take a much more historical viewpoint and say, “Such and such a philosopher forgot something”—neither of these approaches is particularly interesting or useful (Foucault 1998c, pp. 294-295, emphasis mine).

Accordingly, Foucault delineates the nature of his historical discourses by engaging in a critical dialogue with the belief in the unique, negative-teleological, and counter-apocalyptic origin. “The purpose of history, guided by genealogy,” writes Foucault, is “not to discover the roots of our identity,” “to define our unique threshold of emergence, the homeland to which metaphysicians promise a return,” but “to commit itself to its dissipation” (Foucault 1998d, pp. 386-387). That is to say, Foucault’s discourses do not seek to give a unitary causal explanation of what there is by unconcealing the cause, “the unitary origin” as “that which establishes a certain unavoidable,” “a genesis oriented towards the unity of some causal principal cause burdened with multiple descendants”; rather, they focus on the multiplicity of polyvocal, dynamic, unstable, and transformable clashes between forces and counter-forces, strategies and counter-strategies, alliances and counter-alliances; i.e., on “the intersection of heterogeneous processes” and their “effects” (Foucault 1997c, pp. 63-64).

Secondly, as opposed to Heidegger’s unquestioned presupposition that each historical epoch acquires its entire intelligibility thanks to a particular understanding of Being peculiar to that epoch, that is, as opposed to Heidegger’s ontological holism, Foucault claims that it is impossible to reduce epochs to their unitary ontological
foundation. Although in his 1966 *The Order of Things*, Foucault seems to come closer to Heidegger’s holism—especially when he says, “In any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one *episteme* that defines the conditions of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice”—he distances himself from such holism in the following years (Foucault 1970, p. 183). In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, for example, Foucault writes, “in *The Order of Things*, the absence of methodological signposting may have given the impression that my analyses were being conducted in terms of cultural totality” (ibid., p. 18). And then he argues that the *epistemes* he described in his 1966 book cannot be generalized in such a way that they will be regarded as the *epistemes* of cultural totalities such as the Modern “*Weltanschauung*” or “the Classical Spirit,” but they should rather be thought to be confined to certain human sciences (Foucault 1972, pp. 175, 176). For, say, “the history of mathematics does not follow the same model as the history of biology, which does not follow the same model as psycho-pathology either” (Foucault 1989a, p. 35). That is, these histories, together with their historical *a priori* rules of formation, and together with the histories of the transformations of these rules, can be reduced neither to a unilateral history of Being nor to a negative-teleological unfolding of the history of philosophy.

Lastly, as opposed to the Heideggerian conceptualization of the present, of modernity as the end of the original degeneration of the unique origin, as the starting point of the new beginning—the pure beginning which may come into existence as the salvation of humanity only if the original beginning is subversively re-appropriated—Foucault rejects what he calls “one of the most harmful habits in contemporary thought, in modern thought even,” namely, “the analysis of the present as being precisely, in
history, a present of rupture, or of high point, or of completion or of a returning down,”
as “the unique or fundamental or irruptive point in history where everything is completed
and begun anew,” as the unique moment in which the necessity “to awaken what has been
forgotten” has to be felt in order not to perish in the ruins of the decadent present
(Foucault 1989a, p. 41; Foucault 1998e, p. 449).

Hence, for Foucault, there is no unique heritage to be re-appropriated at the
expense of remaining blind to the plurality of sub-heritages, and at the expense of
marginalizing those sub-heritages in order to eliminate the stumbling-blocks on the way
to the re-awakening of the pure heritage. Similarly, there is no present as the end of a
unilateral history of the original degeneration that necessitates the re-appropriation of the
unique heritage, and that demands the overcoming of the decadent modernity at the
expense of ignoring the atrocities of revolutionary movements and their genocidal
ideologies. Lastly, there is no redemptive future, no pure beginning that will be based on
the retrieval of the unique heritage, which would justify the homogenization of a
historical people on the basis of this heritage and, thereby, the marginalization of
minorities as the stains on the path that will lead to the construction of heritage-respecting
future generations.

Accordingly, the Heideggerian/Foucauldian understanding of freedom as the
constant subversive repetition of traditional possibilities is neither discriminatory nor
non-discriminatory. What bridges the gap between the Heideggerian/Foucauldian
freedom and discrimination is the monolithic conceptualization of history, i.e., the
conservative blindness to the existence of sub-heritages, of the multiplicity of socio-
historical possibilities to be preserved, appropriated, or overcome, and of the
indeterminacy of the futures to come. That is to say, as opposed to the hegemonic way of questioning the relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and the National Socialist ideology, we should not label fascistic or latent-fascistic any call for the re-appropriation of the traditional possibilities of Being-in-the-world and any rejection of the modern/liberal understanding of human existence as an ahistorical, a-traditional, unworldly, purely-rational, isolated existence.

Is it possible, then, to further appropriate the Heideggerian/Foucauldian understanding of freedom—but this time in order to be neither supportive nor neutral to discriminatory ideologies and their murder of minorities, but in order to conceptualize the intrinsic relationship between freedom and the resuscitation of the socially-murdered segments of a given society? In the next chapter, I will re-appropriate Judith Butler’s philosophy from the perspective of the Heidegger of Being and Time. Due to this re-appropriation, I will claim that one’s freedom is dependent on the cultural resuscitation of socially-murdered racial, sexual, ethnic, religious, and sectarian/confessional minorities.
The names “Judith Butler” and “Martin Heidegger” rarely come together in Butler and Heidegger scholarship. As a matter of fact, the basis for the lack of a dialogical exchange between Butlerian and Heideggerian scholars is straightforward. After all, it seems *prima facie* that there is an unbridgeable gap between Butler’s and Heidegger’s philosophical and political stances. For example, whereas Butler is a social constructivist, Heidegger, at least in *Being and Time*, interrogates the universal structures of human existence such as Being-in-the-world and Being-towards-death. Whereas Butler is a sort of radical democrat, Heidegger supported National Socialism whole-heartedly in the years of 1933 and 1934, and, even in his last interview in 1966, stated that “I am not convinced that it is democracy” that can solve the shortcomings of modernity (Heideger 1991d, 104). Whereas the goal of Butler’s philosophy is “to establish more inclusive conditions for sheltering and maintaining life that resists models of assimilation” (Butler 2004a, p. 4), Heidegger appropriated, as we have seen above, the terminology of *Being and Time* to support and justify the fascist movement in Germany.

Furthermore, Butler rarely refers to Heidegger in her texts. And when she mentions the name of Heidegger, she usually refers to Heidegger’s style rather than the content of his philosophy. For example, in a 2000 interview, Butler says when she was a student, she “took numerous seminars on Heidegger” and appreciated Heidegger’s

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4 The original version of this chapter will be published in the following article: Butler and Heidegger: On the Relation between Freedom and Marginalization, Aret Karademir, *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy* (forthcoming), (John Wiley and Sons).
puzzling writing-style, insofar as it problematizes those unquestioned ways in which we experience beings:

Reading Heidegger as a young person and trying to figure out what it is he was trying to do with his neologisms and his coinages also influenced me. … I think there was and remains a rather profound effort there to call into question ordinary language and the ways in which we structure the world on its basis, an analysis of the kinds of occlusions or concealments that take place when we take ordinary language to be a true indicator of reality as it is and as it must be” (Butler 2007c, p. 327).

Lastly, the most direct link between the philosophies of Butler and Heidegger is fairly indirect. As is well known, Butler is deeply influenced by the philosophy of Foucault and re-appropriates the Foucauldian understanding of productive power. Foucault, in turn, as we have seen above, was a devoted Heideggerian. As a result, there seem to be nothing other than a possible, yet fragile, Foucauldian bridge between the philosophies of Butler and Heidegger that justifies the task of interpreting the former from the perspective of the latter.

Be that as it may, I believe, the critical encounter between Butler and Heidegger might be philosophically/politically promising—especially for inquiring into the relationship between freedom and discrimination. My aim in this chapter is to re-appropriate Butler’s philosophy from the perspective of the Heidegger of Being and Time. That is, I will read Butler with the aid of Heideggerian concepts such as “Being-in-the-world,” “Being-towards-death,” “(in)authenticity,” “anxiety,” “guilt,” “conscience,” and “authentic solicitude.” Through this reading, I will argue that one’s freedom is dependent on the resuscitation of socially-murdered racial, sexual, ethnic, religious, and sectarian/confessional minorities. More specifically, I will claim that the socially-sanctioned subject’s freedom is dependent on the marginalized Other’s freedom, and, conversely, the marginalized Other’s freedom is dependent on the socially-sanctioned
subject’s freedom. In re-appropriating Butler’s philosophy from the perspective of Heidegger, I also hope to respond to a common critique of Butler’s philosophy: why is the critical re-appropriation/subversive repetition of the norms of race, gender, and sex preferable to conserving the hegemonic interpretation of them, if there are no absolute criteria to judge different regimes of power/discourse (Allen 1998; Benhabib 1995b; Fraser 1995a; Fraser 1995b; Stone 2005)?

5.1. Existential Guilt

Just like Heidegger, Butler believes that human beings are not free-floating, isolated, present-at-hand entities. Rather, they are socio-historically situated beings who are born and enculturated into a “grid of cultural intelligibility,” into a web of norms that defines the parameters of what is socially intelligible and what is not, what is livable and thinkable within the social domain and what is not (Butler 2007b, p. 126). Hence, for Butler, “to be a subject is to be born into a world in which norms are already acting on you from the very beginning” (Butler 2007c, p. 341). It is to be socialized into what Veronica Vasterling (2003) calls “a world of significations,” a social clearing, which structures the boundaries of the intelligible ways of existence and intelligible modes of experiencing beings, including one’s own being (p. 207).

Accordingly, Butler claims, it is the web of norms that produces not only the domain of intelligible actions, bodies, and ways of life but also the domain of socially dead, marginalized, and abject beings. Put differently, the web of norms brings about not only the domain of those lives that are meaningful, socially recognized, and, therefore, worth living, but also the domain of those lives that are deprived of intelligibility and
social recognition—those lives that are not worth living and that do not deserve grieving or mourning when they are lost. Butler writes, “An ungrievable life is one that cannot be mourned because it has never lived, that is, it has never counted as a life at all” (Butler 2010, p. 38). As a result, in Butler’s view, it is the grid of cultural intelligibility that “establish[es] in advance what kind of life will be a life worth living, what life will be a life worth preserving, and what life will become worthy of being mourned” (ibid., p. 53).

Butler calls this grid the “heterosexual matrix”—especially when she ignores racial, ethnic, and religious norms and those contexts in which one set of norms is articulated into the other (Butler 1999, p. 208). However, this does not mean that Butler is oblivious to the multiplicity of matrices. For she cites, especially in her recent works, various matrices as frames of subject-formation. She claims, for example, in her 2004 Precarious Life, “there are racial and ethnic frames by which the recognizably human is currently constituted” (Butler 2004b, p. 90). Similarly, in her 2012 Parting Ways, she argues that religion—not as a set of dogmatic beliefs but as “an embedded framework for valuations”—functions as a matrix of intelligibility that defines for a conforming community intelligible ways of, put in Heidegger’s terminology, Being-in-the-world (Butler 2012, p. 116):

religion often functions as a set of practices and, indeed, as a matrix of subject formation. Perhaps I could not be who I am without a certain formation in religion that in no way implies a specific set of religious beliefs regarding God (the metaphysical reduction) or modes of belief that are distinct from reason (the epistemological reduction). Certain values are embedded in practices and cannot be easily “extracted” from them and made into explicit “beliefs” formulated in propositions. They are lived as part of embodied practices formed and sustained within certain matrices of value (ibid., p. 22).

Therefore, Butler’s emphasis on the heterosexual matrix should be interpreted not as a deficiency in her account but as referring to the “case-study” nature of her works and
especially of her earlier works in the 1990’s. We should also keep in mind that even the Butler of the 1990’s does not take the heterosexual matrix to be the ultimate, unilateral, and unadulterated Source—with a capital S—of cultural intelligibility. In her 1990 Gender Trouble, for example, Butler argues that the web of norms as the source of intelligibility and recognition is neither “monolithic” nor “monologic.” That is, it may be reduced neither to the so-called universal “phallogocentrism” at the expense of ignoring racial, ethnic, and religious idiosyncrasies of different forms of sexual oppression, nor to the norms of sexual difference at the expense of remaining blind to other sources of cultural intelligibility (Butler 1999, p. 18). Hence, we should interpret the Butlerian context of intelligibility as a heterogeneous web of sexual, racial, ethnic, and gender norms. And we should read the Butlerian heterosexual matrix as an instantiation of such a heterogeneous web.

Butler believes it is the heterosexual matrix as “a hegemonic discursive/epistemic model of gender intelligibility” that determines which gendered bodies and ways of life are intelligible, livable, and thinkable within the social domain (ibid., p. 208). That is to say, thanks to the heterosexual matrix, those lives that do not express heterosexual “coherence and continuity among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire” are thrown into the margins of society; they are socially dead (ibid., p. 23). This does not mean, of course, that these lives are inherently unintelligible or entirely beyond the domain of cultural intelligibility such that they may be regarded either as the ones which can never be re-integrated into the domain of intelligibility or as the ones which are free from the impositions and interventions of the norms of heterosexuality. For the norms of
coherence and continuity are the *sine qua non* for being constructed and experienced as incoherent and discontinues. As Butler puts it,

> the spectres of discontinuity and incoherence, *themselves thinkable only in relation to existing norms of continuity and coherence*, are constantly prohibited and produced by the very laws that seek to establish causal or expressive lines of connection among biological sex, culturally constituted genders, and the “expression” or “effect” of both in the manifestation of sexual desire through sexual practice (ibid., p. 23, emphasis mine).

As a result, in Butler’s view, there is no subject—be it socially-sanctioned or marginalized—that is not a product of the grid of cultural intelligibility, of the hegemonic regime of power/discourse. Butler claims, for example, “the law produces *both* sanctioned heterosexuality and transgressive homosexuality. Both are indeed *effects*, temporally and ontologically later than the law itself” (ibid., p. 100). Moreover, not only are the abjected lives neither precultural nor prediscursive but also their *social* construction is the *sine qua non* for demarcating the domain of intelligibility and intelligible lives. Thus, the domain of the unintelligible is the “constitutive outside” of the domain of the intelligible; it is “the domain of the dehumanized and the abject against which the human itself is constituted” (ibid., p. 151). It is a *socially* constructed, yet marginalized, domain. In this respect, the “constitutive outside,” the marginalized Other, is not the *absolute* Other. It is not *absolutely* outside the social clearing. Rather, it is an “outside” that is nevertheless fully “inside,” not a possibility beyond culture, but a concrete cultural possibility that is refused and redescribed as impossible. What remains “unthinkable” and “unsayable” within the terms of an existing cultural form is not necessarily what is excluded from the matrix of intelligibility within that form; on the contrary, it is the marginalized, not the excluded, the cultural possibility that calls for dread or, minimally, the loss of sanctions. … The “unthinkable” is thus fully within culture, but fully excluded from *dominant* culture (ibid., p. 105).

Hence, just like Heidegger, Butler believes that not only what is experienced as inside but also what is constructed as outside the socio-historical context of intelligibility,
indeed, the very distinction between what is socially intelligible and what is not, what is central and what is marginal, what is recognizable and what is beyond the domain of intelligibility and social recognizability, is always located within the grid of cultural intelligibility, the social clearing.

Accordingly, just like Heidegger, Butler argues that there is nothing in human existence that does not come to its own within the grid of cultural intelligibility. That is to say, just like Heidegger, Butler believes that the essence of human beings is “performative.” In her view, humans become what they are by repeatedly citing racial, gender, and bodily norms, by being interpellated, and by repudiating what is produced by the hegemonic regime as unlivable and unthinkable. In other words, for Butler, one’s gendered identity does not refer to a prediscursive substance. It is not a natural quality, but it is the “sedimented effect” of the repeated citation of a set of norms (Butler 1993, p. 10). Consequently, one’s gendered identity “has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality,” apart from rule-governed, norm-following acts, habits, and gendered performances (Butler 1999, p. 185). Thanks to such performances, “bodies are trained, shaped, and formed,” and one thereby acquires the sense of one’s gendered identity (Butler 1993, p. 54). Butler writes, “There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender,” there is no ahistorical, present-at-hand gender-substance behind gendered performances, but “Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being” (Butler 1999, pp. 34, 45).

Repeating the norms of gender and race intelligibly also means that the subject, in order to become what it is, must repudiate what is abjected by the hegemonic
interpretation of these norms; it must abject what threatens the borders of its intelligible identity. It must repeatedly reject “contestatory possibilities,” “that which it cannot abide,” that which produces “the threat of a certain dissolution of the subject” (Butler 1993, pp. 109, 188; Butler 1997a, p. 136). Thus, just like repeated citation, abjection is the \textit{sine qua non} for subject-formation. In Butler’s words, “the subject is constituted through the force of exclusion and abjection, one which produces a constitutive outside to the subject, an abjected outside, which is, after all, ‘inside’ the subject as its own founding repudiation” (Butler 1993, p. 3).

Lastly, the subject comes into existence as long as it is interpellated, as long as it is hailed into existence. To wit, the subject is constructed by the terms with which it is called and the terms with which it is not called. And just like citing the norms and excluding the abjected, interpellation does not refer to a single act but repetition. Butler writes,

Consider the medical interpellation which ... shifts an infant from an “it” to a “she” or a “he,” and in that naming, the girl is “girled,” brought into the domain of language and kinship through the interpellation of gender. But that “girling” of the girl does not end there; on the contrary, that founding interpellation is reiterated by various authorities and throughout various intervals of time to reenforce or contest this naturalized effect. The naming is at once the setting of a boundary, and also \textit{the repeated inculcation of a norm} (ibid., pp. 7-8, emphasis mine).

As a result, in Butler’s view, the subject acquires its subjectivity thanks to the repeated citation of norms. This does not mean, however, that a prediscursive agency within human beings is responsible for the citation. Rather, the very agency of the subject comes into existence thanks to repetition, repeated interpellation, and constant abjection. Butler claims, for example, “the process by which a bodily norm is assumed, appropriated, taken on as not, strictly speaking, undergone \textit{by a subject}, but rather that the
subject, the speaking ‘I’, is formed by virtue of having gone through such a process of assuming sex” (ibid., p. 3). That is, citation precedes the subject and its agency. Therefore, for Butler, “agency begins where sovereignty wanes” (Butler 1997a, p. 16). For the subject obtains its subjectivity by being subjected to the terms, conventions, and norms that are not of its own making. “Only by persisting in alterity,” writes Butler, “does one persist in one’s ‘own’ being” (Butler 1997b, p. 28). To wit, just like the Heideggerian Dasein, the Butlerian subject is, always already, alienated from itself—it is existentially guilty. It requires, in order to be, to be subjected to what is outside of itself. This is what Butler calls “primary complicity with subordination,” “a primary and inaugurative alienation in sociality” (ibid., pp. 17, 28).

Nevertheless, the existential fact that the subject is guilty of complicity with its own subordination does not mean that the very same subject cannot resist power, that it is determined by the web of norms once and for all. For neither the subject nor power is a static entity that preexists the repeated citation of norms. To be more specific, Butler does not conceptualize human existence according to the model of substance ontology. Butler’s understanding of performativity does not refer to two ontologically independent substances, the subject and power, such that the subject, in order to become what it is, reaches out that which is ontologically distinct from itself as to internalize, once and for all, what is beyond itself, the determining norm. Rather, the Butlerian subject is the repeated citation of a set of norms. Hence, the subject never is in the traditional sense of the word, but becomes as the repeated citation of norms. That is to say, in conceptualizing human existence, Butler utilizes “a vocabulary that resists the substance
metaphysics of subject-verb formations and relies instead on an ontology of present participles” (Butler 1988, p. 521).

Since the subject becomes as the repeated citation of norms, its identity refers to a process, to that which is “constituted in time,” to “a constituted social temporality” (Butler 1999, p. 191). In this respect, no subject can internalize the norms once and for all and no norm can determine the subject once and for all, because being a subject means to be incomplete, to be on the way to completion—put in Heidegger’s terminology, to be towards death. Hence, Butler, just like Heidegger, takes human existence to be an unfolding-life story, a story that unfolds itself from the subject’s situatedness to its completion, from its sedimented, partially completed essence to its identity as the end product of its intelligible performances, i.e., from its birth to death. Butler writes, in her 2005 Giving an Account of Oneself, “in living my life as a recognizable being, I live a vector of temporalities, one of which has my death as its terminus, but another of which consists in the social and historical temporality of the norms by which my recognizability is established and maintained” (Butler 2005, p. 35).

Similarly, the norms of gender and race, indeed, the very web of norms itself, refers neither to a Platonic world of forms nor to the Lacanian Symbolic that ontologically precedes its social instantiations, that has an independent ontological status with respect to rule-governed performances. Rather, the web of norms one cites in order to become what one is acquires its identity thanks to its being cited, its being reproduced in time. Hence, the Butlerian web of norms “is not stable or static, but is remade at various junctures within everyday life” (Butler 2000b, p. 14). Accordingly, for Butler, “There is no power that acts, but only a reiterated acting that is power in its persistence
and instability” (Butler 1993, p. 9). As a result, whether the norms of race and gender have the power to determine, once and for all, what is livable and what is not, whether they are able to force the subject to perform a monolithic, imitative, and mechanical repetition by threatening it with social death, and whether they have unquestioned authority to compel the subject to abject certain possibilities in order not to lose its identity, is dependent on whether they are cited monolithically, as the laws that demand constant and almost automatic obedience. Butler writes,

The force and necessity of these norms … is thus functionally dependent on the approximation and citation of the law; the law without its approximation is no law or, rather, it remains a governing law only for those who would affirm it on the basis of religious faith. If “sex” is assumed in the same way that a law is cited … then “the law of sex” is repeatedly fortified and idealized as the law only to the extent that it is reiterated as the law, produced as the law, the anterior and inapproximable ideal, by the very citations it is said to command (ibid., p. 14, my emphases).

Since the law requires citation and reproduction in order to become what it is and in order to empower itself, it is never complete; it is always on the way to its completion. Therefore, it is always vulnerable to being cited in such a way that it is de-constructed rather than being re-constructed. In other words, because of its dynamic existence, it is always possible for the law to encounter, on its way to completion, those “forms of repetition that do not constitute a simple imitation, reproduction, and, hence, consolidation,” but subversion and de-construction (Butler 1999, p. 42). Accordingly, Butler believes, the opposite of being subjected to power is not “emancipation” with respect to the web of norms (Butler 1995b, p. 137). That is, resistance to power does not lie in the attempt to transcend the web of norms once and for all, and thereby to embrace a norm-free, unintelligible life, but in subversive repetition, in citing the norms of sex, gender, and race inappropriately, in previously unauthorized contexts, “in the possibility
of a failure to repeat, a de-formity, or a parodic repetition” and “parodic recontextualization” (Butler 1990, p. 338; Butler 1999, p. 192). This is the reason why Butler says, “power can be neither withdrawn nor refused, but only redeployed” (Butler 1999, p. 169).

But how does subversive repetition make resistance possible? How does failing to repeat the norms of race and gender appropriately de-calcify and de-authorize the reified regime of power/discourse? How does parodic repetition disempower the web of norms in such a way that the law/norm loses its power to force the subject to cite the norms of race and gender monolithically? In order to answer these questions, I suggest, it is promising to remember Heidegger’s philosophy and to read Butler from the perspective of the German philosopher.

5.2. Anxiety

As we have seen in the first chapter of this essay, for Heidegger, human beings are worldly entities. They become who they are by appropriating the norms, terms, and conventions of their life-world. However, in their everyday lives, they do not realize that the world they are born into and the social possibilities this world offers are neither natural nor inevitable, that they have to construct their identities by performing certain socio-historically viable possibilities in certain socio-historically viable ways, and that although they have to ground their identities on their own insofar as their essence is performative, they are not the absolute grounds of themselves insofar as they have to appropriate that which is not of their own making in order to be who they are. In other words, in their everyday lives, human beings cover up their anxiety-engendering truth,
namely, their contingency, performativity, and existential culpability; they silence, as it were, their conscience by remaining blind to their original guilt. In Heidegger’s terminology, this means they are, proximally and for the most part, lost within the world they are socialized into; and, therefore, they are neither free nor authentic. Heidegger believes it is only the awakening of anxiety as the unconcealment of the anxiety-engendering truth of human existence that can free humans from being lost within their calcified context of intelligibility and, thereby, for creating and re-creating themselves as their own authentically. We have also seen that whereas the Heidegger of the late 1920s conceptualizes anxiety as a mystical happening that needs “no unusual event to rouse it” and that “can awaken in existence at any moment,” for the Heidegger of the 1930s anxiety is engendered by subversively-repetitive works.

We can read the Butlerian subversive/parodic repetition against this background, that is, as an anxiety-engendering/awakening practice in the sense that repeating the norms of race, gender, ethnicity, and religion subversively may unconceal the contingency, performativity, and existential culpability of human existence. Butler claims, for example, repeating the norms of sex and gender inappropriately, repeating them in unauthorized ways and in unauthorized contexts as in the case of, say, drag and butch performances or homosexual and lesbian kinship relations, that is, failing to conform to the expectations of the hegemonic/heterosexual interpretation of these norms, reveals that the norms of sex and gender may be appropriated differently, that the taken-for-granted way of citing these norms is historically contingent. To wit, subversive repetition of the norms of sex and gender may disclose the existential fact that what is taken for granted, what is calcified through time, is “changeable and revisable” (Butler
1999, p. xxiv). Thus, by de-reifying the norms of sex and gender, subversive repetition may “compel the question: what is a woman, what is a man” (ibid., p. xi)? It engenders “a deformation of dominant language” (Butler & Spivak 2007, p. 67). For it puts the reified interpretations of gender categories into crisis such that it becomes difficult to distinguish who is “really,” say, a woman or a man and who is a “bad/abnormal” imitation of “natural” femininity or masculinity. That is to say, subversive repetition reveals “the arbitrary relation between the signifier and the signified” (Butler 1999, p. 167). It de-naturalizes what is naturalized, and “deprives hegemonic culture and its critics of the claim to naturalized or essentialist gender identities” (ibid., p. 188).

Accordingly, as Samuel Chambers and Terrell Carver (2008) point out, subversive repetition does not aim at eradicating the norms of sex and gender once and for all, but at “working on norms from within,” “eroding their efficacy,” and, thereby, “challenging their status,” their reified nature (p. 142). That is, by disrupting the heterosexist assumption of natural unity between sex, gender, and desire, subversive repetition of the norms of sex and gender “reveals the performative status of the natural itself” (Butler 1999, p. 200). It shows that one’s gendered expressions are not the natural consequences of one’s essential sex which forces human beings to act in certain ways, that they are, rather, the very performances which produce the illusion of essence. Hence, it discloses the existential fact that one’s gendered identity does not refer to the unconcealment of one’s true essence, but to the citation of the terms, norms, and conventions that are not of one’s own making. Butler writes,

> When the disorganization and disaggregation of the field of bodies disrupt the regulatory fiction of heterosexual coherence, it seems that the expressive model loses its descriptive force. That regulatory ideal is then exposed as a norm and a fiction that disguises itself as a developmental law regulating the sexual field that it purports to describe (ibid., p. 185, emphasis mine).
As a result, subversive repetition of the norms of sex, gender, race, and ethnicity de-calcifies and de-refies the hegemonic interpretation of these norms and, thereby, frees the subject from being lost within calcified and reified social roles. For it reminds the subject that it has to choose certain social possibilities in order to become what it is, that the subject itself is the only ground of its own self insofar as the way it performs certain roles shapes its identity, that the way the subject cites the norms of sex, gender, race, and ethnicity matters, i.e., it cannot be left to the discretion of, put in Heidegger’s terminology, the “dictatorship of the ‘they’.” As Butler puts it in an early article, in her 1987 “Variations of Sex and Gender,” “we realize,” thanks to the anxiety-engendering repetitions, “that it is hardly necessary that we be the genders we have become, we confront the burden of choice intrinsic to living as a man or a woman or some other gender identity” (Butler 2007a, p. 27). We become, as she claims in a later work, in her 2009 Frames of War, able “to assume responsibility for living a life that contests the determining power” of the norms, instead of being their inauthentic puppets (Butler 2010, p. 170).

But is it really possible to repeat the norms of sex, gender, ethnicity, and race subversively, if it is true that the grid of cultural intelligibility one is born into forces one not only to repeat the norms but also to repeat them in certain ways in order to become what one is and in order to have an intelligible subjectivity (Benhabib 1995b, pp. 110-111; Salih 2002, p. 66)? Is it not true that the Butlerian subject is devoid of the possibility of resisting power? Is it not true, as Butler herself claims, that “performativity cannot be understood outside of a process of iterability, a regularized and constrained repetition of norms” (Butler 1993, p. 95, emphasis mine)? Butler writes,
The “performative” dimension of [subject-]construction is precisely the forced reiteration of norms. In this sense, then, it is not only that there are constraints to performativity; rather, constraint calls to be rethought as the very condition of performativity. Performativity is neither free play of forces nor theatrical self-presentation; nor can it be simply equated with performance (ibid., pp. 94-95, emphasis mine).

In other words, the Butlerian subject has to repeat the norms in question, and it has to repeat them in certain ways. Be that as it may, Butler believes, although “The practice by which gendering occurs, the embodying of norms, is a compulsory practice,” it is “not for that reason fully determining” (ibid., p. 231). As we have seen above, Butler tries to support this claim by conceptualizing both the subject and power dynamically. Accordingly, as some of her commentators point out, Butler’s understanding of performativity refers neither to voluntarism nor to determinism (Disch 1999, pp. 549-550; Lloyd 2009, p. 60-1; McNay 1999, pp. 175-176). However, this neither-voluntaristic-nor-deterministic nature of the Butlerian performativity has often been misunderstood by her critics.

Seyla Benhabib (1995a), for example, reads Butler deterministically. That is, she claims that since the Butlerian subject is nothing other than “the sum total of the gendered expressions,” it can neither resist power nor act freely. For it is not endowed with a power-free, prediscursive agency which would be able “to stop the performance for a while” (p. 21). Teresa Ebert (1993), on the other hand, takes Butler’s performative account of human existence to be defending a sort of voluntarism. Ebert says, “for Butler gender is a simulation—what she calls ‘performance’”; and “sexual difference” is nothing other than “a sliding, slipping play of differences ‘performed’ by the subject”—“an independent, free subject who acquires freedom outside the collectivity of the social” by performing social norms in any way it wants (pp. 14, 35-36).
The most interesting misunderstanding, however, is that of Martha Nussbaum—considering that she combines both of the misunderstandings mentioned above in her “The Professor of Parody.” Nussbaum (1999) argues that whereas feminist scholars have focused on “many concrete projects” for years such as “the reform of rape law,” “legal redress for the problems of domestic violence and sexual harassment,” “campaigning against the trafficking of women and girls in prostitution,” etc., new-age feminists, whose most prominent representative is Butler, are entirely pessimistic with respect to the possibility of social change (p. 37). For Butler, according to Nussbaum, believes that “We are doomed to repetition of the power structures into which we are born,” “the dream of escaping altogether from the oppressive structures is just a dream,” and, therefore, all we can do is to freely and hysterically “make fun” of these structures by parodic repetitions (pp. 40, 43). Obviously, such pessimistic laughter is the end of not only feminist but also LGBT movements: Butler “suggests that the institutional structures that ensure the marginalization of lesbians and gay men in our society, and the continued inequality of women, will never be changed in a deep way; and so our best hope is to thumb our noses at them, and to find pockets of personal freedom within them” (p. 43, emphasis mine).

One way to understand Butler’s neither-voluntaristic-nor-deterministic account of performativity, together with this account’s relation to the possibility of social change, I believe, is to focus on Butler’s earliest writings on gender. In her 1986 “Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex,” for example, Butler argues that gender is both “received and innovated,” that one chooses to assume one’s gendered identity “within a network of deeply entrenched cultural norms” (Butler 1986, p. 37, emphasis mine). That
is, one’s gender-choice refers neither to a blind imitation nor to “a radical act of creation”; rather, to assume gender is “to interpret received gender norms in a way that organizes them anew,” to conduct “a tacit project to renew one’s cultural history in one’s own terms” (ibid., p. 40). Put metaphorically, one acquires one’s sense of gender by performing gender norms just as an actor rehearses a script on the scene. Although the actor has no power to re-create the script ex nihilo, s/he has the power to interpret it in his/her own way to a certain degree, i.e., within the confines of the script’s earlier interpretations. Similarly, as Butler puts it in her 1988 “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution,” “the gendered body acts its part in a culturally restricted corporeal space and enacts interpretations within the confines of already existing directives” (Butler 1988, p. 526).

However, the content of the script cannot be thought without taking into account its particular interpretations by its performers. That is, the script “requires individual actors in order to be actualized and reproduced as reality” (ibid., p. 526). Similarly, the subject’s situated, yet subversive, interpretations of the norms of sex and gender re-construct the content of these norms. And assuming that sexually “oppressive structures” in a given society cannot be separated from, say, misogynistic and homophobic interpretations of the norms of sex and gender in that society, “social change” cannot be projected without a positive re-construction of the content of these norms. Therefore, as Karen Zivi (2008) points out, and as opposed to Nussbaum, it would be wrong to interpret the political value of Butler’s philosophy under the assumption that “the theatrical and the political,” i.e., the politics of performativity and “the ‘real’ politics of public policy making,” are entirely different occupations (p. 161).
As a result, Butler’s account of performativity is neither voluntaristic nor deterministic; nor is it pessimistic with respect to the possibility of social change. But is it still not true that the Butlerian subject cannot repeat the norms of sex, gender, ethnicity, and race *subversively enough* to the point of de-calcifying and de-naturalizing the hegemonic regime of power/discourse? After all, the Butlerian subject owes its very identity to the *sedimented* effect of its repetitions such that it cannot simply overthrow its calcified identity to repeat the norms of sex, gender, ethnicity, and race in *radically* subversive ways—*radical enough to engender anxiety in the grid of cultural intelligibility*. Butler says, “We cannot simply throw off the identities we have become”; performativity is “not a performance from which I can take *radical distance*, for this is deep-seated play, psychically entrenched play” (Butler 1997b, p. 102; Butler 2007b, 125, emphasis mine).

Moreover, since the subject acquires its intelligible identity thanks not only to citation but also to repeated repudiation, to “the compulsory repudiation by which the subject incessantly sustains his/her boundary” and “constructs the claim to its ‘integrity’,” repeating the norms of sex, gender, ethnicity, or race in *radically* subversive ways, that is, retrieving them to the point of letting what has been abjected so far breach the boundaries of the subject, brings the subject face to face not only with social ostracism but also with “the threat of psychosis, abjection, psychic unlivability” (Butler 1993, pp. 15, 114). Hence, for Butler, *radical* subversive repetition is not a viable option for the subject. As she writes,

> every such being is constrained by not only what is difficult to imagine, but what remains radically unthinkable: in the domain of sexuality these constraints include the radical unthinkability of desiring otherwise, the radical unendurability of desiring otherwise, the absence of certain desires, the repetitive compulsion of
others, the abiding repudiation of some sexual possibilities, panic, obsessional pull, and the nexus of sexuality and pain (ibid., p. 94).

Is it not true, then, as Moya Lloyd (2007) puts it, Butler cannot explain “how the norms regulating the psyche can be reconfigured without threatening the subject with psychic dissolution” (p. 101)? Is it not true, as Amy Allen (2006) argues, that the Butlerian reduction of political resistance to the subversive repetition of the very norms one appropriates in order to acquire one’s intelligible identity and social recognizability is doomed to “a theatrical and political dead end,” because such reduction seems to equate political dissidence with “a form of social suicide” (p. 209)? That is, is it not true, as Catherine Mills (2000) claims, that the Butlerian performativity refers to “a form of pessimistic politics wherein the subject who would resist exposes itself to social death in doing so” (p. 265)?

5.3. Anxiety-Engendering Other

The intelligible subject cannot repeat the norms of sex, gender, ethnicity, religion, and race subversively to the point of de-calcifying and de-naturalizing the hegemonic regime of power/discourse without losing its intelligible identity and social recognizability—assuming that repeating the norms slightly differently from what is socially acceptable, cross-dressing now and then, for example, has no power to engender anxiety in the calcified and reified grid of cultural intelligibility. This does not mean, however, that Butler’s philosophy leads us to a politically dead end. Rather, it means that in the Butlerian framework, only the Other, the marginalized, that is, racial, sexual, ethnic, religious, and sectarian/confessional minorities, can engender anxiety in the calcified grid of cultural intelligibility. To wit, in the context of sexuality, for example,
not the cross-dresser as the otherwise intelligible subject, but “The phallicized dyke and the feminized fag,” “the lesbian femme who refuses men, the masculine gay man who challenges the presumptions of heterosexuality,” can de-reify and de-naturalize the hegemonic interpretation of norms (Butler 1993, p. 110). For the domain of the unintelligible is the “anxiety-producing field of gendered possibilities”; racial, sexual, ethnic, religious, and sectarian/confessional minorities are anxiety-engendering Others (Butler 2004a, p. 47).

Butler’s texts, I believe, are full of textual evidence that supports this reading. First of all, as we have already seen, the domain of the unintelligible, for Butler, does not refer to the domain of pre-cultural beings. Rather, the unintelligible, the marginalized, just like the intelligible, the socially-sanctioned, is a product of the grid of cultural intelligibility. That is to say, even the marginalized owes its identity to the repeated citation—however inappropriately it may be—of the norms of sex, gender, ethnicity, and race. To wit, the marginalized Other is not the absolute Other, the prediscursive revolutionary, the one which can take radical distance from its sedimented identity as to contest the hegemonic norms by subverting them voluntarily; but it is the one which is a product of the inappropriate repetitions of the norms of sex, gender, and race. Butler writes,

The question of what it is to be outside the norm poses a paradox for thinking, for if the norm renders the social field intelligible and normalizes that field for us, then being outside the norm is in some sense being defined still in relation to it. To be not quite masculine or not quite feminine is still to be understood exclusively in terms of one’s relationship to the “quite masculine” and the “quite feminine” (ibid., p. 42, emphasis mine).

As a result, racial, sexual, ethnic, religious, and sectarian/confessional minorities are the inappropriate appropriators of the grid of cultural intelligibility. They are what
Chantal Mouffe (2000) calls “friendly enemies.” They are “friends because they share a common symbolic space” with others, i.e., they are the products of the socio-historically shared world of a historical community; but they are also “enemies because they want to organize this common symbolic space in a different way,” i.e., they repeat the norms of their socio-historically shared world inappropriately and, thus, non-hegemonically (p. 13).

Secondly, since the boundaries of the domain of intelligibility are circumscribed by the abjection of the marginalized Other, only the re-inscription of the marginalized into the intelligible domain can engender anxiety in the grid of cultural intelligibility, can “haunt those boundaries as the persistent possibility of their disruption and rearticulation” (Butler 1993, p. 8). Butler writes, “That the category [of sex, gender, or race] is crafted in time, and that it works through excluding a wide range of minorities means that its rearticulation will begin precisely at the point where the excluded speak to and from such a category” (Butler 2004a, p. 13, emphasis mine). For the Other, by inappropriately appropriating the terms, norms, and conventions of the grid of cultural intelligibility, whose hegemonic articulation acquires its socially recognizable borders, and thereby its intelligible content, due to the marginalization of minorities, enacts a sort of “performative contradiction” in the domain of intelligible lives, i.e., messes with the borders and, hence, unquestioned intelligibility, of the intelligible domain (Butler 1997a, p. 91).

Therefore, not the intelligible subject which might repeat the norms slightly differently from what is socially acceptable, not the cross-dresser, but “the disruptive return of the excluded from within the very logic of the heterosexual symbolic,” can de-
reify and de-naturalize the hegemonic power/discourse (Butler 1993, p. 12). Accordingly, since the publication of *Gender Trouble*, Butler has emphasized over and over again that not drag but the transsexual as a constitutive outside of the domain of intelligible gendered identities is the main example of subversive sexual practices. In her 2004 *Undoing Gender*, for example, she describes her philosophical/political project by asking: “How is it that drag or, indeed, *much more than drag*, *transgender itself* enters into the political field (Butler 2004a, p. 217, emphasis mine)? The importance of this question lies in the fact that “transgendered lives,” as opposed to simple cross-dressing, “have a potential and actual impact on political life at its most fundamental level, that is, who counts as a human, and what norms govern the appearance of ‘real’ humanness” (ibid., p. 28). To wit, Butler is not concerned with the question of the intelligible subject’s ability to repeat the norms in *radically* subversive ways. Rather, her main concern is “to understand how what has been foreclosed or banished from the proper domain of ‘sex’ … might at once be produced as a troubling return” into the domain of intelligibility, i.e., as “the occasion for *a radical rearticulation of the symbolic horizon*” (Butler 1993, p. 23, emphasis mine). This is the reason why Butler writes, in her 1999 preface to *Gender Trouble*,

The discussion of drag that *Gender Trouble* offers to explain the constructed and performative dimension of gender is not precisely *an example* of subversion. It would be a mistake to take it as the paradigm of subversive action. … The point is rather different. If one thinks that one sees a man dressed as a woman or a woman dressed as a man, then one takes the first term of each of those perceptions as the “reality” of gender. … [I]f we shift the example from drag to transsexuality, then it is no longer possible to derive a judgment about stable anatomy from the clothes that cover and articulate the body. That body may be preoperative, transitional, or postoperative; even “seeing” the body may not answer the question: for what are the categories through which one sees? The moment in which one’s staid and usual perceptions fail, when one cannot with surety read the body that one sees, is precisely the moment when one is no longer sure whether the body encountered is that of a man or a woman (Butler 1999, pp. xxiii-xxiv).
As a result, only the marginalized Other, that is, racial, sexual, ethnic, religious, and sectarian/confessional minorities, who fail to repeat the norms of race, sex, ethnicity, and religion appropriately, who are thrown into the domain of social death in order to circumscribe the boundaries of the domain of intelligible race, sex, ethnicity, and religion, can engender anxiety in the calcified grid of cultural intelligibility. Only they can reveal to the socially-sanctioned subject, thanks to their disruptive return to the domain of intelligibility, the contingency, performativity, and culpability of its existence. Only they can disclose the existential fact that what is taken for granted, what is reified, including one’s very identity, acquires its semblance of reality, naturalness, and inevitability thanks to the citation of norms that are not of any subject’s own making and that can be cited differently from how they have been hegemonically cited in one’s familiar environment.

Accordingly, only the marginalized Other, the constitutive outside of the familiar world, can free the socially sanctioned subject from being lost within its calcified world, from turning into a social automaton, from being dragged into anonymity by the “dictatorship of the ‘they’,” by reminding it that the way in which one cites the terms, norms, and conventions is historically contingent, that the way in which one performs the norms of sex, gender, and race shapes one’s very identity, that is, the way in which one appropriates socially intelligible tools in order to construct one’s own self cannot be left to the discretion of the anonymous One. In other words, the marginalized Other is the anxiety-awakening Other; it is, put in Heidegger’s terminology, the conscience of the socially-sanctioned subject. It reminds the socially-sanctioned subject that it needs to be the ground of its own identity by citing the terms, norms, and conventions that are not of
its own making. Thus, it calls the socially-sanctioned subject to acknowledge its being guilty, to be “wanting to have a conscience,” to refuse to suppress its original complicity with its own subordination to the point of forgetting its anxiety-engendering contingency and performativity, and to embrace anxiety and face the burden of constructing itself as its own. This does not mean, however, that the one who confronts the burden of self-construction acquires the power to re-create one’s self from the ground up. But it means that the burdened subject comes face to face with the necessity of shaping its identity “within a highly rigid regulatory frame” without being able to transcend, once and for all, its sedimented identity through radical self-transformations.

Moreover, if it is true that the power of the norms of sex, gender, ethnicity, and race to determine what is livable and what is not, to force the subject to repeat the norms in question monolithically by threatening it with social death, and to compel the subject to repudiate certain possibilities in order not to lose its intelligible identity, as we have seen above, is performative, then the anxiety-engendering Other can also disempower the calcified regime of power/discourse. For the anxiety-engendering Other challenges, by repeating the norms inappropriately and by de-reifying the hegemonic interpretations, the calcified regime of power/discourse in such a way that the hegemonic culture loses its unquestioned authority to circumscribe the domain of intelligibility, to bring into existence what it interpellates, and to force the subject to monolithic repetition and abjection. In Butler’s words, inappropriate repetition “calls into question the monotheistic force of its [i.e. the norm’s] own unilateral operation” (Butler 1993, p. 122).

Hence, only the anxiety-engendering Other can free the subject from turning into a puppet of the calcified web of norms, assuming that “the capacity to develop a critical
relation to these norms presupposes a distance from them, an ability to suspend or defer
the need for them,” and that the said capacity and ability can be acquired if and only if
the monotheistic force of the hegemonic regime of power/discourse is loosened up by the
anxiety-engendering Other (Butler 2004a, p. 3). To wit, only the anxiety-engendering
Other “makes us see how realities to which we thought we are confined are not written in
stone” and, more importantly, makes us capable of repeating the norms of race, gender,
and sex differently as far and wide as possible without being exposed to the threat of
social death, psychosis, or identity-dissolution (ibid., p. 29). And assuming that “agency”
lies in “the possibility of a variation of that repetition,” only the anxiety-engendering
Other can endow the socially-sanctioned subject with its agency (Butler 1999, p. 198). In
other words, if the reified character of the grid of cultural intelligibility is not questioned
by those who are marginalized to calcify and reify the hegemonic culture, if the grid of
cultural intelligibility acquires the status of, say, the Lacanian Symbolic as the universal
structure of intelligibility, which is, in fact, nothing but “the sedimentation of social
practices,” then the hegemonic regime of power/discourse becomes “a limit to the social,
the subversive, the possibility of agency and change, a limit that we cling to,
symptomatically, as the final defeat of our own power” (Butler 2000a, pp. 19, 21).

As a result, the socially-sanctioned subject’s freedom, that is, its freedom from
being lost within the calcified grid of cultural intelligibility and freedom for repeating the
norms of sex, gender, and race differently, is dependent on the resuscitation of socially,
and sometimes literally, murdered minorities. In other words, only if the socially-
murdered Others are resuscitated in every sphere of life and given the ability to create
and re-create their sub-cultures and hardly recognized identities within the social domain,
may the socially-sanctioned subject be freed from the “dictatorship of the ‘they’” and learn to listen to its anxiety-engendering conscience. That is to say, only if the terms, norms, and conventions are forced by inappropriate repetitions to be more inclusive to the point of providing socially-murdered minorities with the possibility of social recognition, may the grid of cultural intelligibility be re-signified in such a way that not only the marginalized Other can live in it but also the socially-sanctioned subject can be freed from its inauthenticity. In the context of sexuality, this means the socially-sanctioned gendered subject’s freedom is dependent on “the cultural emergence of those ‘incoherent’ or ‘discontinuous’ gendered beings who appear to be persons but who fail to conform to the gendered norms of cultural intelligibility by which persons are defined” (Butler 1999, p. 23).

Thus, subversive repetition, i.e. the anxiety-awakening resurrection of inappropriate appropriators, is preferable to the conservation of the hegemonic interpretation of norms not for the sake of transcending those norms that are judged “bad,” and thereby “deserve to be subverted,” according to the dictates of some universal criteria (Allen 1998, p. 466), but also not, as Nancy Fraser (1995a) seems to assume, for the sake of valorizing “change for its own sake” due to the absence of ahistorical standards as to evaluate different regimes of power/discourse (p. 68). Rather, it is preferable for the sake of freedom, i.e., freedom from the calcification and reification of the web of norms, and, hence, freedom for repeating the norms differently as far and wide as possible.

In other words, just like Heidegger and Foucault, Butler believes that no social clearing, no nexus of power-knowledge, no grid of cultural intelligibility, is bad in itself.
For every web of norms is exclusionary, considering that the precondition of constructing an intelligible context of life and, thereby, intelligible lives is the abjection of what is regarded as unintelligible. As Vasterling (1999) puts it, “Constraint and enablement, exclusion and production are two sides of the same coin” (p. 31). But this does not mean that since Butler does not utilize a supposedly universal norm to pass judgments on the contents of various power/discourse regimes, she “surrenders the normative moment,” renounces all “the moral-theoretical resources,” and, accordingly, stays neutral before “the monotonous succession of infinite ‘power/knowledge’ complexes” (Benhabib 1995b, p. 114; Fraser 1995a, p. 69; Fraser 1995b, p. 162). For the only genuine stumbling-block on the way to freedom, for Butler, just like for Heidegger and Foucault, is the calcification and reification of the norms, not their contents—considering that if the norms are not de-reified and de-calcified through the resuscitation of inappropriate appropriators, even the slightest failure of and resistance to the hegemonic articulations of them become sufficient for one to lose one’s intelligible identity. That is to say, if the marginalized Other, the socially-murdered one, is not resuscitated, humans are forced to repeat the norms monolithically, imitatively, and mechanically in order not to lose their social recognizability and psychic integrity.

But how can the socially-murdered one be resuscitated? It can be resuscitated only if the socially-sanctioned subject embraces its guilt, only if it is “wanting to have a conscience,” only if it is ready for anxiety. That is, the anxiety-engendering Other can be resuscitated if and only if the socially-sanctioned subject is anxious and, thus, unwilling to suppress its anxiety-engendering contingency, performativity, and existential culpability. Hence, the socially-sanctioned subject must understand that its socially-
sanctioned identity does not refer to the unconcealment of its prediscursive essence, but to the sedimented effect of the citation of the terms, norms, and conventions that are not of its own making. It must understand that the way in which it cites the terms, norms, and conventions is historically contingent, and its identity is always dependent on such historically contingent social possibilities. That is to say, it must understand that it is neither self-identical nor self-transparent, because it is, *always already*, outside of itself.

Butler writes,

The infant enters the world given over from the start to a language and to a series of signs, broadly construed, that begin to structure an already operative mode of receptivity and demand. From this primary experience of *having been given over from the start*, an “I” subsequently emerges. And the “I,” regardless of its claims to mastery, will never get over having been given over from the start in this way (Butler 2005, p. 77).

However, having been given over from the start, being outside of oneself, that is, original complicity with subordination, in Butler’s account, is not limited to infancy, insofar as the subject, in order to become what it is and in order to give an account of itself, must *repeatedly* cite the historically contingent terms, norms, and conventions—those terms, norms, and conventions by which “we make ourselves intelligible to ourselves and to others” (ibid., p. 21). Hence, the subject is, *always already*, vulnerable to what is outside of itself. Butler claims, “Part of understanding the oppression of lives is precisely to understand that there is no way to argue away this condition of a primary vulnerability” (Butler 2004a, p. 24). In other words, for Butler, the acknowledgement of one’s original vulnerability and opacity to oneself might function as a foundation for a non-discriminatory ethics—“an ethics based on our shared, invariable, and partial blindness about ourselves” (Butler 2005, p. 41).
Butler asks, “If I find that, despite my best efforts, a certain opacity persists and I cannot make myself fully accountable to you, is this ethical failure? Or is it a failure that gives rise to another ethical disposition in the place of a full and satisfying notion of narrative accountability” (ibid., p. 40)? The importance of this question lies in the fact that only if the subject acknowledges its vulnerability, its anxiety-engendering culpability, its non-self-identical and non-self-transparent identity, can it avoid accusing the marginalized Other of failing to appropriate the hegemonic ways of citing the norms of sex, gender, ethnicity, and race as if they were natural and inevitable. Only then can it stop not only judging but also holding accountable the marginalized Other for its inappropriate appropriations. In Butler’s words, “An ability to affirm what is contingent and incoherent in oneself may allow one to affirm others who may or may not ‘mirror’ one’s own constitution” (ibid., p. 41). An ability to affirm what is anxiety-engendering in one’s own self might help one embrace the challenge that comes from the anxiety-awakening Other and its anxiety-awakening inappropriate appropriations. And to embrace the anxiety-awakening challenge, to be “wanting to have a conscience,” is to be willing “to learn to live in the anxiety of that challenge, to feel the surety of one’s epistemological and ontological anchor go, but [also] to be willing … to allow the human to become something other than what it is traditionally assumed to be,” to allow the dehumanized Other to be re-integrated into the domain of intelligibility to the point of re-structuring the parameters of what is human and what is not (Butler 2004a, p. 35).

As a result, the resuscitation of the anxiety-engendering Other, the dehumanized, depends on the anxious and conscientious socially-sanctioned subject. To wit, the anxiety-engendering Other’s freedom, i.e., its freedom from social death and freedom for
creating and re-creating itself as an intelligible, socially recognizable being, is dependent on the socially-sanctioned subject’s freedom, insofar as the free subject is the one which is not lost within its calcified world but the one which is “wanting to have a conscience,” the one which does not suppress its anxiety-engendering guilt by socially, or even literally, murdering minorities. Butler writes,

The person who threatens violence proceeds from the anxious and rigid belief that a sense of world and a sense of self will be radically undermined if such a being, uncategorizable, is permitted to live within the social world. The negation, through violence, of that body is a vain and violent effort to restore order, to renew the social world on the basis of intelligible gender, and to refuse the challenge to rethink that world as something other than natural or necessary (ibid., p. 34).

5.4. Authentic Solicitude

Therefore, the socially-sanctioned subject’s freedom is dependent on the anxiety-engendering Other’s freedom, and, conversely, the anxiety-engendering Other’s freedom is dependent on the socially-sanctioned subject’s freedom. In other words, one’s freedom is not a present-at-hand entity one can solipsistically possess, but it is always dependent on another’s freedom. As a result, it is the reciprocal relation between the socially-sanctioned subject and the anxiety-engendering Other that provides individuals with the possibility of freedom. But does this not mean that we are trapped in a circle here? It is important at this point to keep in mind, as Heidegger reminds us, that not every circle is “a vicious circle” (Heidegger 1962, p. 27). But how can we apply this particular insight of Heidegger into the issue at hand?

As we have seen above, for Butler, the domain of intelligibility is constituted by certain abjections, that is, by its constitutive outside. Similarly, the intelligible subjects of the domain of cultural intelligibility have to abject certain possibilities in order not only
to acquire but also to preserve their intelligible identities. That is to say, “no subject emerges without certain foreclosures,” and no subject is endowed with an intelligible identity without those “acts of differentiation that distinguish the subject from its constitutive outside” (Butler 1995a, p. 46, Butler 2000c, p. 148). Put differently, intelligible subjects are situated beings; and their situatedness refers not only to the fact that they are socialized into a particular life-world but also to the fact that they are constrained by what is foreclosed to them. Therefore, it would be utopic to expect the intelligible, socially-sanctioned subjects to re-create themselves from top to bottom, and to expect them to embrace any Other that challenges the boundaries of the very norms they appropriate in order to acquire their own boundaries.

But we should also keep in mind that the anxiety-engendering Other is neither a static nor a monolithic entity. Butler does not believe that the constitutive outside of the grid of cultural intelligibility has a unitary, ahistorical, and self-identical essence. Different matrices of cultural intelligibility have not only their peculiar Others but also their privileged Others. Some matrices, especially the dominantly religious ones, for example, privilege ethnic and racial minorities over religious and sexual minorities. Other matrices privilege a segment of sexual minorities such as homosexuals while being oblivious to the sufferings of transsexuals or racial/religious minority segments of sexual minorities. Yet other matrices privilege certain ethnic minorities over other ethnicities. In other words, some Others are less threatening to the domain of intelligibility; and, therefore, their resuscitation is more likely in a given grid of cultural intelligibility with respect to other minorities. Thus, the resuscitation of the privileged Others might free the socially-sanctioned subjects by de-reifying the hegemonic norms; and the socially-
sanctioned subjects, in turn, might learn to live even alongside the unprivileged Others without socially murdering them. Put differently, the resuscitation of the privileged Others might de-calcify and break the taken-for-grantedness of the hegemonic interpretation of the norms of sex, gender, race, and ethnicity, and thereby create the possibility of re-signifying the domain of cultural intelligibility and its unquestioned parameters of what is livable and what is not. And this possibility, in turn, might create another possibility—the possibility of re-integrating even the unprivileged Others into the domain of cultural intelligibility. For once “those frames that govern the relative and differential recognizability of lives come apart … it becomes possible to apprehend something about what or who is living but has not been generally ‘recognized’ as a life”; that is, it becomes possible to recognize life in what is unlivable (Butler 2010, p. 12).

This does not mean, however, that the non-vicious circular relation between the socially-sanctioned subject and the (un)privileged Other(s) will endow human beings with the possibility of freedom once and for all. For freedom is not a static entity one can possess. That is, just like the Heideggerian/Foucauldian understanding of freedom, the Butlerian freedom refers to Being-towards-freedom. More specifically, Butler believes, it is impossible to create a society in which there is no otherness, no marginalization, and no exclusion. For in order to create an intelligible public space and intelligible subjective positions, what is intelligible must be separated from what is unintelligible. Hence, exclusion is the sine qua non for inclusion—inclusion into the intelligible domain of life and into the socially recognizable possibilities of existence. This is the reason why Butler says, “inclusiveness is an ideal, an ideal that is impossible to realize”; “The ‘inclusion’ of all excluded possibilities would lead to psychosis, to a radically unlivable life,” because it
will destroy, *once and for all*, the difference between what is livable and what is not, what is intelligible and what is not (Butler & Laclau 2004, pp. 330, 331).

*Being-towards-freedom*, then, does not mean to get rid of all the norms of cultural intelligibility and their exclusionary effects. It does not mean to get rid of, *once and for all*, the boundaries of the norms of sex, gender, and race, and thereby embrace a sexless, genderless, and raceless life. But it also does not mean to appeal to those supposedly universal norms as to decide *conclusively* which exclusions are acceptable and which are not. Rather, *Being-towards-freedom* is to keep the non-viciously circular relation between the socially-sanctioned subject and the marginalized Other *open*. It is to realize that no decision regarding who or what will acquire the status of socially-sanctioned, marginalized, privileged, or unprivileged subjectivity cannot be given before the *process* of resuscitating minorities and, thereby, freeing the already-sanctioned subjects get started. Hence, *Being-towards-freedom* is to be ready for being *constantly* challenged by inappropriate appropriators, and to be ready for the *constant* re-signification of the borders of the grid of cultural intelligibility one is born into. That is to say, it is to embrace the *permanent* incompleteness of the ideal of inclusiveness. As Butler argues,

> there is no way to circumscribe in advance the form that an ideal of inclusiveness would take. This openness or incompleteness that constitutes the ideal of inclusion is precisely an effect of the unrealized status of what is or will be the content of what is to be included. In this sense, then, inclusion as an ideal must be constituted by its own impossibility; indeed, it must be committed to its own impossibility in order to proceed along the path of realization (ibid., p. 330).

Accordingly, the circle I have mentioned above refers neither to a vicious nor to a static circle; it rather refers to a *dynamic, unpredictable, and permanently incomplete* one. It refers to the *never-ending* process of the resuscitation of the marginalized Other(s) and, therefore, *never-ending* awakening of anxiety in the grid of cultural intelligibility. As a
result, only the socio-political commitment to resuscitate socially-murdered minorities—and such a commitment should always be understood as the commitment to the constant resuscitation of inappropriate appropriators, as constant subversive repetition—only the commitment to let/help socially-murdered minorities create and re-create their sub-cultures as socially recognizable, cultural products, that is, only the commitment to be conscientious, can bring freedom to human beings—be it socially-sanctioned or marginalized.

Put in Heidegger’s terminology, this means freedom may flourish among subjects only in an authentic society, a society of “authentic solicitude” or “authentic Being-with-one-another.” For Heidegger, there are three types of Being-with-one-another: a “deficient” type, a “leap-in” type, and a “leap-ahead” type. In the “deficient” version, one is indifferent to the other: “Being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, not ‘mattering’ to one another—these are possible ways of solicitude. And it is precisely these last-named deficient and Indifferent modes that characterize everyday, average Being-with-one-another” (Heidegger 1962, p. 158). In the “leap-in” version, on the other hand, one dominates and patronizes the other by leaping in for it, by relieving the other of its everyday concerns and existential anxiety. Heidegger writes, “In such solicitude the Other can become one who is dominated and dependent, even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him” (ibid.). Lastly, in the “leap-ahead” version, in authentic Being-with-one-another, one does not leap in to help the other lose itself in the “dictatorship of the ‘they’,” but it leaps ahead of the other in order to remind it of its contingency, performativity, and guilt, in order to reveal to it that it is the only ground of itself and, in order to become what it is, it has to cite the historically
contingent terms, norms, and conventions that are not of its own making. As Heidegger puts it, *leaping ahead* is to help “the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it” (ibid., p. 159). Hence, *leaping ahead* of the other is to become the *conscience* of one another. It is to call one another to acknowledge one’s existential guilt. It is to call one another to have a conscience and to be ready for anxiety. Thus, it is to free one another from being lost within the calcified world by unconcealing the contingent, performative, and culpable nature of human existence. As a result, only in an authentic society, in which socially constructed subjects free one another by *being conscientious* and by *being the conscience* of one another, is freedom a social possibility. That is to say, humans are free as long as they are the *subjects of conscience*.

Put in Butler’s terminology, only in a *radical democratic* society, in which the reified status of the hegemonic ways of citing the terms, norms, and conventions, whose boundaries are circumscribed through marginalizing a wide range of minorities, are challenged, transformed into “permanent site[s] of contest,” and forced to confess their contingent and performative character by “minority version[s] of sustaining [these] norms,” is freedom a social possibility (Butler 1993, p. 221; Butler 2004a, p. 3). Hence, only in an *agonistic* Being-with-one-another, thanks to which minorities are allowed to remind the socially-sanctioned subject of its original self-alienation, its opacity to itself, its existential guilt, by challenging the naturalized status of what is taken for granted, may human beings be endowed with the possibility of freedom. For only then the socially-sanctioned subject becomes able to re-create itself, i.e., to repeat the norms differently as far and wide as possible without suppressing its conscience by remaining oblivious to its self-alienation and self-opacity, and, thereby, acquires the ability to recognize the Other
and to acknowledge its conscience-awakening challenge. In Butler’s words, “my own opacity to myself occasions my capacity to confer a certain kind of recognition on others” (Butler 2005, p. 41).

As some of her commentators point out, Butler’s conception of radical democracy draws from that of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau (Lloyd 2007, p. 148; Lloyd 2009, pp. 33-4; Schippers 2009, p. 75-77; Webster 2000, pp. 14-15). Accordingly, reviewing Mouffe and Laclau’s conception of radical democracy might help us understand Butler’s better. For Mouffe and Laclau, every socio-political force endeavors to unify the socio-political sphere, to construct “the social” as “an objective and closed system of differences,” through the production of certain centers of meaning thanks to which various subjective positions may be defined, common senses may be established, and different social and political demands may find their grounds of intelligibility (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, p. 125). That is to say, for Mouffe and Laclau, the socio-political sphere as a unified whole is not naturally given but constructed through force relations; and no subjective position refers to the representation of a prediscursive identity, but to a socio-historically contingent, “discursive position” (ibid., p. 116). Moreover, in their view, every socio-political unity, every center of meaning, and every subjective position is not only “pierced by contingency” but also destined to be “incomplete” (ibid., p. 110). For “Every ‘society’ constitutes its own forms of rationality and intelligibility by dividing itself; that is, by expelling outside itself any surplus of meaning subverting it,” by abjecting its constitutive outside, by marginalizing what is constituted as unintelligible in order to draw the boundaries of what is intelligible (ibid., pp. 136-137). Therefore, no
social unity can manage to represent all the differences in a given society, and no subjective position can be the sole representative of that which it claims to represent.

Against this background, Mouffe and Laclau argue that “radical and plural democracy” demands the acknowledgement of every socio-political identity’s—including the racial, sexual, and religious ones and their constitutive outsides—autonomy, legitimacy, and right to construct its own hegemony without dehumanizing and delegitimizing it by appealing to the so-called order of things, course of nature, or to the supposedly unitary national, racial, or religious identity of a given society. That is, instead of eliminating or assimilating into the so-called natural/unitary whole what or who is constructed as the constitutive outside of the socio-political sphere, a radical democratic society should, as Mouffe (2005) puts it, acknowledge the ineradicable heterogeneity in the socio-political sphere and, therefore, take the marginalized identities, ways of life, and political ideologies to be holding the sites of “an adversary whose existence is legitimate and must be tolerated”—an adversary which challenges and contests the hegemonic ways of constructing the socio-political sphere, which competes legitimately with the hegemonic forces as to re-structure the socio-political arena, and which constantly exposes to light the socio-historically contingent character of what is naturalized by the hegemonic forces (p. 4). As a result, as Laclau (2000) writes, a radically democratic society is the “one which permanently shows the contingency of its own foundations” and “permanently keeps open the gap” between what is particular, on the one hand, and what is universalized at the expense of homogenizing what is heterogeneous, on the other (p. 86).
Similarly, in Butler’s view, a radical democratic society is the one in which universalized norms, terms, identity categories, subjective positions, and right claims are open to constant contestation by those who are excluded from the radius of the domain of intelligibility. Put differently, a radical democratic society is the one in which the boundaries of what is universalized by the hegemonic forces are open to never-ending re-significations. Hence, a radical democratic society “defers [its] realization permanently,” insofar as its contingent foundations are always vulnerable to being challenged by their constitutive outside (Butler 2000d, p. 268). Butler writes, in a radical democratic society, “The term ‘universality’ would have to be left permanently open, permanently contested, [and] permanently contingent, in order not to foreclose in advance future claims for inclusion” (Butler 1995a, p. 40-1). Such un-realizability, Butler argues, is not a stumbling block on the way to democracy or to universality. Rather, it is what is to be preserved for the sake of democracy, and what is to be utilized in constructing universals democratically:

To claim that the universal has not yet been articulated is to insist that the “not-yet” is proper to an understanding of the universal itself: that which remains “unrealized” by the universal constitutes it essentially. The universal begins to become articulated precisely through challenges to its existing formulation, and this challenge emerges from those who are not covered by it, who have no entitlement to occupy the place of the “who,” but who nevertheless demand that the universal as such ought to be inclusive of them. The excluded, in this sense, constitutes the contingent limit of universalization. And the universal … emerges as a postulated and open-ended ideal (Butler, 1996, p. 48).

Butler’s faith, as it were, in such ideal-ism is the reason why she rejects what she calls “easy multiculturalism” (Butler 2012, p. 4). That is, she problematizes the multiculturalist assumption that various communities with their already-intelligible subjects occupy a shared socio-political sphere, and that what needs to be done in the face of such cultural plurality and heterogeneity is to find “the right tools” for bringing these
communities together; that is, to utilize certain, supposedly universal, procedures to ensure the harmonious togetherness of different ethnic, racial, or sexual communities, and accordingly, to expand the existing boundaries of the norms of social recognition in such a way that the society will not be divided anymore into the socially-sanctioned and the marginalized (Butler 2010, p. 163). What this presupposition misses is that every shared socio-political sphere is necessarily based on certain exclusions, and that any supposedly universal procedure is, always already, grounded on a particular and necessarily exclusionary understanding of that which is to be universalized. Moreover, for Butler, the pretense to utilize universal, that is, power-free and prediscursive, procedures is “the most insidious ruse of power,” insofar as it covers up its ideological, particularistic, and exclusionary nature (Butler 1995a, p. 39). Butler writes, “To establish a set of norms that are beyond power or force is itself a powerful and forceful conceptual practice that sublimates, disguises, and extends its own power play through recourse to tropes of normative universality” (ibid.).

Accordingly, in Butler’s view, to construct a radically democratic society, what needs to be done is neither to establish certain, supposedly neutral, procedures in order to ensure “an ultimate fusion of all cultural horizons,” and thereby end every antagonism between different communities of the shared life-world, nor to assimilate the excluded into hegemonic culture by expanding the boundaries of the existing norms of social recognition—that is, neither “redomestication” nor “resubordination” (Butler 1997c, p. 269; Butler 2000b, p. 21). Rather, what needs to be done is to make sure that the possibility of challenging, contesting, and, thereby, re-signifying the existing norms of social recognition is never eradicated, and that the product of such challenges and
contestations is not the assimilation of the excluded but the never-ending “translation” of the different versions, including the minority versions, of the norms, terms, and identity categories into each other—in order to create “an opening towards alternative versions of universality that are wrought from the work of translation itself” (Butler 2000c, p. 179).

In Butler’s words,

The task that cultural differences sets for us is the articulation of universality through a difficult labor of translation, one in which the terms made to stand for one another are transformed in the process, and where the movement of that unanticipated transformation establishes the universal as that which is yet to be achieved and which, in order to resist domestication, may never be fully or finally achievable (Butler 1995b, pp. 130-131).

As a result, freedom as Being-towards-freedom is a social possibility only in a radical democratic society, in an authentic Being-with-one-another, in which the socially-sanctioned subject and the marginalized Other permanently relate to one another via the process of constant adversary, contestation, and translation, which leads to the social construction of individuals as subjects of conscience—that is, as conscientious and conscience-awakening beings, as the ones who embrace the never-ending challenge and the ones who never-endingly challenge.
CONCLUSION

Human beings are not free-floating, isolated, present-at-hand beings but worldly entities who are born and socialized into a particular life-world, into an historically contingent context of significations, into a web of norms that defines the parameters of what is intelligible and what is not, what is livable, thinkable, and sayable within the social domain and what is not. Hence, it is the web of norms that produces not only the domain of intelligible lives, discourses, and conducts but also the domain of unintelligible lives, marginalized discourses, and excluded ways of Being-in-the-world. Moreover, the domain of unintelligibility is the constitutive outside of the domain of intelligibility, insofar as it structures the contours of the intelligible domain, and insofar as the social construction of unintelligible ways of being, acting, and thinking is the sine qua non for drawing the boundaries of what is taken to be intelligible.

Humans become what they are by performing, appropriating, and internalizing the social roles and norms of their intelligible life-world. Moreover, since both the intelligible world and the intelligible norms this world offers acquire their intelligibility thanks to the marginalization of what is regarded as unintelligible, appropriating the intelligible norms of the life-world such as the norms of gender, sex, race, ethnicity, and religion means to abject what is excluded from the domain of intelligibility, what is constructed as unintelligible by the hegemonic interpretation of these norms. Accordingly, humans become what they are by appropriating certain historically
contingent norms in certain historically contingent ways at the expense of not appropriating the same norms in other, socio-historically unintelligible, ways. That is to say, humans acquire their intelligible identity thanks to the sedimentation of their performances, appropriations, and abjections.

Since humans are the sedimented effects of intelligible performances and abjections, since they acquire their intelligible subjectivity by performing certain norms in certain, socio-historically acceptable, ways, their individual identity refers to the exemplification of the hegemonic understanding of what it means to be, what it means to think, and what it means to act intelligibly. In their everyday lives, however, they, proximately and for the most part, lose their individuality within such exemplification, within the anonymity of conformism, within their calcified and reified life-world. They do not problematize the historically contingent norms of their life-world but take them for granted. Accordingly, they cover up their contingency, because they forget that they become who they are by being socialized into a historically contingent life-world. They cover up their performativity, because they forget that they acquire their intelligible identity thanks to performing certain norms in certain ways. And they cover up their original self-alienation, because they forget that they owe their very individuality to the appropriation of the norms that are not of their own making. Instead, they take the socio-historically contingent norms, terms, roles, and conventions of their life-world to be natural, ahistorical, and inevitable. They take their sexual, gendered, ethnic, or racial performances to be the unconcealments of their natural substance or ahistorical human essence. And thus, they take what is marginalized by the hegemonic interpretation of norms to be universally unintelligible.
Accordingly, in their everyday lives, humans forget that they have to make something of themselves by choosing to repeat certain norms in certain ways without having a natural or ahistorical guidance. They forget that they have to be the grounds of their identities without having the possibility of being the absolute grounds of themselves—insofar as the norms and social roles they choose to appropriate are not of their own making. That is, they do not take hold of themselves; and they do not embrace what is anxiety-engendering in their unquestioned lives, namely, their contingency, performativity, and original self-alienation. Hence, in their everyday lives, humans are neither authentic nor free, because they are lost within unquestioned and unproblematized ways of Being-in-the-world.

It is only anxiety, then, as the unconcealment of the contingency, performativity, and original self-alienation of human existence, that can free humans from being lost within reified and calcified ways of thinking, acting, and being, and for creating and re-creating themselves as their own without naturalizing what is socio-historically contingent and without reifying what is performative. For thanks to anxiety, the calcified life-world as the reified web of norms, together with the intelligible norms of this world, loses its unquestioned intelligibility. And accordingly, the residents of this world realize that the intelligible norms of their life-world are neither natural nor inevitable, that these norms do not force themselves upon human beings, but that humans themselves have to choose certain norms in order to acquire their intelligible identity and in order to write their intelligible life-story.

However, although anxiety is the cause of the collapse of the unquestioned intelligibility of the calcified life-world, although in this respect anxiety finds its source
outside the familiar context of life, it is not for that reason a mystical event that unconceals itself out of nowhere. Rather, anxiety is engendered by what is thrown into the margins of the intelligible domain of life, into the domain of unintelligibility. That is to say, anxiety is engendered by those who fail to appropriate the norms of sex, gender, race, ethnicity, and religion intelligibly, who owe their unintelligible identities to the inappropriate appropriation of these norms, who are thrown into the margins of society in order to draw the intelligible boundaries of the intelligible life-world. For the inappropriate appropriators of the life-world disclose the existential fact that the norms of sex, gender, race, ethnicity, and religion may be performed differently, that the hegemonic way of performing these norms is neither necessary nor natural. Hence, it is the inappropriate appropriators who engender anxiety in the unquestioned domain of intelligibility by de-reifying and de-calcifying the hegemonic articulation of the web of norms, within which humans, proximally and for the most part, lose themselves and thereby turn themselves into social automata, into the ones who passively receive and mechanically repeat what is handed down to them by the hegemonic understanding of what it means to be, what it means to think, and what it means to act intelligibly.

Therefore, only if the marginalized lives are re-integrated into the domain of intelligibility, only if socially-murdered/unintelligible sexual, racial, ethnic, religious, and sectarian/confessional minorities are resuscitated in every sphere of life and, thereby, the hegemonic ways of appropriating the norms of sex, gender, race, ethnicity, and religion are challenged by minority versions of sustaining these norms to the point of exposing to light the socio-historically contingent nature of the hegemonic articulation of the web of norms, is freedom a social possibility for human beings. Put differently, human existence
may be endowed with the possibility of freedom only in a society in which sexual, racial, ethnic, religious, and sectarian/confessional minorities are allowed/encouraged to create and re-create their sub-cultures and hardly recognized identities as intelligible, socially recognizable products, and thereby given the opportunity of re-structuring the domain of intelligibility by challenging the hegemonic articulation of it via the public appearance of their symbols, values, goals, ways of life, literature, experience, kinship relations, social and political institutions, philosophical and religious perspectives, and marginalized interpretations of what it means to lead an intelligible life. Such a society may be constructed with the aid of affirmative action policies, bilingual education, politicization of minority cultures, popularization of minority heritages through media, legalization of minority kinship relations, or what Iris Young (1990) calls “the principle of group representation.” Young writes,

a democratic public should provide mechanisms for the effective recognition and representation of the distinct voices and perspectives of those of its constituent groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged. Such group representation implies institutional mechanisms and public resources supporting (1) self-organization of group members so that they achieve collective empowerment and a reflective understanding of their collective experience and interests in the contexts of the society; (2) group analysis and group generation policy proposals in institutionalized contexts where decisionmakers are obliged to show that their deliberations have taken group perspectives into consideration; and (3) group veto power regarding specific policies that affect a group directly, such as reproductive rights policy for women, or land use policy for Indian reservations (p. 184).

This does not mean, however, that there is a universal way of resuscitating minorities. For every society has its own hegemonic articulation of the web of norms; and every hegemonic articulation has its own constitutive outside. That is, each society has its own exclusions and, therefore, its own ways of including what is excluded into the intelligible domain of life. Moreover, since it is impossible to construct an intelligible domain of life without at the same time constructing an unintelligible outside, every
attempt to resuscitate minorities, and, thereby, every attempt to re-structure the boundaries of the intelligible domain, is an attempt to create new minorities. This is the reason why the resuscitation of minorities does not refer to the commitment to eliminate, once and for all, each and every marginalization in a given society by appealing to supposedly universal standards that will help us create a life-world within which what is intelligible and what is unintelligible are one and the same, but to the constant readiness for re-integrating the marginalized segments of the society into the domain of intelligibility, and, accordingly, constant readiness for re-structuring the existing boundaries of the intelligible domain of life. Similarly, what we should understand by freedom is not the end-product of being exposed to certain anxiety-engendering minorities, but the permanent openness to the constant problematization of the hegemonic ways of Being-in-the-world. In this respect, one’s freedom does not refer to a present-at-hand entity one can possess, but to one’s being on the way, on the way of the never-ending problematization and never-ending self-(re)creation.

Hence, the only stumbling-block on the way to freedom is the monolithic conceptualization of the life-world and the monolithic conceptualization of Being-in-the-world. That is to say, it is the conservative blindness to the plurality and heterogeneity of the socio-historical existence that eliminates the possibility of freedom for human beings. For such blindness is responsible for the social, if not literal, murder of the marginalized segments of a given society, for the never-ending discrimination against minorities and never-ending unintelligibility, unrecognizability, and unlivability of the marginalized lives. Therefore, fighting for freedom and fighting against discrimination are two sides of the same coin.
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