



Preventing Violent Extremism through Value Complexity: Being Muslim Being British

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Preventing Violent Extremism through Value Complexity: Being Muslim Being British

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Abstract

This article reports on an intervention designed to prevent violent extremism in young UK Muslims, and provides an empirical assessment of its effectiveness. The course was designed to expose participants to the multiplicity of value priorities that influential Muslims embody, and to structure group activities that allow participants to explore all value positions on issues central to radical Islamist discourse, free from criticism or social pressure. The intervention, a 16 contact hour course using films and group activities that enables participants to problem solve according to a broad array of their own values, was pre and post tested with 81 young Muslims (mean age 19.48; SD=2.14) across seven pilot groups around the UK. As hypothesised, value spread and integrative complexity increased significantly by the end of the course in group discussions, and in written responses to moral dilemmas, conflict resolution style shifted towards collaboration and compromise.

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Introduction

The value complexity prevention method addresses radicalization and involvement in violent extremism (RIVE) in the United Kingdom (UK) by enabling participants to maximize a wider range of their own values as a means to increase their complexity of thinking about issues of potential cleavage between Muslim and British/western identities. The argument we marshal below is that increasing the complexity with which people think about the issues that other radicalizers exploit, serves to reduce vulnerability to the messages of extremism as a broad-based form of primary prevention.

Primary prevention of social problems such as RIVE is aimed at the widest relevant population (not all of whom show signs of the disorder) with the aim of increasing resilience and social support while decreasing vulnerability and stressors, in order to reduce the prevalence of the social problem.¹ Secondary prevention of RIVE, in contrast, has a tighter focus. It focuses on early diagnosis, or referral and treatment when signs of the disorder become evident, for example, when someone with a radical opinion shows signs of transitioning toward extremist violence. The UK's multi-agency referral program, known as Channel, is a good example of secondary prevention.² Tertiary prevention applies to an even smaller subset where the disorder is in an advanced state, for example, through work in prisons with those detained on terrorism related charges. Tertiary and secondary prevention share in common a focus on what will inhibit transition from radical opinion to violent actions. McCauley's Two Pyramid Model is a much-cited model for researching what promotes or inhibits a transition from radical opinion to violent actions.³ This model identifies 250 key transition points between the holding of radical opinion (the Opinion Pyramid) and taking action (the Action Pyramid). No determinism is implied; individuals can move from one level to another, between pyramids, in any direction motivated by their experience of interventions (that inhibit progression) and activations (that catalyse progression towards violence). The model is embedded in a wider political, social, and economic context that also modifies or intensifies the impact of interventions and activations. The social context is itself tiered, comprising wider society with its socially shared worldview, sacred values, grand narratives and culturally defined degrees of individualism versus collectivism.⁴ This admirably multivariate model for pinpointing a plethora of transitions to violence illustrates the challenge of secondary/tertiary prevention of RIVE: there is no single pathway towards violent actions.⁵

Primary prevention has the advantage here of being able to be successful in the absence of complete understanding of pathways to violence. For example, in the latter part of the 19th

¹ Bloom, Martin, *Primary Prevention* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc, 1996); Jose Liht, Sara Savage, and Rayan J. Williams, "Being Muslim being British: A Multi-Media Educational Resource for Young Muslims," in George Joffe (ed), *Islamist Radicalisation in Europe and the Middle East: Reassessing the Causes of Terrorism* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013).

² Home Office, "Channel: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism," ed. Home Office (London: HM Government, 2011).

³ C. McCauley and S. Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20 (2008); C. McCauley and S. Moskalenko, "Individual and Group Mechanisms of Radicalization," *Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter Radicalisation and Disengagement* (2010).

⁴ H. R. Markus and S. Kitayama, "Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation," *Psychological Review* 98 (1991).

⁵ Horgan, John, *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements* (London: Routledge, 2009).

century, primary prevention successfully contained the spread of infectious diseases as people took measures that were seen to work, yet without complete knowledge of germ theory.⁶ With primary prevention, doing something strategic to interrupt a pernicious cycle (and then evaluating the outcomes of that intervention) is a step forward, without having to identify the exact pathway for a given individual. The best available account of a social problem improves and focuses prevention efforts when empirically evaluated for effectiveness. This feeds into its further conceptualization and evaluation. In this way, this intervention can make a contribution to the overall map of RIVE prevention.

In the UK, community-based primary prevention initiatives (such as those seeking to counter extremist ideologies, provide cautionary tales about extremism, promote moderate Muslim voices, mentors and networks, develop awareness of the victims of extremism, or empower people to address grievances through social and political engagement) have been criticised for their broad-brush approach that might appear to target the whole of the Muslim community, as well as for their lack of empirical evidence for effectiveness. In this article's approach an attempt is made to address both these problems. Rather than focusing on the *content* of ideology or beliefs particular to a community, the focus is on the *structure* of thinking - a cognitive construct that is precise and measureable, while being applicable to a range of extremisms or inter-group conflicts.

This approach is inspired by Isaiah Berlin who posits that human values (e.g. freedom, equality, security, achievement, tradition, etc.) are all equally important and desirable. Values motivate behavior, they organize cultural identity and bring significance to human life.⁷ Yet, due to limited resources or cultural constraints, individuals have to make choices: they often have to prioritize one value over the other, as any life context makes it extremely difficult to maximize all human values equally. Differences in value hierarchies between individuals and groups can be a source of conflict, unless people are able to perceive some validity in the different value priorities of others, even if they don't coincide with those they have chosen for themselves.

A number of researchers suggest that the wider context for RIVE is the increased interpenetration of cultures arising from globalization.⁸ This increases the likelihood of conflict as groups with differing value hierarchies come into ever closer contact, leading to uncertainty about identity and behavioral norms, particularly amongst young people whose developmental task is to find answers to these questions. In a response to perceived threats to values, groups can retrench to polarized, value monist position. Clashes between value hierarchies affects 'host culture' young people in the UK, as well as immigrant groups with more traditional value hierarchies, with one extremism pitted symbiotically against another extremism, as in the right wing English Defence League mobilizing against radical Islamists. In these cases, self-definitional uncertainty is strongly associated with wanting to identify with groups that are highly orthodox, simple and consensual. This is what extremist groups offer. Groups with clear value hierarchies become attractive as they provide certainty and resolve the ambivalence of competing values in the globalized condition. They do this

⁶ Caplan, Gerald, *Principles of Preventive Psychiatry* (London: Tavistock, 1964).

⁷ Berlin, Isaiah, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity* (London: John Murray, 1990).

⁸ Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

through eschewing value complexity and providing simple, black and white solutions to a complex world.⁹

Threat to important values seems to be involved in a range of extremist discourses. Islamist, right wing, animal rights groups and various fundamentalisms can be understood as a defence against the erosion of their cultural/ religious group's value hierarchies.¹⁰ Such discourses are structured to prevent value trade-offs by emphasizing one moral value to the exclusion of any other values, particularly in regard to values that define group identity.¹¹ Whether religious or secular, extremist discourse usually emphasizes one moral value (such as justice for the oppressed or communalism) in regard to an issue to the exclusion of all other values (such as liberty or individualism). This focus on one single value (per issue) reduces the perceived complexity of the social world. Such a move pits the in-group and their most important value against the out-group and their most important value, maximizing in-group coherence and marshalling unified action.¹²

It is well documented that the inability to make trade-offs between competing values results in low complexity reasoning.¹³ Low complexity reasoning often leads to conflict (even violent conflict) because nuanced collaborative solutions are by definition screened out as the black and white, intransigent demands of one group are pitted against the black and white demands of the other.¹⁴ Dogmatism, authoritarianism, the inability to engage in trade-offs and low integrative complexity all seem to be undergirded by similar cognitive processes in which either *freezing* or *seizing* on to certain outcomes makes thinking rigid (a low integrative complexity score is a measure of this rigidity in cognitive style).¹⁵

Low complexity structure is precisely what analysis of extremist rhetoric shows. Linguistic analysis of extremist communications shows overwhelmingly low complexity of thinking, and that a violent extremist's (e.g. terrorist) rhetoric is even lower in complexity than their non-terrorist (but ideologically-similar) counterparts measured by various constructs including integrative complexity.¹⁶

⁹ Michael A. Hogg, "Uncertainty and Extremism: Identification with High Entitativity Groups Under Conditions of Uncertainty," in Vincent Yzerbyt, Charles M. Judd, and Olivier Corneille (eds.) *The Psychology of Group Perception: Perceived Variability, Entitativity, and Essentialism* (New York: Psychology Press, 2004).

¹⁰ Bruce Hunsberger, Michael Pratt, and Mark S. Pancer, "Religious Fundamentalism and Integrative Complexity of Thought: A Relationship for Existential Content Only?" *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 33:4 (1994); John T. Jost et al., "Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition," *Psychological Bulletin* 129:3 (2003); Vassilis Saroglou, "Beyond Dogmatism: The Need for Closure as Related to Religion," *Mental Health, Religion & Culture* 5:2 (2002).

¹¹ Strozier, C.B., D.M. Terman, and J.W. Jones, *The Fundamentalist Mindset* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

¹² P. Suedfeld, Leighton D., and L. Conway, "Integrative Complexity and Cognitive Management in International Confrontations: Research and Potential Applications," in Mari Fitzduff and Chris E. Stout (eds) *The Psychology of Resolving Global Conflicts: From War to Peace* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006).

¹³ Philip E. Tetlock, David Armor, and Randall S. Peterson, "The Slavery Debate in Antebellum America: Cognitive Style, Value Conflict, and the Limits of Compromise," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 66:1 (1994); Philip E. Tetlock, "A Value Pluralism Model of Ideological Reasoning," *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology* 50:4 (1986).

¹⁴ Hunsberger, Pratt, and Pancer, "Religious Fundamentalism and Integrative Complexity of Thought: A Relationship for Existential Content Only?"; Jost et al., "Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition";

¹⁴ Saroglou, "Beyond Dogmatism: The Need for Closure as Related to Religion."

¹⁵ Kruglanski, Arie W., *The Psychology of Closed Mindedness* (New York: Psychology Press, 2004).

¹⁶ Lucian G. Conway and Kathrene R. Conway, "The Terrorist Rhetorical Style and its Consequences for Understanding Terrorist Violence," *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways Toward Terrorism and*

A large body of cross-cultural research by Peter Suedfeld and colleagues shows that conflict is predicted when integrative complexity (IC) drops from its recent baseline (measured in the communication of political decision-makers); conversely when IC rises, peaceful solutions to conflict ensue.¹⁷ Suedfeld, Cross & Logan further substantiate the predictive power of the integrative complexity construct across a range of extremisms: Islamist, territorial (Northern Ireland), white supremacist, and animal rights.¹⁸ Their study shows that a participant's increasing degree of commitment to violent action is attended by an increasing and significant lowering of IC. IC scores here differentiate significantly across all three categories of activist (legal), radical (illegal) and terrorist groups.

The role that complexity in thinking plays in RIVE is also underlined by Gambetta & Hertog's research showing that engineers, graduates of a field centred on problems that have a single, clear-cut, black and white answer, are significantly over-represented among violent extremists.¹⁹ In line with this, and based on extensive fieldwork with violent extremists, Ginges and colleagues insist that sacred values, which are defined structurally by the impossibility for any co-mingling with other values, play a key role in motivating the actions of extremists.²⁰

In the light of this research, the approach to primary prevention considers that what extremist ideologies have in common is a simple binary structure of "us versus them," or "right versus wrong" that is underpinned by value monism. It is precisely this lack of complexity on conflicted issues exploited by radicalizers that offers a measurable site for primary prevention, whatever pathway may have led an individual or group to it. This precise point of value monism is what this article has targeted through the techniques developed for the *Being Muslim Being British* (BMBB) primary prevention method.

The aim of this method is to remove the obstacles to the participant's normal cognitive development as it progresses from simplicity to complexity. A vast literature supports that complex information processing, undergirded by the attempt to maximize multiple competing values, is associated with the adoption of non-violent strategies of conflict resolution.²¹ Thus this research argues that the appeal of extremist ideology can be lessened in this primary prevention initiative by facilitating an individual's normal developmental pathway towards value pluralism. Moreover, individuals are more receptive to messages with a complexity level similar to their own when thinking about conflicted social issues, and this has

Genocide 4:2 (2011); P. Suedfeld, K. Legkaia, and J. Brcic, "Changes in the Hierarchy of Value References Associated with Flying in Space," *Journal of Personality* 78:5 (2010).

¹⁷ Suedfeld, D., and Conway, "Integrative Complexity and Cognitive Management in International Confrontations: Research and Potential Applications"; Suedfeld, Legkaia, and Brcic, "Changes in the Hierarchy of Value References Associated with Flying in Space."

¹⁸ P. Suedfeld, R. W. Cross, and C. Logan, "Can Thematic Content Analysis Separate the Pyramid of Ideas from the Pyramid of Action? A Comparison Among Different Degrees of Commitment to Violence," in D. Lyle and H. Cabayan (eds.), *Looking Back, Looking Forward: Perspectives on Terrorism and Responses to It* (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013).

¹⁹ Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, "Why are There So Many Engineers Among Islamic Radicals?," *European Journal of Sociology* 50:2 (2009): 201-230.

²⁰ J. Ginges et al., "Psychology out of the Laboratory: The Challenge of Violent Extremism," *American Psychologist* 66 (2011).

²¹ Tetlock, Armor, and Peterson, "The Slavery Debate in Antebellum America: Cognitive Style, Value Conflict, and the Limits of Compromise"; Carmit T. Tadmor, Philip E. Tetlock, and Kaiping Peng, "Biculturalism and Integrative Complexity: Testing the Acculturation Complexity Model" (paper presented at the Academy of Management Proceedings, 2006/08).

implications for developing resilience to the communications and recruitment efforts of extremists.²²

Based on this articles arguments above, it is believed that: (a) RIVE can be thought of in terms of value complexity, (b) there is evidence that globalization processes heightens the attractiveness of extremist groups that circumvent value conflict through value monist ideologies, and (c) interventions that help people explore value commitments in a safe environment can develop resilience to the attractiveness of extreme groups. In the *Being Muslim Being British* (BMBB) course, this is done by enabling young Muslim participants to experience more complex ways of balancing their own value hierarchies, affirmed in the context of a relevant peer group, so that a forced choice between conflicting value hierarchies can be avoided. In other words, in BMBB, participants explore the ways they can maximize both what it means to be Muslim *and* what it means to be British.

The Intervention

In designing *Being Muslim Being British* (funded by the European Commission and the UK Home Office, 2007-2010), Imams and Muslim community leaders were consulted as a means to pilot the program with groups of young Muslims from the earliest stages. Any social group thinks and develops value hierarchies within its own cultural/religious milieu, and feedback from the early piloting process helped to culturally ‘clothe’ the intervention appropriately for the intended audience. The *Being Muslim Being British* (BMBB) multi-media course is designed for young people ages sixteen and over who are, or have been, exposed to extremist discourse (which is prevalent and easily accessible on the internet), as well as for people who are interested in the issues that affect young Muslims and thus may encounter extremist discourse. The course uses digital versatile disc (DVD) films to represent an array of Muslim viewpoints from the extreme right to the extreme left including middle positions followed by group activities inspired by Theatre of the Oppressed pedagogy that help participants become aware of the value trade-offs in each position.²³ Using these multi-media course materials, trained facilitators enabled participants to work through the steps of raising integrative complexity by “laddering down” to underpinning values, in order to explore value trade-offs in line with participant’s own value hierarchies and religious traditions, described more fully below.

BMBB’s Three Steps of Transformation

Transformation Step One: Differentiation

The explicit aim of BMBB is to increase thinking complexity promoted by value pluralism, measured by integrative complexity (IC).²⁴ The first step for integratively complex thinking is differentiation, the ability to perceive multiple viewpoints or dimensions on an issue.²⁵ In BMBB, eight topics were selected for use by radicalizers in order to increase cleavage between Muslim and Western worldviews and identities, and to present each topic from the

²² Peter Suedfeld and Alistair B. Wallbaum, "Modifying Integrative Complexity in Political Thought: Value Conflict and Audience Disagreement," *Revista Interamericana de Psicologia* 26:1 (1992).

²³ Boal, Augusto, *Legislative Theatre: Using Performance to Make Politics* (London: Routledge, 1998).

²⁴ Suedfeld, Legkaia, and Brcic, "Changes in the Hierarchy of Value References Associated with Flying in Space."

²⁵ Peter Suedfeld, Philip E. Tetlock, and Siegfried Streufert, "Conceptual/Integrative Complexity," in *Motivation and Personality: Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis* ed. C.P. Smith, et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

differing perspectives of three to four well-known Muslim speakers via filmed interviews (on DVD). For example, in session one, to address the topic of “how should young Muslims should live in the West?,” four influential speakers present their different viewpoints arguing for 1) an international Caliphate, 2) separatist (Salafist) personal piety, 3) integrating into British society while maintaining Muslim identity and faith, and 4) support for jihadism. Through this process, participants are motivated to make some sense of the variety of Muslim viewpoints within a group discussion and are spurred to think afresh about the topic.

Transformation Step Two: Value Pluralism

Step two involves enabling participants to discover some validity in the values that undergird each of the four viewpoints, even the extreme ones, but without having to sacrifice other competing values – which is implicit in adopting every aspect of extreme viewpoints. This second step of enabling value pluralism is operationalized by providing the context in which participants can maximize a wider array of their *own* values in their moral reasoning. Information is drawn from Philip Tetlock’s Value Pluralism model that argues that a motivating force for doing the extra cognitive work of integratively complex thinking comes from the desire to maximize more than one value when those values are in tension with each other and each has high importance in participant’s personal hierarchies.²⁶ While extremist ideologies concentrate, for example, on the magnetic pull of one value, such as “justice,” to the exclusion of “liberty,” the course enables young people to explore the pull of both ends of a value spectrum (e.g. justice *and* liberty).

To operationalize this in the intervention, after participants have watched the four film clips, they are invited to explore a value spectrum laid out on the floor. For example, in session one concerning “how should young Muslims live in Britain,” a key value spectrum underlying the four viewpoints is that of communalism versus values of individualism. These are the two broad value poles laid out across the floor. Participants are then invited to “vote with their feet” by standing where they think each of the different filmed speakers would position their respective viewpoint on this continuum. The variety of answers that participants give to this activity, and the discussion it provokes, helps to make difference of opinion become ‘normal’ in the session. Next, the participants are invited to ‘vote with their feet’ to show where they personally position themselves as individuals in regard to the issue. They are encouraged to think about the relative importance that each value pole has for them as individuals and to explore the real world pressures they experience in their lives. They are encouraged to embrace some (even small) degree of *both* value poles in a way consonant with their own value priorities and real life constraints, rather than remaining “stuck” in the value monism of radical discourse. In this way, cultural differences between Muslims and Westerners (for example, between a collective culture vs. an individualistic culture) become easier to understand, and thus bridge, from a vantage point of value pluralism. This is done in the context of non-judgemental discussion of all the possible positions on the values continuum and the tensions between them.²⁷

Each session employs this basic strategy, so that the following value continua are explored throughout the course concerning topics often exploited by radicalisers:

²⁶ Tetlock, "A Value Pluralism Model of Ideological Reasoning"; Tetlock, Armor, and Peterson, "The Slavery Debate in Antebellum America: Cognitive Style, Value Conflict, and the Limits of Compromise."

²⁷ Ibid.

1. Communalism versus individualism in regard to relationships, family and marriage (e.g. arranged marriages vs. individualist/romantic relationships)
2. Theism versus materialist scientism (e.g. religious knowing vs. scientific knowing as outworked in western culture)
3. Women and men as similar versus women and men as different vis-à-vis the working out of Islamic and Western concepts of equality
4. Economic liberty (free market capitalism) versus economic control (by Muslim clerics, as in a Caliphate)
5. Activism (violent and/or pro-social) versus passivism (fatalistic) as a response to international issues in a democratic political context
6. Hedonism versus control of the body's desires (western 'self-indulgence' vs. abstinence or early marriage)

For the eight sessions and their values continua, research from Schwartz & Boehnke's is used to cross-culturally validate research that has identified ten universal values and their dynamic tensions: (a) power, (b) achievement, (c) hedonism, (d) stimulation, (e) self-direction, (f) universalism, (g) benevolence, (h) tradition (which includes religion), (i) conformity, (j) security.²⁸ These dynamic tensions can be collapsed into two higher order dimension continua that capture tensions between values: (a) Conservation of tradition vs. Openness and (b) Self-enhancement vs. Self-transcendence. Their research shows that under the influence of threat to traditional values coming from a secular-rationalist culture, people's values can shift to a defensive value monism, for example, to the conservation of tradition and self-transcendence value poles, excluding openness and self-enhancement. In doing so, they become a more one-sided and less complex consonant with the findings of Inglehart and Welzel.²⁹ In short, based on this structure of tensions between values, and according to how threat or worldview defence in the globalized context affects the polarization of value commitments (value monism), each session is designed to develop complexity in regards to values continua.

Transformation Step Three: Integration

Integratively complex thinking requires the ability to find some linkages between the different viewpoints, or to perceive an overarching framework that makes sense of why reasonable people can maintain differing views.³⁰ Value pluralism is the necessary precondition to enable the integration of different viewpoints and dimensions, and entails the discovery of realistic but value-complex solutions to moral and social issues. It is value-complex solutions that protect both sacred and secular values of different groups, and it is this protection of sacred and secular values that enables peaceful and stable resolutions for inter-group conflict in the context of globalization, thus protecting people from the lure of value-monist radical discourses. As argued previously, extensive research literature shows that thinking with higher levels of integrative complexity (IC) is related to lower conflict levels

²⁸ Shalom H. Schwartz and Klaus Boehnke, "Evaluating the Structure of Human Values with Confirmatory Factor Analysis," *Journal of Research in Personality* 38:3 (2004).

²⁹ Shalom H. Schwartz and Sipke Huismans, "Value Priorities and Religiosity in Four Western Religions," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 58:2 (1995); Ronald Inglehart, *Changing Human Beliefs and Values, 1981-2007: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook Based on the World Values Surveys and European Values Studies* (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2010); Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*.

³⁰ Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Streufert, "Conceptual/Integrative Complexity."

and more capacity to find peaceful negotiated solutions with less dogmatic and more moderate social and political stances.³¹

An example of a group activity in session two, fostered integration (the discovery of linkages or frameworks to make sense of different viewpoints) by targeting the tension between communitarian versus individualist pressures. This was acted out in role play in which suitors try to “sell” themselves to “Aisha,” a potential bride, while other group members play Aisha’s parents, family and community/religious leaders who seek to influence “Aisha.” The different roles allowed the enacted pitting of communitarian influences against Aisha and her friends who are arguing for individualism in regards to marriage choice. This activity is geared to enable participants to explore new ways to find middle-ground value trade-offs in order to maximize, as the participants see fit, something of both communitarian and individualist values. Another group activity (in session six) involved participants evaluating two different modes of political decision-making: one democratic (involving the value of self-direction), and the other religious, for example, under a Caliphate (involving the value of religious tradition and conformity to social roles). When describing these two decisional methods verbally, no commonalities or ways of relating them could be found; they were seen as black and white contrasts. But when the participants created non-verbal mimes to exhibit both modes of decision-making (and performed them for ‘a visiting Martian’), the mimes enabled participants to see with greater detail the areas of commonality between democratic and religious modes of decision-making.³² Thus, it became possible to avoid the extremes of value poles in their evaluations. From this kind of experiential learning, participants are able to reflect upon the various tensions found between consensus and leadership methods that are present in both religious and democratic decision-making systems. This method also articulates what they have learned by freeing them from value monism and the social pressure that arises from the extremist discourse that presents democracy and theocracy as completely alien to each other. In this way, the black and white communications of radicalizers appear less convincing as trade-offs that respect an individual’s own values that have been affirmed in a relevant peer group context.

Value complexity is also the basis for learning a further set of IC-related skills, structured through other group activities that promote meta-cognition, social intelligence and embodied cognition. Meta-cognition is supported by the Theatre of the Oppressed pedagogy as a role play that enables participants to “see” themselves and their thinking, and to reflect on that process in group discussion. Meta-cognition group activities in BMBB also include identifying and subverting common rhetorical strategies that promote rigid thinking (such as black and white contrasts, caricatures or ‘thin end of the wedge’ rhetorical strategies) commonly found in an array of extremist discourses (right wing, Islamist, etc.). Amid humor and repartee in group discussions, the strategies used by radicalizers are minimized. Social intelligence skills are supported through empathy-fostering activities such as ‘active listening’ practiced through role play in trios of participants trying to reconcile a conflict that was once experienced by one of the trio members. Experiencing cognition as embodied and multi-sensory is encouraged through group activities involving movement and mime, and through the multi-sensory DVD input (music, symbols, images, and film clips) resourcing a broader focus of attention, assuaging the defensive “tunnel vision” of rigid thinking.

³¹ Suedfeld and Wallbaum, "Modifying Integrative Complexity in Political Thought: Value Conflict and Audience Disagreement."

³² Savage, "Four Lessons from the Study of Fundamentalism and Psychology of Religion," 143.

Effectiveness Evaluation

This study assessed the effectiveness of the eight session course through testing two main hypotheses:

As a result of the intervention, participants will think in more complex ways about social issues underpinned by conflicting values by showing an increase in the levels of integrative complexity (IC) when comparing verbal data gathered during the first and last sessions of the course.

As a result of the intervention, participants will care about a greater amount of values (value pluralism) when working with social issues underlined by conflicting values by showing an increase in the spread of values in verbal data gathered in the first and last sessions of the course.

Both hypotheses were tested on two sets of verbal data: (a) first, through the coding of written responses to moral dilemmas before and after the course and (b) second, through the coding of group discussions that happened during group activities at the beginning and end of the course.

Figure1: Pre and post-test comparisons

	Dilemmas pre-test	Dilemmas post-test	Group discussions pre-test	Group discussions post-test
Increase in IC	Comparison 1		Comparison 2	
Increase in values	Comparison 3		Comparison 4	

Method

Sample and Recruitment

Seven groups with a total of eight-one individuals from seven pilot groups participated in the course evaluation, using pre and post testing. (However, only forty-nine filled a questionnaire through which demographics were gathered, which was handed out after the final session). Questionnaire data revealed a mean age of 19.48 (SD=2.14) years. The sex of participants was twenty-nine (60 percent) males and nineteen (40 percent) females. The religious background of the participants was mainly Sunni Muslim with thirty-six (88 percent) individuals and two (5 percent) who responded 'other.' One pilot group (Brixton B) included some youth professionals interested in the intervention and so the religious background includes Church of England two (5 percent) individuals, other Protestant one (2 percent). The ethnicity of the participants was Pakistani fourteen (29 percent), Bangladeshi four (8 percent), Black twenty (42 percent) and Indian ten (21 percent) origin. Out of the twenty-three who answered the question, thirteen (57 percent) participants were in full-time education.

Pilot Groups

The study made initial contact with youth practitioners at a UK Home Office Prevent conference where BMBB course was advertised. These youth practitioners, who were working with our target audience of young Muslims (those exposed to extremist discourse, or interested in the issues raised by it), were invited to participate in a one day training course to become facilitators for BMBB. Seven pre and post-tested BMBB pilot courses around the UK were led by five different trained youth practitioners, one of whom was a Muslim chaplain at Anglia Ruskin University. The five facilitators invited young people with whom they

normally worked to their BMBB course, aiming for ten to fourteen participants per group as the optimal group size. The Anglia Ruskin pilot took place in a university setting, the Watford pilot took place amongst students in a technical community college, the Acton pilot took place in the context of a community group for new Somali immigrants, the two separate Brixton pilots took place through Prevent local initiatives, and the two Manchester pilots took place in existing youth initiatives for young Muslim women and young Muslim men, respectively, in the North.

Instruments / Measures

Group discussions. Pre and post comparisons on group discussions arising from session activities were recorded for coding for IC levels and presence of values (some groups allowed video recordings; others allowed tape recordings). These recordings were taken from the first group discussion during the first BMBB session (lasting up to twenty minutes) and from final group discussion during the last activity of the last BMBB session (which included general discussion about the course and discussions of participant's projects, lasting a minimum of twenty minutes). Recordings were transcribed verbatim for analysis.

Moral Dilemmas

Six vignettes based on moral dilemmas relevant to Muslims living in Britain were presented to the participants in order to measure levels of integrative complexity (IC) and the presence of values. Two pairs of three dilemmas were written so that each dilemma triad would activate a conflict between conservation of tradition (including religion) and: (a) self-enhancement, (b) self-transcendence and (c) openness to change (see Appendix).

Responses to moral dilemmas and group discussions were coded by two researchers for the presence of Schwartz's ten basic values:³³

1. Power (social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources)
2. Achievement (personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards)
3. Hedonism (pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgent)
4. Stimulation (novelty, new information, excitement and challenge in life)
5. Self-direction (independent thought and action, choosing own goals)
6. Universalism (equality, social justice, wisdom, tolerance, unity with nature)
7. Benevolence (helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal, whatever the cost)
8. Tradition (respect, commitment to, and acceptance of traditional religion or culture)
9. Conformity (restraint of impulses or actions likely to violate social or family norms)
10. Security (personal safety, family security, national security, social order)

The number of times each value was present in participants' responses for each group discussion and each dilemma was examined. Secondly, the value scores (based on Schwartz & Boehnke) for each dilemma were aggregated in order to obtain scores on two higher order dimensions: (a) Conservation of tradition vs. openness to change and (b) self-transcendence

³³ Schwartz and Boehnke, "Evaluating the Structure of Human Values with Confirmatory Factor Analysis."

vs. self-enhancement. Values for these two higher order dimensions were calculated using the following formulas:³⁴

Conservatism = ((Security + Conformity + Tradition) - ((1.5 * Stimulation) + (1.5 * Self Direction))).

Self Transcendence = ((Benevolence + Universalism) - ((Power) + (Achievement))).

Note: the 1.5 weighting is to balance the number of values that support Conservatism minus those that do not.

Higher numerical values thus indicate higher Conservation of tradition and higher Self-transcendence poles of the continua; negative values indicate the opposite poles of openness or self-enhancement; zero represents the midway point.

Figure 2: Conservatism and Self-transcendence continua

+	0	-
Conservatism		Openness to Change
Self-transcendence		Self-enhancement

Integrative Complexity (IC)

All IC coding followed the standardized IC coding framework and protocol.³⁵ Inter-coder reliability criteria was assessed by calculating Kappa levels between two trained coders blind to the pre-intervention post-intervention conditions.

Demographics and Group Identity Measures

A questionnaire made up of twenty-two questions was also administered in order to assess basic demographic and group identity data.

Procedure

Eight two-hour BMBB sessions were completed for each of the seven pilot groups in a period ranging from five to fifteen weeks, led by a trained course facilitator. Five course facilitators (youth professionals such as a Muslim university chaplain, Prevent workers, youth and community workers) conducted the seven pilot courses with the aid of a facilitator's manual and a training video prepared by the researchers, along with a day of preliminary training given by the researchers.

Three moral dilemmas pitting conservation of tradition vs. openness to change and self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence values, instancing issues faced by Muslims living in Britain, were presented to all groups at the start of the first session and written responses were collected for pre-training IC coding. A second set of three equivalent moral dilemmas and written responses was collected for post-training measurement immediately after the last

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Gloria Baker-Brown et al., "The Conceptual/Integrative Complexity Scoring Manual," in *Motivation and Personality: Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis*, ed. C.P. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

session for all groups. All administrations were balanced for order of presentation effects (see Appendix 1 for moral dilemmas) except for one group (Anglia Ruskin University group).

Results

Intercoder Reliability

In order to verify the reliability of IC scores given to both dilemmas and group discussions across pre and post conditions, one researcher coded all the dilemmas ($6 \times 54 = 324$) and all fourteen group discussions (pre and post discussions from seven pilots). The coder was blind to pre-post conditions for dilemmas; group discussions in codable chunks were randomized to lessen the coder identifying the condition. In accordance with accepted practice, a secondary scorer blind to the pre-post conditions of both dilemmas and group discussions, coded thirty-four dilemmas (a more than 10 percent stratified random subsample, representing relevant demographics and spread of IC) and a subsample of random paragraphs from the fourteen group discussions (to total 20 percent of the discussion data).³⁶ Cohen's Kappa index of reliability (which measures for exact correspondence, not just correlation) was calculated for the IC scores of dilemmas and group discussions and was averaged. The result, Kappa = 0.54, indicated acceptable to good intercoder reliability levels. Similarly for value codes, the first researcher coded all dilemmas and group discussions, and a secondary scorer gave value codes to a subsample of (thirty-four) dilemmas and random chunks to total 20 percent of the fourteen group discussions. The intercoder reliability of the value codes given to both dilemmas and communications was calculated by dividing the number of dilemmas in which two coders gave an exact value coding (e.g. the same number of values seen to be operating in the dilemma) by the total number of dilemmas coded. The resulting agreement of value codes was of 87 percent indicating a good intercoder reliability level.

Comparison One: Hypothesis 1a - IC in group discussion arising from BMBB activities

In order to test whether BMBB was effective in increasing the complexity with which participants think about conflicted social issues, we coded the audio recordings from all groups according to integrative complexity coding practice and compared scores for the participant's first group discussions during session one (a debate and discussion on whether the McDonalds halal hamburger is truly Islamic) to scores from group discussions at the end of the session eight activities (including discussions around participant's projects).

Due to floor the effects of IC scores, non-parametric procedures were used to assess IC change. A Mann-Whitney test revealed that scores for paragraphs belonging to the post-test group discussion were significantly higher ($Mdn = 3$) than those for the early group interaction ($Mdn = 1$; $U = 1269$, $n = 238$, $p = 0.001$). Because of the anonymity of participants in the audio recordings, we were unable to identify individual speakers to their pre-test IC levels. Therefore, although the IC scores should form paired type data, the study analyzed scores as independent sample data. Results thus indicated that the intervention had an effect of increasing the complexity with which participants think about social issues as indicated by levels of IC. Hypothesis 1a was supported. A group by group comparison between early and late stage revealed that all groups increased their IC levels significantly. (See Table 1.)

³⁶ Ibid.

Table 1: Comparisons of IC using group discussions

			Condition					
			Pre			Post		
			Count	Mean	SD	Count	Mean	SD
	Acton	IC	10	1.20 _a	.42	21	2.29 _b	1.06
	Anglia	IC	10	1.40 _a	.70	14	3.36 _b	.84
	Brixton 1	IC	13	1.92 _a	.64	32	3.25 _b	.80
	Brixton 2	IC	24	1.38 _a	.58	10	3.20 _b	1.03
	Manchester female	IC	20	1.30 _a	.57	18	3.11 _b	.68
	Manchester male	IC	25	1.32 _a	.48	13	2.23 _b	.83
	Watford	IC	8	1.38 _a	.52	20	3.25 _b	.44

Note: Values in the same row and subtable not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at $p < 0.05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column means. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni correction.

Comparison Two: Hypothesis 1b - IC in written moral dilemmas

Integrative complexity data were collected for fifty-four participants who took both the written pre and post-tests. Comparisons were made averaging the IC score of the three pre-test dilemmas and the three post-test dilemmas. Except for Anglia Ruskin's group, dilemmas were balanced for order effect by randomly assigning half of the group to a dilemma 1,2,3 pre-test and dilemma 4,5,6 post-test order while the other half was assigned to a dilemma 4,5,6 pre-test and dilemma 1,2,3 post-test order (see Appendix 1). All coding was performed under blind-to-group, condition and order, by a trained IC coder.

Mean IC level for the pre-test was 2.08 (SD=0.67), for the post-test 2.12 (SD=0.84) and the mean gain in IC was 0.14 (SD=0.83). The statistical t test of difference between pre-test and post-test (related samples) for IC ($M=0.14$, $SD=0.83$, $n = 29$, $p=0.20$) provided no evidence against a non-zero increase in IC levels. Since IC scores showed a strong floor effect with a majority of scores in the lowest category, a Wilcoxon Signed-ranks non-parametric test for related samples was also used. This test confirmed the non-significant results of the non-parametric test (Mdn pre = 2.00, Mdn post = 2.00, $n = 54$, Wilcoxon statistic = 597, $p=0.536$).

When analyzing groups separately, Anglia Ruskin's university-based group showed the strongest trend against a non-zero increase from pre-test ($M=2.33$, $n = 9$, $SD=0.74$) to post-test ($M=2.75$, $SD=1.05$; $p=0.12$ one-tailed) when tested with a Wilcoxon Signed-ranks non-parametric test for related samples. All other groups presented non-convincing evidence of an increase in complexity for the dilemmas data. Consequently, hypothesis 1b was not supported.

Comparison Three: Hypothesis 2a - Values in group discussions

The group discussions were qualitatively coded for the presence of Schwartz's ten universal values in accordance with Schwartz's value definitions.³⁷ The findings show significant increases in the post condition discussions for the values of: Universalism (a recognition of the inherent equal worth of human beings, and in our coding of the verbal data this often pertained to mention of the equal worth of Muslims and Non-Muslims), Benevolence (the

³⁷ Schwartz and Boehnke, "Evaluating the Structure of Human Values with Confirmatory Factor Analysis."

importance of bestowing kindness and benevolence to others regardless of the cost to oneself) and Stimulation (valuing new information and being open to new viewpoints as a result of the BMBB course experience itself). Note that there is some (non-significant) increase in Tradition, which in our coding of the verbal data refers mainly to respecting the religious tradition, indicating that the intervention does not seem to reduce the importance of religious tradition (see Table 2).

Table 2: Comparisons of values in group discussion

	Condition									
	Pre					Post				
	N	M	Mdn	SD	S.E.	N	M	Mdn	SD	S.E.
Tradition†	7	3.43	4.00	1.51	.57	7	5.00	5.00	2.08	.79
Conformity†	7	.86	1.00	.90	.34	7	1.29	1.00	1.80	.68
Security†	7	1.71	1.00	1.98	.75	7	1.86	2.00	1.35	.51
Power†	7	2.14	2.00	1.46	.55	7	.86	.00	1.21	.46
Achievement†	7	.29	.00	.49	.18	7	1.00	.00	1.29	.49
Hedonism†	7	.29	.00	.49	.18	7	.14	.00	.38	.14
Stimulation*	7	.50	.00	1.22	.50	7	8.71	7.00	6.80	2.57
Self direction†	7	.43	.00	.79	.30	7	2.71	2.00	3.35	1.27
Universalism*	7	1.00	1.00	1.00	.38	7	9.29	7.00	4.57	1.73
Benevolence*	7	.71	.00	1.25	.47	7	3.29	3.00	1.70	.64

Note: *Significant at the $p < 0.05$ level; †Non-significant ($p > 0.05$) in the two-sided test of equality for column means. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni correction.

When the value coding scores were collapsed into the two higher order dimension continua: (a) Conservation of tradition vs. openness and (b) Self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement, the results show that there is a significant shift away from higher order Conservation of tradition, comparing the pre-condition ($M = 4.67$) to the post condition ($M = -9.0$). Examining the Conservation values separately, there is little change in Security, and a modest increase in Tradition is strongly offset by the increase in the value Stimulation. It is Stimulation (appreciation of new information coming from the BMBB course materials, appreciation of novelty) that is responsible for the significant shift away from Conservation of tradition towards Openness.

Regarding the second higher order values continua, there is a significant shift towards Self-transcendence in the post condition ($M = 10.71$). While there are modest, non-significant increases in Achievement and Self-direction (self-enhancement values), the strong increase in Universalism and Benevolence is responsible for the shift towards Self-transcendence. In our coding of the verbal data, Universalism pertains to seeing the equal worth of people, usually applied to both Muslims and non-Muslims.

As the two higher order continua shift in opposite directions in almost equal measure, rather than moving together into Schwartz's "threat" value-monist position, the research asserts that value complexity significantly increases as a result of the course. Hence, Hypothesis 2a is supported (see Table 3).³⁸

³⁸ Schwartz and Huismans, "Value Priorities and Religiosity in Four Western Religions."

Table 3: Comparisons of higher order dimensions of values in group discussions

	Condition									
	Pre					Post				
	N	M	Medn	SD	S.E.	N	M	Medn	SD	S.E.
Conservation*	7	4.67	4.50	5.06	2.06	7	-9.00	-7.50	8.52	3.22
Self-transcendence *	7	-.71	-1.00	1.70	.64	7	10.71	11.00	3.95	1.49

Note: *Significant at the $p < 0.05$ level in the two-sided test of equality for column means. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni correction.

Comparison Four: Hypothesis 2b - Values data in written dilemmas

In the written dilemmas, there are no significant differences in value spread comparing pre and post conditions, although the trends are in line with the significant changes seen in the group discussion value analysis. Here, the largest (yet non-significant) increases are in the values of Tradition and Universalism (with some gain in Benevolence and Achievement) in the post condition.

There are no significant differences in the two higher-order continua (Table 4), although both show movement towards the middle (0 point) for both higher order continua. Neither is there a significant shift to the “threat position,” nor to a thoroughgoing “liberal” position, and so non-significance here does not undermine course effectiveness, rather the reverse. In fact, the increases in Tradition and Universalism suggest a way of maximizing Muslim religious values in a western context in a way that is consonant with pro-sociality.

There is a positive correlation between IC levels in written dilemmas and the number of values in the written dilemmas. Rank ordered correlation between number of values present in a dilemma and IC score of dilemma: $r(46) = 0.671$, $p = 0.001$. This finding supports the theory that value complexity is closely related to IC. (In this theory, moving beyond a monist value structure towards greater value diversity is necessary to enable IC, which in turn is needed to support pro-social conflict resolution).

Table 4: Comparisons of higher order dimensions of values in written dilemmas

	Pre					Post				
	N	Mean	Median	SD	SE	N	Mean	Median	SD	SE
Conservation †	192	1.87	2.00	1.79	.41	192	1.65	2.00	2.12	.47
Self Transcendence †	192	-.67	-1.00	2.00	.67	192	-.37	-1.00	1.59	.40

Note: *Significant at the $p < 0.05$ level; †Non-significant ($p > 0.05$) in the two-sided test of equality for column means. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni correction.

Conflict Styles

As value monism and low IC predict conflict, and increased value complexity and thinking complexity promotes resolution of conflict, the research explored whether conflict styles changed as a result of the course. The structure of the written moral dilemmas pits one or more moral value/s against other value/s, and so the study examined participant’s conflict styles – comparing how participants resolved the conflict between values in pre and post conditions. As the structure of one value pitted against other/s was not generally present in the freely arising group discussions, this analysis is restricted to written dilemmas data that

do have this structure. Five conflict styles are empirically discriminated by Kraybill: Compromise, Collaborate, Compete, Accommodate, and Avoid.³⁹ These are identified by how important the issue/s in the dilemma are considered to be, and how important the relationships or people in the dilemma are considered to be based on the orthogonal relationship between Importance of Issues and Importance of Relationship axes.⁴⁰

The research coded various participant dilemma responses according to whether:

1. The value supported in the solution is at the expense of relationships = Compete.
2. Value/s are ignored in the solution and neither are the relationships deemed important = Avoid.
3. Value/s are ignored in the solution while preserving relationships is deemed very important = Accommodate.
4. Trade-offs are found (both the value/s and relationships are somewhat important) = Compromise.
5. Trade-offs are found that maximize the high importance of values and the high importance of relationships = Collaborate.

Higher order conflict styles were calculated by the following formula:

Trade-off conflict style = ((Collaboration + Compromise) x 1.5)

Problematic-in-long term conflict style = (Compete + Avoid + Accommodate)

A weight of 1.5 is used to balance the number of pro-social vs. problematic-in-long term conflict styles.

Higher order comparisons between pre and post written responses to dilemmas show that the two conflict styles that promote trade-offs and are deemed in the conflict literature as most adaptive in the long term - Collaborate (8.3 percent in pre-test to 22.7 percent in post-test) and Compromise (25 percent in pre-test to 50 percent in post-test) - increase significantly at the $p < 0.05$ level in the post condition, while the conflict styles that are less adaptive in the long term when used inflexibly, Compete (37.5 percent in pre-test to 18.2 percent in post-test), Avoid (12.5 percent in pre-test to 4.5 percent in post-test) and Accommodate (16.7 percent in pre-test to 4.5 percent in post-test) decrease in the post condition (a non-significant difference).

Group Identity and Demographics and Questionnaire Post Hoc Analysis

Questionnaire findings also showed that age was moderately and negatively correlated with IC gains ($\rho = -.320, p = 0.026$). Also, strength of identification with participants' self-designated "in-group" (such as 'Pakistani British', or 'Muslim', or 'Somali Muslim') correlated positively with post-test IC scores ($\rho = .514, p = 0.012$).

Discussion

The theoretic starting point is that the wider context for RIVE is the way globalization entails different cultures rubbing shoulders in new and uncomfortable ways. This can increase a

³⁹ Kraybill, Ronald S. and Evelyn Wright, *The Little Book of Cool Tools for Hot Topics: Group Tools to Facilitate Meetings When Things are Hot* (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2006).

⁴⁰ Ibid.

sense of threat to a group's value priorities and can lead to a defensive retrenchment to a value monist position that conserves tradition (Conservation) and Self-transcendence (the setting aside of personal enhancement in order to conform to social duties).⁴¹ Value monism protects people from uncertainty about identity and behavioral norms in the face of the competing value priorities of different cultures.⁴² This explains the attraction of a radicalizer's black and white, "us and them" communications for some groups, as such discourse is undergirded by value monism: one value must be realized above all others (the value the radicalizers themselves define). This, in turn, reduces uncertainty states and mobilizes people to a cause.

The study argues that the present analysis of the *Being Muslim Being British* intervention, which operationalizes relevant value conflicts while providing the resources for young people to discover their own spread of values to promote thinking complexity, lends support to this conceptualization of radicalization, as well as showing results that are consistent with building resilience to RIVE. One course facilitator stated: "The BMBB experience showed that the whole group at the beginning their views were aligned with the Hizb ut Tahrir [*an illegal radical network*]. But at the end of the course all of them had significantly changed their position."

Comparing the pre and post BMBB group discussions for a shift in the values continua, away from value monism, the study found that there is a significant change towards Openness in the post-test data, and away from Conservation of tradition. This shift is explained mainly by a participant's valuing of new information and viewpoints (Stimulation), which in the verbal data is described as a result of the BMBB course experience. This shift towards Openness does not seem to be at the expense of religious tradition per se, as the single value of Tradition in our coding pertains to the value of *religious* tradition, and this increases (moderately but not significantly) in the post-test condition, indicating an increased ability to balance values-in-tension.

The other higher order value dimension, Self-transcendence (the setting aside of self-enhancement in order to conform to prescribed social duties) shifts significantly to the Self-transcendent pole away from the Self-enhancement pole. This shift is in the *opposite* direction to that of the first higher order dimension. Thus the two higher order values continua in the post-test are balanced in nearly equal measure, and in this way, a more complex array of values in tension is indicated in the post condition. While there are modest, non-significant increases in Achievement and Self-direction (which contribute to Self-enhancement values), the significant increases in the single values of Universalism and Benevolence are responsible for the significant shift towards Self-transcendence: affirming the equal worth of people (Muslims and Non-Muslims) and the importance of kindness to all. One participant said: "This course has reminded us of the very basic points the Prophet has taught us: that Islam is the middle way. We shouldn't be extreme in any way, we should come half way to understand whoever is opposite to us...the Prophet lived with the Jewish people, the Christians; he made so many treaties with them. We are not the only people to live on this earth, we have to always find common ground, to come together with other communities where we live." Many participants expressed a longing for this kind of benevolence and universalism also to be extended reciprocally to them: "Muslims need to be more broadminded, not seeing the West as the enemy. On the other side, [there needs to be]

⁴¹ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*.

⁴² Hogg, "Uncertainty and Extremism: Identification with High Entitativity Groups Under Conditions of Uncertainty."

not seeing the *niqab* as a barrier to integration... both sides need to build bridges, see beyond stereotypes, build bridges instead of building walls.” The increase in Benevolence and Universalism in our data corresponds to research on Catholic Christians in which the symbolic processing of scripture was highly correlated with the pro-social values of Benevolence and Universalism (versus literal processing which correlated with the self-protective values of Power and Security).⁴³ In short, in the BMBB data, as these two higher order values continua move in a counter-balancing way, we argue that an increase in value spread (high on Openness *and* high on Self-transcendence) are evidence of value complexity for which the course aimed.

The values data highly correlates with the IC data, lending support to our theory that attaining value complexity is crucially related to developing integrative complexity (IC). Further, in accordance with hypothesis 1b, each separate pilot group (measured via group discussions) shows significant gains in IC, indicating course efficacy across a range of target audience demographics. We conclude that BMBB enables participants to move towards viewing the social world in a more complex way (IC), and yet, this does not detract from valuing religious Tradition, as one participant remarked: “As a practicing Muslim, I think IC is in Islam anyway – that’s my personal view.”

In the group discussion data, most group’s IC levels start out around IC level one: issues are seen categorically, in black and white, and are considered in relation to only one evaluating criteria (an IC level similar to that of most radical discourse). By the end of the course, all seven groups score at IC level three, where participants explicitly verbalise perceiving the validity of differing viewpoints evaluated by multiple criteria, as described by this participant: “It’s also helped me... to break away from a kind of tunnel-vision thinking, that everything is kinda straight-forward: all or nothing... This course has helped me say, okay, let me just take a look at that thing and settle my mind a bit. It has helped me understand how different people think.”

The median IC score of three in the post-test group discussion condition contrasts favourably with a range of studies carried out on US university students, showing an average IC score of two.⁴⁴ In contrast to this, BMBB enables young people to move from black and white thinking (IC level one) to achieve explicit differentiation at IC level three over just eight sessions. Our data also shows that younger participants showed greater *net* IC gains, consistent with the marked plasticity of the brain in adolescence, whereas the pilot group based at Anglia Ruskin University showed the highest overall IC post-test score.

While the group discussion comparisons show significant shifts for both value spread and IC in accordance with hypotheses 1a and 1b, the question is asked why the written dilemmas do not. Differences in the higher order values continua are not significant. Both values, however, continue to show movement towards the middle (0 point) of the two spectrums, away from the extremes of the “threat” values-monism position. Neither was a thorough-going secular-rational position the result. The latter, the study argues, would not be stable for the target BMBB audience. Thus, the research does not consider these value findings to be antithetical to the desired outcomes.

⁴³ Johnny R. J. Fontaine et al., “Consequences of a Multidimensional Approach to Religion for the Relationship Between Religiosity and Value Priorities,” *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion* 15:2 (2005).

⁴⁴ G. W. Russell and M.L. Sondilands, “Some Correlates of Conceptual Complexity,” *Psychological Reports* 33 (1973).

Even so, why are there no significant IC gains in the written dilemmas? Firstly, there are known floor effects with IC coding: 50-60 percent of people measured in the IC research show low IC at level one.⁴⁵ Secondly, in the integrative complexity literature, the usual means of assessing IC is to code archival data such as political actor's speeches, parliamentary proceedings, diaries, letters, or records of negotiations. These forms of verbal data usually involve preparation time, avoiding underperformance – in contrast to the moral dilemma tasks we presented as a test “on the spot,” to our participants. In retrospect, the study indicates that the highly detailed moral dilemmas (see Appendix) used for eliciting written responses had a heavy cognitive load. Since carrying out this BMBB study, the research has recently found that using the Paragraph Completion Test (PCT) using simpler, open-ended prompts such as “When I think about our own group...” is a better way of eliciting written evidence for gains in IC.⁴⁶ Indeed it was the PCT that early IC studies successfully used.

The underlying theory of BMBB draws upon decades of research in the integrative complexity research tradition that shows that IC gains predict non-violent, pro-social conflict resolution, while significant drops in IC predict violent inter-group confrontation. The written responses to the moral dilemmas show a significant increase in the higher order Collaboration/Compromise conflict styles in the post-test condition. The conflict styles Collaborate (through which both parties maximise values in a win/win solution) and Compromise (through which both parties get something, but not all, of what is important to them) are the two styles that simultaneously balance the importance of the issue as well as the relationships involved.

The findings provide initial support for the efficacy of the course in building resilience among young UK Muslims to a radicalizer's black and white (Competing), value monist, low complexity solutions to conflicted issues. By the end of BMBB, participants expressed that they felt that they were better equipped to choose pro-social yet assertive ways of resolving conflict, as expressed by this participant: “What BMBB taught me is you should always look at other people's perspectives instead of judging them straight away. Whereas before I would probably be quite harsh on them now I look at the bigger picture.” Another participant commented: “I liked how we had to think laterally about conflict resolution and not act upon our first instincts.”

Implications for Prevention

The study positioned at the outset the BMBB course, a primary prevention aimed at increasing individual strengths of pro-social problem solving based on a wide spread of values and higher IC, and to decrease individual vulnerability to value monist, low-IC extremist communications.⁴⁷

This approach complements other primary prevention initiatives such as those that explore new narratives, involve in social action or bridge-building through cultural exchanges and artistic ventures, develop empathy for victims of extremist violence, or hear cautionary tales from ex-radicals. These forms of primary prevention implicitly involve an ability to perceive

⁴⁵ Philip E. Tetlock et al., “The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals,” *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology* 78:5 (2000).

⁴⁶ S. Streufert and P. Suedfeld, “Conceptual Structure, Information Search, and Information Utilization,” *J Pers Soc Psychol* 2:5 (1965).

⁴⁷ Bloom, *Primary Prevention Practices*, 5; Liht, Savage, and Williams, “Being Muslim being British: A Multi-Media Educational Resource for Young Muslims.”

other's viewpoints and values in more complex ways. The IC approach also suggests ways forward for measuring the effectiveness of these other primary prevention initiatives and offers a language for these initiatives to "talk to each other."

The IC approach used in BMBB also complements secondary/tertiary methods, particularly in view of the predictive power of the IC construct for identifying growing commitment to violent action.⁴⁸ As well, prevention models that rely on promoting a broad "secular value system" of human rights may not be acceptable to religious people. BMBB posits that religious, non-secular values need not be discarded or even tempered in order to achieve social cohesion.⁴⁹ BMBB rests on the premise that what fosters social cohesion is a healthy spread among value commitments that spans values, whether embedded in religious and/or secular terms. This, the study argues, is what makes the BMBB model attractive to young Muslims and their communities (evidenced by participant's low rate of attrition reported by facilitators). Similar outcomes to BMBB are currently being measured in two new IC-based courses for Christians of differing theological orientations, and for Scottish males vulnerable to sectarianism.⁵⁰ What provides deep and lasting impact is that the embodied, experiential learning occurs within a validating relevant peer group, and the skills that are learned are those that enable individuals to maximize the spread of their own values.

The overall results cohere with the theoretic foundation and provide initial support for the efficacy of BMBB in promoting resilience to radicalization. Yet, questions and gaps inevitably remain. Time and resource constraints for the BMBB project meant that the study did not have a control group. This is a gap currently being addressed in current IC-based projects. The study also is now using the Paragraph Completion Test instead of using moral dilemmas to elicit written data for IC coding. It is clear from these gaps that researchers need to build upon the initial results provided by this study. And finally, what are the long-term effects of BMBB? This question requires longitudinal research, which was beyond the scope of this project but which is planned for future projects.

Conclusion

The initial findings are encouraging. BMBB's method of exposing participants to a multiplicity of value priorities, worked out through group activities structured to enable participants to explore the implications of the whole of the value spectrum, was measured through pre and post testing. The group discussion data showed, as hypothesized, significant gains in the group discussions as participants were enabled to deploy a greater range of values, and to think in more complex ways, measured by IC. According to the integrative complexity literature, and in line with RIVE research and prevention initiatives, such changes predict pro-social rather than violent means to resolve conflict, evidenced here in participant's significant shift towards pro-social conflict styles of Collaboration and Compromise. The overall picture, despite the lack of significance in some of the written dilemma data, supports the theoretical model and efficacy of this IC/values complexity based intervention, designed particularly for primary prevention. New projects currently underway

⁴⁸ Conway and Conway, "The Terrorist Rhetorical Style and its Consequences for Understanding Terrorist Violence," 2001; Suedfeld, Cross, and Logan, "Can Thematic Content Analysis Separate the Pyramid of Ideas from the Pyramid of Action? A Comparison Among Different Degrees of Commitment to Violence."

⁴⁹ Davies, Lynn, *Educating Against Extremism* (Stoke on Trent, UK: Trentham Books, 2008).

⁵⁰ See <https://sites.google.com/site/scotlandinic> for a summary of the assessment research for the IC-based course to address sectarianism in Scotland; see also Eolene Boyd-MacMillan and Sara Savage, forthcoming.

are examining the long-term effects of the intervention as well as the model's effectiveness in cross-cultural, cross-extremisms adaptations.

Appendix: Moral Dilemmas

After a racist attack on two Somali women, some neighbours in Oxfordshire organize a committee to raise awareness and to press for any racist attacker to be brought to justice. Amina, a twenty-two year old journalism trainee is assigned to the roughest areas in which to gather information about victims and attackers. Although Amina is highly motivated to help the committee, her husband does not want her to be put at risk through digging information. She reasoned with him about the injustice women were suffering, and how little the police were doing. Amina's husband replied that there will always be racists around and nothing could be done about it. Please write down... What should Amina do? Why should she take that course of action?

Takfir is a twenty-five year old university student living in London. There he met another Muslim student named Leila. Although Takfir had never dated before, he started seeing Leila and ended up falling in love, and had sexual relations with her. Wanting to do the right thing, Takfir proposed to Leila that they should get married as soon as they can. However, Leila had accepted a student grant that requires that she remains single until she finishes her degree in three years. She wants to carry on with the relationship as it is, but without making it public. Please write down... What should Takfir do? Why should he take that course of action?

Fatima is a Sixth Form College student. Fatima always did well in school, but she was never encouraged by her parents to go to university. However, because Fatima received top national level scores in her chemistry and biology A Levels, her college tutor insists that she accepts an offer from a top university in London. Her parents would pay her tuition if she asked them, but this would mean that her parents would not have enough money to send back to Fatima's uncle in Egypt. Fatima's uncle has lost his job and can now barely support his family. Please write down... What should Fatima do? Why should she take that course of action?

Husain is a twenty-three year old waiter in Liverpool. After taking restaurant management courses and working hard for years, Husain finally got a new job in one of the best restaurants in Liverpool's Met Quarter. This means a lot to him because he will now be able to afford the tuition for his young son to attend the local Islamic school. However, one of Husain's new duties will be serve alcoholic drinks. He had managed to avoid doing this in previous jobs - on the grounds of it being against his religion's teachings. He tried to persuade his new manager, but the manager said that if no one else is available, Husain will have to serve drinks if he is to remain in the job. Please write down... What should Husain do? Why should he take that course of action?

Jessica, an accountant working in Manchester, recently married a man named Tamerlane. Jessica helps her sick mother every week, cooking and cleaning, and taking her mother to the Alzheimer's clinic in Manchester town centre. And now, suddenly Tamerlane's father falls ill. Tamerlane has no brothers or sisters, and he is insisting to Jessica that they move to Leicester to be near his father. Jessica does have a brother in Manchester, but he is not a reliable person. Whenever the brother has been left in charge, their mother's health deteriorates drastically. To convince Jessica to move to Leicester, Tamerlane reminds Jessica that a woman's place is, at the end of the day, to be with her husband. She can let her brother sort out her mother's needs. Please write down... What should Jessica do? Why should he take that course of action?

Qasim and Aisha live in a small village in Yorkshire. They have one son, Samir. It's time for the family to think about secondary school for Samir. There are two local secondary schools. One is a large High School with very large class sizes and problems with discipline. Few pupils there ever get good grades. The other is a local Grammar School with smaller class sizes and good standards of teaching. Here the students mainly get good grades. The Grammar school was founded by Christians and the children are expected to attend chapel every week, with Religious Education lessons taught by a priest. The large High School has assemblies and multi-faith Religious Education. Samir is smart enough to get into the Grammar School, with a rosy future ahead. But his parents are wondering if, as a Muslim, Samir should go to the big High School instead. Please write down... What should Samir's parents do? Why should they take that course of action?