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# Joint physical layer security and PAPR mitigation in OFDM systems

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(54) **JOINT PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY AND PAPR MITIGATION IN OFDM SYSTEMS**

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(74) *Attorney, Agent, or Firm* — Thomas I Horstemeyer, LLP

(51) **Int. Cl.**

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**H04L 9/32** (2006.01)

**H04W 12/02** (2009.01)

**H04B 7/14** (2006.01)

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(57) **ABSTRACT**

**ABSTRACT**

Systems and methods for securing orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) transmission of data are discussed herein. Transceivers can sense the signal strength of frequencies on an OFDM wireless channel. The transceivers can determine which of the frequencies are fading frequencies failing below a threshold. A transmitting transceiver can send artificial data on the failing frequencies and genuine data on the remaining frequencies. Artificial data can be designed to mitigate peak-average-power ratio (PAPR) to have an additional benefit without using extra resource. Finally, receiving transceiver can transceiver receive the genuine data while discarding any date received on the failing frequencies.

(52) **U.S. Cl.**


CPC ..... **H04L 27/2618** (2013.01); **H04B 1/40** (2013.01); **H04W 72/0453** (2013.01)

(58) **Field of Classification Search**

None

See application file for complete search history.

**20 Claims, 6 Drawing Sheets**






FIG. 1




FIG. 2A




FIG. 2B




FIG. 3




FIG. 4






FIG. 5A

FIG. 5B





**FIG. 6**



## JOINT PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY AND PAPR MITIGATION IN OFDM SYSTEMS

### BACKGROUND

The broadcast nature of wireless mediums can be susceptible to threats regarding privacy and security of wireless communication. For example, an eavesdropper may be able to capture wireless signals. Depending on the type of wireless transmission, these signals can be available from a variety of distances, for example several yards, a mile, or across the globe. Data protection techniques can provide one form of security to communication. Encryption with a secret key is one method to conceal data. However, encryption techniques may not be sufficient for some scenarios, such as securely sharing a secret key with the intended nodes. Therefore, alternative means are needed to increase security. For example, physical layer security can provide enhanced security in the waveform domain. Security measures dealing with the waveform domain can prevent the extraction of the actual data properly. An eavesdropper can be prevented from extracting the actual data even if they can receive entire transmissions.

A multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) system can have enhanced physical security by the addition of artificial noise to the actual signal. The noise signal can be designed to fall in the null space of the channel matrix between the antennas of legitimate devices using the MIMO system. Artificial noise can be eliminated while the signal is passing through the channel. Another device located in a different place has a different channel matrix than a legitimate transmitter. The artificial noise can distort the actual signal. The distortion of the actual signal can increase security. In a single-input single-output system (SISO) for single carrier-frequency domain equalization (SC-FDE) waveforms, artificial noise can be added to fading frequencies. For example, the artificial noise can be added to the fading frequencies instead of adding artificial noise to the null space. Fading frequency information can only be determined by legitimate transmitters. For example, an eavesdropper cannot separate the actual signal and artificial noise. As such, an eavesdropper can experience a significant error. However, unlike SC-FDE, where data symbols are carried in the time domain, OFDM systems carry data symbols in the frequency domain. Therefore, introducing a noise signal to an OFDM signal might not prevent eavesdroppers from detecting which frequencies are utilized and ignoring transmissions on those frequencies since noise has a different characteristic compared to the data.

In wireless communication systems, orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) can provide numerous advantages, for example OFDM can transmit data with high bandwidth efficiency, OFDM can be implemented with fast Fourier transformation (FFT), and OFDM can be equalized simply by exploiting the advantage of cyclic prefix (CP). On the other hand, OFDM signals can suffer from high peak to average power ratio (PAPR) caused by the parallel transmission because of the non-linear characteristics of power amplifiers. An OFDM signal can be nonlinearly scaled, and in-band interference can occur at the transmitter.

### DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

For a more complete understanding of the embodiments and the advantages thereof, reference is now made to the following description, in conjunction with the accompanying figures briefly described as follows:

FIG. 1 is a drawing of a networked environment according to various embodiments of the present disclosure;

FIGS. 2A and 2B illustrate frequency regions of data as seen by various receivers and transmitters according to various example embodiments;

FIG. 3 illustrates bit-error rates for various receivers and transmitters according to various example embodiments;

FIG. 4 illustrates PAPR reduction performance according to various example embodiments;

FIGS. 5A and 5B are flow charts illustrating one example of functionality implemented on a transmitting transceiver and a receiving transceiver according to various embodiments; and

FIG. 6 illustrates an example schematic block diagram of a computing environment which can embody one or more of the system according to various embodiments.

The drawings illustrate only example embodiments and are therefore not to be considered limiting of the scope described herein, as other equally effective embodiments are within the scope and spirit of this disclosure. The elements and features shown in the drawings are not necessarily drawn to scale, emphasis instead being placed upon clearly illustrating the principles of the embodiments. Additionally, certain dimensions or positionings may be exaggerated to help visually convey certain principles. In the drawings, similar reference numerals between figures designate like or corresponding, but not necessarily the same, elements.

### DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In the following paragraphs, the embodiments are described in further detail by way of example with reference to the attached drawings. In the description, well known components, methods, and/or processing techniques are omitted or briefly described so as not to obscure the embodiments.

Although embodiments have been described herein in detail, the descriptions are by way of example. The features of the embodiments described herein are representative and, in alternative embodiments, certain features and elements may be added or omitted. Additionally, modifications to aspects of the embodiments described herein may be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention defined in the following claims, the scope of which are to be accorded the broadest interpretation so as to encompass modifications and equivalent structures.

Discussed herein is a technique for securing OFDM signals. In addition, the technique can also be enhanced to mitigate PAPR. The reduction of PAPR can be accomplished without sacrificing additional spectral bandwidth. In contrast to introducing artificial noise, artificial data can be inserted into modulated symbols since an eavesdropping device may be able to determine the frequency location utilized as artificial noise. By inserting artificial data into modulated symbols, an eavesdropping device can be prevented from detecting artificial data frequencies.

In addition, the artificial data can be chosen to mitigate PAPR. By choosing PAPR mitigating artificial data, the PAPR can be reduced without consuming resources beyond those utilized for security. The artificial data can be selected based on the data to be transmitted. The data signal can include genuine data that corresponds to the frequencies that meet the channel gain threshold. In one example, the genuine data is information to be transmitted from the transmitting device to the receiving device.

The system can include an OFDM wireless channel that is between a pair of wireless transceivers. The wireless channel can include a plurality of frequencies bands. For example, in OFDM multiple orthogonal frequencies are used. A wireless transceiver can communicate over the OFDM wireless channel to another wireless transceiver. Each of the wireless transceivers can be configured to sense the signal strength or channel gain of each frequency on the OFDM wireless channel. The transceivers can also be configured to determine which of the frequencies meet a threshold, and this determination can be based on the signal strength of each of the frequencies.

While the threshold can be predefined, in some embodiments, the threshold can be set by a user of the system, and in other embodiments, the threshold can be negotiated between two devices. The threshold can be based on the amount of data to be transmitted and/or the sensitivity of the data. For example, if a transceiver is to transmit a short and very important data packet, the threshold can be higher.

The transmitting transceiver can be configured to generate artificial data that reduces the PAPR of the resulting transmission. The transceiver can also initiate transmission of the resulting data signal. The resulting data signal can include the artificial data corresponding to frequencies that are determined not to meet the threshold. The resulting data signal can include genuine data being mapped to frequencies that are determined to meet the threshold.

With reference to FIG. 1, shown is a networked environment **100** according to various embodiments. The networked environment includes a transmitting device **103**, a receiving device **106**, one or more eavesdropping device **109**, and an OFDM wireless channel **112**. The transmitting device **103**, the receiving device **106**, and the eavesdropping device **109** can include one or more transceiver **115**, **118**, and **121**, respectively. Each of the transceivers **115**, **118**, and **121** can transmit and receive a wireless OFDM signal on the OFDM wireless channel **112**.

The wireless OFDM channel **112** can have unique characteristics between any two of the transceivers **115**, **118**, and **121**. The unique characteristics can be based on the location of each of the transceivers **115**, **118**, and **121**. As an example, the wireless OFDM channel **112** between the transceiver **115** and the transceiver **118** has different characteristics in comparison to the wireless OFDM channel **112** between transceiver **115** and transceiver **121** or between transceiver **118** and transceiver **121**.

In OFDM, a block of N complex valued QAM symbols, for example  $X=[X_0, X_1, \dots, X_{N-1}]$ , can be mapped onto N subcarriers with the IFFT operation. The resulting signal can give the elements in a time domain representation,  $x=[x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{N-1}]$ . In one embodiment, a sample of this signal can be written as:

$$x_m = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} X_k e^{j2\pi km/N}. \quad (1)$$

After passing through the wireless channel, such as OFDM wireless channel **112**, each subcarrier can be multiplied by the channel gain of the corresponding frequency, and received signal in frequency domain can be given as

$$Y_k = H_k X_k, \quad (2)$$

where  $Y_k$  is the received symbol and  $H_k$  is the channel gain at the frequency of kth subcarrier. The channel gain on the OFDM wireless channel **112** at a frequency can be depen-

dent on the location of the communicating devices. For example, the channel gain at a frequency can be based on the location of the transmitting device **103**, the receiving device **106**, and the medium between the transmitting device **103** and the receiving device **106**. As the location of the transmitting device **103** or receiving device **106** changes, the OFDM wireless channel **112** between them can also change.

In addition, the OFDM wireless channel **112** between two communicating transceivers is reciprocal. According to one example, the characteristics of the OFDM wireless channel **112** between the transceiver **115** and the transceivers **118** have the same characteristics when viewed from either transceiver **115** or **118**. Both the transceiver **115** and the transceiver **118** can experience the same OFDM wireless channel **112** throughout the coherence time of the medium. Further, transceiver **121** cannot experience the same OFDM wireless channel **112** throughout the coherence time of the medium between the transceivers **115** and **118**.

In an SC-FDE system, artificial noise can be inserted on fading frequencies. Fading frequencies can be one or more frequency and/or one or more bands of frequencies. The fading frequencies can be identified as having low channel gains. The fading frequencies can also be identified as causing large power losses as compared to other frequencies. Information regarding which frequencies can be faded on any given channel will only be available to the receiver and transmitter sharing the channel. An eavesdropping device cannot separate the actual signal and artificial noise. Therefore, the data carrying signal from the eavesdropping device can be distorted with the artificial noise. Meanwhile, the transmitting device and receiving device can agree to ignore artificial signal noise because of the channel reciprocity.

However, unlike in the SC-FDE system, where data symbols are carried in the time domain, OFDM systems carry data symbols in the frequency domain. Therefore, introducing a noise signal to an OFDM signal may not prevent eavesdroppers from detecting which frequencies are utilized and ignoring transmissions on those frequencies. However, inserting artificial data as opposed to artificial noise can solve this deficiency of artificial noise. For example, if a QPSK modulation is utilized, the transmitting device **103** can select symbols from four complex numbers. If a particular region of a signal is filled with arbitrary samples while the remaining part can be filled with QPSK symbols, the eavesdropping device **109** may be able to understand artificial noise carrying frequencies through observation. However, the transmitting device **103** can choose irrelevant QPSK symbols rather than artificial noise, which is referred to herein as artificial data insertion. Further, the transmitting device **103** can select the artificial data to reduce PAPR. In fact, a large PAPR can correspond to a large variance in the signal, which can be one of the major drawbacks in OFDM systems.

As PAPR increases for an OFDM signal over OFDM wireless channel **112**, a power amplifier can output outside of its linear range, which can cause signal distortion. This distortion can degrade communication performance. This can be prevented by reducing the PAPR of a signal. Alternatively, this can be mitigated by utilizing a more expensive power amplifier having a larger dynamic range in transceivers **115** and **118**. When artificial data is added to the fading frequencies on a channel on OFDM wireless channel **112** for security, the transmitting device **103** can choose the artificial data to reduce PAPR to mitigate PAPR problems without additional cost. For example, the transmitting device **103** can reduce the the PAPR without utilizing additional band-

width on the OFDM wireless channel **112** beyond the fading frequencies utilized for security.

By doing this, the transmitting device **103** can reduce PAPR and secure the communication to the receiving device **106** over OFDM wireless channel **112** without consuming any extra resources. As a non-limiting example, the artificial data inserted OFDM signal in time domain can be expressed in equation 3 as follows:

$$\hat{x}_m = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} (a_k X_k + b_k \tilde{X}_k) e^{j2\pi km/N} \quad (3)$$

where  $\tilde{X}_k$  is the artificial data samples in frequency,  $a_k$  is 1 when  $k$  is the index of an information data, otherwise it is 0 and  $b_k$  is 1 when  $k$  is the index of an artificial data, otherwise it is 0. Then we can form our objective function as,

$$\tilde{X}_k = \underset{\tilde{X}_k}{\operatorname{argmin}} \|\tilde{x}\|_{\infty} \quad (4)$$

$$\text{subject to } \tilde{X}_k \in \Gamma \quad (5)$$

where  $\|\tilde{x}\|_{\infty}$  represents the infinite norm operation and  $r$  is the set of modulation symbols, e.g.,  $\{e^{j\pi/4}, e^{j3\pi/4}, e^{-j3\pi/4}, e^{-j\pi/4}\}$  for QPSK type of modulation.

In this way, transmitting device **103** can reduce the PAPR and secure the OFDM wireless channel **112** to prevent attacks by the eavesdropping device **109**. For example, the transmitting device **103** can prevent the eavesdropping device **109** from determining the genuine data because the eavesdropping device **109** cannot determine which frequencies are carrying the artificial data.

According to one embodiment, the transmitting device **103** and a receiving device **106** are identical devices. The receiving device **106** transmits data over the OFDM wireless channel **112** to the transmitting device using the security and PAPR reduction techniques discussed herein. For example, the receiving device **106** can transmit artificial data chosen to reduce PAPR in frequencies that fail to meet a threshold and transmit genuine data in the remaining frequencies. The transmitting device **103** receives the wireless transmission over the OFDM wireless channel **112** from the receiving device **106** using the techniques discussed herein. For example, the transmitting device **103** determines which frequencies fail to meet the threshold and discard data on those frequencies.

With reference to FIG. 2A, shown is an illustration of the fading frequencies of the OFDM wireless channel **112** as seen by the transceivers **115** and **118** according to various embodiments. The OFDM wireless channel **112** as seen by transceivers **115** and **118** includes genuine data frequencies **203** and artificial data frequencies **206**. The transmitting device **103** and the receiving device **106** can sense the frequencies having signal characteristics, such as signal strength, that fails to meet the threshold.

The transmitting device **103** and the receiving device **106** sense the strength of the signal using transceivers **115** and **118**. The transmitting device **103** and the receiving device **106** can identify those frequencies as artificial data frequencies. In communications, the transmitting device **103** and the receiving device **106** can use the frequencies meeting the

threshold signal strength to carry genuine data and use the frequencies failing to meet the threshold signal strength to carry artificial data.

With reference to FIG. 2B, shown is an illustration of the fading frequencies of the OFDM wireless channel **112** as seen by the transceiver **121** according to various embodiments. The eavesdropping device **109** can receive the OFDM wireless data transmitted by either transmitting device **103** or receiving device **106**. However, the eavesdropping device **109** experiences different fading frequencies as compared to the transmitting device **103** and the receiving device **106** when receiving the OFDM wireless data. The OFDM wireless channel **112** as seen by transceivers **121** and **118** cannot differentiate between genuine data frequencies **212** and artificial data frequencies **215**.

FIGS. 3 and 4 illustrate measured results according to an example embodiment. In this example embodiment, the multiple parameters can be determined. For example, QPSK can be utilized for modulation, a number of subcarriers can be determined as 32, a 16-tap Rayleigh channel can be used for having the required selectivity in frequency, the average channel power can be normalized to 1, and one of three different threshold values, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3, can be chosen in order to select artificial data insertion frequencies. According to one example, the thresholds of 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3 correspond to utilizing of 9%, 18%, or 26% respectively for spectral resource for artificial data based on the performed simulations.

FIG. 3 illustrates a bit error rate for a variety of users and thresholds according to the example embodiment. Bit-error-rate (BER) results for a legitimate user using receiving device **106**, Bob, and an eavesdropper using eavesdropping device **109**, Eve, are shown in FIG. 3. The receiving device **106** has a lower error probability rate than standard communications because the fading frequencies are used for artificial data insertion. This is because the majority of bit errors that occur in OFDM can be within data transmitted over the fading frequencies. In contrast in FIG. 3, the eavesdropping device **109** has a large BER even for high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) values. For example, the BER does not noticeably reduce as  $E_b/N_0$  (dB) increases for the signal sensed by the eavesdropping device **109** at any threshold level. In addition, the transmitting device **103** can use a larger threshold can degrade BER performance of the eavesdropping device **109** while enhancing BER performance of the receiving device **106** at the expense of more spectral resource usage.

FIG. 4 illustrates PAPR values for legitimate user Bob using receiving device **106** and Eve on eavesdropping device **109** at various threshold values according to the example embodiment. The additional data can be selected to optimize PAPR. Shown are the PAPR curves for the aforementioned threshold values. The transmitting device **103** can use a flipping algorithm to find a sub-optimum artificial data set that reduces PAPR. The complexity of this technique can be expressed as proportional to  $M \times K$  where  $M$  is the number of modulation symbols and  $K$  is the number of subcarriers used for artificial data in one symbol. As shown in FIG. 4, as the threshold increases, the PAPR reduces. In addition, utilizing a flipping algorithm may not add significant complexity because a flipping algorithm for such optimization problems can be implemented with low complexity. In other embodiments, more complex algorithms can be selected by the transmitting device **103** to obtain better PAPR reduction performance.

Referring next to FIG. 5A, shown is a flowchart that provide examples of the operation of a receiving device **106**

(FIG. 1) according to various embodiments. It is understood that the flowchart of FIG. 5A provides merely an example of the many different types of functional arrangements that can be employed to implement the operation of the portion of the receiving device 106 as described herein. As an alternative, the flowchart of FIG. 5A can be viewed as depicting examples of steps of a method implemented in a receiving device 106 according to one or more embodiments.

The process in FIG. 5A can be used to receive data with security in the physical layer and a reduced PAPR on the transmitted signal according to one or more embodiments. In step 503, the process involves sensing the signal strength of each of one or more frequencies on a wireless channel. For example, a transceiver 118 (FIG. 1) can be configured to communicate utilizing closely spaced orthogonal sub-carrier signals on parallel data frequencies. The transceiver 118 can be configured to sense the signal strength on each of the frequencies.

In step 506, the process involves identifying frequencies that meet a threshold signal strength on the wireless channel. In some embodiments, the process can involve identifying fading frequencies that fail to meet the threshold signal strength. For example, the receiving device 106 can compare the signal strengths measured in 506 to a threshold frequency. The receiving device 106 can identify the frequencies that meet the threshold as frequencies to use to receive genuine data. The receiving device 106 can identify the frequencies that fail to meet the threshold as frequencies to use for artificial data.

In step 509, the process involves receiving an OFDM transmission from the wireless channel. For example, the transceiver 118 can listen on the OFDM wireless channel 112 for a transmission and record the transmission upon receipt. In step 512, the process involves processing data from frequencies that meet the threshold. The receiving device 106 can identify data from frequencies that fail to meet the threshold as artificial data and processing data from the frequencies that meet the threshold. The receiving device 106 can discard data received on the frequencies failing to meet the threshold.

Referring next to FIG. 5B, shown is a flowchart that provide an example of the operation of a transmitting device 103 (FIG. 1) according to various embodiments. It is understood that the flowchart of FIG. 5B provides merely an example of the many different types of functional arrangements that can be employed to implement the operation of the portion of the transmitting device 103 as described herein. As an alternative, the flowchart of FIG. 5B can be viewed as depicting examples of steps of a method implemented in a transmitting device 103 according to one or more embodiments.

The process in FIG. 5B can be used to transmit data with security in the physical layer and a reduced PAPR on the transmitted signal according to one or more embodiments. In step 515, the process can involve sensing the signal strength of each of one or more frequencies on a wireless channel. For example, a transceiver 115 (FIG. 1) of the transmitting device 103 can be configured to communicate utilizing closely spaced orthogonal sub-carrier signals on parallel data frequencies. The transceiver 115 can be configured to sense the signal strength on each of the frequencies.

In step 518, the process involves identifying frequencies that meet a threshold signal strength on the wireless channel. The transmitting device 103 can identify fading frequencies that fail to meet the threshold signal strength on the OFDM wireless channel 112. For example, the transmitting device

103 can compare the signal strengths measured in 515 to a threshold frequency. The transmitting device 103 can identify the frequencies that meet the threshold as frequencies to use to transmit genuine data. The transmitting device 103 can identify the frequencies that fail to meet the threshold as frequencies to use for artificial data.

In step 521, the process can involve generating a signal including artificial data on frequencies that fail to meet the threshold and genuine data on frequencies that meet the threshold requirement. The process can also involve generating the artificial data as data that minimized the PAPR of the generated signal. For example, the transmitting device 103 can determine artificial data that will lower a PAPR value of a resulting signal when substituted for genuine data. The transmitting device 103 can also place artificial data into bandwidth frequencies that, based on various real world factors, require greater power to or that have reduced quality or intensity at a corresponding receiving device 106. As an example, the various real world factors can include the medium between the transmitting device 103 and the receiving device 106 and the distance between the transmitting device 103 and the receiving device 106.

In step 524, the process can involve transmitting the resulting signal over the OFDM wireless channel. For example, the transmitting device 103 can transmit the signal over the OFDM wireless channel 112. The transmitting device 103 can utilize the transceiver 115 to transmit the signal to a receiving device 106.

FIG. 6 illustrates an example schematic block diagram of a computing architecture 600 that may be employed as either of the transceivers according to various embodiments described herein. The computing architecture 600 may be embodied, in part, using one or more elements of a specific purpose processing circuit or computing device. The computing architecture 600 includes a processor 610, a random access memory (RAM) 620, a Read Only Memory (ROM) 630, a transceiver 640, a memory device 650, and an Input Output (I/O) interface 660. The elements of computing architecture 600 are communicatively coupled via one or more local interfaces 602. The elements of the computing architecture 600 are not intended to be limiting in nature, as the architecture may omit elements or include additional or alternative elements.

In various embodiments, the processor 610 may include or be embodied as a general purpose arithmetic processor, a state machine, or an ASIC, for example. The processor 610 may include one or more circuits, one or more microprocessors, ASICs, dedicated hardware, or any combination thereof. In certain aspects and embodiments, the processor 610 is configured to execute one or more software modules which may be stored, for example, on the memory device 650.

The RAM and ROM 620 and 630 may include or be embodied as any random access and read only memory devices that store computer-readable instructions to be executed by the processor 610. The memory device 650 stores computer-readable instructions thereon that, when executed by the processor 610, direct the processor 610 to execute various aspects of the embodiments described herein.

As a non-limiting example group, the memory device 650 includes one or more non-transitory memory devices, such as an optical disc, a magnetic disc, a semiconductor memory (i.e., a semiconductor, floating gate, or similar flash based memory), a magnetic tape memory, a removable memory, combinations thereof, or any other known non-transitory memory device or means for storing computer-readable

instructions. The I/O interface **660** includes device input and output interfaces, such as keyboard, pointing device, display, communication, and/or other interfaces. The one or more local interfaces **602** electrically and communicatively couples the processor **610**, the RAM **620**, the ROM **630**, the memory device **650**, and the I/O interface **660** so that data and instructions may be communicated among them.

In certain aspects, the processor **610** is configured to retrieve computer-readable instructions and data stored on the memory device **650**, the RAM **620**, the ROM **630**, and/or other storage means and copy the computer-readable instructions to the RAM **620** or the ROM **630** for execution, for example. The processor **610** is further configured to execute the computer-readable instructions to implement various aspects and features of the embodiments described herein. In embodiments where the processor **610** includes a state machine or ASIC, the processor **610** may include internal memory and registers for maintenance of data being processed.

The transceiver **640** can be any one of transceiver **115**, **118**, or **121** (FIG. 1). The transceiver **640** can transmit and receive data wirelessly on various frequencies. The transceiver **640** can also be configured to sense the signal strength on each frequency of a wireless channel. The transceiver **640** can communicate utilizing wireless LAN radio interfaces; digital radio system, such as DAB/EUREKA 147, DAB+, Digital Radio Mondiale, HD Radio, T-DMB, and ISDB-TSB; terrestrial digital TV systems, such as DVB-T and ISDB-T, terrestrial mobile TV systems, such as DVB-H, T-DMB, ISDB-T, and MediaFLO forward link; cellular system, such as 3G, 4G, LTE, BWA, MBWA, and E-UTRA; and other wireless frequencies.

Therefore, the following is claimed:

1. A system comprising:
  - a first transceiver and a second transceiver being configured to sense a respective signal strength for individual ones of a plurality of frequencies of an OFDM wireless channel;
  - the first transceiver and the second transceiver being configured to determine whether the individual ones of the plurality of frequencies meet a threshold signal strength based at least in part on the respective signal strength;
  - the first transceiver being further configured initiate a transmission of a data signal comprising a plurality of artificial data corresponding to the plurality of frequencies failing to meet the threshold; and
  - the second transceiver being further configured to determine whether individual ones of the plurality of frequencies meet the threshold and receive a plurality of genuine data from the data signal by multiplying a plurality of subcarriers in the data signal by a channel gain corresponding to one of the plurality of frequencies determined to meet the threshold.
2. The system of claim 1, wherein the plurality of artificial data is generated to minimize a PAPR across the wireless channel.
3. The system of claim 2, wherein the PAPR is minimized using a flipping algorithm.
4. The system of claim 1, wherein the channel gain is based at least in part on a first location of the first transceiver and a second location of the second transceiver.
5. The system of claim 1, wherein the threshold is predefined.
6. The system of claim 1, wherein the threshold is negotiated between the first transceiver and the second transceiver.

7. A method comprising:
  - sensing, via a transceiver, a respective signal strength associated with individual ones of a plurality of frequencies utilized by an OFDM wireless channel;
  - identifying a subset of the plurality of frequencies failing to meet a threshold signal strength;
  - generating a plurality of artificial data;
  - transmitting, via the transceiver, a signal comprising the plurality of artificial data on the subset of the plurality of frequencies;
  - receiving, via a second transceiver, the signal; and
  - determining a plurality of genuine data from the signal by:
    - determining a plurality of subcarriers from the signal, individual ones of the plurality of subcarriers corresponding to the individual ones of the plurality of frequencies; and
    - multiplying the individual ones of the plurality of subcarriers by a corresponding channel gain associated with the corresponding individual one of the plurality of frequencies.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the signal further comprises a plurality of genuine data on a remainder of frequencies of the plurality of frequencies.
9. The method of claim 8, wherein the method further comprises generating the signal by inserting the subset of the plurality of frequencies and the plurality of genuine data into a plurality of modulated symbols.
10. The method of claim 7, wherein the plurality of artificial data is generated to minimize a PAPR of the OFDM wireless channel.
11. The method of claim 10, wherein the PAPR is minimized using a flipping algorithm.
12. The method of claim 7, wherein the subset of the plurality of frequencies is identified based at least in part on the respective signal strength of the individual ones of the plurality of frequencies.
13. The method of claim 7, wherein the OFDM wireless channel is between the transceiver and a remote device.
14. The method of claim 13, wherein the respective signal strength associated with individual ones of the plurality of frequencies utilized by the OFDM wireless channel is unique to the OFDM wireless channel between the transceiver and the remote device.
15. The method of claim 14, wherein a respective second signal strength associated with individual ones of the plurality of frequencies utilized by a second OFDM wireless channel between the transceiver and a second remote device differs from the respective signal strength associated with individual ones of the plurality of frequencies utilized by the OFDM wireless channel.
16. The method of claim 13, wherein the respective signal strengths on the OFDM wireless channel are exclusively sensible by the transceiver and the remote device.
17. A method comprising:
  - sensing, via a transceiver, a respective signal strength associated with individual ones of a plurality of frequencies of an OFDM wireless channel;
  - identifying a subset of the plurality of frequencies meeting a threshold signal strength based at least in part on the respective signal strength of the individual ones of the plurality of frequencies;
  - receiving, via the transceiver, a wireless signal on the OFDM wireless channel; and

determining a plurality of data from the wireless signal

by:

determining a plurality of subcarriers from the wireless  
signal, individual ones of the plurality of subcarriers  
corresponding to the individual ones of the plurality 5  
of frequencies; and

multiplying the individual ones of the plurality of  
subcarriers by a corresponding channel gain associ-  
ated with the corresponding individual one of the  
plurality of frequencies. 10

**18.** The method of claim **17**, wherein determining the  
plurality of data from the wireless signal further comprises  
extracting the plurality of data from a plurality of modulated  
symbols.

**19.** The method of claim **17**, wherein the OFDM wireless 15  
channel is between the transceiver and a remote device, and  
the wireless signal received is from the remote device.

**20.** The method of claim **17**, wherein the plurality of data  
corresponds to the subset of the plurality of frequencies  
meeting the threshold signal strength. 20

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