Constructing a New Nationalism from Below: The Dalit Movement, Politics and Transnational Networking

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Constructing a New Nationalism from Below:
The Dalit Movement, Politics and Transnational Networking

by

Lisa A. Daily

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Liberal Arts
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Date of Approval:
May 22, 2009

Keywords: India, globalization, social movements, Exclusion, Bahujan Samaj Party

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Dedication

I'd like to dedicate this thesis to my family for all of their support, love, and patience.

I would especially like to name Sophie and Cody for their loyalty, understanding, and knowledge of when I was in need of a break.
Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge my family and friends for all of their support and patience. To my sister, Jamy, for cooking me meals, bringing me up when I was down, and constantly loving me. To my parents, Jim and Lauren, for love and always supporting my endeavors and whims. To those wonderful friends, both old and new, who have provided advice, entertainment, and the occasional questions about what I would actually do with my degree. Lastly, I would like to give endless thanks to my superb thesis committee—Mark Amen, James Cavendish and Bernd Reiter—for all of their direction, understanding, patience, advice, and dedication. I would also like to thank all the professors who have taught and guided me in my academic pursuits and the Humanities and Cultural Studies department, especially Dr. Daniel Belgrad, for employing me and having faith in my teaching skills. I am honored to have been able to work with all of you.
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ABSTRACT

This research examines one potential route for sub-national social movements to alter preexisting contemporary nationalisms- the transnational social movement network. When social movements “go global” they move beyond the nation where they are typically excluded from the national project and instead, become members of an alternative and inclusive transnational project. What social movements do at this level is not under examination here, but rather how they go about returning to their respective nations and challenging the hegemonic national project. Does the transnational site impact the success of sub-national social movements? Is a movement more likely to achieve its goals and experience inclusion into the national identity due to transnational networking? One key assumption of this research is that on a global and national level there exist projects which seek to include some citizens or groups while excluding others. These divisions are paralleled to racial divides according to Anthony Marx (1998).

The Dalit movement in India serves as an exploratory case study due to its sub-national roots and transnational mobilization, and the racialized and exclusionary
practices of the caste structure. Dalits, previously known as “Untouchables,” are relegated to the lowest position below the caste hierarchy where they witness discrimination primarily through violence and a lack of access to resources. The movement has gone global, but then returned to India where it seeks to hold states accountable. It has also sought inclusion through political means, forming its own political party—the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)—in 1984.

This research traces the global route of one Dalit movement organization, the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR), but then tests the success of Dalit inclusion by examining one internal indicator—the electoral results of the Bahujan Samaj Party. The electoral results where taken from a pre-global (1995-1999) and a post-global (2002-2009) period. Findings demonstrate that over time the BSP has significantly increased its participation in elections and slightly increased its success-rate at achieving elected positions. While the Dalit movement continues to experience some degree of success at both the national and state levels, they have not yet been fully integrated into India’s national project.
Chapter One

Introduction and Organization

The manner in which nationalism is influencing nation-states and elites is changing in an era of globalization. Scholars are, thus, responding to claims about nationalism and globalization by re-examining the meaning and status of nationalism. Some scholars argue that nationalism is becoming irrelevant while others suggest its importance has increased. There, most certainly, is not a consensus on the current state of nationalism with the exception of the broad opinion that something is changing (Delanty 2008; Archer et al. 2007; Hearn 2006; Kaldor 2004; Kennedy 2001; Newman 2000). On a large scale, this project address the lack of consensus by suggesting an alternative- the need for an analysis of post-modern nationalism as seen from below, to examine if the changes in nationalism may be affected by the masses, particularly sub-national social movements.

The exclusive nature of many national projects may, in turn, shape those very people who are excluded into an alternative inclusive community-one which then contests its own exclusion from the nation. One possible alternative inclusive community is beyond the local or national level, but rather may be found at the global level of transnational social movement networks. These networks act as sites of global inclusivity, gathering people from around the world who share grievances. Yet, as Ruth
Retain (2007) points out, going global is most effective when those social movements which left the nation for the global then return to the nation to seek change from within.

The exclusion of certain people and citizens from the central nation—whether through ideology, religion, or access to resources such as education and the market—demonstrates most concretely why certain groups rise up to challenge and change aspects of their nations, states, and/or communities. Nationalism is most often thought of as a top-down creation; by below, I reference citizens and non-governmental organizations which are not considered elite or associated with the government. The possible increasing success and recognition of sub-national movements, as noted in scholarly literature, which participate in the transnational social movement network hint at changes and challenges to previously established nationalisms as well as policies, traditions and cultural norms.

Similar to the contemporary debate over nationalism and globalization, the very definition of nationalism is incongruous. For the purposes of this paper, I recognize nationalism as an ideology defined by both Anthony Smith and Benedict Anderson. Anthony D. Smith (1998) defines nationalism as: “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a human population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (256). Smith asserts that nationalism is, “the most ubiquitous and enduring phenomenon in the modern world, the ideological movement and symbolic structure with the greatest staying power, one that always appears, as it were, to be waiting in the wings for its opportunity to emerge, in the chaos of conflict and disintegration that attends the fall of states and empires” (258). Smith understands Benedict Anderson's (1991) perspective on nation and nationalism as
an “imagined community.”

Anderson defines nation as “an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (6). He considers it imagined because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (6). Anderson's definition is comparable to Hobsbawm's (1990), who calls nationalism an “invented tradition.” These definitions point out the social construction of nationalism as opposed to some sort of naturally-occurring national collective identity.

In its creation, as historically done by states and elites, people are either included or excluded, often among racial divides (Marx 1998). These excluded groups and their potential for affecting changes to previously established nationalisms are what will be studied in this research project.

The Dalit movement of India, based around Dalit rights for equality and inclusion, serve as a case study for this project. Dalits (“broken people”) are formerly known as “untouchables,” and the lowest members of the “backward castes” within the Hindu caste system. They are a group of people who have historically been denied participation in India's national identity and access to vital resources such as water, food, housing, education, and the economy. Modern India has between 160 million and 170 million Dalits out of its total population of about 1,147,995,904 (2008 census). Today Dalits directly challenge the discriminatory practices embedded in India's structure often relying on previously unenforced Indian law. The Indian Constitution of 1950 declares casteism as wrong; this was later reinforced with the 1989 Prevention of Atrocities Act.

Dalit exclusion is demonstrated in the statements and literature of the movement,
its goals and actions, large-scale human rights organizations, and previous scholarly research. There is currently, however, no work looking at the potential influence of sub-national movements which go “global” to transnational social movements and their impact on nationalism. The Dalit movement has followed this path from the local to the national and then to the global, but has remained rooted in the need for change within the nation and state. Some research has been done on the Dalit movement as it goes global, but few scholars have sought to see what then happens when Dalits return to the nation in order to challenge their own inclusion. For this reason, it seems necessary for an exploratory case study analysis.

There is not as yet a direct causal relationship between social movements, globalization and nationalism. For instance, it is possible that other sub-national movements which do not go global also impact a given national project. This project is not arguing that changes in nationalism are only due to global activism among social movements. It is merely one avenue in need of exploration when seeking an understanding of the current status of nationalism and its potential for change from below.

Therefore, I ask are sub-national social movements who “go global” by participating in the transnational social movement network successful at then returning to their nation and effectively challenging the previously understood national identity? Are they more successful than prior to “going global”? The purpose of my research project on the Dalit case is threefold. I examine if, in fact, the movement is challenging nationalism, if it is successful, and if it is more likely to be successful due to the processes of globalization. Globalization is operationalized through only one aspect-the
transnational social movement network, particularly movement participation in the 2001 UN World Conference against Racism (WCAR) held in Durban, South Africa and the World Social Forum since 2001.

I hypothesize that contemporary sub-national social movements are more likely to experience success at either challenging their own exclusion or in achieving an increased level of national inclusivity after participating in the transnational social movement network. This is in comparison to movement success prior to going global. I test this hypothesis by conducting a comparison of pre- and post- transnational social movement participation in the Dalit movement case. Measures of success rely on two crucial indicators- one which monitors the internal national and state-based success of the movement and one which follows the movement to the transnational public sphere. These indicators provide insight into the Dalit movement presence at both the global and the local levels.

Internal success is analyzed through electoral results of the Dalit-based political party, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), in comparison to the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party. Although the BSP is a political party, it has emerged from the Dalit movement and remains connected through affiliations, shared goals, grievances, and a collective identity. The success of the external indicator of transnational networking is not under review here. Sufficient scholarship and movement data provide adequate support that this has indeed been beneficial to the movement. Instead, this thesis studies the internal indicator both prior to and after the movement went global.

Transnational forums, such as the World Social Forum (WSF) and the UN World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) act as sites for alternative collective identities,
networking, collaboration and also, negotiation and contention among its participants. These forums consist mostly of sub-national movements made up of groups which are excluded from their national policy, politics, and identity. These groups “go global” to the transnational level, but then as Ruth Reitan (2007) in *Global Activism* notes, they return to the local and national level to affect change.

**Theoretical Framework**

Several theoretical frameworks provide an understanding of the reflexive relationships among nationalism, globalization from below and social movements. Antonio Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony grounds this research in order to reiterate how a dominant discourse is used to subvert other, less powerful or mainstream ideas, beliefs, and identities. Nationalism prevails as the hegemonic whereas excluded groups are subverted. Yet, if these subversive, excluded groups gain recognition and support they may quickly get appropriated into the hegemonic. This is why they may be successful at altering nationalism. The Bahujan Samaj Party is officially recognized as a national political party in India and risks this very appropriation opting for political power instead of activism.

Gramsci highlights a vital aspect of the social interactions which exist in this case study. A central concern for social movements, whether sub-national or transnational, is a battle not only over ideology, politics and culture, but the power to effectively enforce or change the status quo. Power can be enacted through forceful rule as Max Weber believes or through the subtle acts of hegemony. Although violence is often involved in imposing the caste-ranking and position of the Dalits, it has most effectively been ingrained in the citizens of India very slowly over time through religion and then
Regarding the Dalit movement, Gramsci’s theory predicts that as the movement grows and the Dalit-based party, the Bahujan Samaj Party, increases in popularity the movement risks appropriation and the loss of authenticity. Nicolas Jaoul’s (2007) “Political and 'Non-Political' Means in the Dalit Movement,” is particularly concerned with this risk calling the attainment of political power “a potential trap for an authentic people's movement” (191). In part, this concern is subverted by the Dalit movement's refusal to become a part of the contemporary Bahujan Samaj Party. Rather, it opts to unofficially support the party and only officially support BSP candidates as they run for office.

Gramsci heavily influences Althusser (1970) who distinguishes between repressive state apparatuses and ideological state apparatuses and points out the seemingly naturalness of ideology, as is the case with nationalism. This theory supports claims in social movement analysis about center and periphery (Vanden 2004). The Dalit movement is most certainly on the ideological periphery of Indian values and norms.

Mark Rupert (2003), in “Globalising common sense: a Marxian-Gramscian (re-)vision of the politics of governance/resistance,” suggests that a Marxian-Gramscian interpretation is needed when studying globalization and modern international relations. He writes, “Gramsci’s rich if eternally inchoate legacy suggests a conceptual vocabulary for a transformative politics in which a variety of anticapitalist movements might coalesce in order to produce any number of future possible worlds whose very possibility is occluded by capitalism” (181). He is referencing the World Social Forum’s motto of “another world is possible.” More directly, Harry E. Vanden (2007), in “Social
Movements, Hegemony, and New Forms of Resistance,” studies social movements in Latin America and considers whether or not they are “coming together in a new cycle of subaltern actions that can break down the hegemony historically exercised” (17). Other scholars (Lash 2007), however, argue that alternative concepts need to be produced because “power now...is largely post-hegemonic” (55). Yet, this claim comes with additional contestation from another scholar (Johnson 2007) in “Post-Hegemony?: I Don't Think So.” The current debate about the relevance of Gramsci's hegemony is not of central concern for this thesis.

Rather, Gramsci's theory is examined by first tracing what the hegemonic and subversive entail in the case study of the Dalit movement. As already mentioned, the Dalit movement and even the Dalit-based Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) are the subversive group while Hindu nationalism and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are clearly the hegemonic. This project does not test what the hegemonic in India is but rather, provides an account of what it looks like, does and believes as a way to effectively demonstrate what the Dalit movement struggles against and seeks to change.

Other important ideas and theories regarding nationalism, social movements, and globalization are analyzed in an interdisciplinary literature review that follows this chapter. Specifically, Anthony Marx (1998) in, Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, The United States, and Brazil, notes the importance of inclusion and exclusion in national projects and how it is most often constructed around race. It is inevitable and yet, those who are excluded are often more likely to collectively identify and put forth a movement to not only change policy but change the social construction of who is excluded and who is not. Marx writes, “state-imposed exclusion of a specified
internal group, used to reinforce the allegiance and unity of a core constituency, may be a more pervasive pattern” and that “indeed, nation-states have often been based on such exclusion, not only according to race, but also ethnicity, class, and other cleavages” (25).

Lastly, an understanding of space, both the global and local, is necessary. Bullen and Whitehead (2005) declare that the “changing spatial emphasis has in turn exposed a whole range of citizens and modes of radical/alternative citizenship forged around issues of gender, sexuality, ethnicity, age, class and religion, which had previously been excluded” (500). Globalization scholarship currently examines this “changing spatial emphasis” and how space may be loosing its connection to place. Lauren Langman (2001) refers to the “compression of space, time and distance associated with globalization” (196). The Dalit movement goes beyond the place of the nation to a transnational space as a way to develop inclusive networks which better prepare them to return to the nation and witness increased inclusion.

**Research Methodology**

The Dalit movement in India serves as an exploratory case study to determine whether or not there is sufficient evidence to support the assumptions and hypothesis of this project. Robert K. Yin (2003) states, “the case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, but when relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated” (7). For this research to be possible large concepts, such as nationalism, have been restricted. For instance, although nationalism and its changes may be monitored through cultural media this research only focuses on nationalism as a political entity.

I look at what hegemony looks like in India and then the alternative projection by the Dalit movement as seen in Bahujan Samaj Party election results. Is contemporary
Indian nationalism remaining static, moving closer to the movement's vision, or shifting to a renewed assertion of traditional values as Smith (1999) argues?

Regarding the effectiveness of transnational social movement participation by sub-national social movements, I try to answer what is accomplished by going global, what strategies and networking tools are gained, what international attention the social movement's cause receives, and how the movement reflects all of this in its literature and action.

By analyzing a social movement both before it went global and after and then charting any political changes pertaining to it or the excluded groups it represents, I may have enough information to support my hypothesis and generate suggestions for future research. I will focus on political success as witnessed by the inclusion of excluded groups into the political sphere. Since nationalism is a dynamic construction, there will most likely not be a clear method for determining the link between the politics and the national ideology. For instance, policy in India already dictates equality among its citizens. However, these laws are not enforced nor are they a part of the national identity and ideology. Yet, “elections matter to a very large sector of Indians. It is a matter of life and death to them...and despite all apparitions the elections do reflect the choices of the people” (interview with Professor Ashistani on NPR’s Morning Edition (April 15, 2009).

Because “success” can be examined in a variety of ways, I focus on political and policy-oriented success. William Gamson's model for analyzing success (1990) is recognized although it has not proven very helpful in actually determining movement “success.” Gamson (1990) provides a sociological perspective on how to go about measuring success and defining a “challenge period.” If it were not for the reliance on
political party results, Gamson’s model may be more useful here. According to Gamson (1990: 30-1), success is achieved when the “challenging group ceases to exist as a formal entity,” when it either dissolves or stops actively mobilizing, or lastly, when it is accepted by its “major antagonists…as a valid spokesman.”

For this case study, Gamson’s last point is most relevant. The Dalit movement and several of its ever-expanding organizations are internationally recognized and supported. Yet, the movement has still not “achieved success”; perhaps it has achieved some success, but as a whole it still deals with many inequalities, injustices and forms of exclusion on local, state, national and global level. There is a disconnect between the organizations of the movement and even a political party as valid spokesman and what the lived reality of (mostly rural) Dalits is like.

Ruth Reitan(2007), in Global Activism, draws connections between the sub-national (local) and transnational (global) levels of social movements and demonstrates the reflexivity between the two levels. Her model begins with “localized action” against “trigger events” of neoliberal policy. After localized action is initiated the next phase for a movement is in the realization of the need to go global. Once this has been achieved, frames and claims tend to shift, bringing about heightened solidarity among the movement and other movements with similar grievances. Solidarity is fully actualized when movements have “coordinated transnational action.” But, Reitan then notes the importance of those movements to return to localized action where their actions will have a larger impact. This process of starting local, going global, and then returning to the local is exactly what is traced with the Dalit movement. As stated earlier, the argument for this route is not viewed as the only possible answer to why nationalism is changing.
Alternatively, this is viewed as one conceivable avenue that needs to be further explored.

In the case of India, I examine the dominant Hindu nationalism against the challenging Dalit movement. My hypothesis is operationalized and tested by examining the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), the Dalit-based political party. I also, however, monitor the results of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Hindu nationalist party. This is the clearest manifestation between the traditional Indian nationalism as opposed to the Dalit movement's new vision for the Indian nation and identity. Electoral data on both the BSP and BJP are gathered on a state-by-state basis for two key periods: pre-global movement activity (1995-1999) and post-global movement activity (2002-2009). The “moment” of going global for the Dalit movement is between 2000 and 2001. This is the most recognized period of transnational activism as the movement participated in two legitimate and established forums- the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism held in Durban and the 2001 World Social Forum held in Porto Alegre.

Election results come from the Election Commission of India (www.eci.gov.in) and are compiled from India's 28 states. For a variety of reasons, however, only 16 of these states have sufficient data to analyze. These results, however, alone are not necessarily enough to claim that the movement and the BSP are successful. Other statistics have also been gathered to provide a broader perspective of Indian nationalism, the plight of excluded groups, and the actions of social movements. When surveyed with various other facets, such as relevant scholarship and research, news coverage, and analysis of movement websites, it seems plausible to assert that the BSP and the Dalit movement are progressing very slowly.

The collected data includes: the election year, BJP contesting seats, BJP wins,
BSP contesting seats, BSP wins, total seats, and the overall winning party. Once the data are compiled from multiple elections per state in the form of a spreadsheet, a comparison can be done between the pre and post-global periods and monitor changes that are occurring with the BSP and BJP. Even small changes in the Bahujan Samaj Party electoral results warrant a notable shift either in favor of or potentially against the Dalit cause.
Chapter Two

Literature Review

Since many of the terms in this paper stem from scholarly debates, contestations and negotiations, it seems necessary to define key concepts which, in turn, place my own perspective within (or against) the framework of previous theorists. I will clearly define terms such as: nation, nationalism, the state, and globalization. I’d also like to clarify an understanding of social movements, nationalism, the transnational social movement network, and lastly, how race impacts inclusion or exclusion.

Nationalism is recognized as an ideology as defined by both Anthony Smith and Benedict Anderson. All social movements are not considered a threat to nationalism, but instead some are seen as attempting to change the ideology of a particular constructed nationalism. Like revolution, certain social movements are trying to change what it means to be included or excluded from a national project and identity. Nick Crossley (2002), in Making Sense of Social Movements, examines social movement theory and practice, stressing the importance of contestation as a strategy for change. Furthermore, he writes:

social movements are in effect, natural experiments in power, legitimation and democracy. Their existence, successes, failures and more generally their dynamics, though all incredibly difficult to read and interpret, allow us to gauge the workings of the broader political structures of our society” (9).
Crossley establishes the value (and difficulty) in analyzing social movements as a broader way to examine a society's struggle over power, structures and identity.

Anthony Marx (1998) in, Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, The United States, and Brazil, notes the importance of inclusion and exclusion in national projects. It is inevitable and yet, those who are excluded are often more likely to collectively identify and put forth a movement to not only change policy but change the social construction of who is excluded and who is not. Marx writes, “state-imposed exclusion of a specified internal group, used to reinforce the allegiance and unity of a core constituency, may be a more pervasive pattern” and that “indeed, nation-states have often been based on such exclusion, not only according to race, but also ethnicity, class, and other cleavages” (25). Marx provides insight into the exclusion of some by the nation-state and national projects by declaring that states make race and not the other way around. Race is used as a way to determine inclusion and exclusion as mandated by elites; it is applicable to this study as caste discrimination is, at least in part, a form of racial discrimination. In the case of discrimination against Dalits there is a clear urban-rural divide and a state-by-state division.

The state is defined as: a geographic territory with internationally recognized boundaries; an internationally recognized and identifiable population that lives within those boundaries; and an internationally recognized authority structure or government (Duncan et al. 2006, 70). This is a fairly basic definition that leaves out the political and philosophical debates on the creation and justification for the modern state system. While most political philosophers, such as Marx, Weber, Hobbes, and Locke, have input on the meaning of the state, I find Weber's definition also useful. He connects violence
and force to states, supporting Trotsky's remark that “every state is based on force” (qtd. in *Politics as Vocation*, 33). Weber continues by claiming that the modern state “is the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the *monopoly of legitimate physical violence* within a particular territory- and this idea of 'territory' is an essential defining feature” (33). This then leads to the role of power and who has it which reinforces the power structures of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony.

A clear understanding of globalization also seems necessary in this study. Jan Aart Scholte (2005) describes globalization as: “a shift in the nature of social space caused by the spread of transplanetary and supraterриториal connections between people- particularly to the extent that physical space becomes obsolete or much less of a barrier to social connections in the past” (59). Scholte defines keywords, *transplanetary* and *supraterриториal*, as connecting to space. *Transplanetary* is thought of as being “across the planet” (61). In this, territoriality still exists and matters, but it goes beyond international relations. *Supraterриториal* is considered to “transcend territorial geography;” it is “delinked” from actual territories without any constraint on space (61). I use this definition of globalization for its reliance on social connections and space. For instance, the UN World Conference on Racism could be considered an example of a newly emerging transplanetary space which has an important role in national policy and identity constructions against racism and other forms of exclusion. Yet, this space is still very much connected to local places when sub-national social movements return to the national or local level to implement change.
Nationalism as Either-Or Constructions

One area of nationalism scholarship needs to be discussed due to the complex relationship between the Dalit movement, the caste structure, Hindu nationalism and modern anti-discrimination policy. Past debates over nationalism focused around either-or constructions. Is nationalism civic-based or ethnic-based? Most current scholars (Walker 2003; Ozkirimli 2005) argue that instead of these exclusive claims there is a middle-ground.

Umut Ozkirimli (2005), in *Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A Critical Engagement*, discusses the ethnic versus civic forms of nationalism. Civic nationalism, he writes, is “a shared commitment to the public institutions of the state and civil society” (23). Ozkirimli quotes Ignatieff as arguing that civic nationalism “maintains that the nation should be composed of all those—regardless of race, color, creed, gender, language or ethnicity—who subscribe to the nation's political creed” (23). Ozkirimli continues by describing ethnic nationalism as “a contrast” which “emphasizes common descent and cultural sameness” (23). Civic nationalism is believed to be inclusive, while ethnic nationalism is thought of as exclusive.

It is not quite this easy, however. Ozkirimli continues by pointing out the problematic nature of these two typologies:

since all nations lay claim to a unique place in history and to certain boundaries, all national identities are exclusionary. In that sense, all nations are ethnic nations (24).

Similarly, he debunks civic nationalism for its “oxymoronic quality,” quoting Laitin (2001):

the term 'nation' connotes a community into which a person is born, while
the term 'civic' connotes a community to which a person belongs by choice or common belief. And if the common belief is of putative common ancestry, or if the choice is to believe in common ancestry, is the national idea still civic? (qtd in Ozkirimli 24).

Ozkirimli concludes on the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalisms by calling them “bogus, both in theory and in practice” (28). Instead, one should view the civic-ethnic constructions on a linear scale with degrees of synthesis between the two.

Regarding Indian nationalism, this idea maintains credibility. Historically, Indian nationalism is more ethnic than civic, being structured on caste hierarchies. Bannerji (2006), in “Making India Hindu and Male,” argues that Indian nationalism is completely constructed on the premise of Hinduism. He, however, further elaborates that “Hindu” means the Hindu right of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). He asserts that the BJP promotes “aggressive masculinity and organized violence” as an attempt to construct and maintain the national space. Lower castes and non-Hindu religions thus are left with the option to flee, conform, or fight back.

Rogers Brubaker (2004), in Ethnicity without Groups, also comments on the ethnic-civic distinction, noting their ambiguities and concluding that one can not continue to see them as “mutually exclusive” (139). He argues for an alternative: the state-framed or counter-framed forms of nationalism. He recognizes the “state-framed” mode to conceive of nation as “congruent with the state,” while the “counter-state” mode thinks of nation as an “imagined...distinct form, and often in opposition to, the territorial and institutional frame of an existing state or states” (144). This alternative theory is supported by the case of India and the Dalit movement.

Lastly on this topic, Stephen Shulman's (2002) article on “Challenging the
Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of Nationalism” is useful. It references Hans Kohn's (1944) ideas of West/East divisions and connects them with civic/ethnic divisions. Shulman tests the appropriateness of these connections of Civic/West and Ethnic/East by completing survey data on 15 countries. Overall, he concludes that “Western civic nations are more ethnic than is usually recognized, and Eastern ethnic nations are more civic” (554-5).

All of these often-conceived oppositional nationalisms connect with one another upon closer analysis. This is also true of the political or cultural forms of nationalism. None can be envisioned without the other. While I recognize the importance of understanding the previous frameworks constructed regarding nationalism, it seems unnecessary dialogue when trying to understand the concrete ways in which nationalism is produced and challenged from below and how the transnational arena affects the outcomes in individual movements and nations.

Having said that, I agree with the recent conclusions by many scholars that there is not an either-or form of nationalism; rather, I see the complexity of nationalism in the permeable ways it is imagined, invented, projected and challenged. Politics or culture, civic or ethnic, West or East, polis or cosmopolis are not fixed boundaries but instead shape one another and can be thought of as a continuum of more political or more cultural, more civic or more ethnic, but never one or the other. Gerard Delanty (2008) in his review of Jonathan Hearn's Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, reiterates some of these points: “nationalism can be many things at once—a feeling or consciousness, identity, an idea or movement and process...nationalism [is] multifaceted” (399).

Della Porta et al. (2005) discuss the need for alternative conceptions of politics
and the necessary balance between dichotomies such as polis and cosmopolis. She asserts the need for politics to become congruous with the public and the masses. She writes, “the search for the polis, which political parties and institutions are accused of betraying, is expressed as the need for the public to reclaim political activity, stressing participation and attempting to construct values and identities (as opposed to administrating the existent)” (213). This is exactly what the Dalit movement is attempting to do. The entry into national politics seems necessary to reframe nationalism since it is most often a part of a national project constructed by political institutions and elites in order to maintain control over citizenship and inclusion. When considering the Dalit movement it is necessary, however, to link the nationalism debates with race and nation.

**Race and Nation(ality)**

When analyzing nation and nationalism, one important form of the categorization of who is included and who is not is a racial or ethnic division. I've already remarked on Anthony Marx's ideas on race, nation and ethnic nationalisms, but have not yet fully examined this perspective of race in relation to nation-making. The connection between race and nation is important for this study as I am only looking at a movement which has participated in the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism. Marx's book, *Making Race and Nation* (1998), provides a theoretical perspective on the invention of race and inclusion/exclusion. Other authors provide variations of these ideas or propose something different. For instance, Guibernau's (1996) ideas, in *Nationalisms*, seem to correspond with Marx's. He states, “race is a way of naming the difference between members of a particular collectivity and the 'other', 'the alien'. Race establishes a
boundary” (85) between those included in a given national project and those considered on the periphery.

The social construction of race as well as the inclusion/exclusion division is supported by Omi and Winant (1986). Although their work focuses on the United States, it relates to racial formation across boundaries and borders. They claim that race is socially constructed and that this then constructs racial categories and identities which are constantly “formed, transformed, destroyed and re-formed” (61). They continue by stating that what they call “racial formation” refers to “the process by which social, economic, and political forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by racial means.” (61-2). The history of the Dalits as a group have most certainly been altered and transformed by Indian society as well as the lengthy period of colonization.

Numerous scholars argue, as they do with respect to nationalism, that there is an increase or decrease in racialization along discriminatory national lines. Harrison (2005) states, “political, social, and economic human rights violations-and the inequalities in power and resources that permit them-appear to be on the rise” (10). Harrison supports the structural violence claim as seen by Reitan (2007) because of a noted increase in both hegemonic discrimination and social movements opposing it (and the neoliberal order). While I support many of the arguments by these scholar-activists, I disagree with them on the stance of nationalism. They support Jonathan Friedman's (1994) claim that nationalism is in a crisis and is weakening due to the “outcome of cultural processes that global economic forces engender” (13). The articles in this collection stress the need for a reanalysis of power and who has access to it. They also stress the importance of
recognizing divisions among the “isms” of sex/gender, race (and caste), and class.

Anthony D. Smith (1995), in Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, states that there is a contemporary and global risk for the resurgence of ethnic conflict and nationalism. He writes, “in the era of globalization and transcendence, we find ourselves caught in a maelstrom of conflicts over political identities and ethnic fragmentation” (2). He notes that there is an increased break-down of the “homogenous nation” where national identities are becoming fragmented, hybridized, and less structured. The Dalit movement exemplifies this; as it become less excluded and more included there is an increase in discrimination and violence to reassert exclusion. Similar to Islamic fundamentalism, the Hindu nationalists are trying to retain cultural and political traditions of caste hierarchy.

Other authors look at the specific cases of race and nation. Fredrickson (1997) traces racism as national projects in the United States and South Africa through a comparative historical method. He also looks at how social movements in both areas have served to alter, even if very slowly, the racist policy which may be construed as a part of the national projects of inclusion and exclusion. Similarly, Spickard (2005), in Race and Nation, connects race and ethnicity to the nation. Through a collection of essays, Spickard examines how ethnic systems are constructed and maintained. While I understand that this is not the focus of Spickard, he pays more attention to race than to the conjunctions between national projects and racial projects. However, this book is successful in providing concrete examples of racial systems in the modern era and hint, sometimes more obviously than others, at the national projects that coincide with them.

Yoshino (1999) also looks at cases of racialized national projects. He finds it
useful to distinguish between political and cultural nationalisms, but does not see the
constructiveness of participating in the discourse on what is happening to nationalism.
Instead, the book seeks to show how nationalism is being produced and reproduced in
areas previously not studied. Particularly, the “consumption of nationalism” is explored
in how ethnicity in Asia is utilized to propose, enforce, and then reproduce nationalism in
both a cultural and political manner.

Lastly, T.K. Oommen (1997) is helpful for his connections among race, nation and
citizenship. In Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity, he claims citizenship as a useful
way to reconcile nationality and ethnicity. He writes, “one must recognize the role of
citizenship as an instrument that can reconcile the two identities of nationality and
ethnicity and the competing demands of equality and identity” (243). He notes, however,
the exclusionary practices of even citizenship, but sees it as the most likely way for
excluded groups to feel included even if they are still experiencing discrimination and
exclusion from higher class-standing and access to resources. I agree that citizenship is
one manner in which appears to enable inclusion; yet, I don't think this means that all
groups are actually included.

When perceiving race as a factor in national projects, Hearn (2007) is most
insightful. In “National Identity: Banal, Personal and Embedded,” he looks at the various
levels of nationalism, from the national to the personal. He writes,

national identity does not exist in two polar forms—one inscribed on the
inner self, the other suspended in the discursive other. Rather, it gets
reproduced along a series of relations, as individuals reach out through the
various forms of social organization that frame their particular lives and
circumstances (671).

He also, as the title suggests, looks at Billing's (1995) concept of “banal” nationalism.
The term banal nationalism is introduced to cover the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced. It is argued that these habits are not removed from everyday life, as some observers have supposed. Daily, the nation is indicated, or 'flagged' in the lives of its citizenry. Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition (qtd. in Hearn, 660).

These reproductions, whether symbolic or ideological are seen in the “everyday life” of discrimination as seen in overtly discriminatory policy or the subversive structural problems which appear as natural to most citizens. From a cultural aspect this relates to the idea of simulacra—the idea of a copy of a copy without any reference to an original (Baudrillard).

**Nationalism and Globalization**

Hedetoft (2003), in The Global Turn: National Encounters with the World, participates in the globalization debate over whether or not it is new, supporting the viewpoint that “globalization is both real, unique and deeply consequential for the nation-state and the international system,” but contends that this “does not imply the withering-away of the national state, but a process of adaptive structural repositioning through which it undergoes a profound change” (2). Hedetoft views the nation-state and globalization as two differing sites where they are neither contradictory nor necessarily complimentary.

Both Held (1999) and Scholte (2005) struggle with this issue of globalization's newness or lack thereof. They, however, go about the discussion in different ways. Scholte provides a more normative and somewhat prescriptive approach, emphasizing a “newness” in degree and kind Held, instead, provides a historical framework, stressing the change in extensity, intensity, velocity and impact propensity, or the “newness” by
degree and not kind. With regards to nationalism, Scholte views globalization as undermining nationalism or at least providing other ways in which it is formed. He looks to the hybridization of identities as a new way in which people collectively identify. He links the decrease in national identity formation to space, commenting, “a relative deterritorialization of social space could therefore be expected to transpire hand in hand with a relative denationalization of social identity” (225). Scholte sees increasingly plural national identities which may coincide with Kaldor's view on new and small nationalisms.

Mary Kaldor (2004) argues that nationalism is responding to globalization, calling it a “new nationalism” which is “both shaped by, and shapes, the various phenomena we bunch together under the rubric of globalization” (162). She states that this new nationalism will be “regressive” and “contribute to a wild, anarchic form of globalization, characterized by violence and inequality” (162). While disagreeing with both Anthony Smith and Eric Hobsbawm, she finds possibility in Guibernau's (1996) concept of “small nationalisms” (162). She contrasts these small nationalisms, as seen by European open (national) identities, with the exclusionary “fundamentalist political networks” (175). She notes that these open small nationalisms are able to be “mobilized not only from above, but also from below by the human rights regime and peace movements” (175).

Saul Newman (2000), in “Nationalism in Postindustrial Societies: Why States Still Matter,” brings the discussion back to how the nation-state is effected by globalization. He suggests that perhaps there is a “transformation” occurring called “globalization.” He, however, reasserts the emphasis to the context of states and how they respond. He argues that in studying nationalism it “would be well-advised to keep nationalist
movements and parties front and center in its analyses” (39). He highlights a point made by several scholars, which is the threat of fundamentalist movements and terrorism as a response to globalization. This is an interesting area of study, but outside the realm of the intended research project.

This brings up the importance of power structures and dynamics when discussing nationalism and globalization. Held emphasizes power when understanding contemporary debates over globalization and nationalism. While this too could be discussed at length in a book or separate article it is only important to recognize here. Power, to one degree or another, is what movements are trying to gain and what national projects are trying to maintain. With power comes inclusion to the national identity if not the ability to reconfigure what it means. It also translates into access to resources, which in turn, have the ability to lead to education, wealth, and the chance to participate in the local, national or even, global economy.

Scholte's reliance on the importance of space or the increasing lack of needing to rely on space creates a need to reassert the importance of territory on nationalism in this study. Ruth Reitan's (2007) amended scale shift model demonstrates the process of going global and how it, in turn, affects the local, calling it “glocal.” It is a completely reflexive relationship, one in which the importance of space continues to be relevant.

Della Porta et al. (2006), in Globalization from Below, claim that territorial identities do not fade but are increasingly impacted by other places and cultures. This is leading to resistance movements to defend traditional cultures, which in turn, lead to a resurgence of nationalism, ethnic movements and religious mobilization (15). The Dalit movement, which is considered to be a member of the Global Justice movement through
its continuous participation in the World Social Forum, is in fact against a traditional
culture and nationalism for its history of witnessing exclusion, discrimination and
violence. Yet, perhaps it is globalization and transnational forums which have enabled
movements to more loudly resist the traditional culture by gaining support from the
international human rights regime and other nations who view the Dalit cause as
legitimate. These forums and networks are thought of as alternative inclusive networks.
The problems experienced by the Dalit community in India were recognized by the
United Nations in August of 2001, the European Union in May of 2007, and lastly, the
United States Congress in July of 2007 (NCDHR website).

Nationalism from Below: the Transnational and Social Movements

Dallmayr and Rosales (2001) consider nationalism to be “at a crossroads today”
(xv). I do not intend to demonstrate what nationalism is changing to, but instead seek to
show one route for potential changes to a given national identity. This route is
understood as “going global” to the transnational level in order to experience success,
inclusivity, and then return to the national level to also experience success and growth in
politics.

Transnational forums are emerging global spaces which enable territory-based
movements to share solidarity. Ruth Reitan (2007) examines why movements and
networks have shifted scale to the global (230). She concludes that this takes place so
that solidarity can occur in any of the following ways:

those of worthiness for distant issues and sufferers,
interconnectedness with others whose struggles are seen as related to one's
own, and similarity with activists sharing the same identity which is
harmed or threatened (231).
Reitan makes another significant contribution to work on transnationalism and social movements which is that “networks have moved well beyond protest toward proposal” (258). What she means is that the traditional protest methods of social movements have advanced to not only protest, but propose alternatives to the hegemonic policy and projects that have guided the top-down approach. Iain Bruce (Ed.) (2004) argues this point as well.

Peter N. Funke (2008) postulates that the World Social Forum is an “open space” where a “resistance relay” may then take place. By this, Funke means that “like a relay, social forums try to 'open' circuits that are stronger than social forum's own current and thus hope to function as a sort of catalyst or amplifier for convergences” (459). The opening of transnational social movement networks is supported by most scholars of globalization and social movements.

The success of bottom-up transnational networks is in several factors: it fosters solidarity among participants from all over the globe, creating what many scholars refer to as the “global citizen”. With this solidarity comes an exchange of tactics, frames, grievances and visibility. For instance, the Dalit movement's National Campaign of Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) has visited and publicly united with Brazil's Landless Workers' Movement and several movements from Japan.

Despite all of the recent scholarly attention paid to the transnational, Della Porta et al. (2005) suggest it is also important to note how these transnational imaginings affect the internal politics and cultures of nations. Reitan also reinforces this argument with her amended scale shift model.
Chapter Three

Case Study: India's Dalit Movement and Hindu Nationalism

Background Information

The Dalit movement in India has existed in numerous forms since the late 1800s. Nick Crossley (2002) states, social movements are important because “they are key agents for bringing about change within societies” (8). Despite the Dalit movement’s transformations over time, it has consistently sought to do just that: challenge and change Indian society. In particular, it seeks to alter the Hindu caste structure, the formation and power of Hindu nationalism, and the exclusion of “Untouchables” and lower castes from vital resources, such as water, education, housing, jobs, and access to the global economy.

Entering politics remains a longstanding tactic of the movement as a way to gain power. A Dalit leader from Andhra Pradesh comments, “We want annihilation of the caste system and the only way we can do this is if we get political power and we're going to fight for political power” (Unreported World: India's Broken People interview). The thrust of the movement into politics is best demonstrated in the 1984 formation of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), a Dalit-based national political party. For this reason, along with the movements' trajectory of “going global,” it is a fitting case study for the larger purpose of exploring nationalism today and its potential for change from below by sub-national movements.
The Dalit movement is very much still a territory-based movement in India with pockets of mobilization throughout the Indian states (Figure 1: Map of India). It also has, however, since the late 1990s and especially by 2001, participated in the transnational social movement network. By “going global” it has been able to find an inclusive community, share ideas and tactics, unify with other movements and their goals, gain international attention for the Dalit cause, and lastly, change the framing strategies of the movement so that they are more universally understandable.

Figure 1: Map of India
The Hegemony of India's Caste Structure and Nationalism

The Caste system exists of four castes, varnas, which literally means “color” although it is somewhat metaphorical in this case (Channa 2005). There are numerous sub-classes, or jatis, within each caste to which someone is born, lives, and dies traditionally. The Dalits' or “Untouchables” place within the caste-system is actually beneath it, but this placement comes with a set of duties like all other castes. Each caste has a dharma, the Sanskrit word for “duty” or “religion”. The Braham is the highest caste made up of priests; the Kshatriyas are rulers, warriors, and landowners; the Vaishya are merchants; Sudras are farmers, artisans, and servants. The Dalits' function within the system is to do the work that no other respectable person would do such as cleaning up human waste, disposing of dead animals, particularly cows (a sacred animal to Hindus), and/or making leather. Historically, no other castes were supposed to interact with “Untouchables” and most certainly not come in physical contact with them (Luce 2007). Female Dalits have typically suffered a double blow- being Dalits and females. Higher caste males are allowed to use female Dalits for sex as is apparent in the high rape statistics on Dalit women. More specific details regarding Dalit discrimination will be forth coming.

This antiquated system of caste hierarchy is, in part, what Hindu nationalists seek to uphold, as recognized in the Hindutva philosophy. Thomas Blom Hansen (1999), in The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India, reinforces this claim; he states, “the Hindu nationalists desire to transform Indian public culture into a sovereign, disciplined national culture rooted in what is claimed to be a superior ancient Hindu past, and to impose a corporatist and disciplined social and political organization
upon society” (4). He also considers this idealization of the Hindu past in the form of nationalism to have “emerged out of the longest, most sustained, and most successful trajectory of democracy anywhere in the postcolonial world” (5). Chetan Bhatt (2001), in *Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies and Modern Myths*, remarks that the Hindu ideas on caste have “developed in conjunction with...conceptions of nation” (3). Many Dalits throughout history, like Ambedkar, have converted from Hinduism as a way to remove themselves from the caste system. The Hindu nationalists wish to reassert it as the primary identity of India and its people. This is done, in part, through the use of force, violence, discriminatory practices, and politics, as seen by the BJP.

**Hindu Nationalism and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)**

Nationalism in India today is founded, in part, on two core perspectives: the influence of European primordialist ideologies on colonial India and the previously established caste-hierarchy of Hinduism (amended from Hansen 1999; Bhatt 2001). Chetan Bhatt (2001) states, “while regional nationalisms and local patries had existed in India before the colonial period, an overarching framework that served to provide ideological coherence for the idea of a primordial nationalism, primarily defined through an invention of archaic Verdic Hinduism, mainly gained force from the nineteenth century” (10).

Hobsbawm states, in *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (1990), the idea of nation and nationalism is no older than 18th century. While the caste system is centuries old, only since the colonial period has India construct the concept of nationalism as a unified identity. Ambedkar states, “it must be recognized that there never has been a common Indian culture, that historically there have been three Indias, Brahmanic India,
Buddhist India and Hindu India, each with its own culture” (qtd in Omvedt 43). Instead, pre-colonial India maintained pockets of local or regional identities, often affiliated with the territories, languages, and religions (Omvedt 2006; Zavos 2000; Hansen 1999). Colonial rule, however, stressed a geopolitical unified identity and this seemed most conveniently to correspond with the caste structure. Upon independence and the partitioning of India and Pakistan in 1947, the Indian identity became territory-based but also faith-based. According to a 2001 census (www.cia.gov), India is made up of about 80.5% Hindu, 13.4% Muslim, 2.3% Christian, 1.9% Sikh, and other or unspecified at 1.9%.

Despite claims of equality and diversity, nationalism in India is fiercely embedded in traditional Hindu beliefs. Modern urban centers often seem more equal for minority religions and lower castes; yet, a Hindu-derived identity has only increased since independence due to residual problems regarding the partition of Pakistan and resentments felt by both Muslims and Hindus alike.

Hindutva in a concept derived from a 1923 pamphlet by V.D. Savarkar, who stressed India as both a holy-land and a fatherland, asserting a form of ethnic nationalism (Bhatt). Extreme forms of this perspective faded slightly during the mid-20th century but reemerged by the 1980s, especially with the founding of the BJP, a political party based on these teachings.

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has a history intertwined with previously established parties, movements and ideologies such as Hindutva, Sangh Parivar and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Bharatiya Jana Sangh party. Sang Parivar, the VHP and the RSS are nationalist organizations that
emerged at the height of Aryan race theories in the early 1900s and have maintained support among both moderate and conservative Hindus.

The BJP emerged in 1980 as a moderate party, claiming to support diversity and equality in India. It has many platform issues it is known for, but for the purposes of this study it is important in its historical connections with Hindutva and Hindu-based nationalist organizations. The BJP is directly linked with the Bharatiya Jana Sangh party which was created in 1951; both the BJP and BJS are connected to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) which was an organization created in 1925 (Luce 2007; Hansen 1999; Bhatt 2001; Malik and Singh 1994).

While the BJP advocates equality and inclusivity, it at the same time relies on rhetoric that stresses the threat of outside influences, particularly the unwillingness of Muslims to support change in India. The BJP website claims, “Hindu society has an unquestionable and proud history of tolerance for other faiths and respect for diversity of spiritual experiences” (www.bjp.org). And yet, it later states, “Hindutva is here to stay. It is up to the Muslims whether they will be included in the new nationalistic spirit of Bharat (India)”. One might wonder, however, how it is possible for Muslims to fully “be included” when “Hindutva is here to stay.”

Smith's (1995) claim that nationalism is resurfacing as a tool to defend tradition and cultures, causing increased ethnic conflicts, is relevant to Hindu nationalists and the way they struggle to maintain tradition at the perceived threat of contestation. The BJP upholds the traditional Hindu belief system, including the caste structure. They resent the Muslim minority within India, in part, to the partitioning of “their own land” into modern-day India and Pakistan (www.bjp.org). For this reason, they urge India to remain
committed to its Hinduist history, values, majority, and caste structure.

**Enforcing Exclusion: Discrimination and Dalits**

Dalits have been fighting back against exclusion and discriminatory practices since the late 1800s. Despite policy supporting equal rights violence continues. While there is no proof that the BJP actively advocates discriminatory practices towards Dalits, they do so by ignoring such practices and by supporting traditional Hindutva ideology. Various policies call for equality in India, but at the same time it is recognized that these policies are not effectively enforced (ncdhr.org; Human Rights Watch).

Despite article seventeen of the 1950 Indian Constitution, which declares equality amongst all castes and races and bans any form of discrimination, violence in India's stratified society persists. The Prevention of Atrocities Act of 1989 also seeks to end discrimination. Human Rights Documentation Centre (hrdc.net) of India states:

The Act attempts to curb and punish violence against Dalits through three broad means. Firstly, it identifies what acts constitute 'atrocities.' These include both particular incidents of harm and humiliation such as the forced consumption of noxious substances, as well as the systemic violence still faced by many Dalits, especially in rural areas. Such systemic violence includes forced labor, denial of access to water and other public amenities, and sexual abuse of Dalit women. Secondly, the Act calls upon all the states to convert an existing sessions court in each district into a Special Court to try cases registered under the POA. Thirdly, the Act creates provisions for states to declare areas with high levels of caste violence to be “atrocity-prone” and to appoint qualified officers to monitor and maintain law and order.

Yet, as the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) argues, there is not proper enforcement. The Human Rights Documentation Centre claims, “although the POA is a powerful and precise weapon on paper, in practice the Act has suffered from a near-complete failure in implementation.”
Discrimination against Dalits takes many forms with varying degrees of tragedy and violence: sexual assault on Dalit women, the burning and brutal killing of Dalit families, police brutality and a glass-ceiling effect keeping the majority of Dalits from well-paying jobs and education. There is a difference between the idealism as seen in the Indian Constitution and the lived reality of Dalits in modern India. R.M. Pal is quoted on the Human Rights Watch website stating, “the constitution has merely prescribed, but has not given any description of the ground reality. We can make a dent only if we recognize the fact that the cast system is a major source, indeed an obnoxious one, of human rights violations” (www.hrw.org/reports/1999/india). This is, in fact, what Human Rights Watch set out to do when they published a book titled *Broken People: Caste Violence against India’s “Untouchables”* (1999).

The National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights along with a variety of other organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, International Dalit Solidarity Network and both the United Nations and the European Union, have gathered data on the discriminatory practices against Dalits. NCDHR supported a study that gathered statistics from 11 states and over 565 villages throughout India. A sampling of these statistics is provided below to emphasize the violence and discrimination that occurs against Dalits on a daily basis.

- up to 38% of Dalit children in government schools are forced to sit separately while eating
- in 20% of schools, Dalit children are not allowed to drink from the same water source
- 27.6% of Dalits are not permitted to enter police stations
- 25.7% have been denied access to ration shops
- 33% of public health workers have refused to visit Dalit homes
- 48.4% of Dalits in villages have been denied access to the public water source
- 73% have not been allowed to enter a non-Dalit home
• 70% have been denied eating with non-Dalits
• in 10-20% of villages surveyed Dalits were not allowed to wear “clean, bright or fashionable clothing.”

These are just a few of the restrictions placed on Dalits, not including the actual violence they experience. The International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN) cites “official Indian crime statistics” between 2001 and 2005. It has calculated that about 27 atrocities occur against Dalits every day, 13 Dalits are murdered every week, 5 Dalit homes are burnt every week, 6 Dalits are kidnapped every week, 3 Dalit women are raped every day, 11 Dalits are beaten every day, and a crime according to Indian law is committed against a Dalit every 18 minutes (www.idsn.org).

One brief story from *National Geographic* (Mayell, June 2003) demonstrates this assertion of force by higher castes on the lower castes:

> One night, while Maurya was away in a nearby city, eight men from the higher Rajput caste came to his farm. They broke his fences, stole his tractor, beat his wife and daughter, and burned down his house. The message was clear: Stay at the bottom where you belong.”

Other incidents have been reported throughout India newspapers, academics and organizations alike. Human Rights Watch, in *Broken People* (1999), writes that between 1994 and 1996, 98,349 cases were registered with the police as crimes against scheduled castes. This number seems rather low compared to the 160-170 million Dalits in India, yet it is likely that there is a higher statistic of actual violence versus what is reported.

The Human Rights Documentation Centre says that part of the problem is that “policemen have displayed a consistent unwillingness to register offences under the act. This reluctance stems partially from ignorance. According to a 1999 study nearly a quarter of those government officials charged with enforcing the Act are unaware of its
existence” (hrdc.net). Human Rights Watch also argues that there is a lack of enforcement. Similarly, Amnesty International estimated that roughly only 5 percent of attacks are registered (qtd. in Mayell 2003). IDSN cites that about 18.7% of crimes against Dalits were pending with police at the end of 2002 while 77.69% of the court cases were pending. In 2005, pending police investigation of crimes against Dalits was at 23.9% and 80.2% of these crimes were pending a trial by the end of 2005.

On September 29th, 2006 an event took place in Maharashtra that has become known as the Kherlanji Massacre (www.ibn.com; www.autrocitynew.worldpress.com) in which a Dalit family was murdered by higher caste members for asserting rights to land. A wife, daughter, and two sons were stripped naked; the females allegedly raped, and were then beaten, maimed and killed. Very little was done about the incident and brought about a reactionary violence by Dalits in response to such violence by upper-castes.

Subhadra Mitra Channa (2005), states that the discrimination of Dalits persists particularly through geographic segregation in urban and rural areas. She provides the example of Dalits in Delhi, where they live in small tenements in the slums of a section of the city. She also links, as do many other academics (Jefferey 2004), to the social segregation especially in education and the school systems. Access to water is also limited for Dalits. In one village the state installed a specific water tap for Dalits, but it quickly became used by upper-caste villagers. Channa quotes one Dalit villagers as saying, “the government can provide taps for the untouchables, but it can not give them the courage to use them” (51). Overall, Channa provides insight into some of the more subtle forms of discrimination. Her outlook on the modern Dalit condition is somewhat bleak as she writes, “almost fifty years down the line, in spite of a fair number of
untouchables having become political leaders and holding responsible jobs, their position has undergone little change” (51). Her article tries to show how a system of oppression “survives in subtle and covert forms and has its roots deeply entrenched even when apparently uprooted and done away with in legislation and overt social norms” (51).

Discrimination and violence in India is not only experienced by Dalits, but is also a lived reality for many Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, and other non-Hindu Indian citizens (Kamat and Mathew 2003). These groups, like the Dalits, are excluded from the Hindu nationalist ideology and identity. The Dalit movement and the Bahujan Samaj Party often embrace these other outsiders.

Discriminatory practices continue to permeate Indian society. It is difficult to determine if violence against Dalits is decreasing, increasing or remaining the same since statistics do not prove to be entirely accurate. Wever-Rabbel (2006)(qtd in O’Neil, 2003, 30) comments,

> Until India's 'hidden apartheid' is abolished...the world's largest democracy is nothing but a palace built on a dung heap.

**Subaltern Actions: Historical Tracings of the Dalit Movement**

Among scholars there is not a consensus on when the Dalit movement officially began. Luce (2007) references the Dalit Panthers as the first mass-mobilization of Dalits in 1972. Pai (2002) connects modern day Dalit organization to the small movements of the colonial period. Most scholars (Joshi 1986; Smith 2008; Omvedt 2006; Bob 2007), however, consider Dr. Bhimrao Ramji (B.R.) Ambedkar to be the first person to focus on the “autonomy of the Dalit movement” (Omvedt, 43). Although Ambedkar is the most commonly referenced Dalit leader other leaders have also significantly impacted its
strength, tactics, and audience throughout the movement's history.

Tactics, leaders, and small goals have shifted throughout time, yet, the fundamental goal of Dalit inclusion and equality has not changed since the late 1800s. Table 1 (below) presents a historical overview of Dalit movement leaders and organizations since its inception. It should be noted that it is not holistic since access to some of this information is either not readily available or overwhelming in its quantity. For instance, Dalit organizations today are in the thousands and stretch across the globe.

A direct link between generations of leaders and organizations has not been made clear in academic literature. In fact, few scholars examining the Dalit movement today have spent sufficient time tracing its roots back throughout India’s history. Doing so, however, reinforces the steadfast nature of this movement despite changing tactics, organizations and leadership. It also demonstrates a continual assertion of the importance of politics in achieving the long-term goal of Dalit inclusion.

Jotiba Govindrao Phule (1827-1890) was a Dalit leader who began by proposing alternative religions to Hinduism that would emphasize equality. Omvedt (2006) notes, “Phule is today taken as a founding figure in Maharashtra [a Western Indian state] not simply by the anti-caste but also by the farmers, women's and rural-based environmental movements” (21). He questioned the Aryan race theory which was prominent during the time and greatly influenced some of the Dalit leaders of the 1920s who framed their movement according to race/ethnicity. Phule also founded the Satya Shadohak Samaj organization in 1875 which is the first well-known Dalit organization (Omvedt). Satya Shadohak Samaj focused on uniting lower-castes and Dalits. Its goals were to bring about equality and access to education for Dalits and lower-caste members (shudras).
In order to understand the early forms of the Dalit movement one must also understand what it was up against: the formation of Hindu nationalism in the early 1900s. The development of Hindu nationalism and its core ideological beliefs have already been presented, yet, this must be reiterated here because it was during the period of the late 1800s and early 1900s that Hindu nationalism becomes a concrete ideology and movement. Zavos (2000) states, “after the turn of the century, the idea of organized Hinduism began to assume an increasingly significant role in projections and counter-projections of the Indian people, which were central to contemporary political discourse”
This is done so through the formation of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Hindu Mahasabha, two organizations that promote an Indian national identity based on the Hindu caste system.

The emergence of Hindu nationalism between the late 1800s and early 1900s serves as a jumping-off point for the swell of Dalit activism which takes place in the 1920s. It may also justify the change in tactics of the Dalit movement to promoting itself as an identity-based coalition. Omvedt states, regarding the differences between Phule and the activism of the 1920s, “a whole period of the construction of Hinduism had intervened, with the formulation of an increasingly sophisticated ideology of Hindu Nationalism” (39).

Movements in the 1920s continued to promote equality for Dalits. They, however, changed one major aspect of the movement-unlike in previous times, they began to claim an “original Indian” identity or “adi”. Omvedt points to the popular Aryan race theories of the time that influenced the Hindu nationalist movements as a pertinent reason the “adi” movements took hold. She writes, “the adi ideologies were pervasive ideas that won a popular base, as census reports show, and expressed the powerful emotional resistance to brahmanism and caste hierarchy that was embodied in dalit organizations everywhere in the colonial period” (39).

Instead of allowing Hindu nationalist claims to resonate, Dalits, taking lessons from Phule, found a way to highlight their differences to upper-caste Brahmans and their colonizers. They did so by founding various Dalit organizations, including the Ad-Dharm in the northwestern Indian state of Punjab, Adi-Hindu in the northern central state of Uttar Pradesh and Hyderabad, a city in the southeastern state of Andhra Pradesh, Adi-
Dravida, Adi-Andhra and Adi-Karnataka in the southern region of India. Each of these organizations might be regarded as social movement organizations (SMOs), as defined by contemporary scholars of social movements (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Armstrong and Bartley 2007), in that they were created for the “collective pursuit of social change as a primary goal” (Armstrong and Bartley 2007).

A few notable leaders of this time period include Kisan Faguji Bansode (1870-1946), Bhagyareddy Varma (1888-1939), and Mangoo Ram (1886-1980). Bansode worked primarily in Maharashtra while Ram mostly organized in Punjab. Mangoo Ram organized in 1926 a separatist organization, the Ad-Dharm, which sought to form a separate Dalit community in a Punjab village. It was not met with much success. Bhagyareddy Varma was a leader who had been organizing Dalits since the early 1900s, especially adi-Hindu conferences. He was connected to the “petty bourgeois dalit group” (Omvedt 36) and therefore, had access to more resources than most Dalits during the time. He formed the Adi-Andhra Mahajana Sabha in 1917, which was an open conference of Dalits, meant to foster relationships and collaborate on necessary actions, goals, and tactics. This, however, did not lead to a national level umbrella organization. That level of mobilization did not happen until Ambedkar became involved in the movement.

Evidence supports that these early leaders of the movement directly impacted Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (1891-1956), the most notable and studied Dalit leader. Ambedkar, after returning to India sometime in the early 1920s from earning a law degree in the United States, quickly became involved in politics and the plight of Dalits. He too was a Dalit, although he grew up not experiencing the same casteism that other Dalits encountered.
He is thought to be the “most articulate Dalit leader” (Omvedt 44). Unlike the 1920s movements, Ambedkar does not claim an indigenous identity, but instead finds fault with the construction of the Hindu caste system. For this reason, he declares in 1935 that he was “born a Hindu but would not die a Hindu” (Ambekar.org).

In 1936, Ambedkar created the Independent Labour Party (ILP) as a way to fight for the Dalit cause from inside the political sphere. While other leaders had also taken a political route for the Dalit movement, Ambedkar was the first to form a(n) (initially) successful political party. Kanshi Ram, the founder of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), points to Ambedkar as an inspiration (Pai 2002). The Independent Labour Party (ILP) was a worker-peasant party with goals that included ridding caste discrimination, but also focused on problems with capitalism, wealth distribution and equal access to resources. Ambedkar remained involved in both sides of the movement: the political process and the grassroots organization. After Ambedkar died in 1956, the ILP slowly faded away. It was not until the Bahujan Samaj Party formation in 1984 that another Dalit-based political party emerged.

Ambedkar also organized the Bahishkrut Hitakarni Sabha (BHS), an organization structured around the goals of the Dalit movement. Its purpose was to hold various conferences throughout Mahad, a city in the western state of Maharashtra. It also acted as one of the earliest umbrella organizations, connecting smaller movements and mobilizing individuals. For instance, the Mahad Satyagraha, the “first untouchable liberation movement in Mahad” (Omvedt 44), met with Ambedkar and the BHS around 1926 by attending the conferences. Its tactics, however, were more radical than those utilized by Ambedkar. The Mahad Satyagraha led marches to drink the water from the
village tanks, which was prohibited for Dalits. Several of their marches ended in violence between Dalits and upper-caste Indians. The collaboration between Ambedkar's Bahishkrut Hitakami Sabha and the Mahad Satyrgraha at this time demonstrates the unification of various organizations despite differing tactics. The end goal of Dalit equality remained the same as previous and later waves of the movement.

It was not until the Dalit Panthers in 1972 that there was the first glimpse of western influence on the way the Dalit movement organized and framed its goals. This western influence on the Dalit movement is very important due to its internationalization of movement tactics and frames. The frame of human rights over civil rights has remained effective since the 1970s. Within the past decade, however, this frame has actually fused with other human rights movements at the transnational level.

The Panthers originated in Bombay as a militant youth organization without any clear leadership. They were much more radical than previous organizers and had connections to other various movements and ideologies such as the Naxalites (Omvedt 73), a communist movement. The Dalit Panther manifesto from 1973 states:

We want the rule of the whole country. Change of heart, liberal education will not end our state of exploitation. When we gather a revolutionary mass, rouse the people, out of the struggle of this giant mass will come the tidal wave of revolution...we will build the organization of the workers, dalits, landless, poor peasants...we will hit back against all injustice perpetrated on dalits. We will well and truly destroy the caste and varna system that thrives on people's misery, which exploits the people, and liberate the dalits...Sympathizers and members of the Dalit Panthers, be ready for the final struggle of dalits (qtd. in Omvedt 1993).

The Dalit Panthers witnessed and then utilized the tactics of the Black Panthers during the Civil Rights era in the United States. The Dalit Panthers relied on Malcolm X's idea that violence can not be combated with non-violence and instead, only violence
stops violence. The framing strategy of “human rights” over “civil rights” was also taken from Malcom X.

While the Dalit Panthers still exist they have taken on a softer role, seeking “to promote better understanding between castes...a democratic movement which gives voice to the people at the bottom rung of society” (Hugo 54). There are now several smaller camps of the movement each with various platforms, some still relying on militancy while others promote political organization and lobbying.

Today, the Panthers are most popular in the southeastern state of Tamil Nadu with a national party, the Liberation Panther's Party, which seeks to promote a regional identity over any type of cohesive nationalistic Indian identity. They still, however, maintain the claim that they are guided by Ambedkar.

Despite the variety of political parties that have emerged out of the Dalit movement, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) remains the most potentially successful at achieving movement goals. As stated earlier, the BSP was founded in 1984 by Kanshi Ram (1934-2006). Ram created various other organizations throughout the 1970s before forming the BSP, including the Backward and Minority Communities Employees' Federation (BAMCEF). Ram was well aware of the more radical Panthers, but instead chose to follow the political middle-road of Ambedkar. Like Ambedkar's Independent Labour Party, Ram set the goal of Dalit equality and policy reform.

Movement activity stagnated from the early 1980s until about the mid-1990s. Very little information can be found about the movement during this period. Various fractions still existed although the radical militancy of the Dalit Panthers lost its momentum. Instead, this period serves as a transition period, moving away from
radicalism to more mainstream tactics. Rajkhowa (2008) states, the 1990s are defined “by caste politics.” This is in part due to the increasing presence of the BSP in state and national elections. Other scholars (Satyanarayana 2003) argue that this period served as a culminating point for the influence of Ambedkar, noting, “the stature of Ambedkar” grew “with the emergence...of the movement in the 1980s and 1990s” (Sikh Times, June 28 2003). The majority of Ambedkar's writings did not become publicly available until this period, bringing about a renewed inspiration for the movement. Satyanarayana continues by arguing that during this period “Ambedkar and his work...emerged as an important symbol of the Dalit movement and become difficult to ignore.”

Although the movement as a whole may have stagnated during this period, it should be viewed instead as a period of reinvigoration and reflection. The renewed impact of Ambedkar led not only to the steady growth of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) but also to the formation of many of the Dalit movement organizations that are so influential today. By the late 1990s several of these organizations were transitioning from the local to the national and then to the global. Peter Jay Smith (2008) attributes a “more extensive Dalit movement” to the “emergence of a Dalit middle class” in the 1990s (21). Smith continues by pointing out that “significant elements of the Dalit movement in the 1990s reorganized on a transnational basis” (21). The 1990s brought about increasing access to resources for Dalits and new technologies, such as the Internet, that made “going global” easier and faster.

The Dalit movement today remains linked with its past. Most modern Dalit organizations claim a connection to the past whether through goals, political affiliations, leadership, faith, or inspiration. Appendix 1 provides a detailed account of some of the
most prominent current Dalit social movement organizations (SMOs) and supporting information such as their goals, tactics, affiliations, year established, inspirations, connections to the transnational sphere and places of operation. This substantiates the claim that despite the variety of Dalit organizations and tactics, the overall goals are similar and justify the thought of a unified and singular “Dalit movement.” While organizations may dispute religious views, tactics, political affiliations, and frames they remain grounded in the desire for Dalit equality.

The contemporary Dalit movement consists of various social movement organizations each sharing in the belief of Dalit equality. Many of these organizations overlap, working with other like-minded organizations. The Dalit movement today is multi-faceted. It includes various and sometimes oppositional groups focusing on radicalism and violence, separatism, non-violence, and religious conversion. These groups, however, are linked if by no other way than in their shared belief in Dalit equality.

For the purposes of this study the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) organization acts as the face of the Dalit movement. This decision is based on several factors: previous scholarship on NCDHR; accessibility; NCDHR's local connections as well as its visibility in the transnational social movement networks (visibility in both the local and the global); its growth into an umbrella organization and its support by smaller or periphery organizations; and lastly, its goals. Additionally, although NCDHR remains separate from Indian politics and political support, it actively supports the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and recognizes the success of the BSP as a victory for the movement. In particular, it was vocal in the successful election of
Mayawati, a female Dalit, to the current Chief Minister position in Uttar Pradesh.

The National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR), is a well-known and established organization that serves as a “key node” (Smith 2008, 21) to the movement. Numerous scholars (Smith 2008; Bob 2007; Thekaekara 2005; Crossette 2000) examine the NCDHR as a way to study the larger Dalit movement. NCDHR claims to be a coalition of organizations, activists, journalists, and academics who are trying to end discrimination, monitor hate-crimes and bring awareness to the problems of Dalits. It asserts that it is not represented in government positions such as the BSP party. NCDHR has been represented, however, in the 2001 World Conference Against Racism (WCAR), all World Social Forums since their inception in 1998, a 40-day Dalit Swadhikar Rally in 2004, and the first International Conference on the Human Rights of Dalit Women at the Hague in 2006 among other national and international events (www.ncdhr.org).

While the NCDHR does not employ rhetoric that directly challenges Indian nationalism, it clearly articulates that India’s status quo needs to transform into a more inclusive space. An overview of scholarship, activities, frames and transnational linkages about this organization will be provided later in this chapter.

The National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights was created by Martin Macwan, a Dalit activist and now lawyer from the state of Gujarat (Crossette 2000). He was honored with the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award in 2000 and was named as one of the top five “outstanding human rights defenders around the world” according to Human Rights Watch (Crossette 2000). His involvement in the organization is somewhat vague as the NCDHR website does not even mention his name. Instead the formation of this organization is recognized as being created when 78 Dalit activists gathered from across
India to discuss the lack of enforcement of the Prevention of Atrocities Act of 1989. It is assumed that Macwan was a part of this gathering. Currently, Vincent Manoharan is the acting National Secretary for the NCDHR. Upon its inception, the NCDHR is quoted as stating (www.ncdhr.org.in):

We were anguished that though our nation had just completed her 50th year of independence, and in spite of our Constitutional and International commitments to the contrary, the prevalence of 'untouchability' continued unabated in many parts of the country. In conjunction with the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we called for an urgent national campaign to highlight Dalit Human Rights and to uphold that 'Dalit Rights are Human Rights.'

Much of the NCDHR's inspiration comes from Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s ideologies. The NCDHR website claims: “At NCDHR we are both inspired and energized by the teaching and intervention of Dr. Ambedkar and find relevant his strategies for the struggles of our day.”
Chapter Four

The National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights

and the Bahujan Samaj Party

“Our's is a battle not for wealth or for power. It is a battle for freedom. It is a battle for the reclamation of human personality.” - Ambedkar

The National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights: Claims, Frames and Connections

The National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) was founded in 1998 with the slogan to “cast out caste.” This organization utilizes the Internet and maintains its website as a vital tool to spread its message, remain connected to its affiliates and supporters, and enable transnational networking. The NCDHR website serves as an additional resource for understanding the Dalit struggle but also for witnessing its framing strategies, tactics, known affiliates and successes.

According to the NCDHR website, the organization has constructed three phases which will have taken place before its large-scale goals are accomplished. Phase one states that there is an urgent need for “raising visibility.” The NCDHR considers this phase to have been successfully completed, as it notes, “NCHDR has managed to successfully raise the visibility of Dalit issues at the state, national and international level” (www.ncdhr.org.in). It provides many reasons for why this phase has been completed, including its global activism and participation, especially at the UN World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) held in Durban in 2001.
The second phase is “internationalizing Dalit rights.” For this phase, NCDHR states that it has made “major strides in giving visibility to the plight of the Dalit community.” These strides have been made through NCDHR's participation in all World Social Forums (WSF), the World Conference Against Racism (WCAR), the 40-day Dalit Swadhikar Rally throughout India, “The Situation of the Dalits in India” at the European Parliament in Brussels in 2006, and the first International Conference on the Human Rights of Dalit Women at The Hague in 2006, the recognition of the problems of Dalit Human Rights by the United Nations in August of 2001, recognition by the European Union in May of 2007, and lastly, recognition by the United States Congress in July of 2007. NCDHR also won the RAFTO award in 2007 for its work at progressing human rights. The NCDHR website does not make declarative statements about the final accomplishment of this phase as yet.

Eventually, the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights intends to focus on Phase Three, which is “holding states accountable.” The website states that work on this phase began in 2003 with the goals to eradicate the illegal discrimination that occurs on a daily basis. It states:

\[\text{We seek foremost to hold the State responsible for not checking the 'impunity' being enjoyed by non-Dalits in the criminal justice administrative system. Specifically, we challenge the State and its justice delivery mechanism, including the Human Rights institutions that are in place, to actually implement and enforce its constitutional and legislative measures to safeguard, protect and promote the basic human rights of Dalits.}\]

The NCDHR uses the Prevention of Atrocities Act of 1989 as a legal grounding for its claims. Peter (Jay) Smith (2008), in “Going Global: The Transnational Politics of the Dalit Movement,” brings up the point, which is now emphasized on the new NCDHR
website (as of April 2009), that the Dalit movement does not desire to internationalize without returning to the state level to seek substantial changes. Instead, the Dalit movement goes global, but also “remains rooted in making the Indian state serve as a means of social protection for the Dalit peoples” (Smith 2008, 13). In fact, the internationalization of the movement serves the purpose of Phase One by raising visibility beyond the Indian borders.

This relationship between the national and the global relates to Ruth Reitan's Amended Scale Shift process where a movement builds at the local and national, goes international, but then either returns to or is effected by the national (or local). Appendix 3 demonstrates the solidarity networks which have emerged out of the Dalit movement and distinguishes between the sub-national, the international, and the transnational. Among this, it clarifies how the NCDHR works with various levels of the movement and transnational networks, but is reflexive as Reitan argues.

NCDHR focuses on holding states accountable because though legal intervention it hopes to slowly end the discriminatory practices and violence perpetrated towards Dalits.

The National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights' general objectives is as follows:

1. To serve as platform for shared reflection and collective actions for AIDMAM, DAAA, NFDLRM and NDMJ.
2. To extend critical support to Dalit community to realize right to equity and justice in the economic, political, cultural, social and gender domains through its movements.
3. To recognize, develop expand initiatives to respond to the larger capacitation and public action demands from the Dalits.
4. To support movements with Dalit ideology, culture, values and work ethics so that they can effectively serve as energizers of Dalit public action.

NCDHR's first objective refers to four “movements” it has started. AIDMAM is
the All India Dalit Mahila Adhikar Manch, a forum for Dalit women to work towards altering the double-burden of Dalit females-being Dalits and women. It seeks to challenge the structures that enable discrimination, whether patriarchal, caste or class-based, or economic. The DAAA is the Dalit Arthik Adhikar Manch, a branch of the NCDHR that focuses on changing the economic and educational practices in India which leave Dalits behind while other castes move forward. The NFDRLM consists of the National Federation of Dalit Land Rights Movements. This organization focuses on Dalit access to land and an agricultural livelihood. Lastly, the NDMJ is the National Dalit Movement for Justice, a broader movement within the NCDHR. It mostly consists of Dalit survivors of violence or discrimination as well as sympathizers and seeks to enforce justice. It does so by attempting to, “establish [Dalits] as equal citizens in the society under Dalit leadership within our rising consciousness...to promote and protect Civil Political Rights of Dalits for ensuring... fair justice”

(http://www.ncdhr.org.in/ndmj/ndmj).

While the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights only exists in about 14 Indian states, these smaller branches of the NCDHR operate in additional states. For instance, the National Dalit Movement for Justice (NDMJ) works in about 17 states and the National Federation of Dalit Land Rights Movements (NFDLRM) is active in 16 states. Some of these organizations even navigate states which do not have a significant presence by the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights, other Dalit movement organizations or even the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).

The NCDHR states that its goals are achievable through a variety of strategies. The NCDHR website is currently undergoing renovations; these changes from its
previous site emphasize its increasing role as an umbrella organization meant to serve and strengthen these smaller groups or organizations. This is reflected in a few of its somewhat vague strategies of:

1. Form and strengthen movements owned and managed by Dalits
2. Develop organizational mechanisms to strengthen the emerging movements
3. Even while respecting the internal structures of management and control within each member movement, facilitate the internalization and reflection of ideology, values and principles in these movements
4. Support in Mobilizing adequate resources, knowledge and expertise to further advance vision of the four movements (www.ncdhr.org.in).

NCDHR increasingly frames its goals and strategies in the context of its connections to both smaller and larger movements and organizations. On its home page it now emphasizes not only its motto to “cast out caste” and has a photograph of Ambedkar, but also provides links to the NCDHR Coalition, One World South Asia, an even larger umbrella organization, and has the capability to stream the well-known film among activists, academics and sympathizers on the plight of the Dalits- “I'm Dalit. How are You?.” It also provides a link to a recent full-length film, “India Untouched: Stories of a People Apart” (2007). Lastly, it promotes the four sub-movements mentioned earlier and a list of recent interventions and daily atrocities. All of these changes reiterate the emphasis on connecting the global and the local.

**From the Local to the Global: NCDHR's Transnational Ties**

The National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) continues to expand to the transnational sphere where it gains visibility, solidarity, and also increased access to resources. As Charles Tilly (1978) notes, any social movement organization is reliant on resources to remain active. It is due to this need for resources that the movement has
historically been driven by Dalits who have access to resources, education, and financial capital. Some Dalit organizations have even expanded to include non-Dalit leadership as a means of securing additional resources. For instance, the BSP has allowed non-Dalit politicians to enter into the party as long as the goals remain aligned with the party and movement. The current chairperson of the BSP-Mayawati- however, is a Dalit.

The upward direction of the Dalit movement to the global level is what most scholars of the movement (Smith 2008; Smith 2005; Bob 2007; Lerche 2008; Paul 2002) examine. This section will provide an overview of relevant scholarship regarding the Dalit movement and transnational networking and more specifically, demonstrate the process of going global which the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights has enacted. This will then allow for a sufficient tracing back to the local and national levels where election results of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) are analyzed.

Dalit movement participation in the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism in Durban is argued by Dalit scholars (Smith 2008) as the most important moment for the movement to the transnational sphere. This conference brought the issue of casteism to an international stage while also providing legitimacy to Dalit movement organizations such as the NCDHR. It was at this moment that Dalit organizations began to reframe their strategies and language to enable solidarity among other excluded groups. Smith (2008) also points out that the NCDHR “took a significant step in transnationalizing the Dalit struggle” by aiding in the formation of the Denmark-based International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN) in 2001. Appendix 3 demonstrates the transnational networking of the NCDHR both to the smaller local organizations and the much larger global organizations which either focus on Dalit rights or support Dalit right. Appendix 1
also lists the INSN in order to demonstrate its goals and tactics in comparison with other organizations. The Dalit movement has support from groups across the globe, including religious, minority, human rights, anti-slavery and anti-discrimination groups. NCDHR has even recently been involved with the Landless Workers' movement in Brazil.

Before the Dalit movement attended the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) it experienced other successes which are likely attributed to increasing interconnections between regions and movements. In fact, Peter Jay Smith (2008) points all the way back to the immigration of Dalits to Europe as the beginnings of the “internationalization of the Dalit issue” (21). The internationalization of the Dalit movement is not under contention here. Instead, the year of 2001 is used as the moment of transnationalization. The NCDHR participated in the World Social Forum (WSF) in Porto Alegre in 2001 as well.

Other organizations, however, were already monitoring the plight of the Dalits. For instance, Human Rights Watch was studying and exposing casteism in India years prior to 2001. It published *Broken People: Caste Violence Against India's “Untouchables”* in 1999. This book includes recommendations to the government of India, all state governments, the United Nations, World Bank and other international lending institutions, and India's donors and trading partners. It examines in very precise detail forms of discrimination in specific regions and instances, as well as outlines the failures of India and Indian states to meet domestic and international legal obligations. The work was conducted in 1998 with over 300 interviews of Dalit men and women. Human Rights Watch also met with government officials, activists, and other people involved on either side of the movement. NCDHR relies on many of the facts from this
book to support its claims.

The Human Rights Watch report does not conclude with positive outcomes. Regarding politics, it only discusses how local, state, and/or national governments handle or ignore blatant acts of discrimination and violence. For the purposes of this research, the HRW report successfully provides the context for the persistence of discrimination in India. In 2007 another Human Rights Watch report came out: *Human Rights Watch Report: Hidden Apartheid: Caste Discrimination Against India’s “Untouchables.”* These reports by Human Rights Watch jump-started the internationalization of both the Dalit cause and movement. Like the movement's participation in the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, the reports also provided the necessary legitimacy for the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) to expand to the global sphere.

Peter Jay Smith (2008), in his article, “Going Global: The Transnational Politics of the Dalit Movement,” analyzes the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights' (NCDHR) participation in the 2004 World Social Forum held in Mumbai. He attended the 2004 WSF in Mumbai as well as the 2005 and 2007 forums (15). He attained interviews with various Dalit leaders, subscribed to Dalit forums, and examined various primary and secondary literatures on the Dalit movement. Smith connects the Dalit movement to the larger opposition against neo-liberal globalization and policy (14), stating, “while globalization may disempower people, it may simultaneously empower the most marginalized groups who increasingly are acquiring the capacity to project themselves and their causes beyond their borders, in this instance, the Dalits” (14).

While Smith's approach is somewhat different from my own, focusing on economic policy and the Global Justice movement, his scholarship is the most pertinent
to my own examination of the Dalit movement for several reasons. Smith relies on a case study methodology and employs Ruth Reitan's (2007) use of “understanding” and “explanation”, the subjective and objective. These concepts, covered earlier in this thesis, are a part of her methodology leading to the Amended Scale Shift Model. Smith uses Held's (1999) definition of globalization as way to place himself within relevant scholarship. He also emphasizes the importance of space for the movement and NCDHR's primary objective of “making the Indian state better serve the interests of the Dalit people” (15). Although Smith focuses on the transnational level of movement activity, he successfully argues for the goal of the movement to return to the local and national levels. Lastly, as this is an exploratory case study, Smith's fieldwork provides a useful first-hand account of NCDHR and its path to the global.

Regarding Dalit organizations going beyond India, Smith asserts, “they widened the basis of their struggle against caste and shifted scales beyond the nation-state, a struggle very much premised on the ideas of Ambedkar. Yet, at the same time...the Dalits insisted that the state retain its key role in terms of social protection and improvement” (21). In fact, in one interview a Dalit activist links this path to Ambedkar, noting, “Ambedkar showed that boundaries for solutions to the problem of caste discrimination are not to be drawn around the village, district, state or nation. What is an internal solution or external solution should not be determined by geographic borders or national borders” (21). Smith also argues that Dalits are more nationalistic perhaps, since their “primary objective [is in] making the Indian state better” (15).

According to Smith, the Dalit movement during the 1990s shifted its focus to the transnational level due to increased frustration with neoliberalism. He states, “they
widened the basis of their struggle against caste and shifted scales beyond the nation-state...yet, at the same time...Dalits insisted that the state retain its key role in terms of social protection and improvement” (21). He concludes that “real change” is possible in modern India although it has not been fully realized as of yet.

Clifford Bob (2007), in “‘Dalit Rights are Human Rights’: Caste Discrimination, International Activism, and the Construction of a New Human Rights Issue,” argues the Dalits have achieved “limited but important advances among transnational NGOs, international organizations and foreign governments since the late 1990s” (167). He points to organizational and rhetorical factors as to why the Dalits are increasingly successful at gaining recognition for their cause. Bob continues by asserting that this is due to the movement's unified network within India (as can be seen in the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights) but then also outside of India. Bob points to changes in framing strategies- a broader framing away from casteism to a more readily familiar terminology of human rights, discrimination and exclusion (168). This allows the Dalits to connect with a variety of other minority groups such as the Burakumin of Japan, a minority group, and the landless workers of South America.

Jens Lerche (2008), in “Transnational Advocacy Networks and Affirmative Action for Dalits in India,” comments: “strategy matters” (239). Lerche, too, argues that the shift of grassroots organizations to a more unified coalition has made them more successful than previous organization. He states, the Dalit movement “uses transnational advocacy networks to generate international social and political pressure on the Indian government, in order to further its own agenda at a national level” (240). A key strategy of the modern Dalit movement is just this: the reframing of the cause to succinctly match
that of other human rights organizations. “Casting out caste” is still important, but so too is the understanding that “dalit rights are human rights” (NCDHR). NCDHR also believes in the motto of the World Social Forum—“another world is possible.”

Lastly, Nicolas Jaoul’s chapter, “Political and ‘Non-Political’ Means in the Dalit Movement,” links the movement and the BSP to both political and non-political or socio-cultural tactics. This article is crucial to this thesis because it synthesizes the Dalit movement and its connections to the BSP, the local and the transnational. Jaoul writes, “with the rise to power by the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in Uttar Pradesh (UP), it has been widely acknowledged that Dalits have improved their position in the local power structures” (191). He connects the success of the BSP to the success of the Dalit movement and inclusivity. Jaoul, however, is hesitant to focus on the political route of a social movement, noting “the attaining of political power is acknowledged as an essential step, but also regarded as a potential trap for an authentic people’s movement” (191). He is critical of BSP officials once they are elected into office and the ways in which they interact with the movement and UP citizens; Jaoul states, “the cynical behavior of the BSP elected representatives towards their electorate has exacerbated the popular suspicion of politicians and the political sphere as a whole” (214). Jaoul’s statement clarifies why the NCDHR and other organizations opt not to officially affiliate themselves with a political party and choose instead, to support individual candidates.

The Dalit movement does not directly make claims about challenging Indian nationalism but rather attempts to assert an Ambedkar philosophy of equality on the basis of human rights and Indian citizen rights. The contestation of Dalits against Hindu nationalism is supported by most Dalit-scholars. Gail Omvedt is a sociologist and
scholar-activist who has been a part of the Dalit movement since the 1970s. Her writings focus on her personal knowledge of the movement and its history. In her book, *Dalit Visions* (2006), she states that the movements “came to contest the way in which the Hindu-nationalist forces sought to depict and hegemonize Indian culture” (6). Omvedt continues by pointing out three themes in Dalit politics: challenging the very definition of Hinduism as the core of Indian tradition and the necessity for this powerful force to be overthrown; support for all marginalized or oppressed people in India; and the need for cultural, economic and political change in India (86-7).

Omvedt, like other scholars (Bob 2007; Smith 2008; Paul 2002) note that the movement has not as yet achieved its primary goal of Dalit equality. Of course, pockets of both equality and severe discrimination exist today, typically aligned with the urban/rural divide. It is also noteworthy that the BSP like the movement has evolved its goals to be more moderate and universal, fostering a “broader vision which could make it a leader of a mass upsurge” (Omvedt 91). Other researchers have presented evidence to suggest that NCDHR's participation in transnational meetings has contributed to its ability to successfully achieve its goals of inclusion to both the Indian place and the global space.

*The Indian Political Sphere: Dalits, Politics and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)*

The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) was founded in 1984 as a Dalit-based political party with the goals of addressing the needs of the excluded and oppressed Dalit population (Pai 2002). The BSP philosophy is inspired by B.R. Ambedkar, who was a Dalit political leader in the early and mid-20th century. It was founded, however, by Kanshi Ram, a Dalit-Sikh. He grew up in the northwestern rural state of Punjab and was
the only child to graduate school. He claims to not have experienced any
“untouchability,” or Dalit-based discrimination, until working for the government where
the celebration of Dr. Ambedkar's birthday was disputed. This experience and the
reading of Ambedkar's work inspired Ram to take up Dalit rights in the early 1970s,
founding the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes and
Minorities Employees Welfare Association in 1971. By 1973 the organization became
the All India Backward and Minority Employees Federation (BAMCEF).

Ram's goals initially focused on radical social transformation, the BAMCEF
motto being, “Educate, Organize and Agitate.” His focus, however, slowly shifted away
from community organizing and into politics with the goal of placing Dalits (or Dalit-
rights sympathizers) into elected office. Thus, the BSP was born with this amended goal
of successful social change through political power.

The BSP is currently listed as a national party in India, but even within the last
decade has either not been present in certain Indian states or run as a state party.
This is most likely due to Dalit movement activity within some states and not others.
Sudha Pai (2002), in Dalit Assertion and the Unfinished Democratic Revolution: The
Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh, claims that “the gradual emergence of Dalit
consciousness and movements was significant feature of colonial India...leading to [the]
uneven development of the Dalit movement” (25). Pai continues by asserting that that
the socio-political roots of the BSP rest in India's colonial past.

Scholars (Luce 2007; Omvedt 2006; Pai 2002) claim that the emerging status of
the BSP as a legitimate, established party is due to the Dalit consciousness movements
beginning in the colonial period, especially the influence of Ambedkar, and the over 30
years of post-independence before the establishment of the BSP. The party is firmly rooted in the identity politics of Dalits although it allows non-Dalit participation. In fact, in the January 21\textsuperscript{st}, 2009 edition of \textit{The Hindu} news a well-known BJP official, Kalyan Singh, former Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister, stepped down from the party to instead back the BSP. Singh is quoted as saying, "We will take up the cause of Dalits, backwards, farmers and downtrodden in the days to come" (www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/000200901211431.htm). Some critics, however, claim that Singh may be doing this due to the increasing popularity of the BSP in Uttar Pradesh whose supporters could potentially back him in a run for Prime Minister.

Because the BSP is the party primarily supported by the Dalit movement, it will be imperative to explore how BSP support varies across regions in India and across time as the movement shifts from being locally and nationally to transnationally networked. Scholars remark that although the movement is making significant strides it is still not at a point of completion. Pai (2002) states, the BSP has “failed in its avowed goal of displacing \textit{manuvadi} (representing upper castes) forces and introducing social change” (1). The author argues that the BSP is at a cross-road and must decide between remaining loyal to its revolutionary leftist roots or to push forward as a political party “driven solely by the compulsion of achieving power” (1).

Yet, the overall goals of the BSP remain rooted within the movement and Ambedkar's vision for Dalits in India. It strives for justice and equality as is stated in the Indian Constitution (bspindia.org). The BSP states on its website:

> The chief aim and objective of the party shall be to work as a revolutionary social and economic movement of change with a view to realise, in practical terms, the supreme principles of universal justice,
liberty, equality and fraternity enunciated in the Constitution of India, to be followed by State in governance, and in particular summed up in the following extract from the Preamble of the Constitution.

Mayawati is the key leader of the movement and acts as unifier of politics and social activism, similar to how Ambedkar served the movement. She is often cited as a potential future Prime Minister of India.

Prior to the 2001 World Conference Against Racism Dalits were relatively successful in the Indian political sphere. Pockets of support for the BSP before the pre-global period are most recognized in the central state of Uttar Pradesh (UP). The data collected in this project reinforces this and is expanded on in Chapter Five. Long before this research, however, scholars have analyzed the success of the BSP, most notably in Uttar Pradesh.

A few articles and books (Pai 2002; The Economist 3/15/2003 and 5/26/2007; Jaffrelot 1998) have already been written on this BSP in Uttar Pradesh. Other articles highlight the oppositional dichotomy that exists between the BSP and the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). An article titled, “Saffron Fading: The Hindu Nationalists are struggling for leadership and direction,” appeared in The Economist (May 26, 2007). It declares that “Indians are out-of-love with dynastic politics” and connects this 2007 UP election to the 2004 loss of the general election by the BJP. The article notes, however, that the party does still hold power although its message has softened in order to have more appeal. Another Economist article (March 1, 2008), “Beginning the Long Goodbye,” also comments on the decline of the BJP. It claims that they have been “demoralized” and has “been torn by feuding over its Hindu-elitist ideology.”
The BSP, on the other hand, has had a “rise [that] has been inexorable.” This is most apparent in the victory of Mayawati, a female Dalit and BSP chairperson, who was elected chief minister in Uttar Pradesh for the fourth time in the May 2007 election.

Mayawati is known as “the Dalit queen” and was a former protégé of Kanshi Ram, the founder of the BSP. Simon Robinson, in an article for the *Time Magazine* (*South Pacific Edition*, April 14, 2008), cites Mayawati as “emerging as a national power broker--and even a potential Prime Minister.” Radhika Govinda, in “The Politics of the Marginalized: Dalits and Women's Activism in India” considers Mayawati and the BSP's success as uplifting for the Dalit movement in general. Govinda writes, “the BSP's emergence as a strong regional party under the leadership of Mayawati has led to a significant rise in confidence within Dalit communities” (183). She goes on to note as these Dalit political successes happen or increase so too do attacks on Dalits by upper-caste men and women (183).

Mayawati has also been working towards enforcing the previous Indian and international policies against discrimination and ensuring that the affirmative action policies are also enforced. Sagarika Ghose (2007) mentions how Mayawati had a leader of a political union, the Bharatiya Kisan Union, arrested for making a “casteist” comment. Overall, it is clear that Mayawati is a symbolic icon for the future of Dalits in India. Her name has spread to the international media, even being recently written about in the *Los Angeles Times* (Chu 2008). This is not to ignore, however, the many controversies that surround her such as accusations of corruption, embezzlement, and altering the original goals of the BSP to include other caste politicians and leaders. Yet, as she most recently publicized, not much is changing in more traditional Indian political
parties. She attacked Congress General Secretary, Rahul Gandhi, most recently for attempting to appeal to Dalits in UP while in private conducting ritual purification after interacting with Dalits, whose vote he is after for the upcoming 2009 election (www.mynews.in).

Even though political successes have been shown, there is not enough evidence to say that Dalits have conclusively “achieved” success. Rather, the BSP continues to gain mainstream popularity in certain regions of India while remaining virtually unknown (and unelected) in other areas. There is hope for the BSP with the projection of Mayawati as the potential next Prime Minister. This will eventually trickle down to the 160 million Dalits living in India. Likewise, the National Campaign of Dalit Human Rights continues its transnational networking while remaining grounded in the communal and political needs of Dalits in India.

Sam Paul (2002), in “Dalits, Durban and Delhi...Now What?,” argues that the “mindset of the masses must be influenced” for any sort of radical change to occur (149). He also remarks that “the real plight of the Dalits in our towns and villages will not be affected much even in a post-Durban scenario...atrocities against Dalits remain the same. They must live in separate settlements, draw water from separate pumps or wells, refrain from entering temples, and refrain from dining with the upper castes with separate places to sit” (149). He even provides measures which he thinks will be helpful. It is also somewhat interesting when reading his biography to notice that he is a writer from the All India Christian Council. Religions typically support the Dalit cause if for no other reason then they seek new membership. One of his measures for adoption is no surprise: the mass conversion of Dalits to Christianity.
Other scholars agree, however; Gopal Guru (2004) considers Dalits to still remain “bahishkrut,” which is noted as translating to “outcastes, ostracized, ghettoized, and socially boycotted” (757). Guru's article, “Dalit Vision of India: from Bahishkrut to Inclusive Bharat,” supports the earlier argument of Dalits as the future protectors of the Indian nation, as it is stated, “Their responsibility as the defender of Indian nation has increased manifold because the upper castes have a shaky commitment to the Indian nation” (762). This is because many Dalits do not, as of yet, have access to the global market.

Guru's final claim is one of hope: “the final future project of the Dalits would be to detoxify the civil society of its deep-seated prejudices and the structures of humiliation that push Dalits into the siege.” Guru continues, “the Dalits will prefer that kind of India, which will not produce the structures that will underlie and renew the structures of inequality” (762-3).

While the Dalit movement has evolved over time as a means to acquire new skills, tactics, and relationships, its overall goals have remained grounded in the task of created a new India that correlates its policy of equality with what Dalits and lower castes actually experience. The BSP, while historically rooted in the Dalit movement, has sought to achieve success not only from below but also from above by gaining political power. Christophe Jaffrelot (1998) points out that this is not, however, different from what other Dalit organizations have sought to do throughout history, particularly Ambedkar (35). Kanshi Ram, the founder of the BSP, was in fact very much a part of the movement and, like most Dalit organizations, took his inspiration from Dr. B.R. Ambedkar.
Chapter Five

Data, Findings, and Future Research

State Electoral Results Data

It is now necessary to turn to the electoral results of the Dalit-based Bahujan Samaj Party. Although a comparison has been done between the BJP and BSP, the results of the BSP alone are of interest. Individual state data and corresponding electoral data table may be found in Appendix 2. This includes the state's population, its literacy rate, its urban/rural division, and Dalit movement presence gathered in part from the 2001 census (India.gov.in). The electoral results for both the BSP and BJP are indicated in a table per state. Each table presents the year of the election, how many seats the BJP contested, how many seats they actually won, how many seats the BSP contested, how many they won, and the total winning party for the election. Before getting started, Table 2 provides a list of common political parties, their abbreviations, and is followed by a brief summary of the most common national Indian political parties.

Table 2: Common Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Political Party Abbreviations:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSP</td>
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<tr>
<td>BJP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INC</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPM</td>
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The Indian National Congress (INC) was founded in 1885 and was the main party which became a part of the Indian Independence movement fighting against colonial rule. Currently, the INC claims to be the only party “anchored in the larger vision of India as a nation, while at the same time being sensitive to regional and local sentiments” (www.congress.org.in). The INC has roots in the beliefs of Mahatma Gandhi, especially the concept of Sarvodaya which is to help uplift all segments of the Indian population. In the 2009 Lok Sabha elections the INC along with a coalition of other parties, the United Progressive Alliance, came to power.

The Communist Party of India and then the splinter-party, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) are both communist parties with limited success in Indian states-Kerala and Tamil Nadu. The CPI claims to be the party of the “Indian working class” (www.cpiindia.org). It seeks justice through a socialist regime where all citizens have an equal opportunity. The CPI was founded in 1925. The CPI(M) split with the CPI around 1964 due to the desire to continue with radical tactics whereas the CPI has softened its message.

Indian political parties are divided by either state or national standing. Some state-based parties, such as the Jammu & Kashmir National Conference, have successfully won state general assembly elections and coalitions in the national government. Much of India’s political party structure consists of numerous small and regional parties. As of 2004, there were only 9 national parties and about 50 recognized state parties (eci website).

Data for this project were gathered from 16 states. Out of those states, the number of seats contested and/or won by the BSP increased from the pre-global to post- periods.
It is noteworthy that out of the 16 states that data were successfully collected from, a NCDHR branch exists in 12 of them. Once factoring the sub-movements of the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights only Jammu & Kashmir has no known Dalit movement presence. This information, along with other Dalit movement activity, is outlined in Appendix 1.

Table 3 (below) provides a list of Indian states, the states where data were collected, and whether or not findings were conclusive or inconclusive. Inconclusive data are determined by a lack of BSP participation in a given state. Three states- Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand- were not formed as states until 2000; therefore, they were not used in data collection as they did not have viable elections to establish a pre-global period. Table 3 also provides a summary of each state’s political activity-which party won and changes in both contested and won seats by the BSP.

Table 3 highlights several important outcomes. First, there are drastic rises in the seats contested by BSP candidates in every state where data were collected. This, however, does not necessarily translate to more elected positions in those states. In fact, in two states- Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir- the BSP elected positions decreased. There continues to be a rather low “success” rate of BSP candidates achieving elected positions. The remainder of the data provided in Table 3 and in Appendix 2 will be analyzed in more detail shortly. Before that, however, the data and results of Uttar Pradesh’s political landscape are examined more closely because, as previously discussed, this state has unusual BSP success compared with the rest of the states under review.
### Table 3: Electoral Data Collected

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>48 to 160</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
<td>BJP to INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arunachal Pradesh</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>161 to 212</td>
<td>2 to 4</td>
<td>JD to BJP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2002, 2007</td>
<td>7 to 166</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>BJP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haryana</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>67 to 84</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
<td>BJP to INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himachal Pradesh</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2003, 2007</td>
<td>28 to 67</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
<td>INC to BJP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jammu &amp; Kashmir</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2002, 2008</td>
<td>29 to 83</td>
<td>4 to 0</td>
<td>JKN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karnataka</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>85 to 102</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>12 to 107</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>CPI to CPI(M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2003, 2008</td>
<td>170 to 228</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>INC to BJP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>83 to 272</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>BJP to INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orissa</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>59 to 86</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>INC to BJP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002, 2007</td>
<td>67 to 115</td>
<td>1 to 0</td>
<td>BJP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajasthan</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2003, 2008</td>
<td>108 to 199</td>
<td>2 to 6</td>
<td>INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikkim</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Nadu</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9 to 164</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>CPI to INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2002, 2007</td>
<td>296 to 403</td>
<td>67 to 206</td>
<td>BJP to BSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>48 to 128</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>CPM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One clear avenue of future research is fieldwork to see exactly why the BSP has such a tremendous success rate in UP. Scholars have written about the politics in UP without covering the tactics of both the local and state level Dalit movement and BSP offices. The political activity in Uttar Pradesh since the mid-1990s is of particular interest to this research project. As has already been alluded to, it is the only state to have an overwhelming BSP majority and a Dalit Chief Minister, Mayawati. The NCDHR has maintained a significant presence in Uttar Pradesh along with numerous other Dalit organizations, but no research points to a heightened level of mobilization or even movement-party organization.

The BSP, although somewhat successful in the 1990s, drastically increased both its candidates contesting seats and elected officials between 1996 and 2007. In 2007 it took the lead as the winning party across the state. In 1996 the BSP challenged 296 positions and was elected to 67 of those seats. In 2007 its numbers grew significantly to 403 contested seats and 206 elected positions. At table 4 demonstrates, the BJP dropped both its contestation and elected positions between 1996 and 2007. In 1996 it ran for 404 seats and was elected to 174 of those positions whereas in 2007 it contested 350 seats and only won 51 positions.

Table 4: Uttar Pradesh Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BJP Contested Seats:</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJP Wins:</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSP Contested Seats:</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSP Wins:</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winning Party:</td>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>BSP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bahujan Samaj Party presence will need to continue to be monitored over time to see if its political power continues, grows, or decreases. There are several possible
factors for BSP success: UP is the most populated state, with a population of 166,052,859 (2001 census). Also, while it is comprised of about 66% rural land, it has slightly below double the national average of population density. It is rated at approximately 473 people per square kilometer while the national average is at 274 people. UP has a 57.36% literacy rate.

As discussed earlier, the role of Mayawati in state and national elections has been and will continue to be very important not only for Uttar Pradesh but also for the Dalit cause and the Bahujan Samaj Party. She is, according to various news sources, the first Dalit who has a real chance of someday becoming the Prime Minister of India. In fact, there was speculation about this during the most recent general elections in India-the 15th Lok Sabha elections.

2009 Lok Sabha Elections

Into this discussion of Uttar Pradesh must enter the 15th general Lok Sabha elections (April). The data gathered for this study were compiled from the state-by state general assembly elections, particularly the Vidhan Sabha (lower house). This was done so because the upper houses do not have an electoral process by the people but rather, through appointment. The Lok Sabha is also a lower house on the national level. It is the “House of the People” and, like the Vidhan Sabha, allows for elections by the citizens. The majority of this research was accomplished prior to the April 2009 Lok Sabha elections. These elections, however, are very important to this research project. Therefore, an overview of the most recent electoral data will be presented in this chapter.

The media heavily covered the BSP and the role of Mayawati, the chief minister of UP. Although Mayawati was not expecting the Prime Minister position in this series of
elections, various news stories emphasized her future candidacy. Chandra (April 16th, 2009) for *Indian Express* writes, “the significance of Mayawati as a potential prime minister is not just that she happens to be Dalit — but that she has built a mass political base by openly presenting herself as being of and for Dalits” (www.indiaexpress.com).

Coverage of Mayawati's chances as a Prime Minister is not restricted to India. On April 14th, 2009 National Public Radio published the following article on its website, “'Untouchable' seeks power in Indian election.” This was followed by a radio news story on April 15th, 2009 regarding the general elections. The NPR article asks regarding Mayawati, “But can she become prime minister?”

It continues,

She certainly has a chance. While national politics have long been dominated by two parties — the left-of-center Congress and the Hindu nationalist BJP — neither is expected to be able to form a strong coalition. This has given regional and caste-based parties — particularly Mayawati's — additional power as they negotiate to join alliances that will form after the five phases of voting end May 13.

The findings of this research project accompanied by scholarly and non-scholarly literature make one claim clear- Indian politics and the Bahujan Samaj Party's function within it should continue to be followed.

Once the elections were over several media outlets wrote about the devastating results for the Bahujan Samaj Party. Article titles include: “Stung by Defeat, Mayawati to revert to Dalit Agenda,” “Maya fails to cast a spell,” and “Dalit movement takes a Beating.” There was an unprecedented and perhaps unwarranted amount of hype regarding an anticipated BSP-alliance landslide win. Therefore, when the BSP did not live up to this performance, the media took the approach of the BSP being “defeated,” “beaten,” or “failing to cast a spell.” The India Election Commission put out a table
stating the electoral results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian National Congress (INC)</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other State Parties (OTH)</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The BSP when compared to either the INC or BJP does not fare well. But, the BSP is not yet on the same mainstream level, whether ideologically, socially or politically, as either the BJP or INC. Although it continues to increase its presence in states, it is not an old enough party to make leaps into the winning party of India. Just as Dalit rights are not yet a mainstream concern across India, neither is the Bahujan Samaj Party.

A brief glance at the results of both the 13th and 14th Lok Sabha elections demonstrate that despite media coverage, the BSP has, in fact, increased its elected seats in the Lok Sabha. The BSP won 14 seats in the 13th Lok Sabha elections (1999) and won 19 seats in the 14th Lok Sabha elections (2004). During the 15th Lok Sabha elections the BSP won 21 seats.

This is not a drastic increase; the BSP is not suddenly over-powering the Indian National Congress or Bharatiya Janata Party. Yet, this study is not looking for obvious success or even drastic changes in the Indian social conscious or political landscape. As an exploratory case study, this project instead seeks to see if this area of research is relevant and in need of future research.

**Findings and Conclusions**

What does this mean for the Dalit movement and what are the larger implications
for nationalism in India? Currently, the BSP remains focused on Dalit and low caste rights. As political power is ascertained this may change in which case the movement may react against the party. Vikram Garg, a PhD student studying caste politics, is quoted in an article by Ghimire for *The Global Voice* as saying, “that despite all efforts made to empower the dalits, their situation still remains dire” ([www.globalvoicesonline.org](http://www.globalvoicesonline.org)). This sentiment is reflected in the statements of human rights organizations and the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights. The NCDHR states that it has accomplished the goal of internationalizing and spreading its cause. This can potentially connect to the drastic changes in BSP candidates across the states under review. Yet, the NCDHR recognizes that it has not yet successfully returned to the state level where it seeks to hold states accountable for discriminatory practices; hence, BSP candidates are not typically elected. Calls for changes to the traditional national ideology have not changed enough yet to allow for wide-spread BSP political power.

Since this project does not handle primary research in India, it is hard to make a connection between what the BSP does in India, what the lived reality of Dalits is, and how the two interact. The data presented above is a start for understanding the political landscape of India and how the BSP fits into it. Much work still needs to be done and additional data would provide more support for what the data seeks to determine—whether or not going global increases the chances of successfully challenging nationalism. While these elections may not provide a direct link to the inner-workings and success of the Dalit movement, it is achieving the goals set forth by the project as an exploratory case study.

Comparing electoral results from 1995-1999 and 2002-2009 does not provide a
unmistakable relationship between the Dalit movement's participation in the transnational sphere, the Bahujan Samaj Party's success in the domestic sphere, or the contestation of Hindu nationalism as represented in the Bharatiya Janata Party. This path of “going global,” however, should be viewed as one possible reason for the changes in BSP success. An interpretation of the data reinforces several points: visibility for the Dalit cause has increased and most likely will continue along this path. Also, there are noticeable small changes to the success rate of the BSP in gaining elected positions. The state general assembly elections and the 2009 Lok Sabha elections both support this claim.

The NCDHR asserts that the goal of internationalizing the plight of the Dalits has been achieved due to its participation and attention from numerous global entities. Regarding the collected data, overall the BSP contested only 1,277 seats between the 16 states reviewed in the pre-global period (1995-1999). Out of those contested seats it won 87. This is only a 6.81% success rate. In the post-global participation period the BSP contested 2,576 seats, winning 230 of those. This is a success rate of 8.93% and more than a 50% increase in both contested and won seats.

The BJP, on the other hand, ran for 2,591 seats overall in the 1995-1999 period. It won 674 of those seats throughout the various Indian states. In the 2002-2009 period it decreased the number of seats it contested running for 2,089; it increased, however, its elected seats to 684. This is a jump from a 26% success rate in the pre-global period to a 32.74% success rate in the post-period. Table 5 demonstrates these total changes in the BSP and BJP between the pre- and post-periods.

Thus, the rate of success for both the Dalit-based BSP and the Hindu nationalist
BJP has increased in recent years. Yet, the number of seats contested has drastically increased for the BSP and sharply decreased for the BJP. Several scholars have pointed to the increasing fragmentation of large, stable political parties in India. This was actually one of the predictions for the 2009 Lok Sabha elections—that it would be dominated by alliances between the small regional parties instead of one of the large national parties. The BSP was not expected to gain a majority on its own, but instead would be a part of a much larger coalition.

Table 5: Total Changes in the BSP and BJP

The BJP is among one of these parties that were expected not to fare well; and yet, although it decreased the number of seats it ran for it maintained and increased its elected positions in numerous states. The heightened success of both parties alludes to the fact that the voter-base of each may not be leaving one for the other. There is not an either-or
division between the BSP and BJP; rather, the voter base is drastically different and it seems more likely that voters would be pulled from the more moderate Indian National Congress or vice-versa. This project did not expect that there was a clear oppositional relationship between the BSP and BJP. Since, however, the BJP is the most closely linked party to Hindu nationalism it was helpful to also monitor what was going on with its party. Perhaps, the BSP has gained recent voters that were not voting previously; the Dalit movement mentioned that it sponsors voter registration campaigns in rural and poor villages.

Future research needs to examine the specific relationship between the BSP, BJP and other political parties to study how the Indian nation has adequate space for several to succeed. The BJP has slightly decreased its numbers but remains stable and powerful. The Indian National Congress has become more popular which may be due to their sympathetic message to uplift all the segments of Indian society. And, as the NCDHR publicizes its cause the BSP also continues to grow. How the ideology of each party resonates with the voter-base Indian identity is also of interest.

Analysis of individual states potentially offers a more direct correlation between the Dalit movement and Hindu nationalism as recognized in the BSP and BJP. Table 6 (below) illustrates the changes between the BSP and BJP in the state of Uttar Pradesh. Uttar Pradesh, as previously discussed, is a special case for the BSP in India. It won control over the state government in 2007 although it has had a significant presence in UP prior to the Dalit movements’ “going global.” In the 1995-1999 period, the BSP had a 22.67% success rate, much higher than the national average. By the post-global period, however, its success had jumped to an astounding 51.11%. The case of Uttar Pradesh
does show a link between the BSP's success and the BJP's success. In the pre-global period the BJP had about a 42% success rate; by the post-global period its success rate had plummeted to only a 14.57% success rate.

Table 6: Changes between BSP and BJP in Uttar Pradesh

Since the BSP maintains a shared message with movement since its inception from the movement, a connection between the two has been made. When and if the BSP continues to grow and/or present a more moderate message the relationship between the party and movement will need to be reexamined. The movement may very well abandon the party if it begins to focus more on political power instead of fighting discrimination for Dalits and other low castes. The plight of Dalits in India will not necessarily disappear with the increased political power of the Bahujan Samaj Party. The Dalit
movement will continue, despite the BSP's political success, to urge states to function as a protector for citizens (NCDHR.org.in). As India and the Dalit movement become more connected with the global world it is likely that the Dalit cause will continue to mobilize and spread its message.

The rate of “success” for the movement is a difficult conclusion to make. Gamson (1990) was considered for his measures of success, but did not prove very helpful in the case of the Dalits. This, in part, is because the movement success in this case was determined by the success of a political party and not the only the achievements of the social movement organizations. There are, however, several other problems with Gamson’s measures in this case. For instance, the persistent problems of Dalits in India have been formally recognized by a variety of institutions and governments, including the United States, the European Union and the United Nations. Yet, he considers this recognition his third indicator for success.

One risk to the apparent success of the movement is Smith’s (1999) claim that as excluded groups and various movements becomes increasingly visible in a global world that there is the risk of a reassertion of traditional values. The findings of this project show that India’s political sphere acts as an open space for both traditional and non-traditional ideas and politics. The BSP may be a long ways away from becoming one of the major players in Indian politics just as the Dalit movement is not going to end all Dalit-based discrimination in the near future, despite its already lengthy past with this struggle.

Regarding the 15th Lok Sabha elections, Shivam Vij argues that that whatever the outcome for the BSP and Mayawati, it will strengthen the Dalit cause. National Public
Radio (April 14th, 2009) quotes Vij as saying,

The 2009 general elections are not the last general elections for Mayawati. They are the first," said Shivam Vij, a journalist and longtime Mayawati watcher. "And if she doesn't become prime minister this year she'll say 'Look, they stopped a Dalit from succeeding.'

More specific future research requires fieldwork in India as a way to gain insight into the national mood. Is Hindu nationalism as relevant to most Indians' lives as some scholars think? Is there a direct and oppositional relationship between Hindu nationalism and Dalit rights? Electoral results do not support this relationship. Also, a first-hand account of the Dalit movement campaigns, transnational participation and local activity would aid in determining if this study has any relevance to nationalism, globalization, and social movements.

This body of preliminary work points to the feasibility of subaltern action to challenge hegemonic national identities. There is a clear path which can be traced beginning with the exclusion of the Dalit people from the Indian consciousness. This exclusion was manifested in discriminatory practices which only increased during colonial rule. Rather than being a part of the Indian Hindu identity, the Dalits found solidarity and inclusivity first in their own collective identity and then later in the transnational social movement network. This gave them a sub-cultural sense of identity for which to then challenge the hegemonic Hindu nationalism.

The exclusion of the Dalits remains a central concern for both the movement organizations and political parties. If it were not for this sense of exclusion from the Indian nation perhaps neither the movement nor the party would exist. Although some Dalits witness increasing inclusion into the national identity, it is still only achieved
through upwards social mobility, the abandonment of Hinduism, or social, cultural, or political power.

This project initially asked are sub-national social movements which “go global” by participating in the transnational social movement network successful at then returning to their nation and affecting change in the previously understood national identity? Are they more successful than prior to “going global”? The hypothesis stated: contemporary sub-national social movements are more likely to experience success at either challenging their own exclusion or in achieving national inclusivity after participating in the transnational social movement network. While the data presented do not incontestably answer the research question and support the hypothesis it demonstrates that this is a worthy exploratory case study in need of additional monitoring and research.

According to Bahujan Samaj Party results the answer to the research question is yes. Even a 2.12% increase in success is success nonetheless. Again, this project does not, however, argue that this is the only reason the BSP may be experiencing increasing success. There are many other possible routes for the political changes in India. The claim of the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights of successfully internationalizing the Dalit cause should be connected, however to the parallel visibility in elections by the BSP.

The debate over contemporary nationalism needs to be connected to the vast literature on transnationalism, global connections, and social movements. Even if power shifts between the global, the national and the local, there continues to be an emphasis on inclusivity. Who is included and who is not will remain an important question to ask as power circulates between, below or beyond the nation. Scholars will continue to study,
debate, disagree and write about the changing nature of nationalism as it is affected by
global policy, citizenship, and protest. As top-down approaches continue to determine
“the hegemonic” of nationalisms and global neoliberal policy, so too will the contention
from below-whether sub-national, transnational or a reflexive movement between the
two.
Appendices
## Appendix 1

### Dalit Social Movement Organizations (SMOs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Movement Organization</th>
<th>Tactics</th>
<th>Slogan</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Participation in Transnational Network</th>
<th>Additional Places of Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR)</td>
<td>raise national &amp; international awareness through outreach, transnational networking, policy reform and various other sub-national organizations</td>
<td>“Dalit Rights are Human Rights. Cast out Caste!”</td>
<td>NCDHR performs atrocity monitoring, legal interventions, and national and international advocacy to achieve a three-pronged objective: (1) to hold the State accountable for all Human Rights violations committed against Dalits; (2) to sensitize civil society by raising visibility of the Dalit problem; and (3) to render justice to Dalit victims of discrimination and violence.</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch; World Social Forum; World Conference against Racism, European Union and United Nations</td>
<td>14 Indian States: Bihar, Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Pondicherry, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh. Default Location: New Delhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN)</td>
<td>work with international policy-makers, UN and EU</td>
<td>“Working globally against discrimination based on work and descent”</td>
<td>“The International Dalit Solidarity Network - IDSN - works on a global level for the elimination of caste discrimination and similar forms of discrimination based on work and descent. We link grassroots priorities with international mechanisms and institutions in order to change policies and practices that lead to caste discrimination.”</td>
<td>work primarily with various organizations and policy-makers inside the European Union and United Nations. Known interaction with various branches of the Dalit movement.</td>
<td>India, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 1 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Movement Organization</th>
<th>Tactics</th>
<th>Slogan</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Participation in Transnational Network</th>
<th>Additional Places of Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dalit NGO Federation-Nepal</strong></td>
<td>To eradicate caste-based discrimination through a process of empowerment, networking and alliance building of Dalit and pro-Dalit institutions</td>
<td>“United mission for social change.”</td>
<td>“The main aim of DNF is fighting together against caste-based discrimination. It is a common forum for raising collective voices of Dalit community for claiming rights, dignity and opportunity through policy influencing, networking and alliance building.”</td>
<td>works with smaller organizations in Nepal and then larger international organizations, especially throughout Asia.</td>
<td>serves as an umbrella organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founding Date: 1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founding Place: Kathmandu, Nepal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Website: Dfnnepal.org</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dalit Solidarity</strong></td>
<td>work in extremely rural and poor communities. Provides access to education, health care, and economic opportunities</td>
<td>“Justice and Equality for all Indians”</td>
<td>“Dalit Solidarity is committed to the principles of justice and equality for all Indians, regardless of caste, race, gender or religion. This commitment is expressed by providing access to quality health care and education, by making economic opportunities available for India's poorest citizens, and by working to protect human rights.”</td>
<td>Exclusively sub-national. Works with NCDHR however.</td>
<td>Works exclusively in Tamil Nadu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founding Date: 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founding Place: Tamil Nadu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Website: Dalitsolidarity.org</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navsarjan</strong></td>
<td>training, awareness, fieldwork and legal intervention</td>
<td>“Ensuring human rights for all.”</td>
<td>“Our mission is to eliminate discrimination based on untouchability practices; ensure equality of status and opportunities for all, regardless of caste, class or gender; and to ensure the rule of law.”</td>
<td>Works with NCDHR, IDSN, Dalit Foundation, Indian Institute on Dalit Studies</td>
<td>3,000 Indian villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founding Date: 1988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founding Place: Gujarat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Website: Narvsarjan.org</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2
State Electoral Data

Table 7: Andhra Pradesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Information:</th>
<th>Electoral Data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statehood:</strong> 1956</td>
<td><strong>State:</strong> Andhra Pradesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population:</strong> 76,210,007</td>
<td><strong>1999</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Literacy Rate:</strong> 60%</td>
<td><strong>BJP Contested Seats:</strong> 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% Urban:</strong> 27.3</td>
<td><strong>BJP Wins:</strong> 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dalit Movement Presence:</strong> yes</td>
<td><strong>BSP Contested Seats:</strong> 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Dalit</td>
<td><strong>BSP Wins:</strong> 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Rights Movement</td>
<td><strong>Winning Party:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location:</strong> Southeast India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Findings:**

BJP slightly increases its candidates running for office from the pre-global to post-global periods whereas the BSP more than tripled its presence from 48 to 160.

The BJP decreases its elected positions from 12 to 2. The BSP increases its positions from 0 to 1.
Appendix 2 (Continued)

Table 8: Bihar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Information:</th>
<th>Electoral Data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statehood: 1936</td>
<td>State: Bihar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate: 47.53</td>
<td>BJP Contested Seats: 315 168 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Urban: 15.78</td>
<td>BJP Wins: 41 67 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalit Movement Presence: yes</td>
<td>BSP Contested Seats: 161 249 212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights</td>
<td>BSP Wins: 2 5 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location: North India</td>
<td>Winning Party: JD* BJP BJP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Janata Dal

Findings:

Both the BJP and BSP maintain high numbers of candidates contesting seats. The BSP remains somewhat unsuccessful because the BJP remains the majority party in the state. The number of contested seats for the BSP has increased from 161 to 212 while the BJP numbers went from 315 all the way down to 102. The BSP won 4 seats in the 2005 election whereas it only had 2 in 1995. Although the number of contested seats by the BJP has decreased, it has increased its overall success in garnering elected positions- from 41 to 55.
Appendix 2 (Continued)

Table 9: Gujarat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Information:</th>
<th>Electoral Data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statehood: 1960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 50,671,017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate: 69.97%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Urban: 37.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalit Movement Presence: yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDHR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location: West India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BJP Contested Seats</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJP Wins:</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSP Contested Seats:</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSP Wins:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winning Party:</td>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>INC</td>
<td>a close second</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings:

Although the BJP has won every election since 1998, two factors are important: the INC has almost won during various elections. Also, the number of BSP candidates running has drastically increased since 1998 from only 7 candidates to 166.
Table 10: Haryana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Information:</th>
<th>Electoral Data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statehood: 1966</td>
<td>State: Haryana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate: 69.97%</td>
<td>BJP Contested Seats:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Urban: 29</td>
<td>BJP Wins:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalit Movement Presence: yes</td>
<td>BSP Contested Seats:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location: North India</td>
<td>BSP Wins:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Winning Party:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings:

Despite the fact that Haryana has a significant Dalit movement presence the BSP has not significantly shown improvement. It has managed to hold one seat since 2000 and has only slightly increased the number of BSP candidates running for office. Surprisingly, however, is that while the BJP has almost quadrupled the number of seats it contests it has gone from 11 elected seats in 1996 to only 2 in 2005.
Appendix 2 (Continued)

Table 11: Himachal Pradesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Information:</th>
<th>Electoral Data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statehood: 1948</td>
<td>State: Himachal Pradesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literary Rate: 77.13%</td>
<td>BJP Contested Seats: 68 68 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Urban: 10</td>
<td>BJP Wins: 31 16 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalit Movement Presence: yes</td>
<td>BSP Contested Seats: 28 23 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location: North India</td>
<td>BSP Wins: 0 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Winning Party: INC INC BJP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings:
The BSP has not been very successful in HP and yet, by 2007 it has increased its presence by both running for more contested seats and winning one of those seats. It jumped from 28 potential seats to 67. The BJP has remained steady with 68 contested seats, but has slightly increased its number of election positions from 31 to 41. HP is an extremely rural state and comprised mostly of agriculture and hill communities.
Appendix 2 (Continued)

Table 12: Jammu & Kashmir

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Information:</th>
<th>Electoral Data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statehood: 1846</td>
<td>State: Jammu &amp; Kashmir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate: 48.22%</td>
<td>BJP Contested Seats: 53  58  64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Urban: 23.33</td>
<td>BJP Wins: 8  1  11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalit Movement Presence: no known presence</td>
<td>BSP Contested Seats: 29  33  83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location: northernmost tip</td>
<td>BSP Wins: 4  1  0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Winning Party: JKN* JKN JKN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Jammu & Kashmir National Conference

Findings:

Neither the BJP nor the BSP have been very successful in J&K, but instead its political landscape has been dominated by the Jammu & Kashmir National Conference (JKN) party. Despite the majority rule of the JKN, the BJP and BSP have both expanded their presence in the elections. The BSP presence went from 29 to 83 regarding the number of seats it ran for; it however, had 4 elected positions in 1996 and did not win any in the 2008 election.
Appendix 2 (Continued)

Table 13: Karnataka

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Information:</th>
<th>Electoral Data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statehood: 1956 (boundary) 1972 (current name)</td>
<td><strong>State:</strong> Karnataka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 52,850,562</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate: 66.6%</td>
<td>BJP Contested Seats:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Urban: 33.98</td>
<td>BJP Wins:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalit Movement Presence: yes NCDHR</td>
<td>BSP Contested Seats:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location: Southwest India</td>
<td>BSP Wins:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winning Party: INC</td>
<td>INC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings:

Although the BSP and BJP contest a high number of seats, the Indian National Congress (INC) party has remained strong. The seats contested by the BJP jumped from 149 in the pre-global period to 198 in the post-global period. It also gained an additional 35 seats from the 44 it had in 1999. The BSP has not had any candidates elected although it slightly increased its presence from 85 to 102.
Appendix 2 (Continued)

Table 14: Kerala

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Information:</th>
<th>Electoral Data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statehood:</strong> 1956</td>
<td><strong>State:</strong> Kerala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population:</strong> 31,841,274</td>
<td><strong>1996</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Literacy Rate:</strong> 90.92%*</td>
<td><strong>BJP Contested Seats:</strong> 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% Urban:</strong> 26</td>
<td><strong>BJP Wins:</strong> 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dalit Movement Presence:</strong> yes</td>
<td><strong>BSP Contested Seats:</strong> 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location:</strong> southwest tip</td>
<td><strong>BSP Wins:</strong> 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Findings:**

Politically, Kerala is most often associated with the Communist Party of India, both Marxist and not. Despite this majority, the INC gained power in 2001 only to lose it in 2006. The BSP has increased its presence while not winning any positions. Likewise, the BJP has not won any positions, but also slightly increased its presence in the state.

*High literacy rate is thought to be associated with the high Christian population (at 19%) and a history of missionary work promoting education.*
Appendix 2 (Continued)

Table 15: Madhya Pradesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Information:</th>
<th>Electoral Data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statehood: 1956</td>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate: 64.1%</td>
<td>BJP Contested Seats: 320 230 228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Urban: 17</td>
<td>BJP Wins: 119 173 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalit Movement Presence: yes</td>
<td>BSP Contested Seats: 170 157 228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location: central India</td>
<td>BSP Wins: 11 2 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Winning Party: INC BJP BJP

Findings:
The BSP has had a relatively strong presence in MP, although it has not overcome the BJP in the elections by any means. BSP presence in the post-global period has grown from 170 to 228; it has, however, maintained 11 seats between the pre- and post-period. The contested seats by the BJP have decreased from 320 to 228, but their elected positions have grown from 119 to 143.
Appendix 2 (Continued)

Table 16: Maharashtra

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Information:</th>
<th>Electoral Data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statehood: 1960</td>
<td>State: Maharashtra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 96,752,247</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate: 76.9%</td>
<td>BJP Contested Seats: 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Urban: 42.4</td>
<td>BJP Wins: 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalit Movement Presence: yes</td>
<td>BSP Contested Seats: 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDHR</td>
<td>BSP Wins: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location: West India</td>
<td>Winning Party: BJP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings:

Despite the BSP's lack of elected officials, it has more than tripled its presence in elections between 1999 and 2004 from 83 to 272. BJP numbers are relatively static, only decreasing by 2 elected seats and 6 contested seats.
Table 17: Orissa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Information:</th>
<th>Electoral Data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statehood: 1949</td>
<td>State:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 36,804,660</td>
<td>Orissa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate: 63.61%</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Urban: 14.97</td>
<td>BJP Contested Seats:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalit Movement Presence: yes</td>
<td>BJP Wins:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location: east coast of India</td>
<td>BSP Contested Seats:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BSP Wins:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Winning Party:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings:
There have been no major changes in the BSP in Orissa; it has not been elected to any positions and grew marginally from 59 to 86 contested seats. The BJP, however, has won more seats in the past two elections, 2000 and 2004, winning 38 seats and 32 seats. And yet, it has not contested as many seats as was seen in the 1995 election, falling to 63 from 144.
Appendix 2 (Continued)

Table 18: Punjab

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Information:</th>
<th>Electoral Data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statehood: 1937</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 24,358,999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate: 60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Urban: 33.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalit Movement Presence: yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDHR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location: northwest tip</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Punjab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997  2002  2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJP Contested Seats:</td>
<td>22     23  23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJP Wins:</td>
<td>18     3    19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSP Contested Seats:</td>
<td>67     100  115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSP Wins:</td>
<td>10     0    0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winning Party:</td>
<td>BJP    INC  BJP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings:

The Dalit movement has had a lengthy history of activism in Punjab. And yet, the BJP continues to maintain a majority in the 2007 elections. It has steadily held about 18-19 seats although it lost to the INC in the 2002 election, dropping its seats to a mere 3.

The BSP has jumped from 67 to 115 contested seats but lost its one seat in the 1997 election by 2002 and did not gain any additional seats in the 2007 election.
Appendix 2 (Continued)

Table 19: Rajasthan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Information:</th>
<th>Electoral Data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statehood: 1956</td>
<td>BJP Contested Seats:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 56,473,122</td>
<td>BJP Wins:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate: 61.03%</td>
<td>BSP Contested Seats:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Urban: 23.4</td>
<td>BSP Wins:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalit Movement Presence: yes</td>
<td>Winning Party:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDHR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location: west India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings:
The BSP has slightly increased both its number of candidates running and how many gain a seat. In 1998 it won 2 of the 108 seats it ran for whereas in 2008 it won 6 of the 199 contested seats. The BJP's elected positions have grown considerably from 33 to 78. The number of seats BJP candidates have run for has remained somewhat static.
Appendix 2 (Continued)

Table 20: Tamil Nadu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Information:</th>
<th>Electoral Data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statehood: 1969</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 62,405,679</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate: 73.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Urban: 44.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalit Movement Presence: yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location: southeast tip</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State: Tamil Nadu</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BJP Contested Seats:</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJP Wins:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSP Contested Seats:</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSP Wins:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winning Party: CPI</td>
<td>CPM</td>
<td>INC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings:
The BSP has drastically increased its candidates contesting seats in elections, from 9 in 1996 to 17 in 2001 to 164 in 2006. It did not win any of those seats. The BJP increased the number of seats it ran for as well-from 143 to 225. As of 2006, however, it did not gain any positions in government. The leading party is typically the Communist Party of India or the Communist Party (Marxist) although the INC won in the 2006 election.
Appendix 2 (Continued)

Table 21: West Bengal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Information:</th>
<th>Electoral Data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statehood: 1950</td>
<td>State:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 80,176,197</td>
<td>West Bengal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate: 69.22%</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Urban: 28</td>
<td>BJP Contested Seats: 292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BJP Wins: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalit Movement Presence: no known presence</td>
<td>BSP Contested Seats: 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location: northeast India</td>
<td>BSP Wins: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Winning Party: CPM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings:
Politically, West Bengal has historically been dominated by the Communist Party of India- Marxist (CPM). The BSP has, however, increased its presence on the polls. In 1996 it only ran for 48 seats whereas it ran for 128 in 2006. Despite this growth the BSP has not been elected to any positions. The BJP has not held any elected positions in the electoral years under review here. Its number of candidates has significantly decreased from 292 in 1996 to only 29 in 2006.
Appendix 3

Dalit movement Solidarity Networks

Global National Dalit Organizations
- Dalit NGO Federation-Nepal
- Human Development Organization-Sri Lanka
- National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights
  - All India Dalit Mothers' Alliance
  - Dalit Article Adhikar Abhiyan
- National Dalit Movement for Justice
- National Federation of Dalit Law Rights

International Networks
- Human Rights Watch
- Amnesty International
- UN World Health Federation
- International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination & Racism
- UN Human Rights Commissioner
- Anti Slavery International
- Democracy and Human Rights Initiative
- Pacifica International
- Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development
- International Catholic Movement for Intellectuals & Cultural Affairs
- The World Council of Churches
- Center for Human Rights & Global Justice

National Dalit Networks
- International Dalit Solidarity Network
- Platform Dalit Solidarity in Germany
- Dalit Solidarity Network USA
- Dalit Solidarity Network UK
- Dalit Solidarity Network Netherlands
- Dalit Solidarity Network Canada
- Dalit Solidarity Network Europe
- Dalit Solidarity Network Belgium

Regional Networks
- World Social Forum
- UN World Conference Against Racism
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Human Rights Watch website: (www.hrw.org/reports/1999/india)


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